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The Maratha Supremacy

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R. C. Majumdar

Assistant Editors
V. G. Dighe

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OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE

THE
MARATHA
SUPREMACY

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FOREWORD

The publication of this volume completes "THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE" Series published by the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay. It was originally planned to consist of only ten volumes; and the first six volumes, ending with the history of the Delhi Sultanate, were published between 1951 and 1960.

In the meanwhile the idea had gradually gained ground that the British period of Indian history ending with the independence of India was so important both from practical and sentimental points of view that it must take precedence over the other volumes and should be dealt with in three volumes instead of two, assigned to it. So Volumes IX, X and XI, dealing with the British rule in India, were published between 1963 and 1969. Volume VII dealing with the Mughul period was then taken up and published in 1974. The present Volume VIII, dealing with the period from 1707 to 1818, completes the scheme, initiated in 1944, of writing the history and culture of the Indian people from the earliest times.

The project of writing this history was conceived by Dr. K. M. Munshi and the idea lying behind it is stated by him in the following words in the Foreword to Vol. I of this series:

"In the course of my studies I had long felt the inadequacy of our so-called Indian histories. For many years, therefore, I was planning an elaborate history of India in order not only that India's past might be described by her sons, but also that the world might catch a glimpse of her soul as Indians see it. The Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, an educational society which I founded in 1938, took over the scheme. It was, however, realized only in 1944, when my generous friend Mr. G.D. Birla, one of India's foremost industrialists, lent me his co-operation and the support of the Shri Krishnarpan Charity Trust of which he is the Chairman. As a result, 'The Bharatiya Itihas Samiti', the Academy of Indian History, was formed with the specific object of preparing this series, now styled "THE HISTORY AND CULTURE OF THE INDIAN PEOPLE."

In the same Foreword Dr. Munshi defined the scope and object of history (quoted again in Vol. VII, p. vii) which have always been kept in view by the Editor in preparing this series.

When, in 1944, Munshiji conceived the project of writing this history, there were two other schemes of writing such a history of India, respectively, in twenty and twelve volumes. Only two volumes of each of these projects have been so far published. This clearly indicates the handicaps under which such projects have to be carried out in this country and is cited here not as an excuse or explanation of the long period of thirty-two years required for the completion of this series of eleven volumes, containing about 9,000 pages, 283 plates and 20 maps.

When I naturally feel a sense of relief and exaltation that I have lived long enough to see the completion of the hardest and most arduous and ambitious literary work in my life, I cannot but recall without deep sorrow that Munshiji is no longer with me to share this emotion. Fortunately, Gunanidhi Shri Ghanshyamdas Birla, whose munificent donation enabled Munshiji to start this project, as mentioned above, is still with us to see the completion of the project.

I take this opportunity to offer my heart-felt thanks to the scholars—about seventy-five in number—who have enriched this series by their contributions. Many of them, alas! are no longer with us to share our joy. To this category belongs Dr. A. D. Pusalkar, the Assistant Editor of the first six volumes. I cannot express in words the deep obligations I owe to him for helping me in various ways in preparing the first six volumes. I take this opportunity to place on record my deep obligations to the other Assistant Editors who rendered very valuable service in preparing this series. These are Dr. A. K. Majumdar, Dr. J. N. Chaudhuri, Dr. D. K. Ghose, Dr. S. Chaudhuri and Dr. V. G. Dighe, who are all happily alive to share my joy at the completion of this series of eleven volumes.

I also convey my thanks to the editors of the various journals whose favourable reviews of the different volumes proved to be a great source of inspiration and enthusiasm that sustained me in carrying on this arduous task of editing the eleven volumes. I still remember how encouraged I felt when I read the review of the First Volume in the *Times Literary Supplement* containing the following appreciative remarks: ".....This history, unlike its predecessors, is first and foremost a history of India and of her people, rather than a history of those who have invaded her from time to time. The standard, in a word, is very high....."

The following expressions—to quote only a few—in the reviews of the subsequent volumes in pre-eminent journals, both Indian

FOREWORD

and European, offered very flattering tributes beyond our highest expectation: ".... will transform the study of Indian history"; ".... authors are not only writing history, they are making history...."; ".... magnificent piece of exact and unbiased scholarship...."; ".... will be accepted as the standard and authoritative work on Indian history....".

Today, when this 32-year old scheme has had a successful completion, the 88-year old Editor considers it as the proudest day in his life and takes leave of the readers of this series by uttering *Nunc Dimittis*, "Oh my Lord, let me die in peace."

4, Bepin Pal Road,
Calcutta-26.
October 2, 1958
Vijayadasami.

R. C. MAJUMDAR

PREFACE

This volume deals with the history of India from the death of Aurangzīb (1707) to the Third Marāthā War (1818). It was an eventful period that witnessed the end of Muslim rule, the rise and fall of the Marāthā Empire and the foundation of the British Empire in India.

The period began with political disintegration leading to struggle for power, not only among the Indian States but also between the French and the British trading companies in India. This chaotic political situation facilitated, if not invited, foreign invasions, notably those of Nadir Shāh and Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, which bear comparison, both in nature and effect, with those of Sultan Mahmud and Tamerlane.

But there is no cloud without a silver lining. This period of political disruption leading to great disasters also witnessed the rise of great personalities—not less than ten within a century—that shed lustre on the age. These were Bālājī Vishwanāth, Bājī Rāo I, Nānā Phadnis, Mahādji Sindia, Haidar 'Alī, Ranjit Singh, Robert Clive, J. F. Dupleix, Warren Hastings, and Marquess Richard Colley Wellesley.

But the political history, highly important though it was, was not the only important feature of the period. It paved the way for India's transition from the Medieval to the Modern Age in the nineteenth century. It was during this period that India first came into close contact with the Western World—Europe and America—which was big with future consequences so far as Indian culture is concerned. It brought about those remarkable changes in almost all aspects of Indian culture in the nineteenth century, which is generally referred to as Indian Renaissance. It was during the period under review that the Indians first learned the English language, which may be regarded as the most important single factor that brought about those far-reaching changes in Indian life, thought and education as well as social and religious concepts in the course of one hundred years in the 19th century, such as were not noticed during the previous thousand years. That the nineteenth century India was a New India was mainly due to those forces and factors which began to influence India during the period under review. To realise this truth, it is only necessary to point

PREFACE

out that the Fort William College was founded in 1800 and the Hindu College was established in Calcutta in 1817. The Pandits of the Fort William College laid the foundation of modern Bengali language and literature, which served as the model for the rest of India, while at the Hindu College the young generations of Bengalis imbibed the ideas of free thinking and social and political reforms. And these formed the foundation on which New India was built.

Against this background of all-round signs of progress must be seen the deterioration in the economic condition to such an extent that it would be hardly an exaggeration to say that India, which was one of the wealthiest countries in the world, sank to the position of one of the poorest in the world during the period under review. This was as much due to the British rule in India as the brighter features of cultural regeneration noticed above. The ruthless economic exploitation of India by the British was undoubtedly the cause of the deplorable poverty in India following the ruin of trade and industry by the unfair competition of British merchants and manufacturers aided by the political power of Britain.

Many of the chapters were written long ago, and the Editor places on record his deep regret at the death of Prof. C. S. Srinivasachari, Prof. S. V. Puntambekar, Prof. Biman Behari Majumdar, Dr. N. K. Sinha and Prof. D. N. Banerjee who contributed scholarly chapters to this volume.

My special thanks are due to Dr. V. G. Dighe not only for his contributions to this volume but also for the valuable service he rendered as Assistant Editor. Owing to my serious illness while this volume was in the press, the editorial work had mainly to be carried on by him, and I am deeply grateful to him for his ungrudging performance of this duty with conspicuous success.

I also convey my sincere thanks to Dr. C. M. Kulkarni for the help I received from him and to the several contributors for the services rendered by them in the preparation of this volume.

There is no separate Chapter on Art in this volume as the art of this period has already been dealt with in Chapter XLV of Vol. XI of the Series.

Before I take leave of this stupendous project, it is my pleasant duty to thank the staff of the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan for the devotion they have shown in this work throughout the long period of thirty-two years. I would specially like to mention the very

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capable Executive Secretary, Shri S. Ramakrishnan, whose sustained interest in this project made it possible to complete the History Series. The former Production Manager Shri S. G. Tolat and his successors Shri M. K. Rajagopalan (who died prematurely in 1975), and Shri B. Srinivasa Rao, the present holder of the post, have all bestowed great care in the printing and publication of the present as well as the earlier volumes, for which I am much indebted to them. I also take this opportunity to thank the Library authorities of the University of Bombay and the Director of Archives, Government of Maharashtra, for granting facilities to our contributors and editors to use their vast treasure-houses.

The printing of this History Series was made possible because the Bhavan has behind it the experience and willing help of the Associated Advertisers and Printers, and my thanks are also due to the staff of the Press.

*4, Bepin Pal Road,
Calcutta-26.
October 2, 1958
Vijayadasami.*

R. C. MAJUMDAR

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ABBREVIATIONS

Titles of works referred to in the volume run into hundreds and have been indicated in full at the end of each chapter, as far as possible. But some of the series and publications have been so frequently referred to, that it was deemed proper to use abbreviations instead of the full titles of books every time. In most cases primary sources have been utilised; elsewhere secondary sources of great importance have been used:

- ALS** *Aitihasik Lekha Samgraha*, ed. by V. V. Khare, sometimes indicated as Khare, Vols. 1-14.
- BISMQ** *Bharat Itihās Samshodhak Mandal Quarterly*.
- BISMSV** *Bharat Itihās Samshodhak Mandal Sammelan Vrittā*.
- MIS** *Marāthyanchya Itihāsachi Sadhanen*, ed. by V. K. Rajwade, Vols. I, II, III, IV, VIII, XII, XIII, XV, XX have been used.
- KSPY** *Kavyetihas Sangraha Patre Yadin Vagaire*, ed. by Sardesai, Kale and Vakaskar (3rd edition, 1930).
- Ait. Patra** *Aitihasik Patrav yawahar*, ed. by Sardesai, Kale and Kulkarni.
- S.P.D.** *Selections from Peshwā Daftar* (45 Vols. in Marāthī, ed. by G. S. Sardesai (1930-33).
- Four or Five *Bakhars* of major importance have been used.
- They are: Chitnis, Malhar Ram Rao, *Saptaprakaranatmak Charitrā* or *Shivā Charitrā* (ed. by R. V. Herwadkar).
- Sambhaji Maharaj and Thorle Rajram Maharaj Yanchi Charitren*, (ed. by R. V. Herwadkar).
- Bhau Sahebanchi Bakhar*, ed. by S. N. Joshi (1959).
- Shiv Chhatrapatiche Charitrā*, by Sabhasad, Krishnaji Anant, edited by Sane (1923).

ABBREVIATIONS

Holkaranchi Kaifiyat, ed. by Y. N. Kelkar (1954).

Peshwanchi Bakhar, by Sohani, Krishnaji Vinayak, edited by Sane, (1925) used only for the events of the last days of the Peshwā regime.

Among English works used are:

P.R.C.	<i>Poona Residency Correspondence series</i> , ed. by Sardesai and Sarkar (14 Vols).
History	<i>History of the Mahrattas</i> , by James Grant Duff (1921 edn. in two Volumes).
New History	<i>New History of the Marāthās</i> , by G. S. Sardesai, three volumes.
Fall	<i>Fall of the Mughal Empire</i> , by Jadunath Sarkar, 4 volumes.
Shivaji	<i>Shivaji and His Times</i> , by Jadunath Sarkar, (4th Edn. 1948).
Maratha Series	<i>Selections from the Letters, Despatches and other State Papers</i> preserved in the Bombay Secretariat, <i>Home Series</i> volumes and <i>Marāthā Series</i> , ed. by G. W. Forrest.
Central India	<i>A Memoir of Central India</i> (2 vols. 1880), by Sir John Malcolm.

Some of the contributors worked in record offices and have utilised the material which is shown under the full title *Public*, and *Pol.* and *Secret Department Diaries* are from the *Maharashtra State Archives*; *Madras Military Consultations* are from Madras Record Office, etc.

CHAPTER I

INDIA ON THE DEATH OF AURANGZĪB

Retrospect and Survey

When the last of the Great Mughuls was in the throes of death, his mighty empire was convulsing with upheavals of far-reaching nature. Aurangzib's successes and failures had neutralised each other; the traditional glory and greatness of his house was tottering to a fall. His vast empire presented a pathetic picture of a body without soul—a body in the grip of the process of disintegration and decay. Everywhere centrifugal tendencies were raising their heads, and the inexorable forces of history were converging fast, one upon the other, to lead to the inevitable dissolution. The dying monarch's mind was torn with pangs of bitter failures and frustration. He had pitched his ambition too high and had played the political game for heavy stakes. He lost more than what he could gain and the consequences of his fruitless aggressive policy proved more tragic than he could ever imagine.

Thus, imperial politics towards the close of the first decade of the 18th century was in a state of flux. The foundations of peace and stability had been steadily eroded during the last fifty years; now they had to bear the stress of more violent and virulent forces which, though shaping for a considerable time before, gained terrible momentum from the blunders of Aurangzib. But it must be frankly admitted that he was neither the author nor the sole cause of the downfall of the Mughal empire. His role, at the worst, was that of a passive agent. He failed to ride successfully through the political storm of his age; he was simply swept off by it.

Bengal:

The first province to react to the process of disintegration was Bengal. Throughout mediaeval history, it had been a headache to the rulers of Delhi or Āgra. Its distance from the headquarters rendered its effective control almost impossible. The ruling turbulent Afghāns, backed as they were by the other sections of the indigenous population, could never reconcile themselves to the new order initiated by the Mughul; and they never missed the opportunity of challenging the central authority. But such intervals of disorder alternated with periods of peace and prosperity. The

last was under Murshid Qulī Khān¹ who raised the province to the highest degree of affluence; but he was loath to play the second fiddle to the Viceroy, Prince 'Azīm-ush-Shān, who hatched a plot to murder him.² Murshid Qulī, however, outwitted his enemy, and to guard himself against any attempt on his life in future, he took up his residence at a new place called Maqsudabad³ which he renamed Murshidabad. In January, 1703, Prince 'Azīm-ush-Shān was ordered to Bihar,⁴ while his son Farrukh-siyar remained at Dacca as his deputy. In the following year Murshid Qulī Khān was promoted to the rank of 200 + 1100 and the *diwani* of Bihar was added to his charge. Henceforward he became the virtual Governor of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, because he wielded the financial as well as the executive authority. It was his writ which was obeyed in these provinces, the authority of the emperor having been reduced almost to a cipher.

The Sikhs:

The state of affairs at the other end of northern India in the Punjab was perhaps much worse. During the emperor's absence in the Deccan, the Sikhs had organised themselves into a solid military fraternity under the leadership of the last of the Gurūs, Gurū Govind Singh. He embarked upon a plan of sporadic forays into the imperial territories and the neighbouring hill states. His uninterrupted successes alarmed the government officials in the Punjab and they became equally a source of grave anxiety to the hill chiefs. The latter addressed a petition to the emperor saying, "He (Govind Singh) has vowed to avenge the death of his father. He wanted us to join him in his seditious projects. On our refusal to prove false to our most just and merciful emperor, he has become hostile to us and our people. He has founded a new sect which he calls the *Khālsā* or the Pure, but which in reality is the impurest medley of sundry low-born castes in the world. To these low-born people he holds out hopes of power and sway in this world, and of salvation in the next. Their heads are turned; they allow us no rest. We, Your Majesty's humble slaves, have turned our combined strength against them, but have not been quite successful. We are in a sore plight. To whom should we turn for help, but to our benign emperor?.... kindly send a large army. We shall pay all its expenses."⁵

In other words, the Punjab, the key province of the Mughul empire was passing through a grave political crisis. Such a state of affairs could be tolerated only at a serious risk to the peace of

the western region; hence strenuous efforts were made to deal with the insurgence of the Sikhs. Gurū Govind Singh was driven from pillar to post till in sheer frustration and disappointment he had to retire to Damdamah, and he even made up his mind to come to terms with the emperor. He composed in exquisite Persian verse an address known as *Zafarnama*.⁶ It is a mixture of words of threat and conciliation. The author prophesied that a day would come when the Sikhs would avenge fully the injuries inflicted upon them; and there is no doubt that for a considerable time they remained a running sore to the empire.

The Jats:

The Sikh obduracy and spirit of defiance proved to be very catching. The Jats, living within striking distance of Delhi and Agra and hitherto a hard-working and peaceful community engaged in agricultural pursuits, abandoned the plough and took to arms. In view of the fact that a vast majority of Sikhs were originally Jats, it may be reasonably presumed that the former were in constant contact with their brethren who inhabited the region south of the two capitals of the empire. No wonder, therefore, that the Jats would have received inspiration and encouragement from their neighbours and erstwhile kinsmen. Their resistance was organised under the leadership of an intrepid adventurer named Goklā. It is difficult to ascertain the cause or causes of their grievance. Sir Jadunath Sarkar has attributed it to their religious resentment; but there is little evidence to show that the Jats were a community of strong religious convictions and over-sensitive about their faith. On the other hand, Prof. Irfan Habib has ventured to suggest that the Jat rising was primarily agrarian, the consequence of financial distress which had overtaken the Mughul empire. But this contention also cannot be sustained, because beyond the general presumption that the rate of revenue demand had increased during the reign of Aurangzib, there is no record to show that it had become exorbitant or back-breaking. Moreover, there were no such agrarian risings in other parts of northern India. So, the only conclusion which appears to be convincing is that the slackening of central administrative machinery and its consequent ineffectiveness encouraged the sturdy Jat community to make a bid for freedom. And what is more striking is that, in comparison with the Sikhs, their rise was far more phenomenal. Within the space of a decade or so, the Jats became a power to be reckoned with. They proved themselves as dangerous to the Mughul empire as to the neighbouring State of Amber. In other words, the Jat rising was primarily a

political phenomenon having very little concern either with religious susceptibilities or economic distress. If there were any such considerations they were merely a cloak and a pretext.

The Bundelas:

On the direct line of communication between northern India and the Deccan lay Bundelkhand, the home of a warlike and adventurous community. Ever since the time of Akbar the Great, it had off and on proved a source of anxiety to the government. But like the rulers of Rājasthān, the chiefs of Bundelkhand lacked unity of outlook and the sense of common brotherhood. In the famous war of succession, Chhatrasāl had helped Aurangzīb;⁷ but his ambition could ill reconcile itself to a life of abject subordination. At one stage he even thought of joining hands with Shivājī; the latter, however, advised him to return to his homeland and work for its salvation. But he was sternly dealt with and even compelled to go to the Deccan and join the imperial service. Here he was appointed commander of Satara fort.⁸ But he resigned his post soon after and returned to Bundelkhand to reorganise resistance to the central government. As a result, much earlier than expected, the problem of the Bundelas assumed proportions which sorely tried the wits of the politicians as much as the genius of the military commanders of the Mughul empire. And, though unlike the Jats, they were unable to establish an independent unified state, their insurgence ate into the vitals of the central administration.

Mālwa:

During the closing years of the seventeenth century, the two provinces of Mālwa and Gujarāt had also begun to suffer from the effects of mal-administration and Maratha encroachments. In November, 1699, a Marāthā contingent of troops crossed the Narmadā and raided Mālwa up to Dhamuni.⁹ Four years later Nemājī Sindia burst into Berār, defeated and captured the Mughul general Rustam Khān.¹⁰ Then he marched to Sironj, plundering the villages and towns on the way; though Nemājī was repulsed and put to flight by Firoz Jang, great was the consternation and alarm which had seized the people and local officials alike. Upon this, Prince Bidar Bakht was appointed Viceroy of the province with instructions to deal effectively with the marauders.¹¹ When two years later the prince was transferred to Gujarāt, Mālwa was placed in charge of Khān-i-Alam. But conditions did not improve; they became worse. The Marāthās, the Bundelas and the Afghāns constantly fomented trouble there and Mālwa was completely ruined.

Rajasthan:

Like the Sikhs in the Punjab and the territory immediately to the south of Agra and Delhi, most of Rājasthān was also seething with discontent on the eve of Aurangzīb's death. The emperor had failed to suppress the resistance movement which had originated in the latter part of Shāh Jahān's reign. It was sheer coincidence that Mewār and Mārwar had allied themselves to face the common enemy. In the end, Aurangzīb made peace with Mewār on terms which did little credit to him. But, worse than that, he left behind him bitter feelings of rancour and resentment. Disaffection continued to blaze in Mārwar, and its leaders were not inclined to keep quiet or modify their spirit of defiance. But in striking contrast to these two States, Amber maintained its loyalty to the Mughul emperor and its rulers played an important role in the imperial politics of the post-Aurangzīb period. Similarly, the Rājput chiefs of Kotāh, Būndī and Sirohi maintained their allegiance to Delhi. Therefore, the statement that Aurangzīb went to the Deccan with one of his arms amputated is not wholly correct. He had forfeited the confidence of Mārwar and Mewār, but not of the entire Rājput community. Indeed, in the last part of his reign the Rājputs constituted 17.6 per cent of the total imperial nobility. They were not humiliated either.¹² On the other hand, they were given higher status than was conceded to the Hindus in general, and they were also exempt from *jizya*. In 1704, even Ajit Singh and Durgādas made peace with the emperor.

The Deccan and Far South:

Aurangzīb spent the last twenty-five years of his life in a fruitless conflict against the Marāthās and in satisfying his long cherished ambition of subduing the two semi-independent States of Bijāpur and Golconda. Although he had the morbid satisfaction of wiping out the existence of these two States, he had to realise in the end that the success which he had achieved was fraught with fatal consequences for his own empire. It indirectly encouraged the Marāthās who now ravaged with impunity the entire region south of the Narmadā. Furthermore, they were emboldened to play a game of hide and seek with the imperialists whom they harassed incessantly by plundering their convoys and by interrupting their lines of communication.

Indeed the failure of Aurangzīb's Deccan policy brightened the prospects of Marāthā imperialism. The Marāthās could now dream of unrestrained expansion not only in the south, but also towards the north. Hence it would not be too much to assert that Aurangzīb

prepared the way for the future Marāthā empire. It may sound paradoxical that he inadvertently strengthened the hands and enhanced the prestige of the Marāthā chiefs by granting them high *mansabs*. And towards the end of his reign, the proportion of the Marāthā *mansabdars* had risen to 16.7 per cent,¹³ which gave them a place of influence in the Mughul governing class. In the long run it proved disastrous to the empire.

This brief review of the political condition of the Mughul empire on the eve of Aurangzīb's death brings into bold relief some of its interesting aspects. That it was tending towards decline admits of no doubt. The process of incessant expansion had sealed its fate. It was impossible to manage and control this vast region with the resources and means then available to the central government. Similar experiment had been tried by Muhammad Tughluq, but it had miserably failed. And though history is a stern teacher, few learn the lesson. Moreover, a succession of military campaigns in various parts of the empire, either for fresh conquests or for the suppression of internal risings, was gradually but steadily, leading to economic crises. Though for another fifty-five years or so the sea-borne trade of India still remained in a flourishing condition, its profits did not flow into the imperial coffers. Similarly, although there is reason to believe that agriculture also expanded, it did not add to the financial resources of the empire, because of the prevalence of the *jāgīr* and *ijara* (contract) systems. Finally, the administrative machinery had not only become expensive but also cumbersome, top-heavy and obsolete. Neither could it be effectively controlled, nor did it function to the advantage of the empire. The administrators were turning more and more into politicians, forming cliques and groups with a view to seize power, which they saw, was falling from the hands of the emperor. The era of despotism was at an end and that of anarchy and dissolution had set in.

NOTES

1. *Riyaz-us-Salatin* by Ghulam Husain Salim, pp. 254-60.
2. *Ibid*, p. 249.
3. *Ibid*, p. 251; Sarkar, Jadunath, *History of Aurangzīb*, Vol. V, p. 401.
4. *Ibid*, p. 252.
5. See Zaluki (Zahiruddin), *Aurangzīb and His Times*, pp. 255-56; Nijjar Bakshis Singh, *Punjab Under the Great Mughuls*, p. 94.
6. Macauliffe, *The Sikh Religion*, Vol. V, p. 201.
7. *Chhatraprakāsh* (Pogson), p. 32. Manucci and Bhimsen confirm it. Irvine, *Later Mughuls*, Vol. II, p. 224.
8. *Ibid*, p. 229. For Chhatrasāl's life, see Sarkar, *Aurangzīb*, Vol. V, pp. 390-99.
9. Bhimsen, *Dilkushā*, f. 129 a; *Akhbārāt* (1699)—The expedition was led by Krishnaji Sawant.
10. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, Vol. V, pp. 383-85.
11. Inayat Ullah, *Letters* (Aligarh MS), f. 43 a, 45; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 384.
12. Athar Ali, *The Mughul Nobility under Aurangzīb*, p. 25.
13. *Ibid*, p. 30.

SUCCESSORS OF AURANGZĪB

During his reign of about half a century Aurangzīb had created more problems than he was in a position to solve. Certainly some of them he had inherited from his forbears, but many were of his own making. These together shook the empire to its very foundations. No wonder that at the time of his death the political and financial horizon betokened the dark prospects of decline, decay and dissolution. The far-famed glory of the Mughul empire was now becoming past history; its tragic end was in the offing. The following half a century witnessed many a blood-curdling event. It was a period of clash of ambitions, of group rivalries, of base intrigues, of licentious orgies and, above all, of the decline of moral and ethical values. The political field was crowded with individuals devoid of sober vision or abiding loyalty. They were permeated with callous indifference towards the interests of the very institution which was the main source of their honour and sustenance. These courtiers failed to realise that they were playing with fire—a fire, the flames of which would consume the empire more speedily than they could imagine. Thus, the history of the Mughul empire in the 18th century is, an agonising story of its steady disintegration.

Despotic Militarism:

Multitudinous were the causes which dragged the empire to this tragic end, some inherent in the political system of the mediaeval age, whereas others were its concomitants or corollaries. As in other parts of the contemporary world, the Mughul political system derived inspiration and vitality from militarism, which reduced it to a machine for incessant territorial expansion. And when it was capped by the vices of absolute despotism, the inexorable fate could not be avoided or postponed. Thus, there arose a situation when the army, instead of becoming a bastion of the imperial fabric, turned into an agency for its destruction. The military leaders, immersed in narrow selfishness, began to grind their own axes. Moreover, the army which the successors of Aurangzīb had inherited was matched in its cumbersomeness by its rank inefficiency. It could neither be controlled nor be dispensed with. On the other hand, the rulers were called upon to meet its over-growing demands which caused constant financial drain. In other words, the military system had begun to sink under its own weight.

Unwieldy Expansion and Degeneration of the Nobility:

Again, the uninterrupted territorial expansion extending over a period of 150 years, had increased the dimensions of the Mughul empire to almost unmanageable proportions. In an age when scientific inventions had not yet eliminated the barriers of time and distance, the administration of an extensive empire required a host of loyal and efficient officers. For a variety of reasons the supply of officers of the right calibre was falling short of the actual demand. The Rājputs were not only reluctant to enrol themselves to defend the cause of the empire, but also lacked the qualities and military leadership of a Mān Singh, Jagat Singh or Jay Singh. Immigration from Persia and Trans-Oxus region had almost come to a dead stop. A life of pleasure and opulence had adversely affected the morale and physique of those foreigners who had settled in this country. They could only still boast of their pride of birth; as to their worth, it had become conspicuous by its absence among them. They had plenty of ambition; but they sought to satisfy it at the cost of the empire. Like the proverbial wood-cutter they cut the very branch on which they were perched.

If the officials and nobles were greedy and inefficient, the sovereigns who were expected to set the ideal, were immersed in licentiousness. Their vision hardly ever travelled beyond the four walls of their palaces. They spent most of their time in the harem making merry with the cup and their concubines, or in the gay company of poets and musicians in utter disregard to their own duty. Such debased specimens of humanity could hardly evoke sympathy or inspire respect. They could not but be the architects of their own doom and passive witnesses to the tragic fate besetting the empire. With the partial exception of Bahādur Shāh, the immediate successor of Aurangzīb, none was gifted with even a modicum of initiative. They were reduced to the unenviable position of being the nominees of their supporters instead of being their leaders.

Centrifugal Tendencies:

To add to the distraction of their puppets and their protagonists, the entire sub-continent was overtaken by a mixed wave of regeneration and reaction, which intensified the centrifugal tendencies. The States of Awadh, Rohilkhand and Bengal represented one phase of the movement, and the Marāthā expansion and the foundation of Hyderabad symbolised the other phase. But, in the context of the empire the result was the same, i.e., the dismemberment of the parent body. It would, however, be erroneous to presume that any

of these States were moved by religious fervour. They were primarily political entities, each struggling against the other to preserve its existence or to promote its own growth and expansion. In fact, religion had almost ceased to influence either political or moral values. Selfishness and narrow parochialism had gained the upper hand. It was an age of fortune-hunters and of bold military adventurers.

Thus passed the first three decades after the death of Aurangzīb, and during this period the internal conditions became more and more complicated. On the one hand, there were local risings of the Sikhs, Jāts and Bundelas, and on the other the Marāthā aggression was fast enveloping the entire sub-continent. So, it became almost impossible to focus attention on one particular source of peril; the outbreaks were at times simultaneous and sometimes the insurgent groups were in league with each other. Moreover, it was not uncommon that the leaders of cliques in the court themselves encouraged defiance as and when it suited the promotion of their selfish ends. On the top of it all, came foreign invasions, which dealt stunning blows to the dwindling prestige of the emperor and the empire.

Contemplated Partition:

In the closing years of his life, Aurangzīb was much perturbed at the gloomy prospects of a bloody civil war amongst his sons. Like his father, therefore, he also attempted an equitable distribution of the empire among the future claimants. It reminds one of a similar scheme adumbrated by Bābur, the founder of the Mughul empire. Aurangzīb, on his part, had intended that the eldest, Mu'azzam, should receive 12 *subahs* with his capital at Delhi; the second, A'zam, should have Āgra, the *subahs* of the Deccan, Mālwa and Gujarāt; the youngest, Kām Bakhsh, should have the two provinces of Bijāpur and Hyderabad. Though the will (alleged to have been found by Hamid-ud-din Khān) confirming this distribution is of doubtful veracity, the presence of Mu'azzam in Kābul, deputation of Kām Bakhsh by his father to Bijāpur, and that of A'zam to Mālwa, lend support to the presumption that Aurangzīb did not want his sons to be near one another or to be at each other's throat.¹

A'zam Proclaimed Emperor:

But his wish in this respect, as had happened in the past, was not respected. It would have violated the hoary Timūrid tradition of fratricide. When the frightful tradition had been followed by the father, why should his sons lag behind? So, when the emperor

had breathed his last, *Vazīr Asad Khān* who was master of the situation, assembled the other *amīrs* and in consultation with them, sent messengers to A'zam asking him to return post-haste to Ahmad-nagar.² Accordingly Prince A'zam arrived there and was proclaimed king on 14 March, 1707.³

Although most of the officers and commanders, present in the camp of the late monarch, had tendered their submission to the new emperor, there were others who were indifferent towards him. Even Asad Khān, so enthusiastic in the beginning, became lukewarm later on. As to the Turānis like Chin Qilich Khān, his father Ghāzi-ud-Din Khān Firoz Jang, and Muhammad Amin Khān, they were definitely unwilling to take any risk by extending support to a prince having *Shī'a* inclinations.⁴ Undeterred by the dubious attitude even of his supporters, A'zam decided to march straight to Āgra. This was what Shāh Jahān had attempted in the past. Indeed, the project of seizing Āgra had emanated from Prince Bidar Bakht, and his father A'zam had already commissioned him to undertake it. But on subsequent considerations, he countermanded his earlier instructions, and thus inadvertantly ruined his chances of success.⁵

Mu'azzam's Activities:

While A'zam was making for the north, his elder brother Mu'azzam was not sitting idle. He left Kābul and arrived at Pul-i-Shah Daulah where he celebrated his accession, assuming the title of Bahādur Shāh.⁶ He had already conciliated Budh Singh Hada of Būndī and Bijay Singh Kachhwāha of Amber and had, through them, enlisted a large number of Rājputs.⁷ Luckily for Mu'azzam, his second son, Prince Muhammad 'Azim-ush-Shan, was on his way to the Deccan in response to the summons of his grand-father.⁸ It was at Shahzadpur that he heard of the latter's death.⁹ He lost no time in grasping the situation, and made straight for Āgra where he joined his father. The capital thus fell into the hands of Mu'azzam, who thereby scored a march over his rival.¹⁰ Because, though Bidar Bakht had succeeded in forcing through the line of the Chambal held by Muhtashim Khān, on behalf of Mu'azzam, the fate of A'zam had been sealed. The rival armies faced each other at Jājau near Samugarh. A bloody conflict ensued in which A'zam was killed, and so also his sons Bidar Bakht and Wala Jah.¹¹

Kām Bakhsh:

But Jājau did not end the struggle for succession. There was yet another claimant in the field. Kām Bakhsh had already the

Khutba recited and coins struck in his name in the Deccan. He assumed the style of *Din Panah*,¹² and appointed Ahsan Khān as his *Bakhshi* and Taqarrub Khān as *Vazīr*.¹³ He next turned his attention to recovering places which had either shaken off allegiance to the imperial authority or had declined to recognise him as sovereign. Wakinkhera, Arcot, Kurnool and Hyderabad were reduced to submission one after the other; but the commandant of Golconda refused to surrender the fort on the plea that he had received a communication from Bahādur Shāh.

It must be said to the credit of Bahādur Shāh that before proceeding to extremes, he made a sincere effort at conciliation. He wrote a very affectionate letter to his brother asking him to resign himself to God's will.¹⁴ But Kām Bakhsh suspecting the messenger who had brought the letter to be a traitor, subjected him to cruel indignities, and put to death many innocent young men suspected to be in league with him.¹⁵ Nor did the remonstrances of the *Vazīr* Taqarrub Khān have any effect on the mind of the young man. He turned a deaf ear to all overtures for peace.

Bahādur Shāh was thus left with no other alternative than to make an appeal to the sword. He marched to Hyderabad and arrived there in January, 1709. On the eve of the decisive battle which occurred on January 13, 1709, the position of Kām Bakhsh was very pitiable. He had neither men nor money; still he bore the brunt of the imperial attack very bravely. His son, Muhi-us-Sunnat, also displayed remarkable courage. But in the face of superior numbers, their efforts proved of little avail. They were wounded and captured. The same afternoon Kām Bakhsh was brought in a palanquin to Bahādur Shāh who was very affectionate towards him. He wiped off the dry blood from his brother's wounds, and even persuaded him to take some food. But he died at night.¹⁶ This was the last war of succession in which the initiative lay in the hands of the royal contestants who made their own plans. After this, it was the *Vazīr* or some other influential noble who shuffled the cards and coaxed his trump piece to the forefront.

Bahādur Shāh's Character:

Bahādur Shāh was now the undisputed lord of the Mughul empire. He was the first and the last of the Mughuls to have exercised real authority associated with their names. Though his administrative talents were not of a high order, by his affable temperament and conciliatory attitude he managed to retain the support of every one of the numerous factions and groups in the imperial court. His per-

sonality had a very sobering effect on the rivalry and bitterness among his nobles and officers. By nature he was not stern; but he had a full grasp of the political situation. He attempted to discharge his onerous responsibilities by a skilful process of adjustments and compromises. At times he was even able to assert himself.

After the battle of Jājau, the task to which he addressed himself was the reconstitution of his government. In doing so, he was called upon to pay due consideration as much to the tradition as to the exigency of the moment. His father had left behind a number of capable and experienced officers whose record of past services could not be bypassed. Nor could he leave in the lurch those who had advocated his cause and had stood by him through thick and thin. Ministerial changes after every accession were a normal feature of the Mughul politics, and Bahādur Shāh would have been fully justified in brushing aside the claims to office of the previous incumbents. But the situation in which he was placed was peculiar in so far as he could not afford to lose even a grain of sympathy, if he was to steer successfully through the troubles which lay ahead of him. Therefore, he decided upon the only feasible course in the circumstances, that of making as little change in the political and administrative set-up as possible.

Rājputānā:

After the distribution of posts and honours the emperor turned his attention to tackling political problems. Embers of disaffection were still alive in Rājputānā. The Rāthor ruler, Ajit Singh, had expelled the imperial officers after the death of Aurangzīb and occupied his capital Jodhpur.¹⁷ The Kachhwāhā chief, Jay Singh of Amber, a young man of about 21, had, by throwing in his lot with A'zam Shāh, given a cause of offence to the new sovereign who had been for considerable time befriending a rival claimant in the person of Bijay Singh.¹⁸ Rānā Amar Singh of Udaipur also was not well inclined towards the changed order in the Mughul empire.¹⁹ The ruler of Kotāh, Ram Singh, was in the Deccan with Zu'lfiqār Khān and the Rājā of Būndī, Budh Singh, was with Bahādur Shāh. The strategic position of these States in relation to the far-flung possessions of the emperor required bold and immediate action.

Bahādur Shāh was not slow to react to the gravity of the situation. He resolved to march to Jodhpur by way of Amber and Ajmer. His departure from Āgra, which betokened his firmness, cowed down the spirits of the Rānā of Udaipur and he sent to the emperor his brother Bakht Singh with a letter of congratulations and numerous

costly presents.²⁰ As to Amber, the country was made over to Bijay Singh who was distinguished by the title of Mirzā Rājā.²¹ Meanwhile Ajit Singh had been defeated and put to flight by Miharāb Khān, the *faujdar* of Jodhpur, and the fort of Merta had been occupied.²² Further resistance being out of question, Ajit Singh decided to tender his submission. He was pardoned, given a special robe of honour and the title of *Mahārājā*, and his rank was fixed at 3500 *zat* and 3000 *sawar*. His two sons, Abhay Singh and Rākhi Singh, were also enrolled as *mansabdars*.²³

But the peace thus restored in Rājputānā did not prove to be enduring, mainly because it did not satisfy the ambitions of the hostile parties; and incidentally because the emperor could not prolong his stay there owing to the distraction caused by the activities of Prince Kām Bakhsh in the Deccan. Taking advantage of the change in the political situation, Ajit Singh, Jay Singh and Amar Singh formed a confederacy with the object of completely rooting out the Mughul influence from Rājputānā. The Mahārājā married his daughter to Jay Singh on the specific condition that the son born of the wedlock would be the heir-apparent of the State of Amber to the exclusion of any other elder male progeny by other wives.²⁴ The allies invested Jodhpur and compelled the *faujdar* to abandon the fort. Encouraged by these successes they marched towards Agra and defeated the *faujdar* of Hindaun and Bayāna. Then proceeding by way of Ajmer and Merta, they bore down on Sāmbhar which was the garrison town of the imperialists; but they were repulsed by the combined forces of the *faujders* of Mewat and Narnaul.²⁵

The situation had indeed become very critical. To meet it the emperor issued urgent instructions to Asad Khān and other prominent officers in and near the capital to assemble their armies and march to the place of trouble. On the other hand, the policy of conciliation too, was not altogether discarded and it bore fruit. Jay Singh opened negotiations for a peaceful settlement, and upon the intercession of Prince 'Azim-ush-Shān, he and Ajit Singh were restored to their former ranks.²⁶ It is, however, evident that Bahādur Shāh regarded the arrangement to be tentative only, because when he had settled the affairs of Kām Bakhsh, on his way back to the north he paid a second visit to Rājputānā. But the outbreak of trouble in the Punjab precipitated his departure from there. In short, Bahādur Shāh's Rājput policy fully reveals his temperament and political sagacity. He was firm in suppressing the insurgents, but was not averse to holding out an olive branch towards them. He displayed the strength of his arms, and subsequently, in keeping

with the exigency of the situation, he restored to Jay Singh and Ajit Singh their capitals and homelands. Later, when in October 1711, the two kings arrived at the court they were sent to Sadhaura to guard the foothills from the raids of the followers of Bandā.²⁷

The Sikhs:

Bahādur Shāh had for a considerable time past been on friendly terms with Gurū Govind Singh.²⁸ The Gurū met the new emperor at Āgra and was received with honours due to him; and he was successfully persuaded to accompany the imperial army to the Deccan. On reaching Nanded, the Gurū separated himself from the emperor, and being attracted by the natural beauty of the spot, decided to pass the rest of his earthly life there. It was here that he was murdered on 17 November, 1708 A.D.²⁹

At Nanded, the Gurū came in touch with a *bairagi* named Lachman Dās who enrolled himself as a disciple and styled himself Bandā or slave. The Gurū commissioned Bandā to go to the Punjab, act as the temporal leader of the *Khālsā*, and in consultation with five of his councillors to punish the enemies of the *Khālsā*. He was strictly warned against assuming or aspiring to the spiritual leadership of the Sikhs. Fired with the zeal of his new mission and burning with feelings of revenge, Bandā arrived in the Punjab, collected a large army, and making his way into the hilly districts, established himself at Sadhaura.³⁰

Swift was the conflagration which spread in the country between the Sutlej and the Jamunā. The Sikhs chose Sirhind as the main target of their attack, and succeeded in capturing it.³¹ They then moved towards Thāneshwar, but their progress was checked by a local Muslim Rājput Zamīndār. They, however, crossed the Jamunā and occupied half of *Sarkar* Saharānpur. The demoralisation of the imperial officials was complete. Taking advantage of it, the Sikhs moved westward to seize Sultānpur, and they extended their depredations to the Shālimar gardens, a suburb of Lahore. For several months they closed the north-western road from Delhi.³²

The plundered inhabitants of Sirhind, Thāneshwar etc., arrived at Ajmer to represent their tales of woe and misery to the emperor. Winding up the Rājput affairs, Bahādur Shāh left Ajmer on 27 June 1710, and hurried to the scene of trouble. He even bypassed Delhi, prohibited his soldiers from visiting the capital, and issued orders to the Hindus in his train to shave off their beards,³³ so that they may be distinguished from the enemy. Extensive preparations were made to suppress the insurrection. In the face of such heavy odds the

Sikhs were unable to keep firm to their ground. They were driven out of Thāneshwar, ousted from Sirhind, expelled from Lahore, closely invested at Lohgarh, and made to suffer crushing defeats at numerous places. Nevertheless, they did not give up their plan of harassing the imperialists and plundering those who sided with them. Thanks to the mutual rivalry between the two imperial generals, Muhammad Amīn Khān and Rustam Dil Khān, Bandā was able to effect his escape; but the moment the storm had abated a little, he reappeared and raised fresh disturbances in the Barī Doāb. But he was defeated and repulsed by Muhammad Amīn Khān. Bandā was now exposed to a grave peril, but the sudden death of the emperor, and the departure of Muhammad Amīn to participate in the war of succession staved off the doom. The Sikhs succeeded in recovering Sadhaura and Lohgarh.³⁴

Death of Bahādur Shāh:

As to the Deccan, it appears that Bahādur Shāh was unable to formulate a clear-cut and decisive policy. After the defeat and death of Kām Bakhsh, Zu'lfiqār Khān was appointed Viceroy of the Deccan. He favoured conciliation with the Marāthās, whereas the *Vazīr* Mun'im Khān counselled a different approach. Striking the mean between the two conflicting views, the emperor restored to Shāhū his former *mansab*; but he was reluctant to recognize his claims of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* on the six *subahs* of the Deccan. But this half-hearted concession did not cut much ice and the Marāthās restarted their plundering raids. They ravaged even the *jāgīrs* of Zu'lfiqār Khān. His representative secretly concluded a pact with Shāhū, conceding his claims; but this was not formally confirmed by the emperor. And so the Deccan remained a scene of confusion and lawlessness. After bringing under control the trouble created by the Sikhs, Bahādur Shāh marched to the Punjab. He arrived at Anwala near Lahore on 11 August, 1711 and pitched his camp there. For some time past no *Khutba* had been recited at Lahore because of the objections of the learned divines, who resented the addition of the word *Wasi* after the name of 'Ali, as an indication of the emperor's *Shī'a* proclivities.³⁵ The latter now assembled together the learned men of the city and attempted to convince them of the propriety of his innovation. But he failed and he lost his temper. An ugly situation was averted only when the emperor gave way to the popular demand, viz., that the word *Wasi* should be dropped. But he was very much distressed. He now busied himself in improving and altering the Shālīmar Gardens. About the middle of January 1712 his health began to decline and he died on 27 February, 1712.

With the death of Bahādur Shāh disappeared even the last semblance of the glory and greatness of the Mughuls. Though mild, generous and accommodating, he held the reins of administration fast in his hands. In matters of state, his word was final. He rose high above party factions and court intrigues and rarely allowed himself to be swayed by passion or prejudice. But it was impossible for him to liquidate the evil consequences of the mistakes of his predecessors. Compared to them his outlook was limited and his equipment poor; yet unlike his successors, he cannot be said to have played the role of a mere puppet. When Bandā escaped capture, the emperor did not fail to reprimand his favourite Prime Minister Mun'im Khān. In his dealings with the Rājputs he displayed both firmness and discretion, though the final solution of the Rājput problem proved to be beyond him. He might have succeeded in suppressing the Sikhs, but his untimely death left the situation in a state of flux. To sum up the policy and administration of Bahādur Shāh, it may be stated that he remained in power for too short a period to achieve any permanent results. He could overawe the Rājputs, could persecute the Sikhs, but he failed to find even a temporary solution to the Mārāthā problem. Though his attitude towards the Hindus was less intolerant than that of his predecessor, he did not abolish the *jizya* or rescind discriminatory regulations, but the rigour of their application was considerably softened. Nor could he arrest the acceleration of financial crisis. He granted *jāgīrs* recklessly and gave promotions and rewards to all and sundry. When he ascended the throne, he found 13 crores worth of coined and uncoined gold and silver in the treasury at Āgra. By the end of his reign all of it had been spent away and the salary of artillery men had fallen into arrears.

The Last War of Succession:

Bahādur Shāh left behind him a numerous progeny. When he died at Lahore, his four sons Jahāndar Shāh, 'Azim-ush-Shān, Rafi-ush-Shān and Jahān Shāh were with him. Of these, the second was by far the most capable and resourceful. But the arch-intriguer Zu'lfiqār Khān, who was keen to play his own game, succeeded in combining the eldest with the other two. 'Azim-ush-Shān was defeated, and he disappeared in a sand-storm which swept the bed of the Rāvi. But the victors could not agree among themselves, and the conflict reopened. Jahān Shāh, who was the first to strike the blow, was killed in an encounter with Zu'lfiqār Khān when on the brink of success. In the end, Rafi-ush-Shān also drew sword to defend his claims. Deserted and deceived, he fought valiantly and faced death with the supreme courage of a soldier.³⁶

Jahāndar Shāh:

Jahāndar Shāh proclaimed his accession at Lahore. Though about fifty years of age, he behaved like a frivolous young man of eighteen. His morals were highly depraved. He drank heavily and passed most of his time in the company of his mistress—Lāl Kunwar, whose relations had obtained high posts in government service. Nor could his *Vazīr* Zu'lfiqār fill in the void successfully. He had been overtaken with senile decay. He devolved his entire responsibility on his favourite, Sabhā Chand.³⁷ So he lost all the influence which he had built up; nay, he was bitterly hated, as was his master. With such persons at the helm of affairs, the fate of the empire can better be imagined than described.

Farrukh-Siyar's Bid for Power:

While Jahāndar Shāh and his Prime Minister were living in fool's paradise in Delhi, a severe political storm was brewing in the eastern provinces. Here 'Azim-ush-Shān's son, Farrukh-siyar, had succeeded in winning the support of Sayyid Husain 'Ali, the governor of Patna, and Sayyid 'Abdullah, the governor of Allahabad.³⁸ He advanced with a large following towards the west to contest the throne with his uncle. On the way he overcame the opposition of his cousin A'zz-ud-Din who blocked his path at Khajuha.³⁹ Near Āgra he confronted the hastily assembled hosts of his uncle. Treachery in his camp, combined with improper disposition of his forces, brought defeat upon the head of Jahāndar Shāh, who, with his mistress, fled to Delhi in a bullock cart.⁴⁰ Zu'lfiqār Khān was already making fast for the capital. The fallen emperor took protection with Asad Khān, the *Vakil-i-Mutlaq* who betrayed him to his enemies.⁴¹ For such an act of treachery, he and his son Zu'lfiqār, had to pay dearly; one suffered disgrace, the other was put to death.

Farrukh-siyar ascended the throne burdened with a deep debt of gratitude to his supporters, particularly the Sayyid brothers, Husain 'Ali and 'Abdullah. The latter became the Prime Minister with the title of *Qutb-ul-Mulk*, and the former was appointed *Mir Bakhshi* and was styled *Amir-ul-Umara*. During his seven years of the so-called regal authority, the new emperor was constantly afflicted by mental conflict caused, on the one hand, by his will to assert his power and prerogative, and by his concern, on the other, not to wound the susceptibilities of his benefactors. But in the midst of deceit and dissimulation, his weakness of will prevented him from taking bold decisions and suppressing his enemies. He proved himself unfit to be a sovereign. Fate had raised him to the throne; the very same fate hurled him down from it.

Military Campaigns:

Three military campaigns were undertaken during the reign to suppress the spirit of defiance which was prevailing in northern India. In Mār wār, Ajit Singh had re-asserted his independence, and even occupied Ajmer. The *Amir-ul-Umara* marched against him and pursued him from pillar to post. In the end, Ajit Singh begged for peace which was granted on condition that he gave one of his daughters in marriage to the emperor, sent his son Abhay Singh to the court, and promised to attend in person whenever summoned.⁴² Similarly, an army was sent against Bandā who was compelled to evacuate Lohgarh and retreat to Gurdāspur. Even here he was not allowed to live in peace. The place was stormed and Bandā was forced into submission, brought to Delhi where he was brutally put to death.⁴³ The third military project related to the suppression of the Jats who had again become obnoxious under the leadership of Churāman. He had commenced levying unauthorised road-tolls, terrorised the local *jāgīrdārs* and constructed a stronghold at Thun. Rājā Jay Singh pressed him hard, and Churāman approached the *Vazīr* to secure pardon for him. Farrukh-siyar had to give in.⁴⁴

Party Politics:

Both during the Mār wār and Jat campaigns, factions at the court resorted to underhand dealings. Ajit Singh was encouraged in his opposition to the *Amir-ul-Umara* and was promised rich rewards if he succeeded in frustrating the plans of the latter. During the Jat campaign the *Vazīr* asked Churāman to foil the attempts of Jay Singh.⁴⁵ Such were the earlier rumblings of the violent storm which was to burst upon the political atmosphere. That the emperor did not trust his constitutional adviser, the *Qutb-ul-Mulk*, became a matter of common knowledge—a knowledge which produced a rich crop of intrigues and counter-intrigues.

Thus party politics formed an important phase in the court life during the reign of Farrukh-siyar. But these parties conformed neither to religion, nor to race—nor even to nationalities. As to principles, there was none whatsoever. It were the individuals and their satellites who mattered. Their governing passion was self-interest, and their guiding maxim personal aggrandisement. The Sayyid brothers wanted to lord it over the emperor. Others like Mīr Jumla, Jay Singh and Muhammad Murād Kāshmīri were equally keen to do the same. And none cared for the fairness or foulness of the means to achieve his end. The repercussions of such display of rivalry and disunity were very far-reaching on the fortunes of the empire and disastrous for those of Farrukh-siyar.

Farrukh-siyar and the Sayyid Brothers:

The relations between the emperor and the Sayyid brothers were very much strained from the very beginning. The breach widened with the lapse of time. It was made up temporarily when Farrukh-siyar's favourite, Mīr Jumla, was sent away to Patna, and the *Amir-ul-Umara*, Sayyid Husain 'Ali, left for the Deccan as the Viceroy of the six *subahs* of the Deccan.⁴⁶ The fire of misunderstanding was fanned to full fury again when Mīr Jumla came back from Patna⁴⁷ and the Nizām-ul-Mulk from the Deccan,⁴⁸ and when 'Inayatullah Kāshmīri was appointed *Dīwan-i-Khālsā*,⁴⁹ much against the wishes of the *Vazīr*, Sayyid 'Abdullah. The quest by Farrukh-siyar of a substitute for the *Vazīr* brought the quarrel to a head. The elder Sayyid succeeded in weaning away from the side of the emperor all his adherents. He then sent express messages to his brother in the Deccan asking him to return to Delhi as quickly as possible.

Husain 'Ali and the Peshwā:

To buttress himself against all eventualities, Husain 'Ali opened negotiations with *Peshwā Bālājī Vishwanāth*. The latter demanded the recognition of Shāhū's succession to Shivājī's kingdom, of the right of levying *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* on the six provinces of the Deccan, confirmation of recent Marāthā conquests in Berār, Gondwana, Karnātak and the return of Shāhū's mother and his family to the Deccan. In lieu of these concessions, the *Peshwā* promised to pay a tribute or *peshekush* for the *sardeshmukhi*, to preserve and guard peace in the Deccan, and in return for the *chauth* place 15,000 Marāthā horsemen at the disposal of the Mughul Viceroy. The terms being advantageous to both parties, the bargain was soon struck. But when these were laid before the emperor for final confirmation, he rejected them with indignation.⁵⁰

End of Farrukh-siyar:

Thus commenced the final act in the tragedy of Farrukh-siyar. The more he strove to thwart the plans of the Sayyid brothers, the greater the troubles he had to face. At length Husain 'Ali arrived at Delhi with his Marāthā allies. The city was thrown into a state of alarm and so was the emperor. He now made desperate efforts to undo the mischief by placating the Brothers, but they were impervious to tears and threats alike. Farrukh-siyar had, by this time, been completely isolated. Even his father-in-law, Ajit Singh, deserted him.⁵¹ He was overpowered, arrested, and consigned to prison. He was subjected to all sorts of tortures by his jailors. Bitter and

over-salted dishes were served to him; even slow poisoning was attempted for some time. But he survived all these base experiments. At last, executioners were sent and they strangled him to death in April 1719.⁵² This was the first instance of a sovereign of the Mughul dynasty losing his life at the behest of a noble. The Brothers had to pay for this dastardly crime with their blood.

Rafi'-ud-Darajat:

But for the moment the Sayyids were maddened with their success. They raised to the throne Rafi'-ud-Darajat, a puppet. The Marāthās were permitted to return to the Deccan. They carried with them three *farmans* granting the concessions which they had demanded.⁵³

The Brothers now found they were sticking their hands in a hornets' nest. Their cruelty to Farrukh-siyar was resented by the people of Delhi; their ally Ajit Singh was subjected to insult and ridicule; and their rivals set up Niku-siyar,⁵⁴ another puppet emperor at Agra. Add to this, the growing mistrust and rivalry between the Brothers themselves. The *Vizir* favoured settlement with Niku-siyar; the *Amir-ul-Umara* insisted upon a fight with him. The latter's view prevailed.

Rafi'-ud-Daulah:

Meanwhile Rafi'-ud-Darajat's health began to decline fast, and on his suggestion, the Sayyids raised to the throne his elder brother Rafi'-ud-Daulah on 6 June, 1719. The new sovereign, Shāh Jahān II, was virtually a prisoner, in charge of Sayyid Himmat Khān Barha. He was not permitted to attend the Friday prayers, nor to go out hunting, nor even to converse with any noble, except in the presence of his custodian. He fell ill and died on 17 September 1719.⁵⁵

The tragic end of Farrukh-siyar and the succession of two puppets, one after the other, brought to the fore certain political complications which, in the absence of a master-mind, defied solution. In the first place, it was patent now that henceforward the Mughul emperor was to reign only and not to rule. He was not the master of his destiny; it was to be shaped by others. Secondly, group rivalries became more acute than ever, and conflict of interests rendered the pursuit of a strong and effective imperial policy not only difficult but almost impossible. Zu'lfiqār Khān had advocated pro-Marāthā attitude; but the *Vazir* Mun'im Khān was against it. So the court circle became divided on this vital issue, which continued till 1761. Thirdly, there was clash between the liberal and conservative outlooks. The Sayyid brothers favoured conciliation of the Hindus;

whereas the Turāni leaders like the Nizām-ul-Mulk pressed for the revival of Aurangzīb's methods of coercion and suppression of non-Muslim elements as the only remedy for preserving the integrity of the empire. Even so, if the Brothers befriended the Jāts and the Bundelas, they did not look with a kindly eye on Jay Singh. This was the paradox of the situation. For the moment, however, the Marāthā peril was the gravest, and strenuous efforts were needed to meet it.

Muhammad Shāh:

The '*King-Makers*' now selected another puppet, Prince Roshan-Akhtār, son of the late Khujista Akhtār Jahān Shāh, the fourth son of the emperor Bahādur Shāh. He was proclaimed emperor on 28 September, 1719, and assumed the style of Abul Muzaffar Nasir-ud-din Muhammad Shāh Bādshāh Ghāzi.⁵⁶

Never before did a more care-free sovereign sit on the throne of Delhi. This lad of 17 had passed most of his time within the four walls of the palace, in the society of eunuchs and ladies of the harem. None had cared for his education, because few could foresee the good fortune which lay in store for him. Though fairly intelligent, he never attempted to make of his wits. He was of a generous disposition and never gave his consent to shedding of blood or doing harm to God's creatures. 'Timid and wavering, he was free from insolent pride'. He was a lover of pleasure, indolent and addicted to loose habits. He made it a rule of his life never to decide anything for himself; his favourites did it for him. He readily lent his ears to the advice of others without pausing to reflect upon the consequences of accepting it. He had no initiative, nor even the dash of some of his predecessors. He was utterly ignorant of the elementary rules of the game of politics; he was not even anxious to know them. Rustam 'Alī, the author of *Tārīkh-i-Hind*, says that 'Muhammad Shāh was negligent of his duties; but the fact is that he did not know if he had any duties to perform'. His reign may justly be styled as the period of the ascendancy of favourites.

For full one year after his accession, Muhammad Shāh remained a virtual prisoner in the hands of the Sayyid brothers. He was surrounded by 'numbers of their trusted adherents; and when occasionally, in the course of two or three months, he went out hunting, or for an excursion into the country, they went with him and brought him back'. After the disappearance of the '*King-Makers*' he fell into the clutches of Rahmat-un-Nisā Kōkī Jiu, the eunuch Hāfiz Khidmatgār Khān, the necromancer Shāh 'Abdul Ghaffār, and

Turrahāz Raushan-ud-Daulah Zafar Khān Pānīpatī. In 1732 they were supplanted by Khān Daurān Samsāmud-Daulah and his brother Muzaffar Khān. After their death in 1739, they were succeeded by another set consisting of Amīr Khān, Muhammad Ishāq, Asad Yār, who in 1743 were joined by Safdar Jang.⁵⁷

The reign of Muhammad Shāh divides itself into two broad periods of unequal duration, the dividing point being the invasion of Nādir Shāh. Besides the petty court intrigues, the main interest in the political sphere centres round the steady expansion of the Marāthā influence, and its pressure on imperial possessions. They spread the network of their activity from Gujarāt to Bengal, and from the Narmadā to the Jamunā, and even up to the Rāvi. Their leader was the second Peshwā, Bājī Rāo, the strong man of action. Under his inspiration the Marāthās cut across the limits of the Deccan and carried their arms right to the very heart of the Mughul empire. There was none to obstruct this terrific onrush of their progress.

Fall of the Sayyid Brothers:

The indignities which the Sayyid brothers had heaped upon the royal house had made them sufficiently odious; but in their extreme greed for power, they failed to discover the halter which was speedily closing in round their necks. They conciliated Jay Singh, who never made a secret of his pro-Farrukh-siyar sympathies, by assigning to him the *Sarkar* Sorath in the *Subah* of Ahmadabad.⁵⁸ They suppressed and killed Budh Singh, and seated their ally Bhim Singh on the *gadī* of Būndī.⁵⁹ They attempted to disperse the Turānī group, by sending away Nizām-ul-Mulk to Mālwa. They sent forces against Chhabelā Rām, the rebellious Governor of Allahabad who was devoted to Farrukh-siyar. On his death, his nephew Girdhar Bahādur was persuaded to surrender Allahabad, and in lieu thereof he was made Governor of Awadh and received 30 lakhs of rupees.⁶⁰

So far, events had moved in favour of the Sayyids, but soon alarming reports began to upset their equanimity. The Nizām-ul-Mulk, after reaching Mālwa,⁶¹ gave free play to his ambitions. He marched to the South, defeated and killed in two separate battles Dilawar 'Ali Khān and 'Alam 'Ali Khān, and seized the Deccan *Subah*.⁶² The apple-cart of the Sayyid supremacy was now overturned. The Brothers were now on the horns of a dilemma. 'Abdullah did not trust Husain 'Ali, and neither of the two could count upon the support of a few faithful adherents. After prolonged discussion they decided that 'Abdullah should remain at

Delhi and Husain 'Ali and the emperor should go to the Deccan to deal with Nizām-ul-Mulk.⁶³ This marked the beginning of their end.

Accordingly, Muhammad Shāh and the *Mir Bakhshi* Husain 'Ali left Delhi. They chose the Ajmer route in the hope of meeting Rājā Ajit Singh and reinforcing the imperial army by his Rājputs. Up to Āgra nothing untoward happened. But after the departure from the place, the conspirators became more active. Muhammad Amīn Khān, Qamar-ud-din Khān, Haidar Qulī Khān, Mīr Jumla, Sayyid Muhammad Amīn and Sa'ādat Khān began to think out schemes for the assassination of the *Mir Bakhshi*. They even succeeded in winning over the emperor's mother. At last on 8 October, 1720, their plans bore fruit, and Husain 'Ali was stabbed to death.⁶⁴ This was followed by the arrest of Ratan Chand and Muhkham Singh Jāt who were the supporters of the *Qutb-ul-Mulk* 'Abdullah.⁶⁵ The very next day after the murder of Husain 'Ali, Muhammad Shāh appointed Muhammad Amīn Khān minister and other conspirators were rewarded by promotion to higher ranks or offices. The conspirators then marched northward against 'Abdullah and the imperial army reached Hasanpur, fifty miles south of Delhi on 14 November, 1720.

When 'Abdullah heard of the assassination of his brother, he remonstrated with the emperor against the perfidy and demanded dire punishment of the miscreants. Not being hopeful of a favourable response from Muhammad Shāh, he set up a rival at Delhi in the person of Prince Ibrāhīm, brother of Rafī'-ud-Daulah and proceeded to meet the advancing imperial army. But 'Abdullah suffered a crushing defeat at the battle of Hasanpur. He was taken prisoner and handed over to the charge of Haidar Qulī. He was poisoned and killed two years later, and was buried by the side of his mistress Kesar Bai.⁶⁶

Gujarāt:

After the fall of the Sayyid brothers, thanks to the pusillanimity of the central government, the distant provinces of the empire began to yield rapidly to the Marāthā incursions. Gujarāt witnessed a conflict between the representatives of Nizām-ul-Mulk and Sarbūland Khān to whom the province had been assigned after the former's resignation from the *vizarat*.⁶⁷ Though Sarbūland Khān succeeded in expelling his rival's nominees, he failed to prevent the Marāthās from overrunning the province, their help having been purchased by Nizām-ul-Mulk.⁶⁸ He was replaced by Abhay Singh in

1730, and to overawe the Marāthās he assassinated one of their leaders, Pilāji Gaikwār.⁶⁹ This occasioned a widespread upheaval among the local population. Pilāji's brother Mahādaji seized Baroda;⁷⁰ his eldest son Damāji reduced eastern Gujarāt and even invaded Jodhpur. Gujarāt was finally lost to the empire in 1737.

Mālwa:

Nizām-ul-Mulk remained, with a few breaks, the governor of Mālwa till 1724. After this, the vigorous administration of Girdhar Bahādur and his nephew Dayā Bahādur, along with the pre-occupation of the *Peshwā* elsewhere, reduced Marāthā fortunes here to the lowest ebb for two years—1726-27. But the very next year the *Peshwā* despatched a large army under his brother Chimnāji Appā. He defeated and killed Girdhar Bahādur and Dayā Bahādur and the Mughul administration in South Mālwa collapsed completely.⁷¹ Jay Singh and Muhammad Khān Bangash made some attempts to retrieve the situation, but in vain. In 1736, Bāji Rāo made demands asking for virtual control over Mālwa, Bundelkhand, Bengal and the Deccan.⁷² Next year (1738 Jan.) he defeated the Nizām-ul-Mulk at Bhopal and compelled him to sign a convention whereby (a) the whole of Mālwa was granted to the *Peshwā*, and (b) also the right to levy tribute from the Rājās in the region between the Narmadā and the Chambal.⁷³ After the invasion of Nādir Shāh, Jay Singh was once more appointed as Viceroy of Mālwa; but he gave up in despair the task entrusted to him. He came to terms with the Marāthās and ceded the province to them in 1741.

Bundelkhand:

Barring a few intervals of peace, Bundelkhand had remained constantly in a state of unrest against the imperial authority ever since the reign of Shāh Jahān. The valiant Bundela leader Chhatrasāl joined Bahādur Shāh in his struggle against Kām Bakhsh and vigorously participated in the campaign against the Sikhs. He appears to have done little to embitter his relations with the imperial power till the end of Farrukh-siyar's reign. But after Muhammad Shāh's accession he could not refrain from anti-Sayyid activities. At the instigation of Budh Singh Hadā he created trouble on the borders of Mālwa between Āgra and Allahabad.

In 1720 Muhammad Khān Bangash was appointed to the *Subah* of Allahabad and he decided to deal with the Bundelas who had sacked Kalpi and extended help to the rebel Girdhar Bahādur at Allahabad.⁷⁴ The Bangash army succeeded in ejecting the insur-

gents from Kalpi, but its leader Dīler Khān was defeated and killed by Chhatrasāl. The Bundelas now overran the entire Bundelkhand and though by the end of 1728 they had been driven to bay, the enemies of Muhammad Khān encouraged Chhatrasāl to continue his resistance. Further support came to him from the *Peshwā*. When the Bundela leader died in 1731, the Marāthās occupied a part of the province and the imperial hold over it became very feeble.⁷⁵

Rājputānā:

Rājputānā too, began gradually to slip out of the imperial sphere of influence. The inter-state politics of the region became complicated and unsettled. Jay Singh of Amber was ambitious and restless, and was keen to assert his supremacy over other Rājput States. He reduced Būndī to the status of a vassal by removing Budh Singh and placing Dalel Singh on the throne.⁷⁶ In Mālwa he pursued the policy of appeasing the Marāthās, but he had to return home disappointed. Subsequently in April 1734, Malhār Rāo Holkar and Rāņoji Sindia stormed Būndī, carried off the Regent, Salim Singh and restored Budh Singh.⁷⁷ They even extended support to Anand Singh and Rāj Singh against Abhay Singh in Mārwar. The Maharaja remained helpless and could do nothing when the Marāthā generals swooped upon Rampura.⁷⁸

Jay Singh convened a conference of all the Rājput chiefs at Hurda on July 17, 1734, to explore ways and means for keeping the Marāthās south of the Narmadā, and although they signed an agreement for joint efforts, it virtually remained a dead letter because of the absence of a common bond of interest among them. Abhay Singh was engrossed in his ambition of extending his domain in Gujarāt; Budh Singh was preoccupied in his feud with Dalel Singh and Mahārāņā Jagat Singh considered his elephant fights more important than keeping off the common enemy.⁷⁹

In 1735, the Marāthās burst into Rājputānā, and Malhār Rāo and Rāņoji Sindia after routing the imperial troops converged on Jaipur, Kotāh and Būndī. Next year they plundered Udaipur, Ajmer, Roopnagar and Merta. In distress, Jay Singh in consultation with Khān-i-Daurān, extended an invitation to *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo to come to Jaipur to discuss terms, but the effort proved fruitless. But after Nādīr Shāh's invasion, the situation became favourable and Jay Singh succeeded in persuading the emperor Muhammad Shāh to grant the deputy-governorship of Mālwa to the *Peshwā* (1741). In this way, inadvertently he opened the flood-gates of the Marāthā

advance into Rājputānā. When he died in 1743, the political situation in that region became still more complicated. Būndī, Kotāh and Jaipur became involved in internal strifes and the Marāthās began to take sides.

Awadh:

It was during this period that Awadh became a strong and almost semi-independent political unit. The credit for this change goes to Mīr Muhammad Amīn, surnamed Sa'ādat Khān, who was appointed governor of this province in September 1722.⁸⁰ He seized Lucknow from the Shaikhzadas, suppressed the refractory chiefs e.g., the Kanhpurias of Tiloi, the Bais of Baiswara and the Chandels of Chachendi; and in this way enlarged his possessions.⁸¹ He was held in esteem by Muhammad Shāh, because of the part he had played in the conspiracy against the Sayyids. Indeed, it was Muhammad Amīn, who after the assassination of Husain 'Ali, forced his way into the ladies' apartment taking the head of the Sayyid in his hand, and with the humblest apologies snatched the emperor from the lap of the Queen-mother and brought him out into the open to assure the conspirators and alarm the enemies. It was in his life-time that he secured the deputy governorship of Awadh for his nephew and son-in-law, Abul Mansur Safdar Jang.

The Jāts:

Near the capital, the Jats had for a long time been a source of trouble. Their leader, Churāman, was an active partisan of the Sayyid brothers whom he followed like a shadow. He was with the army of Husain 'Ali at the time of the deposition of Farrukh-siyar. and accompanied him to Āgra to fight Niku-siyar. After the assassination of his patron, he was persuaded to join Muhammad Shāh; but he went over to 'Abdullah and created much confusion in the rear of the imperial army. He now set up as an independent chief, and allying himself with Ajit Singh of Mārwar sent assistance to the Bundelas to keep the imperialists busy in the east. But his leadership was seriously imperilled when he at first imprisoned his nephew Badan Singh, and then released him at the intercession of other Jat Chiefs.

In 1720 Sa'ādat Khan was appointed *subahdar* of Āgra with specific instructions to deal with the Jat insurgents. But his deputy, Nilkanth Nagar, was defeated by Muhkam Singh, the son of Churāman. Upon this Sa'ādat Khan was removed from his post and was replaced by Jay Singh. Churāman having committed suicide, the

new *subahdar* took up the cause of Badan Singh, and expelled the sons of the late Thākūr from Thun. Badan Singh was now installed on the *gadi*. Within a very short time he became powerful, shook off his dependence upon Jaipur, and dominated over the entire districts of Āgra and Mathura. He arrogated to himself the title of *Braj Rāj* and built a strong fortress at Dig. His followers plundered a portion of Nādir Shāh's treasure when he was retreating towards the Punjab.⁸²

Recall of Nizām-ul-Mulk:

It was in this atmosphere of distraction and disintegration that Muhammad Shāh and his court minions were almost compelled to select a suitable person to deal with the perilous situation. The task was evidently beyond them. They now began to make a frantic search for a talented administrator who might stave off the impending doom. Their choice fell on Nizām-ul-Mulk, who was once more summoned from the Deccan. He arrived at the capital on July 12, 1737, and was accorded a warm welcome. He was appointed governor of Mālwa superseding Bājī Rāo, and also governor of Āgra vice Rājā Jay Singh. He started for the former province to drive away the Marāthās; but he had to sign a disgraceful convention at Bhopal on 7 January, 1738.⁸³

Nādir Shāh's Invasion:

Meanwhile, the spectre of a foreign invasion began to loom large over the political horizon of the western parts of the Mughul empire. Nādir Qulī, after consolidating his position in Persia, had assumed the title of Shāh-in-Shāh. He was warlike and ambitious and was keen to earn a name and fame and to raise his country to the glory which it had enjoyed under the Safavi rulers. He entertained aggressive designs both eastward and westward. He came into conflict with the Turks and he sent troops to punish the governors of Bālkh and Andkhūd. He then decided to conquer Qandahār, which was a running sore to the security of his eastern possessions. He won remarkable success in this enterprise. Where Mughul princes like Aurangzīb and Dārā Shukoh had met with disgrace and disaster, Nādir Shāh scored a decisive victory. He captured Qandahār by storming his way into it.⁸⁴

But he had purchased his victory at a very heavy price. To collect adequate resources for the Qandahār campaign, he had despoiled the inhabitants of Gombroon, and so denuded the province of Kirmān that it was exposed to famine for seven or eight years

afterwards. Contributions were extorted from other parts of the empire as well. In short, in his hour of triumph, financial stringency impeded his further conquests. If he was to implement his future plans, he had to replenish his treasury as speedily as possible. And here lay the genesis of his Indian invasion. What encouraged him in his design was the growing weakness of the Mughul empire and the information about the enormous wealth of India, which his successive ambassadors must have conveyed to him. In the words of Lockhart: "With the spoil of India he could raise and pay more the Afghan and Uzbek levies, and so renew war with Turks; besides by invading the Punjab, he would be following the example of Alexander the Great, Mahmood Ghazni, and thereby merit the title of 'World Conqueror'."^{84a} Thus the real motive for the invasions was the greed for wealth.

It is also suggested by some Indian and European writers that both Nizām-ul-Mulk and Sa'adat Khān, the two rivals in the Mughul court, had invited Nādir Shāh to invade India.⁸⁵ But these allegations need definite and decisive proofs. It is likely that rumours to this effect might have been circulated by interested parties. Dr. Yusuf Husain Khān has rejected the allegation against Nizām-ul-Mulk. He says: "Most probably the party of Samsām-ud-Daulah and Rājā Jay Singh was responsible for spreading this rumour in order to discredit Nizām-ul-Mulk in the eyes of the Emperor", and cover up their own incompetence. As to Sa'adat Khān, his behaviour and conduct throughout the tragic episode belies the presumption of his complicity. Hanway has rightly remarked, 'it appears to me that Nādir did not stand in need of such instruments for the execution of his ambitious designs.'^{85a}

Apart from 'the greed for wealth, the immediate pretext for the invasion of India was the alleged disregard for Nādir Shāh's repeated requests to the Mughul emperor to desist from affording asylum to the Afghān rebels. Indeed, even after the siege of Qandahār had commenced, the Mughul authorities did nothing to close the western frontier against the refugees. And when Muhammad Khān Turkman, the Persian envoy, delivered in person the protest of his master to the emperor Muhammad Shāh, instead of giving any straight reply, his advisers wasted their time in the controversy as to how to address the Persian upstart. Thus the envoy was unduly detained much to the chagrin of Nādir Shāh who had explicitly directed him not to prolong his stay beyond forty days.⁸⁶

Muhammad Khān Turkman had been preceded by two other envoys viz., 'Alī Mardan Khān Shāmlu and Muhammad 'Alī Khān.

They had brought similar requests; but they had received evasive replies. What added fuel to the fire was the murder of two Persian couriers who had been sent to Delhi under escort to bring news of Muhammad Khān Turkman. Nādir Shāh's patience was exhausted and his ire was inflamed to the highest pitch. He marched straight to Ghaznī. While leaving this place, to cover up his real intentions, he sent word to the *Kotwal* of Kābul assuring him that he had no territorial ambitions, that he only wanted to extirpate the fugitive Afghāns and that he was expecting hospitality on his arrival there. He used Qandahār as a vital base for his Indian expedition. His onward journey was uninterrupted. He arrived at Ghaznī from where he marched to Kābul which he occupied after a brief resistance on the part of the commander of the citadel, Shirzā Khān. Here again, he professed his friendly intentions towards the Mughul emperor saying that his sole object was to punish the rebel Afghāns and that he had no territorial designs. He also accredited an envoy to the Court of Delhi, but the envoy was killed at Jalalabad. Soon, however, Nādir Shāh ruthlessly avenged the murder and sacked the town of Jalalabad.⁸⁷

It would be erroneous to believe that the political leaders at Delhi were totally unaware of the reaction which the political developments in Persia would have on the situation in India. The shrewd Nizām-ul-Mulk had advised the Mughul emperor to extend a helping hand to the ruler of that country⁸⁸ and had volunteered to go there himself. But Muhammad Shāh took the matter lightly and failed to come to any decision. Ultimately, when Nādir Shāh came out victorious, Nāsir Khān, the governor of Peshāwar and Kābul, sent a note of warning and appealed for reinforcements.⁸⁹ To his representatives, the *Amir-ul Umara Khān-i-Daurān* replied, "know you not that I am a man of too great experience to be caught by such stories that are often made up to extort gold my house is in the plain and my imagination only dwells on what my eyes can see. Your house is on the mountains and perhaps from its summit you have caught a glimpse of the Persian host."⁹⁰ When such was the estimate of the *Mir Bakhshi* of the empire, what preparation could be made for the defence of the western frontier? The inevitable happened. Indeed, the court atmosphere was so surcharged with intrigue, neglect and indifference, that it was impossible to have a clear picture of the crisis which had developed.

Nādir Shāh left Jalalabad and marched towards Peshāwar. Meanwhile Nāsir Khān had, by his own exertions and at his own initiative, collected 20,000 Afghāns whom he had stationed in the

Khyber Pass to check the progress of the Persian army. But by making a detour the Persian invader avoided confrontation with the Afghāns and taking an unfrequented route, he entered the Bāzar valley, and advanced towards Jamrud. On the way, he came face to face with Nāsir Khān's Indo-Afghān troops which he drove back with heavy losses. Nāsir Khān and a number of his officers were taken prisoners.⁹¹

The Afghāns posted in Khyber pass having taken to flight, the way was clear for Nādīr's baggage train and artillery which joined him in full strength. Peshāwar was easily occupied, and the region between Peshāwar and the Indus was thoroughly sacked. A bridge was constructed at Attock and the Persian army crossed over to the other side. It then marched towards Wazirabad and crossed the Jhelum without any difficulty. At Kunja Mazra, (Irvine reads it as Kacha Mirza), an Indian army led by Qalandar Khān barred the enemy's advance; but the general was killed and his troops were dispersed.⁹² Nādīr Shāh resumed his march and crossed the Chenab. On his way to Lahore the entire region was subjected to wanton plunder. Near Lahore, the Mughul governor Zakariyah Khān had deployed his troops along the Rāvi. But because of inadequacy of numbers and carelessness of the imperial officers to send reinforcements, he considered it discreet to come to terms with the invaders. He made an abject surrender and by offering a gift of 20 lakhs of rupees and several elephants he saved his skin and the property and honour of the people of Lahore.⁹³ Nādīr Shāh stopped here for twelve days. He restored to Zakariyah Khān the governorship of Lahore and gave to Nāsir Khān the *subahdari* of Kābul and Peshāwar. He then marched to Sirhind where he arrived on February 16, 1739. From here he sent out 6,000 Kurdish cavalry under the command of Hājī Khān to reconnoitre the Indian position.⁹⁴

From Sirhind he set out for Ambala where he deposited his heavy baggage and harem. He then advanced to Shahabad, thirty-four miles north of Karnāl. Meanwhile, his Kurdish patrols had come into conflict with Indian forces, and many of them were killed and captured. From Ambala he marched to 'Azimabad where he planned his strategy to meet the Indian army. From 'Azimabad he marched towards Karnāl crossing the 'Alī Mardan canal. At the head of some of his bodyguard, the Shāh rode up to the Indian camp, but returned quietly without hazarding a battle.

The fall of Ghaznī should have opened the eyes of the emperor Muhammad Shāh to the grave peril which was threatening the

Mughul empire. But he paid no heed to it, and he and his advisers remained absolutely inactive.⁹⁵ They awoke only after Kābul had been occupied by the Persians and the Indus had been crossed by them. Now feverish efforts were made to stem the tide which was raging in full fury. The *Amir-ul-Umara* sent urgent messages to Rājput princes to arrive at Delhi and stave off the impending catastrophe. But there was no response worth the name. They remained silent spectators of the tragedy.

The emperor summoned Burhān-ul-Mulk, Sa'ādat Khān, from Awadh,⁹⁶ but did not wait for his arrival. He immediately held a council of war with Nizām-ul-Mulk, Khān-i-Daurān and Itimād-ud-Daulah and decided that the nobles should march to Karnāl and wait for the enemy there. The number of combatants in the Indian army at the moment was about 75,000. The imperialists pitched their camp and laid out fortifications to defend their position. Shortly after, arrived Sa'ādat Khān with his exhausted and tired troops. He went to pay his respects to the emperor. Meanwhile, news was brought to him that the Persians were plundering his baggage. Upon this he could not restrain himself. He hurriedly left the audience, called his men to arms and rushed to save his baggage. Evidently his action was not only desperate, but unwise and impetuous. It left no time to the imperial army to work out a planned strategy to meet the enemy. When Sa'ādat Khān emerged from the imperial camp, the Persians feigned retreat. He moved ahead to pursue them, and thus he lost all contacts with the base. Realising the gravity of his situation he sent urgent appeals to the emperor for speedy help. After much discussions Khān-i-Daurān with about 8,000 or 9,000 cavalry was sent to the assistance of Sa'ādat Khān. But the imperial *Mir Bakhshi* was only a carpet knight, ignorant of military tactics. He knew only how to brag.

Thus a minor action developed up into the battle of Karnāl.⁹⁷ The Persians with regular volleys of swivel guns slaughtered a considerable number of Sa'ādat Khān's men. But the Khān stood his ground firmly. At this critical juncture arrived Khān-i-Daurān, and though the two combined chiefs offered brave resistance, they could not reverse the situation. Khān-i-Daurān was fatally wounded in the face and fell unconscious in the *howdah*. Likewise Sa'ādat Khān also received two wounds. Even when everything had been lost, he went on boldly shooting arrows to resist capture. At the last moment, at the instance of a young Persian of Naishāpur, he surrendered and was carried a prisoner to the camp of Nādir Shāh.

It appears strange that emperor Muhammad Shāh, his Vazīr Qamar-ud-dīn and his adviser Nizām-ul-Mulk should have complacently watched the terrible carnage which was going on before their very eyes. The Indian left wing under their commands remained intact to the last. It could have advanced to the succour of the hard-pressed imperial forces. Only two explanations may be given for this criminal and heartless inactivity. Either Nizām-ul-Mulk was taking a malicious pleasure in the humiliation of his two rivals, or otherwise he considered it futile to combat the superior tactics of Nādir Shāh. Anyway, it is difficult to defend his reprehensible conduct.

When Sa'adat Khān was led into audience of Nādir Shāh, he tactfully answered the questions put to him. He proclaimed his loyalty to the Mughul emperor, though he hailed from the same country as Nādir Shāh. He impressed upon the latter that there were still vast resources at the disposal of Muhammad Shāh and that he was in a position to fight on equal terms. He advised him to send for Nizām-ul-Mulk, who was the 'key of the empire', and negotiate with him. Accordingly, an invitation was sent through a trustworthy person, with a copy of the *Holy Quran* as a guarantee for good faith. In view of the past attitude of Nādir Shāh, the Mughul emperor apprehended treachery on his part; but the Nizām dispelled all such doubts from his mind and went to the Persian camp along with his nephew 'Azimullah Khān Bahādur.

He succeeded in negotiating peace with the Persian invader on the following terms:

- (1) That the Persian army would not advance towards Delhi, provided an indemnity of 50 lakhs of rupees was paid to the invader.
- (2) That out of this stipulated amount, 20 lakhs would be paid immediately—10 lakhs at Lahore, 10 lakhs at Attock, and the balance at Kābul.
- (3) That no territorial annexations would be made.⁹⁸

Evidently the terms were satisfactory to both the parties and the Nizām returned to the Mughul camp with flying colours. This was followed by a visit of emperor Muhammad Shāh to the Persian camp, where he was received with great honour and consideration. Everybody now thought that the storm had blown over and that the empire would regain its peace and would be saved from further bloodshed. But this was not to be. The mutual jealousy between Nizām-ul-Mulk and Burhān-ul-Mulk irretrievably upset the terms of

peace which had been concluded and on which the ink was not yet dry.

When Muhammad Shāh returned to his camp, he was apprised of the death of Khān-i-Daurān. He immediately conferred on Nizām-ul-Mulk the title and post of the deceased noble.⁹⁹ This was bitterly resented by Burhān-ul-Mulk Sa'ādat Khān, who himself had for some time past been coveting the post of *Mir Bakhshi*. Casting to the winds his loyalty to the emperor and his devotion to the country of his adoption, he became eager to take full revenge on his rival, the Nizām. He impressed upon Nādir Shāh that he had been duped by the latter who would have agreed to pay much more. He suggested to him to take Muhammad Shāh, the Nizām and others into custody, march to Delhi and make himself master of the immense treasures in store there. Nādir Shāh accepted the suggestion, because it was after his heart. To make his assurance doubly sure, Sa'ādat Khān summoned his troops from the Mughul camp and quartered them near the Persian army.

For the next few days there was a lull in the atmosphere; but the storm was steadily brewing. Nizām-ul-Mulk was again invited to the Persian camp and on his arrival there, he was asked to furnish twenty crores of rupees in addition to 20,000 cavalry to serve under the Shāh. When he pleaded his inability, he was placed under surveillance. Similarly the emperor Muhammad Shāh, *Vazīr Qamar-ud-dīn* and the royal harem were also placed in custody. Sa'ādat Khān was elevated to the post of *Vakil-i-Mutlaq*, and along with Tahmāsp Khān Jalā'ir was sent to Delhi with instructions to the governor Lutf-ullah Khān Sadiq to hand over the keys of the imperial palaces and establishments. Preparations were begun at the capital for the reception of the two monarchs—one a captive and the other a victor.

They left Karnāl on 12 March and after six days arrived in Shālīmar Gardens near Delhi. The emperor was permitted to enter the city beforehand to enable him to accord a suitable welcome to his honourable visitor. On March 20, Nādir Shāh entered Delhi in a magnificent procession headed by 100 elephants each of which had several *Jazairchis*. Nādir Shāh himself was mounted on a horse. Near the fort, he was greeted with the booming of guns, and the emperor received him at the gate with great pomp and show and placed before his guest all the royal treasures and jewels. After this Nādir Shāh took up his residence near the *Diwān-i-khās* in the palace built by Shāh Jahān, while the emperor occupied a building

near Asad Burj or Lion Tower. Next day (March 21) the *Khutba* was read in all the mosques of Delhi in Nādir Shāh's name and coins were also struck in his name.

Sa'adat Khān, though high in favour with the Persian invader, was feeling distressed at his inability to collect the large amount which he had promised. Afraid of being slighted on that account, he committed suicide. But contemporary historians have given different versions regarding his death. 'Abdul Karim attributes it to excessive pain in his leg; Abul Qāsim Lāhori attributes it to some bodily ailment; but Har Charan Dās definitely says that "as Nādir Shāh demanded the sum he had promised, Sa'adat Khān took diamond powder to save his name and honour and died the following morning." Rustam 'Alī in his *Tārīkh-i-Hind* gives more details. According to him "Nādir Shāh publicly abused Nizām-ul-Mulk and Sa'adat Khān and threatened them with corporal punishment." To save themselves from dishonour they made a suicide pact; but the Nizām did not abide by it, whereas Sa'adat Khān 'like a true soldier drank a cup of poison and departed to the next world'.¹⁰⁰

When the exchange of courtesies between the two monarchs was over, towards the close of the day Nādir Shāh retired to his own palace. But in the city wild rumours were spread that he had met with untimely death or had been seized or imprisoned by the orders of the emperor. None cared to verify the truth and great commotion arose. Mobs collected at various nooks and corners and, in the excitement, began to attack the *Qizilbāsh* troops in the town. The Persians were in a state of consternation because of the reports of their master's death. Thus about 3,000 of them fell a prey to the wanton attacks on the part of the people of the capital. Add to this, the indiscretion of two Indian nobles, Sayyid Niyāz Khān and Shāh Nawāz Khān, who collected 500 men, raided the royal elephant stables, killed the superintendent and removed the elephants.

At first Nādir Shāh refused to believe the reports of the disturbance and blamed his own men for stirring up the trouble. But when two of his *Yaswals*, sent one after the other to inquire and ascertain the true state of affairs had been mercilessly killed, he sent a body of his troops to quell the rioters; but owing to darkness and smallness of their members, they failed to restore order. The Persians passed the whole night under arms and next morning the Shāh rode through the streets to the Golden Mosque in Chāndni Chowk. On the way a bullet missed him, but killed one of his officers. Mounting the roof of the mosque, red with anger, he ordered a general massacre of the inhabitants of the capital. "The

Persian troops began their dreadful carnage at 9.00 a.m. The soldiers forced their way into shops and houses killing the occupants and laying violent hands on anything of value. The money-changers' bazar and the shops of jewellers and merchants were set on fire and destroyed, all the occupants perishing in the flames. No distinction was made between the innocent and the guilty, male and female, old and young."^{100a} While the work of death and destruction was going on, Nādir Shāh remained sitting in the mosque with his drawn sword beside him. The massacre continued for about six hours. It is difficult to give the exact number of lives lost. It varies from 8,000 to 40,000. Sir Jadunath Sarkar puts it at 20,000, besides several hundred women who committed suicide. This dark day has become proverbial in the history of India and Nādir Shāh stands as a symbol of pitiless cruelty and wanton disregard for human life. The streets of Delhi remained littered with corpses for several days; but at length Nādir Shāh directed the *kotwal* to burn them. Timber from the wrecked houses provided fuel for funeral pyres, on which the bodies of Muhammadans and Hindus were burnt without distinction of creed and caste. Many thousands of corpses were collected and thrown into the Jamuna.

At the fervent appeal of the emperor Muhammad Shāh conveyed to Nādir Shāh by Nizām-ul-Mulk and Qamar-ud-dīn Khān, he ordered his soldiers to halt the carnage. But Sayyid Niyāz Khān and Shāh Nawāz Khān were not allowed any respite. They were captured and put to death. The heavy bloodshed satisfied only the beastly instincts of the Persian invader and earned for him everlasting hatred. His lust for gold had not yet been satisfied. 'His agents went from house to house to prepare inventories of the properties of the citizens of Delhi. Nizām-ul-Mulk Itimād-ud-Daulah and Sarbūland Khān were appointed to supervise the collection work. The capital was assessed at two crores.' According to one author, Nādir Shāh obtained from the emperor, his nobles and people about 70,00,000 rupees.^{100b} Anand Rām has aptly remarked "the accumulated wealth of 348 years changed hands in a moment." Next to the famous Peacock throne, there was the *Koh-i-Nur* diamond which Nādir Shāh grabbed with avidity.¹⁰¹ Besides these he also confiscated the properties of Khān-i-Daurān and Muzaffar Khān. Then he sent a strong contingent of Persian troops to Awadh to bring the treasures of Burhān-ul-Mulk.

Having thus gratified his lust for money, Nādir demanded the hand of a Mughul princess for his son Nasrullāh. His demand could not be refused and a great grand-daughter of Aurangzīb was married

to him. To celebrate the occasion, Nādir ordered illuminations, display of fire-works and lavish entertainments. The people of Delhi were in a state of mourning, but the despoiler Nādir Shāh was in a festive mood. His Indian adventure was not only most successful but was also the most glorious event of his life.

Summer having advanced, any further stay in this country was inconvenient. So Nādir Shāh held a *darbar* on May 12 to which he invited the emperor and the principal nobles and in their presence placed the crown on his head and conferred robes of honour on others. In this way, he vindicated the long-standing claim of the Persian rulers, of their superiority to the Mughul sovereigns whom they had regarded as their beneficiaries, because they had extended help to Bābur and given asylum to Humāyūn and several other princes of the Chaghtai family. Finally, he gave some advice to Muhammad Shāh on the art of government and exhorted the nobles to obey him promising all help in case of emergency. "He also warned the emperor particularly against Nizām-ul-Mulk whom he had found to be cunning, self-seeking and more ambitious than became a subject".¹⁰²

He marched out of Delhi on 16 May, 1739. His homeward journey was not without mishap. His long and richly laden baggage train consisting of, besides costly jewels and cash, hundreds of camels, mules and elephants, was subjected to plunder and loot by the hardy and daring peasants of the Punjab. He occasionally put some of them to sword; but they would not desist. Thus trudging his way, he returned home via Peshāwar and Kābul.

Nādir's invasion was in the nature of a holocaust. It is a record of wholesale destruction, blood-curdling massacre, plunder and rapine. It gave a severe blow to the Mughul empire. Moreover, it proved to be the harbinger of future invasions of Ahmad Shāh Abdālī and led to the horrible tragedy of Pānīpat. It shook the nerves of many Indian politicians and statesmen. The French, the English and the Dutch trading companies were also frightened. Rājā Jay Singh of Amber sent his family to Udaipur. Peshwā Bājī Rāo was so alarmed that he asked Chimnāji Appā to abandon his campaign against the Portuguese and to join him as speedily as possible. He made peace with his enemy in Central India exclaiming, "there is now but one enemy in Hindustān." In fact, the entire sub-continent was terribly shaken.

The imperial court, after the departure of Nādir Shāh, presented a tragic picture of confusion and discord. Gone was its famous glamour and gone its wealth which had dazzled even the foreigners. Of the older nobles, Jay Singh had already retired to his own coun-

try; Nizām-ul-Mulk was called away to the Deccan to meet the Marāthā pressure on his possessions; and Sa'ādat Khān was dead. As to Itimād-ud-Daulah Qamar-ud-dīn Khān, his indolence and licentiousness had rendered him a broken reed. The younger men who stepped into the political void were a band of self-seekers, unfit to discharge their responsibilities in conditions of constant strife and struggle. The empire began to disintegrate more rapidly than ever before.

The Rohillas:

The Rohillas under the leadership of 'Alī Muhammad Khān were steadily pushing on their conquests in all directions. They were being secretly supported by Qaim Khān Bangash, the successor of Muhammad Khān and by the *Vazīr* Qamar-ud-dīn.¹⁰³ In this way they had become a veritable source of danger to Safdar Jang of Awadh who had now worked himself into the favour of Muhammad Shāh. At the instance of the former, a campaign against the Rohillas was sanctioned. On this occasion was exposed the total bankruptcy of the military leadership of the emperor's favourites. In the end, upon the intervention of the *Vazīr*, 'Alī Muhammad tendered his submission. He was sent away to Sirhind. When Ahmad Shāh Abdālī entered Lahore, he opened negotiations with him and succeeded in recovering Rohilkhand in 1748.¹⁰⁴

Bengal:

In the distant provinces of Bengal, Bihār and Orissa, conditions were no better. The governor owned only vague allegiance to Delhi. Shortly after the invasion of Nādir Shāh, 'Alī Vardi Khān killed his master Sarfarāz Khān, Governor of Bengal, and secured the recognition of his title by bribing the emperor.¹⁰⁵ But his claim for the possession of Orissa was disputed by a relation of the former *subahdar* of Bengal, who invited the intervention of the Marāthās. Henceforward, the three provinces in the east were subjected to a series of Marāthā incursions, till in 1746 Orissa passed into the possession of Raghūjī Bhonsle. From the Bengal revenue twelve lakhs of rupees a year had to be paid to Raghūjī as *chauth* for that province according to the treaty concluded in May 1751.

The Punjab:

At the time of Nādir Shāh's invasion, the governor of the Punjab was Zakariyah Khān. At the invader's instance, Multan was added to his charge and he was created an eight-hazari. But when he died in 1745, a civil war broke out among his sons, one of whom invited

Ahmad Shāh Abdālī to come to his assistance. The invitation was responded to with alacrity.¹⁰⁶

Ahmad Shāh Abdālī:

Ahmad Shāh was originally a general of Nādir Shāh, who, after the latter's assassination, proclaimed himself king. He occupied Kābul and Peshāwar, crossed the Indus and seized Lahore. He then marched towards Delhi. When the emperor received the report of his advance, he despatched a large army under the *Vazīr* Qamar-ud-dīn Khān, the *Mir Atish* Safdar Jang, and Ishwari Singh. They were later on joined by Prince Ahmad. The imperial army marched to Karnāl, and passing Sirhind crossed the Sutlej. But the invader had crossed the same river at a different place and occupied Sirhind. The Mughuls thereupon turned round and commenced their backward march. They contacted the enemy near Sirhind, and inflicting a crushing defeat on Ahmad Shāh, pursued him up to Lahore. But just on the eve of the battle, the *Vazīr* Qamar-ud-dīn was hit by a cannon-ball and killed. Shortly after, the emperor who had been ailing for some time, also breathed his last (25-6 April 1748).¹⁰⁷

Between the death of Aurangzīb in 1707 A.D. and that of Muhammad Shāh in 1748, the imperial politics passed through a tortuous course of base intrigues, underhand dealings, treachery and bloodshed. But strangely enough though the empire was falling to pieces, the name of the Mughul emperor and his titular supremacy had still some prestige left. He was recognised sovereign as much by the aggressive Marāthās as by the succession States of Bengal, Awadh, Rohilkhand and Hyderabad. Even the Rājputs did not repudiate formal allegiance to him. The *sikka* was struck and the *Khutba* was recited everywhere in his name. The ruler of Hyderabad styled himself Nizām-ul-Mulk and that of Awadh styled himself *Nawāb Vazīr*. Similarly, no other chief either cared or dared to assume the supreme title of king or emperor.

Another feature of Muhammad Shāh's long reign of twenty-eight years is reflected in the growth of cliques and groups in the court to which some reference has already been made. They were neither based on religious affinity, nor on any healthy political principles. They came into existence and changed their complexion and composition in the context of the interest of an individual or a group of individuals. Similarly, loyalty to the emperor was conspicuous by its absence among them, though some of them enjoyed special favours of the sovereign and were called as "King's favourites". Others came together to promote or pursue a policy which was of ad-

vantage to them. And in this background certain queer combinations may be noted. Zu-'fikār Khān, an Irānī, was supported by 'Abdus-Samad Khān, a Turāni, Dāu'd Khān Panni, an Afghān, and Rājputs like Rāo Singh Hada and Rāo Dalpat Bundela. The Sayyid brothers sought the co-operation of the Turānis, although they were deemed to be pro-Haindustani. The Turāni-Muhammad Amin Khān and Irānī Sa'ādat Khan joined hands to bring about the downfall of the Sayyid brothers. Later on Vazīr Qamar-ud-dīn Khān, Sa'ādat Khān, Muhammad Khān Bangash and Rājā Abhay Singh formed one group, while Khān-i-Daurān, Jay Singh and some other Afghān *amārs* formed the opposite party. Even Nizām-ul-Mulk came to terms with the Marāthās, whom he bitterly hated. Besides these ever-shifting groups, there were the favourites of the emperor who also had a hand in shaping contemporary politics and in interfering with administrative details.

A third feature of this reign was the growing licentiousness both among the royalty and the nobility. Muhammad Shāh and his Vazīr Qamar-ud-dīn closely resembled each other in their habits and temperament and they were inseparables. Their example was eagerly imitated by other *amārs*. And soon the imperial court became a centre of jest and frivolity much to the annoyance and disgust of conservatives and disciplinarians like the Nizām-ul-Mulk.

In the colourful language of Macaulay the position is thus stated: "A succession of nominal sovereigns, sunk in indolence and debauchery, sauntered away life in secluded palaces, chewing bhang, fondling concubines, and listening to buffoons. A succession of ferocious invaders descended through the western passes, to prey on the defenceless wealth of Hindostan. The warlike tribes of Rajpootana threw off the Mussulman yoke. . . . The Jauts spread dismay along the Jumna. The highlands which border on the western sea-coast of India poured forth a yet more formidable race, a race which was long the terror of every native power. Every corner of Aurangzeb's empire learned to tremble at the mighty name of the Mahrattas. Their dominions stretched across the peninsula from sea to sea. Mahratta captains reigned at Poona, at Gwalior, in Guzerat, in Berar and in Tanjore."¹⁰⁸ The expansion of their power and its nature will be traced in subsequent chapters.

NOTES

1. William Irvine, *Later Mughals*, Vol. I, p. 6 and foot note.
2. *Jangnāmāh*, f. 1(b); *Ruznamcha*, ff. 16 and 16(b); Irvine, *op. cit.* Vol. I, p. 7. Hamid-ud-din has in his *Waqai-Alamgiri* given quite a different version of this will and he does not refer to partition at all. Irvine refers to 20 *subahs* only, whereas a MS copy in the India Office refers to 21 *subahs*.
3. *Akhhārat*; Kamraj, *Ibrat Nāmāh* f. 10(b); Bhimsen, *Dilkusha*, f. 162.

4. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 13 and note.
5. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 14, 18.
6. There is a difference of opinion among the contemporary historians with regard to the date when Prince Mu'azzam received the report of his father's death. Khafi Khān, Vol. II, p. 573; *Dilkusha*, f. 164; but Irvine's conclusion is correct; Vol. I, p. 18.
7. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 19.
8. *Jangnāmāh*, f. 1(b).
9. *Ibrat Namah* by Muhammad Qasim Lahauri, f. 8; Kamraj, (f. 10) writes that Azim-us-Shāh received the news at Kanauj.
10. *Nushka-i-Dilkusha*, f. 164; Kamraj, f. 9.
11. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 33; Khafi Khān, *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab*, Vol. II, pp. 579-88; *Jangnamah*, f. 28.
12. M. Hadi Kamwar Khān, *Tazkirat-us-Salatin-i-Chughtai*, f. 308; Kamraj, *Ibrat Namah*, f. 37; *Dilkusha*, f. 162; Khafi Khān, Vol. II, p. 569.
13. Khafi Khān, Vol. II, p. 569.
14. Kamwar, *op. cit.*, f. 309; Khafi Khān, Vol. II, p. 608.
15. *Vīr Vinod*, Pt. II, p. 930; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 56-57.
16. *Akhbārāt*, 4 January 1709; Kamraj, f. 39.
17. Khafi Khān, Vol. II, p. 605; *Māsir-ul-Umarā*, Vol. I, p. 178; *Ādhunik Rājasthān*, pp. 156-57.
18. *Akhbarat*, 28 April, 1707 A.D.: *Dilkusha*, f. 166(b); Iradat Khān, *Tazkirah*, p. 37.
19. According to *Vīr Vinod*, Amar Singh did not take sides in the war of succession. (Vol. II, p. 746). In the opinion of Udayarāj Singh, with the exception of the ruler of Jodhpur, other Rājput princes were friendly with the Mughuls. Unpublished thesis, p. 139.
20. *Akhbarat*, 30 October, and 30 November, 1707; *Dilkusha*, f. 170.
21. Perhaps the reason for this change of rulers was Jay Singh's intrigue against Vijay Singh; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 47.
22. Dr. Satish Chandra, *Parties and Politics at the Mughal Court*, p. 32.
23. Kamwar, Pt. II, f. 308 (b); Kamraj, f. 37 (b); Khafi Khān, Vol. II, p. 661.
24. *Vamsa Bhāskar*, pp. 3, 17-18; *Vīr Vinod*, Vol. II, pp. 769-71; *Jodhpur Ki Khyat*, Pt. II, p. 83; Ojha G. H., *Jodhpur*, p. 536.
25. Ojha, *Udaipur*, Pt. II, p. 605; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 67; *Jodhpur Ki Khyat*, Vol. II, p. 83; *Vīr Vinod*, Pt. II, p. 834.
26. *Akhbarat*, September 26, 1708 A.D.; *Arzdasht of Jaipur Vakil*, June 30, 1708.
27. *Akhbarat*, October 3, 1711; *Kamwar*, Pt. II, f. 329.
28. Govind Singh fought on the side of Bahādur Shāh at Jajau; Ganda Singh, p. 12.
29. Govind Singh was placed in charge of the Godavari valley. Cunningham, *History of the Sikhs*, p. 72; Lahauri, f. 27(b)-28-(b). Ganda Singh, p. 22; Khafi Khān, Vol. II, p. 652.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Khafi Khān, Vol. II, pp. 662-63.
32. Irvine, *ibid.* Vol. I, p. 98.
33. *Akhbarat*, July 5, 1710 and August, 1710; *Vamsa Bhāskar*, p. 303.
34. For further details see Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 93-121. *Akhbarat*, Kamwar etc.
35. According to Kamraj [f. 45(a)], the situation became so grave that the emperor did not dare going out on hunting excursions or boating trips; Khafi Khān, pp. 680-81; *Akhbarat*.
36. For the details of intrigues and the internecine struggle, see Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 158-85.
37. He was a Kāyastha and was promoted to the rank of 2000+1000. Dr. Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, p. 68, f.n. 26; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 197.
38. At first Sayyid Husain 'Alī was very reluctant to support Farrukh-siyar. Dr. Satish Chandra, "Early Relations of Farrukh-siyar and the Sayyid brothers", *Mediaeval India Quarterly*, Vol. II.
39. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 216-19. Khān-i-Daurān fled from Khajuha and Lutfullah Khān Sadiq, the Diwan, deserted Prince A'zz-ud-din. Khafi Khān, p. 717; *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 190.

SUCCESSORS OF AURANGZĪB

40. *Ibrat Nāmah*, f. 15(a), Khafi Khān, pp. 718-24, Irvine, *op. cit.*, pp. 219-36.
41. Waris, *Mīrat-i-Warīdat*, f. 145 and f. 275; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 236-40.
42. Ajit Singh had given to the Emperor several causes of offence; his men had murdered Muḥkam Singh and the Rāthor Rājā honoured them; he had established *thanas* at Rupnagar; he contemplated aggression against Mālwa, etc., and established *thanas* at Todah and Malpura. He refused to comply with the imperial orders; *Mundiyes̤h ki Khyat*, p. 246; *Ibrat Nāmah*, f. 60(a); Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 290.
43. Qasim Lahauri, *Ibrat Nāmah*, f. 174(a); Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 307-19.
44. Qanungo, K. R., *History of the Jats*, p. 60; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 321-27.
45. Bhargava, V. S., *Mewar and the Mughul Emperors*, holds that no such letters were written, p. 158.
46. Khafi Khān, Vol. II, p. 741; *Akhbarat*.
47. Mīr Jumlā entered Delhi secretly. He had returned from Patna in complete frustration. *Ibrat Nāmah*, ff. 48a-51(a). Khafi Khān, Vol. II, p. 769. The emperor was annoyed and deprived him of his titles, which were subsequently restored. Dr. Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, p. 119; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 330 and f.n. 3 and pp. 352-56. He was expelled twice from Delhi.
48. Nizām-ul-Mulk arrived at Delhi on June 13, 1715, *Hadiqat-ul-Alam*, p. 93.
49. Khafi Khān, Vol. II, p. 774; *Ibrat Nāmah* 70 (a). Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-28.
50. For details, see Chitnis, *Thorle Shahu Charitra* (1924), pp. 54-56. Grant Duff, Vol. I, (1921 ed.), pp. 337-8.
51. For the role of Ajit Singh, see Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, pp. 139 and 141; Yusūf Husain, p. 98; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 348, 363, 374, 380, 382.
52. Khafi Khān, Vol. II, pp. 819-20; Ajit Singh's letter in Sobhavat Dayal, May 4, 1719.
53. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 406-07; Yusuf Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-02. Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, p. 149.
54. Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, p. 145; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 408-20; Kamwar Khān, Khafi Khān, p. 827.
55. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 431; Yusuf Husain, pp. 104-05.
56. Kamwar, p. 413; *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, p. 166.
57. Sarkar Jadunath, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, pp. 16-17.
58. Khafi Khān, p. 838.
59. *Ibid*, p. 851; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 5-6.
60. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 6-16.
61. Nizām-ul-Mulk accepted the governorship of Mālwa on condition that he would not be transferred on flimsy grounds. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 17; Yusuf Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
62. Khafi Khān, Vol. II, pp. 852-97. Yusuf Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-41; Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-60.
63. Yusuf Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 136; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 51-52; Khafi Khān, Vol. II, p. 897.
64. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 56-67; Khafi Khān, pp. 902-05; *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari*, pp. 271-73. Despatches from the Court to Jay Singh; Yusuf Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
65. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 65.
66. Satish Chandra, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-62; Irvine, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-96.
67. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 185.
68. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 170-90.
69. I.H.R.C. report, 13th Session, Jodhpur letters and *Shahu Roznishi*, No. 161.
70. *Jodhpur Rāj Ka Itihas*, Vol. II, p. 630.
71. SPD. XIII, Nos. 16, 17, 23-28, 31-35.
72. Dighe, V. G., *Peshwā Bājī Rāo*, I, pp. 127-8.
73. *Ibid*; SPD. XV, pp. 83-90.
74. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 231.
75. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 232-33 and 238-41; J.A.S.B. (1878) Part IV, p. 301.

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76. Jagdish Singh Gahlot, *Rājputana ka Itihas*, Vol. II, p. 81.
77. Tikkiwal, H.C., *Jaipur and the Later Mughals*, p. 79.
78. *Ibid*, pp. 79-80.
79. *Ibid*, pp. 79-80.
80. Srivastava A. L., *First Two Nawabs of Oudh* (1933), p. 30.
81. *Ibid*, pp. 33-43.
82. *Ibid*, pp. 28-29.
83. Yusuf Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 208-15; SPD. XV, p. 66, *Brahmendra-Charitra*, Appendix 35, 116.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 220; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 320.
- 84a. Lockhart, L., *Nadir Shah* (1938), p. 123.
85. For a discussion of this point, see Yusuf Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-22; Rustam Ali believed in Sa'adat's complicity, Elliot and Dowson's *History*, Vol. VIII, p. 60; Fraser, pp. 129-32, Hanway IV, 142. Lockhart, *op. cit.*, p. 139.
- 85a. Hanway, Vol. IV, p. 142.
86. Yusuf Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 223; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 321.
87. Irvine, Vol. II, pp. 326-28; Yusuf Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 224.
88. Yusuf Husain, *op. cit.*, p. 219.
89. *Ibid*, p. 220.
90. *Tazkirat of Anand Ram Mukhlis* (Elliot and Dowson, Vol. VIII, p. 78).
91. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 330-31.
92. Lockhart, *op. cit.*, p. 129.
93. *Ibid*, pp. 130-31.
94. *Ibid*, p. 133.
95. Srivastava A. L., *First Two Nawabs of Oudh*, p. 62.
96. *Ibid*, p. 62.
97. For the battle of Karnāl, see Srivastava A. L., *op. cit.*, pp. 62-67; Yusuf Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 225-26 and Lockhart, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-43.
98. Yusuf Husain, *Ibid.*, p. 228; Srivastava A. L., has given more details, *op. cit.*, pp. 67-68.
99. Srivastava A. L., *op. cit.*, p. 69. Yusuf Husain says that the post had been promised to Burhān-ul-Mulk, p. 229.
100. Srivastava A. L., *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.
- 100a. Lockhart, *op. cit.*, p. 148.
- 100b. Lockhart, *op. cit.*, p. 152.
101. For the controversy regarding the identity of Kohi-Nur, see Aziz Ahmad, *Treasury of the Mughals*.
102. *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. IV, p. 362; for the details of Nādir Shāh's invasion, see Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 335-59. Srivastava, A. L., *op. cit.*, pp. 61-75. Yusuf Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 217-36. Lockhart, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-54.
103. Srivastava A. L., *op. cit.*, p. 107.
104. Sarkar, Jadunath, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, (1932), pp. 57-65.
105. *Ibid*, pp. 71-72.
106. *Ibid*, pp. 189-196.
107. *Ibid*, pp. 200-33.
108. Macaulay T. B., *Critical and Historical essays* (J. M. Dent & Sons, 1933), pp. 487-88.

CHAPTER III

RISE OF THE PESHWĀS—BĀLĀJĪ VISHWĀNĀTH

The eighteenth century is rightly looked on as the age of Marāthā supremacy. The Marāthās dominate the Indian political scene right up to the end of the century to the exclusion of any other power. Their predecessors, the Mughuls, suffered a decline as dramatic as it was unexpected. The Deccan campaign of Aurangzīb drained the moral and material resources of the empire and brought it to the brink of disaster. As the shrewd Italian traveller Manucci noted, "King Aurangzīb repents of having entangled himself in the war with the Marāthās. In this war over a hundred thousand souls have died yearly, and of animals, horses, pack oxen, camels, over three hundred thousand. The great nobles are in distress, their families are begging."¹

The three succession wars during less than a decade took a heavy toll of their nobility and of their armies from which the successors of Aurangzīb never recovered. It is a misfortune of hereditary succession that it does not ensure capable descendants; nay, on the contrary, being brought up in leisure and luxury of the royal household and shielded from the hard life of the field and practical world, these scions of royalty lack the hardihood of their forefathers and the will to rule, are encouraged in vicious ways and licentious habits at a very early age by fawning servants, and easily become tools in the hands of ambitious men. This was the fate that befell the Mughul empire after the death of Aurangzīb. With the burial of the dead emperor at Khuldabad in 1707, vanished the glory and prestige of the empire. The governors of distant provinces, while professing loyalty to the throne, refused to take orders from the royal court and assumed independence for all practical purposes. The Afghans who swept down to Delhi more than once, esteemed the throne not worth the keeping! Near at home there was fierce rivalry for the control of the emperor and the royal household and direction of imperial affairs. Among the Hindu populace of the empire, there were revolts against foreign rule and resurgence. The Rājputs, the Sikhs, the Jats, the Bundelas and the Marāthās started thinking in terms of independence and challenged the might of the empire. The Marāthās on account of their simple habits, hardihood and national fervour, proved the most successful of the lot, liberated their homeland and carried the war in the enemy's country. Khafi Khān wrote,

"for all the struggles and schemes, the campaigns and sieges of this prince the power of the Mahrattas increased day by day. . . . They divided all districts among themselves and in the imperial fashion they appointed their *Subahdars*, *Kamaishdars* and *Rahdars*. They attack and destroy the country as far as the borders of Ahmadabad and the districts of Malwa and spread their devastation through the provinces of the Deccan to the environs of Ujjain."²

Shāhū Rājā's new *Peshuā*, Bālājī Vishwanāth, perceived the shift in the political atmosphere and reoriented the foreign policy of the Marāthā State. Instead of following the traditional policy of directing expansion of the Marāthā State in the eastern and southern parts of the Deccan, he set on the bold adventure of participating in the imperial affairs by the treaty of 1718 with Sayyid Husain 'Ali, *Subahdar* of the Deccan. Under his son and grandson participation made way for direction and control. The Marāthās succeeded to a large extent in conquering Mālwa, Gujarāt and a part of Bundelkhand and levied tribute from Bengal to the Punjāb and from Agra to Arcot. Unfortunately they were not able to develop satisfactory administrative and political and cultural institutions to evoke the co-operation of the local people and win their loyalties. After the setback received at Pānīpat (1761) and the first Anglo-Marāthā war (1774-82) Mahādajī Sindia became the king-maker at Delhi and directed imperial affairs till his death in 1794. So, when Lord Wellesley came out to India to settle the Indian problem, his opponents were the Marāthās and not the Mughuls. During the last decade after Mahādajī Sindia's death, all the great and wise leaders of the Marāthās had departed from the scene and the great proconsul found himself dealing with small men who could not understand that their interest lay in cohesion and unity. British diplomacy created disarray among Marāthā chiefs and fought them separately. The Patwardhans and other southern jāgirdārs were seduced by Arthur Wellesley in 1800. Sindia and Bhonsle were defeated in 1803; Holkar in 1804-05 and the *Peshuā* was finished in 1817-18. Marāthā supremacy was gone and new forces began to shape Indian destinies.

Aurangzīb himself was not unaware of the drift of events, and during the last years of his life had tried to come to an understanding with the Marāthās, to obtain peace with honour. He had an idea of making use of the captive Shāhū to gain his ends, but his suspicious nature defeated the move. On his death, therefore, his son A'zam began his march northward without concluding any formal agreement with the Marāthās. The Marāthās in his rear were soon active and renewed their attacks on the imperial territory. The captive Shāhū, unwilling to be dragged to far off Delhi, began efforts

to remain his liberty. The party in his favour at the emperor's court consisting of Zu'lfiqār Khān and the Rājput nobility, advised A'zam to allow Shāhū to return to the Deccan, reclaim his patrimony and rule it as a feudatory of the empire. That would, they contended, ensure the safety of Mughul dominions in the south by having a friendly prince as their neighbour, or should Shāhū fail to obtain general recognition, embroil the Marāthās in civil war and remove this source of danger for some time.

Shāhū's Release and Home-coming:

A'zam, therefore, gave a willing ear to Shāhū's proposals. Between March and May, 1707, there were two or three audiences between the two princes, and robes and titles conveying royal favour were conferred on Shāhū. The talks, however, appeared to have a tendency to protract over a long period as the Mughul prince, busy planning the campaign for the throne, had little time for delicate negotiations. Uneasy at the prospects of further detention, Shāhū left his Mughul friends one night at Duraha near Sironj about 8th May with a very slender escort consisting of his immediate attendants. To elude pursuit he plunged in the Vindhya forests and made his way to Bijagarh, south of the Narmadā. The Rāwal of that place, Mohan Singh, gave him a cordial welcome and helped him to get on to Sultanpur in Khāndesh. Near Sultanpur Amrut Rāo Kadām Bāndé joined the prince's cause and they advanced to Lambkani in Khāndesh. Word went round that the exile prince was returning and now veteran soldiers, loyal servants, and adventurers began to flock round his standard. In his imprisonment Shāhū had contacted several Marāthā chieftains; to them and to others he wrote tactful and conciliatory letters inviting them to come and help him in the task of rebuilding the shattered Marāthā State and reviving its faded glory. One of the first influential chiefs to respond to the prince's call was Parsoji Bhonsle of Berār. His example proved infectious; Neinājī Sindia, Chimnājī Dāmodar Moghe, Haibat Rāo Nimbālkar and a host of Marāthā captains in Khāndesh hurried to join his standard and swear allegiance to their new, yet rightful master. His army thus swelled, Shāhū advanced to Ahmadnagar; this old town was the seat of Muhammadan authority for over two centuries and occupied a central position and to it Aurangzīb had repaired in the last year of his life. From here Shāhū paid his respects to the remains of the old emperor buried at Khuldabad and communicated his arrival to his aunt Tārā Bai who was ruling as regent at Satara on behalf of her infant son, Shivājī, eleven years of age.

Shāhū's Struggle with Tārā Bāi:

Shāhū, having informed the ruling party at Satara of his return, invited from them proposals for the future government of the Marāthā State. The regent Tārā Bāi was a woman of imperious temperament and the prospect of resigning the reins of administration to her nephew and accepting a subordinate position was distasteful to that masterful lady. She refused to believe the reports of Shāhū's release, discredited his letters and declaring the new claimant for the *Gadi* to be an impostor, ordered her generals to destroy him wherever they should find him. This ruse could not stand for long; Shāhū was personally known to the leading Marāthā chieftains and officers who had come in contact with him. As a proof of greater conviction Parsoji Bhonsle publicly dined with him. Tārā Bāi then put forth another and a stronger reason why she was not prepared to admit Shāhū to government. She argued 'that the Marāthā kingdom had been reared up with painful toil by the great Shivājī. This was lost by Shambhuji, Shāhū's father, and her husband Rājārām raised the edifice anew out of ashes. He defended it against the Mughuls' onslaught and hurled them back. The present Marāthā State, she contended, was her husband's creation. She also argued that the great Shivājī had expressed a wish on his death-bed that the succession should go to his second son Rājārām, the elder, Shambhuji, being unfit to rule. Shāhū thus in no way could lay any claim to the *Gadi*.'³

Tārā Bāi's specious arguments could make little impression on the Marāthās, always zealous of the right of the elder or the senior branch to which Shāhū belonged. They had fought all these years to liberate their homeland and obtain the release of their legitimate Prince Shāhū to whose freedom and reinstatement they had looked forward as the natural culmination of that struggle. The sacrifice the nation had made was not to uphold the cause of Rājārām or his son, but to save the honour of the house of Shivājī of which Shāhū of the senior branch was the living symbol, and whose return had great significance to them. Even Rājārām at the time of ascending the *Gadi* in 1689, had declared that he was holding the office of *Chhatrapati* (the King) only in trust for his nephew then absent in the Mughul camp and that he would be only too happy to step down for the rightful owner. The issue had always been presented to the masses as the restoration of the senior branch to its rightful authority; and the widow's quibbles regarding the superior claims of her son deceived nobody. Herein lay Shāhū's advantage. The common people and soldiers were solidly on his side. It was ultimately this support of

the common people that sustained his cause and helped him triumph over odds. Though commanded by the Queen to swear fidelity to her son on milk and boiled rice, Tārā Bāi's officers did so with a reservation that their first loyalty would be to support the cause of legitimacy and uphold the dignity of the house of Shivājī.^{3a}

Shāhū advanced to Khed on the Bhimā; his further prospects depended on the attitude of the great Marāthā captains and especially of the *Senāpati* (Dhanājī Jādhav) who commanded the largest Marāthā army in the field. Dhanājī knew young Shāhū personally and was convinced of his superior claims to Marāthā leadership by his *Diwan* Bālājī Vishwanāth and Khando Ballāl, the *Chhatrapati*'s hereditary Secretary. The old soldier refused to take arms against his legitimate sovereign and carried with him the major part of the army. The remnant was too small to make a stand against the combined forces and fled to Satara. (Battle of Khed, 12 October 1707).

Important consequences flowed from the battle of Khed. It opened to Shāhū the gates of Swarāj, the heart of the hilly country of Poona and Satara, where the great Shivājī had begun his wonderful career and which he took care to fence round with formidable fortresses. The powerful forces led by *Senāpati* Dhanājī had declared in his favour; Shāhū decided to press home his advantage. He marched on to the capital occupying on his way Jejuri, Shirwal and Chandan Wandan. The *Sāchiv* of Bhor, Shankarājī Nārāyaṇ, held some of the important hill forts in the tract; he was summoned by the young prince and assured of royal favour. Torn between his personal loyalty to the Queen and his higher duty to his nation and the cause of legitimacy, the old veteran decided the issue by putting an end to his life.⁴ (27 October 1707). Shāhū sent messages of sympathy to the bereaved family. By his conciliatory conduct he made an excellent impression on his compatriots and obtained the hill forts of Rājgarh, Tornā, Rohidā, and Vichitragarh without striking a blow. These forts were the sites of Shivājī's first exploits. His rear thus secured, Shāhū was free to commence the siege of the capital. Tārā Bāi in the meanwhile had fled to Panhālā with her son and her *Amātya*, Rāmachandra, leaving the defence of Satara to Parashurām Pant *Pratinidhi*. The garrison and the commandant had no heart to fight their own brethren. By seizing the Commandant's family at Wai, Shāhū forced him to open the gates of the fort and city. It was on a Saturday in January 1708, that the victorious entry was made; and the memory of the happy event was kept green by the custom of beating of drums on Saturdays at the fort.

After a week's time Shāhū ascended the *Gadi* in ceremony^{4a} and appointed his new ministers. Anxious to conciliate old families he made few changes and made them where absolutely necessary. The post of *Peshuā* went to a son of Moropant Pingle; Dhanājī Jādhav was confirmed as *Senāpati* and the right of making collections in several districts was delegated to him. At this period of confusion (as remarked by Duff) "the revenue was realized on no fixed principles but levied as opportunity presented itself in the manner of contribution." The infant son of Shankarājī Nārāyaṇ was likewise confirmed as *Sachiv*; Gadādhār Pralhād Nirājī at Jinjee, was elevated to the post of *Pratinidhi* as Parashurām Pant *Pratinidhi* refused to abjure his oath to Tārā Bāi. The Chitnis family was continued in its office. Dhanājī's *Diwān*, Bālājī Vishwanāth, who had materially helped the Prince's cause, was taken in direct service of the king, appointed *Mutaliq* or Deputy to the *Amātya*, and was honoured with the dignity of '*Senā Karte*', probably in appreciation of his skill in obtaining loans, raising new contingents and furnishing them properly. The great Marāthā captains Nemājī Sindia, Parsoji Bhonsle, Haibat Rāo Nimbālkar and a host of others received high-sounding titles and robes and confirmed in their conquests as the sovereign had yet little to confer on the powerful chieftains.

But Shāhū was not yet out of the wood. His aunt had fled before him to Rangna and from there was busy fomenting discord among Marāthā ranks and sowing disunity among Marāthā chiefs. Many Marāthā leaders like Ghorpades, Chavāns, Dābhādes, and Thorāts had risen to greatness in her husband's service; the great house of Santājī Ghorpade was the rival of Dhanājī Jādhav and competed with the Jādhav family for the honour of the generalship. Rāmachandra *Amātya* and the queen who had directed the defence of Mahārāshtra for over a long period, from Panhālā, claimed personal devotion from not a few commandants of forts in the Ghāt region. Shāhū, therefore, had to follow Tārā Bāi to the hills. He offered to cede to his cousin, territory south of the Wārṇā to put an end to the internecine strife. Tārā Bāi refused the concession. How could she accept this small consolation when she wanted the sovereignty of the entire Marāthā State for her son? The offer was spurned and the struggle went on for quite a while; Shāhū's forces occupied Kolhapur and invested Panhālā; Tārā Bāi abandoned it for Rāngṇā, and feeling insecure there moved to Mālwan. Panhālā was occupied by Shāhū's forces; he attempted to storm Rāngṇā, but failed and returned to the capital to spend the monsoon (1708 June).

Failure of Negotiations with Bahādur Shāh:

It was not possible for Shāhū to resume the offensive against Tārā Bāi after the close of the monsoon. The new Mughul emperor Bahādur Shāh had been called to the south by the assumption of authority by his brother Kām Bakhsh. Bahādur Shāh arrived in the Deccan in January, 1709, called upon Shāhū to aid him and sent a general call to the Deccan chiefs to lend him support in suppressing the revolt. Shāhū's relations with the Mughul authorities were of a nebulous kind; vague promises had been held out to him, but no definite agreement concluded, no *farman* granted. Shāhū despatched an envoy to the emperor's presence to obtain the *farmans* of *Swarāj*, *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi*, while a strong force under Chandrasen Jādhav hovered in Khāndesh to back up his request. By Zu'lfiqār Khān's representations Bahādur Shāh was inclined to favour Shāhū's cause; but Tārā Bāi (about this time) sent counter proposals saying that her son was the lawful sovereign of the Marāthā State and offering to accept much lower terms. The enemy's game of throwing an apple of discord amongst the Marāthās succeeded. Bahādur Shāh refused recognition to either party asking them first to settle between themselves as to whom he should deliver the goods. He retired to Hindustān in the summer of 1709; Mughul goodwill was one of Shāhū's assets; its hollow nature was now exposed publicly. The Marāthā prince, if he was to rule his kingdom in the plenitude of his grand-father's power, must do it on his own. The failure of his mission to the emperor thus revived the embers of the civil war which, before this, were flickering out.

The suspense in which things were left by the retiring emperor stiffened the attitude of some of the local officials. Lodi Khān of Chākan had become quite an eye-sore to the Marāthās by his depredations in the Poona district as far south as Purandar. He now showed the audacity of blocking up the path of the Marāthā force retiring from Khāndesh through the Junnar pass; he was defeated and killed and his assistant, Karim Beg of Junnar, was taken prisoner.⁵ At the same time Tānājī Jagtāp, Yāsin Khān, the Sidi of Janjira and several others became restive and started trouble in the Marāthā territory. However, so long as Dāu'd Khān, a nominee of the friendly Zu'lfiqār Khān, continued as Deputy Governor, Shāhū had no fear of general opposition to the establishment of his authority. But it was obvious that the most he could expect from this quarter was neutrality and not active help in his cause.^{5a}

The second prop that gave way about this time was Shāhū's *Senāpati*, Dhanājī Jādhav, who died in August 1708. His army had

materially contributed to the early successes of Shāhū. The great Marāthā soldier died at Vadgaon on the Warna from the effects of one of his old wounds. His son Chandrasen inherited the father's army, but not the old tradition in which his father had been reared.

Shāhū's third prop disappeared when Parsoji Bhonsle died in 1709. Parsoji was one of the few great chiefs who had declared themselves early in Shāhū's favour. He was of the same house as the Prince and had been able to carry with him a number of chieftains in Khāndesh.

The situation demanded of Shāhū a quick decision, high organising capacity and daring, and swift action of a skilful general, which, by rapid successes, would overwhelm his opponents, and rally to his standard not only the common peasantry who believed in the righteousness of his cause, but also the waverers and trimmers who were but too anxious to throw in their lot with the winning party. Unfortunately, young Shāhū, though full of personal courage, lacked qualities of military leadership. He had passed his youth as a prisoner in the Mughul seraglio and had no opportunity to cultivate habits of active life and no chance to obtain administrative experience or to learn military tactics and planning. Nor had he that iron discipline so essential for a successful soldier in those rough times when the king was primarily a military leader before anything else. A great landslide began round Shāhū.

Renewal of the Civil War—Chandrasen's Revolt:

Tārā Bāi's partisans who had kept themselves aloof during the first rush of Shāhū's victory, now came out in the open. Hīndū Rāo Ghōrpade joined Hamīd Khān and opposed collection by Shāhū's officers near Bijāpur (14 November, 1709). In March 1710, Hamīd Khān surrounded Jādhav near Burhānpur. Before the end of the year 1710, Tārā Bāi's intrigues had begun to bear fruit. Rambhāji Nimbālkar walked over to the Mughul camp and accepted service as *Faujdār* of Ahmadnagar. The air was thick with whisperings of a wide-spread conspiracy.⁶ The blow descended in the form of the revolt of the King's *Senāpatī*, Chandrasen Jādhav.

Chandrasen was in a peculiar position about 1710. At the head of one of the largest forces in Mahārāshtra he was being courted by Tārā Bāi on the one hand, and by the Mughul *Subāhdar* on the other. Young Chandrasen's head was swollen with his importance; he had little regard for the monarch whose resources were of a very meagre kind, who looked to his chieftains to do for him the hard work of

fighting and yet could hold out no hopes of rich rewards, and who refused to share his confidence with the youthful commander. Chandrasen lent a willing ear to Tārā Bāi's overtures, and a conspiracy was formed under his leadership; prominent Marāthā chieftains, the Thorāts, Shāhāji Nimbālkar and Dābhāde were to join under Chandrasen, march against Satara, and oust Shāhū in favour of Tārā Bāi's son. These secret negotiations perhaps did not pass quite unnoticed. Shāhū had invited these chiefs to Satara in October 1710, and when Chandrasen moved out in the next campaigning season, Bālājī Vishwanāth was sent after him to watch his steps. Chandrasen was already jealous of the great influence Bālājī Vishwanāth had obtained over his father as his *Diwān*; the latter's elevation in the King's council had done nothing to abate the jealousy. Early in 1711 Chandrasen's force was foraging round Baramati with Bālājī trailing behind him as a revenue official of the king. There was no love lost between the two and a petty dispute between the followers of Chandrasen and Bālājī was taken up by the principals. Chandrasen attacked Bālājī, dispersed his force and sent the latter flying to the King. To the King's protest against the outrage, the *Senāpatī* sent an insolent reply that Bālājī should surrender to him, or he would no longer consider himself bound by his oath of fealty. Such an open defiance of authority Shāhū would not tolerate. He ordered his *Sarlashkar*, Haibat Rāo, to hold up the rebel's advancing columns and sent him reinforcements. Chandrasen was defeated in two battles near the Adarki pass and Salpa pass (old Phaltan State) and turned back to join Dāu'd Khān near Bahādur Garh. His later movements, till he was befriended by Nizām-ul-Mulk in 1713, are uncertain. If he joined Tārā Bāi, he seems to have achieved precious little.⁷

Chandrasen's revolt was a signal for a general rising all round. Tārā Bāi's followers—Ghātge, Ghorpade and Chavān, took up arms, occupied Vadgaon, Kumtha, Shirala, Karhad and other places and threatened to advance on Satara. Chandrasen, with the aid of the Mughul officers, began raising fresh troops to renew the contest. Even in closer quarters, Shāhū's authority came to count for nothing. The petty Ināmdar of Khatāv, Krishna Rāo, proclaimed his independence. Dāmāji Thorāt, another dependent of Tārā Bāi at Hingangaon, (Patas *parganā*, Poona district), turned out the King's officers. Parashurām Pant, who some time back had made a show of being reconciled to the new regime, had been granted the dignity of *Pratinidhi* and rewarded with the Vishalgarh *jāgīr*. His son in possession of the *jāgīr*, now declared for Tārā Bāi. Shāhū suspected the father to have instigated the treachery and, losing his usual equanimity of temper, ordered the *jāgīr* to be confiscated and the old

Pratinidhi to be blinded. The execution of the extreme penalty was stayed by the intercession of Khaṇḍo Ballāl Chitnis, but Parashurām was thrown into jail once more.⁸

The most serious danger to Shāhū, however, came from Konkan. Here the powerful Angria, on Tārā Bāi's orders, drove Shāhū's garrisons out of the Konkan forts of Rajmachi, Tung Tikona and Ghangarh, occupied Lohgarh, seized his *Peshwā* Bahiro Pant Pingle and threatened to march on Poona.

Shāhū's position was a precarious one. Though he had tried hard to conciliate the leading members of the old nobility, they, with a few exceptions, refused to respond to his call and work with him whole-heartedly. On slight pretences they were changing sides and thwarting his plans for the settlement of the country. The *Senāpati* was up in arms against him; his *Peshwā* had shown himself altogether devoid of initiative or capacity; the *Pratinidhi* was wavering in his loyalty, and the *Sarkhel*, after capturing the *Peshwā*, threatened to march on the capital; Dābhāde, Ghātge and Thorāt were all either sitting on the fence or actively taking part in fanning the civil war. The only party that stood to gain by this internecine struggle was the Mughul *Subāhdar* of the Deccan. The Deccan governorship had in the meanwhile changed hands, and in place of the friendly Zu'lfīqār and his nominee Dāu'd Khān, brought on the scene Nizām-ul-Mulk, a man of different metal, who meant to follow a different line of action towards the Marāthās.

Rise of Bālāji Vishwanāth — Change of Policy:

Shāhū's intimate friends and counsellors, foremost among whom were Khaṇḍo Ballāl Chitnis and Bālāji Vishwanāth Bhat, advised him to make an immediate change of policy. The lesser nobility and the common masses believed in the righteousness of the cause of Shāhū, as being the senior member of Shivāji's house and therefore, the lawful and hereditary heir to the Marāthā throne; they had been greatly impressed by his loving, God-fearing, saintly disposition, and were therefore solidly behind the new king. What was necessary was to organise this general goodwill in the King's behalf and to assure the warring nobility that the new position they had acquired in the changed circumstances would be duly recognised and maintained. For the time being, at least, there was no going back to Shivāji's days and Shivāji's constitution of centralised monarchy.

Shāhū, being at his wits' end, called upon Bālāji Vishwanāth to shoulder the responsibility and carry out the policy he advocated.

Bālājī was not an altogether unknown figure in politics. His forefathers were hereditary *Deshmukhs* or revenue collectors of *Mahal Danda Rajpuri* and *Shriwardhan* in Konkan, about fifty miles south of Bombay. The family had left Konkan and migrated to *Desh* country owing to troubles with the Sidi rulers of Janjira. Bālājī's native cleverness, his experience as revenue officer and pleasant manners brought him employment immediately and secured his advancement in the Marāthā country. He worked as *Subāhdar* (Administrator and revenue collector) in Poona and Aurangābād districts in Rājārām's time, and thus became familiar with the currents and cross-currents of Mughul-Marāthā politics and the leading personalities in both the camps. Since Shāhū's return to Deccan he had faithfully followed his fortunes and had shown great organising capacity and skill as a mediator. It was his advocacy that had brought to Shāhū's cause the veteran leader Dhanājī Jādhav in 1707 and secured him his ancestral throne. Again, in 1711, by his activity, watchfulness and tact, he had foiled Chandrasen's conspiracy and defeated Shāhū's rivals. By defeating Krishna Rāo Khaṭāvkar, he had taught a stern lesson to the rebels. Shāhū felt that Bālājī was the only man who could save his affairs and bring order out of chaos. On 17 November, 1713, he appointed him his *Peshwā* or Prime Minister, gave him a fresh *jāgīr* of six Mahals and two forts to meet the expenses of his troops, and asked him to proceed against Kānhoji Angria.⁹

Kānhoji Angria Conciliated:

The Angrian threat was quite a formidable one. Kānhoji Angria was brave and active and had risen to the admiralty (1698) by personal prowess. He had attracted to his service some of the most daring men of all nationalities. His ships scoured the western waters and brought him a treasure that was reported to be fabulous. His name had become a veritable terror to the Sidi, the English, the Dutch, and the Portuguese. To contend with the *Sarkhel* looked quite a perilous task, but Shāhū's new *Peshwā* showed himself quite the master of the situation. In dealing with Kānhoji Angria he decided to rely more on his powers of persuasion and diplomatic skill than on force. His personal friendship with that great chief in his former days proved a great asset to him. Marching towards Konkan at the head of about 4,000 troops he invited the great Angria to a personal meeting, and told him that a great future awaited their country provided they closed their ranks, and exposed the folly of the course he was pursuing; it was sin, he told him, to oppose the lawful heir to the Gadi. "Your father Tukoji", he told Angria,

"was raised to his high position by the great Shivājī. Is it right that you, his son, should so far forget your loyalty to the senior branch of Shivājī's house that you should overrun Shāhū's kingdom and seize his minister? This is outright treachery. If you feel you have given your word of honour to the Queen, go and stay with her in peace. Why disturb our provinces? The best course for you, when the junior branch was defeated, was to acknowledge your mistake, reaffirm your allegiance and win Shāhū's favour. There is no third alternative for a subordinate chieftain. I have been asked to fight you and recover the territories you have seized. Remember you are surrounded by enemies who would be too glad to attack you at the first opportunity. Once hostilities start, it may be difficult to obtain Royal pardon."¹⁰ The great Angria was a shrewd man and knew the strength as well as the weakness of his position. He understood full well that when a sea-power acquired territory on land with a frontier open to the attack of a military State, it incurred great danger. Kānhoji felt he was no longer bound by his oath to the Queen, and Shambhujī (the successor to Tārā Bāi's son) had neither a programme nor showed promise of repeating the glories of his father or grandfather. Kānhoji entered into Bālājī's proposals and accepted his offer. 'On being confirmed in command of the fleet, his territory in Konkan and his title of *Sarkhel*, he agreed to renounce Shambhujī, to release the *Peshwā*, to restore all his conquests except Rajmachi and maintain the cause of Shāhū.'¹¹

This agreement which was soon ratified at Satara was a great triumph for Bālājī Viswanāth's diplomacy. It won over to Shāhū's cause, without bloodshed, the most powerful chieftain from Tārā Bāi's party and established his power on firm foundations. The new policy enunciated by the *Peshwā* in dealing with the Angrian chief, carried assurance of security to other chieftains who willingly came with declarations of loyalty.

About this time Tārā Bāi, the source of all this trouble, lost her power in Kolhapur and was thrown in confinement. Girjojī Yādav and Tulājī Sitole were the arch conspirators who effected the revolution.¹² It is not known what part Bālājī had in the revolution in the Kolhapur camp.

The Nizām in the Deccan:

It was none too early that Shāhū secured peace on the home front. The several revolutions at Delhi had removed from the scene his old friends and brought in new personalities and developed a

new situation. Imperial authority was on the decline and the empire was showing signs of dissolution. The friendly Zu'lfiqār Khān was no more, his place at Delhi having been taken by the Sayyid brothers, 'Abdullah and Husain 'Ali. They appointed to the Deccan governorship Nizām-ul-Mulk who had different ideas about the policy to be pursued towards the Marāthās.

The Deccan had peculiar fascination for the Nizām. Having spent his early career in the south in the emperor's campaigns, the Nizām had obtained an intimate knowledge of the province, its people and its problems. Separated by a long distance from the heart of the empire, the southern province offered great possibilities to an ambitious man in the declining days of the empire, and the Nizām was not one who would not perceive them. The only effective opposition to the establishment of his independent authority in the Deccan might come from the Marāthās who were his rivals in the field. To check their rising power and keep it within proper limits became the watchword of his policy.

This advocate of a strong policy arrived in the Deccan in June, 1713. He found his charge in a strange condition. The local representative of his predecessor, Da'ūd Khān Pani, had conceded to the Marāthās the rights of collecting *chauth* which Bahādur Shāh had refused to grant in 1709; the Marāthā agents had established a kind of parallel government and were everywhere active, collecting their dues direct from the ryots. No merchandise could pass without paying their toll. A Marāthā chief, Nemājī Sindia, had been taken in Mughul service and held charge of Aurangābād division which enabled him to extend his influence right up to Mālwa and Central India. The very existence of Mughul authority in the south was at stake.

The Nizām immediately set himself to put the house in order. He repudiated the convention entered into by his predecessors and turned out the Marāthā officers from their military posts in his territory. The Bhimā-Godāvarī basin became the battle-ground where the two powers faced each other. Here the Nizām sent a strong force to seize the advance posts of the enemy. At the same time he decided to take advantage of the dissensions in the Marāthā court, invited to his service the traitor Chandrasen Jādhav from Kolhapur and through him, opened negotiations with the Kolhapur party.

To counteract the Nizām's activities the new *Peshwā* took the field immediately on his return from the Konkan. A number of

indecisive engagements took place; in one such battle Haibat Rāo Nimbālkar was killed at Chāndā; in another the Nizām claimed to have defeated the *Peshwā* near Purandar; in yet another the Mughul *Fauzdār* of Bāglān, Muhammad Ibrāhīm Tabrizi, was lured into an ambushade and killed by Khande Rāo Dābhāde while convoying a caravan from Surat to Aurangābād. The *Peshwā* also instigated several risings within the *Subāhdar's* territory with the help of the Marāthā officials who had entrenched themselves in Mughul districts.¹³

While the Nizām was trying to grapple with the Marāthās in the Deccan, his enemies at Delhi gave him no rest. They appointed as his *Diwān* Haidar Qulī Khān who affected to act independent of the *Subāhdar*. The task of contending with enemies outside and within proved beyond the strength of the Nizām. He came to an understanding with the *Peshwā*, withdrawing his troops and retiring from the Poona district. A few months later he was recalled to Delhi, his place being taken by Sayyid Husain 'Ali (1715 May).

Agreement with Husain 'Ali:

The Nizām's transfer from the southern scene did not bring on an immediate improvement in the situation. His successor, Husain 'Ali Sayyid, for a time tried to follow the Nizām's strong policy towards the Marāthās. One of their chiefs, Khande Rāo Dābhāde, had established himself in Khāndesh and levied fee on all merchandise passing from Surat to Burhānpur and Aurangābād. The Mughul Viceroy despatched a strong force of ten thousand under a dashing soldier Zu'lfīqār Beg to bring Dābhāde to book and clear up the road. The Beg's column pursuing the enemy dispersed into the hills, when it was surrounded and cut up to a man. 'Not one bullock, camel or horse belonging to that army was saved.'¹⁴

Husain 'Ali retaliated by sending yet another and a stronger expedition under his *Diwān*, Muhkam Singh, accompanied by his brother Saif-ud-din Khān and Chandrasen Jādhav. Dābhāde skillfully retired before the enemy, fighting rear-guard actions. A major engagement took place near Ahmadnagar. The Marāthā troops succeeded in breaking out and crossing the Bhimā. Sweeping aside the enemy's light cavalry that was harassing his flanks and rear, Muhkam Singh pressed towards Satara in the hope of coming against the main army. Dābhāde bided his time and went to Rājā Shāhū who had moved to Satara fort. The Marāthā garrisons, which were posted in various places, held their ground. Whenever the Mughul army approached, the Marāthā force dispersed, and as soon as it

departed they returned and occupied their positions. Against such a wary enemy the Mughul force could make little progress. Mukham Singh and Jādhav retired the way they had advanced.¹⁵ (December 1716-January 1717).

Husain 'Ali's discomfiture against Khande Rāo Dābhāde was learnt by Emperor Farrukh-siyar with evident satisfaction. Farrukh-siyar was a strange admixture of bravado and cowardice; he owed his elevation to the two Sayyid brothers, yet he did not like to surrender himself completely to their advice. He was jealous of the great powers wielded by them, plotted against them practically from the first day of his accession, and wrote to his distant governors and feudatories to make war on them to bring about their ruin. Among others, Shāhū and several Marāthā chieftains received these royal *farmans* with which they complied most readily. Bands of horsemen overran imperial districts in the Deccan reducing everything to utter chaos.

Distracted by the Marāthā attacks on one side and court intrigues on the other, Husain 'Ali had recourse to negotiations with Shāhū. To this course he was advised by Shankarājī Malhār, a former minister of Rājāram now in the confidence of the Sayyid. The *Subāhdar* deputed Shankarājī Malhār to Shāhū's court to find out a basis for peace. The Marāthā viewpoint in the discussions was set forth by Peshwā Bālājī Vishwanāth.

Some kind of a formal agreement between the two powers was long overdue. Aurangzīb had not been able to make up his mind on what terms to purchase peace. A'zam held out vague promises which both parties were interpreting differently. Bahādur Shāh evaded the issue asking Shāhū to settle first the question of succession, with his rival of the Kolhapur party.¹⁶ Though the highest authorities were thus burking the issues on some pretext or other, the ground was slipping under the feet of their local representatives. No longer able to hold their own against growing Marāthā pressure, they very conveniently sought accommodation with Marāthā chieftains as best as they could. This indefinite state of affairs only served to increase the general anarchy and profited none of the principals. The Marāthās were extending their depredations to Gujarāt and Mālwa. Bold and intrepid spirits raised levies and began to make collections on their own. Partisans of Shambhuji were overrunning the Karnātak *subāh* of Bijāpur. No wonder both parties were keen on a settlement.

Bālājī Vishwanāth, in the name of his master, asked the right of levying *chauth* throughout the six provinces of the Deccan (Auran-

gābād, Berār, Khāndesh, Bidar Golconda and Bijāpur which included the whole of Karnātak, including the tributary states of Mysore, Trichinopoly and Tanjore). He argued that the Marāthās over two decades were raising contributions from the Deccan provinces of the Mughul and this fact should now be formally recognised by an imperial grant. He also demanded *chauth* of Mālwa and Gujarāt which Marāthā horse had invaded. He demanded likewise the right of raising an additional impost of ten per cent for the Rājā as *Sardeshmukh* or head of the landed gentry. The old conquests of Shivājī in Mahārāshtra—*Swarāj*—was to be completely restored, and *Subāhdar* would issue orders for the release of such forts and districts as still continued under Mughul occupation. Shivner, Shivājī's birth-place, was required to be given up, as also the fort of Trimbak in Nasik district. Conquests lately made by Parsoji Bhonsle in Berār and Gondwana were to be confirmed. The old districts in Karnātak were demanded in the name of Fateh Singh Bhonsle. The mother and the family of Shāhū detained at Delhi were likewise to be set free and restored to the Rājā.

On his side, for the grant of *Chauth*, the *Peshwā*, on behalf of his master, promised to maintain 15,000 troops with the *Subāhdar* to aid the emperor; for the hereditary right of *Sardeshmukhi* he agreed to pay the fee of ten per cent of the annual income from that source and bound himself to keep law and order in the country and suppress banditti; for the *Swarāj* or old territory the Rājā agreed to pay a tribute of ten lakhs of rupees every year. It was a condition of all these grants that the Rājā would be faithful to the imperial throne and serve it loyally.¹⁷

The choice of the envoy had evinced the *Subāhdar's* anxiety to come to an understanding with the Marāthās. The proposals worked out by his envoy were immediately accepted with the exception of claims on Gujarāt and Mālwa. Husain 'Ali delivered a *sanad*, containing the articles of peace, under his seal to the *Vakils* of Rājā Shāhū and made no delay in writing for a royal *farman* confirming the agreement. He introduced the agents of Rājā Shāhū everywhere and orders went round for restoring *Swarāj* territory to the Rājā's officials.¹⁸

The importance of the treaty was not lost upon the emperor. It practically meant complete abdication of imperial authority in the Deccan and strengthening the hands of his tormentors. He could not tolerate this and refused to ratify the agreement. He prepared for war, and called to his aid Sarbuland Khān from Patna, Nizām-ul-Mulk from Moradabād and Ajit Singh from Gujarāt.

They arrived in the capital but found that they had neither the emperor's confidence nor authority to act, and wisely made their peace with the Sayyids. The Sayyid brothers, informed of the monarch's intrigues, prepared to strike. Husain 'Ali marched to the capital with his Marāthā allies and arrived in Delhi in February, 1719. The brothers surrounded the palace with their troops, entered the palace, and seized the emperor's person after some altercation. The hapless monarch was thrown in confinement and subsequently put to death. A puppet was set up in his place, all power passing into the hands of the Sayyids. The treaty entered into between Rājā Shāhū and Husain 'Ali Khān was ratified and *farmans* confirming the arrangements of *Chauth*, *Sardeshmukhi* and *Swarāj* were issued on 13 and 24 March, respectively.¹⁹ Bālājī Vishwanāth, who had accompanied Husain 'Ali, the *Amir-ul-Umara*, to the capital, returned to the Deccan in May 1719, with the deeds and the Rājā's family.²⁰

A right royal welcome awaited the minister at Satara. He had at last obtained recognition of the claims for which the Mughul-Marāthā struggle had continued over two decades. The treaty marked a triumph for Rājā Shāhū. His recognition by the Mughul authority gave him a distinct advantage over his rival Shambhuji and made other Marāthā chieftains look up to him as the fountain of authority. The Mughul rulers accepted the *fait accompli* and recognised the supremacy of the Marāthās in the south by granting them the right of collecting revenue from the six provinces of the Deccan.

Criticism of the (Delhi) Treaty of 1719:

The treaty has been criticised variously by different writers. While some have hailed it as a great diplomatic triumph, others have questioned its moral basis; yet a third school of historians condemn the minister for accepting Mughul suzerainty and perpetuating Muslim rule. They contend that while Shivāji fought for an independent Marāthā State, his grandson, acting on the advice of his *Peshwā*, threw away the jewel of liberty accepting in exchange the badge of Mughul slavery. This is an extreme view and loses sight of the fact that in politics satisfactory solutions of vexed problems are often found in face-saving devices or fictions. To accept the fictions literally, to analyse them in a legalistic way without taking into account how they worked in actual practice, is mere casuistry and evinces a frame of mind ill becoming a dispassionate historian. A tributary state has no independent authority to make war or

peace, has no claims on the sovereign. *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* over the six *Subāhs* of the Deccan were granted to the Marāthās who went on exploiting their advantage till they demanded tribute from the whole of the imperial domain. No man of commonsense would look on this relation as one of subordination to the Mughul Crown. The Marāthās were realists and were satisfied with the direction of policy leaving ostentatious display to the effete successors of Aurangzīb.

Criticism may rather be levelled against the scheme for realising the claims through a number of agents instead of obtaining the revenues direct for the royal treasury and thereby putting central authority on firm foundations. For, according to this scheme, the collections in Gujarāt were assigned to the *Senāpatī*, those in Berār and Gondwana to the Bhonsle of Nagpur, of the Satara region to the *Pratinidhi*, of the Māwals (Poona district) to the *Sachiv*; to the *Peshwā* was granted Khāndesh and Bāglān and Central India for his activities; the *Sarlashkar* obtained the basin of the Godāvarī, and Fateh Singh Bhonsle was expected to make the annual levy from the Karnātak. Konkan was left in the possession of Kānhoji Angria. It was of the essence of the scheme that the chieftains whose authority had been established in a particular area should be recognised as the immediate rulers or law-givers of the region, should administer it and appropriate its revenues towards the maintenance of their troops, while they contributed only a small share to the Royal Exchequer. *Darrackdars* or revenue officers for each *Saranjam* were sent from the centre, but they seem to have been unable to curb the powers of the feudatory chiefs.

Bālājī perceived that the revival of Marāthā power in its old monarchical form was no longer possible, that it would be difficult to harness the nation's military resources to the common cause unless concessions were made to the great war-lords who had won an important place for themselves. He made them subordinate allies or confederates of the sovereign, granting them a free hand in administering their conquests, called from them no greater sacrifice than uniting on matters of common policy. The arrangement, however, left too much authority in the hands of these chiefs without providing for checks to call them to account. This was the beginning of the *jāgīr* system or feudalization of the Marāthā State which was responsible for the speedy expansion of the Marāthā power and its rapid dissolution. Historians point out that 'this granting of authority over territory instead of salaries to the officers by Bālājī Vishwanāth was a departure from the wise rule of Shivājī', but

throw the blame on the master and not on the minister. They suggest that Bālājī substituted for the autocracy of the sovereign the Marāthā confederacy, because he saw that Shāhū had not the commanding talents and energy which had made possible the great King's concentrated dominion. But it has been made plain in these pages that it was the support of the common people, of the Marāthā peasants and the Marāthā *Shiledārs*, that enabled Bālājī to beat down the opposition of the great war-lords and wrest victory for his master. In his desire to conciliate the great barons, Bālājī Vishwanāth appears to have gone too far and compromised royal authority. In leaving large powers in their hands Bālājī undoubtedly surrendered the gains of the battle after winning the victory.

But it would be wrong to hold the *Peshwā* solely responsible for the defects which the system developed later. He accepted the situation and found in the *jāgīr* system the best solution possible to bring peace to the distracted country. He had seen the Marāthā State wilting under the fierce onslaughts of the Mughul and had also witnessed the tide slowly turning against the enemy. He grasped, as few men of his generation did, the significance of the changes in the political atmosphere and was determined that his country should profit by them. His conciliatory approach enabled the great Marāthā soldiers to come under the common flag and unite their skill and resources for common purposes. Playing cleverly on the rivalries and factions of the Mughul court, he wrested from the emperor terms which secured for his State the gains of the bitter fighting of a quarter of a century and established the political supremacy of the Marāthās in the Deccan.

Bālājī Vishwanāth did not live long to work out his scheme in detail. After the monsoon he marched south and dispersed the Kolhapur force at Ashtā and laid siege to Kolhapur. After some desultory fighting he retired to Sāswad near Poona and died there on 2 April, 1720. He left behind his widow, Rādhā Bāi, two sons, and three daughters. The eldest son, Bāji Rāo, who had been his companion in most of his campaigns in his later years succeeded him to the *Peshwāship*.

Bālājī Vishwanāth has been truly called 'the second founder of the Marāthā State'. He piloted the ship of the State through dangerous waters and brought it to a safe haven. His greatness has been dimmed by the brilliant victories of his son and successor to the *Peshwāship*. But it need not blind us to the fact that it was the father's statesmanship that brought order out of chaos, upheld national interests and preserved the unity of the State when it look-

ed as if the Marāthā State would once more be split up into a number of petty principalities, making war upon each other and ending in submission to a foreign aggressor. The treaty with Husain 'Ali Sayyid was a great diplomatic triumph which secured to the Marāthā people the gains of their suffering for a quarter of a century and created a wide field for their restless ambition.

The term of Bājājī's *Peshwāship* marks the transition from the royal period to the age of the *Peshwās*. It ushers a new era in the history of the Marāthās. The feeble successors of the House of Shivājī fade into insignificance and become mere figure-heads with the passage of time. The reins of government pass into the hands of the able Prime Ministers, who direct the course of Marāthā polity for the next century.

NOTES

1. Niccolao Manucci, *Storia Do Mogor*, Vol. IV, pp. 96-97.
2. Khafi Khān, *Muntakhab-ul-Lubab* as translated in *History of India*, Vol. VII by Elliot and Dowson, p. 374.
3. Original paper published in *Vividh Dnyān Vistār*, Feb. 1924. Cited by Sardesai in *Marathi Riyasat V. Shāhū* (1942), pp. 35-6.
- 3a. Chitnīs, *Shāhū Charitra*, pp. 14-15.
4. *Itihās Sangraha*, Vol. VI, Peshwā Daftarāntil Mahitī, pp. 188-89.
- 4a. The dates given by Sardesai of the capture of Satara by Shāhū and of his coronation and followed by later writers lack in authority. Sardesai takes these from *Shedgaonkar Bakhar* and in looking up the calendar makes a slight mistake. If Satara was captured on a Saturday, that day cannot be 1st January of 1708 as given by Sardesai, which according to the calendar was a Thursday. Then the Sarvadhāri Hindu year given in *Shedgaonkar Bakhar* accords with 1709 and not with 1708.
5. *Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal's Quarterly*, Vol. VII, p. 86.
- 5a. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I (1921 Ed.), p. 319. Duff depends on Khafi Khān.
6. *Jaipur Akbhars* (Unpublished).
7. Chitnīs, *Thorle Shāhū Maharāj Yanche Charitra*, (1924 ed.), pp. 25-31. Selections from *Peshwā Daftar*, Vol. VII, pp. 8-91.
8. *Shāhū Roznishi*, p. 55; Chitnīs, *Shāhū Charitra*, pp. 31-33.
9. *Shāhū Roznishi*, pp. 45-46; V. K. Rajwade, *Marathyanche Itihasachi Sadhanen*, Vol. IV, pp. 32-37; *Itihas Sangraha*, Peshwā Daftarāntil Mahitī, pp. 13, 122-24. S.P.D. Vol. VII, Nos. 1, 2 and 40. *Tritiya Sammelan Vritta*, pp. 84-91 and 149-52.
10. Chitnīs, *op. cit.*, (1924 Ed.), pp. 38-39. *Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal's Quarterly*, Vol. XXVIII, p. 76.
11. Chitnīs, *op. cit.*, *Thorle Shāhū Maharāj Yanche Charitra*, p. 40. V. K. Rajwade, Vol. II, pp. 23-25; *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Ed. by Mawji and Parasnis, pp. 197-199.
12. A. G. Pawar, *Tārā Bāi Papers* (Persian-1971), Nos. 12, 111, 112 and 201.
13. Khafi Khān in Elliot & Dowson, Vol. VII, pp. 450-51.
14. Elliot & Dowson, *op. cit.*, Vol. VII, p. 463.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 463-64; S.P.D. XXX, pp. 235-40.
16. Khafi Khān in Elliot & Dowson, Vol. VII, p. 409.
17. *Thorle Shāhū Maharāj Yanche Charitra*, pp. 50-55; *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, ed. by Mawji and Parasnis, pp. 1-9; also Khafi Khān, p. 467.
18. Khafi Khān in Elliot & Dowson, Vol. VII, p. 468.
19. Dr. A. G. Pawar, *Indian Historical Records Commission, Proceedings*, Vol. XVII, pp. 209-13.
20. S.P.D., Vol. XXX, pp. 255-65.

CHAPTER IV

PESHWĀ BĀJĪ RĀO I (1720-40)

I. *The Peshwā's Problems:*

Bājī Rāo, the eldest son of Bālājī Vishwanāth, who was about twenty years old, succeeded him in the *Peshwāship* on 17 April, 1720. His extreme youthfulness, his bluff manner and his passion for military adventure, were held against him as disqualifying him for the highest ministerial post in the realm. But the Rājā, grateful to his late *Peshwā* for securing his throne against heavy odds, waived aside the objections of his counsellors and conferred the robes of the *Peshwāship* on Bājī Rāo at Masur. His argument was that the father had not survived long enough to enjoy the fruits of his achievements and he owed it to the son to appoint him to the father's post. If the new *Peshwā* proved unworthy of his responsibilities, he would think of replacing him in proper time.¹

The fact of the matter was that the late *Peshwā* had on his own responsibility raised large loans and put armies in the field to secure the *Chhatrapati's* position. The *Chhatrapati* was not very keen to involve himself in the military and administrative problems of his kingdom, but was content with a nominal supervision of the same. Rājā Shāhū was now in the prime of his life, being thirty-eight years old. If he had the will to rule and not only reign, he could have easily taken over the reins of government in his hands and conducted the administration in the manner his grand-father, the Great Shivājī, did. But Rājā Shāhū, by the circumstances of his upbringing and his inclinations, lacked the will to exert himself and refused to be bothered with the details of administration or lead armies in the field. The result was the gradual transfer of the chief executive powers to the *Peshwā's* hands from those of the *Chhatrapati*. The transfer of power, which was legalised by the rescripts of Shāhū written on his death-bed and later strengthened by the agreement of Sangola in 1750, was thus a gradual process which started much earlier. It will be discussed in a later section.

The several problems that confronted the young *Peshwā* were a legacy of his father's policy. The great feudatories of the State who were acting independently posed a problem. It was necessary that the royal authority, if it was to be effective, should be strong

enough to override that of the feudatories and bend them to its will.

The security of the homeland had been guaranteed by the grants of *Swarāj*, and *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of the six *subāhs* of the Deccan by the treaty concluded by Sayyid Husain 'Alī Khān in 1718 and ratified by the emperor in Delhi in March, 1719. That treaty, however, had been concluded by the Sayyid brothers who were out of favour with the new emperor and whose party was overthrown within a year of the conclusion of the agreement. Their rivals—the Turāni party, came into power and were not likely to abide by the commitments of their predecessors. The Deccan was seized by the Nizām, the most capable among the Mughul or Turāni chiefs. He had no respect for the agreement concluded by his opponents which made mockery of his authority. In collusion with Rājā Shāhū's rival, Shambhūjī of Kolhapur, he threatened to destroy the Marāthā State. The Nizām thus posed a serious challenge to the very existence of the Marāthā State, and required to be watched. A part of the *Swarāj* territory was yet in the hands of Mughul officers like the Sidi of Janjira and had to be wrested from them. The civil war with the Kolhapur party was only in abeyance, the faction of Shambhūjī refusing to accept a subordinate position.

To these problems awaiting solution must be added the Marāthā claims on Gujarāt and Mālwa which had not been admitted by the Mughul Court. As a reply to the Mughul offensive against their homeland, the Marāthās had crossed into these provinces to cut off the rear of the enemy and had made inroads as far as Ratanpur in Gujarāt and Sironj in Mālwa in the days of Aurangzīb. These had been repeated with greater boldness in the second decade of the eighteenth century. But these attempts, not being backed by organised authority, could not produce the necessary impact to make the adversary yield. The *Peshwā* was determined not to lose the advantage of the ground thus prepared, but to consolidate the gains and make a further advance. While on a visit to Delhi with his father in 1719 he had seen enough of the Mughul Court to convince him of its weakness. The parties anxious to dominate at the Court were bidding against each other for Marāthā co-operation, and the young *Peshwā* was too shrewd not to perceive the advantage such a situation gave him. He realized early, as few of his contemporaries appeared to have done, that the Mughul empire was rushing to its doom and that it was time for his people to march into Hindustān and seize supreme power instead of remaining confined within the narrow limits of their Deccan homeland. His early movements and his great victory at Pālkhed over the Nizām secured his position at home and increased his confidence and resources, and in 1728 his

armies burst into Central India. With Rājput help he secured a safe base for his further advance. In 1731 he overawed the lesser chiefs by destroying the *Senāpati* at Dabhoi and later recovered Marāthā territory from the Sidi and the Portuguese. His rapid gains thus facilitated his plan of Marāthā domination at the Delhi Court which became the watchword of Marāthā policy and animated all Marāthā activities in the years to come.

II. *The Nizām humbled:*

The first problem that confronted the young *Peshwā* was the security of the homeland. The Sayyids' party which had conceded Rājā Shāhū's claim to rule over *Swarāj* and had granted him rights to collect the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* from the six *subāhs* of the Deccan, was in disgrace. The emperor, who had ratified the treaty rather unwillingly, plotted against his benefactors, had Sayyid Husain 'Alī murdered in September, 1720 and his brother 'Abdullah in 1722. The grants of *Swarāj*, *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* had to be reconfirmed by the Mughul or Turāni party, which was opposed to any concessions to the Marāthās. Shrīnivās Rao *Pratinidhi*, the *Sarlashkar*, and Fatesingh Bhosle who had been granted the six *subāhs* as their spheres of activity were stay-at-home politicians, unable to raise resources and force issues.² The early years of the *Peshwā* were therefore spent in watching events in the Deccan and at the Mughul Court at Delhi and the movements of the Turāni leader, Nizām-ul-Mulk.

Born in 1671, Mir Qamar-ud-din as he was first known, saw much service in the Deccan. In 1683 he accompanied his father in the expedition of Poona and Supa; in 1688 he was active in the siege of Adoni and in 1693 in that of Panhāla. In 1698 he led independently in the expedition against the rebels of Nagori near Bijāpur. In 1699 he was given a high rank as Chīn Qīlich Khān. The next year he was busy in the investment of the fort of Parli and was rewarded with the *faujdāri* of Bijāpur. Two years later he was raised to the governorship of Bijāpur, and Azamnagar, Belgaum and Sampgaon were added to his charge. He took a prominent part in reducing Wakinkhera and acquired great influence over the emperor. While the emperor was at Ahmadnagar in 1707, he made Chīn Qīlich Khān responsible for the administration of Firoznagar and Talikota. As his end was nearing, Aurangzīb called Chīn Qīlich Khān for consultation. The emperor desired that the Turāni party of which Chīn Qīlich was now the leader, should lend its support to his favourite son Kām Bakhsh.

Chin Qilich refused to take part in the fratricidal war that followed the death of Aurangzib and was rewarded by Bahādur Shāh with the *Subāhdari* of Awadh and a high-sounding title in 1707. The *Subāhdari* he refused as he did not like to work under Zu'lfiqār Khān who had assumed supreme command at the Court, and went into voluntary retirement. In 1713 Zu'lfiqār Khān's nominee, Jahāndar Shāh, was defeated and the royal sceptre was wrested by Farrukh-siyar. Zu'lfiqār Khān's star waned and he met with an ignominious end for his part in the death of Farrukh-siyar's brothers. Chin Qilich Khān who had stood aloof and prevented the Turāni party from joining Jahāndar Shāh, was rewarded with the title Nizām-ul-Mulk Bahādur Fateh Jang and was appointed Viceroy of the six *subāhs* of the Deccan.³

The Nizām sensed the coming dissolution of the empire and nursed dynastic ambitions. His first governorship was very brief lasting over only two years. But during the short period the policy he was to pursue later, was developed. The Marāthā claims of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* brought in a foreign element in his administration and reduced it to impotence. He therefore determined to repudiate their claims at all costs. But he knew he could not succeed in opposing the Marāthās where the full might of the empire had failed. He would therefore foment disputes among the Marāthā chiefs and then reject their claims. During the brief spell of two years (1713-15) he incited Shambhūji of Kolhapur, Chandrasen Jādhav and other disgruntled Marāthā chiefs to create disturbances in Shāhū's territory.⁴

But the Nizām's *Subāhdari* of the Deccan did not last long. In 1715 he was removed from the *Subāh*, which was taken over by *Amir-ul-Umara* Sayyid Husain 'Alī Khān. The Sayyid brothers were at loggerheads with the emperor, and to secure Marāthā aid they made an agreement with Rājā Shāhū recognizing his succession to Shivājī's *Swarāj* (old Kingdom) in lieu of which Shāhū promised a tribute of ten lakhs of rupees; Marāthā claims of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* over the six *subāhs* were also conceded; for the first the Marāthās agreed to serve the emperor with a contingent of fifteen thousand horse; for the *sardeshmukhi* the Marāthās agreed to put down disturbances and pay ten per cent *peshkush*, of which a fourth only was to be paid immediately and the rest later. Sayyid Husain 'Alī marched to Delhi accompanied by a Marāthā contingent, deposed the fickle-minded Farrukh-siyar, put another scion of the Mughul house on the throne and had the agreement made with the Marāthās ratified by the new emperor.⁵

But the Sayyids' power was short-lived. The new emperor conspired against the brothers and had Husain 'Ali murdered in September 1720. The eldest brother 'Abdullah was defeated, thrown into prison and was despatched in 1722. The Turāni party came in power. Muhammad Amīn Khān became the *Vazīr* and Nizām-ul-Mulk seized the *subāh* of the Deccan.

The Marāthā Court and the *Peshwā* were bewildered spectators of these political changes at the Mughul capital. When the Nizām came south to fight Husain 'Ali's deputy, 'Alam 'Alī Khān, the *Peshwā* fought by his side, but withdrew with his troops to Khāndesh on the latter's defeat on 31 July, 1720. In the cold weather of 1720-21 the *Peshwā* invaded Khāndesh, perhaps to realize Marāthā claims of *chauth* and had his first meeting with the Nizām on 4 January, 1721, near Chikhalthan. Khāndesh and Bālāghāt were included in the *Peshwā's* sphere of activity and he wanted to keep Marāthā claims of *chauth* over the region alive and was moving in the region in 1722 as well.

In the meanwhile, the Nizām went back to Delhi lured by the prime ministership of the empire. But he did not hold the post long. The emperor and his boon companions did not like the austere manners of the new *Vazīr*, nor his administrative measures, nor his suggestion of redistributing imperial *jāgirs* to worthy persons. When the Nizām added the *subāh* of Gujarāt to his charge of the Deccan and Mālwa, there were loud rumours in the Court suggesting that the *Vazīr* was very grasping and perhaps intended to reduce the emperor to a cipher. In the circumstances, the *Vazīr* thought it wise to retire to his Deccan principality. On the pretext of ill-health he left the capital and reached Ujjain in 1724. In the meanwhile the emperor had relieved the Nizām of the governorship of the Deccan and Mālwa and sent orders to his officers and feudatories in the Deccan to treat the Nizām as a rebel. Mubārīz Khān, *Subāhdar* of Hyderabad was asked to oppose the Nizām with the help of Rājā Shāhū.⁶ The Nizām in search of allies, met the *Peshwā* at Nalcha on 18 May and won him over to his cause with all kinds of promises.⁷ In the struggle that ensued, the Nizām defeated his rival Mubārīz Khān at Shakarkharda (1 October, 1724) with the help of his Marāthā allies. By way of reward the *Peshwā* was awarded the rank of 7,000 *Zat* and 7,000 horse, an elephant and jewellery.⁸

Trusting to the friendship of his new ally, Rājā Shāhū suggested joint expeditions into Karnāṭak for establishing Marāthā claims of *chauth*.⁹ Twice Marāthā forces under the command of the *Prati-*

nidhi and the *Peshwā* marched into Karnāṭak (1725-26, 1726-27) only to be met by opposition from the Nizām's officers.¹⁰

The Nizām, as soon as he had triumphed over his Mughul rivals, began his efforts to free himself from the shackles of Marāthā demand. As a first step he removed his capital from Aurangābād to Hyderabad, and negotiated through the *Pratinidhi* exemption of the district of Hyderabad from the claims of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* in lieu of a *jāgir* granted to the Minister in the Bālāghāt-Gangathadi region.

Shāhū's activities in the Karnāṭak region roused the enmity of Shambhūjī of Kolhapur who began to concert measures to prevent further encroachments on what he regarded as his own sphere of influence. Through the renegade, Chandrasen Jādhav, he made overtures to the Nizām to secure his own recognition as head of the Marāthā State and oppose Shāhū's all-pervading claims of *chauth*.^{10a}

Shambhūjī's proposals were most acceptable to the Nizām. The emperor had confirmed his appointment as *Subāhdar* and had acquiesced in his usurpation. Relieved from the pressure from the north, the Nizām no longer had any use for his alliance with Rājā Shāhū and was anxious to shake off the hated claims of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* over his *subah*. Shambhūjī's force effected a junction with the Nizām's force and the joint army began to move ominously towards Marāthā country. The Nizām declared himself unwilling to observe the terms of the pact entered recently with Rājā Shāhū, till the rival claims of the cousins were settled. In pursuance of this policy, he dismissed Shāhū's officers and asked him to submit his claims to his arbitration.¹¹ In one of his letters to Sawāi Jay Singh he boasted of his plan: "With a view to carry out the emperor's order, I have with God's help, called to my side Rājā Shambhūjī (of Kolhapur) who is Shāhū's rival, conciliated him and engaged in punishing and exterminating Shāhū. Sultānji Rao (Nimbālkar, *Sarlashkar*) who was the general of the enemy's army came and saw me and was appointed to command Rājā Shambhūjī's army. I am hopeful that other partisans of Shāhū would desert him soon and his party would cease to exist. I have challenged the Marāthās to battle out of reliance on the grace of God and the Emperor's favour and aid."¹²

Shāhū was dumbfounded. Under the advice of the *Pratinidhi* he had pursued a conciliatory policy towards the *Subāhdar*. And here was the *Subāhdar*, denying him his right to the throne. He hastily recalled his army from the south and asked his Killadars to

hold on to their posts. The *Peshwā* on his arrival in May, 1727, asked the Rājā to break off negotiations with the Nizām. On 1 August orders for a general mobilisation were given and as soon as the monsoon was over, a large army consisting mainly of light cavalry and led by the *Peshwā*, invaded the Nizām's territory and marched towards Aurangābād. There was a skirmish near Jālnā with the Nizām's force led by Iwaz Khān; but the *Peshwā* avoiding a general engagement, pushed northward towards Burhānpur. Then taking a westerly route the Marāthā army moved into northern Khāndesh and then into Gujarāt, with the Nizām's force in pursuit.¹³ The Nizām abandoned the pursuit in the hilly tract and marched in the direction of Poona. Quite a few outposts like Udāpur, Avasari, Pābal, Khed and Nārāyaṅgarh surrendered. While returning, the Nizām occupied Poona and advanced against Supā, Pātas and Bārāmati. When he was in Bārāmati he heard the news that the *Peshwā* had burst eastward through the Kasarbari pass and was marching towards Aurangābād, the heart of his kingdom.¹⁴ The Nizām started in pursuit of the Marāthā army, asking his Marāthā allies to show the same vigour and mobility as the *Peshwā's* army which was closing on the Nizām's and harassing his rear and wings. Both Shambhūjī and Chandrasen pleaded inability to counteract the *Peshwā's* tactics.¹⁵ The Nizām found himself challenged for action in a waterless tract near Pālkhed on 25 February.¹⁶ Starved of food and water, the Nizām's army would not fight. Through the intercession of Iwaz Khān, the Nizām sent the *Peshwā* a word of his miserable plight and his willingness to come to terms.

The Mughul army was then allowed to move to the vicinity of the river and a treaty was concluded at Mungi-Paithan in *parganā* Shevgaon on 6 March, 1728. The main articles were the recognition of Rājā Shāhū as *Chhatrapati* and of the grant of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of the six *subāhs* to him which had been withheld. All talk about Shambhūjī's succession to the Marāthā throne was stopped. Bājī Rāo had demanded the surrender of the person of Shambhūjī to which the Nizām as a point of honour, would not agree. Shambhūjī was sent away to Panhālā. Whatever outposts like Poona, Khed, Bārāmati, Narayangarh, Akkalkot and the districts surrounding them had been seized by the Mughuls, were restored.

Field Marshal Montgomery who took a leading part in the defeat of Hitler and the destruction of his war machine, has recently published a book, *A History of Warfare* (1968), in which he discusses some of the important battles fought since ancient times to this day. He has selected the battle of Pālkhed as an action which was fought

in the style of Mongols and the original Turkish invaders of India. He writes:—

“The Pālkhed campaign of 1727-28 in which Bajī Rao I outgeneralled Nizām-ul-Mulk is a masterpiece of strategic mobility. Bajī Rao’s army was a purely mounted force, armed only with sabre, lance and a bow in some units, and a round shield. There was a spare horse for every two men. The Marāthās moved unencumbered by artillery, baggage or even handguns and defensive armour. They supplied themselves by looting.

“In October 1727 with the end of the rains Bajī Rao burst into the territory of the Nizām. The lightly equipped Marāthās moved with great rapidity, avoiding the main towns and fortresses, living off the country, burning and plundering. They met one reverse at Jalna at the hands of Iwaz Khān in the beginning of November but within a month they had fully recouped, and were off again, dashing east, north, west, with sudden changes of direction. The Nizām for a time pursued them but was bewildered by the swift and unpredictable movements of the enemy, and his men became exhausted.

“At the end of January the Nizām changed his strategy; he gave up the pursuit of the elusive Marāthā forces and instead made direct for their heartland round Poona, which he ravaged and captured. Bajī Rao received urgent calls to come back. But with good strategic sense he resisted the call and instead countered the Nizām’s move by in turn threatening his capital Aurangabad. Bajī Rao had not actually captured the capital but he had pillaged the neighbouring area. As the Nizām once again endeavoured to catch Bajī Rao, the Marāthās harried and circled round his forces. The Nizām preserved his army intact, but in March 1728 he gave up. By the peace terms some of their territorial claims were conceded.”¹⁷

The Nizām’s attempt to challenge Marāthā supremacy in the Deccan failed in a decisive manner. Marāthā expansion to the east and south became a matter of time and will, to press the advantage home by the Rājā’s ministers who had been assigned these spheres for their activity. Its legality was never called into question. The Nizām had invaded Marāthā territory not to recover this province or that district, but he aimed a deadly blow at Shāhū’s authority. By this defeat of the great Mughul chief the *Peshuā* won for himself a place of confidence in the Rājā’s counsels which nothing could shake.

The Kolhapur prince, having lost the support of the Nizām, could

no longer resist the superior claims of Shāhū. He was defeated in 1730. But Shāhū was anxious to conciliate his cousin. Instead of laying down harsh terms he met him near Karhād and invited him to visit Satara. The visit lasted over two months at the end of which the treaty of Wārṇā was concluded on 13 April, 1731. The territory held by Shambhūji was recognised as his State, and his right to expand southward right up to Rameshwar was also recognised. Both States were to act with one accord and not to harbour each other's enemies. There was an exchange of some enclaves so as to straighten up the frontiers of the two states.¹⁸ But the Rājā of Kolhapur showed little interest in the expansion of Marāthā power in Karnāṭak region and could not claim any part of the conquests made by the *Peshwā*. Kolhapur now came to occupy the position of a prince who was given full internal autonomy.

The Nizām continued to be a thorn in the side of the Marāthā State. He continued to foment discord among the Marāthā chiefs, but when pressed hard, would yield ground. In 1732 he came to an understanding with the *Peshwā* to give the latter a free hand in the north. As the *Iqbal Nama* puts it, "the tempo of Marāthā attacks and invasions continued to increase and those who were at the imperial court represented that all this was due to Nizām-ul-Mulk."¹⁹

III. *Peshwā-Senapati Strife:*

The defeat of the Nizām besides securing the safety of the Marāthā homeland, had other repercussions as well. It immensely increased the *Peshwā's* prestige both at home and abroad. This was reflected in the increased activities of his armies in Mālwa and Gujarāt. In Mālwa his army secured a decisive victory over the *subāhdar* Girdhar Bahādur at Amjhera and overran the whole province. These developments will be described later on. We may now turn to the developments in Gujarāt where the *Peshwā* started staking his claims for *chauth* from 1725.

The Marāthā State was fast developing into a feudal state with the powerful chiefs administering their *jāgīrs* nominally with the authority of the Rājā but practically independent of him. According to Grant Duff, "The *Peshwā* and Senaputtee, charged with the command of a great proportion of the Rājā's personal troops, were ordered to direct their attention to the general protection and defence of the territory."²⁰ But in their race for power, the *Peshwā* had by now far outstripped *Senāpati Dābhāde*.

Dābhāḍe family had seen service in the days of the Great Shivājī and Rājārām. Khanderao Dābhāḍe had built a number of fortlets on the Khāndesh-Gujarāt route and had defeated a Mughul general who tried to oust him from the Bāglān region. He had accompanied the *Peshwā* to Delhi in 1719 and his son had taken part in the Karnāṭak expedition. But during the last five or six years he was an ailing man and had not been able to keep pace with the rising fortunes of the *Peshwā*. Khāndesh, Bālāghat and Mālwa formed the sphere of activity of the *Peshwā*. The *Senāpati* was vested with similar authority in Bāglān and Gujarāt. Pilājī Gaikwār and Bāṇḍe were working on behalf of the *Senāpati* and had penetrated as far as Surat by 1723. This, according to *Mirat*, was the first year in which the Marāthās levied a regular tribute on Gujarāt. In June 1724 Trimbak Rao Dābhāḍe, the son of the *Senāpati*, was reported to be active in Surat Aṭhāvisi.²¹

Gujarāt was then in the throes of political turmoil. The province which had been put under the governorship of Nizām-ul-Mulk only a year back, had been transferred from him to Sarbuland Khān. But the Nizām was in no mood to surrender his authority to his successor and had asked his deputy, Hamīd Khān, to defy the new governor's orders. Sarbuland Khān was slow in taking over charge of his new office. He had asked a local chief Shujā'at Khān to deputise for him till his arrival at Ahmadabad. Hamīd Khān, the deputy of the rebel Nizām, called in the help of Kanthājī Kadam Bāṇḍe and Pilājī Gaikwār, and with their aid, defeated and slew Shujā'at Khān within sight of the walls of the capital. His brother Rustam 'Alī met with the same fate at Basu, 25 miles away from Ahmadabad on 11 February, 1725. He was surrounded by the force of Hamīd Khān and of his Marāthā allies, which was further strengthened by a contingent of the *Peshwā* led by Udājī Pawār. The *chauth* of Gujarāt was shared between Bāṇḍe and Gaikwār as the representatives of the *Senāpati*, and Udājī Pawār acting on behalf of the *Peshwā*.²²

In the meanwhile Sarbuland Khān arrived in Gujarāt with feelings of great trepidation about dealing with the Marāthās. He inflicted a defeat on the *Senāpati*'s chiefs, Gaikwār and Bāṇḍe near Sojitra (January, 1726) and chased them out of the province. But another force led by the *Peshwā*'s Diwan, Ambājī Purandare, and Bājī Bhivrao entered Gujarāt from the north-west. They exacted four lakhs of rupees from the merchant princes of Vadnagar. Kanthājī and Pilājī again threatened to attack the province. Sarbuland Khān felt himself unequal to deal effectively with the menace. He

agreed to grant the *chauth* of Gujarāt to the *Peshwā* in April 1726.²³

Shāhū issued orders to Pilājī Gaikwār and Kadam Bāṇḍe that half the *chauth* of Gujarāt had been granted to the *Peshwā* and the other half to Trimbak Rao Dābhāde on behalf of the *Senāpati* and that they should not disturb the arrangement.²⁴ Next year also (February 20, 1727) Sarbuland Khān repeated the agreement granting *chauth* to the *Peshwā* on behalf of the *Chhatrapati*. For this he was to serve the *Subāhdar* with a contingent of 2,500 horse and chase away marauders and disturbers of peace—a clause directed against Pilājī Gaikwār and Kadam Bāṇḍe. The Rājā was happy to receive the amount of rupees four lakhs and thirteen thousand as *sardeshmukhi*.²⁵ Sarbuland Khān felt almost helpless; his provincial force was unable to meet the waves after waves of Marāthā horsemen entering his province, and the central government was too lethargic to send him aid. When such a powerful chief as the Nizām invited the *Peshwā* to personal meetings and conceded him the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of the six *subāhs* of the Deccan, how could he deny the *Peshwā's* demands on Gujarāt? It was not necessary for him to consider the legality or otherwise of the *Peshwā's* claims. The *Peshwā* appeared the most powerful Marāthā chieftain and promised to punish the disturbers of peace.

But *Senāpati* Dābhāde objected to the *Peshwā's* aggression in Gujarāt. In *Dābhāde Hakikat* it is reported that while the *Chhatrapati* had assigned the *mulkgiri* of Gujarāt to the *Senāpati* and that of Mālwa to the *Peshwā*, the latter suggested that the *Senāpati* should yield half the *Mahāls* of Gujarāt to the *Peshwā* and he in his turn would give over half his conquests in Mālwa to the *Senāpati*. The *Senāpati* did not favour this kind of arrangement. But the *Peshwā* was powerful and would not abandon his designs on Gujarāt. He continued his aggressive activities in Gujarāt. On 30 July, 1727, Shāhū issued orders that "the *Mokasa* in pranth Gujarāt previously granted to Chimnāji Ballāl is now given to Khanderāo Dābhāde towards the maintenance of his troops."²⁶ The Rājā gave the clear verdict that the *Peshwā* should keep his hands off Gujarāt. He disapproved of the *Peshwā's* aggression in Gujarāt. Besides, as the Nizām was threatening to advance in the Marāthā country, Shāhū did not like his *Peshwā* and *Senāpati* to be contending and disunited. If the *Peshwā* had loyally obeyed the orders of his master, the future dispute between the two leading Marāthā chiefs could have been avoided. But the *Peshwā* would not readily abandon the Gujarāt enterprise. He had raised vast forces and during the last two years he had triumphed over the *Subāhdars* of Mālwa and Bundel-

khand. Elated by his victories he was in no mood to give up his grip over northern Gujarāt. In December 1729 he sent another army under the command of his brother Chimnāji Appā to Gujarāt. Pāwagarh occupied by Kadam Bāṇḍe fell on 6 January 1730 and then the army marched northwards reaching Petlad and Nadiad in the first week of March.²⁷

The situation became most alarming. Sarbuland Khān being detested at Delhi, could not count on drawing support from the Court and the enemy began knocking at the door. The desperate situation required a desperate remedy and the Khān sought it in coming to an agreement with Chimnāji by renewing the treaty concluded in February, 1727. The new agreement was concluded on 23 March, 1730. *Sardeshmukhi* or ten per cent of the whole revenue, both of the land and customs with the exception of Surat and *chauth* of the province were granted to the *Peshwā*. The *Peshwā* was to keep 2,500 horse for keeping peace in the province and agreed to punish disturbers of peace—a clause aimed at preventing the entry of the *Senāpati*'s troops into Gujarāt.^{27a}

The agreement concluded by Chimnāji Appā was clearly an infringement of the *Senāpati*'s claims over Gujarāt. The *Peshwā* appeared to be claiming a superior authority over other chiefs and subordinate them to his dictation. This was resented by the *Senāpati* and by all those whose interests the new agreement affected. The *Senāpati* became the leader of opposition to the *Peshwā* and round him rallied the disaffected elements—Pilājī Gaikwār, Kanthājī Kadam Bāṇḍe, Kānhoji Bhonsle, Udājī Pawār and others. The party counted on being supported at Court by the *Pratinidhi*.

At this stage of dispute young Dābhāḍe (the father died in September, 1729) committed a tactical blunder which cost him the sympathies of the Court and placed him in the position of a renegade against constituted authority. Apprehending he might not get justice from the monarch he entered into secret negotiations with the Nizām to invoke his aid. The Nizām readily seized the opportunity of weakening his opponents, sent encouraging replies to the *Senāpati* and assumed threatening posture towards the *Peshwā*'s agents.²⁸

The report of these intrigues reached the *Peshwā*. Before the disaffected elements could formulate their plan of action and effect a junction with the Nizām, the *Peshwā* entered Gujarāt at the head of a picked force, renewed the engagements with the *Subāhdar* concluded last year and then advanced upon Baroda held by Pilājī Gaikwār. Trimbak Rao Dābhāḍe hastened to meet the challenge, was

joined by Bhil and Koli levies and by a detachment of the Nizām. The two armies met at Dabhoi on 1 April, 1731. The battle was sanguinary and lasted over six hours. The superior leadership of the *Peshwā* won the day. Trimbak Rao Dābhāde *Senāpati* fell on the battlefield and his force was dispersed.²⁹ The Nizām's attempt to exploit differences in the Marāthā Court had once more been baffled and his intrigues defeated. Gujarāt was restored to the *Senāpati* on whose behalf the Gaikwār worked and brought the province under Marāthā control by 1737.

The battle of Dabhoi and Bājī Rāo's victory form a landmark in the history of the *Peshwās*. It left the *Peshwā* without a rival at home and "with all but nominal control of the Marāthā sovereignty."³⁰ The *Peshwā* on his return to Satara met the mother of the dead Dābhāde in a contrite mood, gave up his claims to the districts of Gujarāt and took over the charitable practice of honouring *Shāstrīs* and *Vaidiks* from the *Senāpati*. The *Shrāvāṇ Dakṣhaṇā* became one of the cultural institutions of the Marāthā State at which learned Brāhmins were shown regard according to the state of their learning, and continued to the end of the *Peshwās'* rule.

Nizām-ul-Mulk whose intrigues had been exposed, thought it convenient to come to terms with the *Peshwā*. He concluded an agreement with the *Peshwā* in December, 1732 by which "the former was to be at liberty to gratify his ambitions in the south, while the *Peshwā* obtained a free hand in the north."³¹

IV. Campaign against the Sidi of Janjirā:

The coastal strip of Mahārāshtra or Konkan from Jawhar in the north to Kārwar in the south formed a part of Shivājī's *Swarāj*. Two powers—the Sidis of Janjirā and the Portuguese of Goa held out against him clinging to their small maritime possessions. But during the interregnum of his death in 1680 and Shāhū's home-coming in 1707 during which the Marāthās were fighting the Mughuls for their very existence, these two powers had seized outlying Marāthā territory in Konkan and refused to surrender it after the withdrawal of the Mughuls. The draft treaty which was sent with Bālājī Vishwānāth to Husain 'Alī Sayyid in 1718 contained as its first article restoration of the forts like Rāigarh, Miraj, Junnar, Chāul, Kalyan and Bhivandi with their surrounding districts. The Sidis had been put in possession of the important fortresses of Raigarh and Mahād, Dābhol and Ratnagiri by Aurangzīb, and had on their own, grabbed several coastal points like Revas, Thal and Anjanwel from which they harassed Marāthā shipping and sent raiding parties inside

Marāthā territory.³² The Sidis had become a thorn in the Marāthā side and had to be taught a stern lesson.

Konkan had been assigned to Kānhojī Angria as his sphere of activity. His resources in men and money were not adequate to deal with the two deadly enemies of the Marāthās—the Sidis and the Portuguese—and yet he did not like to see the intrusion of the King's forces in his territory. So nothing much could be done while he remained at the helm of the admiralty. His death in 1729 cleared the way for reoccupation of the lost parts of the Marāthā homeland.

These political considerations for expelling the Sidis were aggravated by the atrocities one of the Sidi chiefs committed on a temple near Chiplun. Brahmendra Swāmi, a religious person, was much respected in the *Peshwā's* family and shown very high regard by the entire Marāthā Court. He had built lovely temples dedicated to Shiva, Ganapati, Māruti, Renukā, a *dharmaśālā*, *deepamālā* at Parashurām near Chiplun. Sidi Sā'at, the commandant of the nearby fort of Anjanwel, taking offence with the Swāmi, made a sudden raid on the place on *Mahāśivarātri* day (February 8, 1727) and razed to the ground the lovely temples and the rest houses and ill-treated the Brāhmin priests. The Swāmi's rage knew no bounds; he rained curses on the Sidi, left Konkan and settled at Dhavadshi near Satara preaching a crusade against the despoiler of his temples.³³

In 1733 a political revolution occurred at Janjirā. The Sidi chief, Sidi Rasul Khān, died in February, 1733, and his eldest son and successor was murdered by other claimants to the command. The son of the murdered 'Abdullah fled to the Marāthās for protection and asked their help to get him the Nawābship.³⁴ A powerful Sidi chief, Yakub Shaikhji, who was in command of the Sidi fleet and was a partisan of Abdullah, agreed to transfer his allegiance and come over to the Marāthā side for a substantial reward. Yashwant Rao Pōtnis had carried out these secret talks. Though it was the height of summer and end of the campaigning season, two forces—one under the *Peshwā* and Fateh Singh Bhosle and the other under the *Pratinidhi*, were immediately ordered to march into Konkan and seize Janjirā and Rāigarh. The *Peshwā* descended into Konkan and arrived before the island castle of Janjirā on May 2, 1733.³⁵ The suddenness of the approach of the Marāthā force took the enemy by surprise. Rājpurī and Khokri on the coast were seized³⁶ as well as places inland like Tala, Ghosale, Birwadi etc. Part of the Sidi's fleet lying in the creek came over to the *Peshwā* with its commanding officer Shaikhji, and Abdur Rahman, the contender for the Nawābship. The rebels, after a feeble resistance, fled to the castle

and closed its gates before the pursuing Marāthā force could get in.

Janjirā is a fortified island girdled by the sea all round. It lies within the entrance of the Rājpurī creek about half a mile distant from the mainland. In shape it is irregularly oval and is girt by walls which at high tide rise to a height of about fifty feet. The walls are battlemented and loopholed. The passage from Rājpurī to the castle was then covered by artillery, making the approach of any outsider well nigh impossible. An attacking force without adequate support of a fleet and long-range artillery and mortars, was helpless before it. The *Peshwā* invited Sekhoji Angria, son of the famous Kānhōjī in command of Marāthā navy, to meet him and prepare a concerted plan to attack the castle. He looked to the admiral to provide naval support for his enterprise. But owing partly to the lateness of the season and partly to the jealousy Angria felt at the intrusion of the King's forces in his field, Angria was slow in supporting the *Peshwā*.³⁷ Shaikhji, the Sidi commander from whom much was expected, proved of little help after the first surprise.³⁸ Help began to pour in at Janjirā from outside.

The Janjirā campaign was being directed by the Rājā, in person. The gains and conquests were to be his and therefore, his feudatories were loath to risk their money and men in the enterprise. The *Peshwā* after the first surprise, realized the difficulties of reducing the castle. The few vessels that had fallen in his hands were taken away by Sekhoji Angria. While the *Peshwā* sat helplessly before Rājpurī asking for reinforcements from Satara, the Admiral occupied himself with the capture of Revas, Thal and such other coastal places. He planned an assault on the castle after the rains. In the meanwhile the Sidi chief had appealed successfully to the English at Bombay, and obtained their succour for their beleaguered garrisons at Underi and Janjirā.³⁹ Capt. McNeil arrived on the scene with a powerful squadron and the attack on Janjirā had to be abandoned.⁴⁰

Śhrīnivās Rao *Pratinidhi*, who had been sent into South Konkan, bribed the Killadar of Rāigarh and occupied the fort on 8 June while the *Peshwā* was already negotiating for its surrender.⁴¹ Vijaygarh and Mandangarh were seized by Sekhoji Angria in July, 1733.⁴² The occupation of Rāigarh by the *Pratinidhi* kindled the *Peshwā's* ire. The two chiefs began to work at cross purposes making further progress in the expedition impossible. In the meanwhile, Sekhoji Angria died on 28 August.⁴³ The *Peshwā*, tired of sitting before the island castle without hope of reducing the place,

advised the Rājā to accept the terms offered through the English. Truce was declared and on December 1, Abdur Rahman, the Peshwā's nominee, was seated on the Janjirā *masnad*. The preliminaries were settled, the Peshwā agreeing not to claim beyond what territory was then in actual possession of the invading force. Bājī Rāo abandoned the siege of the island castle and marched away from Rājpurī (December, 1733).⁴⁴

The results of the campaign were not altogether unsubstantial. The Sidi was driven back to the sea, his territory dwindled to the rock islands of Janjirā, Underi, Anjanwel and Govalkot in the south. The Marāthās became masters of much of his land possessions. Rāigarh, the capital of the Great Shivājī, was recovered as also Chāul, Thal and Revas. Sidi Sā'at of Anjanwel continued to give trouble for some time; there was much fighting about Bānkot, Govalkot and Anjanwel.⁴⁵ But Sidi Sā'at was overcome in 1736, when taking his fleet to Bombay waters, he pounced upon Revas and marched to Kolābā. His small force was overwhelmed by a numerous army led by the Peshwā's brother Chimnāji Appā near Revas.⁴⁶ A final treaty was concluded on 25 September, 1736, establishing dual government in the eleven *mahāls* formerly owned by the Sidi. The Sidi continued to administer the five and half *mahāls* near the coast while the rest were taken over by the Peshwā's officers. The Sidi's power declined and the Sidi became in all but name, a tributary of the Marāthā State.⁴⁷

V. Conquest of Mālwa: (1700-1730)

The eighteenth century witnessed a change of the first magnitude in the political aspect of India—the rise of Marāthā power to eminence in Indian politics. Aurangzīb's Deccan war (1681-1707), proved a colossal failure. His enemies, the Marāthās, ill-equipped to fight the Mughuls in their manner, resorted to guerrilla tactics which demoralised the splendid armies of the emperor, broke their spell of invincibility and wore them out. In the process, the magnificent fabric of order and civil administration built up by the great Akbar and his successors was dissolved and Mughul authority lost popular respect. The aged emperor Aurangzīb during his last days tried to come to some sort of understanding with the Marāthās, but died before a settlement could be effected. His son, Ā'zam, on the advice of his noble Zu'lfiqār Khān, released Shāhū, recognising him as the head of the Marāthā state and promising him *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of the Deccan.⁴⁸ Though Ā'zam was defeated at Jājau (June, 1707) the pact made with Rājā Shāhū continued in

operation.⁴⁹ The Mughul Government was no longer in a position to refuse the victorious Marāthās the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of the six *subāhs* of the Deccan. After much procrastination the claims were given legal recognition by the treaty concluded in 1719.⁵⁰ Though put in the form of concessions made to Rājā Shāhū by the Mughul overlord, the grants signified a vital change in Mughul-Marāthā relations. The Marāthās had broken the power of the Mughul enemy and demanded tribute, which it suited their genius to take in the form of the inflated *chauth* or one-fourth of the standard revenue of the six *subāhs* of the Deccan.

The Marāthās entered the northern provinces of the empire in the first decade of the 18th century; a measure adopted in the early stages of the struggle as a counterpoise against Mughul attacks on their bases, the northward drive gained momentum as the century advanced.

According to Sir Jadunath Sarkar, the first invasion of Mālwa by the Marāthās occurred in 1699 when Krishna Sāwant (?) crossed the Narmadā with 15,000 cavalry and ravaged places near Dhamuni and retired. "The path thus opened was never again closed till at last in the middle of the 18th century Mālwa passed into the regular Marāthā possession."⁵¹ In 1703 after the rains Nemājī Sindia burst into Mālwa near Handia and marched down to Sironj, plundering and burning villages on the way. By February, 1704 he had advanced as far as Kalabāg. To stop his activities and open up communications the emperor had to despatch a special force under Firuz Jang. These raids were repeated with greater boldness in the decade that followed and Nemājī Sindia, Kānhōjī Bhosle, Santāji Bhosle, Gangāram, Khanderao Dābhāde and other Marāthā chieftains fought Mughul *subahdars* with varying fortunes.

In Peshwā Bājī Rāo the policy of northward expansion found its most fearless champion. He realized full well the weakness of the empire, the levity of its rulers, the incompetence and corruption of its officers, and made a bid for a dominant position in the Mughul empire. To the energy of his people that was being wasted in fratricidal war and internal disputes the best remedy and outlet was expansion of Marāthā power beyond the Narmadā. Combining qualities of military leadership and diplomatic skill, the *Peshwā* adopted the policy of northward drive and steadily pursued it during his life-time, bringing Mālwa, Bundelkhand and Gujarāt under Marāthā control. This achievement of the *Peshwā* of controlling Hindustān from the Deccan must be regarded as a radical, revolutionary change from the traditional trend; it guided Marāthā policy

till about the end of the 18th century and gave the Marāthās ascendancy in the politics of north India. If Shivājī secured the freedom of his people, *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo gave them a wider field of activity, brought renown to his state and made the Marāthās an all-India power.⁵²

Though the draft treaty, concluded with Sayyid Husain 'Alī Khān in 1718, contained the clause relating to the *chauth* of Mālwa and Gujarāt, this claim had been rejected by the Mughul Court. The *Peshwā* would wrest by arms what his father could not achieve by diplomacy.

The old province of Mālwa which is now merged in Madhya Pradesh, was the connecting link between the Deccan and Hindustān proper. On account of its central position the province was looked on as an important charge of great strategic significance. The highways of commerce and military routes to the Deccan and Gujarāt passed through it and armies based in Mālwa could strike at Rājputānā or Bundelkhand with the greatest ease. First conquered by Humāyūn and then reduced by Akbar, the *subāh* of Mālwa enjoyed peace for over a century. This peace was disturbed when Aurangzīb began to exhibit bigotry against the Hindu subjects by levying *Jizya*, destroying their temples and draining away the provincial revenues for his Deccan war. Provincial administration lost its efficiency and minds of men were disturbed when they found themselves discriminated on grounds of religion and ill-governed. The discontented Rājput chiefs, zamindārs and their Hindu subjects refused to co-operate with the Mughul *subāhdār*; on the contrary, they welcomed the Marāthā invaders, gave them secret information about rivers, fords and mountain passes and facilitated their early aggressions.⁵³

In the apportioning of spheres of influence following the imperial grants of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* in 1719, Khāndesh and the province of Mālwa bordering on it were assigned to the *Peshwā* for making collection, as a stroke of deliberate policy. The *Peshwā* and the Court looked on the possession of Mālwa as the best guarantee for the security of the Marāthā homeland and the Deccan. Marāthā influence had penetrated the province for some time and for this they were anxious to obtain legal recognition. The *Peshwā* invaded Mālwa in February, 1723 and again in May, 1724, collected *chauth* and met the Nizām on both the occasions. Home affairs kept him away for the next four years, but his subordinates kept the pressure on and laid southern Mālwa under contribution.

The appointment of Girdhar Bahādur as *Subāhdar* in June, 1725 prevented for a time the disorder in Mālwa. Girdhar Bahādur was an officer of strong character and refused to compromise with the enemies of the empire. He turned out Marāthā Kamavisdars and chased Marāthā troops beyond the Narmadā. It was only after the defeat of Nizām-ul-Mulk at Pālkhed in February, 1728 that the *Peshwā* could respond in a fitting manner to this challenge to his authority. About the end of 1728 two big armies invaded Central India. The first under the *Peshwā*'s brother Chimnāji Appā entered Mālwa by the Mandu Ghāt and surprised the *Subāhdar* Girdhar Bahādur in his camp at the border town of Amjhera (November 29, 1728). Girdhar Bahādur's troops fought with the courage of despair, but they were outnumbered and outmanoeuvred. After six hours of fierce fighting the Mughul force was annihilated, its commanders Girdhar and his cousin Dayā Bahādur with a number of chiefs were slain; its colours and all camp equipage were captured by the Marāthās. It was a complete victory for Chimnāji and congratulations were showered on him from all quarters.⁵⁴

Resting his troops for a couple of days Chimnāji pressed on towards the capital Ujjain. The brave defence put up by the *Subāhdar*'s son, Bhavāni Rām, held up the Marāthā advance for some time. But Chimnāji moved in the open country and made collection from Sārangpūr, Rājgarh, Bhanpurā, Rampurā and Jāwad, and then by way of Jhalod, retired to the Deccan.

There was utter confusion in the imperial ranks in Mālwa. No money or reinforcements could be obtained from the emperor. The troops clamoured for their arrears. Sayyid Najmuddin 'Alī Khān who had been ordered to support Bhavāni Rām, preferred to look on himself as the *Subāhdar* and called on Bhavāni Rām to account for the revenues of the province. The defeat of the *Subāhdar*'s troops and the subsequent squabbles of the generals encouraged the peasantry and local zamindars to withhold revenue. All the efforts of Bhavāni Rām who succeeded his father in the governorship, failed to hold up the avalanche. The mountain passes into Mālwa were lost to the Marāthās; the flood-gates were thrown open and the tidal waters now rushed in, and within a decade Mālwa passed into the hands of the Marāthās.

About the end of 1729 Sawāi Jay Singh was appointed governor of the province. His tenure witnessed the beginning of a new policy—the policy of appeasement—towards the Marāthās. The growing power of the Marāthās and the convulsions in Mālwa made a deep impression on Jay Singh's mind. He perceived that the only

practicable policy that might succeed in the circumstances, was the policy of appeasement which was in consonance with his sympathies for Marāthā aspirations.⁵⁵ The immunity of Mālwa was to be secured by the grant of a *jāgīr* to Rājā Shāhū worth ten lakhs of rupees. It was expected that the grant of this *jāgīr* would induce the Rājā to keep his generals in check and prevent their inroads in the province. To this end a Marāthā general was to serve under the imperial banner.⁵⁶ Written undertakings were exchanged with Dādo Bhimsen, Shāhū Rājā's envoy, and Deep Singh, an eminent Rājput, was deputed (September, 1730) to the Marāthā country to bring about a lasting settlement and an enduring peace.⁵⁷ The fort of Mandu captured by Holkar and Pawār was restored to the *Subāhdar* in March, 1730 and Marāthā chieftains in Mālwa were asked to cease operations.⁵⁸

None of the parties were sincere in their professions of friendship and none believed that the arrangement would fulfil its purpose. Sawāi Jay Singh wanted to seize the *Subāh* of Mālwa for himself and to set up practically as an independent ruler; for the *Peshwā*, Mālwa was the sphere of his activities and he was not likely to abandon it lightly in lieu of a small *jāgīr* to his sovereign. The Mughul Darbar was suspicious of the activities of Sawāi Jay Singh in Mālwa, and when it found him negotiating a settlement with the Marāthās, it replaced him by an anti-Marāthā *Subāhdar*, Muhammad Khān Bangash, in September, 1730. The Mughul policy was now to alternate between peace negotiations through Rājput and Hindustāni chiefs at the Court and war and resistance as advocated by the Turāni chiefs. The Marāthās made their demands look tempting and acceptable by professing loyalty to the Mughul throne and offering their services to protect the imperial territory over which their claims were to be recognized.

VI. *Progress in Bundelkhand:*

While Chimnāji was reducing Mālwa, the *Peshwā* entered Bundelkhand at the head of another large army. His help was invoked by Rājā Chhatrasāl when he was hard-pressed by Muhammad Khān Bangash, governor of Allahabad.⁵⁹ The Bundelā chief in great distress requested the *Peshwā* to come to his aid. He sent him a poetic letter of which the following lines are famous:

"I am in distress like the famous *Gajendra*
Unless you rush to my aid, I am lost."

Muhammad Khān Bangash had been appointed to the *Subāh* of

Allahabad in 1720. From 1727 he had opened the campaign against the rebellious Bundelās and captured their strongholds one by one. The last to surrender was Jaitpur which surrendered in December, 1728. Thus all Bundelā forts had passed into Bangash's hands; their forces had been beaten in the field, and were scattered. Bangash sent back the major part of his army and lay encamped at Jaitpur with hardly 10,000 men.⁶⁰ He allowed the Bundelā chiefs to remove to a distance on the pretext of celebrating the *Holi*. The *Peshwā* in the meanwhile had pushed on into Bundelkhand from Deogarh. Near Māhoba he was joined by the Bundelā chiefs with their men. With his army, now swollen to near 70,000 men, the *Peshwā* invested the *Subāhdar* in his encampment. Reduced to great straits, Bangash invited reinforcements from Allahabad and from Delhi. His son Qāim Khān tried to send relief but was defeated.⁶¹ The imperial Court, immersed in its rounds of pleasures, had no time and no inclination to attend to the demands of its Governors. Bangash retired from Bundelkhand leaving the Bundelās masters in their home. The grateful Chhatrasāl came to look on the *Peshwā* as his son, and promised him a part of his kingdom. The actual grant of *jāgīr* was made after the old man's death by his sons Jagat Rāj and Hirdesa, who gave the *Peshwā* districts worth two and a quarter lakhs of rupees and promised to assist him in all his enterprises in Hindustān. The grant was later on increased to rupees five lakhs.⁶² The Marāthās thus obtained another foothold from which to mount their offensive against the Mughul empire.

Rājā Jay Singh of Amber (1729-30, 1732-37) and Muhammad Khān Bangash (1730-32) who held between them the governorship of Mālwa from 1729 to 1737 tried, as indicated earlier, appeasement and war in turn, but neither policy proved successful. Bangash governed the province from September, 1730 to October, 1732, chasing the Marāthās from place to place, but found his resources altogether inadequate to throw them out. Rājā Jay Singh who succeeded Bangash in the governorship, was the ruler of the important principality of Jaipur, a friend of Khān-i-Daurān, *Mīr Bakhshi*, and wielded considerable influence at the Mughul Court. Jay Singh was a man of culture and refinement; he advocated the policy of winning the Marāthās over to the imperial cause by making large concessions and satisfying their demands. Aware of the decay creeping over the Mughul empire, the Rājput prince entertained secret ambitions of enlarging his kingdom of Amber so as to include in it the rich province of Mālwa. For this it was necessary to persuade the Rājput nobility to accept his leadership and conciliate the Marāthās.⁶³ But diplomacy rarely succeeds unless backed by

force and the Rājput was too sensual and pleasure-loving to exert himself in the field. The Rājput princes refused to unite under the Kachhwa banner and nothing short of the *subāhdari* of Mālwa would satisfy the *Peshwā*. Jay Singh purchased peace by sharing with the Marāthās the large sums sent to him from Delhi for the defence of the province.

In October, 1730, Malhār Rao Holkar was granted the entire assignment on the province of Mālwa. Next year in October, 1731, Rāņoji Sindia was associated with him. The Pawārs likewise were given a share in the collection the same time. From 1732 the collections made from Mālwa came to be shared regularly among the *Peshwā's* chief Sardars, Holkar, Sindia and the Pawārs. Udājī Pawār, who had taken a prominent part in leading Marāthā armies in Mālwa claimed half the share, was refused and joined the party of the disgruntled *Senāpati*. This was the end of his career. His brother Ānand Rao and his cousins Tukōjī and Jivājī were favoured along with Holkar and Sindia. Holkar and Sindia made Indore and Ujjain their headquarters and the Pawārs settled at Dhār and Dewās. The revenues were shared equally between the Sindia and Holkar and the Pawār brothers,⁶⁴ after the usual deduction of 45 per cent, as the dues of the *Peshwā*.

From 1732 the Marāthā offensive took the form of a two-pronged drive. One army under Sindia and Holkar would pour into western Mālwa by way of Gujarāt while another taking a north-easterly route would enter Bundelkhand and with the aid of their Bundelā allies, ravage the country as far north as Gwalior and Gohad. In February, 1733, Sawāi Jay Singh was surrounded near Mandasor and extricated himself by paying six lakhs in cash in addition to the revenue of 28 *parganās* already collected. In April, 1734, Bundī was attacked and Jay Singh's nominee Dalel Singh was driven out; a force that advanced to Sironj under Muzaffar Khān was invested and escaped with difficulty.

Two large armies marched against the Marāthās in the cold season of 1734-35. Vazir Qamar-ud-dīn Khān came up against Pilājī Jādhav in February, 1735, near Narwar, but found himself in great distress by the constant attacks of the light Marāthā horse. He sought refuge in the fort of Orchha and had to bribe the Marāthās with five lakhs of rupees before they retired. Jādhav made collections in the *parganās* of Sivpuri, Kolaras, Pohari and Narwar before retiring to the Deccan.⁶⁵

The second army under Mīr Bakhshi, Khān-i-Daurān, left the

capital in November. It was joined on the march by Sawāi Jay Singh, Abhay Singh of Mārwar and Durjan Sāl of Kota till it swelled to near two lakhs. The imperial forces were unwieldy and difficult to manage. While encamped at Rāmpurā, Sindia and Holkar surrounded them and cut off their supplies. Then abandoning the blockade they passed the rear of the Mughul army, crossed the Mukundra pass and by way of Bundī, entered the territory of Sawāi Jay Singh. On February 28, the rich city of Sambhar was plundered yielding a rich harvest. This sudden eruption of the enemy in their rear caused dismay in Mughul ranks and the Rājput allies insisted on going back to save their homes. Khān-i-Daurān's army retired and while he was at Kota, a meeting was arranged with the Marāthā chieftains on March 24, 1735, at which they agreed to accept twenty-two lakhs as *chauth* for Mālwa.⁶⁶

"The Marāthās", says the author of *Siyar-ul Mutakherin*, "continued to extend their ravages and incursions to which they had been encouraged by receiving contributions in order to purchase their forbearance wherever they appeared. When they saw no measures were taken to oppose their movements, they recommenced their operations in the next year. At length they assumed absolute dominion of the districts which formerly only paid tribute. By these encroachments the frontier of the empire receded while that of the Marāthās advanced. By the supineness of the emperor they now occupied territories as far as Gwalior and approached the vicinity of Akbarabad" (Āgra).⁶⁷

The policy of appeasement pursued by Sawāi Jay Singh had not been very successful. Fresh concessions had called forth fresh aggressions. Having succeeded in levying *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* in Mālwa, the *Peshwā* now applied through Jay Singh for the formal grant of Mālwa and Gujarāt in *jāgīr*. The growing encroachments of the Marāthās had given rise to serious misgivings at the Imperial Court. Was Rājā Jay Singh, his enemies openly asked, in league with his co-religionists and encouraging their aggressions, or was he incompetent to deal with them? The Court blamed Jay Singh and Khān-i-Daurān for the continued aggression. Sa'ādat Khān told the Emperor: "Jay Singh has ruined the empire by his secret support to the Marāthās. Give me only the *Subāhdari* of Āgra and Mālwa. I do not ask for treasure. I want to save the empire. Jay Singh and party ask for crores of rupees to meet the expenditure. The Nizām is my friend. We will hold up the Marāthās south of the Narmada." To this a reply was made by Khān-i-Daurān, "The Marāthās cannot be effectively subdued by fighting. By friendly negotiations

I shall induce either the *Peshwā* or his brother to meet your Majesty. If his demands are accepted there will be no disturbances in the imperial domain in future. If, on the other hand, Sa'adat Khān and the Nizām combine, they would set up another emperor." The Pādshāh felt that there was some truth in this. Khān-i-Daurān further submitted: "I only promised the Marāthā generals that they would be given as *jāgīrs* those *parganās* of Mālwa which are in the hands of the refractory Rohillās and other brigands. Then they will not disturb any other district under the emperor's rule. Bājī Rāo desires the emperor's patronage and will serve him. He has brought his family from the Deccan on the plea of bathing in the Ganga."⁶⁸ However, Jay Singh felt that his position was seriously assailed and invited the *Peshwā* to a personal meeting at which he hoped to evolve a formula satisfactory to both parties and yet keep the *subāhdari* of Mālwa to himself.

There were reports also of the emperor having effected a reconciliation between the *Vazīr* Qamar-ud-dīn and Abhay Singh of Mār-wār and of his having appointed the former to the charge of Āgra, Mālwa and Gujarāt. If Jay Singh joined the *Vazīr*, his territory was not to be molested. Otherwise no consideration was to be shown to him. The emperor was dissatisfied with Jay Singh's handling of the Marāthā problem and wanted to put it in abler hands. It was common talk that two armies would take the field against the Marāthās—one led by Jay Singh and Khān-i-Daurān by way of Jaipur and the other by way of Gwalior under the command of *Vazīr* Qamar-ud-din Khān, Sa'adat Khān and Abhay Singh.⁶⁹

The *Peshwā* felt he could no longer remain away from the scene. He left Poona in October, 1735, at the head of a large force. His march to the north created quite a stir at the Courts of foreign rulers. There were wild rumours about his real intentions; and the *Peshwā* added not a little to the confusion by making an appeal to all Hindu rulers to gather under his banner.⁷⁰ About the beginning of February he arrived at Udaipur and met the Rānā in a formal *Darbar*. On 4 February, 1736, he visited the Mahārānā's famous water-palace known as *Jal Mandir* in the Pichola lake.⁷¹ The *Peshwā* wanted the *parganā* of Banera to be conferred on him as *jāgīr*. The Mahārānā politely declined to give away the *parganā* as *jāgīr*, but agreed to allot its revenues to the *Peshwā*.⁷²

Agents began to arrive from Sawāi Jay Singh and from the Imperial Court carrying drafts of agreements which would prove acceptable. Jay Singh's proposal amounted to the grant of a subsidy of twenty lakhs of rupees, a *jāgīr* of forty lakhs in Mālwa and tan-

khah on the territory of Dost Muhammad Rohillā.⁷³ The meeting with Sawāi Jay Singh took place on March 4, at Bhambholao near Kishangarh.

The emperor was prepared to concede to the Peshwā *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of the *subāh* of Mālwa, an assignment of thirteen lakhs of rupees on the revenues of districts south of the Chambal and authority to levy tribute from the Rājput States from Bundī in the west to Bhadawar to the east.⁷⁴ The concessions excited the Peshwā's cupidity and called forth fresh demands; he went on raising his claims till at last he demanded:

- (i) The *subāh* of Mālwa inclusive of the tributary States to be granted in *jāgīr* to the Peshwā;
- (ii) the Rohillā chiefs of Bhopal and Bhilsā to be ejected from the province and their *jāgīrs* to be made over to the Peshwā;
- (iii) the forts of Māndu, Dhār and Raisin (commanding passes into Mālwa from the south) to be ceded to the Peshwā;
- (iv) the territory up to the Chambal to be granted to the Peshwā in *jāgīr*;
- (v) an assignment of fifty lakhs of rupees or the revenue of Bengal to relieve the Peshwā's debts;
- (vi) the cession of the holy places of Allahabad, Banāras, Mathurā and Gayā;
- (vii) the cession of Sardeshpandeship of the Deccan, and lastly
- (viii) demand for another *jāgīr* of fifty lakhs of rupees in the *subāh* of the Deccan, while the *subāh* is held by a son of the emperor.⁷⁵

From the modest demands for cession of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of Mālwa and war indemnity to meet his debts, the Peshwā had gone on to ask for the virtual control of Mālwa, Bundelkhand, Bengal and the six *subāhs* of the Deccan. This was really staggering and the Mughul Court decided to fight. As long as the Peshwā remained in Mālwa with his troops, it procrastinated merely to gain time.

The Peshwā went back to the Deccan leaving behind his generals, Sindia and Holkar, to press his demands.⁷⁶ All that Jay Singh could persuade the emperor to grant to the Peshwā was the deputy

governorship of the province, which fell far short of the latter's expectations; and the renewal of hostilities was inevitable.⁷⁷

VII. *Peshwā Marches to Delhi:*

When the next campaigning season opened, the *Peshwā* marched into Hindustān at the head of an army, fifty thousand strong. Bhopal and Bhilsā, the only islands of opposition held by Rohillā chieftains, were reduced⁷⁸ and the *Peshwā* then struck in the north-eastern direction and attacked the Jāt Rājā of Bhadāwar. The Rājā made his submission agreeing to pay twenty lakhs of rupees in tribute and presented ten elephants.⁷⁹

The *Peshwā's* arrival on the northern borders of Bundelkhand, hardly 70 miles distant from Āgra, constituted a threat of the first magnitude to the empire and roused the Court to feverish activity. Large armies were equipped and put into the field under the command of *Vazīr Qamar-ud-din Khān* and *Mīr Bakhshi Khān-i-Daurān*. Royal letters were despatched to provincial governors, and Mughul and Rājput chiefs to rush to the defence of the capital. The movement of troops and their concentration in the Delhi-Āgra area were reported from all sides.⁸⁰ It was necessary to counter this convergence of Mughul troops and create a diversion. A strong detachment under *Malhār Rāo Holkar* therefore crossed the Yamunā and entered the Doāb. Moving swiftly, Holkar plundered Itimādpur and Firozābād opposite Āgra. At Jalesar, however, he was surprised by *Sa'adat Khān*, Governor of Awadh, and repulsed with losses.⁸¹ The *Peshwā* was foiled in one more attempt to dissolve the concentration of enemy forces and had to think of other plans. Retiring to a little distance from Āgra he sent away his baggage and camp-followers under heavy escort of his Bundelā allies. The temporary withdrawal of the *Peshwā's* troops created the impression that the Marāthās, unable to face the imperialists, were making for the South. *Sa'adat Khān* wrote to the emperor glowing accounts of his victory, boasted of his soon being able to drive the Marāthās beyond the Chambal and advised the emperor to break off negotiations with the *Peshwā*.⁸²

The *Peshwā's* *Vakil*, Dhondo Govind, who was in the camp of the *Mīr Bakhshi* communicated *Sa'adat Khān's* accounts of his success and the violent reaction it had produced at the Court. The *Peshwā* was resolved to tell the emperor the truth, "to prove that he was still in Hindoostan, and to show him flames and Mahrattas at the gates of his capital."⁸³ While the Mughul chiefs were celebrating *Sa'adat Khān's* recent victory, the *Peshwā* making a wide detour through the Jāt and Mewāt country on the west, passed the enemy's

rear and arrived in the vicinity of the capital on 29 March, 1737. Leaving Barapula and the Kālikā temple (near Okhla) to his right the *Peshwā* arrived in the plain near the capital. On reaching the walled city, the *Peshwā* changed his mind of sacking the city; he knew that the emperor and Khān-i-Daurān were inclined towards peace, but the Mughul party was opposed to such a move. In case of an attack on the capital, the Mughul Court would be driven to take extreme measures and negotiations would break down. Therefore, forbidding any destruction of the city, he sent friendly messages to the emperor inviting fresh proposals. As the presence of the army was likely to lead to disturbances, the *Peshwā* moved in the direction of the Jhil tank. As the *Peshwā's* army was changing grounds the next day, the move was misunderstood as retreat and the defenders sallied out to attack the *Peshwā's* troops. The *Peshwā's* commander, Satvoji Jādhav, lured the Mughul force beyond the protection of its artillery and then enveloping it, completely routed it. On 31 March, learning of the approach of the enemy troops, the *Peshwā* disappeared as suddenly as he had appeared before the capital. He hoped to draw the Mughul armies in the arid hills of the Mewāt country, but the enemy refused to take the bait.⁸⁴ Wearied by marching and counter-marching, the Mughul *Vazīr* and *Mīr Bakhshi* retired to their mansions. The emperor felt nothing but disgust and contempt for Sa'ādat Khān for making wild claims and refused to grant him an interview or appoint him to the *Subāhdari* of Mālwa and Gujarāt.⁸⁵ By his clever strategy the *Peshwā* outmanoeuvred his opponents and completely immobilised them. The Turāni party which opposed Marāthā ambitions was discredited in the councils of the empire and the influence of the Hindustāni leaders, Jay Singh and Khān-i-Daurān, once more became supreme.

The *Peshwā* retired through Jaipur territory to Bundelkhand and picked up his baggage. The Marāthās were lightly armed, and the privations they had suffered during the last fifteen days had rendered them unfit to face the respectable force of Jay Singh. But so great was the awe inspired by the *Peshwā's* army that Jay Singh begged of him to spare his country.⁸⁶

VIII. *Battle of Bhopal:*

Now a new combination of forces threatened the realization of the *Peshwā's* schemes and challenged his supremacy in the imperial council. Nizām-ul-Mulk, though he had agreed in 1732 to give the *Peshwā* a free hand in Hindustān, watched his extraordinary progress beyond the Narmadā with the greatest anxiety. He thought

that the *Peshwā's* new entanglements would reduce the latter's resources and allow himself greater freedom in the south. Events, however, belied the Nizām's expectations. The weakness of the empire revealed itself more and more glaringly as the Marāthā-Mughul struggle developed and Mughul armies suffered reverses after reverses. Instead of being checked and driven back, the *Peshwā* reached the very gates of Delhi and threatened to subvert the empire itself. The Nizām could no longer remain an idle spectator while the bulwarks of the empire were crumbling round him. The news of the *Peshwā* trying to obtain greater control over his *subāh* of the Deccan and rivet further chains on his authority was most disquieting. The Nizām decided to make common cause with the imperial government to save it and save himself thereby.⁸⁷

So deeply upset was the Nizām over the *Peshwā's* negotiations with the Mughul Court that he could not wait till the latter's return to the south. He left Deccan and on his march to the capital encountered the *Peshwā's* army near Sironj, met the *Peshwā's* deputy Pilāji Jādhav, made friendly professions to the *Peshwā* and slipped away to the north.⁸⁸

The Mughul Court having realized its weakness in opposing Marāthā encroachments invited Nizām-ul-Mulk to its aid and suspended peace talks. On his arrival in Delhi in June old jealousies and suspicions were set aside. Muhammad Shāh showered favours on the Nizām, gave him the best residence in the capital, and restored to him the government of Mālwa and Āgra on condition that he would drive the Marāthās beyond the Narmadā.⁸⁹ At the head of an army of thirty-five thousand men and a fine park of artillery the Nizām left the capital to seek and, if possible, destroy the enemy. He marched southward through Bundelkhand where he was joined by Sa'ādat Khān's troops and also those of the Rājput and Bundelā chiefs, till his force increased into a vast army of nearly seventy thousand. About the middle of December he arrived at Bhopal. His strategy was to catch the Marāthā army between two pincers—to crush it between the imperial army under his personal command and another force striking from the south under his son, Nasir Jang.⁹⁰

But before the Marāthā outposts on the Narmadā could be seized and their garrisons thrown out, the *Peshwā* invaded Mālwa at the head of eighty thousand troops and came up with the Nizām at Bhopal.⁹¹ He posted a strong detachment under his brother on the Tāpi to prevent relief going to the Nizām from the Deccan. Raghūji Bhosle at the same time defeated Shujā'at Khān in Khāndesh; and

no troops could march to Bhopal to succour the Nizām from the Deccan. The Mughul Court had given him sixty lakhs of rupees to equip his army, while the chief nobles at the Court and Rājput princes had been asked to join him. Delhi was in no position to send further reinforcements. The Nizām thus found himself completely isolated and invested in the town of Bhopal. The grain supply in his camp soon ceased and men and animals famished for want of food. Two detachments that tried to carry relief to the beleaguered army—one from Shāhjahānpur and the other from Burhānpur—were cut off. The Nizām's attempt to break through the enemy's cordon and escape to Delhi under cover of his artillery was foiled by the Marāthā horse hovering round and galling the Mughul army with showers of rockets and matchlock fire. Unable to hold out any longer the Nizām begged for terms on 7 January, 1738, at Duraha Sarai,⁹² and signed a convention⁹³ promising the *Peshwā*:

- (i) the *subāhdari* of the province of Mālwa;
- (ii) levy of tributes from the Rājās in the region between the Narmadā and the Chambal,
- (iii) imperial grants confirming the same, and
- (iv) promise of 50 lakhs of rupees to meet his war expenses.⁹⁴

The victory of Bhopal marks the zenith of the *Peshwā*'s triumphant career. Nizām-ul-Mulk who was opposing the grant of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of Mālwa had been forced to concede the entire province in *jāgīr* and recognize the *Peshwā*'s claims up to the Chambal. The *Peshwā* accomplished the conquests he had set before himself since he came to the *Peshwāship*. Creating powerful armies out of divergent elements of Marāthā Shiledārs, he invaded Hindustān, brought to grief one imperial army after another sent against him, and acquired immense territory till the Marāthā outposts reached the southern banks of the Chambal and the Yamunā. The disaster of Amjhera (1728) first opened the eyes of the imperial government to this menace from the south. But the measures it adopted to fight it were feeble and half-hearted, and lacked in consistency. The friendship of Rājā Jay Singh enabled the Marāthās to plant their power firmly in Mālwa. The later attempts of the Mughul government to oust the Marāthās failed on account of the pusillanimity of its leaders and want of energy in its administration. The defeat of the confederate armies at Bhopal by the *Peshwā* established the supremacy of Marāthā arms in Hindustān and announced the birth of a new power.

The Nizām failed to keep his promise of getting the convention ratified within his lifetime. Serious doubts assailed the mind about effectiveness of the *Peshwā's* military strategy which allowed the Nizām to escape unscathed at Pālkhed in 1728 and again at Bhopal in 1738. Unless the enemy's military strength is destroyed and he makes suitable amends, his acknowledgement of defeat is meaningless. In the first World War "over the whole period of the Allied offensive campaign from July 18th to November 11th, 1918, the captures were about four hundred thousand men and 5,618 guns." The German military machine was crippled, the generals had to resign and the Kaiser had to flee the country.⁹⁵ As against this the *Peshwā* informed his brother how difficult it was to close with the Nizām's army bristling with artillery and why he readily accepted peace terms.⁹⁶

No new *Subāhdar* however was sent from Delhi and the province remained in Marāthā hands. Sindia and Holkar who had already set up their headquarters at Ujjain and Indore, shared the revenues with the *Peshwā*.

IX. *Nādir Shāh's Invasion:*

The invasion of Nādir Shāh next year convulsed the Mughul empire and hastened its decay. The emperor became a shadow figure exercising little direct authority beyond the provinces of Āgra and Delhi. The Irāni's irruption however seriously challenged Marāthā scheme of expansion in Hindustān and of controlling the Mughul empire.

Nādir Shāh had liberated his country of Irān from Afghān domination and had followed his Afghān enemies to their stronghold of Qandahār. When the Afghāns escaped towards Kābul, Nādir Shāh sent a strong protest to Delhi and asked the Delhi Court not to harbour his enemies. But the Mughul Court disregarded his protests, kept his envoys waiting and murdered a courier carrying a message from the Shāh. Enraged at this treacherous conduct, but tempted more by the defenceless condition of the empire, Nādir Shāh at the end of 1738 invaded India. On 26 November the Khyber pass was occupied and Nādir Shāh was in Peshawar on 29th. After a feeble resistance Lahore surrendered on 25 January, 1739. Laying waste the surrounding country he advanced to Karnāl, defeated the imperial army with great slaughter on 13 February, and demanded a huge indemnity. The sum of rupees fifty lakhs was first suggested by the Nizām which Sa'ādat Khān raised to twenty crores. When Muhammad Shāh went to the Persian camp to plead with the conqueror, he was made a captive (24 February). The Marāthā envoy

in the imperial camp who slipped away on 25 February, wrote on reaching Jaipur (6 March); "The Chaghtai empire is gone. The Irāni rule has commenced."⁹⁷

The day after he had seized the Mughul emperor, Nādir Shāh despatched to Delhi Sa'ādat Khān as the emperor's representative and Tahmasp Khān Jalair as his own plenipotentiary to take possession of the city and palaces therein. On 20 March, 1739 Nādir Shāh entered the city with his army and on the next day was proclaimed sovereign from the pulpits of Jama Masjid and other places of prayers. The same afternoon he made the Mughul emperor disgorge all the accumulated wealth of the empire. Then arose a great tumult in the capital; there were wild rumours of the death of Nādir Shāh, and the harassed citizens of Delhi started attacking the Persian soldiers wherever they found them.

Nādir Shāh's anger knew no bounds. From the Golden Mosque in Chāndni Chowk he ordered, without regard to sex or creed, a general massacre of the populace; and for six hours from nine in the morning till three in the afternoon the luckless citizens of the capital suffered unimaginable horrors. Their property was looted, their houses burnt and levelled, their womenfolk dragged and dishonoured and the men put to the sword. How many perished that day and subsequently, nobody could say with certainty. If the reports in Marāthī letters are to be believed, three to four lakhs of the populace were killed, thousands of women were carried away in captivity and treasure and jewellery worth fifty crores of rupees seized.⁹⁸

The upheaval at Delhi bewildered the *Peshwā*. Nādir Shāh was giving out that Marāthā aggression was the main cause of his coming to India and that he would save the Mughul empire from their encroachments. The *Peshwā* was convinced that the days of the Chaghtai empire were numbered and a great calamity had arisen for the Hindus.⁹⁹

The *Peshwā* had been informed that the Nizām had behaved in an atrocious manner in the whole affair and had suggested the seizure of the emperor to the Persian adventurer.¹⁰⁰ This infamous act, the *Peshwā* thought, had completely discredited the Nizām in public estimation and disqualified him to rule over the Deccan. The *Peshwā* would put an end to the Nizām's rule and occupy the Deccan provinces. Earlier reports that the Persians intended to punish the Marāthā aggressors had already reached the *Peshwā*. The *Peshwā* wrote from Khāndesh to his brother to finish the Bassein siege and join him to hold the enemy beyond the Chambal. If the Chaghtai

rule had ended, he felt it was good opportunity to establish Hindu sovereignty.¹⁰¹ But this confrontation with the Persian adventurer never came. Nādir Shāh left Delhi on May 16, enjoining on the princes of India to obey and please the emperor. The wealth accumulated during two centuries of Mughul rule, amounting to nearly one hundred crores in coins and jewels, disappeared in less than a months' time. India's north-western gates had been thrown open and the situation offered a serious challenge to Marāthā designs of controlling the empire.

X. Bassein Campaign:

While the *Peshwā* was overrunning Hindustān, another Marāthā army under the command of his brother Chimnāji Appā succeeded in wresting Salsette-Bassein tract from the grip of the Portuguese and thus liberating a part of the Marāthā homeland. The Portuguese had seized these districts of the Marāthā country two hundred years ago and made Bassein the capital of their Province of the North and raised mighty fortifications round it. Bassein lay within a fertile tract; its equable climate, administrative importance and commercial prosperity drew to it many rich Portuguese families from Goa and the entire territory came to be looked on as a valued possession of the Portuguese empire in the east.

In the 18th century, however, the Portuguese power was on the decline. The command of the sea had passed to the Dutch and the English, and the Portuguese clung to their outposts with difficulty. But they had not the wisdom to understand their unstable position; they had few friends among country powers and they made their subject people their worst enemies by their harsh and intolerant treatment. The inquisition was active in Goa and Bassein from 1550 persecuting all those who did not conform to the Christian doctrine.¹⁰² As soon as Marāthā rule was established in the neighbouring Kalyan district (1719), the popular discontent found expression. The Hindu leaders of Bassein secretly invited the *Peshwā* to deliver them from foreign yoke and restore their religious liberties. The Portuguese, aroused by the danger threatening them, began to put Salsette and Bassein in a proper state of defence and ordered the local population to contribute money and labour. A cry went up among the local people and in desperation they invoked the *Peshwā* to take possession of the country, offering him their whole-hearted co-operation in the enterprise.

Portuguese activities in Konkan were also running counter to the interests of the *Peshwā*. In the domestic dispute of the Angria

family, the Portuguese supported Sambhāji Angria who was flouting the *Peshwā* and became particularly obnoxious to him. Probing attacks on Portuguese territory had started since 1723. Their safety against these and the intrigues of the Hindu subjects lay in the new fortifications that were being built and these the Portuguese pressed on with vigour. The attack on the Portuguese territory could no longer be delayed, and, in March, 1737, a strong force under the *Peshwā's* brother, Chimnāji Appā, prepared to strike at the Portuguese possessions and gathered in secrecy at Kalyan.

The terrain of Salsette and Bassein is peculiar; the narrow coastal strip is cut up in many places by inland channels made by the sea and the rivers flowing into it. This is not a country for large-scale movements of cavalry. Knowledge of fords and their control, therefore becomes an important factor of military strategy in this area. The *Peshwā's* contacts with the leaders of the local population—the Anjurkars and the Kavles¹⁰³ and others—and secret information obtained from them of the geography of the country and the strength of the defence works proved very useful in this respect. On the night of 26 March, at low tide, an advance detachment of Marāthā horse surprised the patrol at Thāpā ford, attacked the St. Jeronimo tower and secured the passage into the island of Salsette. The next day the entire force poured in with its equipment and stores. The surprise was complete. The commanding officer made no effort to give battle, and left the island on 27 March; and the main fort of Thāpā surrendered without much fighting. Detachments were immediately sent out to reduce the remaining fortified places within the island and to dislodge the enemy from the ports of Bāndrā and Versovā.¹⁰⁴

While the main army under the command of Chimnāji Appā was operating against Salsette and had forced its way into the island, another force, 2,200 strong, moved against Bassein and attempted to gain admittance inside the walls by the same stratagem. But the plan miscarried; the Portuguese commander of Bassein had been warned of enemy movements and had, in consequence, posted strong patrols at all fords and outposts, and had taken every precaution against surprise. The Marāthā force negotiated numerous river channels and arrived within the enemy country but was stopped at the wall.¹⁰⁵ Means had to be devised to besiege and assault the formidable fortress of Bassein. Outlying posts like Jivdhan, Takmak, Kamandurg, Tandulwadi, Mandvi, Manori were seized, but the embattled walls of the fortress guarded by the sea on three sides and open only on the north stood frowning on the besiegers.¹⁰⁶ The

Marāthā commander, Shankarāji Phadke, called for reinforcements, suggested blockade of the fortress and made three vain attempts to carry the place by escalade.¹⁰⁷ As the fair season opened, the Portuguese received reinforcements and issuing from the walls of their fortifications, they counterattacked Marāthā forces in the open country, cutting up their detachments at Māhim, and Dhārāvi. In November, 1738 they even tried to recover Thāṇā and sent a large expedition up the creek. The attempt, however, failed miserably, the Portuguese commander Pedro De Mello was killed by a cannon shot and his ships sailed away.¹⁰⁸

The Marāthās now took the offensive and collected a formidable force for the final assault. Another force under Vyankat Rao Ghorpade invaded Goa and cut off supplies going to Bassein.¹⁰⁹ The defenders of Bassein were reduced to great straits; they even melted the Church plate to purchase ammunition from the English at Bombay, but would not talk of surrender. Marāthā artillery roared day and night pounding the walls and leaving the enemy no time to recover his breath. Both Xavier Pinto, commandant of the fort and Martinho De Sylveira, General Commanding, were hit by Marāthā fire and killed. Mines under protection of raised platforms, were run to the walls and exploded on 2 May. A general assault followed and, after two days of heavy fighting, Bassein capitulated on 5 May, 1739; the garrison marched out a week later. The Marāthās suffered over five thousand casualties in dead and wounded, while on the other side the losses were equally heavy.¹¹⁰

The fall of Bassein marked the end of Portuguese rule in north Konkan. The treaty of September, 1740, set the seal on the end, the Portuguese ceding their entire province of the North with the exception of the port of Daman and a few villages surrounding it. The Marāthās acquired besides Bassein, eight cities, twenty fortresses and the island of Salsette. The conquest of Bassein was long cherished by the Marāthās as a matter of national pride and glory.

XI. *Enduring Achievements:*

The last few years of the Peshwā's life were clouded by domestic discord. His fondness for his mistress Mastānī exceeded all bounds. In her company the Peshwā indulged in drinking and eating meat. This transgression roused the ire of the family and the orthodox society of the day. It was not unusual in those days to keep mistresses; that was permissible. But that the Peshwā should drink and eat prohibited food in the company of his favourite *Kanchani* (dancing girl) was anathema. The Rājā was asked to interfere in the

affair, and offered sage advice; vows were exchanged on the holy Gangā waters and for some time Mastānī was kept confined in the Shaniwār Wādā out of sight of the *Peshwā*.¹¹¹

From these distractions the *Peshwā* sought escape in the field. Nizām-ul-Mulk had not fulfilled the conditions of the convention of Duraha Sarai (1738). No new *Sanad* had come from Delhi appointing the *Peshwā* as *Subāhdar* of Mālwa; and the Nizām had been detained in Hindustān by the violent events in the capital. The *Peshwā* now demanded from the Nizām's deputy, *jāgīr* of the districts through which lay his route to Hindustān. When this was turned down, hostilities were renewed. Nasir Jang, the Nizām's deputy, could not succeed where the experienced old man had failed. On account of scarcity of foodgrains in the city of Aurangābād he was forced to leave the protection of the walls and move out in the open. Here he was surrounded by Marāthā horse and harassed day and night. After two months of fighting Nasir Jang agreed to surrender the districts of Handia and Khargon, and peace was restored. After fraternization the *Peshwā* marched in the direction of Hindustān.¹¹²

While encamped at Raverkhedi 36 miles from Khargon he contracted fever on 23 April; after a short illness he passed away on Monday, 28 April, 1740, lamented by his family, by his King and by his people. "He died as he had lived," says Sir Richard Temple, "in camp under canvas among his men and he is remembered to this day among the Marāthās as the fighting *Peshwā* and the incarnation of Hindu energy."¹¹³

Peshwā Bājī Rāo was incessantly fighting from the time of his assumption of the *Peshwāship* in 1720 right up to the moment of his death in 1740. At the time of his appointment, Shāhū's place as *Chhatrapati* of the Marāthā State was in jeopardy; it was being challenged by his cousin Shambhūjī, who was being abetted by the *Subāhdar* of the Deccan. The Rājā's chiefs like *Senāpati* Dābhāde, Angria, Baṇḍe, Gaikwār, Pawār, Bhosle were in a refractory mood. The *Peshwā* won his first big success at Pālkhed over the Nizām (1728). By his swift movements he brought the Nizām to bay, made him agree to uphold the grants of *Swarāj*, *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of the six *subāhs* of the Deccan in Rājā Shāhū's name and not to harbour the Rājā's rival. By defeating *Senāpati* Dābhāde in a decisive manner he put an end to the rebellious activities of the feudatory chiefs and within a few years came to overshadow the monarch himself.

After thus securing the Deccan parts of the Marāthā State, he

turned his attention to expansion in Hindustān. He perceived, as few of his contemporaries did, that the far-flung empire of the Mughul had lost its vitality and was tottering to its fall, and he hastened to take the controlling hand in its administration. For this purpose he cleverly utilised the mutual jealousies and hatreds prevailing among the court factions at Delhi. Leading his armies beyond the Narmadā he overran the Mughul provinces of Gujarāt, Mālwa and Bundelkhand, and to make an impression of his might on the emperor, made a dash to the imperial capital in the face of two hostile armies (1737). At Bhopal (1738) he again frustrated the enemy's designs and established Marāthā superiority at the Mughul Court. It was his policy of northward drive that brought the provinces from Punjāb to Bengal under Marāthā influence by 1760, and gave the Marāthās an eminent position at the Mughul Court. If his successors had understood his policies well and carried them out fruitfully, the Marāthās might have succeeded the Mughuls in the overlordship of the Indian continent. *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo made a beginning and planted Marāthā power in Mālwa and Bundelkhand.

Some historians are critical about the *Peshwā's* policy of northward expansion before the Nizām's rule was crushed in the Deccan. The *Peshwā* had forced the Nizām to recognize Marāthā claims of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* over his domains by the treaty of Mungi-Paithan (1728). He could not go beyond this. The Nizām's territory of Neerthadi, Gangathadi and Karnāṭak had been assigned by the Rājā as spheres of their activity to the *Pratinidhi*, the *Sarlashkar* and Fatesingh Bhosle. These three chiefs talked of raising forces and invading the Nizām's territory. But their intentions remained on paper; they never ventured out on their own and challenged the Nizām's authority in their spheres.¹¹⁴ It was only after Shāhū's death that the *Peshwā*, setting aside these carpet knights, could turn his attention to the Nizām's provinces in the east and to Karnāṭak. But by that time the situation had become complicated by the advent of the French and the English in Indian politics.

If the security of the homeland was his objective in all the *Peshwā's* Deccan campaigns, what made him go over to the offensive in Hindustān? Rajwade, Savarkar and other writers credit him with founding a Hindu empire supplanting the empire of the Chaghtai. This facile explanation is accepted by recent writers. For example, Panikkar, the scholar-diplomat, remarks, "if Shivājī was the founder of the Marāthā state, Bājī Rāo could claim that he transformed what was a national state into an empire. He was the first man to see the possibilities of succeeding to the Grand Mughul's estate

and building up a Marāthā empire."¹¹⁵ After 1728 the *Peshwā*, no doubt, led his armies into Hindustān, occupied Mālwa, exacted tribute from Rājput and Bundelā chiefs and rode up to Delhi. With his success his demands went on rising. But contemporary evidence does not warrant the conclusion that the *Peshwā* aimed at supplanting Mughul rule. "The Rājā," wrote the *Peshwā* to his brother in May, 1739, "has no desire to become the emperor. He only wants to see that the Mughul empire is well administered. It is better far to renovate an old temple than to raise a new one."¹¹⁶ If the master (*Chhatrapati*) did not entertain imperial designs, how can we expect them in his servant?

In a letter written to Sawāi Jay Singh after the *Peshwā's* demise, his brother Chimnāji explains the *Peshwā's* objectives as under: "The *Peshwā* wished nothing more than to administer well the imperial government, earn the goodwill of the subject people, bring prosperity to the land, fill up the imperial treasury and earning renown by good administration of the empire, win favour of the emperor. With this intent the *Peshwā* had established contacts with Khān Daurān through Sawāi Jay Singh."¹¹⁷ Just as Clive laid the foundations of the British empire in India, the *Peshwā* may be regarded as having made possible the raising of such a superstructure by his successors. But unlike Clive, there were no Hastings and Wellesleys among the *Peshwā's* successors; they lacked his vision and his military talents, and organizing capacity, and the *Peshwā's* dream of a Hindu sovereignty, if there was any, remained unfulfilled.

Peshwā Bājī Rāo had established very cordial relations with Sawāi Jay Singh and the Bundelā chiefs. But contemporary records offer little evidence of a grand design of establishing *Hindu-pad-pādshāhi* or Hindu sovereignty. Powerful chiefs seizing provinces of the empire began to administer them independently while making profuse professions of loyalty to the throne. Such of them as were more ambitious also took part in the rivalry for leadership at the Court between the Turāni and Hindustāni factions. The *Peshwā* followed the example of these chiefs and managed to build up Marāthā influence at the Mughul Court. In doing this he succeeded in fulfilling his master's promise—that he would rush to the rescue of the empire when in danger, and achieving his own design of getting control over the outlying provinces. Large Marāthā armies roamed over the provinces of the empire and exacted tribute, but no thought appears to have been given to problems of their good government and prosperity. There were possibilities of restoring Hindu sovereignty in India, but that probably formed no part of the policy of the

Marāthā successors of Shivājī and certainly did not materialize.

Sir Jadunath Sarkar attempts to give an explanation of the failure. "The *Peshwā's* work," according to him "was that of a conqueror, not that of a consolidator. He was a matchless cavalry leader but no statesman, no far-sighted reformer. The very idea of remodeling the political institutions of the Marāthās and setting up of schools for training the new type of captains and civil servants required by the altered conditions of the Marāthā State, and the sudden impact of European arts and arms upon the old Indian world, never entered Bājī Rāo's head, nor into that of his more happily situated son and successor."¹¹⁸

How ill-managed were the state-finances of the *Peshwā* is writ large over his entire correspondence. The one topic of discussion that runs through all these papers is raising of money to meet the expenditure of the army and of the Rājā's court and household. It would appear that the *Peshwā* was unable to meet the expenditure of his large armies from the income of his *jāgīrs* and the tribute he exacted. By 1736 the debts were mounting to twenty lakhs of rupees. In one of his letters he expresses his desperation to his Guru: "I led an expedition to Hindustān (1736); the expedition was successful, but brought in little gain. The army suffered great hardships. I have fallen into that hell of being beset by the creditors. To pacify the *Sahukars* and *Shiledārs* I am falling at their feet till I have rubbed off the skin of my forehead. The other chiefs like Dābhāḍe, Gaikwār and Bāṇḍe have managed to get hold of treasures worth crores, while I, your devotee, am in straitened circumstances, even for my daily needs."¹¹⁹

But it would be unjust to hold *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo responsible for all the lapses and failures of the Marāthā State in the 18th century. A great man like Shivājī with a prophetic vision who moulds society to his heart's desire and raises its intellectual and moral standards, is a rare phenomenon. Most of the great men are representative of their times and reflect the hopes and aspirations of the people among whom they move. A few of them succeed in realizing and giving shape to these aspirations. In this sense Jadunath Sarkar calls Bājī Rāo "a Carlylean hero as a man of action." He gave the young Marāthā State stability and secured its freedom and opened before it a wide prospect of expansion.

NOTES

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26. *Shāhū Diaries*, 159.
27. SPD, XXX, pp. 296-97; Gense & Banaji, *Gaikwads of Baroda*, Vol. I, p. 10; SPD, XII, Nos. 27, 32.
- 27a. SPD, XV, p. 82.
28. SPD, X, No. 72.
29. SPD, XII, 42-6; Dabhade Ballad in *BISM Quarterly*, Vol. XIII, (1933), and *Surat Factory Records*, p. 614, Daniel Innes to Henry Lowther, 7 April 1731.
30. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 377.
31. *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin* (Panini Ed.), p. 235; Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, p. 687 and *BISMQ*, (1940), pp. 11-12.
32. *Shahu Charitra* (1924), pp. 88.
33. Parasnis, D. B., *Brahmendra Swamiche Charitra*, p. 23.
34. Bombay Council to Directors, 14 April, 1733; *Shahu Charitra*, pp. 88-89.
35. Baji Rao Ballal, *Roznishi* (MS).
36. SPD., III, 2.
37. SPD, XXXIII, 10, 40; *Purandare Daftar*, 102-06.
38. *Kavyetihās Sangraha Patre Yadi Vagaire* (1930), 22.
39. SPD, III, 64-65, 69; Forrest, G. W., *Home Series*, II, p. 51.
40. *Ibid.*
41. SPD, III, 7; Rajwade, *MIS.*, VI, 86; *Purandare Daftar*, I, 105.
42. SPD, XXX, 95, XXXIII, 66; Rajwade, *op. cit.*, III, 305.
43. SPD, III, 78-80.
44. SPD, XXXIII, 131.
45. SPD, III, 179, 192.

46. *Ibid.*
47. Mawji and Parasnis, *Treaties, Engagements & Sanads*, pp. 107-113.
48. Khafi Khan's *Muhtakhab-ul-lubab* in Elliot and Dowson's *The History of India*, Vol. VII, p. 395. Hereafter referred to as Khafi Khan.
49. Irvine, W., *op. cit.*, II, p. 163.
50. Sarkar, Sir Jadunath, *Aurangzib*, V, p. 382.
51. Sarkar, Sir Jadunath, *op. cit.*, p. 385; *Shiva Charitra Pradeep*, Gadadhar Pralhad Shakavali, pp. 67-68.
52. The claim made by Marāthā writers like Sardesai, Rajwade and others that the Peshwā aimed at establishing *Hindupadpādshahi* or Hindu empire, appears chauvinistic and seems to be going against facts. Shāhū concluded treaties as a vassal of the empire and like other powerful vassals, attempted to influence Mughul politics. The Peshwās continued the policy and always spoke of defending, not replacing, the Mughul power.
53. Malcolm, Sir John, *A Memoir of Central India*, (1880 Ed.), Vol. I, pp. 44-46, 50-51, 59. John Malcolm, who wrote his *Memoir* during the regime of Lord Hastings (1814-23) is a much more reliable guide to understand the sentiments of the local people of Mālwa than writers of modern times; Also see *Holkar Kaifiyat*, pp. 8-9. The *Kaifiyat* bears out what Malcolm says.
54. SPD, XIII, 15-17, 23-28, 31-35 and *Jaipur Akhbars*.
55. Sarkar, Sir Jadunath, *History of Jaipur*, (MS.).
56. *Ibid.*
57. SPD, X, 66.
58. *Shahu Roznishi*, 198.
59. SPD, XIII, 10, 22, 23, 30, 33, 45; Parasnis, D. B., *Brahmendra Charitra*, *Corres.*, 43.
60. JASB, 1878 (IV) pp. 297-98.
61. SPD, XIII, 45, Rajwade MIS, III, 14; SPD, XXX, p. 291.
62. SPD, XIV, 9; Mawji and Parasnis, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, p. 32; B. D. Gupta, *Marāthā Bundela Relations*. *Marāthā History Seminar*, (Kolhapur), 1971, pp. 127-38.
63. Raghubir Singh, *Malwa in Transition*, p. 194, 222; Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II.
64. SPD, XIII, 54-56; SPD, XXX, pp. 301-07; KSPY (1930 ed.), 496; *Itihās Samgraha*, *Peshwā Daftar*, p. 127, 203, 208.
65. SPD, XIV, 65, SPD, XIV, 1, 2, 21-23, SPD, XV, 6.
66. SPD, XIV, 24-27, XXII, 285; *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, p. 244 and Rustam Ali, in Elliot & Dowson, *History*, Vol. VIII, pp. 50-51.
67. *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin* (Panini Ed.), p. 242.
68. SPD, XIV, 47.
69. SPD, XIV, 39.
70. SPD, (New Series), I, 27.
71. SPD, XXX, 142-43.
72. SPD, XIV, 50.
73. SPD, XV, pp. 93-94 and Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, Vol. I (1921 ed.), pp. 390-91.
74. SPD, XV, pp. 95-96.
75. *Ibid.*, should be dated 29 Sept. 1736.
76. Rajwade, MIS, VI, 95-97.
77. SPD, XV, pp. 95-96.
78. SPD, X, 27; XXII, 339, 341.
79. SPD, XV, 18, 47.
80. *Peshwā Rozkird* and Elliot and Dowson, *History*, Vol. VIII, p. 53; SPD, XV, 89.
81. SPD, XV, 17, 22, 27-28, 47; SPD, XXX, 198, 365-66.
82. *Brahmendra Charitra*, *Correspondence*, pp. 21-30.
83. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 393; *Br. Charitra*, *Corresp.*, No. 27, p. 24.
84. *Br. Charitra*, *Corresp.*, pp. 24-30; *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin* (Panini Ed.), pp. 396-97; SPD, XV, 37, 47.
85. SPD, XV, 29, 47; Elliot and Dowson, *op. cit.*, Vol. VIII, p. 55.
86. SPD, XV, 23, 79.
87. SPD, XV, 29, 33; also Setu Madhav Rāo Pagdi's article in *Nav Bharat*, July 1966.
88. SPD, XV, 44, 45, 48, 49.
89. SPD, XV, 53; Irvine W., *Later Mughals*, Vol. II, p. 301.
90. SPD, XV, 56, 58; *Br. Charitra*, No. 134.
91. *Ibid.*
92. Duraha Sarai is about 20 miles s w. of Bhopal.

93. The best authority for the campaign is Peshwā's letter printed in *Brahmendra Swāmiche Charitra, Corresp.*, Nos. 33-36; also *SPD*, XV, 56, 59-60, 66.
94. *Brahmendra Charitra, Corresp.*, No. 35.
95. Hart, Liddell, *The War in Outline*, p. 251.
96. *Br. Charitra, Corresp.*, No. 35, pp. 52-53.
97. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 330-50; *Br. Charitra*, pp. 117-18. Lockhart, *Nadir Shah*, pp. 121-154.
98. Rajwade, *MIS*, VI, 131; also Anand Ram Mukhlis, *Tazkira*, pp. 81-90.
99. Irvine, W., *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 364-71; *SPD*, XXII, p. 193; also *SPD*, XV, pp. 71-6, 80; *SPD*, XXX, pp. 225-226, 229; Rajwade, *MIS*, VI, pp. 131, 133-34; *Brahmendra Charitra, Corresp.*, Appendix 41-42.
100. *SPD*, XXX, 226; Hanway, *Travels in Persia*, Vol. IV, p. 142; Lockhart, *Nādir Shāh*, p. 139.
101. *Br. Charitra, Corresp.*, No. 41.
102. *Salsette Chronicle*, pp. 2-4; Grose, *A Voyage to the Indies*, p. 69; *English Factories in India*, Vol. XI, p. 144; *SPD*, XVI, 11, 16, etc.
103. *SPD*, XVI, 4, 5, 8 and *Salsette Chronicle* pp. 10-12, 24. *Br. Charitra, Corresp.*, 47.
104. *SPD*, XXII, 348-50; *Public Deptt. Diary*, X, pp. 71-73; *SPD*, XXXIV, 23, 24; *Salsette Chronicle*, p. 37.
105. *SPD*, XVI, 42; *SPD*, XXXIV, 20, 21, 25.
106. For description of Bassein fort, see *Thana Gazetteer* (Old Ed.), Vol. XIV, pp. 28-34; *SPD*, XVI, 42, 44-45; *SPD*, XXXIV, 25; also *Br. Charitra Corresp.*, No. 52.
107. *SPD*, XXII, 359; Rajwade, *MIS*, VI, 114-15. Pissurlencar, *Como Se perdue Bacaim*.
108. Pissurlencar, *op. cit.*, p. 58; Danvers, *History of the Portuguese in India*.
109. *SPD*, XVI, 147, 150.
110. For an account of the final assault, see *SPD*, XVI, 162; *Br. Charitra Corresp.*, No. 52; also Forrest, *Maratha Series*, pp. 36-40; *SPD*, XXII, pp. 191-92.
111. *SPD*, IX, 30-36; *SPD*, XXX, 363; Rajwade, *MIS*, VI, pp. 30-31.
112. *Br. Charitra Corresp.*, 55; *Purandare Daftar*, I, 138-39; *SPD*, XXII, 144; Grant Duff, *History*, I, (1921 Ed.), p. 410.
113. Temple, Sir Richard, *Oriental Experiences*, I, p. 390.
114. *SPD*, XVII, 46, 47; *SPD*, XXX, 171; *Shāhū Charitra*, p. 47.
115. Srinivasan, C. K., *Bāji Rāo I*, Introduction.
116. *Br. Charitra*, p. 119.
117. Khare, G. H., *Hingne Daftar*, I, p. 13.
118. Sarkar's Introduction to Sardesai's *Peshwā Bāji Rāo I*.
119. *Br. Swāmiche Charitra, Corresp.*, No. 32.

CHAPTER V

DISRUPTION OF THE MUGHUL EMPIRE

(a) *Bengal Subāh*:

Within a few years after Aurangzīb's death in 1707 Bengal became completely independent of imperial control under Murshid Qulī Khān. At the time of Aurangzīb's death Murshid Qulī Khān was *nāib nāzim* or Deputy Governor of Bengal and full Governor of Orissa, as well as *diwān* or revenue chief of these two provinces. On his accession to the throne in February 1713, Farrukh-siyar confirmed him in the *diwānī* of Bengal and, in September 1713, made him also Deputy Governor of Bengal and on 6 May, 1714, he received the *subāhdarī* of Orissa with the title of Jāfar Khān. In September, 1717, he was made full *subāhdar* of Bengal with the title of Mutaman-ul-Mulk Alauddaulah Jāfar Khān Bahādūr Nāsiri, Nāsir Jang. He transferred the capital of Bengal from Dacca to Murshidabad, which was named after him.

By moving the imperial court, Murshid Qulī secured on 11 September, 1711, an order by which the collectorship of customs of Hugli port and the *faujdārī* of the Midnapur district, then held by Ziā-ud-din Khān was again placed under the control of the provincial *diwān*, from whom these had been removed and placed directly under the central government two years before. Murshid Qulī could not dislodge Ziā-ud-din from Hugli. But when Ziā-ud-din received information on 22 April, 1713, that the emperor had appointed him *diwān* of the western Karnāṭak he left Hugli at the end of June and the man appointed by Murshid Qulī got possession of it.¹

As a strict ruler Murshid Qulī sought to enforce his authority in various ways and established an efficient administration. He effectively reorganized the revenue system by converting all the officers' *jāgīrs* in Bengal into *Khālsā* directly under the Crown collectors and by introducing the *ijāra* system according to which contracts were given for collection of revenue. "In the second or third generation, these contractors came to be called *zamindārs* and many of them were dignified with the titles of Rājās and Mahārājas, though not of princely birth, but merely glorified civil servants paid by a percentage on their collection". Thus a new landed aristocracy was created in Bengal, whose "position was confirmed and made heredi-

tary by Lord Cornwallis".² The defaulters in collecting revenue were treated with draconic severity and so the revenue contractors tried to make collections in time.

Increase of revenue was also due to Murshid Qulī's economy in administration and maintenance of internal peace by him. For revenue collection he divided the whole of Bengal into thirteen *chaklās* or circles, 'which were subdivided into thirteen tracts under collection by *jāgīrdārs* and twenty-five areas reserved as *Khālsā* (crown-land) farmed out to contractors'.³

While some of the *zamindārs* enjoyed Murshid Qulī's favour and three ruling houses, that is, those of Cooch Bihar, Tipperah and the hill Rājā of Jaintia paid tribute, Sitārām Ray of Bhusnā *parganā* who had much influence in his area, was crushed by him in February-March 1714, and thus disappeared the last Hindu kingdom in Bengal.

To improve economic prosperity of the province, Murshid Qulī showed much indulgence to the traders of all categories, but was somewhat partial to the Mughuls (i.e., Persians). The Dutch and the French East India Companies were not in good condition, and the Ostend Company, started in Austrian Netherlands by a charter from the emperor in 1723 had its privileges suspended under diplomatic pressure for seven years in 1727. The English East India Company secured some important concessions by sending an embassy to the Delhi Court under John Surman, and by emperor Farrukhsiyar's *farman* of 1717, which permitted them to trade in Bengal, free of all duties, subject to the payment of Rs. 3,000 per annum, and to rent 38 villages of Calcutta. Though Murshid Qulī opposed the grant of additional villages to the English, prosperity of Calcutta increased so that it came to have a population of 1,00,000 by 1735.

Some contemporary Muslim writers have bestowed high praise on Murshid Qulī. Writing in 1763, Salimullah, the author of *Tārīkh-i-Bāngālā*, observes:

"Since the time of Shāistā Khān there had not appeared in any part of Hindustan an *āmīr* who could be compared with Jāfar Khān for zeal in propagation of the faith; for wisdom in the establishment of laws and regulations; for munificence and liberty in the encouragement and support given to men of family and eminence; for rigid and impartial justice in redressing wrongs and punishing offenders. His judicial decisions were rational and proper.

"He despised all kinds of luxury, and particularly in dress and food. He possessed very extensive learning, and paid great

respect to men who were eminent for their piety or erudition. During his government, the meanest peasant was secured from injustice and oppression. Two days in the week he administered justice in person and was so impartial in his decisions, and rigid in the execution thereof that no one dared to commit oppression."

Twenty-five years after Salimullah, the author of *Rihāz-us-Salātīn* added: "Never in his life did he take any consort except his one married wife. Such was his delicacy of feeling that he did not admit into his harem any eunuch or any woman who was not of known character and trustworthiness".

After critically examining these observations Sir Jadunath Sarkar expresses the following view: "A puritan in his private life, strictly attentive to his public duties as he understood them, gravely decorous and rigidly orthodox as befitted a favourite disciple of Aurangzīb, and a propagator of his faith as ordained in his scriptures, Murshid Qulī Khān presents one side of his character in a brilliant light. But his heart was cold and his sympathies narrow; his calculating vindictiveness, his religious bigotry, and his utter lack of warm, all-embracing benevolence, denied this conscientious civil servant the right to be ranked as a statesman or even as a truly great soul."⁴

After the death of Murshid Qulī Khān, on 30 June, 1727, without any male issue, his son-in-law Shujā-ud-dīn Muhammad Khān, who had been Deputy Governor of Orissa, ascended the *masnad* of Bengal. He had married Murshid Qulī Khān's daughter named Zinat-un-nisā, and had a son through her named Sarfarāz. Soon after his accession Shujā-ud-dīn appointed his friends and kinsmen to the principal offices of his government. His son, Sarfarāz, remained as the nominal *diwān* of Bengal; his second son, Muhammad Taqī Khān (born of a wife different from the daughter of Murshid Qulī Khān) was Deputy Governor of Orissa and his son-in-law, Murshid Qulī II, was appointed Deputy Governor of Jahāngīrnagar (Dacca). 'Alī Vardī and his three nephews got high posts. Alam Chand, previously *diwān* of Shujā-ud-dīn in the Orissa Government, was now appointed *diwān* of the *Khālsā* at Murshidabad and got from the imperial court a personal *mansab* of 1,000 with the title of *Rāy-i-rāyān*, which had not been so long conferred on any Bengal officer. In managing all important affairs of administration Shujā-ud-dīn followed the counsel of 'Alī Vardī, of his brother Hājī Ahmad, of *Rāy-i-rāyān*, Alam Chand, a loyal officer and an able financier, and of Jagat

Seth Fateh Chand, the famous banker of Murshidabad, who, being owner of vast wealth, had much influence in Bengal politics.

During the early part of his regime Shujā-ud-din paid due attention to the affairs of administration and sought to promote welfare of his subjects. He was charitable to his old friends, kind and bountiful towards his officers and was hospitable towards those who happened to come to Murshidabad. With due regard for justice, he dispensed it impartially. Ghulam Husain, the author of *Siyār-ul-mutakherin*, observes: "He was so impartial an observer of justice, and a judge of so much benignity, that the poorest suitor was sure of being in his presence upon a footing with his very son; and the fearful sparrow, certain of finding in his bosom a shelter against the hawk's pursuit, flew towards him with a perfect reliance on his goodness. People acquainted with history thought they lived in Naushirvān's reign".⁵

But some vices in Shujā-ud-din's private character impaired the efficiency of his administration towards its close. Supreme power fell into the hands of his advisers, Hājī Ahmad, Alam Chand and Jagat Seth Fateh Chand, who degenerated into a clique of self-seekers and fomented intrigues and conspiracies to serve their own interests at the cost of government.

Shujā-ud-din created four divisions for the administration of the Bengal *subāh*, each being placed under a Deputy Governor. Western, Central and a portion of Northern Bengal formed the Central Division; the Dacca division comprised Eastern and Southern Bengal, a small portion of Northern Bengal, Sylhet and Chittagong; the third division was Bihar, and Orissa was the fourth division. Bihar was efficiently governed by its Deputy Governor, 'Alī Vardī Khān; Dacca was administered well by Murshid Qulī II, son-in-law of Shujā-ud-din, with devotedness and ability of his deputy Mīr Habib. But some official changes in Dacca after Murshid Qulī II's transfer to Orissa on the death of Muhammad Taqī Khān caused deterioration in its administration, and Jaswant Rāy, who served as its *diwān* for some time, resigned. The Rājāhs of Cooch Bihar and Dinājpur were reduced to submission. Badi-uz-zamān, the Afghān *zamindār* of Birbhum, was also brought under the Nawāb's control.

Shujā-ud-din had to remit a sum of Rs. 1,25,00,000 a year to the Imperial Government at Delhi.⁶ The standard collections received from the *zamindārs* amounted, as before, to Rs. 1,42,45,561. Shujā-ud-din added to it a further amount of Rs. 19,14,095 by imposition

of *abwabs* or additional imposts following an old practice of Murshid Qulī Khān.

Shujā-ud-din strictly asserted his authority over the European trading Companies in Bengal like the English, the Dutch and the French and some minor ones like the Austrian, the Polish, the Portuguese, the Danish and the Swedish. The English described him as a "rash and powerful *subāh*", and did not consider it advisable "to risk an open rupture with him".⁷ They had to satisfy him occasionally by payment of large sums of money.

After the death of Shujā-ud-din on 30 March, 1739, his body was interred in his favourite garden on the west bank of the river Bhāgī-rathī. His son Sarfarāz ascended the *masnad* of Bengal and following the death-bed instructions of his father, he retained the old officers, the more important of whom were Hājī Ahmad as the chief *diwān*, and Rāy-i-rāyān Alam Chand as *diwān* of the *khālsā*. Excessively addicted to debauchery Sarfarāz did not possess the essential qualities needed for the ruler of a state and indulged in licentiousness. For all this he had to pay a heavy price by losing his life and the *masnad* of Bengal. The *masnad* was seized by 'Alī Vardī.

From humble positions in the government of Shujā-ud-din, 'Alī Vardī Khan, originally known as Mirzā Muhammad 'Alī, rose gradually to higher ones by dint of his tact and ability. In 1728, Shujā-ud-din appointed him *faujdār* of the *chaklā* Akbarnagar (Rājmahāl), which was a place of historic importance,^{7a} in different periods. Alī Vardī governed this area efficiently securing peace and prosperity to its people. 'Alī Vardī's brother, Hājī Ahmad remained at Murshidabad as one of the chief advisers of Shujā-ud-din; his eldest son Muhammad Rāzā (later on called Nawazīsh Muhammad Khān) was appointed Paymaster of the Nawāb's troops and Superintendent of Customs at Murshidabad and his second son Āgā Muhammad Saīd (later on known as Saīd Ahmad Khān) was appointed *faujdār* of Rungpur.

There was a fortunate turn in the career of 'Alī Vardī with his appointment as Deputy Governor of Bihar in 1733. Bihar was then in a disturbed state due to the weak administration for about seven years of its old Governor Fakhr-ud-daulah. 'Alī Vardī restored peace and order in Bihar by some vigorous steps and measures of conciliation. He suppressed the disturbances with firmness. Its *zamindārs*, who had not been quite amenable to the authority of the Nawāb's government, were reduced to submission. They were the Bhojpuri *zamindārs* of Shāhābād, Rājā Sundar Singh of Tikārī in the Gayā district, Kāmgār Khān Mayī of Narhat-Samāi,⁸ and the Rājās of

Bettia and Bhānwarā.⁹ He then suppressed the Chakwārs, a brave and semi-independent Hindu tribe, who with their stronghold at Sambhoo in the Begusarāi district, had defied the authority of the emperors of Delhi and the *subāhdars* of Bengal. 'Alī Vardī also chastised the turbulent Banjaras who, disguising themselves as traders and travellers, had been devastating different parts of Bihar.

Weakness of Delhi authority, inefficiency of Sarfarāz and machinations of Hājī Ahmad at Murshidabad in collaboration with *Rāy-i-rāyān* and Jagat Seth Fateh Chand excited 'Alī Vardī's ambition to seize the *masnad* of Bengal for himself. With this object he left Patna for Murshidabad towards the end of March 1740. Sarfarāz was soon convinced of 'Alī Vardī's infidelity and left Murshidabad to check his advance. In a furious contest between the armies of the two parties at Gheria¹⁰ on 10 April, 1740, there were heavy casualties in Sarfarāz's army and he died from a chance shot on his forehead. Marching from Gheria to Murshidabad, 'Alī Vardī formally ascended the *masnad*. He secured imperial confirmation of his new position by remitting huge amounts of money to Delhi. He tried his best to assuage the wounded feelings of the relatives of Sarfarāz. Khwajā Abdul Karim writes that "by behaving kindly and being on friendly terms with all, by distributing money and by acting with discretion, 'Alī Vardī gained over to his cause all men living far and near."^{10a}

'Alī Vardī made some changes in the offices of the government. He appointed his eldest nephew Nawazish Muhammad Khān *diwān* of crown-lands and Deputy Governor of Dacca with Husain Qulī as his deputy. The Deputy Governorship of Bihar was given to his youngest nephew Zain-ud-din Ahmad, who had been married to his daughter Aminā Begam (mother of Sirāj-ud-daulah), 'Abdul 'Alī Khān, a cousin of 'Alī Vardī, was placed in charge of the government of Tirhut in addition to his duties as the revenue-collector of the *parganās* of Bihar and Biswāk. Mīr Muhammad Jāfar Khān was appointed Paymaster of the army in place of 'Alī Vardī's brother-in-law, Qāsim 'Alī Khān was made *faujdār* of Rungpur, and Nurullah Beg Khān was made Paymaster of the new army. Atāullah Khān, a son-in-law of Hājī Ahmad and *faujdār* of Rājmahāl, was appointed as *faujdār* of Bhagalpur also. 'Alī Vardī's new position was challenged in Orissa by its Deputy Governor Rustam Jang (originally known as Murshid Qulī II). But the latter was ultimately overpowered and fled to the Deccan.

The Bengal Revolution of 1739-40 is a clear instance of the vitiated atmosphere of the period, and of the result of inordinate

ambition, treachery and ingratitude. But the *masnad* of Bengal did not prove to be a bed of roses for 'Alī Vardī. The repeated incursions of the Marāthās into Bengal and Bihar from 1742 to 1751 harassed him very much, subjected its people to various oppressions and seriously affected its economic condition. The Marāthā invasions were complicated by the rebellions of his Afghān Generals, Mustafā Khān, Shamsheer Khān, Sardar Khān and the Afghān soldiers in 1745 and 1748, and added to his troubles. During the Afghān insurrection of 1748, 'Alī Vardī's nephew Zain-ud-din and his brother Hājī Ahmad were assassinated and Patna was under Afghān usurpation for full three months which caused untold miseries to its people. The Afghāns were ultimately vanquished by 'Alī Vardī in a battle with them at Rānichak or Rānīsarāi, near Barh, in 1748. 'Alī Vardī returned to Murshidabad in November, 1748, after staying at Patna for six months to arrange for its administration. He made his grandson Sirāj-ud-daulah nominal Deputy Governor of Bihar, while the actual work of administration was entrusted to Rājā Jānakīrām as Sirāj-ud-daulah's Deputy. Jānakīrām worked in this capacity till his death in 1752, when Rājā Rāmnārāin was appointed Deputy Governor of Bihar.

Worn out with incessant toil and weighed down with age, at the age of 75, 'Alī Vardī Khan concluded a treaty with the Marāthās in May or June, 1751, on the following terms:

- (1) Mīr Habib was to be henceforth regarded as Deputy Governor of Orissa on behalf of the Nawāb.
- (2) From October, 1751, twelve lakhs of rupees were to be paid annually to the Marāthās from Bengal revenue as the *chauth* of that *subāh* in two instalments, on condition that the Marāthās would never set their foot again within the dominions of Bengal *subāh*.
- (3) The river Subarnarekhā near Jālesar was fixed as the boundary of the Bengal *subāh*, and the Marāthās agreed never to cross it again.

Notwithstanding the odds noted above, 'Alī Vardī governed his province ably and with prudence and foresight. In his private life he was free from the prevailing vices of the ruling and aristocratic classes of those days. A contemporary historian, Ghulām Husain, thus writes in high terms about him: "A prudent, keen general and a valorous soldier; there are hardly any qualifications, which he did not possess".¹¹ Another contemporary writer Karam 'Alī, author of *Muzaffarnāmah*, equally praises him. With due allowance for exag-

generation in the views of such writers who were obliged to the Nawāb in several ways, one can well assert that "he was, after all, a tactful and strong governor, who tried to infuse spirit and vigour into every branch of his administration and to serve the interest of the governed".¹²

"Alī Vardī never realized money forcibly from the people, and the mode of collection was not arbitrary. But to meet extraordinary financial needs during the first eleven years of his government, when the revenue collections fell short of the standard assessments, he took 'casual aids' from the European traders and the principal *zamin-dārs* of the province. 'Alī Vardī's attitude towards the European trading companies in Bengal was strict and he asserted his authority over them. But he was not in any way oppressive to them as he realized the importance of encouraging commerce in the interest of the State."

'Alī Vardī died on 10 April, 1756, and was succeeded as the *subāh-dar* of Bengal by his favourite grandson and heir-designate Sirāj-ud-daulah whose regime forms a turning point in the history, not only of Bengal, but of India as a whole. He had enemies among his near relations who coveted the Bengal *masnad* or influence through it. They were his cousin Shaukat Jang, who had been *Nawāb* of Purnea since 27 March and his mother's eldest sister Ghasiti Begam, who had amassed immense wealth which she had kept with herself, well guarded by armed retainers, in the castle of Motijhil, a few miles north of the city of Murshidabad. Sirāj-ud-daulah's most formidable enemy was Mīr Ja'far 'Alī Khān, the Commander-in-Chief of the army. Sirāj-ud-daulah "came to his long assigned throne in a house divided against itself, with a hostile faction in the army and a disaffected subject population."¹³

Soon after his accession Sirāj-ud-daulah seized the huge wealth of Ghasiti Begam to curb her ambition for acquiring influence in government. He removed the traitor Mīr Ja'far from the post of *bakhshī* or Commander of the army and appointed in his place the brave and devoted Mīr Madan. Another faithful and able officer, Mohan Lāl, was made *peshkā*r of the *diwān-khānah*.

All this was followed by Sirāj-ud-daulah's rupture with the English. Sirāj-ud-daulah had three specific grievances against the English. One was that they had "built strong fortifications and dug a large ditch in the King's dominion contrary to the laws of the country". The second one was that they had "abused the privilege of their *dastaks* by granting them to such as were in no way entitled to

them, from which practice the King has suffered greatly in the revenues of his customs". His third complaint was that they had given protection in Calcutta to some of the King's subjects and instead of giving them up on demand they allowed such persons to shelter themselves within their bounds from the hands of justice. He expressed that he "would pardon their fault" if they promised "to remove the foregoing complaints of their conduct" and agreed "to trade upon the same terms as other merchants did in the time of Murshid Qulī Khān". Certainly the charges were not baseless. The English in Calcutta also insulted Sirāj-ud-daulah's messenger Nārāyan Singh or Nārāyan Dās.

The conflict between the English and the Nawāb soon started. On 4 June, 1756, the factory of the English at Kasimbazar was stormed by the Nawāb's soldiers, and starting for Calcutta on 5 June, the Nawāb captured Calcutta on 20 June. Already on 19 June, Governor Drake with some of his followers had fled from Calcutta to Fulta and some Englishmen were made prisoners. But Holwell's story of the 'Black Hole' has been proved by modern researches to be untrue.

Sirāj-ud-daulah also made himself secure from the design of Shaukat Jang who being instigated by Mīr Ja'far, sought to contest the *subāhdarship* of Bengal. By marching from Calcutta towards Purnea, on 24 September, 1756, Sirāj-ud-daulah defeated and killed him in a battle at Manihari on 16 October, 1756. After this Sirāj-ud-daulah returned to Calcutta "in gold-decorated boats with every pomp".¹⁴

As the historian Ghulām Husain writes, Sirāj-ud-daulah was now at the zenith of his power and prosperity. But his star soon began to pale.

On hearing of the disaster of the English in Calcutta, the Madras Council sent there reinforcement of troops under Admiral Watson and Colonel Clive, who recovered Calcutta by the first week of February, 1757. Adverse circumstances now forced Sirāj-ud-daulah to conclude the treaty of 'Alinagar on 9 February, 1757, by which trade rights and factories of the English East India Company were restored to them, and restitution and compensation money were promised by the Nawāb to the Company, its servants and tenants. Further, the English were granted permission by him to fortify Calcutta and to coin *sicca* rupees. Clive rightly described the terms of this treaty as both "honourable and advantageous for the Company".¹⁵

(b) *Awadh (Oudh)*

The *subāh* of Awadh also became virtually independent of the decadent Mughul empire. Jurisdiction of the *subāh* of Awadh then extended not only over Awadh but also over Banāras to the east of it, a good part of the territory to its west and some districts near Allahābād and Kanpur. Sa'ādat Khān, an immigrant from Khorasan and originally known as Mīr Muhammad Amīn, was the founder of the kingdom of Awadh. After being in Sarbuland Khān's service (1710-12), he joined Farrukh-siyar's service, became *faujdār* of Hindaun and Bayānā, and was made a noble on 9 October, 1720. He was appointed Governor, first of Āgra (1720-22) and then of Awadh (September, 1722), and extended Awadh's jurisdiction over Banāras, Ghāzipur, Jaunpur and Chunār. He gradually acquired power and fame and was summoned to Delhi at the time of Nādir's invasion. But, for some undesirable transactions with Nādir, he committed suicide on 20 March, 1739. Sa'ādat Khān, a prominent Mughul noble, was a successful soldier and a wise ruler. The next Governor of Awadh was Sa'ādat Khān's nephew and son-in-law, Safdar Jang (1739-54).

After the first Marāthā invasion of Bengal in 1742 emperor Muhammad Shāh asked Safdar Jang to protect Bihar, and if necessary, to enter into Bengal. So, he started from Faizabād for Bihar in December, 1742. He entered Patna City on 7 December 1742 and encamped at Bankipur, five miles west of it. From this place he began to behave as the virtual ruler of Bihar. At this 'Alī Vardī requested the Mughul emperor to recall him from Bihar. So Safdar Jang left Bihar on 15 January 1743 and returned to his dominion early in February.

Safdar Jang was appointed *Vazīr* of the Mughul emperor in 1748. Safdar Jang's position was "one of unusual difficulty". He was "considered an interloper by the old nobility whose pedigree went back to the reign of Aurangzīb or even earlier".¹⁶ He had to meet opposition of Nizām-ul-Mulk's son and grandson, of Jāvid Khān, the "real power behind the throne", and of the sons of the late *vazīr* Qamar-ud-din. He had contests with the Afghāns (1748-52), was defeated at Rām Chātauni in September 1750, and made peace with the Rohillās and Bangashes under orders of the emperor at the beginning of April 1752. Safdar Jang got his opponent Jāvid Khān murdered in 1753. Safdar Jang had no administrative capacity or statesmanly vision. He tried to grasp everything and became extremely domineering after the murder of Jāvid Khān. All this engendered Court conspiracy against Safdar Jang and caused a civil war between the

emperor and Safdar Jang from March 1753 and ultimately he departed for Awadh in November 1753. Thus ended Safdar Jang's inglorious period of *vazīrship*. But he gave "a lasting peace to Awadh and Allahābād, broken only by temporary Bangash occupation of a part of the *subāh* and a few local, spasmodic outbreaks in the beginning of his rule."¹⁷

Safdar Jang died in October 1754 and his son Shujā-ud-daulah became *subāhdar* of Awadh. Shujā-ud-daulah's personal character was not at all commendable. M. Jean Law wrote about him thus from personal observation in 1758-61: "Shujā is the most handsome person I have ever seen in India. He towers above the *Vazīr* (Imād-ul-Mulk) by his figure, the latter being small and I believe also by the qualities of his heart, but he has to yield to him (Imād-ul-Mulk) in all that relates to the spirit. He is occupied in nothing but pleasures, hunting and the most violent exercises".¹⁸ Later, an English observer, not biased against Shujā-ud-daulah wrote: "Shujā-ud-daulah was not endowed with the genius of a soldier. He wanted that valour, or courage, which is ever shown in the event of common danger. He evinced throughout the Ruhela war a marked pusillanimity sheltering himself in the rear and betraying evident signs of fear. He had acquired an extensive knowledge in the practice of every species of deceit, and could perform with facility every character that was necessary to conduct the various purposes of delusion or treachery. Generosity did not form a fixed part of his disposition. He was equally rapacious in acquiring, as sordid in preserving wealth. His excesses in venery, which knew no control, led him to commit actions derogatory from his station, as well as pernicious to his health."¹⁹

But Shujā-ud-daulah had an important role in history in that period of rapid and significant political changes. Shujā-ud-daulah's relations with the Imperial *Vazīr*, Imād-ul-Mulk, were extremely bitter and led to plots and counter-plots. After some fighting there was peace between the two in June 1757. Malignant hostility of the unscrupulous, jealous and all-powerful *Vazīr* Imād-ul-Mulk led the Imperial Prince 'Ali Gauhar (Shāh 'Alam II) into friendship with Shujā-ud-daulah. In 1758-59 Shujā-ud-daulah encouraged Prince 'Ali Gauhar to invade Bihar. But 'Ali Gauhar's Bihar expedition in 1759 ended in failure.

During the Marāthā-Afghān contest (1759-61) each of the rival parties sought to draw him over to its side and he engaged himself in various activities during it. He fought as an ally of the Ābdālī.

Shujā-ud-daulah was formally invested by Shāh 'Alam II with the office of the *Vazīr* on 15 February, 1762.²⁰ In March-April 1762, Shujā-ud-daulah conducted an expedition against Hindupati, lord of the major part of Bundelkhand, taking Shāh 'Alam II with him. After some negotiations it was settled that Hindupati would pay a fine of seventy-five lakhs of rupees and an annual tribute of twenty-five lakhs.

Deposed and driven by the English in July 1763, Nawāb Mīr Qāsim got shelter in the court of Nawāb Shujā-ud-daulah of Awadh. The emperor Shāh 'Alam II was also then with the Nawāb *Vazīr* and agreed to help Mīr Qāsim in his efforts to get back Bihar and Bengal when Mīr Qāsim visited him in February 1764. Shujā-ud-daulah also agreed to help Mīr Qāsim in recovering his lost province more out of motives of self-interest than out of humanitarian considerations to help a distressed brother-ruler. The exile Mīr Qāsim helped Shujā-ud-daulah in subduing the rebels of Bundelkhand. Mīr Qāsim promised to pay to the emperor and Shujā-ud-daulah ten and seventeen lakhs, respectively. Joined by a party of French adventurers, the allies marched to Bihar. In the first half of 1764 there were some indecisive engagements between the English army and the army of the allies. The English army was not then under proper discipline due to lack of military talent of Major Carnac. But on the arrival of Major Hector Munro as commander of the army, they were duly brought under control, the mutineers among them being punished.

The two armies met at Buxar on 22 October, 1764. It resulted in Shujā-ud-daulah's crushing defeat. After running from one place to another he was finally defeated at the battle of Korā on 3 May, 1765. Munro had already handed over the command of the army to Colonel Fletcher on 6 January, 1765, and the latter overran Shujā-ud-daulah's territory and occupied Banāras, Buxar and Allahābād. Awadh fell completely under British control. Shāh 'Alam II, who had been insulted by Shujā-ud-daulah shortly before the battle and abandoned after it, threw himself under the protection of the English who arranged for his residence in the Allahābād fort.

The battle of Buxar was certainly one of the decisive battles of Indian history. It confirmed British supremacy over Bengal and Bihar and placed Awadh and Shāh 'Alam II completely under their influence. "The victory has proved so complete" wrote the Council in Calcutta to the Court of Directors on 26 November, 1764, "that our troops meet with no further resistance". Referring to this battle Broome rightly observes: "Thus ended the famous battle of Buxar

on which depended the fate of India, and which was as gallantly disputed as it was important in its results".²¹

Clive returned to Bengal as Governor of the English Company for the second time in May 1765. He met Shujā-ud-daulah at Banāras on 2 August and the Mughul emperor at Allahābād on 9 August and concluded treaties with both of them within a few days. By the Treaty of Allahābād dated 16 August, 1765, all the territories of Shujā-ud-daulah were restored to him, with the exception of the districts of Korā and Allahābād which were given to the emperor, Chunar which was retained by the English, and the *zamindāri* of Banāras, which was to belong as before to the family of Balwant Singh under English protection, though formally subordinate to the Nawāb of Awadh. Shujā-ud-daulah agreed to pay 50 lakhs of rupees to the English as compensation for expenses of the recent war. He entered into a defensive treaty with the English for mutual support in the defence of his territories and agreed to defray the cost for maintenance of troops for this purpose. This treaty made the Nawāb of Awadh for all practical purposes a dependent and subordinate ally of the English, to be utilized against invasion of their territories by the Marāthās.

Clive convened a congress at Chapra in north Bihar in July, 1766, which was attended by Shujā-ud-daulah and the envoys of the emperor, the Jāt Rājā and the Rohillā chiefs. They concluded a treaty "for their mutual defence and security" against all attempts of the Marāthās to invade their respective territories. Referring to the terms of the treaty with Shujā-ud-daulah, the Select Committee in Calcutta wrote to the Court of Directors on 8 September, 1766: "The cheerfulness with which he (Shujā-ud-daulah) met the Right Honourable President at the last Congress held in the Bihar province, the ready compliance he showed in paying the remainder of the indemnification to the Company stipulated by treaty even before the time limited for payment expired, and the engagements which he has renewed for mutual defence and security, afford the strongest testimony of the sincerity of his gratitude and friendship". The emperor who had conferred the *vazīrship* of the empire upon his son on being abandoned by Shujā-ud-daulah at the end of 1764, now reappointed Shujā-ud-daulah as *Vazīr* under pressure from Clive.

At Chapra, Shujā-ud-daulah managed to obtain Clive's consent to punish those whom he considered to be disloyal officers and on his return to his kingdom he proceeded to deal with them. The first man to suffer from this was Shujā-ud-daulah's prime minister Beni Bahādur. After Beni Bahādur, Muhammad Elich Khān became prime

minister of Shujā-ud-daulah in March 1767. Shujā-ud-daulah remodelled his army on the western model. But his early designs for subjugation of Rohilkhand were foiled. Further, Richard Smith, who commanded the Company's brigade at Allahābād, sent reports to the Select Committee in Calcutta about what he considered to be anti-English designs of Shujā-ud-daulah. Smith's reports were, however, rejected by the Select Committee as there was no ground for accusing Shujā-ud-daulah of anti-English designs. But as a measure of precaution the English concluded a treaty with Shujā-ud-daulah on 29 November, 1768, which "checked the strength and progress of the *Vazīr's* army and freed the English from apprehension from their ally."²² This treaty left a scar on the heart of Shujā-ud-daulah, who, as a contemporary English writer observed, "saw that his ambition and schemes of aggrandisement would ever be encountered with the jealousy of the English, whom he now beheld with mistrust and resentment; and knowing the Frenchmen were the common enemy of our nation, the *Wazīr* held out many inducements to engage their assistance".²³ This treaty did not cement the alliance between the English and Shujā-ud-daulah, with whom "it was a sore point".²⁴ Hastings wisely reversed it in 1772 and cancelled it fully on 8 September, 1773, permitting Shujā-ud-daulah to maintain an army as he desired.

Shujā-ud-daulah's relations with the Mughul empire were not quite cordial between 1765-68 as he wanted to have full control over the imperial court as *de facto* *vazīr* by eliminating the influence of Munir-ud-daulah in whom the emperor had much confidence. But a deputation consisting of Cartier, Smith and Russell went to Allahābād and effected a reconciliation between the emperor and Shujā-ud-daulah in November 1768, and the latter now became the *de facto* *vazīr* for which he had been trying since 1766. As regards the emperor, the relations between him and Shujā-ud-daulah were cordial in the period from 1769-71. But when in 1771 emperor Shāh 'Alam II returned to Delhi with Marāthā help, Warren Hastings deprived him of the districts of Korā and Allahābād and transferred these to Shujā-ud-daulah in lieu of fifty lakhs of rupees and an annual subsidy for maintenance of a garrison of the Company's troops for the protection of the Nawāb. This arrangement was ratified by the treaty of Banāras on 7 September, 1773, when Hastings had a conference with the Nawāb-*vazīr*.

Some other matters were settled between the Nawāb-*vazīr* and Warren Hastings at the Banāras conference. Warren Hastings promised to help Shujā-ud-daulah in conquering Rohilkhand; cancella-

tion of the treaty of 1768 was confirmed. Shujā-ud-daulah agreed to receive an English gentleman of Warren Hastings' confidence to stay at his court and act as Political Resident in Awadh; the claim of Chait Singh and his heirs to the estate of Balwant Singh was recognized by a special agreement dated 6 September, 1773, and Warren Hastings decided not to pay tribute any longer to Shāh 'Alam II.

What was decided between Warren Hastings and Shujā-ud-daulah at this time led to the war against the Rohillās. The fertile region of Rohilkhand, situated at the base of the Himalayas to the north-west of Awadh with a population of 6,000,000, the bulk of whom were Hindus and governed by a confederacy of Rohillā chiefs under the leadership of Hāfiz Rahmat Khān, had been coveted by the Marāthās since 1771. The Nawāb of Awadh also wanted to occupy Rohilkhand as he had no love for the Afghāns. But common interest now drew them together. To prevent incursions of the Marāthās into Rohilkhand a treaty was concluded between Shujā-ud-daulah and the Rohillās in the presence of the British Commander-in-Chief, Robert Barker, on 17 June, 1772, by which the Rohillās promised to pay forty lakhs of rupees to Shujā-ud-daulah on his expelling the Marāthās from their territory. When the Marāthās invaded Rohilkhand in the spring of 1773 they were repulsed by the combined British and Awadh forces. After this they could not then think of repeating their incursions into Rohilkhand due to their internal troubles in Mahārāshtra after the death of *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo I. Shujā-ud-daulah demanded from Hāfiz Rahmat Khān, leader of the Rohillās, payment of the stipulated sum of forty lakhs, but the latter evaded payment. At this, early in February 1774, Shujā-ud-daulah demanded, from the English, help in this matter on the strength of the treaty of Banāras (September 1773). Warren Hastings and the Council in Calcutta acceded to this demand. A British army was sent under Colonel Champion on 23 February, 1774. The combined forces of Shujā-ud-daulah and the English marched into Rohilkhand on 17 April, 1774. The decisive battle was fought at Miranpur Kātrā six days later. Hāfiz Rahmat Khān was killed fighting bravely. About 20,000 Rohillās were expelled beyond the Gangā, and their province became a part of the Awadh kingdom. But a fragment of it together with Rāmpur, and some other adjacent districts yielding a revenue of Rs. 14,75,000 was left with Faizulla Khān, son of 'Alī Muhammad Rohillā, founder of the Rohillā power, according to a treaty between him and Shujā-ud-daulah, concluded through the intervention of Colonel Champion. It was also stipulated that the Khān would retain in his army only 5,000 troops, and would at all times and on all occasions support him.²⁵

Shujā-ud-daulah died on 26 January, 1775, and was succeeded by his eldest son Asaf-ud-daulah. Awadh, for all practical purposes, became a dependency of the East India Company.

(c) *The Deccan:*

The Deccan also became independent of Mughul control under Nizām-ul-Mulk. His grandfather, Khwājā Abid Shaikh, Shaikh-ul-Islām of Bokhārā, migrated to India and entered the service of Aurangzīb about the middle of the seventeenth century, and his father, Ghāzi-ud-din Firuz Jang held several important posts in the Mughul empire. Chin Qilich Khān also held various posts in different parts of the Mughul empire. At the time of Aurangzīb's death, Chin Qilich Khān was at Bijāpur, and observed a neutral course during the war of succession among the sons of Aurangzīb. Bahādur Shāh removed him from the Deccan and made him the Governor of Awadh and *faujdar* of Gorakhpur on 9 December, 1707. For some time he retired from public service and joined it again towards the close of Bahādur Shāh's reign with the title of his father, Ghāzi-ud-din Firuz Jang. In 1713 Farrukh-siyar appointed him Governor of the six *subāhs* of the Deccan by investing him with the titles of Khān Khānān and Nizām-ul-Mulk Bahādur Fath Jang as a reward for his having espoused his cause.²⁶ Extremely ambitious, he wanted to rule over the Deccan independently of Delhi and he used the troubles prevailing in the Delhi Court to his own advantage.

From the commencement of his viceroyalty in the Deccan Nizām-ul-Mulk as an astute diplomat sought to check the growing power of the Marāthās by stopping the payment of *chauth* and by indefatigably instigating the disaffected, self-seeking and ambitious chieftains of Mahārāshtra against Shāhu.²⁷ With selfish motives and personal ambitions chieftains like Chandrasen Jādhav, Rambhāji Nimbalkar, Shripat Rāo *Pratinidhi*, Raghūji Bhosle and Dābhāde, undermined the prestige of the central authority. But intrigues of the Delhi Court soon led to Nizām-ul-Mulk's recall from the Deccan by the end of 1715 and Husain Āli was appointed Governor of the Deccan. Nizām-ul-Mulk was transferred to Murādābād and subsequently his removal to Bihar was also contemplated. But before he assumed charge of his new office, the regime of Farrukh-siyar came to a close and he was transferred to the Government of Mālwa. He started for Ujjain on 15 March 1719 on receiving the pledge that he would not be transferred again.

In Mālwa Nizām-ul-Mulk was able to lay the foundation of his future greatness. His activities here roused the jealousy of the Sayyid brothers and an order was passed for recalling him on the

plea that it was necessary for the protection of the Deccan that Husain 'Alī Khān should have the charge of Mālwa. This time Nizām-ul-Mulk decided to act in self-defence by arms. He occupied the fortress of Asirgarh on 20 May, 1720, and three days later Burhānpur fell into his hands. The Sayyid brothers sent urgent orders to Sayyid Dilāwar 'Alī Khān and the Deputy Governor 'Alam 'Alī Khān to oppose the march of Nizām-ul-Mulk. But Nizām-ul-Mulk defeated and slew Dilāwar 'Alī Khān in the battle of Khāndwā on 19 June, 1720. 'Alam 'Alī Khān was defeated and killed at the battle of Bālāpur on 10 August, 1720. Husain 'Alī while getting ready to march against the Nizām was stabbed to death by Haidar Beg, also a Sayyid, near Toda-Bhim, on 8 October, 1720. Sayyid Abdullah was defeated in a battle at Hasanpur on 13 November, 1720 and imprisoned. After two years he was done to death by poison.

After the fall of the Sayyids, Nizām-ul-Mulk made himself master of the six *subāhs* of the Deccan and began his operations against the growing power of the Marāthās. But the very next year he received an Imperial summons to proceed to Delhi at once and in February 1722 "he was appointed *vazīr* and received the usual robe, a dagger, an ornamental pen case and a diamond ring of great value".²⁸ The vitiated atmosphere in the Delhi Court was not congenial to him and his enemies poisoned the emperor Muhammad Shāh's mind against him.²⁹ So he left for the Deccan in the third week of December 1723, and reached Aurangābād, the capital of the Deccan in June 1724. But the enemies of Nizām-ul-Mulk succeeded in persuading the credulous emperor to believe that he was in rebellion and to send secret instructions to Mubārīz Khān, Governor of Hyderabad, urging him to fight against Nizām-ul-Mulk and promising him the viceroyalty of the Deccan in case of his success. Mubārīz Khān had offended the Marāthās by his hostile activities. So Nizām-ul-Mulk could enlist support of the Marāthās. With their combined armies Nizām-ul-Mulk marched out in the first week of September 1724. A decisive battle was fought in October 1724 at Sakharkharda in Berār where Mubārīz Khān was defeated and slain.³⁰ Nizām-ul-Mulk followed up his success by reducing Mubārīz Khān's son and taking possession of Hyderabad by the beginning of 1725. "From this period may be dated", writes Irvine, "Nizām-ul-Mulk's virtual independence and the foundation of the present Hyderabad State. Henceforth he bestowed offices in the Dakhin (Deccan); he made promotions in rank, conferred titles and issued assignments on the land revenue at his own will and pleasure. The only attributes of sovereignty from which he refrained

were the use of scarlet or imperial umbrella, the recitation of the Friday prayer in his own name, and the issue of coin stamped with his own superscription".³¹ Nizām-ul-Mulk's strong administration in the Deccan has elicited much praise from Khāfi Khān.³² Ghulam Husain, the author of *Siyār-ul-mutakherin* also remarks: "It is such an extensive tract (the Deccan *subāh*) that he governed with an absolute authority for the space of seven and thirty years."³³

The Nizām-ul-Mulk justly realized that the activities of *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo I were opposed to his policy of establishing supremacy in the Deccan, and so he took steps to oppose him seriously. He also incited many Marāthā chieftains against the *Peshwā*. He made them his allies by grant of *jāgīrs* and also instigated Rājā Shambhūji (of the Kolhāpur branch of Shivājī's family) against Shāhū (of the Satara branch). So Nizām-ul-Mulk, Shambhūji and Trimbak Rāo Dābhāde whose interests in Gujarāt had been rudely interfered with by Bājī Rāo I, united against the *Peshwā*. Bājī Rāo I was thus engaged in a war with them which lasted for about five years from 1727 to 1732. In November 1726, after the departure of Bājī Rāo and the *Senāpati* for Karnāṭak, the Nizām started hostilities against Shāhū. But Bājī Rāo I took the counter-offensive within a year and won a victory over the Nizām at Pālkhed in February, 1728. This was followed by the treaty of Mungi-Shevgaon concluded on 6 March, 1728, in which Nizām-ul-Mulk accepted all the terms dictated by Bājī Rāo I, except one. By his superior genius Bājī Rāo I foiled the ambitions and plans of the confederates. The Nizām was defeated at Pālkhed in 1728 and his great adversary at the Court *Senāpati* Trimbak Rāo Dābhāde was slain in a battle in 1731 fought on the plains of Bhilapur near Dabhoi between Baroda and that town.

The death of *Senāpati* Dābhāde knocked the bottom out of Nizām-ul-Mulk's intrigues and he felt that under the prevailing circumstances it would be advisable to come to terms with the *Peshwā*. The latter realized that it would not be possible to carry on his campaigns in the north so long as Nizām-ul-Mulk threatened his base in the Deccan. So in consideration of self-interest the two chiefs arrived at a compromise in December 1732 by which the Nizām was to be at liberty to gratify his ambitions in the south, the *Peshwā* in the north.³³

After Bājī Rāo's sudden dash on Delhi, the Mughul emperor summoned the Nizām from the Deccan. The Nizām responded to this call and leaving his second son Nāsir Jang in charge of the sou-

thern dominions proceeded towards Delhi and reached there about July, 1737. The emperor showered many favours on the Nizām and conferred on him the title of Āsaf Jāh which meant "equal in dignity to Āsaf, the minister of King Solomon". After collecting forces and securing services of some of the Rājput chiefs, the Nizām marched towards Mālwa, but he was defeated near Bhopal and was compelled to conclude on 7 January, 1738, a convention at Duraha Sarai (sixty-four miles from Sironj). "In his own handwriting the Nizām promised to grant to Bājī Rāo the *Subāhdari* of Mālwa, and rights over the territory between the Narmadā and the Chambal; to obtain a confirmation of this cession from the emperor; and to use every endeavour to procure the payment of fifty lakhs of rupees, to pay Bājī Rāo's expenses".³⁵

During Nādīr Shāh's invasion the emperor called Nizām-ul-Mulk to Delhi to negotiate the terms of agreement with the invader. But nothing could be done in this matter because of Nādīr's increasing demands. The Nizām retired at the age of 70 for good to the Deccan. Early in 1741 he suppressed the rebellion of his second son Nāsir Jang and restored order in the Karnāṭak. In 1743 he appointed Nāsir Jang *subāhdar* of the Karnāṭak and granted him the *jāgīr* of Adoni. Nizām-ul-Mulk died on 21 May, 1748, at the age of seventy-seven. After this, the question of succession in the Deccan and the Karnāṭak gave opportunities to the Marāthās and the European trading Companies to fish in the troubled waters of the Deccan. After many vicissitudes Nizām 'Alī rose to power about 1760 and held the highest post till the end of the century.

The Deccan soon fell into disorder and confusion due to the policy of the revived Marāthā power after their recovery from the blows of Pānipat, the rise of Haidar 'Alī of Mysore to power, the vacillating policy of the Nizām, and growing political ambition of the English, frequent shifting of alliances among them making confusion worse confounded. In 1765 the Madras Council agreed to help the Nizām against Haidar 'Alī and in 1766 the English, the Marāthās and the Nizām formed a triple alliance against Haidar. The Nizām marched against Mysore on April 17 with a party of English troops under the command of General Joseph Smith, but his enterprise was not successful. Under the influence of Mahfuz Khān, brother and rival of the pro-English Nawāb Muhammad 'Alī and enemy of the English, the Nizām soon deserted the English and formed an alliance with Haidar. But General Smith defeated the new allies at the Pass of Changama and Trinomali in September 1767. Haidar's fickle ally, the Nizām, soon left his party and concluded an ill-ad-

vised treaty with the English on 23 February, 1768. By this the Nizām confirmed his old treaty engagements with the English in as irresponsible a manner as he had broken them. The Nizām promised to help the English and the Nawāb of Karnāṭak in chastising Haidar and the English agreed to "send two battalions of sepoy and six pieces of artillery, manned by Europeans, whenever the *subāh* (the Nizām) would require them and the situation of their affairs will allow of such a body of troops to march into the Deccan, provided the *subāh* pays the expenses during the time that the said troops are employed in his service". This treaty did not prove to be helpful to the English, but rather provoked Haidar more bitterly than before. "You have brought us into such a labyrinth of difficulties", wrote the Court of Directors to the Madras Council, "that we do not see how we shall be extricated from them." Ultimately, the Nizām had to pay a heavy price for his vacillation and quick change of alliance and he was reduced to the position of the weakest of the Indian powers. In September 1798 he entered into a subsidiary alliance with the English and became their subordinate ally.

(d) *Invasions of Ahmad Shāh Abdālī:*

Nādir Shāh never returned to India after his first terrible invasion. He was assassinated in 1747. One of his officers named Ahmad Shāh, an Afghān noble of the Abdālī clan, made himself independent ruler of Afghānistan. He styled himself *Durr-i-Durrān*, "the pearl of the age", and his clan henceforth came to be known as the Durrāni. While coming to India with Nādir Shāh, Ahmad Shāh Abdālī had seen with his own eyes "the weakness of the empire, the imbecility of the emperor, the inattentiveness of the ministers, the spirit of independence which had crept among the grandees". So, after strengthening his position at home, Ahmad Shāh Abdālī invaded India seven times between 1748 and 1767.³⁶ These invasions were not mere predatory raids. They indicated a general revival of the Afghāns within and outside India, who made a bid for supremacy on the ruins of the Mughul empire.³⁷ In analysing the motives of Ahmad Shāh Abdālī's Indian expeditions Elphinstone has noted that through these he hoped to consolidate his power at home by gaining resources through foreign wars and thus obtain means to heap favours and rewards on the Afghān chiefs.³⁸

After having conquered Qandahār, Kābul and Peshāwar, Ahmad Shāh Abdālī invaded India for the first time in January 1748 with 12,000 picked troops. But he was defeated at the battle of Mānupur by Ahmad Shāh, the Mughul heir-apparent, and Muin-ul-Mulk or

Mir Mannu, son of the deceased *vazīr* Qamar-ud-din, and was repulsed. Mir Mannu was appointed Governor of the Punjāb. But he had to encounter various difficulties which prevented his being settled in his new position. So Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī invaded the Punjāb for the second time in 1750 and conquered it after defeating its Governor. In the absence of any support from the Delhi Court, the Mughul Governor found resistance futile and entered into an agreement with the invader. Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī invaded India for the third time in December 1751, defeated Mir Mannu, conquered Kāshmīr and forced the Mughul emperor Ahmad Shāh to cede to him the portion of India up to Sirhind. This meant further reduction in the territorial extent and power of the Mughul empire. Mir Mannu submitted to the invader and was appointed by him his Governor of the Punjāb in 1752. He promised to remit to the Ābdālī the surplus revenue of the Punjāb and not to transact any important business without his orders.

After the death of Mir Mannu in November 1753 and that of his son and successor in May 1754, the province of the Punjāb fell into disorder and anarchy, due largely to the caprices of Mir Mannu's widow—Mughlāni Begam. On an appeal from her for help, Imād-ul-mulk, the all-powerful *vazīr* at Delhi, marched to the Punjāb which he coveted for himself. He brought it under his control, appointed Mir Mumin, "the leading nobleman of Lahore", Governor of the province and put Mughlāni Begam, whom the Ābdālī had addressed as daughter, under restraint. All this enraged Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī, who invaded India for the fourth time in November 1756. This invasion was more serious than before and Ahmad Shāh reached Delhi on 23 January, 1757. The imperial city was "plundered and its unhappy people (rich and poor) were again subjected to pillage". Imād-ul-Mulk surrendered to the invader and was pardoned by him. The invader further forced the Mughul emperor to formally cede to him the Punjāb, Kāshmīr and Thatta as also the Sirhind district. For the government of these ceded tracts Ahmad Shāh left his son, Timur Shāh as his viceroy in Lahore, with Jahān Khān, an able Afghān general as the latter's *vazīr*. After plundering the Jāt country, south of Delhi, the Ābdālī returned from India in April 1757.

During Timur Shāh's administration for one year, from March 1757 to April 1758, utter lawlessness and disorder prevailed in the Punjāb. Ghāzi-ud-din recovered Delhi and deprived Najib-ud-daulah, a leading chief of the Rohillā Afghāns of his high office and influence in the Mughul government. Jahān Khān infuriated the Sikh commu-

nity by "maltreating one of their most respected members, a religious guide. The Sikhs rose up on all sides".³⁹ Ādinā Beg Khān, governor of the Jullundur Doāb, revolted against the Afghāns and requested the Marāthās to help him. Raghunāth Rāo marched to Delhi with a strong Marāthā army and proceeded to the Punjāb in April 1758. He defeated the Ābdālī's governor there and expelled the Afghāns. Raghunāth Rāo and his army left the Punjāb by appointing Ādinā Beg Khān as their governor there on payment of an annual tribute of 75 lakhs. Ādinā Beg died in October 1758. Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī invaded India for the fifth time in October 1759 and secured the alliance of the Rohillās and Shujā-ud-daulah of Awadh (jealous of Ghāzi-ud-din and his Marāthā allies). As both the Marāthās and the Afghāns were aspiring for the supremacy of Hindustān, a severe clash between them became inevitable. This took place on 14 January, 1761, on the historic field of Pānipat, where the fate of India had been decided twice before. This battle "registered crowning victory" for the Ābdālī and its results were disastrous for the Marāthās. It frustrated their ambition for north-western advance, caused them heavy losses in men and money and dealt a severe blow to their prestige.

Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī retreated from India on 20 March, 1761. Najib-ud-daulah and Munir-ud-daulah agreed to pay him, on behalf of the Mughul government, an annual tribute of forty lakhs of rupees. The Ābdālī's parting instructions were that "Shāh Alam should be recognized as Emperor, Imād reappointed as *vazīr* and Najib *Mīr Bakhshi*. . . . But a river of blood lay between Shāh Alam and Imād, and the opportunist Najib used this fact to secure his own elevation as regent of the empire for the next ten years".⁴⁰

But the Sikhs soon recovered their power, occupied Lahore, killed Khwajā Abid, governor of the Durrāni at Lahore, and occupied the city in February 1764. At this Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī invaded India for the seventh time in March 1764. But after a fortnight's stay at Lahore he had to retreat to his own country, owing to internal troubles there, particularly mutiny of his own troops. Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī invaded India for the last time in 1767. But he could not suppress the Sikhs and had to retire soon "with a consciousness of his ultimate failure". The long "contest with a nation in arms (the Sikhs), while no dependable ally or lieutenant could be found by him in India, at last wore Ābdālī out; his illness, too, proved to be hopelessly intractable; his soldiers became rowdy through his frequent failure to pay them, and a large contingent of them mutinied and left for Afghānistan in open mutiny".⁴¹

Ahmad Shāh Abdālī returned home hurriedly. But his repeated invasions of India affected the history of this country in several ways. Besides checking the rapid progress of Marāthās in Hindustān, it hastened the dismemberment of the Mughul empire. Further, it indirectly helped the rise of the Sikh power. It has been significantly observed that the Abdālī's "career in India is very intimately a part of the Sikh struggle for independence".⁴²

(e) *The Sikhs:*

After the assassination of Guru Govind Singh in 1708, the Sikhs got a leader in Bandā, his chosen disciple, about whose antecedents and early life nothing very definite and trustworthy is known, though there are several accounts about these.⁴³ With Bandā began the Sikh war of independence against Mughul imperial authority. Bandā gathered round him about 40,000 well-armed Sikhs, "bearing with him the arrows of Govind as the pledge of victory". He overpowered the Mughul authorities in the neighbourhood of Sirhind and captured Sirhind for wreaking vengeance on Wazir Khān, *faujdār* of the place and murderer of Guru Govind's children. The *faujdār* was killed by a musket-shot. "The baggage was plundered, the elephants captured. Not a single Muhammadan escaped with anything but the clothes upon his back."⁴⁴ Bandā committed great atrocities at Sirhind by way of vengeance. Here all power passed into the hands of the Sikhs, and one Bar Singh, belonging to *parganā* Haibatpur Patti in the Bāri Doāb was appointed Governor of Sirhind. Bandā occupied the area between the Sutlej and the Jamunā and built the strong fort of Lohgarh at Mukhlispur, half way between Nahan and Sadhaurā, where he tried to assume something of regal state. "He was the *Sacchā Pādīshāh*, or Veritable Sovereign, his disciples all Singhs or lions. A new form of greeting, *Fāth daras* (May you behold victory!) was invented.... coin was struck in the new sovereign's name".⁴⁵

On hearing of the movements of Bandā, emperor Bahādur Shāh hastened towards the Punjāb, where his local officials had been engaged in suppressing the Sikh rising. Bandā was besieged in his new stronghold. After some successive skirmishes Bandā escaped with many of his followers into the hills north of Lahore, and "laid the fairest part of the Punjāb under contribution".⁴⁶ Bahādur Shāh on reaching Lahore died there on 28 February, 1712. After this Bandā came out of his hiding place, recovered the fort of Lohgarh, occupied the town of Sadhaurā, and built a fort of considerable size with high and thick walls at Gurdāspur between the Beās and the

Rāvi. The Viceroy of Lahore marched against Bandā but he was defeated in a pitched battle. A party of the Sikhs advanced towards Sirhind; the governor marched forward to oppose them, but he and his followers were overpowered.

At this emperor Farrukh-siyar ordered Abdus Samad Khān, the governor of Kāshmīr, a Turāni noble and an able general, to assume the command in the Punjāb and sent some chosen troops to help him in 1715. With many of his warlike countrymen and a train of artillery, Abdus Samad Khān left Lahore and defeated the Sikh army after a fierce resistance on the part of Bandā. "The success was followed up, and Bandā retreated from post to post, fighting valiantly and inflicting heavy losses on his victors; but he was at length compelled to shelter himself in the fort of Gurdāspur."⁴⁷ The Sikhs fought desperately "contending among themselves for martyrdom and many among them were captured after a fierce resistance" against "all the forces that the empire could bring against them for the space of eight months".⁴⁸ But Bandā eventually surrendered on 17 December, 1715, after all provisions in the fort were exhausted. Bandā and his followers were sent to Delhi and severe tortures were inflicted upon them. Bandā was kept in an iron cage, placed on the back of an elephant. "A reward was given for every Sikh head". Taunted by a Muslim noble, Bandā replied that he had been "a mere scourge in the hands of God for the chastisement of the wicked and he was now receiving the meed of his own crimes against the Almighty". Government committed all kinds of atrocities. Bandā's own son was killed before his eyes; and he himself 'was tormented to death' with various tortures on 19 June, 1716.

After the death of Bandā "an active persecution was kept up against the Sikhs, whose losses in battle had been great and depressing".⁴⁹ In fact, "fortunes of the Sikhs were reduced to the lowest ebb in 1716."

But the military spirit of the Sikhs could not be completely crushed. "The tenets of Guru Nānak and Govind had taken root in the hearts of the people; the peasant and the mechanic nursed their faith in secret, and the more ardent clung to the hope of ample revenge and speedy recovery". Gradually the disorganized Sikhs began to raise their heads again and they found a leader in Kapur Singh, a resident of Fyzullāpur, who began organizing what later on developed as the celebrated *Dal Khālsā* or the army of the theocracy of the Singhs. The invasion of Nādir Shāh in 1739, which brought confusion and disorder in Upper India, helped recovery of the Sikhs.

"The Persian invasion is a very important event in the history of the rise of the Sikh power. In the first place, it enfeebled the strong government of Zakāriyā Khān (in the Punjāb). The commotion and the confusion were very favourable to the rise of the Sikhs."⁵⁰ They utilised these to augment their financial resources and to increase their military power. "The suppression of the Sikhs, difficult under all circumstances, became even more difficult now".⁵¹ Even in 1745 after the death of Zakāriyā Khān, Jassā Singh came down to the plains, and raided Kasur with the help of other Sikh Sardars.

The Sikhs organized themselves at a place called Dālewāl and built a fort there. From this place they carried on their depredations round the country and extended them up to the very neighbourhood of Lahore. Nādir Shāh confirmed Khān Bahādur Zakāriyā Khān in the *Nizāmat* of Lahore, whereupon the Sikhs withdrew from Lahore and its neighbourhood and carried on their activities in the Jullundur Doāb. After the departure of Nādir Shāh, Khān Bahādur Zakāriyā Khān placed Adinā Beg Khān in charge of Jullundur Doāb authorising him to reduce the Sikhs. But Adinā Beg did not execute his task properly by trying to subjugate the Sikhs completely, "which he thought, would undermine his influence and power".⁵² The Trans-Sutlej Sikhs were kept under check by Zakāriyā Khān till his death in 1745. But "in the Cis-Sutlej region under the Delhi *Subāh*, the utter weakness of the Government gave the Sikhs a much freer hand to carry on their plundering raids".⁵³

After the death of Zakāriyā Khān in 1745 intrigues of the rival parties in the Mughul Court prevented immediate appointment of governor of the Punjāb. Soon *vazīr* Qamar-ud-din Khān was made the absentee governor. All these factors contributed "to destroy the peace and prosperity which the just rule of Zakāriyā Khān had given to the Punjāb.... Disorder broke out. Everywhere lawless men, plunderers and adventurers, who had so long kept themselves in hiding, now came out in the open and began to desolate the realm.... On one side the Raja of Jammu rebelled and on the other the Sikhs began to cause tumult and trouble".⁵⁴ At last the emperor agreed to the appointment of Yahyā Khān, a son of Zakāriyā Khān, as the Deputy Governor with the *vazīr* as the titular *subāhdar*. After receiving the reins of government Yahyā Khān tried to suppress the Sikhs. Many Sikhs lost their lives at Sahidganj, the chief martyr being Bhai Taru Singh, one of the revered Sikh religious leaders. Yahyā Khān passed an order for a general massacre of the Sikhs. But this was prevented by quarrel between

Yahyā Khān and Shahnawāz (Hayātullah, another son of Zakāriyā Khān). Whenever Yahyā Khān sent troops against the Sikhs, Shah Nawāz helped the latter in various ways. "This fratricidal war gave the Sikhs the breathing space which they so badly needed".⁵⁵

Ahmad Shāh Abdālī led his first invasion against India in 1748 and his repeated inroads between 1748-1767 "exercised a very decisive influence on the history of the rise of the Sikh power".⁵⁶ It has therefore been said that Ahmad Shāh Abdālī's "career in India is very intimately a part of the Sikh struggle for independence".⁵⁷ In his first invasion Ahmad Shāh Abdālī had some initial success. But under the able guidance and the gallantry of the deceased *vazīr's* (*Vazīr* Qamar-ud-din died on 11 March, 1748) son, Muin-ul-mulk or Mīr Mannu, the imperial army fought bravely. In the battle which took place at Mānupur, a village ten miles north-west of Sirhind, the Abdālī had 12,000 picked troops and the number of the imperial army was between 60,000 and 70,000. But due to an accident in the Afghān army, which found some rockets in Lahore and used them in the wrong way, the Abdālī had to retreat. The Sikhs pursued the Afghān army up to the banks of the Indus and plundered Abdālī's baggage. In the confusion which followed it, the Sikhs began to consolidate their position quickly and brought a large portion of the Bāri and Jullundur Doābs under their control. During the Abdālī's flight, Sikh Sardārs like Jassā Singh, Chharat Singh, Bharo Singh and Karora Singh, organized a party of six to seven thousand fighters and named it *Dal Khālsāji* or the army of the theocracy of the Singhs.

The *Subāhdār* of Lahore, Muin-ul-mulk or Mīr Mannu tried his best to subdue the Sikhs. But their depredations could not be thoroughly checked, though many of them were imprisoned and killed. "Those Moslems who could bring severed Sikh heads got rewards".⁵⁸ Muin-ul-mulk could not devote his undivided attention to the suppression of the Sikhs, as Safdar Jang, who was appointed *vazīr* on 20 June, 1748, was jealous of him and fomented plots and conspiracies against him. The first instrument of Safdar Jang's malicious design was Nāsir Khān, whom Muin-ul-mulk had appointed *faujdār* of the 'four *mahals*'—Siālkot, Pasrur, Gujarāt and Auran-gābād, but because of his treachery Muin-ul-mulk compelled him to retire to Delhi. Safdar Jang also utilized Shah Nawāz Khān, the second son of Zakāriyā Khān, against Muin-ul-mulk. All this gave some respite to the Sikhs. But they had as yet no strong fortified place to fall back upon and were scattered throughout the province of the Punjāb.

Ahmad Shāh Abdālī invaded the Punjāb once again in 1750. This time, after an indecisive engagement, Muin-ul-mulk considered it advisable to come to an understanding with the Abdālī.⁵⁹ He, therefore, stopped his advance by promising to pay him fourteen lakhs of rupees as surplus revenue of the four *mahāls*—Siālkot, Pasrur, Gujarāt and Aurangābād.⁶⁰ During the next two years the Abdālī did not press Muin-ul-mulk, who devoted himself to chastise the Sikhs. During the commotion which followed, Jassā Singh, Ahluwālia, Hara Singh, Karam Singh, Jassā Singh Rāmgarhia, Naja Singh and Chharat Singh “had asserted themselves with their combined host, the *Dal Khālsāji*”.⁶¹ Adinā Beg, whom Muin-ul-mulk had engaged to suppress the Sikhs, did not take suitable steps for this but began to intrigue with them. The Sikhs built the mud fort of Rāmrauni, later on famous as Rāmgarh. But Muin-ul-mulk soon effectively subdued the Sikhs. As the Sikhs sought shelter in the hills or the jungles, the hill Rājās were asked to drive them from their territories and to send them to Lahore. Many Sikhs lost their lives at Śahidganj. “The Sikh nation might have been destroyed”, writes Forster,⁶² “but for the intervention of Mir Mannu’s minister, Koura Mal, himself a member of the *Khālsā* sect”. Through his mediation an accommodation was reached. The Sikhs “were left to strengthen themselves, enlarge territory;.... whilst Koura Mal lived, his influence upon the Sikhs restrained their depredations”.

Muin-ul-mulk continued his ruthless policy against the Sikhs till his death. One expedition led by himself against the Sikhs towards the close of 1752 has been thus described by his page: “When the Nawāb Sahib (i.e., Muin-ul-mulk) was out on an administrative tour, in the Batāla district, he heard that a large body of Sikhs were causing disturbances in the neighbourhood, stopping the roads and ruining the cultivators. He then sent Sayyid Jamil-ud-din Khān with his *Bakhshi* Ghāzi Beg Khān to punish them. These officers marched to the scene, fought the Sikhs and put them to flight. Nine hundred of the Sikh infantry threw themselves into the small fort of Rāmrauni, close to Chak Guru Hargovind, which Jamil-ud-din immediately invested. After a few days the garrison rushed out sword in hand, fell upon the besiegers, and were all slain.”⁶³ But “this slaughter had no more effect than stamping upon a few hundred white ants. Such conflicts with Sikh bands continued till the very day of Muin’s death (1753), and grew more numerous after him”.⁶⁴

Various factors, such as the “support of Koura Mal, the selfish policy of Adinā Beg, rivalry between Safdar Jang and Mir Mannu, Jāvid Khān and Safdar Jang, the weakness of Ahmad Shāh, the

Mughul emperor, the ability of his namesake, the Abdālī chief—all had something to do with the survival of the Sikhs".⁶⁵

The Sikhs again plundered Jullundur Doāb. This led Muin-ul-mulk to send Adinā Beg and Siddiq Beg Khān against them. This time Adinā Beg attacked them at Makhowal, killed many of them, and forced them to disperse. "He checked them but did not try to crush them entirely."⁶⁶ "He entered into a secret understanding with them, by which their excursions were limited.... and they gathered strength and resources for future efforts."

After Muin-ul-mulk's death the Punjāb was in a state of utter confusion and disorder, which were aggravated by the "profligacy and capriciousness" of his wife, Mughlāni Begam. When all this was happening, Ahmad Shāh Abdālī invaded India for the fourth time in November 1756. The Sikhs had already been strengthening themselves. "The Sikhs took all those advantages which the local distractions of a falling empire offered them, of extending and establishing their power. Their bands under their most active leaders plundered in every direction".⁶⁷

When Ahmad Shāh Abdālī invaded India for the fourth time in November 1756, the Sikhs could not openly oppose him, but "hung about his wings, plundered all people who straggled from his camp and cut off his provisions". Sikh marauders caused some troubles to the Abdālī army and so he asked those whom he left behind "to take vengeance on the Sikhs for all the excesses which they had committed".⁶⁸ The Mughul emperor formally ceded to Ahmad Shāh Abdālī the Punjāb, Kāshmīr, Thatta and the Sirhind district. Ahmad Shāh Abdālī left his son, Timur Shāh for administration of these districts with the able Afghān General, Jahān Khān, as his *vazīr*.

Timur Shāh and Jahān Khān soon thought of subjugating the Sikhs. On hearing that many Sikh soldiers had assembled at Chakguru, that is, Amritsar, for their holy bath, Jahān Khān attacked and defeated them there. Many of the Sikhs were killed. "Amritsar was occupied and the holy shrine desecrated".

The Sikh community was very much infuriated when Jahān Khān insulted one of their notable religious guides who was also a rich revenue-farmer. "From that day the peace and orderly rule which had been recently established in the country disappeared and the Sikhs rose in rebellion on all four sides". Adinā Beg Khān, *faujdār* of the Jullundur Doāb, was summoned by Jahān Khān to help him in this critical situation. But instead of obeying the summons, he fled away to the Balwan (Balsan?) hills. He even entered

into an alliance with the Sikhs "founded on a scheme of combined hostilities with the Afghāns". "In consequence of it, utter disorder spread throughout the Punjāb. The *Vazīr Jahān Khān* sent *Sarfarāz Afghān* of Attock and *Gafran Khān* as governors of Jullundur and *Kāshmīr* respectively, but both of them returned defeated in the course of a month. Utter lawlessness prevailed. Every force that was sent out by Timur was defeated. Even the environs of the capital were not safe. Every night thousands of Sikhs used to assemble and plunder the suburbs lying outside the walls of Lahore; but no force was sent to repel them, and the city gates were kept closed by way of precaution".⁶⁹ This disorderly state of affairs lasted from November 1757 to February 1758. The Sikhs gathering together under Marāthā advice, "began to attack *Ābdālī's* rule; from some places they expelled his outposts. They defeated *Sa'adat Khān Afridi*, plundered all the Jullundur district, and forced him to flee to the hills. By order of the *Subāhdar*, *Khwāja Abid* came from Lahore with 20,000 horse and foot soldiers to fight the Sikhs. In the end, he was defeated, many of his captains were slain, all his camp and baggage were plundered; all the artillery left behind by *Ābdālī* was captured".⁷⁰

Adinā Beg invited the Marāthās to help him against the Afghāns. The first Marāthā invasion of the Punjāb began by the middle of February 1758, and *Adinā Beg* joined the Marāthās before Sirhind, and *Abdus Samad*, the Durrāni Governor of Sirhind, was worsted, "the Marāthās and Sikhs thoroughly looted Sirhind city".⁷¹ But a genuine Sikh-Marāthā combination could not be effected. "The unbecoming pride and presumption of the Marāthās, their failure to grasp the realities of the situation, the proverbial Marāthā greed for plunder, the presence of the wily *Adinā Beg*, whose interest it was to keep the two peoples divided, the prevalent Sikh view that regarded the Marāthās as intruders—all combined to make a fusion between the two peoples beyond even the domain of possibility".⁷²

A new scene was opened with another *Ābdālī* invasion and the defeat of the Marāthās on the historic field of *Pānipat* on 14 January, 1761. In the course of his return march, the *Ābdālī* was harassed by the Sikhs. Browne wrote: "After the third battle of *Pānipat* as soon as the Durrāni army had passed the *Sutlej* the Sikhs began to plunder the stragglers, but *Ahmad Shāh* could do nothing as his army was loaded with plunder. Every night he had to throw up a light work round his camp and in this manner he continued his march up to Attock, the Sikhs following him all the way. When the Afghāns crossed the Attock, the Sikhs returned to blockade Lahore".⁷³

In the post-Pānipat period, the Ābdālī repeated his inroads into India till 1767, which aggravated confusion and disorder in the Punjāb and afforded opportunities for further assertion of Sikh influence and power. "The Sikh nation was now", a modern writer has observed significantly "far more strong and far more well organized than it had been in the days of Zakāriyā Khān. The most glorious chapter of Sikh history was now to begin. It is a record of the duel in which the all-powerful Afghān conqueror was worn out by an obscure people who successfully wrested from his closed fist that part of India which the House of Timur had failed to preserve from him".⁷⁴ The Sikhs bravely withstood defeats and persecution, including the coercive pressures against them on the part of Najib-ud-daulah, the Ābdālī's friend in India and virtual dictator of Delhi (1761-70). But undaunted by these they presented stiff opposition to the Afghān invader and his followers. In 1764, the triumphant Sikhs assembled at Amritsar and struck here the first coins of good pure silver with the inscription "*Degh, Tegh, Fateh*". This was the first public proclamation of the establishment of sovereignty of the Sikh community. On the final retreat of the Ābdālī from the Punjāb, the Sikhs "reappeared in all their force. Lahore was reoccupied as also the entire open country."⁷⁵ Between 1767 and 1773, the Sikhs extended their power from Saharānpur in the east to Attock in the west, from Multān in the south to Kāngrā and Jammu in the north, and they organized themselves into twelve *misls* or confederacies, the Bangi Misl, the Ahluwālia Misl, the Faizullāpuria Misl, the Rāmgarhia Misl, the Kanheya Misl, the Sukerchākia Misl, the Nakhai Misl, the Dalewālia Misl, the Karora Singhiā Misl, the Phulkias of Patiala, Nabha, Jhind and Kythal.

(f) *The Rohillās:*

In the sixteenth century the Mughuls wrested the sovereignty of Hindustān from the Afghāns. But there was an Afghān bid for supremacy in the middle of the 18th century on the growing dismemberment of the Mughul empire. After the second battle of Pānipat (1556) the Afghān ruling houses in different parts of India had disappeared and there was no Afghān State in any quarter of this country. But there were Afghān settlements in Allahābād, Darbhānga, Orissa and Sylhet, which had been replenished in the 17th century and in the first half of the 18th century when there was a fresh wave of Afghān immigration into Northern India.⁷⁶ Afghān adventurers found military employment in many places either as retainers or as mercenaries. Many of them settled in a solid block be-

tween Delhi and Āgra on the west and Awadh and Allahābād on the east and became a serious menace to the declining Mughul empire by the middle of the 18th century. Their Indian settlement, formerly known as Katehr, now came to be called Rohilkhand from its 'new dominant race'. This area was bounded by the Gangā on the west and the Garra (also called Deoha) river on the east, with the Rām-gangā flowing almost midway between the two.

The Rohillā power had its beginning in the early years of the 18th century in a village situated at the south-west corner of the Bareilly district, through the efforts of Dā'ūd, an Afghān soldier of fortune, who came from Qandahār province. Dā'ūd and his party of Afghān adventurers hired themselves out first to the landowners and then to the imperial governor of that place. Dā'ūd "laid the foundations of an estate". On his death in 1721, his adopted son 'Alī Muhammad Khān obtained command of his retainers and sought to implement his ambitious plans. By occasionally serving the imperial *faujdār* of Murādābād and further by depriving the local *zamindārs* and *jāgirdārs* of their territories, he soon formed a big estate in the Bareilly district, with its centre at Aonlā, a village eighteen miles south-west of Bareilly city.

There was a favourable turn in the career of 'Alī Muhammad Rohillā when, after his victory at Manauna over Muhammad Sālih, an eunuch of the Mughul imperial court in 1727, he seized the villages which had been granted on lease to the latter. "After this success, he ordered high and low alike to call him Nawāb, appointed the officials usual to a royal court and set up a crimson tent for himself, which was an exclusive privilege of the emperors of Delhi".⁷⁷ Through the intercession of the *vazīr* Qamar-ud-din Khān, he got himself appointed as revenue-collector in the place of his victim.

The adverse effects of the invasion of Nādir Shāh on the Mughul empire, emboldened 'Alī Muhammad Rohillā to seize territories right and left. At this, the *vazīr*, to whom had been granted the district of Murādābād as a fief, asked his local deputy, Rājā Harnand Arorā to expel the Rohillā chief. But the Rājā was defeated at the village of Asālatpur-Jarrāi on the Aral river, and killed in a night attack, all his property being captured by the Afghāns. "This far-reaching success immensely increased the resources and fame of the Ruhela upstart; the country lay helpless at his feet, and thousands of Afghāns flocked to his victorious standard."⁷⁸

By various concessions received from the unprincipled *vazīr*, "the Ruhela power, as represented by Muhammad, gradually extended westwards from a few *parganās* in Badāun and Bareilly (dis-

tricts). About 1740-1741 he managed to annex the bulk of Murādābād".⁷⁹ Between 1741 and 1748 'Alī Muhammad Rohillā extended his conquests in the north and the east, occupied the Pilibhit district and the kingdom of Kumāun. In 1748 the whole of the Bijnor district passed under his control.

By 1742 'Alī Muhammad Rohillā had gathered a force of thirty to forty thousand horsemen, besides many others permanently settled in Rohilkhand. Further, the numerical strength of the Afghān force, its racial character and military organization made it still more formidable. An eye-witness of the imperial campaign against 'Alī Muhammad Rohillā in 1745 noted in his diary: "Every soldier in his army, whether horse or foot, carries a musket; every commander of ten or a hundred infantry has his own small banner of parti-coloured cloth, and these are carried at the head of the cavalcade in marching, so that it looks as if a flower garden is travelling with them".⁸⁰ The Afghān soldiers possessed excellent fighting qualities. "They were cool, accurate shots, clever in executing night attacks and ambuscades, extremely mobile on foot, and yet capable of acting in concert and of controlling their fire at the direction of leaders. Their well-regulated volleys, delivered at the right moment, had an electric effect in shaking their enemies' nerves and deciding battles at one stroke".⁸¹ Moreover, above the feud between one clan and another of the Afghāns there arose "the consciousness of the oneness of their race".⁸² Though not free from vindictiveness and cruelty, the Afghān race, as rulers, protected and encouraged the peasantry and traders and drove the robbers from their lands. Thus they won their sympathy and support.

The emperor Muhammad Shāh was persuaded by Safdar Jang, who had been appointed *Mir Atish* in 1744 to lead an expedition against 'Alī Muhammad Rohillā in 1745. After three months' campaigning it "achieved only a superficial and ephemeral victory and that too, more by persuasion than by compulsion".⁸³

Apprehending the risks of journey during the ensuing rainy season, the emperor was persuaded by the *vazīr* to make peace with 'Alī Muhammad Rohillā on 23 May, 1745. The Rohillā chieftain agreed to dismantle the fortifications of Bangarh and to surrender the fiefs usurped by him to the new imperial officer, Farid-ud-din, the son of Shaik Azmatulla Khān of Murādābād. Soon he received a 4,000 *mansab* and was sent to Sirhind as imperial *faujdār* of that place after being detained at Delhi for some months, his two sons being kept there as hostages for his fidelity. But the new arrangement in Rohilkhand removing the usurper's authority, caused

anarchy there. The author of the *Siyar-ul-mutakherin* who was then present in Bareilly observed: "Thousands of Afghāns were living there, and having struck their roots had become owners of the land and made it impossible for anybody else to govern that tract".⁸⁴

Hedayat 'Alī (father of the historian Ghulam Husain) who was sent to administer Bareilly and seventeen other *mahāls* on behalf of the Nizām, to whom these had been granted previously, could not successfully cope with the situation there, and he had to retreat to Delhi with great difficulty. On hearing of Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī's capture of Lahore and his intended advance towards Delhi, 'Alī Muhammad Rohillā left his post at Sirhind in the middle of February, 1748, and returned to Rohilkhand with his full contingent of Afghāns. He re-established his own authority by March/April 1748. Thus imperial rule was overthrown in Rohilkhand.

'Alī Muhammad Rohillā died on 15 September, 1748. Of his six sons, the eldest two, Faizullah and Abdullah, were then captives at Qandahār where the Ābdālī had sent them after his capture of Sirhind, and the other four were very young. "Summoning, therefore, his chiefs around him he made his will before them. His third son, Sadullah was to be his successor until, if ever, his elder sons returned. Rahmat Khān was to be regent (*hāfiz*) and Dundi Khān Commander-in-Chief.... Fatti Khān was to be steward (*Khān-i-sāmān*) with the special care of his three younger sons, while Sardār Khān was appointed paymaster of the troops. These chiefs were enjoined to consult together when any common danger required their concerted action".⁸⁵ This arrangement was thought necessary to protect the Afghāns from ambition and hostility of their powerful neighbours. "Hāfiz Rahmat, Dundi Khān and others were each the father-in-law of a son of 'Alī Muhammad and in the names of their sons-in-law divided the conquests of 'Alī Muhammad among themselves and brought the lands into their own hands. Giving a few villages for sustenance to their sons-in-law, they themselves enjoyed the rest in royal pomp".⁸⁶ As Sadullah was of an extremely dissipated character, "the whole charge of the revenue and the management of the troops devolved on Hāfiz". The ambition of Shaikh Qutb-ud-din to get back the *faujdāri* of Rohilkhand, which his grandfather had once enjoyed, was frustrated at the beginning of 1749 after his defeat in a battle at Dhāmpur, 38 miles north-west of Murādābād.

After sometime the *vazīr* Safdar Jang formed a new plan to suppress the Rohillās. "He did not like Afghān rule in a district

so close to his *subāh*. . . . and looked upon the Ruhelas as serpents infesting his road to Delhi". He sought to destroy one Afghān by means of another, "so that whichever side lost he had one enemy the less".⁸⁷

Safdar Jang instigated Qāim Khān (the Bangash chief) to drive out the Afghāns by appointing him *faujdār* of Rohilkhand and, after some negotiations which were not acceptable to the Rohillās, the latter fought a battle with them at Daunri, four miles south-east of Badaun city. After some successes at the beginning, Qāim Khān's army met with disaster and he himself was shot dead. "All the possessions of the Bangash house on the left or eastern bank of the Ganges (except three *parganās*) were annexed by the Ruhela regent (Hāfiz Rahmat), but he dissuaded his victory-flushed clansmen from crossing the river and invading Qāim Khān's territories on its western bank, saying that the Afghāns should not destroy one another by internecine war".⁸⁸

Within a few months, Safdar Jang became unpopular with the Bangash Afghāns, was defeated at the battle of Rām Chatauni on 13 September, 1750, and was disgraced at the Delhi Court. But he soon re-established his position and formed an alliance with the Marāthās and the Jāts for invading Rohilkhand. The allies won a resounding victory over the Rohillās (April 1751). But on hearing of the Ābdālī's invasion of the Punjāb in early 1752, the emperor asked the *vazīr* to make peace with the Afghāns of Rohilkhand. So at the beginning of 1752 a peace was concluded on the following terms: "Farrukhabad and some other *mahāls* worth 16 or 22 lakhs of rupees a year, were left to Ahmad and other sons of Muhammad Khān Bangash, while the sons of 'Alī Muhammad Rohillā were confirmed in the possession of Mirābād and some other *mahāls* which they had seized after the death of Qāim Khān, but they were subjected to the payment of revenue for these. Qanauj, Akbarpur Shah, and other possessions of the Bangash family were put in the possession of Govind Pant Bundele, the Marāthā agent. Safdar Jang kept a few of the places for himself. The Bangashes and Rohillās thus emerged from this overwhelming invasion with surprisingly little permanent loss".⁸⁹

"Matters remained in this position till after the third battle of Pānipat in January 1761". By rendering good services to the Ābdālī in this battle, the Rohillās and the Bangashes made some gains.

Hāfiz Rahmat Khān was not only a brave warrior but also a wise ruler and the years 1761 to 1768 formed a peaceful and prosperous period of Rohillā rule.⁹⁰

But Rohilkhand was again threatened by the Marāthās in 1772. The Nawāb of Awadh also coveted Rohilkhand. But the common Marāthā menace led to the conclusion of a treaty between the Rohillās and the Nawāb of Awadh on 17 June, 1772, in the presence of Sir Robert Barker. This soon dragged the Rohillās into a war with the English, the result of which was their complete defeat though they fought with "great bravery and resolution". Hāfiz Rahmat Khān was killed while fighting bravely; about 20,000 Rohillās were expelled beyond the Gangā. Their province was annexed to the Awadh kingdom; only a fragment of it, together with Rāmpur, was left in the possession of Faizullah Khān, son of 'Alī Muhammad Rohillā.

(g) *The Bundelas:*

Reference has been made in the preceding volume (pp. 379-80) to the career of Chhatrasāl up to the death of Aurangzib.

In the early part of Bahādur Shāh's reign Chhatrasāl did not attend to the summons of the Delhi Court. But on 30 May, 1708, when Bahādur Shāh was proceeding to the Deccan to fight against his younger brother, Kām Bakhsh, Harde Nārāyan and the other sons of Chhatrasāl appeared before him and got *mansabs*. On 22 April, 1710, when the emperor was at Karatiyā in the Kotā country on his return journey to northern India, Chhatrasāl presented himself before him and joined the army which was then marching against the Sikh leader, Bandā. On 10 December, 1710, he participated in the assault on the Sikh fortress of Lohgarh. He retained imperial favour during the reign of Farrukh-siyar. On 21 January, 1714, he got the rank of 6,000 *zat* (4,000 horse). On 3 May, 1718, three of his sons and some grandsons attended imperial court and received presents.⁹¹

On 25 December, 1720, Muhammad Khān Bangash was rewarded with the government of Allahābād for deserting Sayyid Abdullah Khān. Within the area of this province lay the greater part of Bundelkhand including the entire portion over which Chhatrasāl had established his authority. The Mughuls had little authority in this region.⁹² Dilir Khān, a favourite follower of Muhammad Khān was placed in charge of this area. In 1720, the Bundelas revolted, sacked Kālpi and killed the local *amil*. In a fierce fight on 25 May,

1721, between Chhatrasāl and his men with those of Dilir Khān, the latter and his five hundred men were slain. Chhatrasāl had already incurred the displeasure of the imperial government by sending aid to Girdhar Bahādur at Allahābād and to the rebel Kichar Zamindār of Asothar in the Doāb. After Dilir Khān's defeat and death, Chhatrasāl's suppression was considered imperative by the Delhi Government. This was postponed for some time due to the Mughul emperor's quarrel with Rājā Ajit Singh of Jodhpur.

After peace with Ajit Singh, concluded towards the end of 1723, Muhammad Khān was asked to lead an expedition into Bundelkhand to check the aggressions of Chhatrasāl. But Muhammad Khān remained engaged in other quarters and the Bundelas continued their inroads and Baghelkhand was overrun by them.

Towards the end of 1726, Muhammad Khān was asked to restore order in Bundelkhand. Crossing the Jamunā on 3 February, 1727, his vanguard first cleared the eastern part of Bundelkhand, with the exception of Tarahwan. Entrusting his eldest son, Saif Khān, to conduct the siege of that place, Muhammad Khān moved on to within eight miles of Sahenda. He brought under his possession *parganā* Bhend, Mauda, Pailani, Agwasi and Simanni. Tarahwan also was occupied by Qāim Khān on 22 December, 1727.

On 22 May, 1727, Muhammad Khān encountered the entrenched position of the Bundelas at Ijoli in *parganā* Mahobā. Chhatrasāl and his party sought refuge in the forest of Salhat, nine miles due east of Jaitpur. Here also the imperial army attacked them on 19 June, 1727. But before the Muhammadan troops could come near the Bundelas, the latter went away to Mahobā. The former pitched their camp two miles beyond Mahobā and after spending the rainy season there resumed their advance in November 1727. Active hostilities were resumed in April 1728, and in the month of December 1728, the fortress of Jaitpur fell into the hands of the Muhammadans. Qāim Khān cleared the country to the east as far as Bāgarh. Muhammad Khān sent a detailed report about the battle to the emperor.⁹³

After some time during which there were signs of submission by the Bundelas, they renewed their activities by February 1729, and Muhammad Khān met with difficulties and reverses. Rājā Chhatrasāl beseeched the *Peshwā* to come to his aid and the Marāthās under the *Peshwā*, Bājī Rāo, responded and attacked Muhammad Khān in his encampment on 22 March, 1729. Muhammad Khān and his troops were reduced to straits and had to suffer much for lack of

provisions. On hearing of this at Tarahwan, Qāim Khān reached Supā, 12 miles north-east of Jaitpur, with some reinforcements and supplies. Coming out of their hiding places the Bundelas fought against Muhammad Khān, who withdrew to Jaitpur. The Marāthās after defeating Qāim Khān besieged the town and the fort into which Muhammad Khān had withdrawn. Here also the garrison was subjected to acute troubles, for want of foodstuffs. Muhammad Khān appealed to the emperor and the great nobles to help him in this dire distress. "Not a hand was raised to help or encourage him".⁹⁴ Khān-i-Daurān Samsam-ud-daulah, whom the emperor asked to proceed to Jaitpur, put off his journey and secretly encouraged Chhatrasāl to proceed against Muhammad Khān.

On the outbreak of epidemic in the Marāthā camp and before the rains set in, the Marāthās raised the siege and returned to the Deccan. Considering that it would be more prudent to come to terms, Chhatrasāl and his men allowed Muhammad Khān to evacuate Jaitpur in August 1729 "on signing a written agreement not to attack them again, but content himself with the tribute they had formerly paid".⁹⁵ Muhammad Khān and his party recrossed the Jamunā at Kālpi on 3 October, 1729 and never again came to Bundelkhand.

Chhatrasāl died at Pannā on 14 December, 1731, at the age of eighty-two. Of his many sons, the eldest two Harde Sah and Jagat Rāj divided the State between themselves. A small *jāgīr* was also granted to the *Peshwā*. Harde Sah became Rājā of Pannā and died in April 1739. Jagat Rāj became Rājā of Jaitpur and died in 1758. The younger sons got small appanages for their maintenance.

(h) *Rājasthān*:

Aurangzib's intolerance and persecution had alienated the Rājputs. So after his death the prominent Rājput rulers like Amar Singh of Mewār (Udaipur), Ajit Singh of Mārwar (Jodhpur) and Jay Singh of Amber (Jaipur) sought to cast off their allegiance to the Mughul empire and to assert independence. When Bahādur Shāh proceeded to subdue them, Amar Singh averted the attack on him by sending his brother Bakht Singh to Āgra with a letter of congratulations, one hundred gold coins, one thousand rupees and some costly presents. The emperor also brought Amber under his control and made it over to Bijay Singh, Jay Singh's younger brother, who on 30 April, 1708, received the title of Mirzā Rājā.⁹⁶

After staying in Amber for three days Bahādur Shāh continued his march towards Jodhpur. Its ruler Ajit Singh also tendered sub-

mission to Bahādur Shāh. He received the title of Mahārājā and the rank of 3,500 *zat* and 3,000 horse, a standard and kettle-drums. But soon on 30 April, 1708, Ajit Singh of Jodhpur, Jay Singh II of Amber and Durgādās Rāthor left the emperor's camp, when it was near Mandasor in Mālwa. They had "entered into an agreement for joint resistance".⁹⁷

In view of the Sikh rising in the north of Sirhind, Bahādur Shāh adopted conciliatory measures in relation to the Rājputs between October 1708 and June 1710. On 6 October, 1708 on the intercession of Prince 'Azīm-ush-shān, Jay Singh and Ajit Singh were restored to their ranks in the Mughul service.

During the confusion which followed Bahādur Shāh's death Ajit Singh, "after forbidding cow-killing and the call of prayer from the Almagiri mosque, besides ejecting the imperial officers from Jodhpur and destroying their houses, entered the imperial territory and took possession of Ajmer".⁹⁸ Sayyid Husain 'Alī was sent to subdue Ajit Singh. But so vitiated was the court politics of those days that "official orders were given in one sense, and the opposing side received secret letters of a different purport, assuring them of future favour if they made a vigorous defence and defeated the imperial general sent against them. Letters were despatched to Rājā Ajit Singh urging him to make away with Husain 'Alī in any way he could, whereupon the whole of the *Bakhshi's* property and treasure would become his; and he would, in addition, receive other rewards."⁹⁹ But Ajit Singh did not offer any opposition and concluded a treaty according to one article of which he agreed to give one of his daughters in marriage to the emperor. The marriage was celebrated next year.

During the reign of Farrukh-siyar "the houses of Jodhpur and Jaipur played a conspicuous part in Delhi politics and by their opportune aloofness or adherence they added to their kingdoms a large portion of the empire". To strengthen their own party the Sayyids attached to it the Rājput chiefs who got various appointments, besides holding their fiefs in their own territories. Ajit Singh received the governments of Ajmer and Gujarāt, which he held till 1721. On the fall of the Sayyids, Jay Singh of Jaipur became also the Governor of Agra. After Muhammad Shāh's accession he was conciliated by being given the government of the *Sarkar* of Surat and a large amount of money. "In this way the country from a point sixty miles of Delhi to the shores of the ocean at Surat was in the hands of those two Rājās, very untrustworthy sentinels for the Mughals on the exposed frontier".¹⁰⁰ Ajit Singh secretly assisted

the Marāthās in their movements in western India. But after reaction in the Mughul court against the Sayyid brothers, who had been in alliance with the Rājputs, he was removed from the government of Gujarāt at an inopportune time when this *subāh* was in the welter of internal anarchy, and Haidar Quli Khān was appointed in his place. Thus Jodhpur was alienated and Gujarāt moved away from Mughul control. Ajit Singh met with a tragic death at the hands of his second son, Bakht Singh.

The revival of the Rājput chiefs after decadence of the Mughul empire was temporary and was not of a national type, the chiefs being led by motives of personal aggrandisement. Absence of internal unity and cohesion produced confusion and disorder in Rājasthān and subjected it to external aggression. Sir Jadunath Sarkar observes: "The imperial Government of Delhi had held together and protected all the feudatory States of India. But when the Emperor became a lifeless shadow confined within the harem, when the *wazir's* role was pursuit of pleasure varied only by contests with his court rivals, this unifying bond and common controlling authority was dissolved. No superior power was left to enforce lawful rights and prevent ambitious conflicts between one vassal State and another, and between one prince and another of the same royal house. All the pent-up personal ambitions and inter-State rivalries (hitherto checked) now burst forth without fear or check. And Rājputānā became a zoological garden with the barriers of the cages thrown open and the keepers removed. The fiercest animal passions raged throughout the land".¹⁰¹

The chief storm centres in Rājasthān during the second quarter of the eighteenth century were Bundī, Jaipur and Mārwar. The Hādā country of Bundī was confronted with a threat when Sawāi Jay Singh embarked upon a campaign to make Bundī a vassal State of Jaipur by removing its legitimate ruler Budh Singh and giving its throne to Dalil Singh in 1729. For the following nineteen years the dispossessed Budh Singh and his gallant son Ummed Singh made various attempts to recover their own authority and there was ultimately complete triumph of Ummed Singh. In Jaipur there was struggle between Īshwari Singh (reign 1743-1750) and his younger brother Mādho Singh. Īshwari Singh tried to keep Mādho Singh satisfied by heavy concessions to him and he got the throne only after the death of the former without any issue. In Mārwar there was rivalry between Rām Singh, the successor of Mahārājā Abhay Singh and his paternal uncle Bakht Singh, the chief of Nagore. They entered into contest in 1749 soon after the death of Abhay

Singh. Bakht Singh gained the throne in 1751 and bequeathed it to his own progeny. But there was no peace in the territory till the death of the dispossessed Rām Singh in 1773.

The deplorable effects of these internal quarrels have been aptly described in the following words: "Each of these three dynastic quarrels drew into its vortex the neighbours of the two main contestants, and in time all three became merged into one, with a clear-cut array of allies facing opponents similarly confederated. The Marāthās were called in to decide the issue, and that by every party and almost in every year. In the end the three claimants mentioned above gained their ancestral thrones, but only after ruining and weakening their kingdoms and leaving the Marāthās in supreme command over a divided, impotent and impoverished Rājputānā which lay helplessly subject to their annual exactions and ravage."¹⁰²

The Marāthā advance into the province of Mālwa served as a "convenient starting point for raids into Rājputānā". The Marāthās defeated and killed its *subāhdar*, Girdhar Bahādur, in the plain between Amjhera and Tirla near Mandu, on 29 November, 1728. His cousin Dayā Bahādur was also killed in another part of the same field. On 22 April, 1734, Malhār Rāo Holkar and Rāṇoji Sindiā attacked Bundī. This caused alarm in the whole of Rājasthān and in the second half of October 1734, Sawāi Jay Singh summoned a conference of all the Rājās of Rājasthān at Hurda to prepare a concerted plan for checking Marāthā spoliation of their country. But nothing came out of it.

On 15 January, 1736, the *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo I appeared at the southern frontier of Mewār. The terrified Rāṇā Jagat Singh (1734-1751) welcomed him at Udaipur and signed a treaty promising thereby to pay an annual tribute. The treaty "remained in force during ten years when grasping at the whole they despised a part, and the treaty became a nullity".¹⁰³

After Nādir Shāh's invasion had dealt a shattering blow to the Mughul empire, the imperial authority disappeared from Rājputānā in all but name. "The Rājput princes were left entirely to themselves, to wrangle and fight within the confines of their own country, with the result of establishing a new master, the Marāthās, as the arbiter of their destinies. This change was rendered easier because in the course of the next eleven years all the last Rājput princes who had counted for anything in imperial politics were removed from the scene—Sawāi Jay Singh in 1743, Abhay Singh in 1749 and Ishwari Singh in 1750. The smaller men who succeeded

them and who could not look up to any great suzerain for support, were naturally powerless to make a stand against the Marāthās.”¹⁰⁴

Jay Singh died on 21 September, 1743 and was succeeded by his eldest son Īshwari Singh, but his reign of seven years was one long struggle with his younger brother Mādho Singh and his Rājput and Marāthā allies. Jagat Singh supported the claim of his nephew Mādho Singh and advanced towards Jaipur. But with the support of the Marāthās, Īshwari Singh defeated the Rāṇā early in February 1745. The Rāṇā then managed to secure the help of Malhār Rāo Holkar. In March 1747, a combined army consisting of the troops of Mārwar and Bundī assisted by Holkar's under his son Khaṇde Rāo was defeated at the battle of Rājmaḥal (ten miles north of Deoli cantonment and south of a bend in the Banas river).

At the end of 1750, Jaipur had to suffer from “a new and disastrous visitation of the Marāthās and saw a revolution in its affairs”. Disgusted with the galling yoke of the Marāthās, Īshwari Singh committed suicide in December 1750, and Mādho Singh occupied the throne. But in this war of succession the Marāthās became the arbiters of Rājputānā.¹⁰⁵

Jagat Singh had no strength of character and administrative ability to prevent Marāthā aggressions. In the reign of his successor Pratāp Singh II (1751-1754) the Marāthās exacted large contributions from Mewār, which was tormented by disputed successions. During the reign of Rāj Singh II (1754-61) the repeated invasions on his country so exhausted it “that the Rāṇā was compelled to ask pecuniary aid from the Brahmin Collector of the revenue, to enable him to marry the Rathor chieftain's daughter”.¹⁰⁶

Even after 1761 the recurring Marāthā raids into Rājasthān sucked its life-blood and added to the woes of its unhappy people. The Marāthā invasions resulted in anarchy, plunder, economic ruin and humiliation of the noble race (the Rājputs) who ultimately courted alliance with the British power by entering into treaties with it during the Governor-Generalship of Marquess of Hastings.

(i) *Mālwa*: (1707-1818 A.D.)

The story of the infiltration of the Marāthās in Mālwa, of the defeat of the Mughul *Subāhdar* Girdhar Bahādur in November 1728, and of his successors by *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo, has been told in detail in the earlier chapter. The Nizām by the convention of Duraha Sarai in January 1738 promised to obtain for the *Peshwā* the *Subāhdari* of the province. The promise was fulfilled three years later,

when in July 1741 the *Peshwā* (Bālāji Rāo) was granted the deputy-governorship of Mālwa. Thus, Mālwa ceased to be a part of the empire.

1. *The Marāthā Domination (1742-1766 A.D.)*

Marāthā domination over Mālwa having been thus legalised, it was finally and completely cut off from the Mughul empire. The Mughul administrative control and the government machinery thereof had been rapidly breaking up since the battle of Amjhera (November, 1728) and now it was completely destroyed. The Marāthās had by then been in virtual control of the entire province for about ten years, but they did not provide any centralised provincial administrative machinery of their own to take the place of the shattered Mughul administrative set-up in the province. Consequently after the end of the Mughul rule in Mālwa, the different Marāthā commanders did not find it very easy to establish, much less to strengthen, their hold over the *parganās* assigned to them, which were generally spread over large areas and geographically non-contiguous. During the early decades the *Peshwā* too was quite often changing these assignments to different commanders. Therefore, their revenues were invariably quite inadequate even for their ever-increasing armies, more often than not on the move, and more so for the local administrative purposes.

The Marāthā commanders in charge of the Mālwa region had, however, to contend with another important factor in the polity of Mālwa, viz., the Rājput principalities and estates, of varying status and powers, spread throughout the province. Having been there for quite some time, these Rājput ruling families were well entrenched in their respective principalities; therefore, the Marāthā commanders had necessarily to leave them alone, provided their due contributions were paid off with some semblance of regularity. Hence, with the establishment of the Marāthā domination there, all these Rājput States of Mālwa, began to assume for themselves added powers and greater authority than ever before.

Moreover, there was complete anarchy within *khālsā parganās* and those held by absentee landlords. Various daring Rājput adventurers in the region collected bands of roving horsemen, and taking advantage of the prevailing fluid conditions, began to establish estates or *zamīndāris* of their own. Many of the petty Rājput estates and *thikanas* in Central and Western Mālwa, not comprised

in the then existing Rājput principalities, were thus established during these troublous decades of anarchy after 1732 A.D. These adventurous new occupants were later accepted by the Marāthā commanders as the masters of those territories, as they readily agreed to pay off the Marāthā dues levied on their holdings. Later, by the end of the 18th century, when the successors of these estate holders were dispossessed of their holdings, many of them readily became outlaws and disturbers of peace, and came to be termed '*girasias*'.

With the passage of time the cruel hand of death brought about series of inevitable changes in the personnel controlling the Marāthā affairs in Mālwa. The principle of heredity had already begun to prevail in matters of succession to these early Marāthā *jāgīrs* in Mālwa. But the Marāthā commanders had been getting more and more involved in the Rājasthān and Delhi affairs since 1747 A.D. wherein the House of Sindia suffered series of casualties. Malhār Rāo Holkar, however, secured in 1757 A.D. from Mādho Singh of Jaipur the *parganās* of Rampura-Bhanpura in north-western Mālwa, once ruled over by the Chandrawats, but the dispossessed Chandrawats lost no opportunity to disturb the *parganās* or to seize Rampura. Again, due to lack of sufficient Marāthā forces in Mālwa, none of the Marāthā commanders were able to strengthen their hold even on their *saranjām parganās* there. Thus seething discontent among the residents and the local *zamindārs* of Ahirwada, including the Rājā of Raghogarh, came to surface in May, 1760, which made roads passing through that region unsafe for traffic and even for Marāthā couriers.

The repercussions of the Marāthā disaster at the third battle of Pānipat (1761) were very great in Mālwa. "Everywhere the dispossessed or humbled original chieftains, and even petty landlords, raised their heads and talked of shutting the southern invaders out of their country". The Chandrawats captured Rampura, the Bhopal Nawāb occupied Bhilsa, and Abhay Singh Rāthor, an officer of Maharao of Kota, raised the standard of revolt in the Mālwa *parganās* of the Kota State. For full three months or more the position of the Marāthās in Mālwa was very critical. But Malhār Rāo Holkar, the only senior notable survivor, now in supreme control of the Mālwa affairs, successfully retrieved the situation, as there was no great leader among the countless separate caste and tribal chiefs in Mālwa to unite them and win their freedom from the Marāthā domination. Malhār Rāo Holkar was, however, ailing, and he died at Alampur on May 20, 1766. With him not only the first phase of the anarchy in

Mālwa ended, but also the predominance of the Holkars in Mālwa affairs. With the rise of Mahādji Sindia the balance of relative importance naturally tilted in his favour.

2. *Increasing Marāthā hold on Mālwa (1766-1795 A.D.)*

The forces of the revived Marāthā power were once again on their northward march, but the affairs of Mālwa continued to remain unsettled as the youthful *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo took some time to come into his own to assert his authority. In the meanwhile Ahalyā Bāi had assumed herself all ruling powers over the possessions of the Holkar family and retained her hold over them till the end. Her benign and benevolent rule ensured peace and prosperity in those regions, which were only occasionally disturbed by irreconcilable Rājput *zamindārs* or restive Bhils, who were successfully put down at her bidding.

Similarly, there was much delay in the appointment of a permanent successor to the House of Sindias; hence the situation in the Mālwa possessions of the Sindia House remained fluid. Mahādji Sindia was ultimately acknowledged the sole successor to the Sindia's heritage. Still even thereafter the overall situation in Northern Mālwa continued to remain quite chaotic. The Ahirs were in revolt and in the adjoining Khichiwada the Rājā of Raghogarh became defiant. Elsewhere too in all the *mahāls* Bhils, *Bhumias*, and Rangda *Girasias* (Rājput outlaws) were disturbing the entire country. But as Mahādji could only occasionally spend a few months in Mālwa and that too while passing through it, no lasting results could be achieved.

During the First Anglo-Marāthā War, however, when in 1780, the British decided to invade Mālwa, Mahādji rushed to save it and cantoned there during that rainy season. He was thus able to avert the loss of Mālwa, but even then he could not follow it up with any further effective measures to consolidate his own hold there. Hence, even after being made the Deputy Regent of the Mughul empire, in 1784 A.D., Mahādji found the vital line of communication to Ujjain and southwards threatened due to intransigency of Rājā Balwant Singh of Raghogarh. The expeditionary force sent against him ultimately made the Rājā and members of his family captive, and confined them in different forts. All his property was confiscated and thus an attempt was made to extinguish this old Rājput State, but the redoubtable Khichis could not possibly be thus crushed. Sher Singh, a Khichi cadet, rose in revolt, secured the escape of Jay Singh,

the son of Rājā Balwant Singh, from his prison in the Bhilsa fort, and then both of them together carried on ceaseless guerilla warfare in this region, making the Deccan roads more unsafe than before. Even Mahādji's wife, then proceeding northwards, would have been captured by them, but for personal interposition of the Minister, Chhote Khān of Bhopal. The fateful battle of Lalsot (July 27, 1787) had serious repercussions throughout Mālwa, and there were series of risings all over the province, and Mahādji had to send out forces to put them down. Thus, after seizing the Raghogarh State from the guerillas Mahādji wisely made up with Rājā Balwant Singh by restoring his territories to him on the promise of paying tribute. This policy of pacification, coupled with the armed fist, proved effective and there was some peace in the Mālwa region.

The military might of Mahādji increased due to De Boigne's trained battalions, and it ensured the continuance of semblance of peace in Mālwa for some years till 1795 A.D., which marks the end of an epoch in Mālwa. Due to their increasing military might the Marāthā hold on Mālwa continued to increase in spite of local uprisings and serious discontent throughout the region against Marāthā domination. But nothing was done by the Marāthā rulers there either to organise the local administration or to mitigate the misery of the people of Mālwa in the least. Hence as a result of series of deaths among the Marāthā ruling houses in Mālwa, when new persons came to the helm of affairs, even this semblance of peace and order there finally ended.

3. *The Last Phase of Anarchy and 'Gardi kā Waqt' in Mālwa:* (1795-1817 A.D.)

Daulat Rāo Sindia succeeded Mahādji Sindia to the heritage of the House of Sindias, but the administrative disorder and falling revenues of the State made it impossible for his appointees in Mālwa to do anything at all there. Moreover, before long the situation further worsened as a result of some fateful happenings in Poona. Taking advantage of his dominance at the Poona Court, Daulat Rāo tried to regulate the affairs of the House of Holkar after the death of Tukoji Holkar, which ultimately resulted in the ascendancy of Yashwant Rāo Holkar, the illegitimate son of Tukoji Rāo Holkar. In the meanwhile Daulat Rāo Sindia's war with Mahādji's widows entered Mālwa and Yashwant Rāo Holkar joined them to complicate the situation there. Thus "in the year 1798 the dark clouds of anarchy, rapine and popular suffering descended on the unhappy land (of Mālwa)".

Daulat Rāo Sindia ruined Mālwa by wrong policies and dilatoriness. After his victory at Newri and defeat at Satwas, Yashwant Rāo Holkar captured Ujjain (July 1801). Three months later Daulat Rāo's general, Sarje Rāo Ghātge, defeated Yashwant Rāo Holkar at Indore (October 1801), but Daulat Rāo could not follow up the victory due to utter lack of money and daily mutinies of his long unpaid soldiery. Efforts for peace between them failed because of irreconcilable claims of both sides, and then Yashwant Rāo Holkar carried his war against Daulat Rāo to the gates of Poona, which ultimately shattered Daulat Rāo's power and destroyed Marāthā hegemony once for all.

One major outcome of the Second Anglo-Marāthā War was that all European officers of Sindia's forces, save Jean Baptiste Filose, were seduced away by the British. This greatly reduced the military might of Sindia. Again, during the following decade the series of court intrigues and consequent ministerial changes by Daulat Rāo repeatedly threw his policies and his entire administration into turmoil time and again. Naturally it became weak, confused and bankrupt.

The treaties concluded with the British also greatly reduced Sindia's territories with the result that the ambitions and arms of Sindia were now cooped up within the barren sands of Rājasthān and the then desolate plains of Mālwa. Daulat Rāo sent his expeditionary forces against the various Rājput States in Mālwa to extend his power over them and to exact as much money or territory from them as possible. The Raghogarh Rājā Jay Singh became a fugitive and his State was annexed. This Rājput policy of Daulat Rāo Sindia, following in succession to their decades-old military suppression under Mahādji Sindia, left a legacy of bitter hatred for the Marāthā name in Rājput hearts.

The situation within the territories under the control of the house of Holkar was no better. Yashwant Rāo Holkar, the only man of military leadership among the Marāthās then living, returned to Mālwa after concluding the Treaty of Rajghat (Dec. 24, 1805) with the British. Making Bhanpura (48 miles south of Kota) his headquarters he began to reorganise his military forces, when on 20 October, 1807 he had his first fit of insanity. During the period of his insanity there was complete anarchy in the Holkar State. When Yashwant Rāo Holkar died at Bhanpura on 27 October, 1811, he was succeeded by his minor son Malhār Rāo Holkar, born of Kesar Bāi.

The series of treaties concluded by the British with Daulat Rāo Sindia and Yashwant Rāo Holkar up to 1805, had ended hostilities

between them, but it marked the beginning of ever increasing disorder and anarchy throughout Mālwa. The unpaid, unruly, starving soldiers of the inflated armies of Sindia and Holkar then began to roam about over the length and breadth of Mālwa like beasts of prey attacking the undefended inhabitants, rich and poor alike, throughout the region. Amir Khān, the Pathān employee of Yashwant Rāo Holkar, who had collected a large powerful army of banditti under his leadership, became a major factor at the court of insane Yashwant Rāo Holkar, and ultimately also the absentee regent of the minor Malhār Rāo Holkar. To these were added the large hordes of Pindāris, who were loosely grouped into '*Shinde-Shāhi*' and '*Holkar-Shāhi*' bands and worked without the least fear or restraint under the protection of these two major Marāthā ruling Houses in Mālwa. These Pindāri hordes had their own notorious leaders, and the sole objective of these myriads of wolves was to plunder and collect wealth, for which they committed most atrocious outrages upon all classes of peaceful inhabitants. These human locusts spread utter devastation, desolation and destruction wheresoever they went.

Thus this period of anarchy and utter devastation, known in Mālwa as the '*Gardi-kā-Waqt*' reduced it to the state of utter misery and severe distress. All this was further augmented by the Marāthā *subāhdars* sent out by the various Marāthā rulers to collect revenue, accompanied by large military detachments, which were obliged to live on the country, while at the same time extorting maximum funds for their rulers. By 1817 A.D. the disorder in Mālwa was complete and reached its climax, 'a state of anarchy and general distress, ever unheard of, which had reached its crisis in the absolute depopulation of the country'.

4. *The Establishment of the British Domination over Mālwa and Malcolm's Mālwa Settlement: (1817-1818 A.D.)*

When Lord Moira (Hastings) began his campaign for suppression of the Pindāris towards the close of 1817, 'the hunt of the Pindāris became merged in the Third Marāthā War', which sounded the death-knell of the absolute domination of the Marāthā rulers over Mālwa. Sindia had to sign the Treaty of Gwalior (5 November, 1817). Holkar, defeated in the battle of Mahidpur on 21 December, 1817, signed the Treaty of Mandasor on 6 January, 1818. The Pindāris, in the meanwhile, had been driven across the Chambal, and by the end of January 1818, their organised bands had been eliminated.

Thus the path was clear for the vitally important settlement of Mālwa, which was effected by Sir John Malcolm, the victor of the

battle of Mahidpur. Agreement previously made with the Nawāb of Bhopal in the last months of 1817 became the basis of a formal Treaty (26 February, 1818). Amir Khān and his brother-in-law, Gafur Khān of Jaira, were confirmed in their territorial possessions in Mālwa. But the territories of all the States, big and small, and the estates and *jāgīrs* of varying sizes and differing in status, were so interspersed and intermixed, that there was inextricable confusion as regards their actual boundaries, particularly because of continuous disputes and changing situations, vis-a-vis the two conflicting parties. Hence Malcolm froze the boundaries of one and all as they existed in January 1818, and took up the task of finalising their respective claims. Moreover, they were all linked up together by political agreements or specific understandings, which could not possibly be duly enforced by either party.

Consequently, Malcolm secured to the Marāthā rulers their due tributes, and at the same time secured to their tributaries their *tan-khas*, which were originally a form of blackmail. These tributaries were also guaranteed the permanent possession of the land they then held, so long as they kept the peace and carried out the conditions laid out in their respective *sanads*. All these agreements, mediated by Sir John Malcolm or his assistants between the two parties, the Marāthā ruler on the one side and the Rājput ruler or *thakur* on the other, carried in addition to signatures of both parties an endorsement of the same having been 'confirmed and guaranteed by the British Government'. The basis of all these agreements was thus enunciated by Lord Hastings: "No acknowledged usage stood in the way to establish principles between the sovereign and the subject advantageous to both, giving these principles a defined line of practical application, a departure from which would afford to either party a right of claiming the intervention of our paramount power. While the sovereign had his legitimate authority and his due revenue insured to him, the subject was protected against exaction and tyrannical outrage".

Malcolm's much-acclaimed Mālwa Settlement produced immediate results and before long, peace descended on this greatly troubled land of ancient glory and greatness and the most distracted population then in India became in a few months a comparatively law-abiding community. But the general confusion that existed in the administrative sphere for a long time, however, could not possibly be eliminated forthwith due to the continued serious distrust between the Rājput feudatories and their Marāthā overlords, which had far-reaching effects in the years to come. Under the 'guarantee

system' introduced by Malcolm in the Mālwa Settlement, the British had merely undertaken to ensure that the Marāthā ruler and his feudatory, both carried out their prescribed parts duly and faithfully, and to intervene only if the conditions laid down in the agreements were disregarded. But in reality there grew a form of political practice, greatly resented by the Marāthā overlords, which was very much different from what was actually contemplated by Lord Hastings or ever thought of by Malcolm, and the same could ultimately be ended only a century later on 14 March, 1921.

(j) *The Jāts:*

Reference has been made in the preceding volume (p. 375) to the early career of Churāman Jāt till the death of Aurangzīb. He took full advantage of the war of succession, after Aurangzīb's death, between Bahādur Shāh and his brother Ā'zam with a view to strengthening his position. After the victory of Bahādur Shāh, he professed allegiance to him and received a *mansab* of 1500 *zat*, 500 horse. A clever man as he was, his policy was to wait for a suitable moment for furtherance of his own ambition. Next he joined the imperial forces at Ajmer and fought in their campaign against the Sikhs at Sadhaurā and Lohgarh (1710).¹⁰⁷

In 1712, on the decease of Bahādur Shāh there was again a war of succession among his four sons, and Jahāndar Shāh, the eldest son, having been triumphant, ascended the throne, but he was totally unfit to wield the sceptre. Churāman took this opportunity to go back to his own country and devoted his energy to increase his power. But when Farrukh-siyar, the nephew of Jahāndar Shāh, approached Āgra to contest the throne, Churāman without rendering any aid to the emperor, looted the baggages of both parties.

On the defeat of Jahāndar Shāh, Farrukh-siyar ascended the throne (January 1713). Chabela Rām, the imperial *Subāhdar* of Āgra, then tried hard to subdue the Jāt leader, but in vain. By conciliatory method, the next *Subāhdar* Samsam-ud-daulah (*Khān-i-Daurān*) succeeded in bringing him to the imperial court, where he was cordially received and placed in "charge of the royal highway from Barapula near Delhi to the crossing on the Chambal. But by slow degrees he fell into disfavour, the extent of the country he took possession of was thought excessive, his realization of road dues was objected to, and his interference with *jāgīr*-holders was disliked. All that a *jāgīrdar* could collect from him was a little money thrown to him as if it were an alms".¹⁰⁸ Churāman had also

constructed a fortress at Thun in the midst of a thick and thorny forest.

The conduct of the Jāt leader enraged the emperor who wanted to punish him and entrusted the task to Sawāi Jay Singh of Jaipur. On arrival in the Jāt country the latter besieged Churāman in his fort of Thun (November 1716). The siege dragged on for a long time, and, at last, tired of it, and, experiencing various difficulties, Churāman made proposals of peace to the *Vazīr*, Sayyid ‘Abdullah, offering to pay a tribute of thirty lakhs of rupees to the imperial government and a present of twenty lakhs of rupees to the *Vazīr* himself. Both parties having agreed to the conditions, peace was ratified, and Jay Singh was compelled to raise the siege. Thereafter, the Jāt leader visited Delhi with his nephew Rupā in April, 1718.¹⁰⁹

When, later on, quarrels broke out between Sayyid ‘Abdullah and the emperor Muhammad Shāh, Churāman joined the former, and to him “was confided the duty of harassing the imperial force and plundering it wherever he could”.¹¹⁰ On the first day of the battle between the emperor and his minister, near Hasanpur, he plundered the imperial baggage, but when, on the following morning, Sayyid ‘Abdullah’s position became hopeless, he plundered the baggages of both sides and retired with the spoils to his own country (November 1720).¹¹¹

Besides his faithless conduct, Churāman’s alliance with Ajit Singh of Jodhpur against the interests of the imperial government and his assistance to the Bundelas against the Mughul governor of Allahābād irritated the emperor who ordered Sā‘adat Khān, the new governor of Agra, to chastise him. But his deputy Nilkanth Nagar, while riding out on an elephant, was shot dead by a Jāt.¹¹²

Churāman had undoubtedly gained in strength, but he committed a serious mistake by imprisoning his nephew Badan Singh who, when released at the intervention of other influential Jāts, fled to the Mughul camp. On the other hand, as Sā‘adat Khān was unable to bring the Jāt leader to his heels, he was replaced by Jay Singh as governor of Agra. On advancing into the Jāt country the Rājā besieged the fort of Thun; Badan Singh pointed out its weak places to him and thus helped him in its reduction. In the meantime Churāman had quarrels with his son Muhkam Singh and committed suicide by taking poison. Despairing of success after some resistance, Muhkam took to flight whereupon the imperial army occupied the fort (November 1722).¹¹³

Badan Singh

Badan Singh, the son of Churāman's brother Bhāo Singh, was then recognized as the chief of the Jāts by Jay Singh and this was confirmed by the Imperial Court.¹¹⁴ It was a very critical time for the Jāts. "There was as yet no Jāt State, no politically united Jāt nation, no Jāt King" and even the 'small beginning of a tribal organisation and foundation of a state was totally destroyed' after the death of Churāman and fall of Thun.¹¹⁵ So, Badan Singh had to commence everything afresh. By his amiable conduct he won over the support of Jay Singh who bestowed on him "the *tika*, the *nishan*, the kettle-drum, the five coloured flag and the title of *Braja-raj* (or lord of the Holy Land of Mathurā)... But... Badan very astutely abstained from assuming the title of Rajah.... and throughout life styled himself only Thakur or baron and represented himself publicly as a mere vassal of the Rajah of Jaipur".¹¹⁶ An apt and capable leader with indefatigable energy, he united the scattered units of the Jāts, and all lands and wealth held by Jāt village headmen were brought under his control. He strengthened his position in two ways—first, by application of force where necessary, and secondly, by matrimonial alliances, specially with some influential families of Mathurā.

He organized a strong army, consisting of infantry and cavalry, constructed four strong forts, viz., Dig, Kumbher, Ver and Bharatpur, and provided them with ample provisions and sufficient artillery.¹¹⁷

It was Badan Singh who laid the foundation of a new ruling house, viz., that of Bharatpur, with an enlarged territory. In 1752 he was created "a Raja with the title of 'Mahendra' by the Mughul emperor Ahmad Shāh".¹¹⁸

Badan Singh was also a patron of architecture. He constructed a temple at Vrindavan, known as *Dhir Samir*, fine palaces in the fort of Dig, a beautiful house with a large garden in the fort of Ver (Wair),¹¹⁹ and palaces at Kamar and Sahar.¹²⁰

He died on 7 June 1756, at a ripe old age, and was succeeded by his adopted son Suraj Mal.

Suraj Mal

During the latter half of Badan Singh's regime his son Suraj Mal acted as regent owing to the inactivity and growing blindness

of the father, and it was during this period that he earned fame as an able warrior, efficient leader and able statesman.

When, after the death of Sawāi Jay Singh, a serious struggle ensued between his two sons, Suraj Mal, on appeal for assistance from the eldest son, joined him with 10,000 cavalry; undaunted by the enormous strength of the enemy, he earned undying fame for his valour and military skill.¹²¹ On January 1, 1750, he inflicted a crushing defeat on Salābat Khān, the commander-in-chief of the Mughul army, and compelled him to accept his terms. In the same year and, again, in 1751-52, he rendered material assistance to the imperial *Vazīr* Safdar Jang against Ahmad Khān Bangash of Farukhabad and the Rohillās.¹²² A few days later "the office of *faujdār* of Mathura" was conferred on Suraj Mal. "This gave him the governorship of most of the territory on the two sides of the Jamunā, in the province of Agra and the environs of that city for an annual tribute".¹²³

During the civil war (1753) between the Mughul emperor Ahmad Shāh and Safdar Jang, Suraj Mal, out of gratitude, rendered all possible assistance to the latter and plundered old Delhi and its suburbs mercilessly.¹²⁴ After the civil war he obtained pardon of the emperor through the new *Vazīr* Intizam-ud-daulah.¹²⁵ Next, the Jāt country passed through a great ordeal due to Marāthā attack under Raghunāth Rāo and Malhār Holkar, and eventually, the country was saved on promise of payment of a heavy indemnity.¹²⁶

On the death of Badan Singh (1756) Suraj Mal assumed powers in name as well as in fact. By this time he had established his reputation as an able ruler and efficient general, and he could tackle every problem of the State with due foresight.

After settling the affairs in Delhi, Ahmad Shāh Abdālī marched to the Jāt country for forcible realization of tribute and compelling the Jāt Rājā to enter his service. He besieged and captured the fort of Ballabgarh, putting to death all its inmates (March 1757).

In the meantime, overcoming the opposition of Jawāhir Singh, Jahān Khān, the Abdālī's general, entered Mathurā and carried on indiscriminate plunder and massacre of the inhabitants. Gokul was saved by the stiff resistance of four thousand warlike Naga Sannyāsis, but, for want of opposition at Vrindāvan, it suffered terribly.¹²⁷

In 1760 the Abdālī again demanded tribute from Suraj Mal and invaded the Jāt country, besieging the fort of Dig, but fortunately

for the Jāts, the siege was afterwards lifted and the Ābdālī moved towards Mewāt.

The political situation in India became unusually tense due to the rivalry and deadly animosity between the Marāthās and the Ābdālī. The former enlisted the support of Suraj Mal, but soon a rift occurred between them for various reasons—Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu's rejection of the war-plan of Suraj Mal who was in favour of predatory warfare and keeping the army free from women and heavy baggage;¹²⁸ and the removal of the silver ceiling of the *Diwān-i-Khas*.¹²⁹ Suraj Mal felt so much disgusted that, deserting the cause of the Marāthās, he returned to his own country, apprehensive of a future Marāthā attack against it in case of their victory against the Ābdālī.

But notwithstanding their differences, Suraj Mal was generous enough to provide food and shelter to the Marāthā fugitives who survived the disaster of Pānipat and entered his country. He did this at the risk of vengeance from the Ābdālī¹³⁰ whom he appeased by an offer of tribute. On receiving a rich booty worth fifty lakhs of rupees by capturing and plundering the city of Āgra, he paid one lakh to him, promising him to pay five lakhs more, which he never did.

By his tactful and efficient guidance of the State affairs during this period of turmoil, Suraj Mal not only proved his political foresight and sagacity, but remained "the strongest potentate in India with absolutely unimpaired forces and an overflowing treasury, while every other chief had been more or less ruined".¹³¹

Suraj Mal then wrested considerable portions of the Doāb from the Marāthās, recovered his lost places in Aligarh and Bulandshahar districts from the Ābdālī's possession and conquered also some places of the Āgra district and Haryana. But his bright and victorious career came to an end by his sudden death in a contest with Najib-ud-daulah, the Rohillā chief and the *Mir Bakshi* and "Regent of the imperial administration" on the bank of the Hindaun, about fourteen miles east of Delhi (December 25, 1763).¹³²

Suraj Mal was then fifty-five years of age and his demise was a rude shock to the Jāts. Sayyid Ghulam Husain says that Suraj Mal was "the eye and the shining taper of the Jāt tribe—a prince who rendered himself famous by his good manners and civil deportment, as well as by his conquests and his superior knowledge in the arts of government".¹³³ He gave his State peace and prosperity, was

loved and respected by his subjects and admired and feared by foreigners. He has also been described as "the Plato of the Jāt tribe" and "the Jāt Ulysses" for "his political sagacity, steady intellect and clear vision".¹³⁴

During his regime the Jāt State reached its highest extent. Besides the original Bharatpur principality, it embraced the districts of Agra, Dholpur, Mainpuri, Hathras, Aligarh, Etawa, Mirat, Rohtak, Farrukhnagar, Mewāt, Rewari, Gurgaon and Mathurā. Its annual revenue was one hundred and seventy-five lakhs of rupees, whereas the expenditure was sixty to sixty-five lakhs, and he left a reserve fund of ten crores, inherited and acquired taken together. At the time of his death his army consisted mainly of 15,000 cavalry and 25,000 infantry, besides fort garrisons.¹³⁵ His cavalry, in particular, was highly spoken of by Sayyid Ghulam Husain.¹³⁶

Suraj Mal possessed fine taste for architecture which is testified by his construction of noble edifices at Dig like Gopāl Bhavan, Suraj Bhavan and Krishna Bhavan. Thornton says that the palaces which he constructed "are surpassed in India for elegance of design and perfection of workmanship only by the Tajmahal of Agra".¹³⁷

Jawāhir Singh (1764-1768)

Suraj Mal left five sons, of whom Jawāhir Singh succeeded in capturing the vacant throne of his father.¹³⁸

He made grand preparations against Najib-ud-daulah with a view to taking revenge of his father's death. Besides his own army he hired twenty-thousand Marāthā cavalry under Malhār Rāo Holkar and fifteen thousand Sikhs,¹³⁹ marched to Delhi and laid siege to it. Shahdara, which had large stocks of grain was plundered, and although the beleaguered city was suffering from acute shortage of provision, and its fall became inevitable, the Jāts could not reap the desired benefit due to the faithlessness of Malhār Rāo and treacherous conduct of a section of the Jāt officers. Finally, an agreement was arrived at in 1765; but it was not possible for Jawāhir Singh to achieve the object for which the campaign had been undertaken.¹⁴⁰

On his return from the above campaign he turned his attention against those influential and powerful Jāt leaders whom he considered to be refractory. He enlisted into his service foreign troops, including the contingents of Captain Samru, and with their aid, he arrested the Jāt leaders, including Balaram, "once the chief minister of the State", and Mohanram, "the ex-chief of the artillery". Bala-

ram committed suicide in prison, Mohanram and some other chiefs died under torture, and others saved their lives by surrendering their wealth. Jawāhir Singh imprisoned also his rebellious cousin Bahādur Singh but released him later on. All such actions alarmed the Jāt people, alienated their sympathy from him and created a feeling of bitterness against him.^{140a}

After the above, he was involved in a quarrel with the Marāthās who had supported his brother Nāhar Singh in his claim to the throne of his father. Jawāhir Singh defeated his enemies (March 1766) and captured Dholpur, held by Nāhar Singh as an appanage. In conjunction with the Jāt prince of Gohad he raided also the Marāthā possessions in Northern Mālwa.¹⁴¹ In the rainy season of 1767 he invaded Ater and Bhind, formerly tributary to the Marāthās, "and quickly effected a conquest of all the domains of the Marāthās and the petty *Zamindāris*, up to Kalpi".¹⁴²

Freed from troubles and master of a big and flourishing State, he was then at the height of his power, but he soon brought misfortune upon himself by his quarrel with Mādho Singh, the Rājā of Jaipur. Besides, frontier disputes, his pride and insolence, his demand for the surrender of the widow of Nāhar Singh, who had taken refuge in Jaipur and, lastly, damage done to Jaipur territory by the Jāt soldiers during their march through that State to the Pushkar lake, greatly offended Mādho Singh. When Jawāhir Singh was on his return journey, the Jaipur army, which had been following the Jāt army, attacked him at Maonda in Jaipur territory on December 14, 1767. Although Jawāhir Singh maintained his ground till nightfall and claimed the victory, he lost his artillery, tents and baggage. Sir Jadunath Sarkar has justly observed that "it was a most pyrrhic victory", and he "returned home pillaged, stupefied and overthrown.... The country beyond the Chambal rose at the first report of that rout and was gone as quickly as it was taken".¹⁴³

Mādho Singh then invaded the Jāt country and defeated Jawāhir Singh, but, when the latter was reinforced by 20,000 Sikhs, the Rājputs retired to their country.

In the same year (1768) Jawāhir Singh was assassinated by one of his soldiers.

He was a strong ruler and centralized all powers in his own hands. But this centralization of power, with mercenary troops at its back, weighed too heavily on the freedom-loving spirit of the Jāts. He did not possess foresight, tact and wisdom, as shown by his

father Suraj Mal. His finances were, however, in good order and he maintained a magnificent court.

Ratan Singh (1768-1769)

"Brain and character alike were wanting among the successors of Jawāhir Singh, and, in addition, the lack of a strong man at the head of the State let loose all the selfishness and factious spirit among the other members of the royal family, which completed the national downfall in a few years".¹⁴⁴

Ratan Singh, younger brother of Jawāhir Singh, succeeded to the throne of Bharatpur, but he was thoroughly unfit for such a position. Neglecting the duties of the State, he wasted his time in worthless amusements. He reigned less than a year and was murdered by an alchemist on 8 April, 1769.

Kesari Singh (1769-1775)

Kesari Singh, the infant son of Ratan Singh, succeeded to the throne of his father. During his rule a civil war ensued between the regent Nawal Singh and his brother Ranjit Singh, both half-brothers of the late Rājā, for the above post, leading to the invitation of the Marāthās and the Rohillās. The Jāt State suffered terribly due to this civil war, the legacies of which were "a mutilated State, a factious nobility, a demoralised army," and "a depleted treasury".¹⁴⁵ Although Nawal Singh remained regent, the losses to the State were beyond calculation.

One ominous cloud after another enveloped the political horizon of this State. In 1772, the desertion of Rene Madec, who had rendered valuable services to it, weakened its military efficiency. In the following year, the imperialists under Mīrzā Najaf Khān, the commander-in-chief, attacked it, and, after defeating the Jāt army, plundered the city of Barsana¹⁴⁶ and occupied the fort of Kotavan.¹⁴⁷ Then the forts of Agra (February, 1774) and Ballabgarh fell before his arms. Farrukhnagar was also occupied. Added to these losses, was the desertion of Samru with his contingent. "The Jāts, mostly ignorant peasantry, had not been able to adopt the European discipline and tactics which had now come to sway Indian warfare. This military weakness of their state was for a time concealed by their employment¹⁴⁸ of Madec and Samru, but with their exit, the weakness of the Jāt army was revealed."

The imperialists again invaded this State and took possession of many territories including the *parganā* of Jewār and the fort of Rāmgarh (Aligarh) (1775).

On the death of Nawal Singh, the regent, at Dig in August 1775, Mullā Rahimdād, the Rohillā chief, an ally of the Jāts, who was then there with his army, seized the person of Kesari Singh and retaining him on the throne, proclaimed himself regent.

Ranjit Singh marched secretly at night from Kumbher to Dig with his loyal followers and two thousand Marāthā mercenaries, and drove away the traitor. After this, in view of the grave dangers facing the State, he was installed on the throne in place of his minor nephew Kesari Singh.

Ranjit Singh (1775-1805)

Ranjit Singh had to face serious troubles both from within and outside. Within the State disunion and discords among the Jāt leaders were rampant, and, on the other hand, Mīrzā Najaf Khān, the Mughul *Vazīr*, marched to Dig and laid siege to it. Hard-pressed by food shortage, epidemic of disease and desertions from the garrison, Ranjit Singh left the fort one dark night (April 1776) and succeeded in reaching the fort of Kumbher.

Taking advantage of the pre-occupation of Najaf Khān elsewhere, Ranjit Singh surprised the Mughul collector of Farah, midway between Mathurā and Āgra, killed him and ravaged the territories up to the walls of Āgra. On hearing this, Najaf Khān took the field, drove the Jāts back and captured the forts of Sonkh (almost midway between Kumbher and Mathurā) and Kumbher. Bharatpur was then besieged. Unable to defend it long, the Jāt Rājā had to yield, and, on the entreaty of Rāṇi Kishori to show mercy, Najaf Khān gave her the fort of Kumbher for her residence and territories around it for her support. The fort of Bharatpur and territories yielding a revenue of seven lakhs of rupees were bestowed on Ranjit Singh (c. February 1778).¹⁴⁹ The Jāt State was thus reduced to a very sad plight.

Ranjit Singh entered into a defensive and offensive alliance with the English in September 1803, and fought with them in the battle of Laswari against Daulat Rāo Sindia. But repudiating the conditions of the above alliance, he joined Yashwant Rāo Holkar I, in the following year in his attack on Delhi against the English and the same feeling of hostility having been shown by him against them at Dig, it was besieged and captured. The English then laid siege to Bharatpur. With the utmost valour, Ranjit Singh repulsed four successive assaults of General Lake. But as his men began to lose heart, he became apprehensive and opened negotiations for peace

which was finally concluded (April, 1805). He promised to pay an indemnity of twenty lakhs of rupees and desist from holding any communication with the enemies of the English or employing any European without their permission. The English held on to Dig till they were satisfied with his faithful observance of the terms of the treaty. As he remained faithful, Dig was afterwards restored to him.¹⁵⁰

Ranjit Singh died about seven months after the above treaty. He left four sons, of whom, the eldest, Randhir Singh succeeded his father.

(k) *Jammu and Kāshmīr*: (1707-1818)

1. *Jammu*

The hill States lying between the Indus and the Rāvi in the outer ranges of the Himalayas fell into two political groups. The first group comprised Kāshmīr and many small States situated between the Indus and the Jhelum, all ruled over by Muslim chiefs. The second group embraced Jammu and the petty States lying between the Jhelum and the Rāvi, numbering twenty-two in all. Out of these, eight States, chiefly situated between the Jhelum and the Chenab, were under Muslim chiefs, mostly descending from Hindu Rājās. They were Akhnur, Riasi, Kishtwar, Rajauri, Punch, Kotli, Bhimbar and Khari-Khariai. The remaining fourteen were Hindu, all lying between the Chenab and the Rāvi, namely Jammu, Bahu, Dalpatpur, Samba, Jasrota, Trikot, Lakhanpur, Mankot (now called Ramkot), Behandrata, Chaneni, Bhoti, Bhadu, Balor (now known as Basohli) and Bhadarwah. Ten States—Jammu, Bahu, Dalpatpur, Samba, Jasrota, Trikot, Lakhanpur, Mankot, Riasi and Akhnur—were ruled by a family of which the chief of Jammu was the head, and three—Basohli, Bhadu and Bhadarwah—were governed by branches of the same family. Jammu had been under the rule of a Hindu Rājput dynasty since olden times.

The Mughul Faujdārs

The Mughul emperors kept a Muslim *faujdār* at Jammu to realise tribute from the hill States and to suppress any revolt in the region. As long as the tribute was regularly and punctually paid, he did not interfere in their internal affairs.

On Guru Govind Singh's death in October, 1708, Bandā Bahādūr took charge of the political and military affairs of the Sikhs. In May 1710, he conquered Sirhind province and appointed Sikh

officers in the civil and military departments. He was expelled from his capital at Lohgarh by emperor Bahādur Shāh in December, 1710. Bandā seized Pathankot and Gurdaspur in March, 1711. In June Qutb-ud-din Khān Khesghi, *faujdār* of Jammu, marched against him. His nephew Shams Khān was the *faujdār* of Sultanpur in the Jullundur Doāb. He advanced to join his uncle. In the battle fought in the area of Raipur-Bahrampur Shams Khān was shot dead, while Qutb-ud-din Khān was seriously wounded, and died after three days.¹⁵¹

Emperor Farrukh-siyar appointed Zakāriyā Khān *faujdār* of Jammu in 1713. Bandā had recovered Lohgarh by that time. He was again besieged by the imperial army. Bandā held his ground for six months. He then escaped into the hills and rested on the bank of river Chenab, 60 miles from Jammu. The place came to be called Derah Baba Bandā. Zakāriyā Khān pursued him, captured a number of Sikhs and sent their heads to Delhi where they were produced before Farrukh-siyar on 13 December, 1713. Zakāriyā Khān was granted a robe of honour with the rank of 3,000 *Zat* and 1,000 *Sawar*.¹⁵²

Zakāriyā Khān was again present in the siege of Bandā at Gurdas Nangal, a hamlet 4 miles to the west of Gurdaspur. Bandā with 1,250 followers faced the Mughul army from Delhi, Sirhind, Lahore and Jammu for eight months, and surrendered with 740 followers on 7 December, 1715. Zakāriyā Khān accompanied these prisoners first to Lahore and then to Delhi and participated in their procession in the streets of the capital.

With the decline of the Mughul power, the Rājā of Jammu began to assert his independence. About 1746 he stopped paying tribute to the Mughuls.¹⁵³

Rājā Ranjit Deo

Jammu was under Ranjit Deo from 1750 to 1781. He was a man of great administrative ability. Taking advantage of the confused political state of the Punjāb, owing to the decline of the Mughul rule, the Durrāni invasions and the rise of the Sikhs, Ranjit Deo extended his authority over all the hills situated between the Chenab and the Rāvi, and over some of those lying to the west of the Chenab. His dominions stretched into the plains to the northern parts of Sialkot district. Ranjit Deo was a dependable ally of Ahmad Shāh Abdālī. He helped the Shāh in conquering Kāshmīr in 1752 and again in 1762. In April, 1757, Ahmad Shāh Abdālī confirmed

his alliance with Ranjit Deo by granting him three *parganās* of Zafarwal, Sankatra and Aurangābād. He held sway over the country lying north of a line drawn from Dinga in the Chaj Doāb to the river Chenab at Kalowal, and from Roras to Sankatra, extending up to Munda Khail in Shakargarh *parganā* on the Rāvi.¹⁵⁴

Ranjit Deo struck coins during the earlier part of his reign in the name of the Mughul emperors of Delhi; but later on they were struck in his own name. On these coins he used the Vikram Samvat, but retained the year of the reign of Shāh 'Alam II (1759-1806). It was a time of upheavals and extreme lawlessness, "yet his little State was an abode of peace and safety (*dār-ul-amān*)".¹⁵⁵ During Ranjit Deo's reign the city of Jammu prospered greatly. It became a centre of trade both of the plains and hills including Kāshmīr. Even rich bankers, merchants and high officials of Lahore and Delhi, both Hindus and Musalmans, found a place of refuge at Jammu. During Abdālī's third invasion (December 1751 to March 1752) Muin-ul-Mulk, the Viceroy of the Punjab, sent his family and treasures to the care of Rājā Ranjit Deo of Jammu.

A despatch received by the Governor-General at Calcutta on 9 April, 1780, spoke highly of Ranjit Deo: "That said Rājā is distinguished for his courage and valour and is so just and kind to his ryots that the inhabitants of the Punjāb and the Doāb (Gangā) have since the time of Nadir Shāh's invasion, always found a safe refuge in his country from the tyranny of unscrupulous adventurers.... The writer knows of no people from Attock to Delhi who live more free from care and fear than those of Jammu".¹⁵⁶

Ranjit Deo could not escape the Sikhs. About 1770 he submitted to Jhanda Singh Bhangi and agreed to pay tribute.¹⁵⁷

On Ranjit Deo's death in 1781 he was succeeded by his son Brij Rāj Deo. During his reign the Jammu State came completely under the subjection of the Sikhs.

2. Kāshmīr

'Abdus Samad Khān was the governor of Kāshmīr under Bahādur Shāh and Jahāndar Shāh. Farrukh-siyar transferred him from Kāshmīr to the Punjāb. The great Mughul emperors had maintained their hold on Kāshmīr by visiting the valley frequently in hot weather. Akbar, Jahāngir, Shāh Jahān and Aurangzīb built palaces and gardens at Srinagar. After Aurangzīb's death the decline of the Mughul power affected the political condition of Kāshmīr, which generally remained disturbed up to 1752. No Mughul emperor

visited Kāshmīr after Aurangzīb. Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī conquered Kāshmīr in 1752. The Afghān rule lasted for 67 years up to 1819.

Afghān kings were mainly interested in getting tribute which was fixed at twenty lakhs of rupees a year. As long as this amount was remitted punctually and regularly, the kings left the governors with full powers, and would take no notice how they ruled, ably or tyrannically.¹⁵⁸

There were twenty-eight governors during the Afghān rule. Only one of them was a Hindu while all others were Afghāns. 'Abdullah Khān Ishāq was the first Governor. His chief secretary was Sukhjiwan Mal, a Punjābi Khatri of Bhera. He had taken up service under Ābdālī's prime minister, Shāh Vali Khān, during the first invasion of Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī in 1748. Shāh Vali Khān was so much impressed with his ability and honesty that he appointed him to this high post in 1752.¹⁵⁹

'Abdullah Khān Ishāq was a despot and a despoiler. He denuded the State treasury, and for money he fleeced the people sparing none from his operations. In six months he collected about a crore of rupees in cash and goods. In order to deposit it safely in his home town, Kābul, he left for Afghānistan appointing Khwājāh 'Abdullāh Khān as his deputy. His rule was equally unpopular on account of his greed and extortion.

A local leading noble, Abdul Hasan Khān Bandey, prevailed upon Sukhjiwan to murder Khwājāh 'Abdullāh Khān, and assume the governorship himself. The deputy was killed after four months' rule. Sukhjiwan took charge of the State and conveyed his submission to Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī. This took place in the earlier part of 1753. He was the first Hindu chief in Kāshmīr since 1320 in 433 years. Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī confirmed him and appointed Khwājāh Kijak as his deputy.

Sukhjiwan was a brave soldier, wise administrator, scholar, linguist and a poet. He engaged five good scholars to compile a history of Kāshmīr from the earliest times. Each writer was provided with ten assistants. The head of these historians was Muhammad Taufiq whose original name was Lalaju.¹⁶⁰

Sukhjiwan's government proved the best and most efficient both for Hindus and Muslims, *Sunnis* and *Shias*. His liberal and sympathetic outlook won the hearts of all. In 1754 a severe famine broke out in Kāshmīr owing to the failure of rains. Sukhjiwan purchased large quantities of rice from the Punjāb, and distributed one lakh bags of rice among the poor quite free, while to the rich it

was sold at a concessional rate. Again in the winter of 1755 heavy snowfall and blizzards destroyed all vegetation. Sukhjiwan supplied subsidized ration to the people.¹⁶¹

Ahmad Shāh Abdālī "demanded an exorbitant tribute equal to ten times the revenue of the country". Sukhjiwan ignored the demand on the ground that no money could be saved from regular revenues, whilst he was opposed to extortion. He offered allegiance to emperor 'Alamgir II (1754-59) who conferred the title of Rājā on him.¹⁶²

Ahmad Shāh Abdālī was in the Punjāb from January to December 1762. In June he sent an expedition against Sukhjiwan, but it failed. Ranjit Deo of Jammu was hostile to Sukhjiwan. He envied his efficiency and popularity. Besides he cast longing eyes on the pretty valley. Hence another expedition was despatched in October under the guidance of Ranjit Deo. The Afghān forces entered Kāshmīr by Tosha Maidan Pass. Sukhjiwan came to oppose them at the head of 50,000 troops. His commander-in-chief Bakhtmal, was won over by Ranjit Deo, and he deserted his master. Sukhjiwan was captured, immediately blinded and sent to Lahore where he was trampled to death by horses.¹⁶³ After this the Afghān rule in Kāshmīr was mainly a tale of atrocities.

In Sarbuland Khān Bāmzāi's rule, 1763-65, *Sunni-Shia* riots broke out, in which the latter sustained heavy losses in men and material. The next five years saw six governors in quick succession. Amīr Khān Jawansher, 1770-76, built a number of bridges and buildings, but his deputy Mīr Fāzil persecuted the Pundits.¹⁶⁴ Hāji Karimdād Khān (1776-82) fleeced money from everybody, Hindus and Muslims alike. Azād Khān (1782-95) and Madād Khān (1795-96) were both cruel.

Mīr Hāzar Khān in 1793 sewed up Hindu leaders in gunny bags and threw them into the Dal Lake to be drowned.¹⁶⁵ 'Abdullāh Khān Alkozai (1796-1800) collected one crore of rupees as his personal wealth.¹⁶⁶ Ata Muhammad Khān Alkozai (1800-05) forcibly seized pretty girls to satisfy his lust. "Many parents were compelled to shave the heads of their daughters rather than allow them to be molested and degraded."¹⁶⁷ Many Pundit families migrated to Batote, Kishtwar, Bhadarwah, Punch, Rajauri and Delhi.¹⁶⁸ As a result of this oppression great unrest spread in the province. The neighbouring tribes like Kakkas, Bambas and Gujars sacked the Valley.¹⁶⁹ It was conquered by Ranjit Singh in 1819.¹⁷⁰

1. *History of Bengal*, Vol. I, Ed. by Jadunath Sarkar (1948), pp. 407-08.
2. *Ibid*, pp. 409-10.
3. *Ibid*, p. 414.
4. *Ibid*, pp. 420-21.
5. *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin* (English Translation), Vol. I, p. 323.
6. Letter to Court of Directors, 29 Nov. 1735, para 71.
7. Letter to Court, 26 Dec. 1733, para 57.
- 7a. *Muzaffarnamah*, f. 124.
8. This *zamindari* extended over the south-east of old Zila Bihār. An area of 10½ sq. miles of the Narhat *pargana* was in the south-east of the old Bihār sub-division of the Patna district, while the rest of it and the whole of the Samai *pargana* were in the old Nawadah sub-division of the Gayā district.
9. Bhunrā, 19 miles north-east of Bettia.
10. Giriā is situated on the east bank of the Bhāgīrathī at a distance of about five miles north-west of Jangipur.
- 10a. *Bayan-i-waqai* by Khwaja Abdul Karim, fs. 101-03.
11. *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, Vol. II, p. 162.
12. Datta, K. K., *Alivardi and His Times*, p. 140.
13. *History of Bengal*, Vol. II, p. 470.
14. *Muzaffarnamah*, f. 576.
15. Hill, S. C., *Bengal in 1756-57*, III, p. 239.
16. Sarkar, Sir Jadunath, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, (second edn.), p. 195.
17. Srivastava, A. L., *The First Two Nawābs of Oudh*, p. 246.
18. Sarkar, Jadunath, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 531.
19. *Ibid*.
20. Srivastava, A. L., *Shuja-ud-daulah*, Vol. I, p. 141.
21. Broome, *Bengal Army*, p. 480.
22. Srivastava, A. L., *Shujā-ud-daulah*, Vol. II, p. 84.
23. Forster, George, *A Journey*, etc., p. 158.
24. Davies, C. C., *Warren Hastings and Oudh*, p. 15.
25. *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. IV, No. 13158.
26. Irvine, *Later Mughals*, Vol. I, p. 268-72.
27. Dighe, V. G., *Peshwa Bājī Rao I*, (1944), p. 8.
28. Khafi Khan, in Elliot & Dowson's *History of India*, Vol. VII, p. 518.
29. *Ibid*, pp. 523-25.
30. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 148.
31. *Ibid*, Vol. II, p. 154.
32. Elliot and Dowson, *op. cit.*, p. 527.
33. *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, Vol. III, p. 283.
34. Elphinstone, *History of India*, p. 657; *B.I.S.M. Quarterly*, XXVI, pp. 11-13.
35. *S.P.D.*, Vol. XV, pp. 56, 59-60, 86.
36. In some English records there is a reference to an invasion of the Punjab by Ahmad Shāh Abdālī in 1769; *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Dec. 1934.
37. Datta, K. K., *Alivardi and His Times*, p. 114.
38. Sinha, N. K., *Rise of the Sikh Power*, p. 19.
39. *Ibid*, p. 44.
40. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 377.
41. *Ibid*, p. 500.
42. Sinha, N. K., *op. cit.*, p. 19.
43. Cunningham, *History of the Sikhs*, p. 86.
44. Irvine, *op. cit.*, I, p. 96.
45. *Ibid*, p. 110.
46. Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 87.
47. *Ibid*, p. 88.
48. Irvine, *op. cit.*, I, p. 315.
49. Cunningham, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
50. Sinha, N. K., *op. cit.*, pp. 10-11.
51. *Ibid*, p. 12.
52. *Ibid*, p. 14.

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53. *Ibid*, p. 14.
54. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, (Revised Edn.), p. 107.
55. Sinha, N. K., *op. cit.*, p. 17.
56. *Ibid*, p. 18.
57. *Ibid*, p. 19.
58. *Ibid*, p. 24.
59. *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, III (Eng. translation), p. 289.
60. *Ibid*.
61. Sinha, N. K., *op. cit.*, p. 27.
62. Quoted in *ibid*, pp. 28-29.
63. Quoted in Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, (1932), p. 426.
64. *Ibid*.
65. Sinha, N. K., *op. cit.*, p. 32.
66. *Ibid*, p. 35.
67. Quoted in Sinha, N. K., *op. cit.*, p. 39, from Malcolm, *Sketch of Sikhs*, p. 93.
68. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, p. 94.
69. Quoted in Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 69.
70. *Ibid*.
71. *Ibid*, p. 73.
72. Sinha, N. K., *op. cit.*, p. 49.
73. Browne, *India Tracts*, p. 22.
74. Sinha, N. K., *Rise of the Sikh Power*, p. 64.
75. *Ibid*, p. 84.
76. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I (Revised Edn.), pp. 25-26.
77. *Ibid*, p. 28.
78. *Ibid*, p. 29.
79. Quoted in *ibid*.
80. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 30.
81. *Ibid*.
82. *Ibid*.
83. *Ibid*, p. 33.
84. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 36.
85. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 211 from Bareilly Gazetteer.
86. *Ibid*.
87. *Ibid*, p. 213.
88. *Ibid*, p. 215.
89. *Ibid*, p. 231.
90. Sir J. Strachey, *Hastings and the Rohilla War* (1892), pp. 31-32.
91. *Ibid*, p. 230.
92. *Ibid*.
93. *Ibid*, pp. 233-36.
94. *Ibid*, p. 239; J.A.S.B., 1878, IV, pp. 297-8.
95. *Ibid*, p. 241.
96. Irvine, *The Later Mughals*, Vol. I, pp. 45-47.
97. *Ibid*, p. 67.
98. *Ibid*, p. 285.
99. *Ibid*, p. 286.
100. Irvine, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 4.
101. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I (Revised Edn.), p. 131.
102. *Ibid*, p. 134.
103. Tod, *Annals and Antiquities of Rajasthān*, Vol. I (Crooke's Edn.).
104. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol I (Revised Edn.), p. 156.
105. Tod, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, Chap. XV, SPD, II, 19, 31, XXI, 34.
106. Tod, *Annals of Mewār*, Chp. XVI.
107. Sādhaurā is twenty-six miles east of Ambala, and Lohgarh twelve miles north-east of Sādhaurā.
108. Irvine, W., *The Later Mughals*, I, p. 323.
109. *Ibid*, pp. 323-27; *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin* Vol. I, pp. 106-07.
110. Irvine, *op. cit.*, II, p. 81.
111. *Ibid*, pp. 85-6, 89, 93.
112. *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, tr. Vol. I, pp. 238-39; C.H.I., IV, p. 348.
113. Qanungo, K. R., *History of the Jāts*, p. 59; *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, tr. Vol. I p. 239.

114. *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, tr. Vol. I, p. 239.
115. Sarkar, Sir J. N., *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II (1934), p. 425.
116. *Ibid*, p. 428. Badān Singh was in possession of a part of Braj (Mathurā), but his son Suraj Māl brought the whole of it in his possession.
117. *Ibid*, pp. 428-30; Qanungo, K. R., *op. cit.*, p. 64.
118. Sarkar, Sir J. N., *op. cit.*, II, p. 435.
119. Ver is about twelve miles north-west of Bayānā.
120. Qanungo, K. R., *op. cit.*, p. 64. Growse, *Mathurā*, p. 139.
121. Qanungo, *op. cit.*, pp. 66-70; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, I, 293-94; II, p. 318.
122. *Imad-us-Saadat*, pp. 49-51, 57-59, 64. Qanungo, K. R., *op. cit.*, pp. 80-83.
123. Sarkar, J. N., *op. cit.*, II (1934), p. 435.
124. *Imad-us-Saadat*, p. 63.
125. *Tarikh-i-Ahmād Shāhi*, pp. 81b-83a.
126. *Ibid*, pp. 108b-110a; 114a, 117b, 128a; S. P. D., XXVII, Nos. 79, 81, p. 94. *Bhāu Sāhebānchi Bakhar*, (Ed.), S. N. Joshi (1959), pp. 2-8.
127. *Indian Antiquary*, Vol. XXXVI, pp. 60-62; *SPD*, XXI, 107; XXVII, 152.
128. *Imad-us-Saadat*, pp. 170-80.
129. Qanungo, K. R., *op. cit.*, pp. 129-37.
130. *Imad-us-Saadat*, p. 203; Sardesai, *New History of the Marāthās*, II, p. 443.
131. Sarkar, Sir J. N., *op. cit.*, II (1934), p. 442.
132. *Nur* 66a-70b; *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, tr. IV, pp. 31-32. Hindaun is a tributary of the Jamunā.
133. *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, tr. IV, p. 27.
134. *Imad-us-Saadat*, p. 55; Qanungo, K. R., *op. cit.*, p. 65.
135. Sarkar, J. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 455-56.
136. *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*, IV, p. 28.
137. Quoted in *A Gazetteer of the Bhurtpore State* by Captain Walter, p. 29.
138. Qanungo, K. R., *op. cit.*, pp. 159, 171-72.
139. Sarkar, Sir J. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 457-58.
140. Wendel, *Memoires des Jats*, 59; *Nur*, 74b-92b.
- 140a. Qanungo, K. R., *op. cit.*, pp. 179-84.
141. Gohad is to the north-east of Gwalior.
142. Sarkar, Sir J. N., *op. cit.*, II (1934), pp. 475.
143. *Ibid*, pp. 478-79; Qanungo, *op. cit.*, pp. 202-211.
144. Sarkar, Sir J. N., *op. cit.*, III (1938), p. 4.
145. Qanungo, K. R., *op. cit.*, p. 238.
146. Barsana is situated twenty-two miles north-west of Mathurā.
147. Kotvan is in the Mathurā district and on the Delhi-Āgra Trunk road.
148. Sarkar, Sir J. N., *op. cit.*, III (1938), p. 3.
149. *Ibid*, 117; *Ibratnama*, I, pp. 317, 345-47.
150. Col. H. Pearse, *Memoir of the Life and Military Services of the Viscount Lake*, pp. 355-89; Fortesque, *A History of the British Army*, V, pp. 70-137; Captain Walter, *A Gazetteer of the Bhurtpore State*, pp. 13-16; Malcolm, *The Political History of India*, Vol. I, p. 374.
151. *Masir-ul-umara*, iii, pp. 129-30.
152. Karam Singh, *Banda Bahadur Kaun Tha* (Urdu), p. 94; Ganda Singh, *Banda Singh Bahadur*, p. 191.
153. Bute Shāh, *Tarikh-e-Panjab* (Persian MS.), 255b.
154. *Shamshir Khalsa* (Urdu), 93; *Khazana-e-Amira* (Persian), 100; *Sialkot District Gazetteer*, pp. 16, 17.
155. J.A.S.B., Liv. Pt. i, 63, 65.
156. C.P.C., V, 1836.
157. Forster, i, 286-87; *Raj Khalsa* (Urdu), iii, 4; *Sialkot District Gazetteer*, 18; *Khushwaqt Rae* (Persian MS.), 155.
158. Gwasha Lal Kaul, *Kashmir Through the Ages*, p. 68.
159. Parmu, R. K., *A History of Muslim Rule in Kashmir: 1320-1819* (1969), pp. 354, 358.
160. *Khazana-e-Amira*, 114-16; *Siyar* (Persian), iii, 74; *Tarikh-i-Muzaffari* 122a-b.
161. Narayan Kaul, *Tarikh-i-Kashmir* (1846) (Persian MS.), 185a; R. K. Parmu, *op. cit.*, 356.
162. Parmu, R. K., *op. cit.*, 355.

DISRUPTION OF THE MUGHUL EMPIRE

163. *Khazana-e-Amira*, 114-16; *Siyar*, iii, 74-75; *Tarikh e-Muzaffari*, 122a-b; Khush-waqt Rae, 155; *Ahmad Shah Batalvi* (Persian MS.), 886; Narayan Kaul, op. cit., 186a-187a.
164. Parmu, R. K., op. cit., p. 362, Gwasha Lal Kaul, p. 67 calls him Faqirullah.
165. Parmu, R. K., op. cit., p. 369.
166. Gwasha Lal Kaul, op. cit., p. 68.
167. Lawrence, Walter, R., *The Valley of Kashmir*, London (1895), p. 198.
168. Gwasha Lal Kaul, op. cit., pp. 68-69.
169. Parmu, R. K. op. cit., p. 353.
170. N.A.I.. Foreign Department, Miscellaneous, No. 305, Chap. 2, paras 4, 5; *Umdal-ul-Tawarikh* (Persian), *Daftar*, ii, pp. 134-35; Parmu, R. K., op. cit., p. 353.

CHAPTER VI

BĀLĀJĪ RĀO (1740-1761)

I. *Bālājī Rāo Peshwā's Grand Design*

Bālājī or Nānā Saheb as he was called, was the third great *Peshwā* of the Marāthā State during Shāhū's reign. He succeeded Bājī Rāo I on 25 June, 1740. He was only nineteen at the time but had been associated with his father and uncle in the work of administration and warfare. He was appointed by Shāhū to the *Peshwā's* post on account of the qualities he possessed. *Peshwāship* at that time was not a hereditary office and the Rājā had full authority and freedom to choose a proper person on his merits. In spite of some opposition and adverse influences like those of Raghūjī Bhosle and others, Bālājī was chosen as the fittest person to occupy the *Peshwā's* responsible office. He administered the affairs of the Marāthā State and its expanding empire from 1740 to 1761.

His regime of 21 years is packed with events of momentous importance in Indian history. It saw the end of an epoch—the Mughul empire of India—and the beginning of another—the Marāthā empire in India.

Bālājī's reign saw the zenith of the expansion of the Marāthā State in India and the success of Marāthā arms in its various parts. But it also witnessed the appearance of four new powers in the political contest for supremacy in India, namely, the Afghāns, the Sikhs, the French and the English.

The Mughul empire had grown weak and corrupt. The rising power and aggression of the Marāthās, Nādir Shāh's invasion, loot and massacre, the incompetency and voluptuousness of emperors, the selfishness of the *Vazīrs* or chief ministers and great nobles, and their personal jealousies, rivalries and dissensions, had all shaken it to its foundations. It had practically disintegrated. The *Subāhdars* and Nawābs had usurped the emperor's powers, had risen in rebellion against his authority and had consolidated their own powers with the help of independent feudal armies and mercenary arms, both in the north and in the south. Such were the Nawābs of the Deccan and Karnāṭak, the Nawābs of Awadh and Allahābād, and the

Nawābs of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Similar usurpations were made by smaller officers and nobles in the country.

The Marāthās had invaded, conquered and occupied the provinces of Gujarāt, Mālwa, Bundelkhand, Berar and other parts of the empire. The emperor was compelled to grant them the rights of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* over various *subāhs* or provinces of the empire as they could not be defeated and driven away.

Bālājī had to consolidate these conquests and to regularise these rights acquired during Bājī Rāo's period, and also to expand the Marāthā State and influence in other parts of India. His grand design, like his father's, was to bring the whole of India under Marāthā influence and paramountcy, either by conquest and annexation or by levying *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*. He was, however, not served well by his ministers and generals. They quarrelled amongst themselves, took opposite sides and fought against one another for personal gains and prestige. Senior Marāthā ministers and generals were jealous of the young *Peshwā's* power.

Bālājī's first task lay in making good the territorial gains and claims of *chauth* acquired during his father's regime. He had also to meet the legacy of debt of about Rs. 14 lakhs left by his father—incurred during the campaigns in the north. He had to wage constant war for these purposes. He had also to fight against opponents at home and to eliminate them. Then his policy of fresh advance and aggression in the north and south required fresh arms and resources. It was a Herculean task that he undertook.

II. Defects in the Design

Bālājī's *Peshwāship* may be divided into two periods: one from 1740 to 1749 and the other from 1749 to 1761. During the first period the *Peshwā* was somewhat restrained by the Rājā who tried to control the direction and policy of Marāthā affairs and movements. Though he never took an active part in military campaigns, he would not allow his *Peshwā* to change the main principles of his policy. He divided the work and various spheres of Marāthā activities in the north and the south and allotted them to different ministers, generals and nobles, so as to avoid or minimise conflict amongst them. His aim was to bring all India under Marāthā influence or paramountcy, while maintaining the Mughul empire in name. He wanted the power of Marāthā arms to reach beyond Attock, but in alliance with, or as an agent of the Mughul empire. It was to be a Mughul-Marāthā alliance for the governance of India as a whole.

This could be done either by accepting governorships of provinces from the emperor and administering them directly, or accepting annual tributes in the form of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*, leaving the administration of provinces in the hands of the emperor's nominees, but protecting them from foreign invasions.

The weakness of Marāthā politics lay in this policy of Shāhū which he pursued for 42 years of his reign. It could not result in any outright conquests and annexations of territories. Therefore Marāthā politics had no stability and Marāthā warfare, no finality. It became merely a process of flow and fluctuation.

At home Shāhū would not allow the suppression of old ministers and *sardārs* even when they acted as traitors or rebelled against the State, entered into conspiracies with the enemies of the State or opposed the policies and plans of the Chief Minister in various theatres of war. Moreover, Shāhū was against the amalgamation of Kolhapur and Satara States even after his death. He had not his grandfather Shivājī's vision of the unity of the Marāthā State and the centralisation of its power and administration. Bālājī had to work with this background and to carry out his own plans of building up a great Marāthā State and empire.

During the second period Bālājī became free from the control of the new Marāthā King. Rām Rājā, the successor of Shāhū, was a posthumous son of Tārā Bāi's son, Shivājī II, and had been brought up secretly in humble circumstances. He had not the ability and training of a ruler and fell a prey to the intrigues of his grandmother Tārā Bāi. He was ultimately confined in his palace at Satara and lost all control over the political affairs of the Marāthā State.

Besides the political difficulties inherent in the feudal organisation of the Marāthā State, Bālājī had to face great financial difficulties. The Marāthā State had not adequate resources to finance its growing responsibilities and military expenses. Its armies of expansion and military advance depended on the tributes and contributions of the defeated princes who remained in possession of their power and territorial administration.

There were two main centres of Marāthā political activities: one in the north and the other in the south. Eastern (in the north) and Western (in the south) theatres were of minor importance.

The achievements in the north were primarily due to the *Peshwā* and his new generals. Sindias, Holkars, Pawārs and Jādhavs were the most prominent amongst them. As regards the south, west and east, the old Marāthā ministers like the *Pratinidhi*, and *sardārs* like Bhosles, Dābhādés and Angrias had vested interests, influence and power, and these spheres were marked as their

field of operations. The *Peshwā* could not fully direct and control the politics there nor would Shāhū allow him to do so. Still it was the *Peshwā*, Bājī Rāo and Bālājī Rāo, who checked the Nizāms and the Sīdīs and some rebellious *sardārs* and *jagīrdārs*, Dābhāḍes, Gaikwārs, and Angrias, in their conspiracies and aggressions against the Marāthā State. Thus the Marāthās lacked a common will and policy, one unified control and direction in military affairs and political administration. Hence a centrally directed and controlled Marāthā State could not be built up.

During Bālājī's regime the first year in northern politics culminated in the recognition of Marāthā claims and conquests in Mālwa by the grant of a *farman* of that province by the emperor in 1741.¹ Gujarāt was already conquered by Dābhāḍes, Gaikwārs and *Peshwās*. The Marāthas had begun to interfere in the affairs of Bundelkhand, Rājputānā and other parts of Hindustān as far as Delhi during Bājī Rāo's period. Bālājī's period saw the extension of their activities further to the north beyond Delhi into the Punjab as far as Attock, and to the east into the Doāb, Awadh, Allahābād, Bihar, Bengal and Orissa. The *Peshwā* and his generals worked in the north and Raghūjī Bhosle in the east. Their policies and activities proved at first at cross purposes, but later on Shāhū fixed their separate spheres of activity. Still the weakness of the Marāthā power lay in the fact that it was not one unified power. It became an aggregate of powers with conflicting aims, policies and interests. They even conspired and fought against one another, and Bālājī was not able to centralise the power of the Marāthā State into one hand and thus direct all affairs according to a common policy and a common plan.

The main problems which Bālājī had to face in internal politics were: (1) the constant opposition of some old ministers and *sardārs*; (2) the succession issue and Tārā Bāi's machinations; (3) financial difficulties and debts; and (4) administrative arrangements of old and new conquests.

In external politics his aims were: (1) to advance and establish Marāthā paramountcy over the whole of India; (2) to control the Delhi emperor and to administer imperial provinces in his name or to secure the grant of annual *chauth* from them; (3) to liberate the Deccan province from the Nizām; (4) to establish supremacy over Karnāṭak rulers; (5) to bring Bihar, Bengal and Orissa under Marāthā influence and to secure *chauth* from them; and (6) to deliver the sacred places of the Hindus in the North from Muslim control. As the chief minister of the Marāthā central and supreme power, did Bālājī succeed in solving these problems and achieving these aims? He seemed to make progress, but his achievements

were often nullified by the new powers and alliances which arose in Indian politics, and by the internal dissensions and cross purposes of Marāthā ministers and *sardārs*. The rise of British power in Bengal in 1757 and the failure of Marāthā arms at Pānīpat in 1761 proved a great set-back to whatever Bālājī had achieved.

Bālājī was not an active soldier like his father. He however proved to be a diplomat and a leader of no mean quality. He possessed greater vision and vigour than his associates. But as he had neither dominant and decisive military qualities and foresight nor sound financial resources to support his undertakings and enterprises, his achievements did not prove lasting. He could not meet his debts and the ever-increasing military expenses as his wars and conquests did not lead to lasting results and settlements. He had to meet the same problems and dangers again and again, and thus the energy and resources of the State were exhausted. No doubt, he kept the core and the central part of the Marāthā State (*Swa-rājya*) independent and properly administered, and its frontiers advancing and increasing. But this was not enough. The newly acquired provinces had to be consolidated and properly administered from the centre, and this he was not able to do. His energies were spent in undertaking constant external warfare and in settling internal dissensions.

The system of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* or tribute had elements of political dominance and disturbance but not of political permanence and governance. Two powers, one in actual possession of territories, and the other only demanding regular *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* or tribute, one unwilling to pay or pay only under duress, and the other constantly forcing it to pay, could not create a stable polity or politics in the anarchic conditions of that period. It was a period of great anarchy. There were wars of succession and usurpations in all parts and provinces of India. Marāthā help was sought by the defeated and discontented parties. North of Mālwa the Marāthās appeared more interested in interfering and helping to gain control and money. Thus they interfered in the making and unmaking of the rulers of Rājputānā, Bundelkhand, the Doāb, Awadh, Allahābād, Bihar, Bengal and Orissa in the north. In the Deccan and Karnāṭak provinces in the south, however, they showed concern in acquiring territory.

But Marāthā successes were not decisive as their policy was half-hearted. They did not establish their own regular administration nor succeed in realising regularly their claims to *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* or to large *jāgīrs*. Their invasion and occupation of

those parts did not result in any political permanence or financial assurance.

III. Northern Campaigns and Politics: First Phase (1740-1749)

The Marāthās alone thought in terms of India as a whole and as one. They followed two policies in the north; one of conquest and annexation preceded by a demand for *chauth* as in Gujarāt and Mālwa, and the other of imposing merely *chauth* on territories invaded and conquered. The second policy proved ineffective in developing their permanent influence and political power in those territories. It merely resulted in a 'fight and carry' system, not in a 'conquest and stay' system. Hence Marāthā prowess in the north beyond Mālwa did not result in achieving the permanent expansion of Marāthā power. It left the administration in the hands of old rulers who were neither loyal nor completely destroyed.

The Marāthās had partitioned the Mughul empire into separate spheres of influence and military activities amongst their military captains or *sardārs*. Northern India was primarily the field of the *Peshwā* and his generals, Sindias, Holkars and Pawārs.

Bālājī organised four expeditions to the north between 1740 and 1748 in which he was personally present. The first one was in Rājputānā (1740-41) which had become a centre of succession wars and civil wars. There were disputes for the thrones of Jaipur, Jodhpur, Kota and Bundī, and the help of the Marāthās was sought by one side or the other. The imperial authority was completely destroyed in Rājputānā after 1740. Hence the Marāthās as the stronger power came in by invitation.

The Marāthā chiefs helped one side or the other after taking huge subsidies or tributes. If they were not paid, they helped those who paid more. Thus the Marāthā interference did not help to stabilise the politics of Rājput States. There was no final settlement. There were conflicting policies amongst Marāthā *sardārs* themselves and therefore there was no unity of action. These *sardārs* sometimes helped opposite sides. The *Peshwā* was not able to check this completely. Thus the politics in Rājputānā remained in a perpetual turmoil and its economic life was ruined by constant warfare and the pecuniary demands of the Marāthās.

The *Peshwā's* main object was money, the realisation of *chauth* and tribute demanded for help given. In the first expedition he entered Rājputānā via Bhilsā and met Sawāi Jay Singh at Dholpur and tried to settle through him Marāthā-Mughul relations. He received

15 lakhs from the emperor, and was promised a *farman* for *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of Mālwa. This he got on 7 September, 1741.² The *Peshwā* had demanded *chauth* over all the imperial provinces.

In the second expedition (1741 to 1743), he passed through Bundelkhand and entered the provinces of Bihar and Bengal. These were considered by Raghūjī Bhosle of Nagpur as his field of military activities. These *Subāhs* had been captured by 'Alī Vardī Khān by an act of usurpation and by defying imperial authority in 1740. The *Peshwā* wanted to establish the Marāthā claims of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* over these provinces in his name. Raghūjī Bhosle claimed the provinces as lying within his sphere of influence. This conflict between the *Peshwā* and Raghūjī led to the seeking of help from the *Peshwā* against Raghūjī by 'Alī Vardī Khān. The emperor granted the *chauth* of these provinces to Shāhū on the condition of their being protected from any interference. From Berar to Bengal Raghūjī had made Eastern India as his sphere of military activities. He carried on a number of expeditions there from June 1741 and reduced the authority of the Nawāb in Orissa and western Bengal. 'Alī Vardī Khān sought the help of the *Peshwā* as the protector of imperial provinces, having promised to cede the *chauth* to him. The *Peshwā* wanted to check Raghūjī's rising power and to establish full claim to the *chauth* of these provinces. While his object was money and supremacy, that of Raghūjī was the acquisition of tribute, territory and political power for himself.³

Bālājī proceeded towards Bengal on 8 December, 1742, entered Bihar in February, 1743, met 'Alī Vardī Khān on 8 March, 1743 and expelled Raghūjī's forces from the province. Raghūjī appealed to Shāhū. Shāhū divided the spheres of the *Peshwā* and Raghūjī on 31 August, 1743. Four *Subāhs* of Mālwa, Āgra, Ajmer and Allahābād, and the estates of Tikari and Bhojpur in the *Subāh* of Bihar were assigned to the *Peshwā*, and Raghūjī was given the *Subāhs* of Bengal, Orissa, Awadh and parts of Bihar.⁴ They were ordered not to interfere in each other's spheres. In 1745 the emperor promised to pay *chauth* to Shāhū—25 lakhs for Bengal and 10 lakhs for Bihar. The conflict about shares in the amount between the *Peshwā* and Raghūjī, however, remained. But the *Peshwā* did not interfere in the sphere of Raghūjī. There were about six invasions of Bengal by Raghūjī. The fortune of arms was not constant in favour of one or the other. The Marāthās, however, gained Orissa. Finally in 1751 a treaty was made between 'Alī Vardī Khān and Raghūjī which settled their relations. The surplus revenue of Orissa was to be paid to Raghūjī and 12 lakhs of rupees were to be paid annually to him as the *chauth*

of Bengal and Bihar. On these terms the Marāthās agreed not to enter Bihar and Bengal again. Later on, the Bhosles of Nagpur annexed Orissa to their kingdom of Berar and established their full sovereignty over it.⁵

On his return from Bengal the *Peshwā* defeated the Rājās of Bundelkhand who had refused to accept Marāthā supremacy and demands of *chauth* and tribute. He settled the affairs there by appointing Naro Shankar as the commander-in-charge.⁶ After the defeat of Bundelā Rājās, Govind Pant Bundela was established at Saugor to realise the Marāthā dues.

The third campaign of Bālājī took place again in 1744-45 to settle the affairs in Rājasthān and Bundelkhand. The politics there was in eternal flux. In this expedition Bhilsā was captured by Rānōjī Sindia on 11 March, 1745,⁷ from the Nawāb of Bhopal. Hostilities however, continued in both areas till 1747.

The fourth expedition was undertaken in 1747. Bālājī went to the north on December 6, 1747. One of Bālājī's objects was to help the emperor against Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī who invaded India in 1747. The other was to settle the affairs in Rājasthān and to realise Marāthā claims. Ābdālī was defeated by the emperor's forces on 3 March, 1748; the *Peshwā* was not required to proceed further. He met Mādhō Singh of Jaipur in April, 1748, at Newai, south of Jaipur, and after some arrangements, returned. But he was not able to settle the affairs finally.

The results of these expeditions were meagre and not decisive enough to establish Marāthā paramountcy anywhere in northern India. The Marāthās had to fight constantly to realise their *chauth* and the tributes promised. The Rājput princes, who had welcomed the Marāthās to fight against the Mughuls and to settle their internal disputes, now became hostile to them. Marāthā *sardārs* supported opposite sides and increased their heavy pecuniary demands constantly and did not settle any matter finally.⁸

A case to the point is the mean treatment meted out to Ishwarī Singh, Rājā of Jaipur, in 1751. Sawāi Jay Singh, the father of Ishwarī Singh, was a friend of the Marāthās, had facilitated their entry into Mālwa, and had persuaded the emperor to agree to their demands. May be, he had his personal ambitions to be a leader of Rājasthān chiefs and to have a dominant position in the Mughul Court. Bālājī Vishwanāth and Bājī Rāo, the first two *Peshwās*, had befriended him and acted as his allies. But all this goodwill evaporated after Sawāi Jay Singh's death in 1743. His two sons, Ish-

warī Singh and Mādhō Singh, began to contest for the chiefship of the State. Mādhō Singh, though junior, staked his claim to the throne on the ground of his birth of a Udaipur princess. Ishwari Singh promised his brother an appanage of 24 lakhs of rupees, but Mādhō Singh wanted a half share in the kingdom. Ishwari Singh with the help of his Marāthā allies—Sindia and Holkar—nipped in the bud an attempt to seize by force Jaipur territory in 1745; but then Mahārānā Jagat Singh of Udaipur, with whom Mādhō Singh was residing, held out promises of a large subsidy to the Marāthās in case Mādhō Singh's cause was upheld. The *Peshwā* instead of evolving just principles for succession, now started pleading the cause of Mādhō Singh, because his uncle, the Rānā of Udaipur, promised a large subsidy. To Sindia who entered a protest against the proceedings, he wrote a mollifying letter.⁹ In March, 1747, at the battle of Rājmahal, Ishwari Singh routed his opponent. Mādhō Singh and his uncle, the Mahārānā of Udaipur, would not accept the defeat gracefully. They bribed Holkar heavily and sent their envoys to Poona to exact from Ishwari Singh the fulfilment of his earlier promise, offering Shāhū a tribute of a few lakhs of rupees. The *Peshwā* suggested to Malhār Rāo Holkar and Sindia's Diwān Rāmchandra Bābā to persuade Ishwari Singh to cede the promised territory to his younger brother instead of letting this fratricidal struggle continue.¹⁰

When the demand for half the territory of his kingdom for Mādhō Singh was placed before Ishwari Singh he declined to accede to it. He angrily replied that there was unique and hereditary friendship between the *Peshwā* and himself. Bālājī Rao *Peshwā* knew well how thick was his father with him and what services he rendered to Bāji Rāo. Up till now he (Ishwari Singh) was acting according to the *Peshwā's* advice. But the question was one of inheritance of ancestral property. They were rājās and must follow their hereditary usage. This dispute was in respect of territory of the kingdom. How could he give it away? "I had previously given to Mādhō Singh what your chiefs (Holkar and Sindia) had asked me to grant by way of service to the State. How can I part with more without fighting? How can I bring down upon myself the name of a coward and an unworthy son by dividing my entire kingdom with a younger son? The *Peshwā* and his chiefs want more territory to be given to Mādhō Singh than before, but it cannot be done. The chiefs have changed sides for reasons well known to themselves".¹¹

But Ishwari Singh was humbled next year. He fled from the battle-field when sent against the Ābdālī in March, 1748. When the

entire Marāthā army converged on his kingdom two months later, he was in no position to refuse the *Peshwā's* demands.¹² But Ishwari Singh was not a willing partner to the contract and tried to wriggle out of it. Holkar marched against him with a force in August, 1748 and exacted fulfilment of the terms.¹³ Ishwari Singh agreed to give five *parganās* to his brother and restore Bundī to Ummed Singh. On 9 August he met Holkar and his captains and swore mutual friendship and promised tribute.

At the end of 1750 the Marāthās once more visited Jaipur for exacting payment of the promised tribute. The land had been impoverished by constant warfare and marches and countermarches of rival armies. The Jaipur treasury was empty. The Rājā did not know how to meet the Marāthā demands. "In utter desperation he ordered his servant to bring a live cobra and some arsenic needed to prepare a medicine. At midnight he swallowed the poison and caused the cobra to bite him. When the Marāthā army approached the city, they were surprised to be greeted by a silent city. Soon the news of the horrible tragedy spread and Vakils came from Jaipur to negotiate a settlement. The Marāthā protege, Mādhō Singh, reached the city within a fortnight, but instead of fulfilling the financial agreements, attempted to destroy his allies by treacherous attacks".¹⁴ The Jaipur invasion ended in a fiasco and permanently lost to the Marāthās the goodwill and friendship of the Rājputs. They came to be hated in Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur and lost their prestige and influence amongst them.¹⁵ Their heavy demands of money alienated all. On 10 January, 1751, they were massacred at Jaipur by the Rājputs on account of their rising hatred of the Marāthās.¹⁶

IV. *Southern Campaigns and Politics: The First Phase (1740-49)*

Bālājī had three main objectives in the south: (1) to liberate the Marāthā part of the Deccan from the Mughul rule; therefore the Nizām's power had to be liquidated or brought under control; (2) to bring the outlying Deccan and Karnāṭak provinces under control; and (3) to crush rebellious *polygars* and *nawābs*.

Bālājī had no free field in the south as in the north. Shāhū was not prepared to destroy the Mughul power in the south. He only wanted his rights to *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* recognised and realised. If the Nizām paid them regularly then there was no question of war with him. As against this, the Nizām wanted to free himself from these obligations to the Marāthās. He tried to weaken the Marāthās by fomenting quarrels and conspiracies among their *sardārs* and rival claimants. He had his own army and was supported by a number of local Marāthā *sardārs* hostile to Rājā Shāhū; these

sardārs held *jāgīrs* and estates in the Marāthā part of the Mughul Deccan. The Nizām also had an eye on the Karnāṭak which now consisted of a number of independent *polygars* and *nawābs*.

Then there were a number of old *sardārs* who were interested in controlling and conducting the politics and warfare in the south, and who were opposed to the *Peshwā's* dominant role in it or control of it. Consequently the Marāthā policy towards the Nizām was not fixed, but was vacillating, though the latter was completely opposed to the Marāthā expansion in the south. Some of these ministers and *sardārs* sided with the Nizām against the *Peshwā*. Consequently the Nizām's power could not be liquidated, though he was defeated a number of times. Internal rivalries of Marāthā politics, and dangers and diversions in northern India politics saved the Mughul Deccan from being finally conquered and annexed. All the Marāthā warfare and successes proved of no avail in the end.

In 1741 Nizām-ul-Mulk was supported by the *Peshwā* in his fight against his own son Nasir Jang who wanted to usurp the *subāhdarship* of the Mughul Deccan. He defeated Nasir Jang and established himself again as the *Subāhdar* of the Mughul Deccan.¹⁷ In 1743 he invaded Karnāṭak and wrested it from Marāthā hands. After this till his death he did not fight the Marāthā forces in any theatre of war.¹⁸

Karnāṭak expeditions of the *Peshwā* were necessitated by the aggression of Muslim rulers on Hindu kingdoms of the south. The help of the Marāthās was also sought in quarrels over succession amongst local Muslim rulers in Karnāṭak. In 1740 Shāhū entrusted the task of defeating Muslim rulers to Raghūjī Bhosle. He defeated Dost 'Ali, the Nawāb of Arcot, in the battle of Damalcheri on 20 May, 1740. Trichinopoly was taken on 26 March, 1741, and Chandā Sāhib, his son-in-law, was captured and imprisoned. Thus Marāthā supremacy was established over the Karnāṭak.¹⁹

Nizām-ul-Mulk, however, could not tolerate this. He also laid claims to Karnāṭak as part of the Mughul empire. While Bālājī and Raghūjī were engaged in the Bengal campaign in 1742-43, Nizām-ul-Mulk invaded Karnāṭak in January, 1743, with a large force and brought it under his control. He thus completely undid the work of Raghūjī.²⁰ Shāhū entrusted the task of opposing the Nizām to Bābūjī Nāik and Fateh Singh Bhosle, who were defeated on 15 February, 1745.²¹ On 5 December, 1746, the *Peshwā* sent Sadāshiv Rāo, his nephew, to settle the affairs there.²² Nizām-ul-Mulk, however kept quiet till his death in 1748. Sadāshiv Rāo's campaign was

successful. He conquered a number of places in Karnāṭak and collected tribute from them. He returned on 13 April, 1747. But Bālājī could not get a grip over Karnāṭak till Shāhū's death. Shāhū did not want to displease even those who proved incompetent and treacherous, like Bābūjī Nāik. Bālājī's progress was hampered in the south, owing to the conflicting interests of Shāhū's *sardārs*.

Shāhū died on 15 December, 1749. Bālājī was desirous of uniting Kolhapur and Satara States, and thus creating one Marāthā State. He had therefore agreed secretly to support Shambhūjī's (king of Kolhapur) succession to Satara. But Shāhū was against the union. He appointed Rām Rājā, Tārā Bāi's grandson, as his successor. Tārā Bāi proved that he was not a pretender. Thus a war of succession was avoided in the Marāthā kingdom, but unfortunately Kolhapur and Satara remained separate States. Rām Rājā being weak and incompetent and being a puppet in the hands of Tārā Bāi, the power of the State gradually fell into the hands of the *Peshwā*.

Shāhū's disposition was not active and military. He did not want to disturb the existing conditions and vested interests. His vision was limited. He was not able to coordinate and control the work of his ministers and *sardārs*, nor could he coerce them into submission when necessary. He never interested himself in creating a strong, unitary and centralised administration in his *Swarāj*, much less in his new conquests. He would not allow the *Peshwā* to change the old order and bring in the new by way of reforms.

Bālājī became free from Shāhū's control at the end of 1749 and from succession affairs in 1751. The new ruler, Rām Rājā, was a mere nonentity. He was confined to his palace and was not allowed to take any active part in state affairs, first by Tārā Bāi and then by Bālājī.

The legacy of Bālājī was, however, not a happy one. There was no conception of a centralised and integrated state. The Marāthā State was merely a loose collection of feudal entities. It was only in the *Swarāj* territory that there was some centralised and unified administration. The outlying parts of the State were administered by the military *sardārs* to whom they were assigned as military grants (*Saranjams*).

In the second period of Bālājī's regime, his aims and problems remained the same. He, however, being more free to direct his policy, wanted to bring to a conclusion many of the old festering problems both in the north and in the south. The new dangers which

developed during this period were the conquests made by Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī in the Punjāb, and the military interference of the French and the English in the politics of both north and south.

In order to free himself from domestic troubles the *Peshwā* arrived at a settlement at Sangola in October, 1750 with Rām Rājā. It defined the claims and spheres of various ministers and *sardārs*.²³ On 24 November, 1750, Rām Rājā was put in confinement by his grand-mother Tārā Bāi. He thus ceased to be an active or directive factor in the politics of the Marāthā State.²⁴

V. *Southern Campaigns and Politics: Second Phase (1749-1761)*

In 1748 Nasir Jang succeeded Nizām-ul-Mulk, but was challenged by his nephew Muzaffar Jang. Muzaffar Jang and Chandā Sāheb sought the help of the Marāthās. But they immediately received the help of French forces and defeated Nasir Jang and the Nawāb of Arcot. Then Chāndā Sāheb became the Nawāb of Arcot, and Muzaffar Jang assumed the title of the Nizām. Nasir Jang sought the help of the *Peshwā*. He defeated his opponents but was killed on 5 December, 1750 in the battle between him and the opposite forces led by Bussy. Thus Muzaffar Jang became the Nizām, but he, too, was killed in a melee in 1751. Then Salābat Jang was installed as the Nizām by Bussy. In 1751 Salābat Jang and the *Peshwā* entered into an agreement. But the agreements proved short-lived; in November, 1751, Ramdas, the Diwān of Salābat Jang, on the advice and aid of Bussy, invaded the Marāthā territory. In the battle of Ghodnadi a number of skirmishes took place. Ramdas was not successful and concluded a treaty at Shingwa.²⁵

Ghāzī-ud-dīn, the eldest son of Nizām-ul-Mulk, who was at Delhi came to the Deccan in October, 1752, with a *farman* of the emperor to take over the *subāhdarship* of the Mughul Deccan, but before he could succeed he was poisoned by one of the wives of Nizām-ul-Mulk, mother of Nizām 'Ali, at a banquet on 16 October, 1752. The *Peshwā* and his *sardārs* had lent support to Ghāzī-ud-dīn's claim. Then Salābat Jang made peace with the *Peshwā* at Bhalki in November, 1752. It was agreed that both parties were to conduct jointly the invasion of Karnāṭak.²⁶ There was no warfare between the Nizām and the Marāthās till 1756. But in 1757 again incidents occurred and there was the campaign of Sindkhed from 17 August, 1757 to 2 January, 1758. It was undertaken to realise the 25 lakhs *jāgīr* promised by the Nizām to the *Peshwā*. A peace was made at Sakharkharda, and the *Peshwā* was again promised the *jāgīr*.²⁷ But the terms of the treaty were not carried out. The Nizām's strength which lay in the

French arms, was weakened by Bussy's departure in 1758. He then took the help of the British.

In 1759 Bālājī decided to crush the Nizām finally. The campaign of Udgir took place from October, 1759 to February, 1760. The Nizām's forces were completely defeated. The Marāthās captured four famous places—Burhanpur with fort Asirgarh, Daulatabad, Ahmadnagar and Bijāpur. Final victory was gained on 3 February, 1760. Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu conducted the campaign and led Marāthā forces to victory. The Nizām proposed peace. Sixty lakhs worth of *jāgīr* territory, Asirgarh and Daulatabad forts, Bijāpur and Burhanpur were ceded. Ahmadnagar had already been seized. But the battle of Pānipat and disasters in the north prevented the *Peshwā* from taking full advantage of the victory.²⁸

VI. *Karnāṭak Campaign*

From 1753 to 1760, the *Peshwā* conducted a number of campaigns in Karnāṭak to establish Marāthā supremacy and to secure a regular flow of money by way of tribute. In 1753 his forces entered Seringapatam (Srirangapattan). In 1754 they went to Bagalkot, Savanur and Harihar; in 1755 to Bidnur; in 1756 to Savanur; and in 1757 to Srirangapattan. In the next three years the *Peshwā* sent his *sardārs*. A lot of tribute and some territory was acquired. But matters were not finally settled.²⁹

VII. *Tulājī Angria and the Peshwā*

It is to the eternal discredit of Bālājī that he destroyed the naval power of Tulājī Angria with the help of the British. Without creating a new strong naval arm of the Marāthā State, which was an absolute necessity against European powers in the western seas, he destroyed the old. He did not fully realise the political danger coming from the sea-powers of the west like the Portuguese, the French and the English.

Tulājī Angria did not keep on good terms with the *Peshwā* and was often arrogant and disloyal. His opposition and disloyalty became a thorn in the eyes of Bālājī. He therefore sought the help of the British in the home affairs of the Marāthā State. It was the greatest mistake committed. Tulājī had defied western powers on the seas and checked their ambition and aggression all these years. Bālājī did not fully weigh this fact. The British were very glad of this golden opportunity to crush the Marāthā naval power completely. Bālājī was blind to this. Thus, one of the greatest achieve-

ments of the Marāthās and a century-old unique creation of Marāthā naval genius was destroyed by the *Peshwā* with the help of a foreign enemy. It was a suicidal act born of a short-sighted policy.

Tulājī Angria who had succeeded Sambhājī Angria in 1743, proved strong and daring enough not to allow the Europeans to establish their naval supremacy on the western coast till 1755. But the *Peshwā* and the British entered into a treaty of aggression against Tulājī on 19 March, 1755.³⁰ Tulājī was defeated by the combined forces, and Suvarnadurg was captured on 4 April, 1755,³¹ and Vijayadurg on 13 February, 1756.³² Vijayadurg was taken possession of by the English against *Peshwā*'s desire. It was a great success for the British whose navy could now control the whole of the western coast. The *Peshwā* took Underi from the Sidis in 1759. But the English would not help the *Peshwā* in destroying the power and fort of Sidis. What a contrast between the English and the *Peshwā*!

VIII. Northern Campaigns and Politics:

Second Phase (1749-1761)

The years 1748 and 1749 are very important in the political history of India both in the north and in the south. Indian politics then was primarily personal, not institutional. The death of emperor Muhammad Shāh on 14 April, 1748, of Nizām-ul-Mulk on 21 May, 1748, and of Shāhū on 15 December, 1749, removed men of old traditions and great influence. Similarly, the Anglo-French wars and their successful interference in Indian politics, and Ahmad Shāh Abdālī's invasions and temporary conquests created new dangers and introduced new forces in Indian politics. The old world of the Mughul supremacy practically ended, and a new world of usurping *nawābs* and *nizāms*, ministers and generals arose. We do not find one power as that of the Mughul emperor dominating over India, but a number of usurping powers—ministers and governors—holding that power separately and using it against the unity and safety of the empire itself in their own dynastic and narrow feudal interests. The age may be called the age of *Vazīrs* and *Peshwās* or prime ministers, both in the north and in the south, or of *subāhdars* (governors) and *sardārs*. The Mughul emperor of the north, and the Marāthā king of the south had become puppets or nonentities in the politics of the country. They had no character or ability or strength and proved mere ghosts of their famous predecessors and ancestors, sitting on their thrones as mere puppets.

The Delhi emperors had asked for Marāthā help against foreign invaders like Nādir Shāh in 1739, and against Ahmad Shāh Abdālī

in 1747. Bājī Rāo had started but could not reach in time to fight against Nādir Shāh. Bālājī reached Jaipur in 1747, but Ābdālī was defeated before he could reach Delhi. Marāthā help was also sought by the *Vazīrs* of the emperor against their rivals from the time of Bājī Rāo. During Bālājī's time a Marāthā contingent was placed at Delhi according to an agreement of 1752³³ to serve the Delhi emperor and his *Vazir*. Thus Marāthā influence in Delhi politics went on increasing. Later on, their help was also sought in the Afghān quarrels in the Doāb and in the quarrels in the Punjāb against the Afghān aggression from beyond the Indian borders.

The *Peshwā* had his *sardārs*—Sindia, Holkar and Pawār and other officers, administrators and representatives, permanently placed in important parts of northern India. Rānōjī Sindia, the founder of the Sindia house, died in 1745. His sons Jayāppā and Dattājī were good soldiers and continued their father's work in the north as the military generals of the *Peshwā*. Malhār Rāo Holkar lived during Bālājī's regime and carried on Marāthā military activities in the north, specially in Mālwa, Rājputānā, Bundelkhand, the Doāb and Delhi areas. Other *sardārs* and officers were engaged in minor and restricted theatres of war.

Bālājī did not personally go to the north after he returned from Jaipur in 1748. His *sardārs* and representatives were carrying on military and diplomatic activities on his behalf to secure for him financial and territorial gains and to advance his political interests and supremacy in the north. Bālājī kept himself in touch with northern politics through correspondence. He had envoys at various courts. Hingnes were entrusted with the diplomatic work at Delhi as the envoys of the *Peshwā*.

During the second period of Bālājī's regime four great campaigns were organised in the north—two under the command of Raghūnāth Rāo, the third one under Dattājī Sindia and the last one under Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu. Delhi emperors and *Vazīrs* had asked for Marāthā support in their internal quarrels and against foreign invasions. Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī invaded India a number of times. Though he was defeated in 1748, he was successful in later campaigns, being invited by discontented governors and nobles of the Punjāb and the Doāb. The emperor being weak had to cede some districts in the Punjāb to the Ābdālī in his second campaign.

The *Peshwā's* chief aim in undertaking these expeditions was to realise the vast sums of money promised by north Indian rulers and governors. The first expedition to the north under Raghūnāth

Rāo took place during 1753-55. He was the commander of the Marāthā forces and was assisted by Sindia and Holkar. This campaign lasted till October, 1755. The Marāthās arrived in Rājputānā in October, 1753. They were promised tribute by Kota, Bundī, Jaipur and other States. They fought with the Jāts from 16 January to 22 May, 1754, but failed. After that they marched towards Delhi. They helped Ghāzī-ud-din Imād-ul-Mulk in putting a new emperor on the throne and in making him the *Vazīr*. Raghūnāth Rāo moved round Delhi and its environments; then he entered the Doāb and after realising some contributions from Rohillās and others, he returned to Poona on 10 August, 1755. Malhār Rāo Holkar had accompanied Raghūnāth Rāo in this campaign. The subsidy of 40 lakhs promised to the Marāthās by the *Vazīr* could not be realised. Only a small amount was paid. The Marāthās were therefore given 22 villages in Saharanpur and a few others from the emperor's estate.³⁴

IX. *The Punjāb Politics and Campaigns in the Second Period*

The Punjāb politics was at the time in a confused state. Claimants and usurpers were quarrelling for its governorship. The Sikhs had risen in rebellion. In this state of affairs, Ahmad Shāh Abdālī invaded the Punjāb and stayed there from December, 1747 to March, 1748. Shāh Nawāz Khān who had usurped the governorship of the Punjāb sought his help against the emperor. An engagement between the Afghāns and the Mughuls took place on 11 January, 1748, and Lahore was captured by the Afghāns. Then the Afghāns took Sirhind. But they were defeated by the imperialists on 11 March, 1748.³⁵

Their second invasion occurred in December, 1749. The *subāhdar* of Lahore granted Abdālī the revenues of four *Mahāls* and he retired.

The third invasion took place in December, 1751, in order to realise the promised annual revenues of the four *mahāls*, which were not sent. Muin-ul-Mulk, the governor, had to surrender to Abdālī at Lahore on 5 March, 1752. Thus the Punjāb was lost to the empire and *subāhs* of Lahore and Multan were added to the Durrāni empire by a treaty which was confirmed by the emperor on 13 April, 1752. Abdālī then conquered Kāshmīr.

After the third invasion of Abdālī, the *Vazīr* Safdar Jang and Khoja Jāvid Khān, a favourite and confidant of the court, persuaded the emperor to enter into an agreement with the Marāthās in May, 1752, for undertaking the duty of defending the empire against its

external and internal foes.³⁶ Antāji Mānkeshwar was placed in charge of the Marāthā military force at Delhi for this duty. In return, the Marāthās were to get the *chauth* of the North-Western provinces usurped and occupied by the Afghāns. But that *chauth* could only be secured by actual conquest. The Marāthās were also given the *subāhs* of Ajmer and Āgra which were in the hands of Rājputs and Jāts. This created antagonism between them and the Marāthās.

After the murder of Jāvid Khān on 27 August, 1752, by *Vazīr* Safdar Jang, Imād-ul-Mulk, Ghāzī-ud-din Khān's son, with the help of the Marāthās drove away Safdar Jang in 1753 to Awadh, and in June, 1754 he deposed the emperor Ahmad Shāh. Raghūnāth Rāo, Malhār Rāo Holkar and Najib Rohillā assisted him to become *Vazīr* in place of Intizam-ud-Daulah, the son of the old *Vazīr* Qamar-ud-din.³⁷

The fourth invasion of Ābdālī took place in November 1756. The Punjāb politics and life were in chaos and confusion. The Sikhs had risen everywhere. The Marāthās were interfering in the politics of Delhi and harassing the governors and the governed for money. At this time, Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī was invited to invade India by Mughlāni Begam, the widow of the late *subāhdar* Muin-ul-Mulk, Najib-ud-Daulah, and the emperor 'Alamgīr II, all of whom promised him full support.³⁸ On this occasion there was no opposition to him till he reached Delhi. Delhi was looted and ravaged systematically. Sacred places like Mathura and Vrindāvan suffered the same fate. There were massacres and rapes. Cholera epidemic in his army, however, made him return. While on his way back Ahmad Shāh again sacked Delhi, annexed Sirhind, and laden with immense booty, left Delhi on 2 April, 1757. He gave the office of the *Vazīr* to Imād-ul-Mulk and that of *Mīr Bakhshi* to Najib-ud-Daulah, making the latter his own plenipotentiary and the real master of the Mughul government.³⁹

The defect of Marāthā politics in the north lay in the constant change of policy and allies. This created suspicion and distrust in the minds of all, against them. They thus alienated the sympathy of Rājputs, the Jāts, the Awadh Nawābs and the Rohillās. They had no real and constant allies left for achieving their political objectives in the north.⁴⁰

The fourth invasion of Ābdālī broke the back of the Delhi power and also swept off Marāthā influence there. After Ābdālī's departure the Marāthās again came and established their supremacy at Delhi and ousted Najib-ud-Daulah. They entered into a new treaty in June, 1757, with Imād-ul-Mulk. Instead of one-fourth they were promis-

ed one-half share of all the revenues that they might gather from the Mughul dominions.⁴¹ This meant that the Marāthās must use force on all sides to get their dues. Their main object, however, became the establishment of their supremacy in the Punjāb province.

After May, 1757, the condition of the Punjāb politics was that Abdālī's son, Timur Shāh, was the viceroy at Lahore and Jahān Khān, his general and guardian. There were two other parties who claimed the governorship of Lahore—one, the Mughul party led by Mughlāni Begam, the widow of Muin-ul-Mulk, the old governor, who died in 1753, and the other, the party of Sikhs who had risen as a people against the Mughul rule. Adinā Beg Khān, one of the officers, was carrying on guerilla warfare with the help of the Sikhs for power. The Sikhs had made stable rule of the Afghāns in the Punjāb impossible by defeating their generals. Adinā Beg Khān invited the Marāthās to help him. The Marāthā plan was to prevent Abdālī from crossing the Indus. They, therefore, undertook the campaign in the Punjāb with the consent of the *Vazīr* Imād-ul-Mulk in March, 1758. Raghūnāth Rāo and Malhār Rāo led this campaign.

This was the second expedition of Raghūnāth Rāo carried on during 1757-58. Large Marāthā armies began to move and stay in the north for this purpose. Raghūnāth first invaded Rājputānā and then moved on to Delhi. He attacked Delhi on 11 August, 1757 and took it. Najib Khān Rohillā made peace with the Marāthās on 9 September, 1757. Thus Raghūnāth established Marāthā supremacy over the Delhi area. But Najib-ud-Daulah continued his secret alliance with the Abdālī and invited him to drive away the Marāthās from the north.

The first Marāthā invasion of the Punjāb took place in 1758 under the leadership of Raghūnāth. He was assisted by Malhār Rāo Holkar. It was Adinā Beg who had requested Raghūnāth, when at Delhi, to extend the Marāthā dominions as far as the Indus. The invasion began in February 1758.

The Marāthā troops were about 50,000. Mānājī Pāygūdē, the able Marāthā captain, led the Marāthās to Lahore, on 20 April 1758. Timur Shāh and Jahān Khān retreated beyond the Chinab. Then Raghūnāth and Malhār Rāo returned by the end of May, 1758, at the call of the *Peshwā*. The whole administration of the Punjāb was left in the hands of Adinā Beg who promised to pay 75 lakhs a year to the Marāthās.⁴²

The danger to the Marāthā power lay in not staying in the Punjāb in sufficient strength and consolidating their conquests. That

was the weakness of the whole of their northern and Deccan policy and politics. A small force could not meet all eventualities. However, on their return, Raghūnāth sent Vithal Shivdeo, and Malhār Rāo sent Tukoji Holkar to the Punjāb.

Raghūnāth in his letter to the *Peshwā* from Lahore on 4 May, 1758, describes the Marāthā achievements in the Punjāb as follows:

"We have already brought Lahore, Multan, Kāshmīr and other *subāhs* on this side of Attock under our rule for the most part... Ahmad Khān Ābdālī's son, Timur Sultān, and Jahān Khān, have been pursued by our troops, and their forces completely routed. Both of them have now reached Peshāwar with a few broken troops... we have decided to establish our rule up to Kandahar".⁴³

Adinā Beg died in October 1758. After his death a great scramble for power began in the Punjāb. Tukoji on behalf of Holkar marched on beyond the Jhelum and the Indus in pursuit of the Afghāns in October, 1758, and thus carried Marāthā arms and standard beyond Attock to Peshāwar. Sābāji Sindia who had been sent by Dattāji, followed suit and joined him there. They continued there for four months till they returned to Lahore in March 1759, after new Afghān pressure.

But the anarchy in the Punjāb and the consequent injury to Marāthā interests there compelled the *Peshwā* to send a fresh strong force to the province under the able leadership of Dattāji Sindia. He arrived near the Sutlej in the first week of April, 1759. Here he was met by Adinā Beg's son who paid a part of the tribute. Dattāji then sent Sābāji Sindia with an army to take over Lahore and its governorship directly into his own hands. Sābāji Sindia was obeyed as governor as Dattāji was there to help him with his large force. In August, 1759 Sābāji drove back the invasion of Jahān Khān coming from Peshāwār. The Afghān general retreated across the Indus. His son died and many of his troops were killed and wounded.

But Jahān Khān again crossed the Indus in October 1759, with a strong Afghān force, and marched towards Lahore. At this time Dattāji was engaged in the siege of Shukartāl. Sābāji was not strong enough to oppose Jahān Khān; he therefore retreated from Lahore and thus deserted the Punjāb.

Dattāji and Jankoji, who had gone as far as the Sutlej in April, 1759, did not stay there long enough to organise the Punjāb conquests. They returned, depending on Sābāji and his forces to hold

the Punjāb. The *Peshwā* asked them to return to Delhi as he was in great need of money to pay his heavy debts. He wanted Dattāji to undertake a new campaign to Bengal to get money.

The Marāthās were in the Punjāb from April, 1758, to October, 1759. They acted as representatives of the emperor, and collected the revenue with the help of local Mughul officers. The Marāthās had about 15,000 troops there to oppose the fifth invasion of Abdālī.

The whole province of the Punjāb was occupied by the Afghāns without a blow. Marāthā detachments which were dispersed throughout the province, lost heavily. Abdālī established his government at Lahore in October, 1759, entered Sirhind on 27 November, 1759, and annexed the Punjāb. This was his fifth invasion of India. It was undertaken to remove the Marāthā danger once for all. Najib-ud-Daulah, his Indian ally, invited and helped him in this task.

X. *Rājputānā Politics and Campaigns in the Second Period*

By 1751 the claimants whom the Marāthās had supported in Jaipur, Jodhpur and Bundī, had succeeded to their principalities. But the huge sums which were promised to the Marāthās had not been paid and not even a part of them could be realised except by force. In 1751 and 1752 the Marāthās were helping Safdar Jang of Awadh against the Afghāns of the Doāb. In 1752 Malhār Rāo Holkar was supporting Ghāzi-ud-din, the eldest son of Nizām-ul-Mulk, to secure the viceroyalty of the Mughul Deccan.

From 1753, the Marāthās again took an active part in Rājputānā politics. Sindia and Holkar were the chief Marāthā *sardārs* who were entrusted with preserving Marāthā interests there. Jayappā Sindia was not successful at first at Ajmer, but invaded Mārwar again on 23 June, 1754. At this time Raghūnāth Rāo came from the south along with Malhār Rāo Holkar. He gained some contributions, but his main object was to go to Delhi to help Imād-ul-Mulk. He reached there on 1 June, 1754. Jayappā Sindia completely defeated Bijay Singh of Mārwar on 15 September near Merta. Though Jayappā had early successes in Mārwar in 1755 also, his unco-operative conduct and exorbitant demands ruined the cause of the Marāthās in Rājputānā. On 25 July, 1755, he was murdered by a Rāthor envoy in a heated discussion during negotiations for peace. Therefore warfare continued furiously, and with the help of Dattāji Sindia and other *sardārs* the Marāthās were successful. Jaipur and Jodhpur made peace with the Marāthās in February, 1756. Ajmer

fort and district were ceded to the Marāthās. An indemnity of fifty lakhs was promised. Rām Singh, whom the Marāthās supported, got half the territory of Mārwar.

In the year 1757, the *Peshwā* ordered Malhār Rāo and Raghūnāth Rāo to realise the promised tribute. They had first intended to march to Delhi against Ābdālī, but were not well equipped for it. They had neither sufficient money, nor proper fighting forces and materials, and were not successful in realising the total amount of contributions in spite of threats of force. Jaipur under Mādhō Singh resisted their exorbitant demands, and began to conspire with the Afghāns against them. Raghūnāth Rāo could get only eleven lakhs from Jaipur, but was not able to continue hostilities for want of more money. Nobody offered him any loan, and looting could not maintain an army for long. During this time, while he was engaged in minor conflicts, Ābdālī's fourth expedition took place. The Shāh sacked and ravaged not only Delhi, but also the holy places of Mathura and Vrindāvan and Raghūnāth Rāo was not able to do anything to check him. Raghūnāth returned to the south in June 1758. From July, 1758, Jankōji Sindia, son of Jayappā, was trying to realise tribute from those Rājput States which had agreed to pay, and to use force against those States which were forming anti-Marāthā coalitions and alliances.

In July, 1759, Malhār Rāo Holkar was sent to Jaipur to force it to pay the annual tribute which had not been paid for long. Mādhō Singh had become pro-Ābdālī. The *Peshwā* wanted money badly, but Holkar, in spite of his military superiority, was not successful in his objectives. He had, moreover, suddenly to abandon Rājputānā in December, 1759, at the request of Dattājī Sindia to come to his help. Mādhō Singh delayed Malhār Rāo's departure till Ābdālī had reached Sirhind on 27 November, 1759. Malhār Rāo left for Delhi on 2 January, 1760. Rājputānā affairs thus remained unsettled during 1760.

XI. Delhi Politics and Campaigns

The *Peshwā* had appointed Dattājī in 1758 to replace Malhār Rāo, who was dilatory in diplomacy and warfare in northern India. Dattājī Sindia's campaigns in the north took place during 1759-60. He adopted a stronger policy towards Delhi than that of Malhār Rāo Holkar. His policy was anti-Najib as Malhār's was pro-Najib. He was commissioned to realise all the tributes promised from various imperial provinces. Raghunāth Rāo's expeditions had not been fruitful. Dattājī threatened the *Vazīr*, Imād-ul-Mulk and, after a

few skirmishes near Delhi on 29 January, 1759, there was an agreement about the money to be paid by the *Vazīr*. Dattājī then marched towards the Punjāb on 1 February, 1759 and brought it again under control. He returned to Delhi in May, 1759, as he wanted to lead an expedition to Bengal as suggested by the *Peshwā*. He entered into an agreement with Najib-ud-Daulah to help him in building a bridge across the Gangā. Dattājī entered the upper Doāb and met Najib. But Najib did not like to accompany the Marāthās in their Bengal expedition. Being suspicious of their intentions he defeated their plan by false promises and dilatory tactics. Then monsoon came and the bridge could not be built. Najib had invited Ābdālī and was organising a secret alliance of the Mughul nobles and Afghān and Rājput rulers in order to drive away the Marāthās from the north. Dattājī, therefore, decided to crush him. But Najib had already taken an unassailable position at Shukartāl on the bank of the Gangā, where he entrenched himself. At this place Dattājī wasted four months but failed to dislodge the Rohillā chief.⁴⁴

Sābājī Sindia, the Marāthā governor of Lahore, abandoned the Punjāb and reached Dattājī's camp on 8 November, 1759. Najib would not agree to pay an indemnity of 25 lakhs, and the war went on; but Dattājī's position at Shukartāl became untenable. On 23 November, a small remnant of Marāthā troops of the Punjāb defeated by the Ābdālī reached Dattājī's camp. Dattājī raised the siege, as he had to meet the new Afghān danger. The Afghān army met Dattājī's forces near Thaneswar on 24 December, 1759. Dattājī, being checked, fell back towards Delhi. A battle took place at Barari or Burādi Ghat on 10 January, 1760 in which Dattājī was killed, and the Marāthā army retreated.⁴⁵ Jankōjī Sindia fled, and Malhār Rao Holkar, who was called for help, joined him on 15 January, 1760. Both kept hovering round Delhi, and Malhār Rāo was defeated at Sikandarbad in March, 1760.⁴⁶ Ābdālī did not return to his country after this, but remained in the Doāb at the request of Najib to meet the new Marāthā menace coming from the Deccan to avenge the disaster at Burādi Ghat.

Sadāshiv Rāo's expedition to the north took place in 1760. The *Peshwā* learnt on 27 January, 1760, of Ābdālī's invasion, of Marāthā retreat from the Punjāb, and of Dattājī being forced to raise the siege of Shukartāl. Then the shocking news came on 15 February, 1760, of the death of Dattājī and the destruction of the army under him. Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu, the victor of Udgir, was appointed to lead the expedition to retrieve the Marāthā fortunes in the north.⁴⁷ He was, however, not free to decide matters on his own responsibility, as

Vishwās Rāo, the son of Bālājī Rāo, was made the nominal commander-in-chief. Bhāu reached the Chambal on 8 June, 1760. Malhār Rāo Holkar joined him there. Shujā-ud-Daulah, the Nawab of Awadh, joined Ābdālī's side at the persuasion of Najib Khan. Bhāu invited all chiefs in the north to join in driving out foreigners,⁴⁸ but there was no response from any quarter. Rājput princes were either hostile or neutral. Only Suraj Mal Jāt helped the Marāthās by providing them supplies. All the Muslim rulers of the north combined against the Marāthās. That the Hindu rulers did not join or support Bhāu was a fact which weakened the Marāthā financial resources and military strength. There were differences about the plan of campaign among the Marāthā chiefs themselves. On 16 May, 1760, Hāfiz Rahmat came from Ābdālī, met Malhār Rāo Holkar and Suraj Mal, and proposed peace. But there was no agreement as the Marāthā terms were exorbitant.

Another attempt at peace was made after the capture of Delhi by Bhāu. Shujā-ud-Daulah proposed to bring about peace between Ābdālī and the *Peshwā*. The conditions proposed were that Shāh 'Alam should be acknowledged as emperor and his eldest son Jawān Bakht as his heir, that Shujā should be appointed as *Vazīr*, and that Ābdālī should then return to his own country and the Marāthās to their own. But the opposition of Imād-ul-Mulk and Suraj Mal to this proposal defeated the new peace move.

The Marāthās thought in terms of India as a whole. They had invited all the rulers to join them against Afghān foreigners. Bhāu aimed at fixing India's boundary at Attock. Peshāwar and beyond was to be left to the Afghāns. The Marāthās were to administer imperial provinces in the name of the Mughul emperor.⁴⁹

Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu captured Delhi on 2 August, 1760. He was helped by Malhār Rāo, Jankōjī and Balwant Rāo Mehendale. But Suraj Mal, who was on the Marāthā side, left the Marāthā cause because peace proposals unacceptable to him, were being entertained. His departure was a great loss, as no ally was left to the Marāthās in the north. Suraj Mal suspected Marāthā intentions against his own possessions. The Marāthās had now to rely solely on their own resources and leadership. No peace was possible as the *Peshwā* would not agree to cede the Punjāb to Ābdālī or recognise Najib Khān's possessions in the Doāb, though Bhāu was prepared to entertain these proposals.

The capture of Delhi restored the prestige of Marāthā arms which had been lost after the fall of Dattājī. At this point Ābdālī

showed his readiness for an honourable peace between the Rohillās and the Marāthās and then would have liked to return to his country. But Bhāu's success at Delhi overcame his sense of reality. He exaggerated the differences and anxieties felt in Ābdālī's camp. Najib and Shujā continued peace talks with Bhāu during August and September, 1760. They did not succeed as the *Peshwā's* demands were exorbitant.

After the conquest of Delhi, Bhāu was drawn further north and his difficulties increased as regards food supplies. There was starvation amongst his soldiers. No money or loan was available. His financial resources were exhausted and dried up as there was no local tribute available. Bankers had already disappeared.⁵⁰

XII. *The Battle of Pānipat* (14 January, 1761)

Bhāu captured Kunjpura on 17 October, 1760. This was necessary in order to cut off Ābdālī's communications and to capture his provisions there. But Bhāu neglected to keep his own line of communication intact and watch the fords of the Jamunā to prevent Ābdālī's crossing. While at Kunjpura, news reached him that Ābdālī had crossed the Jamunā near Baghpat and was striding across his path to the south. He then began his march towards Delhi and reached Pānipat on 29 October, 1760. Ābdālī, in the meanwhile, had crossed the Jamunā, arrived at Sonapat on 20 October, 1760, and reached Pānipat on 1 November, 1760. Bhāu's communications with Delhi and the Deccan were consequently cut off.

During March to October, 1760, Ābdālī had destroyed the Marāthā power in the Punjāb, captured Delhi, killed Dattājī Sindia and driven out Malhār Rāo and other Marāthās from the Upper Doāb. He also had compelled Suraj Mal to promise tribute. He would have gone back to his country had not Najib-ud-Daulah insisted on his staying on in order to destroy the *Peshwā's* army coming from the south. So he remained in India after April, 1760, to settle issues with the Marāthās.

Shujā-ud-Daulah of Awadh was won over by Najib Khān on 18 July, 1760. Ābdālī's difficulties of food and fodder during his encampment in the Doāb were met both by Najib and Shujā.

Ābdālī's forces consisted roughly of 40,000 horse and 40,000 foot. His own army consisted of 30,000 cavalry and 10,000 infantry and 2,000 camel-swivels. The rest of the troops—10,000 horse and 30,000 foot—belonged to his Indian allies. Sadāshiv Rāo's army roughly consisted of 55,000 horse and 15,000 foot. This included 9,000 dis-

ciplined sepoy under Ibrāhim Khān Gārdi. Ābdālī's forces were superior both in number and quality. There were quite a large number of irregulars accompanying both the sides. The odds were against the Marāthās and Ābdālī's generalship was superior. His cavalry was the finest in Asia, and his artillery was very mobile. Sadāshiv Rāo had a famished army, and his horses were poor and starved. His artillery was not equal to Ābdālī's.⁵¹ Ābdālī's organisation and discipline of the army were far superior to that of Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu. The Afghān's was a compact centralised organisation. As against this, Marāthā organisation was feudal and individualistic. The Marāthā army was not well-knit in spirit and movement, and its discipline was loose and lax.

Both armies entrenched themselves at Pānipat. Skirmishes and minor battles began from 1 November, 1760. The first regular battle was fought on 7 December, 1760, when the Rohillās penetrated suddenly into the Marāthā trenches. They were defeated, but Balwant Rāo Mehendale, an important *sardār*, fell. He was the chief counselor of Sadāshiv Rāo and an able military leader.

The Afghān cavalry patrols were able to dominate the environs of the Marāthā camp. They cut off Marāthā communications, correspondence and food supplies. This weakened Bhāu's military strength, because he lost connection with his base. His horses and soldiers were starving, and his ammunition was being exhausted. The treasure coming from the south was stopped and cut off. His condition in Pānipat thus deteriorated. Govind Ballāl Bundela failed to send help and supplies. He was killed in a raid in the Upper Doāb on 17 December, 1760. A Marāthā raid in Awadh also failed in January, 1761. The treasure which was sent to Bhāu by Govind Pant was also cut off near Pānipat on 6 January, 1761. Thus Bhāu's condition became worse and full of despair. His army was beleaguered and starved and his food resources were exhausted. Under these conditions Bhāu proposed peace at any price, but Ābdālī rejected it on the advice of Qazi Idris who preached *Jehad* against the Marāthās.

Therefore on 13 January, 1761, the starving Marāthā army decided to fight and next day marched to battle, (on 14 January). The rival armies had encamped close to each other for three months.

The Afghāns had received fresh reinforcements from home, and their discipline and morale were excellent. Ābdālī's army worked under him as one force, and his artillery was more efficient and mobile. The Afghān soldiers were well-armed and well-clad and their military tactics were superior to those of the Marāthās.

*With the Marāthās cut off from their base, the Pānipat campaign developed into a huge siege operation. Bhāu's superiority lay in his heavy artillery and trained battalions, with which he surrounded himself in his entrenched camp at Pānipat. Having retired within the defences of this fortress Bhāu expected the Ābdālī to attempt to take the place by assault. Ābdālī's response was different. Instead of hurling his men against Marāthā cannon, he chose to starve out the beleaguered garrison. Bhāu's hope lay in holding out indefinitely and annoying the besiegers by frequent sorties and by calling his supporters outside to attack the Afghāns. None of the measures he could pursue with success, as he was in a friendless country without outside supporters. The sorties made by the Marāthās succeeded partially, but by themselves they could not decide the issue. Bhāu's primary mistake was to allow himself to be besieged in a foreign land. This view of the event explains why Ābdālī delayed the attack for such a long time, and forced the Marāthās to abandon their defences and come out in the open. When the besieging party is unable to carry a place by assault it seeks to reduce the defence by starvation. The explanation given by some writers that Ābdālī feared to close with the Marāthās and was doubtful of the ultimate issue till the last moment, misses the real issue.**

Bhāu did not get any additional reinforcements from the south. He made a great mistake in not guarding adequately the fords at the Jamunā and maintain his connection with the south. In this battle of Pānipat the Marāthās were routed and defeated completely. It was a great disaster to them. Vishwās Rāo and Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu were killed. Most of the officers fell. A large part of the forces were massacred and annihilated. The remnants were pursued and slaughtered. A large amount of booty was captured by the victors. The total loss of the Marāthās is estimated at 50,000 horses, 2,00,000 cattle, thousands of camels, hundreds of elephants and a large amount of cash and jewellery.⁵²

The Marāthās lost heavily in men, money, military power and political prestige by this defeat at Pānipat, and lost the empire of India. It proved a great set-back to their political ambitions, and they had to re-establish their position in the north.

Ahmad Shāh Ābdālī left India in March, 1761. He gained very little except booty and prestige, and was prepared to make peace with the Marāthās in April 1761. But the attempt proved a failure.

Morally, the defeat of Pānipat was a disaster to the Marāthās. They lost their support and prestige in the north, their help was no more sought in quarrels by local potentates and rulers.

Shortly after hearing the result of the battle of Pānipat Bālājī Rāo Peshwā died on 23 June, 1761. It came as a great shock to him, as all his life's work lay in ruins. His mistake lay in not keeping open a line of constant communication with Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu, in not properly estimating the needs of his army, in not watching constantly the position of Bhāu's forces, and in not keeping a constant flow of reinforcements and supplies to his army. He was not near the field of battle where the fate of his empire was being decided.

Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu's ideal was India for the Indians.⁵³ The country up to Attock or the Indus was to be governed by Indians themselves, not by Turks, Persians or Afghāns. He failed because his captains did not understand his strategy and tactics of warfare. Representing the *Peshwā*, he wanted to defend the Mughul empire from the internal and external enemies from 1752. He received authority from the emperors and *Vazīrs* for this purpose throughout India.

But Marāthā habits and character and their own equipment in men, money, resources and knowledge were not adequate for such a huge task in face of foreign military powers and internal selfish and aggrandising rulers and officers.

APPENDIX

(By the Editor)

The description of the Battle of Pānīpat, given above, in the text, seems to be not only meagre and therefore somewhat misleading, but also inaccurate in some details. The author being dead long ago it could not be revised by him. Though there is some difference of opinion even among modern scholars, the best available accounts are those given by Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, Sardesai in his *New History of the Marāthās*, (Vol. II, pp. 435-44) and Shejwalkar in his monograph *Panīpat*, 1761.

Sardesai's estimate of the strength of the two hostile armies is a little different from that given in the text. He estimates Ābdālī's army as sixty thousand strong, nearly half of which was foreign and half Indian, of which the major portion was cavalry with a small admixture of infantry; the strength of the fighting Marāthā force was forty-five thousand Marāthās "who were certainly weakened by starvation and the loss of animals." Shejwalkar calculates the strength of the Marāthā army in the final action at 50,000. The Marāthās had a powerful artillery of more than two hundred pieces commanded by Ibrāhīm Khān. Ābdālī, on the other hand, "had no heavy guns of the Marāthā type; he had, instead, an efficient fire-arm of about two thousand light guns, camel-borne swivels, which could inflict severe havoc upon the dense mass of the Marāthā ranks at short range" (Sardesai's *New History*, Vol. II, p. 440).

So far as the actual combat is concerned the following account seems to be nearest to truth from available sources of information: The battle lasted from about 9 A.M. to 3 P.M. The Marāthās fought vigorously for a few hours at the beginning, creating great havoc in the enemy's ranks. Ābdālī was "for a moment nervous about the issue" (p. 441) and called the select reserve force of six thousand Kazalbash cavalry corps who retrieved the position. The Marāthā Commander and the Peshwā's son made such a fierce onslaught upon the enemy's centre commanded by the *Vazīr* of Ābdālī that Kashī-rāj (who has written an account of the battle) saw him "sitting on the ground, beating his forehead in agony and trying to rally his fleeing followers piteously crying, 'where are you running away my friends; Kabul is far off; you can't reach it by running away'" (p. 441). Ābdālī who had been constantly on the move watching the situation in different parts of the battle-field, realized his (*Vazīr's*) dangerous position. "He immediately detached fresh troops for his relief and had all the fleeing soldiers called back on pain of cutting them down. Until about two o'clock in the afternoon the Marāthās continued their furious offensive. The enemy was yielding ground and the Marāthās appeared almost within an inch of winning" (p. 442). At this moment the thirteen thousand soldiers who had withdrawn from the battle but returned on pain of death, joined the combat. The Marāthā troops who had been

strenuously fighting "for over five hours without food and water, now showed signs of exhaustion". Ābdālī who had been watching the situation now called in his reserve of ten thousand men and they turned the scale decisively against the Marāthās. The destruction of the Marāthā army was completed by the Afghān squadron of 1500 camel swivels firing from a close range, and a stray bullet killed Vishwās Rāo a little before three in the afternoon. Then commenced a general flight of the Marāthā troops followed by a terrible carnage. About seventy-five thousand Marāthā soldiers and camp followers were killed and twenty-two thousand saved their lives by paying ransom (p. 443).

This account of the battle is corroborated in a general manner by the victor himself, as will appear from the following extracts of a letter written by Ābdālī to Rājā Mādhō Singh. This letter was published by Sir Jadunath Sarkar in the *Modern Review* (May, 1946).

"The enemy distinguished themselves and fought so well that it was beyond the capacity of other races. Gradually the fighting passed from the exchange of cannon and rocket-fire to the discharge of muskets, from which it proceeded to the stage of combat with swords, daggers and knives. They grasped each other by neck. These dauntless bloodshedders (the Marāthās) did not fall short in fighting and doing glorious deeds. Suddenly the breeze of victory began to blow and as willed by the Divine Lord the wretched Decanis suffered utter defeat. . . . Forty to fifty thousand troopers and infantry men of the enemy became as grass before our pitiless swords.

All the enemy's artillery, elephants and property have been seized by my men".

The letter adds that both Vishwās Rāo and Bhaū were killed, and removes all doubts of the death of the latter.⁵⁴

NOTES

1. *Selections from Peshwā Daftar*, Vol. XV, pp. 97-98, hereafter referred to as *S.P.D.*; *Purandare Daftar*, I, 149, Rajwade, VI, 151; also Sardesai, *New History*, II, pp. 202-3.
2. *Ibid.*, also Rajwade, II, 95; Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India*, I, 1880 edn., pp. 75-77.
3. For Marāthā conquests of Bengal, see *S.P.D.*, XX, 24-28, 29, 48-49; *Aitihāsik Patravayawahār*, 35-36; Rajwade, *M.I.S.*, III, 184, 217, 535, VI, 169-71; *Vad, Peshwā Diaries*, Balāji Bāji Rāo, Vol. II, pp. 242-43; *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin* (Eng. Translation), II, p. 117-130 and *Maharāshtrā Purana*, ed. by Edward C. Dimock and P. C. Gupta (1961).
4. *Aitihāsik Patravayawahār*, 35-36.
5. See note No. 3; also Sarkar, Jadunath, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, p. 166.
6. Sardesai, *New History of the Marāthās*, Vol. II, p. 230; *S.P.D.* XXVII, 7; *Bharat Varsha*, I.
7. Sardesai, *op. cit.*, p. 232; Rajwade, VI, 166-67; *S.P.D.* XXI, 7.
8. *S.P.D.* II, 9 and Sardesai, *op. cit.*, pp. 237-40; Rajwade, VI, 190-1, 581.
9. *Aitihāsik Patravayawahār* (1933), 68.
10. *S.P.D.* XXVII, 18, 19, 26.
11. *S.P.D.* II, 11, XXVII, 18, 19, 26, 38.
12. *S.P.D.* XXVII, 30.

13. Rajwade, *M.I.S.* VI, 190-91, 581.
14. *S.P.D.* II, 31.
15. *Marāthā History Seminar* (Kolhapur, 1971), Dr. Raghubir Sinh's paper.
16. *S.P.D.* II, 31 and XXVII, 64-65.
17. *Hingne Daftar*, I, 20 and *Brahmendra Swami Charitra*, 20; also see Yusūf Husain, *The First Nizam* (1963), p. 208.
18. Yusūf Husain, *op. cit.*, pp. 212-14.
19. *S.P.D.* XX, 21-22, Rajwade, *M.I.S.* VI, 149. *Purandare Diary* in Rajwade, *M.I.S.* VI gives details of this episode; *Aitihāsik Patravayawahār*, 26.
20. Yusūf Husain, *op. cit.*
21. *S.P.D.* XXV, 10-72, XXVI, 13, 16, 20-29, XXVIII, 34-35, 52-53; *K.S.P.Y.*, 45, 48, 52-54.
22. *S.P.D.* XXV, 29, 46-72, *Purandare Daftar*, I, 59, *Aitihāsik Patravayawahār*, 73-78.
23. *Itihasa Sangraha*, Peshwā Daftārantil Māhiti, pp. 321-51, Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, I, p. 448.
24. *Dhakta Ramaraja Charitra*, p. 11; *S.P.D.* VI, 119, 124, 127, 139, 141, 147.
25. Rajwade, *M.I.S.* VI, pp. 71-73, 110, 232, *M.I.S.* III, 390, 400, *Purandare Daftar*, I, 372. *Itihasa Sangraha*, Ait. Sankirna Sāhitya, 145-53.
26. *S.P.D.* XXV, 144-49, XXVI, 202, Rajwade, *M.I.S.* III, 415, *K S P Y.* 114.
27. *S.P.D.* XXV, 179-84 and Rajwade, *M.I.S.* I, 73-119.
28. *S.P.D.* I, and Rajwade, *M.I.S.* I, 166.
29. *S.P.D.* XXVIII, 140, 182-83, 185, Rajwade, *M.I.S.* III, 472-73, 479-81.
30. *Secret & Political Deptt. Diary*, Vol. I, pp. 1-35.
31. *Ibid*, p. 14.
32. *Ibid*, Vol. II, pp. 34-36.
33. Rajwade, *M.I.S.* I, No. 1.
34. *Bhāu Sahebānchi Bakhar* (1959 ed.), pp. 2-8, *K.S.P.Y.* 122-31, *S.P.D.* II, 36, 39, 42, XXI, 58, XXVII, 79-83.
35. *S.P.D.* II, 9, *K.S.P.Y.* 65, Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, pp. 215-32.
36. Rajwade, *M.I.S.* I, No. 1, VI, 82.
37. *S.P.D.* XXI, 60, XXVII, 90.
38. Nur-ud-dīn 146; for emperor's invitation to Abdali, see Francklin's *Shāh Aulum*, pp. 4-5.
39. Ahmad Shāh Abdālī in Delhi, 1757: the most detailed and authentic sources are *Delhi Chronicle*, an anonymous Persian MS., described by Jadunath Sarkar in the Proceedings of the Ind. Hist. Records Commission, Vol. II (1921) and *Tarikh-i-'Alamgīrī Sani* in Elliot and Dowson's *History*, Vol. VIII; also *S.P.D.* XXI, 95-111; *Hingne Daftar*, Vol. I, 193.
40. *S.P.D.* XXI, 117.
41. *S.P.D.* II, 84.
42. *S.P.D.* XXVII, 218.
43. Parasnis, *Itihasa Sangraha*, Aitihāsik Sphuta Lekha, IV, 11.
44. Rajwade, *M.I.S.* Vol. I, 138-46, *Bhāu Sahebānchi Bakhar* (1959 ed.), pp. 47-53.
45. *S.P.D.* II, 114, Rajwade, *M.I.S.* I, 165.
46. *S.P.D.* II, 121; XXI, 187-88.
47. Rajwade, *M.I.S.* I, 168, 204, Shejwalkar, T. S. *Panipat*, p. 37.
48. Rajwade, *Ibid.*, 174, *Purandare Daftar*, I, 287.
49. Rajwade, *Ibid.*, 179-80, 226.
50. *S.P.D.* II, 130-31.
51. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, 285-89; Rajwade, Vol. I, 168-69.
* Editor's addition.
52. Kashiraj, *Battle of Panipat* (1926 ed.), pp. 40-45; A. Macdonald, *Memoir of Nana Farnavis* (1851), (1927 ed.), p. 17. Macdonald says, "...of the fighting men only one-fourth are supposed to have escaped, and of the followers about an equal proportion; so that nearly two hundred thousand Marāthās perished in the campaign."
53. Shejwalkar, T. S., *Panipat 1761*, p. 123.
54. Bhau's death is corroborated by letters of Nana Phadnis, published in Sangli Publication (1965) *Pānipatchā Sangrām* in Nāna's words, pp. 1-10.

CHAPTER VII

PESHWĀ MĀDHAV RĀO I

I. *Raghunāth Rāo as Regent and Rebel:*

In the graphic words of Kāshirāj Pandit, the third battle of Pānipat (January 14, 1761) was 'verily Doomsday for the Marāthā people'. The victims included the *Peshwā's* eldest son, Vishwās Rāo, his cousin, Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu, and leading generals like Jankōjī Sindia, and Tūkōjī Sindia. The field of battle as well as the ditch round the Marāthā camp were full of dead bodies, and more than twenty thousand prisoners were captured by the Afghāns. *Peshwā Bālājī Bājī Rāo* received the news of this terrible disaster at Bhilsa on January 24. He retreated to Poona, where he died on June 23. 'It was a dismal sunset to the glorious noon of his father's and his own reign.'¹

Raghunāth Rāo, the eldest surviving member of the *Peshwā* family and the leader of the great Punjāb expedition of 1758, was the natural pilot of the Marāthā State in this unprecedented crisis. Mādhav Rāo, the second son of Bālājī Bājī Rāo, was placed on the *Peshwā's gadi* in his seventeenth year; Raghunāth became Regent and the *de facto* ruler of the State.

The minor *Peshwā* and his vacillating but ambitious uncle had to deal, first of all, with the Nizām of Hyderabad. Anxious to reverse the terms of the treaty imposed by the Marāthās after the battle of Udgir, Salābat Jang (under the guidance of his brother and *Diwān*, Nizām 'Alī) invaded Marāthā territories soon after Bālājī Bājī Rāo's death. Skirmishes extending over several months were followed by a decisive battle in January, 1762, in which the Nizām's army suffered a clear defeat. Although several Marāthā chiefs (like Gopāl Rāo Patwardhan of Miraj and Jānōjī Bhosle of Berar) asked Raghunāth to take this opportunity of crushing the power of the Nizām, the Regent, led by his crafty adviser, Sakhārām Bāpū, conciliated the defeated enemy by granting him very favourable terms.² It is clear that Raghunāth was already anticipating a struggle for power with the minor *Peshwā*—a struggle in which the goodwill of the Nizām was likely to be of great value.

Towards the close of Bālājī Bājī Rāo's life the relations between Poona and Bombay were not at all cordial. Victories in the Kar-

nāṭak and in Bengal strengthened the position of the English, and they began to exploit the difficulties of the Marāthās. When the Nizām's invasion was imminent Raghunāth concluded an agreement with the Bombay Government (September 14, 1761); the Marāthās made substantial concessions, but received nothing in return. Soon afterwards the Marāthās opened negotiations for military assistance, in return for which the Bombay Government demanded the ceding of Salsette and Bassein. Fortunately the Marāthās were able to repulse the Nizām's invasion without the assistance of English troops and guns.³

The conclusion of peace with the Nizām was followed by Mādhav Rāo's first Karnāṭak expedition, which will be described below. Dissensions broke out between Raghunāth and the *Peshwā* even before the Karnāṭak campaign was over. The *Peshwā's* mother, Gopikā Bāi, wanted to secure for her son an increasing share of political power; moreover, her personal relations with Raghunāth and his wife, Ānandi Bāi, were very unhappy. In the open contest which followed, the *Peshwā* was supported by powerful chiefs like Gopāl Rāo Patwardhan and Malhār Rāo Holkar, while Raghunāth, guided by Sakhārām Bāpū, received active assistance from Nizām 'Alī and Jānōjī Bhosle. In November, 1762, the *Peshwā's* army was defeated in two battles.⁴ A reconciliation between the uncle and the nephew followed, and once more Raghunāth became the *de facto* ruler of the Marāthā State. He surrendered to Nizām 'Alī several districts including the forts of Daulatābād, Shivneri, Asirgarh and Ahmadnagar. His supporters, like Sakhārām Bāpū, were appointed to high offices, and some of the *Peshwā's* prominent supporters, like Bābū Rāo Phadnis, were dismissed. Gopāl Rāo Patwardhan's *jagīr* was seized.⁵

The victims of Raghunāth's wrath invoked the assistance of Nizām 'Alī, who was also joined by Jānōjī Bhosle, lured by the prospect of being made Regent for the phantom King of Satara. In May, 1763, Nizām 'Alī plundered Poona. The *Peshwā* had already decided to avoid open engagements to plunder the territories of the Nizām and Bhosle, and thus to compel them to turn back. Entering Berar in February, 1763, the *Peshwā* plundered the suburbs of Hyderabad, burnt Bidar and ravaged several districts. The Marāthā allies of Nizām 'Alī, including Jānōjī Bhosle and Gopāl Rāo Patwardhan, were won over. On August 10, 1763, a portion of Nizām 'Alī's army under the command of Vithal Sundar was defeated by the *Peshwā* in the battle of Rākshasbhūvan. Peace was concluded on September 25, 1763, Nizām 'Alī agreeing to surrender

territories worth 82 lakhs. Jānōjī Bhosle was given territories worth 32 lakhs, and Miraj was restored to Gopāl Rāo Patwardhan. This treaty proclaimed the recovery of Marāthā power after the disaster of Pānipat. In domestic politics it marked the end of Raghunāth's regency.⁶

Two years later the *Peshwā* concluded an alliance with Nizām 'Alī, promising to restore to him the territories given to Jānōjī Bhosle after the battle of Rākshasbhūvan. The purpose of this alliance was to crush Jānōjī Bhosle who was then intriguing with Haidar 'Alī and encouraging Raghunāth's ambitious project of capturing power. Threatened simultaneously by the *Peshwā* and the Nizām, Jānōjī Bhosle concluded peace and surrendered territories worth 24 lakhs, of which a portion worth 9 lakhs was taken by the *Peshwā*, and the remainder was to be given to the Nizām. In this expedition Raghunāth co-operated with the *Peshwā*.⁷ After the conclusion of peace he led an inconclusive campaign to Northern India, which will be described below.

On his return from Northern India in 1767 Raghunāth stationed himself at Anandavalli near Nasik and began to make preparations for an open contest with the *Peshwā*. In 1765 he had demanded the partition of the Marāthā State between himself and the *Peshwā*. He had instigated the *Peshwā*'s officers to defy his orders. Mādhav Rāo was anxious for conciliation. He met Raghunāth in September, 1767, and concluded an agreement; but as soon as he returned to Poona, Raghunāth opened negotiations with Nizām 'Alī, Haidar 'Alī, Jānōjī Bhosle and Damājī Gaikwār. Mostyn, who came to Poona in November, 1767, as the envoy of the Bombay Government to ask for the *Peshwā*'s assistance in the First Anglo-Mysore War, tried to secure Raghunāth's friendship. Raghunāth himself expressed his desire 'to engage the English on his side and receive help from them when he might take up arms' against the *Peshwā*. Although the Company was not yet strong enough to interfere openly in the internal affairs of the Marāthā State, Raghunāth's impending rebellion dislocated the *Peshwā*'s plan in all directions. He could not take advantage of the Anglo-Mysore War to increase his influence in the Karnāṭak. He had to cancel his programme of sending an expedition to Northern India. He had to conciliate the Nizām. He had to give up his project of attacking the Sidis of Janjira. All his resources had to be mobilised for civil war.

As Raghunāth counted upon the support of Jānōjī Bhosle he marched to Dhodap, a fort in the Chandore range. There a decisive

battle was fought and won by the *Peshwā* on June 10, 1768. The fort was captured. Raghunāth was taken to Poona and confined in the Shaniwār Wādā.⁸

After punishing Raghunāth's accomplices, Gangādhār Yashwant Chandrachud (the former *Diwān* of the Holkar State) and Gōvīnd Rāo Gaikwār (the eldest son of Damājī Gaikwār), the *Peshwā* marched against Jānōjī Bhosle. Once again Nizām 'Alī co-operated with the *Peshwā* against his northern neighbour. Unable to face the combined armies of the *Peshwā* and the Nizām, Jānōjī Bhosle embarrassed them by adopting the old Marāthā system of guerilla war. The *Peshwā* plundered Nagpur, captured several forts and ravaged Berar. Peace was concluded at Kanakāpur (at the confluence of the Manjrā and the Godāvari) on 23 March, 1769. Jānōjī Bhosle surrendered territories worth 8 lakhs and agreed to perform the duties of a loyal vassal.⁹ He faithfully observed the terms of this agreement till his death (May, 1772).

Raghunāth could not reconcile himself to his lot even after the final submission of all his supporters. He carried on secret negotiations with the Nizām and Haidar 'Alī. He was released from confinement in March, 1772.

II. *The Karnāṭak Expeditions:*

In 1759 the Marāthās got an excellent opportunity for the conquest of Mysore; that opportunity was, however, neglected because troops were badly needed for the grand Northern expedition and the campaign against the Nizām. Haidar 'Alī got rid of the Marāthā army assisting Mysore *Diwān* Khande Rāo by promising to surrender Baramahal to the *Peshwā*; but this inconvenient promise was forgotten as soon as the news of the disaster of Pānipat reached Mysore. Emboldened by the temporary eclipse of the Marāthās, Haidar 'Alī openly adopted an aggressive policy and began to push his frontier towards the Krishna. He found an ally in Basālat Jang, Nizām 'Alī's disappointed brother, whose ambition was to establish an independent principality in the Karnāṭak. In 1761 Haidar and Basālat captured Hoskote, Dod Ballapur, and Sira. Haidar gave nothing to his foolish ally. Early in 1762 he occupied Chik Ballapur, Kodikonda, Penukonda, Madakasira, Raidurg, Harpanahalli, and Chitaldurg. His aggressions in the Karnāṭak deprived Poona of tribute amounting to about 50 lakhs of rupees.¹⁰

After the conclusion of peace with Nizām 'Alī in January, 1762, the *Peshwā* led an expedition to the Karnāṭak. He was accompanied by his uncle Raghunāth and Trimbak Rāo Pethe. Tribute was rea-

lised from several districts, including Kittur and Bidnur. Instead of confronting the Marāthās Haidar retreated to a forest. Scarcity of provisions, want of money and dissensions at home forced the *Peshwā* to return to Poona without achieving any definite result.¹¹

While the Marāthās were paralysed by internal strife and Nizām 'Alī's second invasion, Haidar 'Alī occupied Bidnur, Sonda, Ratehalli, Bankapur, Shirhati, and Dharwar in 1763. The Nawāb of Sāvanūr, whose territory lay between the rivers Tungabhadra and Malaprabha in the direct line of all Marāthā armies proceeding to Mysore, was defeated and compelled to recognise Haidar's suzerainty. The frontier of Mysore was pushed nearly to the banks of the Krishna.

After the battle of Rākshasbhūvan, Mādhav Rāo found himself free to attend to the affairs of the Karnāṭak. Instead of returning to Poona after the conclusion of the hostilities against Nizām 'Alī, this energetic young *Peshwā* at once proceeded towards the Tungabhadra. He crossed the Krishna in February, 1764. Haidar tried to form an alliance with Nizām 'Alī, who promised help but did nothing. The *Peshwā* occupied Manoli and Hubli, secured the allegiance of the Nawāb of Sāvanūr, who was glad to escape from Haidar's yoke, and crossed the Tungabhadra. Haidar took shelter in the forests near Ratehalli, but in May, 1764, he was drawn out of his retreat and defeated by the Marāthās. This defeat cost him more than 1,000 dead and about the same number wounded (very few of whom survived). On the Marāthā side not more than 50 soldiers and 100 horses were killed and 200 soldiers wounded. The *Peshwā* wrote in exultation to his mother that from that battle Haidar took a terror of the Marāthā name.¹²

Haidar could not forget the lesson of this battle. He decided to avoid another open contest with the Marāthās. So he marched with his army to the entrenched fort at Anavati. The Marāthās could not dislodge him from this position, for the road was bad and the rainy season was near. Unwilling to return to Poona after so inconclusive a campaign, the *Peshwā* cantoned his troops near Dharwar. In June, 1764, Haidar sent a detachment to ravage the Sāvanūr territory, but the *Peshwā*'s timely arrival saved it. Gopāl Rāo Patwardhan was entrusted with the difficult task of defending Sāvanūr. Haidar tried to draw his isolated force to a pitched battle, but he skilfully avoided the trap. The Marāthās occupied Haveri in September, 1764, and began the siege of Dharwar, which capitulated early in November. Twice Haidar made overtures for peace, but

nothing came out of them. He opened negotiations with Nizām 'Alī and Jānōjī Bhosle. The Government of Bombay sent him some cannon, gun powder and fire-arms. Wilks is, therefore, hardly correct in saying that during the rains Haidar's army "wretched, spiritless, and sickly...looked with apathy or aversion to the renewal of active operations".¹³

In November, 1764, the *Peshwā* encamped near Anavati, and on December 1, took place the decisive battle of Jādī Anavati, in which the *Peshwā* personally took the leading part. Haidar lost about 2,000 men and was himself wounded.¹⁴

Meanwhile the *Peshwā* had asked his uncle Raghunāth Rāo to come to the Karnāṭak and to assume the command of the expedition. Probably the *Peshwā*'s motive was to keep his unsteady uncle under observation, so that he might create no trouble during his absence from Poona. Anyhow, Raghunāth Rāo came to the Karnāṭak with a fresh army.

In February, 1765, the *Peshwā* marched towards Bidnur, where Haidar had in the meanwhile shut himself up. Honnali, Kumsi, Anantapur, and Chitaldurg were occupied by the Marāthās. Haidar was certainly in a desperate position, but the *Peshwā* also had his difficulties. The road to Bidnur 'led through woods difficult for cavalry'. Nizām 'Alī was plundering Marāthā territory, and the English merchants of Bombay were creating troubles on the Konkān coast. Both sides were, therefore, ready for peace, and an agreement was concluded in March, 1765. Haidar surrendered several Marāthā districts, including Bankapur, gave up all claims on the Nawāb of Sāvanūr, and agreed to pay 30 lakhs of rupees tribute.¹⁵ Wilks rightly says that this was "an adjustment of extreme moderation, considering the desperate circumstances in which Hyder was placed".¹⁶ The responsibility for showing so much leniency to so powerful and determined an enemy lies wholly on Raghunāth. Wilks also says that among the terms "were without question some secret articles which were the foundation of that good understanding which ever afterwards subsisted" between Haidar and Raghunāth.¹⁷ Whether the *Peshwā* was aware of these 'secret articles', we do not know; but he was not in a position to protest against the selfish policy of his uncle, who could obtain the aid either of Nizām 'Alī or of Jānōjī Bhosle, and perhaps of both. So the *Peshwā* returned to Poona, leaving Gopāl Rāo Patwardhan and Murār Rāo (of Gooty) to protect Marāthā territories in the Karnāṭak against Haidar 'Alī's encroachments.

Mādhav Rāo was anxious to resume his unfinished operations against Haidar 'Alī. In order to secure the safety of his rear he conciliated Nizām 'Alī and gave him territories worth 15 lakhs. The result was a general understanding about co-operation against Haidar 'Alī.¹⁸

Anticipating a renewal of struggle with the Marāthās, Haidar 'Alī tried to secure the active alliance of the English. In July, 1766, the Bombay Government proposed a treaty of peace and friendship. But the Court of Directors were then unwilling to become 'involved in hostilities, especially as principals, in any case short of absolute defence.' Moreover, the Company was very anxious to secure control over the Northern Sarkars, and for this purpose an alliance with the Nizām was necessary. On 12 November, 1766, General Caillaud concluded a treaty with the Nizām, which indirectly provided for the employment of English auxiliary troops in the Nizām's impending war against Haidar 'Alī.¹⁹

Meanwhile Haidar's troops were ravaging Marāthā territory in the Karnāṭak and demanding tribute from important posts like Raidurg, Bellary, Harpanahalli and Chitaldurg. The *Peshwā* completed his preparations and crossed the Krishna in January, 1767. Jetgi, Kittoor, Kenchangudd, Gadwal, Bellary, Shidnoor, Adoni and Devdurg were occupied.²⁰ Haidar fortified Bangalore, Sira and Bidnur, and shut himself up with his army at Seringapatam. Unwilling to engage in pitched battles, he devastated his own territory, so that the Marāthās suffered from the scarcity of food and water. "Such a plan", says Wilks, "may distress but cannot stop such an army."²¹

In February, 1767, the *Peshwā* went to Sira, which was defended by Haidar's General, Mīr Rezā. After some resistance Mīr Rezā surrendered the fort and accepted service under the *Peshwā*.²² The capture of Sira was a great political and personal triumph for Mādhav Rāo. In March he captured the fort of Madgiri, where he found the former Rājā and Queen-Mother of Bidnur, imprisoned by Haidar in 1763. He took them under his protection. Several important posts—Chennarayadurg, Dod Ballapur, Chik Ballapur, Devanhalli, Hoskote, Nandigarh, Kolar—fell to the Marāthās. The Nizām began to advance to join the *Peshwā*. Haidar was thoroughly alarmed, and pressed for peace. The *Peshwā* also found it difficult to advance further, for he had no money to meet the expenses of the camp, and no boats to cross the river in the impending rainy season. Moreover, he did not like to give the Nizām a share of victories to which he had contributed nothing.²³

Peace was concluded at the beginning of May, 1767. The *Peshwā* retained Chennarayadurg, Madgiri, Dod Ballapur, Hoskote and Sira. Kolar, Chik Ballapur and Nandigarh were to be returned to Haidar. Kadappa and Gurrumkonda were to be left to Mir Rezā. Haidar agreed to pay 31 lakhs to the *Peshwā* and 18 lakhs to the Nizām.²⁴ The *Peshwā* started for Poona in May, 1767, leaving Murār Rāo to protect the newly annexed districts. The Nizām was not satisfied with the terms offered to him, and it seems that the money promised by Haidar was never paid.

The outbreak of the First Anglo-Mysore War soon afterwards (August, 1767) made the Marāthās the decisive factor in South Indian politics. The *Peshwā* was courted by the English and Muhammad 'Alī (Nawāb of the Karnāṭak) on the one side and by Nizām 'Alī and Haidar on the other.²⁵ The Madras Government was anxious to purchase the *Peshwā's* support by allowing him to annex Bidnur; Mysore was to be restored to the Hindu Rājā under the British protection and subject to the payment of *chauth* to the Marāthās.²⁶ But the *Peshwā* demanded 'the entire extirpation of Nizām 'Alī and the whole family of Nizām-ul-Mulk from the *subāhship* of the Deccan' and the establishment of one of Shāh 'Alam's sons at Hyderabad. The Madras Government considered that such a step would increase the power of the Marāthās and 'make them dangerous neighbours to the Company's possessions both in Bengal and on this coast'. The Bengal Government discouraged the proposal for Marāthā alliance.²⁷

In November, 1767, the Bombay Government sent to Poona an envoy named Thomas Mostyn for the purpose of preventing the *Peshwā* from joining Haidar and Nizām 'Alī. The English required the military assistance of the Marāthās when they would attack Haidar 'Alī's possessions on the western coast. In return for such assistance Mostyn was instructed to offer Bidnur and Sonda, provided the *Peshwā* agreed to assign to the Company Bassein and Salsette, as well as the Marāthā share of the revenues of Surat,²⁸ in addition to some commercial privileges. The envoy was also advised to take full advantage of the quarrel between the *Peshwā* and his uncle, and to 'encourage any advances' which might be made by the latter.²⁹

Mostyn remained at Poona for about three months (November 29, 1767 to February 27, 1768). He had several interviews with the *Peshwā*. Early in December the *Peshwā* received an agent Nāgojī Rāo from the Nawāb of Arcot. Nāgojī Rāo was instructed by the Madras Government to secure the *Peshwā's* military assistance, or

if that was not possible, at least his neutrality. If the Marāthā court appeared hostile, it was to be informed that Jānōjī Bhosle was soliciting the friendship of the English in Bengal.

In his negotiations with the *Peshwā* Mostyn did not clearly show his cards, for he felt that there was 'no appearance at present' of the *Peshwā's* taking part with the Nizām and Haidar 'Alī. As Haidar 'Alī was the declared enemy of the Marāthās, it would not be wise for them to contribute to his safety or prosperity. Moreover, the *Peshwā's* hands were not free. The Jāts and the Rājputs were creating troubles in Northern India, and, nearer home, Raghunāth was preparing for civil war. The state of the *Peshwā's* finances was also very unsatisfactory. Under these circumstances Mostyn shrewdly suspected that the *Peshwā* had no other course open to him except neutrality. He sent Brome to negotiate with Raghunāth, who demanded British assistance against his nephew.

On 17 January, 1768, Mostyn heard that the Nizām had concluded peace with the Nawāb of Arcot. Haidar 'Alī was now left alone; therefore, said Mostyn, "the forming a junction with the Marāthās appeared the less necessary, more especially as the jealousies and disputes between Mādhav Rāo and his uncle Rāghoba would . . . prevent their joining Hyder 'Alī or giving us any material assistance . . ." ³⁰

In February, 1768, the Bombay Government sent an expedition against Haidar 'Alī's fleet and possessions on the western coast. Mostyn was instructed to secure the *Peshwā's* neutrality. Mādhav Rāo "had no objections to . . . punishing Hyder 'Alī, but he claimed Bidnur and Sonda, and wanted the English to surrender any part of them which they might take. The former Rājā of Bidnur was then at Poona under the *Peshwā's* protection. He wanted to recover his territory with the assistance of the Company, but Mostyn refused to entertain his proposal because it was not acceptable to the *Peshwā*. After Mostyn's departure from Poona, a Marāthā agent went to Bombay and demanded Mysore, Bidnur, and Sonda. This demand was peremptorily refused." ³¹

Some months later it was reported that the Nizām was repentant for making a hasty peace, and the despatches of Brome, the envoy of the Bombay Government at Poona, gave enough cause to apprehend that the *Peshwā* was ready to join Haidar 'Alī. The latter's *vakil* promised payment of arrears of tribute in return for military assistance. An agreement was concluded between the *Peshwā* and the Nizām. A joint expedition was to be sent against the Nawāb of

Arcot; of the territories taken from him, one-fourth would be retained by the *Peshwā*, and the rest would go to the Nizām.

Early in 1769 the position of the Madras Government was so desperate that it was anxious for peace 'on almost any terms'. A despatch to the Government of Bengal, dated January 28, 1769, contains the following statement: "there being no room to doubt of Mādhav Rāo's intentions of hostilities, and considering the state of our treasury and resources, it appears evident almost to demonstration that in a very little time, far from being able to maintain an army in the field, we should not even have the means of paying our forces in garrison'. The old theory of utilising Haidar 'Alī as a 'barrier' against Marāthā expansion was revived: "Haidar is the best barrier to the Carnatic against the Marāthās with whom he ever has been and ever must be at variance and probably never will pay the *chauth* but when they can demand it at the head of a superior force."³²

All speculations came to an end when Haidar 'Alī dictated the terms of peace (April 2, 1769). The second article of the treaty laid down "that in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall from their respective countries mutually assist each other to drive the enemy out." Haidar wanted to be sure of British assistance against the Marāthās; so he was anxious that the alliance should be defensive as well as offensive. But the Madras Government refused to make an offensive alliance.³³

It is quite clear that Mādhav Rāo failed to exploit the First Anglo-Mysore War for his own advantage. He could neither get money from Haidar 'Alī by helping him, nor acquire territory by joining his enemies. The responsibility for this failure to utilise an advantageous situation lies not on the *Peshwā* but on Raghunāth Rāo and Jānōjī Bhosle, whose unpatriotic ambitions crippled the Marāthā State.

On the conclusion of peace with Jānōjī Bhosle in 1769 Mādhav Rāo decided to lead another expedition against Haidar 'Alī, who, instead of paying the arrears of tribute, levied contributions upon some of the Poligars tributary to the *Peshwā*. Mīr Rezā, who had entered the *Peshwā*'s service in 1767, rejoined Haidar and occupied Bagepalli and Talpula. Murār Rāo of Gooty had to purchase peace by promising to pay tribute to Haidar 'Alī. Tribute was realised from Chitaldurg, Harpanahalli, and some other places, and even the Nawāb of Sāvanūr placated Haidar by secretly paying him a large sum of money. Although Haidar was thus encroaching upon the

Marāthā sphere on all sides, he tried at the same time to prevent by negotiations another Marāthā expedition to the Karnāṭak. He also tried to create troubles for the *Peshwā* by instigating Raghunāth and Jānōjī Bhosle to revolt against him.

Mādhav Rāo was determined to take strong measures for the complete subjugation of the Karnāṭak. Gopāl Rāo Patwardhan and Anand Rāo Rāste were sent to watch Haidar's movements. In October, 1769, the *Peshwā* left Poona and marched directly towards Seringapatam. The Marāthā army proceeding to the Karnāṭak consisted of about 75,000 troops and had 50 guns.³⁴ The *Peshwā*, says Wilks, "seemed to abandon the ordinary routine of Marāthā plunder, and to point to the fixed conquest of the whole country. Among other arrangements he was accompanied by garrisons regularly organised and independent of his field force, for the occupation of the principal posts."³⁵ The English authorities wrote on March 10, 1771: "From the present conduct of the Marāthās both in the North and the South, and from the genius, spirit, and ambition of Mādhav Rāo, we are inclined to suspect that their designs are not confined to the mere collection of *chauth* but to extend to the subjection of the whole peninsula."³⁶

Within two months (January and February, 1770) the *Peshwā* occupied several important posts—Budihal, Kandikere, Handikere, Chiknayakanhalli, Bhairavdurg, Nagamangala, Balapur, Nandigarh, and others. Even after the loss of so many posts Haidar remained apparently undisturbed. Wilks observes that he 'did homage' to the 'military talents' of Mādhav Rāo by refusing to confront him in the open field. Haidar deliberately followed his old plan of devastating his own territory. He took shelter in the forest of Udagani. His son Tipū was sent to Seringapatam "to collect all the straw and wood that was possible and to burn all that could not be removed, to fill up the wells and ponds and to give notice to the people to retire from the villages into the larger towns."³⁷

In January, 1770, Haidar left Udagani, went to Turuvekere, and then marched towards Seringapatam under cover of darkness. His real intention was to deliver a night attack on the Marāthās. An engagement took place between Haidar and a Marāthā detachment led by Gopāl Rāo, Murār Rāo, and Anand Rāo Rāste. Haidar's artillery proved too strong for the Marāthās. They were compelled to retreat, and their camp was plundered. But the victor hurriedly marched to Seringapatam; he was not prepared to be caught in between the two Marāthā armies, led by the *Peshwā* and Gopāl Rāo

respectively. He was joined by Mīr Rezā and Tipū, who had been creating diversions for the Marāthās.³⁸

At Seringapatam Haidar collected all his treasures from other forts. His Portuguese officer Peixoto says: "No other fort in Haidar's dominions has a neighbourhood so fit as this for the encampment of a powerful army that requires many necessities for its subsistence, particularly the three essential ones—provisions, water, forage. Provisions for 12 years are laid up here. There is no lack of water, for the Kaveri runs close by the walls, and the fort is in an island!"

In April, 1770, the *Peshwā* captured the strong forts of Devarayadurg and Nijgal.³⁹ Then he started for Poona, for his health was gradually giving way. Trimbak Rāo was left in charge of the operations in the Karnāṭak. The *Peshwā* might have concluded the campaign by taking tribute from Haidar, but he was determined to crush his enemy. Trimbak Rāo was left at the head of a large army, and he had an able lieutenant in Gopāl Rāo.

Peixoto gives us a good idea about the relative positions of the two powers in 1770: "The Marāthās have not only the greatest force on their side, but the prayers of all the people, who everywhere without exception are robbed and harassed (by Haidar) and under a weight of contribution that it is not possible for them to bear. The Nabob (i.e., Haidar) has a large force but not to be compared with that of the Marāthās.... In artillery the Nabob has not, as yet, the advantage, for the Marāthās have much more. The Nabob's advantage is that all his troops are better disciplined. But if he resolves to give battle in the plains or to retire into any stronghold, he is ruined."⁴⁰

For two years Trimbak Rāo, ably assisted by Gopāl Rāo till his death, carried on operations against Haidar 'Alī with conspicuous bravery and success. After the departure of the *Peshwā* the Marāthās captured Chik Ballapur, Gurrunkonda and some important places in the Kolar district. Towards the close of the year 1770 the *Peshwā* again proceeded to the Karnāṭak but ill health compelled him to return to Poona, where he reached on January 20, 1771. Haidar was still at Seringapatam, surrounded by the Marāthās on two sides. He desperately sued for peace, but his terms were rejected by the Marāthās. His position was somewhat improved by the death of Gopāl Rāo on January 17, 1771. Murār Rāo was ill, and Trimbak Rāo became very unpopular owing to his irritable temper.

Towards the close of February or early in March Trimbak Rāo appeared near Seringapatam. Haidar now left the protection of the fort, probably in order to prevent the Marāthā invasion of Bidnur, and met the Marāthā army at Moti Talav, about 10 miles north-west of Seringapatam city, on March 7, 1771. The Marāthās secured a decisive victory. Trimbak Rāo claimed that 75 guns, about 8,000 horses, 20 or 25 elephants, treasure and jewellery were captured. Some of Haidar's principal officers were captured and he himself fled to his capital in the guise of a monk or beggar.⁴¹ But the Marāthās failed to gain any permanent advantage from this victory. They foolishly allowed the remnant of Haidar's army to reach Seringapatam and gave Haidar the long interval of ten days to complete his arrangements for the defence of the capital. When Haidar had partly recovered from the shock and losses of the defeat, Trimbak Rāo came to Seringapatam and tried in vain to capture the fort by a half-hearted siege. Weakened by the scarcity of provisions he gave up the siege towards the close of April and sent some detachments to occupy other forts and ravage Haidar's territory. These indecisive operations and fruitless negotiations for peace occupied the rainy season, at the end of which Trimbak Rāo advanced towards Tanjore in response to an appeal for help against the Nawāb of Arcot from the Marāthā ruler of that principality. This expedition (September, 1771-February, 1772) yielded some money, but Haidar got the breathing time which he so badly required.

The *Peshwā* had urged Trimbak Rāo to proceed against Bidnur instead of wasting time at Seringapatam. On his return from the east he made preparations for invading Bidnur, but it was already too late. The *Peshwā's* illness had become serious, and the Poona treasury was exhausted. In April 1772, the *Peshwā* asked Trimbak Rāo to conclude peace by whatever means possible. Haidar shrewdly exploited the weakness of the Marāthās. He paid 31 lakhs in cash and jewellery and promised to pay 19 lakhs more in three years. The Marāthās retained Sira, Madgiri, Gurrumkonda, Dod Ballapur, Kolar and Hoskote with their dependencies; but important posts like Nandigarh, Chick Ballapur and Devarayadurg had to be surrendered to Haidar. The Marāthā army began its march to Poona in June 1772. Although this expedition cannot be described as wholly successful, yet Haidar's northern boundary was reduced within narrower limits than those which had been possessed by the Hindu ruler of Mysore at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Still, greater success could have been won if Trimbak Rāo had not failed to exploit the situation arising out of the battle of Moti Talav. The

Peshwā's fatal illness and the chronic financial difficulties of the Marāthā State furthered Haidar's cause no less than his ingenuity and his disciplined troops.⁴²

The East India Company played an indecisive part in this war. At the beginning of the hostilities both parties appealed for assistance to the Madras Government. Haidar naturally cited the second article of the treaty of 1769. But the Madras authorities decided to remain neutral, for they were anxious to maintain the balance of power in the Karnāṭak. It was thought best to follow the policy of 'keeping alive the hopes and fears of both parties by not determining in favour of either and without assuring assistance to the one or the other'. But it was difficult to explain away the treaty of 1769. Haidar was told that he was the aggressor; it was also argued that the treaty was 'an act of necessity'. Neutrality might have some pretence of justification, but the Madras authorities were aware that they could not help the Marāthās 'without a certain manifest violation of the treaty'. The cause of the Marāthās was, however, strongly urged by the Nawāb of Arcot, who had a strong personal antipathy to Haidar 'Alī. When Haidar's position became critical, the Madras Government drifted to the conclusion that he should be assisted, but nothing could be done 'without the revenues and resources of the Carnatic', which the Nawāb plainly refused to employ in the service of his rival. Towards the close of 1771 it was suspected that the Marāthās would invade the east coast, and precautionary measures were taken by the Madras Government; but the Marāthās were wise enough not to throw the English in the arms of Haidar 'Alī. The shifting diplomacy of the Madras Government in 1769-1772 alienated Haidar without conciliating the Marāthās.⁴³

III. *Revival of Marāthā Power in Northern India:*

The destruction of the Marāthā army at Pānīpat was naturally followed by a revolt against Marāthā domination everywhere in Hindustān—in the Gangetic Doāb, Bundelkhand, Rājputānā, and Mālwa. Although Mādhav Rāo was fully busy with the consolidation and expansion of his power in the South, he was not at all indifferent to Marāthā interests in the North. For some years after Pānīpat the Marāthās found it impossible to resume seriously their activities in Hindustān. The premature death of Bālājī Bājī Rāo, the invasions of Nizām 'Alī, the question of succession to Jankōjī Sindia, the intrigues and rebellions of Raghunāth Rāo, the revolts of Jānōjī Bhosle, and the long struggle with Haidar 'Alī naturally kept them away from the stormy North. It was only towards the close of his brief

but glorious administration that Mādhav Rāo found it possible to make a serious and successful attempt to recover Marāthā authority in Hindustān.

The task of restoring Marāthā authority in Rājputānā and Mālwa immediately after Pānipat, fell upon Malhār Rāo Holkar. After the capture of Rampura and Gagrani in May-June, 1761, he turned his attention to Mādhō Singh of Jaipur, who had been trying to set up an anti-Marāthā coalition consisting of Najib Khān, Yaqub 'Alī (Ahmad Shāh Abdālī's agent in Delhi) and the exiled emperor Shāh 'Alam II. He was also joined, or was likely to be joined, by some petty Rājput chiefs of Mālwa and Rājputānā. Unable to deal with this menace during the rainy season of 1761, Malhār returned to Indore. He resumed the operations after the rains and defeated the Jaipur army in the battle of Mangrol on 29 November, 1761.⁴⁴ This decisive victory destroyed Mādhō Singh's fond hope of uprooting Marāthā power from the North and restored Marāthā prestige throughout Hindustān. Holkar advanced as far as Manoharpur (40 miles north of Jaipur); but Jaipur was saved from invasion as Holkar's attention was diverted due to the invasion of Bundelkhand by Shāh 'Alam II and Shujā-ud-daulah.

Shāh 'Alam was at this time living as a protégé of Shujā-ud-daulah, who had undertaken to escort him to Delhi. After the rainy season of 1761, they started for the expulsion of the Marāthās from Bundelkhand. The general weakness of the Marāthās, the disobedience of the local chiefs and the treason of Marāthā officers like Ganesh Sambhājī (who joined the imperial army) made it easy for Shāh 'Alam and Shujā to establish their authority over a portion of Bundelkhand. Crossing the Jamuna at Kalpi in January, 1762, Shujā captured Kalpi, Mot (Jhansi district) and Jhansi and realised tribute from the chiefs of Orchha and Datia. After an unsuccessful attempt to subjugate the ruler of Mahoba he re-crossed the Jamuna and returned to his own dominions.⁴⁵

From Rājputānā Holkar had to go to Indore, for he was temporarily incapacitated by a serious wound which he had received at Mangrol. This left the enemies of the Marāthās free to work out their plans in Mālwa, Rājputānā and Bundelkhand. Some energetic officers, however, tried to consolidate Marāthā authority in Gohad and Ahirwada. Even after his recovery Holkar could not venture into the scene of his former triumphs; he was gradually sinking due to old age and ill health. Mahādji Sindia was busy with the question of succession, and the Poona Government as yet showed no desire

to profit by his abilities. During the years 1762-64 the Marāthās did not pursue a vigorous policy in Northern India, and no systematic attempt was made to recover the lost ground.

But the triumph of the Marāthās in the South was not without its influence on their position in the North. In 1764 Ahmad Shāh Abdālī ratified a formal peace with them. This was a much-needed relief, and at the same time an indirect recognition of their still surviving power. In 1765 the East India Company considered it necessary to support Shujā-ud-daulah's restoration, for his removal 'would have destroyed the strongest barrier against the Marāthās'. If a strong barrier against the Marāthās was a necessity to the Company even after the battle of Buxar, the *Peshwā's* prospects in Hindustān could not have been very unfavourable.

In October 1764, Malhār Holkar came to Jobner (13 miles east of Sambhar) in order to compel Mādhō Singh of Jaipur to clear his dues. Then he proceeded, in response to advice from Poona, to assist the Jat Rājā, Jawāhir Singh, against Najib Khān.⁴⁶ But Malhār had no intention of seriously weakening his 'foster son', and his lukewarmness compelled the Jat Rājā to make peace with Najib in February, 1765. Malhār's next adventure was directed against the East India Company. He met the English at Kora on 3 May, 1765, but he was defeated by Sir Robert Fletcher. Then he recovered Jhansi (December, 1765), resumed his operations against the Rānā of Gohad and hastened a rupture with Jawāhir Singh. Before bringing these operations to a satisfactory conclusion he died on 20 May, 1766. His alliance with the Jat Rājā had one good effect for the Marāthās, for it intimidated Mādhō Singh, who agreed to make a satisfactory arrangement for the payment of his tribute. Mahādji Sindia, who had in the meanwhile come to Northern India, adopted a less conciliatory policy than Holkar and pressed Mādhō Singh for arrears.⁴⁷

The annual subsidy promised by the Rānā of Udaipur to *Peshwā* Bājī Rao in 1736 was never regularly paid. During the years 1761-1764 complications in the Deccan, Mālwa and Jaipur prevented the Marāthās from making any attempt to put pressure on that prince. In July 1765, Mahādji Sindia settled the tribute of Kota at 15 lakhs, and left his *Diwān* Achyut Rāo to collect tribute from Udaipur, Shahpura and Rupnagar. Rānā Āri Singh II of Udaipur agreed in 1766 to pay a total sum of Rs. 26,30,221 in four years.⁴⁸

We have already referred to Malhār Holkar's rupture with Jawāhir Singh. The Jat Rājā had become so angry at Malhār's collusion with Najib Khān that on the conclusion of peace he refused

to pay the balance of 12 lakhs still due out of the promised 22 lakhs.⁴⁹ The outbreak of a civil war in the Jāt State provided a welcome opportunity to the Marāthās. Nāhar Singh, Suraj Mal's beloved son and Jawāhir's disappointed rival for the throne, renewed his claim to succession under Malhār's protection. The Marāthās knew that there was in India no other place for money like Bharatpur,⁵⁰ and they gladly prepared themselves to play the same mercenary part in this fratricidal struggle as they had previously played in the case of Jaipur. A detachment of 15,000 horse was sent by Malhār (who was then fighting against the Jāt Rānā of Gohad) to plunder Jāt villages on the other side of the Chambal. Jawāhir came to an understanding with the Sikhs. He paid them seven lakhs in cash in order to bring their plundering activities to an end, and hired 25,000 Sikh horsemen to fight against the Marāthās.⁵¹

Jawāhir Singh at first tried to divert the attention of the Marāthās by plundering the territory of their vassal Mādhō Singh of Jaipur. Mādhō Singh appealed to the Marāthās for immediate relief, promising to pay them a daily allowance of Rs. 5,000 by way of expenses. Mahādji Sindia's troops were at once sent against the Jāts, while the Sikhs were bought off by Mādhō Singh. Jawāhir was thus compelled to conclude a hasty peace with Jaipur.⁵²

In the meanwhile Malhār Rāo had established his camp at Dholpur, the appanage of Nāhar Singh. His troops frequently ravaged Jawāhir's territory. The Sikhs also grew restless at the irregularity of payment, and sometimes plundered the districts of their ally. Jawāhir decided to put an end to his trouble with a bold step. He conciliated the Sikhs, left his camp at Shāhgarh, and attacked the Marāthās near Dholpur (13-14 March, 1766). The combined Jat-Sikh army defeated the Marāthās, captured some Marāthā generals and occupied Dholpur.⁵³ The captured Marāthā generals were released in December next in accordance with a treaty concluded by Nārō Shankar. Jawāhir Singh could have crossed the Chambal and defeated Malhār Rāo himself—then a dying man—but for the refusal of his Sikh horsemen to follow him in the terrible summer heat through a grassless and waterless tract. The Sikhs returned to the Punjāb. Nāhar Singh was abandoned by the Marāthās and committed suicide (December, 1766).

Towards the close of 1765 Raghunāth Rāo made preparations for leading an expedition to the North. He advanced to Mālwa, took tribute from Bhopal, and was joined by Malhār Rāo Holkar and Mahādji Sindia near Bhandar in April, 1766. Holkar died a month later.

Raghunāth tried to finish the contest begun by him against Gohad. The misunderstanding which had arisen between Raghunāth and Mahādji Sindia over the question of succession to the Sindia State rendered it impossible for them to work in sincere co-operation. Moreover, the Rānā of Gohad was being assisted openly by the victorious Jawāhir Singh. After a long siege the Rānā made peace through Sindia's mediation (December 1766), agreeing to pay 15 lakhs. Raghunāth then intended to proceed against Jawāhir Singh, who, however, concluded peace by surrendering the Marāthā commanders captured in March, 1766.⁵⁴

It seems after the settlement with Jawāhir Singh, Raghunāth intended to proceed towards Rājputānā. He captured Bhilsa and marched towards Kota. We are told that Mādhō Singh collected troops and made preparations to resist the Marāthās. The Jaipur ruler was probably alarmed at the report that Raghuāth would insist on strict payment from the Rājput princes. But Raghunāth's plan remained unexecuted. Ahmad Shāh Abdālī had, in the meanwhile, appeared in the Punjāb and "written to Raghunāth in a proud and haughty manner threatening him with war and rapine."⁵⁵ The *Peshwā's* uncle considered it imprudent to meet him and hurriedly left Hindustān. In vain did Shujā-ud-daulah and the English ask him to remain where he was. The Governor of Bengal wrote to Raghunāth that he was prepared, in alliance with the Nawāb of Awadh, to support the Marāthās against Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, and asked him to return to the North 'lest Abdālī should think he was running away to the Deccan in fear'. Nothing, however, could bring Raghunāth back to the North. Within a short time Ahmad Shāh returned to Lahore to punish the Sikhs, leaving the Marāthās free to prosecute their operations—an opportunity which Raghunāth did not utilise.

Raghunāth's departure provided an excellent opportunity for Jawāhir Singh. Strengthened by the death of his rival, Nāhar Singh, and the subjugation of his disloyal Gosāin troops, he occupied Marāthā domains from Bhind to Kalpi. Only Gwalior and Jhansi remained under Marāthā control. The Jāt Rājā established his authority in the Kalpi district, levied tribute from Datia and Seondha, advanced up to the bridge of Narwar, and formed an alliance with the rulers of Picchor and Gohad.⁵⁶ In December 1767, Jawāhir won a 'pyrrhic victory' over Jaipur troops in the battle of Maonda.⁵⁷ While the Jat Rājā was pursuing a policy of aggrandisement, the ambitious Nawāb of Awadh had not been sitting idle. He wanted to occupy Bundelkhand and asked the Governor of Bengal to exercise British

influence in his favour. The Governor recommended a policy of caution.

The temporary eclipse of Marāthā influence due to Raghunāth's hasty retreat did not last long. Marāthā officers in Bundelkhand succeeded in recapturing many posts occupied by the Jāts.⁵⁸ Their position was further improved by internal dissensions in the Jāt kingdom. Jawāhir Singh was assassinated in July, 1768,⁵⁹ and his successor, Ratan Singh, was murdered in April, 1769. A civil war then weakened the Jāt kingdom. Meanwhile the Marāthās had reappeared in the North. Jawāhir Singh's aggressions had led the *Peshwā* to decide that an army under Mahādji Sindia and Tukōji Holkar should be sent to Hindustān in order to deal with the growing menace of the Jāts. These two chiefs accordingly proceeded to the North, but before dealing with the Jāts they invaded Mewār. Rānā Ari Singh II had offended many powerful nobles of his court, who had thereupon set up a rival for the throne in the person of Ratan Singh, falsely reported to be a son of Rānā Rāj Singh II. In May, 1769, Mahādji Sindia and Tukōji Holkar appeared near Udaipur to support the cause of Ratan Singh. Differences, however, soon arose between the two chiefs, as a result of which Tukōji Holkar returned to Kota in June. Mahādji remained idle and took no steps to deliver an assault on Udaipur. He found that it was better to give up the cause of Ratan Singh, who had no money, and to support Ari Singh, who was prepared to pay. Ari Singh agreed to pay 64 lakhs as present to Sindia, and to alienate 1½ lakhs worth of *jaḡīr* in favour of Ratan Singh.⁶⁰ With these favourable terms Sindia left Mewār and joined Holkar in September, 1769. Then they advanced to Karauli in order to put pressure for tribute on Jaipur. Before this purpose could be accomplished, they were lured away by the envoys of Ranjit Singh, Ratan Singh's ambitious brother, to take part in the civil war which was then desolating the Jāt kingdom. Meanwhile a great Marāthā army had already arrived in the North to strengthen the force acting under Sindia and Holkar. Its leader was Rāmchandra Ganesh, a distinguished soldier. He was assisted by another commander, Visāji Krishna.

Early in March 1770, about 30,000 Marāthā troops encamped outside the fort of Kumbher and began negotiations with Ranjit Singh. When they found that the Jāt Chief was unable or unwilling to pay the stipulated sum of money, they ravaged the territories of both Jāt rulers, Ranjit Singh and Nawal Singh, without distinction. An alliance was concluded with Najib-ud-daulah, with the expectation that his support would enable the Marāthās to induce Shāh 'Alam

to get rid of the protection of the English. Najib's death in October 1770, frustrated this project; but his adherence to the Marāthā cause alarmed the Jāts. Nawal Singh was severely defeated near Sonkh (a place midway between Kumbher and Mathura) on April 6, 1770.⁶¹ He took shelter in the fort of Dig, which was then barricaded by the Marāthās. Najib-ud-daulah occupied several Jāt *parganās* which he refused to make over to the Marāthās.

The Marāthās halted at Mathura, and dissensions at once arose regarding the policy to be pursued. It was a very favourable opportunity for restoration of Marāthā influence in the North, for 'no strong enemy was left in the region west of British-protected Oudh'; but personal jealousy and lack of statesmanship once more stood in the way of success. Rāmchandra Ganesh and Visāji Krishna were so jealous of each other that they could never act in sincere co-operation. Holkar was surrounded by ministers who continued Malhār's tradition of hostility to the Sindia family. Naturally, therefore, the four chiefs failed to agree about their course of action after the victory of Sonkh. Mahādji Sindia wanted to make peace with Nawal Singh in return for a moderate sum of money, to conquer the territories of the Rohillā and Bangash Chiefs in the Doāb, and to punish Najib, the bitterest enemy of the Marāthās in Hindustān. Rāmchandra Ganesh, on the other hand, wanted to squeeze as much money as possible from Nawal Singh and to conquer his territories in the Doāb with Najib's assistance. He was unwilling to offend Najib, lest he should oppose the Marāthās at the head of a powerful Muslim confederacy consisting of the Rohillā and Bangash Chiefs as well as the Nawāb of Awadh. The *Peshwā* supported Rāmchandra Ganesh.⁶²

An open breach with Najib-ud-daulah was followed by the conclusion of peace with the Jāts. Nawal Singh agreed to pay 65 lakhs in three years and an annual tribute of 11 lakhs.⁶³ After Najib's death the Marāthās proceeded against the Bangash and Rohillā Chiefs. The districts of Etawa, Shukohabad, and Kanauj were ravaged, and some important posts were occupied from the Afghāns. By this time the quarrel between the Marāthā Chiefs had reached its climax. Rāmchandra Ganesh left the camp in disgust. Under the joint leadership of Visāji Krishna and Mahādji Sindia the Marāthās now decided to occupy Delhi.

As a prisoner of the Company at Allahābād Shāh 'Alam could not cease hankering for return to Delhi. The English and the Nawāb of Awadh never gave him anything but sweet promises. In 1766 Raghunāth Rāo made certain definite proposals which the emperor

could not accept owing to the hostility of his English protectors. The growing weariness of the fugitive, as also his anxiety that some other Mughul Prince might be put on the imperial throne either by the Marāthās or by the Sikhs, threw him into the arms of Mahādji Sindia in December 1770. In January 1771, Mahādji Sindia and Visāji Krishna occupied Delhi. Shāh 'Alam started from Allahābād in April 1771 and reached the imperial city on January 6, 1772.⁶⁴ The *Peshwā* recalled Rāmchandra Ganesh and entrusted the supreme command to Visāji Krishna.

Unfortunately neither victory nor unity of command could prevent dissensions in the Marāthā camp. Visāji Krishna found it impossible to control Sindia and Holkar, each of whom pursued the policy that suited him best. None cared for the interests of the Marāthā State. Zabīta Khan, Najib-ud-daulah's son and successor, was defeated, but at the intercession of the Nawāb of Awadh he was given back his father's estates in Najibabad and Saharanpur. A violent quarrel broke out between Visāji Krishna and Mahādji Sindia on this issue, and all the political arrangements of the Marāthās were thrown into confusion.⁶⁵ Yet the growing strength of the Marāthās alarmed the Rohillās, and on June 17, 1772, they concluded their famous treaty with Shujā-ud-daulah, a treaty which soon afterwards led to their ruin. Towards the middle of 1772 the Nawāb of Awadh requested the Bengal Government to be ready to send a large force to his assistance at the beginning of the winter, for he was afraid that the Marāthās would invade Awadh after the rainy season. In December 1772, Holkar and Visāji Krishna compelled the helpless emperor to confer the office of *Mir Bakshi* on Zabīta Khan and to grant Kora and Allahābād to the Marāthās.

It is impossible in this brief survey to refer to all the complications of North Indian politics during the eventful period covered by this chapter. We have naturally concentrated our attention on the efforts made by the Marāthās to recover that authority and influence over Mālwa, Bundelkhand, Rājputānā, and the Doāb which they had lost as a result of their rout at Pānipat. In estimating the extent of their successes in this difficult enterprise we must not forget either the dangers which they had to confront in the Deccan or the number of enemies they had to deal with in the North. In spite of these difficulties they succeeded in re-occupying Mālwa and Bundelkhand, in exacting tribute from the leading Rājput Princes, in almost crushing the Jāts and the Rohillās, and, finally, in occupying Delhi and establishing the fugitive emperor on his ancestral throne. Their success would certainly have been more spectacular had their leaders

not been pre-occupied with personal interests and mutual jealousy. The great *Peshwā* was not present in the field to restore unity in a house divided against itself. Even after his death his generals lingered on in the North with a view to consolidate their position by fresh victories, but domestic troubles, culminating in the murder of Nārāyan Rāo, compelled them to return to the Deccan in 1773.

IV. *Peshwā's Character:*

Mādhav Rāo died a premature death on 18 November, 1772. He was very much devoted to his mother. His devotion to religious observances was so great that on one occasion the venerable Rām Shāstri had to direct his attention to his duties as the ruler of the State. His sincere faith in rituals was quite in keeping with his aversion to luxury. "While Raghunāth Rāo writes for a supply of pretty and well-trained dancing girls, his puritanical nephew refuses to wear gaily coloured clothes".⁶⁶ Probably he had "an irritable temper, not always under command, which was his greatest defect".⁶⁷

All authorities agree in describing Mādhav Rāo as a great administrator. He did not introduce any institutional changes; for this failure, however, he deserves no blame. His reign was too brief and too tempestuous to provide that leisure and calm which administrative reforms demand. Moreover, as Grant Duff justly points out, 'he had to contend with violent prejudices,⁶⁸ and with general corruption'. So the *Peshwā* tried to make the existing machinery work well, and for the accomplishment of this purpose he was prepared to take infinite pains. His attention to details excites the admiration of all readers of contemporary Marāthi documents.

In this brief survey we have tried to review the character and activities of *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo from many points of view, and not unoften have we looked at him from his enemies' eyes. An eighteenth century ruler whose reputation can survive so close a scrutiny was no ordinary man. A bare enumeration of his exploits in war is a great testimony to his capacity for leadership. It is remarkable that Haidar 'Alī, whose military genius was a terror to British generals, was defeated in all the campaigns led against him by the *Peshwā*. Within a brief period of less than eleven years Mādhav Rāo succeeded in extending his authority from Delhi to Seringapatam. And these exploits were accompanied by the suppression of serious internal revolts and a minute supervision of administrative affairs. The *Peshwā's* private life was blameless, and offers a striking contrast to that of his contemporaries. He was never

guilty of treachery even towards his enemies. It is interesting to speculate whether such a ruler, had he been blessed with a longer life, could have averted the downfall of the Marāthā State.

NOTES

1. Sarkar, Jadunath, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. II, p. 360.
2. *Aitihasik Patravyawahar*, Ed. Sardesai, Kale etc. (1930), No. 103; S.P.D., XXXVIII, pp. 30-50.
3. Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads* (1863), Vol. III, pp. 22-24; *Bombay Pub. Deptt. Diary*, Vol. 37, pp. 720-21.
4. Khare, *ALS*, Vol. I, 89, 91, 105; *Purandare Daftar*, III, 3, 8, 17-18, 73.
5. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, (1921 ed.), Vol. I, pp. 538-39.
6. Khare, *ALS*, I, 320-365; *Aitihasik Patravyawahar*, 105, S.P.D. XXXVIII, 93-106.
7. *Ibid*, XX, 165-73; *Aitihasik Patravyawahar*, 107.
8. S.P.D. XIX, 52-92.
9. *Ibid*, XX, pp. 200-215, 224, 241, 246-58, 261-70; *Aitihasik Patravyawahar*, 116-20.
10. Khare, *Aitihasik Lekha Sangraha*, II, p. 696.
11. Khare, Vol. II, 67; S.P.D. XXXVII, 5-9.
12. Khare, *ALS*, II, 509-10; S.P.D. XXXVII, 53-55.
13. Wilks, *Historical Sketches of the South of India*, Vol. I, pp. 464-65.
14. S.P.D. XXXVII, 55; Khare, *ALS*, II, p. 747; Peixoto III, pp. 22-23.
15. Khare, *op. cit.*, II, Nos. 420-565; S.P.D. XXXVII, 60-63.
16. Wilks, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 466.
17. *Ibid*.
18. S.P.D., XX, 159, 168.
19. Wilson, *History of the Madras Army*, Vol. I, p. 11; Aitchison, C. U., *Treaties, Engagements and Sanads*, Vol. V (1864), pp. 14-18.
20. Khare, *op. cit.*, III, 644-80; S.P.D., XXXVII, 122-35.
21. Wilks, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 302.
22. S.P.D. XXXVII, 122, 133-42; Khare, *op. cit.*, III, 680-90.
23. S.P.D. XXXVII, 148-52; Khare, *op. cit.*, III, 680-91.
24. S.P.D. XXXVII, 158-61; Khare, *op. cit.*, III, 721.
25. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, I, p. 557 and footnote 3.
26. *Bengal Select Committee Proceedings*, 21 September, 1767.
27. *Ibid*, 3rd Oct. 1767.
28. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 557.
29. Forrest, *Selections, Marāthā Series*, Vol. I, pp. 141-43.
30. *Ibid*, Vol. I, p. 169.
31. *Ibid*, Vol. I, pp. 157-75; *Madras Military Consultations*, Vol. 30A, p. 633.
32. *Bengal Select Committee Proceedings*, 1 March, 1769.
33. *Madras Military Consultations*, Vol. 33, p. 231.
34. Khare, *op. cit.*, III, p. 1383.
35. Wilks, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 135.
36. *Bengal Select Committee Proceedings*, 10 March, 1771.
37. Peixoto, *History of Hyder Ali Khān*, V, 163.
38. Khare, *op. cit.*, Vol. IV, Introduction.
39. S.P.D. XXXVII, p. 203-7; Khare, *op. cit.*, III, pp. 1402-04; Wilks, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 136-37.
40. Peixoto, *History of Hyder Ali Khān*, VI, p. 101.
41. S.P.D. XXXVII, No. 226; Khare, *ALS*, 1102-1121; *Pethe Daftar*, Vol. I, p. 60.
42. S.P.D. XXXVII, p. 233; Khare, *ALS*, 1165-75; Wilks, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 149.
43. *Madras Military Consultations*, Vol. 36, p. 49.
44. S.P.D. XXI, 93, 94; Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, II, pp. 506-09.
45. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 543-44.
46. S.P.D. XXIX, 72.
47. S.P.D. XXIX, 99, 102-08.
48. Vad, *Madhav Rao Peshwā I Diaries*, pp. 266-69.
49. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 468.
50. *Ibid*, p. 471.
51. S.P.D. XXIX, 102, 105, 121, 197; Wendel, *Memoirs de origin des Jats*.
52. S.P.D. XXIX, 105.

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53. S.P.D. XXIX, 117, 126-7, 204; Wendel, *Memoirs*, etc., pp. 105-6.
54. Khare, *ALS*, III, 634-44, S.P.D. XXIX, 160, 164; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 471-74.
55. *Calendar of Persian Papers*, II, 207.
56. S.P.D. XXIX, 185, 149, 169, 196, 207-08, 215.
57. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 476-79.
58. S.P.D. XXIX, 75.
59. Qanungo, K. R., *History of the Jāts*, p. 2171.
60. S.P.D., XXIX, 87, 233-45; also Sarkar, *op. cit.*, II, p. 521.
61. For details see, Sarkar *op. cit.*, III, pp. 8-12.
62. S.P.D. XXIX, p. 238, 242-46, 255, K.S.P., pp. 222-24.
63. *Calendar of Persian Papers*, III, 323, 445.
64. C.P.C. III, 693-810; Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, II, pp. 550-55.
65. S.P.D. XXIX, 276.
66. S.P.D. XXXII, Introduction.
67. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 577.
68. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 564.

CHAPTER VIII

MARĀTHĀ PROVINCIAL DYNASTIES

PART I

I. *Feudalization of Marāthā State:*

Shivājī established a strong well-knit monarchy of a unitary type. The king was the leader of his military forces as well as the head of the civil departments of his government. The Rājā's vast forces—two hundred thousand strong—were commanded either by the Rājā in person or by his officers. The plans of campaigns were drawn up by him and when he was elsewhere, he supervised and kept himself informed of the movements of his armies. His officers were paid directly from State treasury and had to account for any levy made on enemy territory. The same procedure obtained in respect of the civil departments—revenue, customs, excise, mints and justice. The Rājā took interest and supervised the details of the working of the several departments and paid his officers in cash or kind. It was only at the village level that the old village servants like the Patel, Kulkarni, Chaugula and the different artisans who served the needs of village communities were permitted to hold on to their *watans*—small pieces of land in lieu of the services they performed. They also received some other perquisites. The village officers collected land revenue and other cesses for government, sent the amount to the *tāluka* officers and managed local affairs. They had little voice in shaping State policies and politics. Where was the Rājā to find officers with intimate knowledge of the numerous rural communes, who had daily contacts with the peasants and artisans of the villages and who could manage local affairs, if not in the hereditary village servants? Hence the old practice continued: land-gifts (*Dharmaday inams*) were also made towards the maintenance of temples and other charitable institutions. There were no intermediaries and the Rājā's writ ran throughout his kingdom.¹

But from the eighteenth century, direct rule gave place to indirect rule. The villages continued to function as before, but otherwise the State administration underwent a change. The Rājā divided his patrimony among his ministers and commanders of military

forces. He expected them not only to raise forces and maintain them to manage their territory but also make fresh conquests, obtaining in return a small share of the revenues, a kind of pension known as *Raj Bakti*. Assignments of revenues to captains of troops became the order of the day. In the *Swarāj* territory, though many grants of revenue were made, regular administration continued to function as before (described in Elphinstone's *Report on Territories Conquered from the Peshwā* (1822), for which further evidence may be obtained from *Vad's Peshwā Diaries*).

Initially the assignments (*Saranjāms*) were made for short periods; the subordinate position of the assignee (who was called *Saranjāmdar* in Marathi) was clearly defined. But after the passage of time, the *Saranjāms* became hereditary and the terms of agreement were evaded as much as possible. The Marāthā power that spread over India thus became a feudal State with its feudatories affecting independence in everything but name. It was from such feudatories that most of the eminent Marāthā dynasties arose. It will not be out of place to give a more detailed description of the working of the *Saranjāmdari system* before we go on to give accounts of a few prominent Marāthā houses.

The term *Saranjām* is of Persian origin. It means apparatus, provisions, furniture, materials or what is essential to any undertaking. The term acquired a somewhat technical sense, meaning a kind of land tenure. Amongst the Marāthās the expression was applied especially to temporary assignment of revenue from villages or lands for the support of troops or for personal military service. The expression was also applied to grants made to persons appointed to civil offices of the State to enable them to maintain their dignity, and to grants for charitable purposes. It was the practice with Muhammadan dynasties to maintain a species of feudal aristocracy for State purposes by temporary assignments of revenue (*Jāgīr*) either for the support of troops or for personal service or for maintenance of official dignity or other specific reason. Circumstances obliged the Marāthā King Rājārām (1689-1700) to fall in line with the *Jāgīrdārī* system and to assign districts and provinces in *Saranjām*. What was then known under Muslim rulers as *Jāgīrdārī* system came to be known under the Marāthās as *Saranjāmdari* system.

The defence given by the protagonists of the system is, that it enabled the ruler to administer far-off provinces by creating centres of power when means of communication were not developed. The defence in itself contains the fallacy of the argument. The chief in

the distant province is a law unto himself, caring little for the restraints placed on him and even eager to break from the weak bonds that bind him to the superior power. The *jāgīr* or *saranjāmi* system is, therefore, incompatible with a strong monarchy. The *jāgīrdār* at the slightest sign of weakness in the central government is apt to assume independence. Shivājī, the founder of the Marāthā State, had a clear conception of the needs of an efficient government and would not countenance the *jāgīr* system. He insisted that his officers be paid directly from government treasury and not by assignments of revenue. He did his utmost to undo the evils of feudalism by depriving the old collectors of land revenue—Deshmukhs and Deshpandes—of some of their obnoxious rights and prerogatives. He pulled down the fortified places of the petty local tyrants and he was determined not to create new fiefs and renew the evils of military tyranny and feudal anarchy.

Shivājī died in 1680. The Mughul emperor Aurangzīb deployed large forces and moved personally southward to direct a campaign to crush the nascent Marāthā State. Shivājī's successor Shambhūjī was unable to keep up the unequal struggle. His army was defeated and dispersed; the Marāthā King was taken prisoner and beheaded. The brutal murder of their King roused the ardour of the marāthā people. They took up the Mughul challenge and renewed their struggle for ousting the Mughuls from their territory. This war of independence lasted over twenty-five years at the end of which the Marāthā people emerged triumphant. But during the interregnum the well-knit state organisation built by Shivājī disintegrated and disappeared.

Rājārām, who succeeded Shambhūjī in 1689, did not possess the magnetic personality of his father. He delegated his authority to his Brahmin officers—the *Pratinidhi* and the *Amātya*—thus lowering the prestige of the royal office in an age when the ruler was either the supreme war-lord of the State or a mere cypher. The task which the King delegated to his Brahmin officers was arduous; they were expected to repel the onslaughts of the Mughul empire, suppress internal rebellions, if any, and run the administration. The majority of the Marāthās were disposed to support their King; the inability of the ministers to command the same loyalty that was shown to the King, obliged them to purchase it for a price, by promising their adherents large concessions and by reviving the *jāgīr* system; many times *jāgīrs* were granted in districts still in possession of the enemy and the *jāgīrdars* were expected to wrest the territory from their opponents before they could realise revenues from them. Only a soldier of fortune would accept such a gift and

would have little respect for the grantor. The decline of the monarchy continued after Rājārām's death. For a small revenue share, the King gave away large tracts and became a pensioner living on the charity, or even at the mercy of his military captains.

Shāhū who became King in 1708 was rescued and enabled to hold his position with the support he obtained from his able *Peshwā*, Bālājī Vishwanāth. Bālājī Vishwanāth, to win over the great captains like Parsojī Bhosle, Khandojī Dābhāde, Dhanājī Jādhav and Kānhojī Angria, allowed them to hold territories they had wrested from the enemy as their hereditary fiefs on condition that they recognized Shāhū as their sovereign, served the King with their forces and made stipulated contributions to the royal treasury. In the initial stages, there were certain other checks on these feudal chiefs; their *Dīwans* and Accountants and other officers were sent from the centre; they were supposed to render annual accounts of their income and expenditure and there was a regular check on the troops maintained by them. The *jāgīrdars* chafed at the restraints placed on their powers, ignored them when they could, and in course of time, came to eclipse the royal authority in their domains. The feudalization of the State was complete when Rājā Shāhū died (December 1749).

Rājā Shāhū must himself be held responsible for the growth and encouragement of this feudal mentality. He was released from Mughul custody in 1707 on condition that he ruled his father's patrimony as a Mughul vassal and rendered tribute. Shāhū not only acknowledged himself to be a vassal of the empire, but to the end of his career, affected to consider himself merely as a zamīndar of the empire in all his transactions with it, (all Rājput and Bundela Rājās were called Zamīndars in Mughul documents) and he insisted that all old *watans*, *ināms* and *saranjāms* be continued to their holders. The *jāgīrdārī* or *Saranjāmdārī* way of thinking thus came to permeate the entire Marāthā State, and it is, therefore, not surprising to find the *Peshwā* accepting the system and working through it. As the Rājā's chief executive officer, he, on one side, claimed precedence over other ministers, seized parts of their *jāgīrs* whenever he could, and expected them to accept his direction; on the other, he went on expanding his own sphere of activities, assigned his conquests to his military captains—Sindia, Holkar, Pawārs, Patwardhans and others. He enlarged his own resources and retained his conquests in north India and on the west coast as his *jāgīrs*. The armies that he raised owed their first allegiance to him; the provinces he acquired were managed by his agents. The *Peshwā*, the *de facto* ruler

of the Marāthā State, thus became the biggest *jāgīrdar* or feudatory of the State.

In 1750, on the death of Shāhū, the *Peshwā's* position became supreme and the *Saranjāmi* system came into full operation. A number of agreements between the *Peshwā* and his feudatories could be found recorded in the *Peshwā's* archives, which bring out the essential relationship between the two parties. *Saranjāms* were granted to military chiefs, civil officers, and for maintenance of forts and *Deosthans*. The Sindias, the Holkars, the Gaikwārs, the Patwardhans and a host of smaller *Saranjāmdars* were allowed to administer their fiefs and collect revenue on condition of military services when required. A *nazar* was paid by the chief on his appointment to the *Saranjām*. Three conditions were exacted. The first was the grant of a document by the *Sarkar* in the form of a *sanad*, memorandum or agreement conferring the *saranjām*. The second condition was that of faithful service. The number of troops with which service was to be rendered was laid down. The party was also to avoid on their own all hostile or offensive entanglements with neighbouring powers. Payment of *nazar* on succession and also on special occasions was the third requisite. In case of dispute over *Saranjām* property, the final word lay with the *Sarkar*. The succession to the *Saranjām* was not automatic but required the *Sarkar's* consent. Once the *Saranjām* was granted, its management rested with the grantee. He could not touch other *Huqdārs* and *Dumālā* grants in his *Saranjām* but could appropriate the rest of the revenue. The civil and criminal jurisdiction remained with the *Saranjāmdar*, and there was little interference in his jurisdiction so long as he continued to perform the service expected of him and retained the sovereign's favour.

Malet, the British Resident at Poona, pointed out the defect of this arrangement as early as 1788. He observed, "the feudal nature of the tenures of the great Marāthā chieftains leads them to a desire for an affection of independence of the Brahmin or civil power."¹

Elphinstone, who was Resident at the *Peshwā's* Court from 1811 to 1817, was called upon to decide the disputes between the *Peshwā* and the southern *jāgīrdars*. The terms he set down are in no way different from those mentioned above. According to Elphinstone, the following were the terms for the settlement of dispute brought about at Pandharpur in 1812:

"1st.: A body of troops, the number, description and pay of which is fixed, to be maintained by the *jāgīrdars*. The personal

allowance to the *jāgīrdar* is fixed; allowances are also granted in some cases to his relations and to some of his ministerial officers.

2nd.: The *jāgīrdar*'s troops may be mustered as often as the *Peshwā* pleases. No men are to pass muster that are not of a certain description and mounted on horses of certain value.

3rd.: All the expenses of the *Saranjām* troops without exception are to be paid from the assigned revenue.

4th.: The expenses of collecting the revenue and protecting the *jāgīr* in ordinary times are to be paid from the assigned revenue."

The *Peshwā* also had other claims such as appointment of *Durrukdārs* or officers employed for inspecting the management of the *Saranjām* lands and payment of troops.²

Not all the *Saranjāmdars* were the *Peshwā*'s creatures. Some of them were relations of the *Rājā* of Satara, his ministers and commanders sent out to conquer territories and afterwards allowed to retain them. Of this description were the *Rājās* of Kolhapur and the chiefs of Nagpur who considered themselves rather as confederates than as vassals. Then there were the members of the *Rājā*'s cabinet—the *Pratinidhi*, *Senāpati*, *Amātya*, *Mantri*, etc. After these, came the large number of *jāgīrdars* created by the *Peshwā* in the provinces held by him. It is not possible to trace the accounts of all the *Marāthā* families; we shall merely give brief accounts of the families of the two *Bhosle* families—*Chhatrapatis* of Kolhapur and *Rājās* of Nagpur. *Sindia*, *Holkar*, and *Gaikwār*, who spearheaded *Marāthā* advance in *Mālwa* and *Gujarāt* need our special attention, as also the house of *Angria*, who for a time were a terror to the western powers.^{2a}

II. *The Chhatrapatis of Kolhapur:*

The House of Kolhapur must be looked on as the junior branch of the *Marāthā* State. It owes its rise to *Tārā Bāi*, who acted as Regent for the *Marāthā* State after her husband's (*Rājārām*'s) demise in 1700. She ruled as Regent for seven years in the name of her child *Shivājī* till 1707. In that year *Shāhū* was released from *Mughul* captivity and allowed to claim his father's kingdom as a vassal of the empire. When *Tārā Bāi*'s specious argument that *Shāhū* was a pretender failed, she put another ingenious one to keep him out. She argued that *Shambhūjī* had lost the *Marāthā* kingdom

to the Mughuls, her husband regained it by his efforts, thus creating by his efforts an altogether new State; Shāhū thus could have no claim and legal title to inherit the Marāthā State.³ Her argument carried little conviction and the main part of the army under its *Senapati* Dhanājī Jādhav, joined Shāhū. Shāhū defeated the remnant of Tārā Bāi's army led by the *Pratinidhi*, occupied the capital Satara and had himself crowned. Tārā Bāi with her son Shivājī sought shelter in fort Panhala.

Rājā Shāhū suggested that the districts marked off by the confluence of the Warna and the Krishna rivers up to the Tungabhadra should be held by his cousin while he ruled the rest of the kingdom.⁴ Tārā Bāi was too ambitious to remain content with a small part. She claimed royal authority over the entire Marāthā State for her son. Shāhū was thus forced to fight to a finish. He marched into Kolhapur territory, occupied the town and laid siege to the hill-fort of Panhala. Tārā Bāi escaped to another remote hill-fort, Rangna, where the pursuers had to abandon the siege and fall back upon Satara.⁵

The struggle went on intermittently for another two decades. In 1714 a revolution occurred in Kolhapur which swept away Tārā Bāi and her son, Shivājī, and put the second son of Rājārām—Shambhūjī—on the throne. But the old policy of confrontation continued. Shambhūjī found a welcome ally in the new Mughul *Subāhdar* of the Deccan, Nizām-ul-Mulk. The Viceroy of the Deccan was unwilling to recognise Marāthā claims of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* over his provinces and asked the two cousins to submit their claims to his arbitration. Rājā Shāhū was confounded by the move of the Nizām, but he had a very capable *Peshwā* who soundly defeated the Mughul Viceroy at Palkhed in February 1728 and forced him to recognize Shāhū's sovereignty over Marāthā dominions and grant him the rights of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* over the six *subāhs* of the Deccan. After the defeat of the Nizām, the Kolhapur prince was isolated; his army was routed at Shirole in March, 1730; after negotiations and a personal meeting of the two cousins, the treaty of Warna was concluded in April, 1731. The treaty defined the spheres of the two parties—the territory extending from the south of the Warna to the Tungabhadra was recognized as belonging to the Rājā of Kolhapur. The country beyond this point up to Rameshwar was to be shared between the two parties. Both parties were to be of one accord and not to harbour the servants or enemies of the other. There was an exchange of territory, the fort of Koppal going to Rājā Shambhūjī and fort Ratnagiri to Shāhū. The

southern Konkan districts were assigned to the Kolhapur Rājā; in exchange Shāhū was to take possession of fortified places like Miraj, Athani, and Tasgaon which the Kolhapur feudatories refused to surrender and which were later seized by the *Peshwā* by force.⁶ "Included among the possessions of the great Shivājī, Kolhapur remained an integral part of the Marāthā empire until the treaty of Warna (in 1731) formed it into an independent principality. The principality contained about 4,000 sq. miles and yielded a revenue of Rs. 28 lakhs. The treaty of Warna was offensive and defensive and provided for the divisions of such conquests as might be conjointly made. But there never was any great cordiality between the Kolhapur and Satara chiefs; and from the first a decided animosity existed between the former and the usurper of the authority of the latter (the *Peshwā*)".⁷ This animosity was to be a deciding factor in the later history of Kolhapur.

"The mass of the people—mostly Marāthā peasants—entertained an enthusiastic veneration for the reigning dynasty. The details of government were conducted by the Rāni and the *Kārbhāris*. The formation of the country helped greatly its independence. There were no great towns which would attract the invader. The whole tract was well-watered by a number of rivers that passed through it and received good rainfall. The frontier forests were exceedingly difficult of approach and the summits of the *ghats* were formed into natural strongholds.

"Besides these protective forts every village contained its distinct party of able-bodied militia who held small lots of land on a service tenure and crowds of these military ryots, trained from youth in the use of arms, eagerly assembled to support the regular standing army of the State when called upon for the defence of their land, or for a marauding foray in the enemy's territory; and from the earliest times an army of 20,000 could be brought into the field at a very short notice."^{7a}

But with all these advantages Rājā Shambhūjī showed little talent either for administration or war. In imitation of his cousin at Satara he appointed a council of eight ministers but except for the *Pratinidhi*, the *Amātya* and the *Senapatī*, little is heard of the rest. Even these three were at loggerheads amongst themselves and with the Prince. The Rājā divided his principality among his ministers and his military chieftains like Udājī Chavān, Ghātge, Pātankar, Sindia, who were not always amenable to royal authority, and the Rājā often turned to his cousin at Satara to bring them

round. Shambhūjī visited Satara in 1732, 1734, 1735, 1736 and 1740. He not only discussed boundary disputes but expected Rājā Shāhū to effect the conquest of the southern region for him. Shāhū extended his cousin every hospitality but he was in no position to grant or to promise military aid.

The visit of the Kolhapur Prince to Satara in 1740 is rather memorable. The great *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo died in April, 1740, and his son Bālājī Rāo came to Satara to receive the robes of *Peshwāship*. Bālājī Rāo (or Nānā Sāheb as he was called) during the visit met the Kolhapur Prince. The *Peshwā* by then had become practically the chief executive officer of the senior branch of the Marāthā State, and thought it a good idea to unite the two branches under one sovereign, with himself as the chief minister after the demise of the ageing Rājā Shāhū. He entered into a secret pact with the Kolhapur Prince, that after Shāhū's death he (Shambhūjī) should succeed to the Satara throne, the two States should be united and the *Peshwā* should serve the new sovereign loyally.⁸

The pact never came into effect. It had been concluded by the *Peshwā* behind the back of his lawful sovereign, without ascertaining his wishes. Shāhū was a man of kindly disposition and a forgiving nature. But he could not forget that his cousin had joined hands with the Mughul *Subāhdar* of the Deccan to oust him and had on another occasion sent assassins to get him out of the way.⁹ He nursed feelings of repugnance towards his cousin and on his death-bed gave an injunction that on no account should the Kolhapur prince be adopted and allowed to succeed him.¹⁰ The Kolhapur party in the meanwhile went on reminding the *Peshwā* of his secret engagement and sought his help to seize territory in the Karnāṭak.¹¹ On hearing of Shāhū's death (December, 1749) Shambhūjī prepared to march on Satara, but his path was barred by a strong force of the *Peshwā*.¹² Secure in the possession of supreme power, the *Peshwā* was no longer anxious to stand by a pact by which he would have to share authority with somebody else. He therefore kept silent over the agreement, but four years later (1754) paid a personal visit to the Kolhapur Prince to mollify him. In February, 1759, he was again at Kolhapur and concluded two agreements with the Prince to help him out of his financial straits and gave him military aid to bring his feudatories to book. The State of Kolhapur looked to the *Peshwā* to prop up its collapsing foundations—a development which the *Peshwā* heartily welcomed.

During the last ten years of his life Shambhūjī left the admi-

nistration to Rāni Jijā Bāi and "spent most of his leisure hours with dancing girls and dissipated his revenue in drinking and debauchery."¹³ He died on 18 December, 1760 without a male issue.

On the death of the Kolhapur Rājā, the *Peshwā* made one more attempt to unite the two kingdoms under his authority. His troops were to march into Kolhapur territory, seize the two strategic hill-forts of Panhala and Rangna and place on the throne his nominee, Umāji Bhosle of the Mungikar family. Rāni Jijā Bāi, under the scheme was to be given a pension and allowed to look after the palace administration, but was to have no hand in the management of the State, which was to be supervised by the *Peshwā's* officers. Jijā Bāi was too spirited to accept the *Peshwā's* scheme and become his pensioner. She sent letters of protest to the *Peshwā*, his chief feudatories and other neighbouring powers informing them that one of the queens was pregnant and it was the wish of the dying monarch that the infant should succeed him. The *Peshwā* then faced a very grave situation in Hindustān and had little energy left to devote his attention to the succession issue at Kolhapur. He failed to support his troops that had advanced into Kolhapur territory. Jijā Bāi defeated the small force and adopted a young boy from the Khānwat Bhosles in the Indapur *tāluk*. The boy was renamed Shivāji (II) and as he was barely five years, Rāni Jijā Bāi became the Regent. The Rāni thus became the saviour of the State of Kolhapur and the second founder of the State.

In the meanwhile the *Peshwā's* army had suffered a crushing defeat at Pānipat in January, 1761 and he himself died of a broken heart in June of that year. In this atmosphere of gloom and despair of defeat and discord in the *Peshwā's* family, it was easy for Jijā Bāi to obtain recognition of her nominee as the ruler and herself as the Regent. For the next ten years Jijā Bāi ruled Kolhapur with an iron hand.

The reign of Shivāji II of Kolhapur (1762-1812) proved to be one of great turbulence—especially in its later stages. Kolhapur State had so far shown little interest in schemes of conquest, either on its own or in co-operation with the *Peshwā*. The result had been that the *Peshwā's* armies had marched east and south and had occupied much of the northern Karnāṭak region. The principality of Kolhapur thus came to be ringed round by the *jāgīrs* of the *Peshwā's* feudatories—the Patwardhans, Rāstes and Gokhales.

Though Kolhapur State could not effect any conquest and remained quiescent while the *Peshwā's* armies were overrunning the

Karnāṭak region, it made a grievance of the *Peshwā's* success in the southern region, felt itself defrauded of its share, and had no qualms in joining the *Peshwā's* enemies—the Nizām and Haidar 'Alī in the former's hour of adversity. The districts east and south of Kolhapur had come to be held in *jāgīr* by the *Peshwā's* feudatories—Patwardhans, Rāstes and Gokhales—and with them Kolhapur remained locked in strife for more than a quarter of a century till the British intervened in 1812, and put an end to the independence of the *jāgīrdars* and of the Kolhapur chief.

But this was a later development. Immediately after she obtained the *Peshwā's* consent to the succession of her nominee, Rāni Jijā Bāi begged the *Peshwā's* help to recover her southern outposts—Hukeri, Raibag, Kagal and the *tāluka*s of Chikodi and Manoli where her authority was being defied by her feudatories. *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo obliged her in 1764 when he was leading an army against Haidar 'Alī; in lieu of seven hundred thousand rupees to meet his military expenses, he put down the rebels. But the Rāni unable to pay cash from Kolhapur treasury, mortgaged the two districts to *Sahukars* who made them over to the Patwardhans for realizing their revenues. The temporary possession of Chikodi and Manoli thus became another cause of friction which embittered the relations between the two parties.

The beginning of the civil war in Poona was the signal for Kolhapur to send its troops across the *Peshwā's* territory. It attacked Ichalkaranji, but the *Jāgīrdar* was a relation of the *Peshwā* and invoked the aid of the Patwardhans for his protection. In 1775 Kōnher Rāo Trimbak attacked Kolhapur troops and inflicted defeat on them. In 1776 there was fighting between the two parties; the Patwardhan troops arrived within the precincts of Kolhapur and showing little regard for the monastery of Shankarāchārya, plundered it (9 March, 1776).¹⁴ But Kolhapur was saved when the Patwardhan forces were diverted to meet Haidar 'Alī's advance towards the Krishna. Haidar 'Alī sent money to the Kolhapur Rājā and promised him further military aid to keep up hostilities with the *Peshwā's* troops.

Haidar 'Alī's advance into North Karnāṭak and the possibility of his joining hands with Kolhapur aggravated the situation. The Poona Government despatched a strong force under Mahādji Sindia to put an end to the activities of the Kolhapur party. Mahādji invested Kolhapur for three months (February-April, 1778) and beat

back sortie after sortie of the besieged. The Kolhapur party agreed to pay Sindia the sum of Rs. 15 lakhs for abandoning the siege.

Kolhapur showed little regard for the agreement and imprisoned all those who stood guarantee for the tribute of Rs. 15 lakhs to be paid to Sindia. It practically repudiated the agreement and invested Kagal in 1779. Parashurām Bhāu, who was in Karnāṭak now advanced on Akewat and took the place by assault in June, 1779. The Poona *Kārbhāris* were busy quelling Raghobā's rising and meeting the English challenge. They came to an understanding with Haidar 'Alī and the Nizām, thus isolating Kolhapur. Its outpost at Shirole from which Kolhapur troops often descended into Patwardhan territory was invested and taken with great loss in May, 1780. Gokak fell in June and the Kolhapur troops that were plundering Walve, Islampur and Karhad, were defeated at Waghapur. By the agreement concluded on 22 January, 1781, peace came to the harried land. The Patwardhans were asked to abandon the outposts and districts belonging to Kolhapur which they had seized during the last five years' struggle, especially Chikodi, Manoli, Hukeri and Raibag *tāluka*s. The dignity of the Kolhapur Prince was to be respected and his *Kārbhāri* or *Diwān* Yashwant Rāo Sindia to be trusted. From 1781 to 1793 there was peace on the eastern frontier of Kolhapur.

But the State was not altogether free from internal troubles and other disputes. In 1781 the garrison of Bhudargarh revolted and the stronghold passed into the hands of Parashurām Bhāu Patwardhan. In 1784 the Bāwdā garrison rose up against the legitimate authority. The revolt was somehow quelled. In 1787 Kolhapur made war on the Sāwant of Wādi, because the latter was assuming superior airs and flaunting the honours received from the Mughul emperor through Mahādji Sindia's agency. The war put a great strain on the ruler of Wādi; to enable him to push back the Kolhapur troops he obtained aid from the Portuguese Government of Goa by surrendering to it the districts of Dicholi, Pedne, Sankhli and Sange. The English had, in 1765, inflicted punishment on the State for piracies committed against their ships. In 1792 the E.I. Co. sent another maritime expedition against Kolhapur and obtained not only reparations for losses suffered by its ships, but also permission to open factories at Malwan and Kolhapur.

In 1793 the Kolhapur State found itself again at war with the Patwardhans. Mahādji Sindia had arrived in Poona a year before and now insisted that the Poona Court should move its Karnāṭak

forces against Kolhapur which was holding on to the coastal districts of his relation, the Sāwant of Wādi. The Patwardhan force under Rāmchandra Parashurām advanced to Alte in Kolhapur State, but was dispersed with great loss. Then the great Bhāu himself marched on Kolhapur with a larger force and cannon and laid siege to the capital. After a month's siege, and much privations suffered by the garrison, an agreement was concluded by which the State agreed to pay the Bhāu an indemnity of ten lakhs of rupees; so long as the sum remained unpaid the districts of Chikodi and Manoli were to remain in the possession of Parashurām Bhāu. The Bhāu had to pay soon a heavy price for this arrangement.

The death of *Peshwā* Sawāi Mādhav Rāo in October, 1795 shook the Marāthā State violently. Nānā Phadnīs who wielded the *Peshwā's* authority as his guardian, was openly challenged by Daulat Rāo Sindīā and his ministers. In the tortuous struggle that ensued, Parashurām Bhāu was made a prisoner and the entire Karnāṭak province including Bhāu's *jāgīr* lay open to the march of Kolhapur troops. Nānā who had fled to Mahad suggested to the neighbouring powers, including the Rājā of Kolhapur, to attack the Patwardhan districts. The Rājā needed no such encouragement. He first occupied the stronghold of Bhudargarh, recovered Chikodi and Manoli, captured Hubli and then turning to Bhāu's *jāgīr*, seized Tasgaon and burnt down the Patwardhan mansions and established outposts upto the Krishna. In 1798 the British Resident at Poona reported, "the Rājā of Kolhapur (the head of the Malwans) was creating disturbances in the quarter of Merritch, Tasgaum, Darwar and Shahnoor. It is reported that the Rājā of Satara, the nominal head of the Marāthā empire, has seized the persons placed over him by Nana Furnavees, that he is in complete possession of the fort of Sattara and forming connection with the Rājā of Kolapore, who is also of the ancient Bhonsla family, he is raising troops.... Rāste was yesterday appointed to proceed with a force of about 3,000 men, ostensibly for the settlement of affairs in the Satara quarter."¹⁵ In June the Kolhapur Rājā was recommending it to Tipū Sultān to avail himself of the distractions in the Poona State.¹⁶

Rāste proved himself unable to quell the disturbances of the two *Chhatrapatis*, and the *Peshwā* in alarm set Parashurām Bhāu free and sent him against the royal insurgents. Bhāu defeated the Satara force on 4 August, 1798, placed outposts round the city on 9 August and occupied the fort on 31 August. After that he left for his *jāgīr* and for chastising the Kolhapur forces which had encroached on *Peshwā's* districts in Karnāṭak.

Parashurām Bhāu's health was in a declining state, but he kept the field throughout the rains and recovered the posts between the rivers—Ghataprabha and Malaprabha. In the month of September he advanced from Gokak towards Kolhapur, but near the village of Pattankudi he encountered the Kolhapur forces headed by the Rājā himself when he suffered a total defeat and was mortally wounded (16 September, 1799). Nānā Phadnis despatched fresh troops from Poona and five of Sindia's battalions to support Bhāu's son Rāmchandra Appā and reduce the Rājā to submission.¹⁷ The Rājā retired to the protection of Panhala before the new army and the city of Kolhapur was invested by the Poona troops. But on the death of Nānā Phadnis in March, 1800, the Poona force was recalled and Kolhapur State was saved, which would otherwise, in all probability, have been subverted.

The death of Parashurām Bhāu Patwardhan did not bring any relief to the State of Kolhapur. The British took the *Peshwā* under protection by the treaty of Bassein (December, 1802) and warned Kolhapur against disturbing the *Peshwā's* districts in Karnāṭak. The Rājā of Kolhapur "pretended authority over the chief of Sāwant-Warree, made war on the Wadi chief and wrested from him the forts of Bharatgarh and Narsingagarh and territory attached to the two forts. The Wadi party called in the help of Sidhoji Rāo Nimbālkar or Appā Desāi of Nipani".¹⁸ Appā Desāi occupied Chikodi and Manoli tāluks, and advanced against the Kolhapur force and defeated it with great loss near Savgaon (1808). Kolhapur sought to bring about peace by entering into a matrimonial alliance with Appā Desāi. But the Desāi suspected treachery and departed immediately after the marriage. He renewed attacks against Kolhapur in 1811. Kolhapur had suffered heavy losses; it readily agreed to British arbitration.¹⁹ "By the terms accepted by the Rājā of Kolhapur (8 October, 1812) he renounced all rights to Chickoree and Menowlee, which were ceded to the *Peshwā*; but all other places taken from the Rājā were restored. To the British government, the Rājā ceded the harbour of Malwan, which included the forts and island of Malwan or Sindhudurg and its dependencies; he also agreed to renounce piracy, to permit no armed vessels to be fitted out and to restore wrecks as well as to assist vessels in distress. He also became bound to pursue no manner of hostility against any other State, without the consent of the British Government. The British guaranteed the Rājā's possessions against the aggression of all foreign powers and States."²⁰

The condition of Kolhapur during the reign of Shivājī II (1762-

1812) is thus described by Major Graham: "The long reign of Shivājī had been from the commencement one of almost incessant hostility and continued suspense between the prospects of ruin and of conquest; and to support the fierce struggle for independence, every effort to provide means had been resorted to—piracy at sea, plunder at the Court and oppression in the collection of the revenue, and all frequently without avail."

"Grants of lands were unsparingly made to the impoverishment of the crown estate; two-thirds of the entire country were thus transferred to partisans for military services, and a swarm of reckless characters were left behind who rejoiced in anarchy and whose livelihood was to be gathered among the troubled waters. All the evils of the feudal system prevailed in full force; continued warfare was allowed between the petty authorities; the rayats were oppressed and the entire rent forcibly seized during the harvest season; fines increased as commutation for all other punishment; justice was one-sided and only meted out to favoured followers; merchants and way-farers were despoiled during the journey; the labour of the cultivator was exacted without remuneration; and a multiplicity of monopolies existed to the destruction of all trade."²¹ The result of the anarchy was that the total revenue of the State had come down to Rs. 10 lakhs of which Rs. 4 lakhs was given away in *jāgīr*.²² The area of the State had dwindled to 3,184 sq. miles and the estimated population in 1853 was 5,56,156.²³

The State of Kolhapur saved itself from total extinction by accepting British protection. Rājā Shivājī died early in 1813. His successors were not very competent persons—one of them was murdered by one of his feudatories. There was so much confusion in the State that the British had to appoint a *Diwān* from outside the state in 1844. Kolhapur was said to be involved in the rising of 1857. But about the end of the 19th century the State of Kolhapur woke up to the needs of the modern age. Schools and libraries were started; the city affairs came to be managed by a municipality. Kolhapur had now turned its back on mediaevalism and was marching into the modern age.

III. The Bhosle Rājās of Nagpur:

The Bhosle Rājās of Nagpur claim close kinship with the *Chhatrapatis* of Satara. They are known as Hingnikar Bhosle, being Patels of Hingni in the Poona district. The founder of the family

was Mūdhōjī, father of the famous Parsojī Bhosle. Parsojī and Mūdhōjī's brother Rupājī are mentioned among the eminent captains of the great Shivājī in *Sabhasad* and *Chitnis Bakhars*. Parsojī led expeditions in Berār and Gondwana and rendered material assistance to *Chhatrapati* Rājārām. In 1699 he was rewarded with the title of *Senā Sāheb Subāh*, was granted *Saranjām* and was asked to collect *chauth* in Berār and Gondwana. Parsojī made Bham in Berār his headquarters and was active in Khāndesh, Berār and Gondwana.

When Shāhū returned home in 1707 under Mughul auspices, Parsojī Bhosle was one of the first chieftains who hastened to join his standard.¹ Doubts expressed by the Regent Tārā Bāi about Shāhū's identity were dispelled by Parsojī eating from the same plate with Shāhū. Shāhū in return confirmed his title of *Senā Sāheb Subāh* and issued a *sanad* granting to Parsojī six *sarkars* and one hundred forty-seven *mahals*(?) in Berār. Parsojī died in 1709 and was succeeded by his son Kanhojī.

Kanhojī Bhosle got involved in disputes with his sovereign and with his relatives. He appears to have mismanaged his *saranjām* and could neither pay the Rājā's contribution nor give proper allowances to his uncle and nephew, Ranōjī and Raghūjī. The Rājā consequently ordered a division of the *saranjām*² which displeased Kanhojī Bhosle. He opened negotiations with Nizām-ul-Mulk and offered to take service with him.³ When the Rājā came to know this, he sent the nephew against the uncle Kanhojī and had him imprisoned.

Raghūjī Bhosle now succeeded to the title and the *Saranjām* of the family. He was the most capable of the Bhosle family and expanded its conquests right up to Bengal. In return for the right of collecting *chauth* from Berār, Gondwana, Allahābād, Patna (Bihar) and Maksudabad (Bengal), Raghūjī "gave a bond to maintain a band of five thousand horse for the service of the State, to pay an annual sum of nine lakhs of rupees to government; and, exclusive of *ghasdana* (of Berār), the half only of all other tribute, prize property and contributions, was to be accounted for to the head of the State. He also bound himself to raise ten thousand horse when required and to accompany the *Peshwā* or to proceed to any quarter where he might be ordered."⁴ Very few of these conditions were fulfilled by the Bhosles.

Parsojī and Kanhojī had established themselves in Berār and Gondwana. Raghūjī's earliest activities naturally extended in that direction. The Rājā Chānd Sultān of Deogarh died in 1735 and the

Gond State was usurped by his illegitimate son Vali Shāh. The mother of the legitimate successor, Ratan Kuvar, called in the help of Raghūjī Bhosle. In two years' campaign Raghūjī Bhosle defeated Vali Shāh's party and acquired a third of the Gond kingdom. In 1748 there was an uprising when the *Diwān* Raghunāth Singh tried to throw off Marāthā yoke. The attempt failed and the two sons of Chānd Sultān—Akbar Shāh and Burhān Shāh—were brought to Nagpur. Raghūjī took over the administration of the entire State of Deogarh in the name of the Gond king. The arrangement continued right up to the end of the Bhosle rule of Nagpur. The Bhosles considered themselves as ruling on behalf of the Gond rulers.

Far off Karnāṭak was to be the scene of the next exploit of Raghūjī Bhosle. Pratāp Singh, Rājā of Tanjore, was in distress and implored Rājā Shāhū to send an army to save him from the harassment of the Nawāb of Karnāṭak. Rājā Shāhū despatched an army 50,000 strong, nominally under the command of Fateh Singh Bhosle, with Raghūjī as his chief aid. The allies met the Nawāb of Karnāṭak, Dost 'Alī, at the head of his troops at Damalcherry pass on 19 May, 1740, killed the Nawāb and put his force to rout. Raghūjī temporarily returned to Satara to support Bābuji Nāik's claim to the *Peshwāship*. But his design failed and Raghūjī once more invaded the Karnāṭak, took Trichinopoly by storm, made Chandā Sāhib, the commander of the fort, a prisoner and overran Karnāṭak, demanding tribute from the petty Rājās and polygars. A force of 15,000 Marāthās approached Pondicherry and under Raghūjī's instructions, demanded reparations from the French for supporting their enemy. The French Governor Dumas prepared the place to stand a siege and sent a spirited reply declining any demand for tribute, but to mark his goodwill he sent a dozen bottles of French liquor as a present to the Marāthā General. The General, already informed of the military preparedness, was impressed by the valour of the French and won over "by the golden produce of France's vineyards."⁵ He had fulfilled his mission of chastising the Nawāb and returned with prestige enhanced.

For the next ten years Raghūjī Bhosle was embroiled in the struggle for power in the eastern region. 'Alī Vardī Khān, the governor of Bihar had rebelled against his master Nawāb Sarfarāz Khān, killed him (10 April, 1740) and usurped the *Subāhdari* of Bengal (which then included Bihar and Orissa). But the dead man's relations and followers, among whom was Mīr Habīb, a prominent officer in Orissa, would not acquiesce in the usurpation. They invited the

Marāthās to their aid and continued to resist the new governor. While 'Alī Vardī Khān was in Orissa dealing with the rebels, a Marāthā army under Raghūjī's minister, Bhāskar Rām Kolhatkar, entered Bihar by way of Pachet and reached Burdwan (April 1742). 'Alī Vardī Khān abandoned his Orissa campaign and came on the heels of the Marāthās. Bhāskar Rām invested the Nawāb's camp and cut off its food supplies. A part of the Marāthā army roamed over the country, plundering the villages far and wide and making it impossible for the Nawāb's army to get any foodgrains. The Nawāb tried to fight his way back to Katwa, but his flight was discovered. The encircling Marāthā horse cut down stragglers and the rear-guard, but somehow the Khān succeeded in reaching Katwa with a small detachment.

The campaigning season was almost over as the rains would now set in any moment and swell the Bengal rivers, making movement of troops well nigh impossible. Bhāskar Rām wanted to return to Nagpur, but Mīr Habīb, his ally, pointed out that Murshidabad, the rich and defenceless capital of Bengal, would prove an easy prey if the Marāthās attacked it during the absence of the Nawāb. He himself led the attack at the head of a small column, crossed over into the city on 6 May, 1742 and plundered rich men's houses and disappeared before the Nawāb arrived on the scene. On the advice of Mīr Habīb, Bhāskār Rām abandoned his plan of retiring to Nagpur, and continued to remain in camp at Katwa. His troops spread over western Bengal and the Nawāb's rule ceased to exist in that region. Gangārām, the author of *Mahārāshtra Purāna* speaks of atrocities committed by Marāthā troops, but he himself says in the beginning that the Bādshāh wrote to Shāhū that "he ('Alī Vardī) who was a servant has killed the governor; he has become very powerful and does not pay me the tax. I have no army. Therefore, you should send men there to take the *chauth*."⁶ What was wrong in the whole episode was the way the Marāthā army made war on the civil population.

'Alī Vardī Khān in the meanwhile collected troops and surprised Bhāskar Rām's camp at Katwa on 27 September, 1742. The Marāthā army fled in great confusion.⁷ The next two attempts by Raghūjī to secure the *chauth* of Bengal were foiled by the Nawāb. In 1743 he obtained the aid of the *Peshwā*'s army and drove out the Bhosle troops from the province.⁸

Raghūjī visited Shāhū's Court and complained against the *Peshwā*'s interference in his sphere. The Rājā marked out the

spheres of the two parties by agreements made in August, 1743.⁹ Raghūjī was now free to pursue his conquests in the eastern region. He sent Bhāskar Rām once more to Bengal. The Nawāb in desperation resorted to a base design to destroy his enemy. He invited Bhāskar Rām to a personal meeting to discuss the payment of *chauth*. Bhāskar Rām had been given solemn promises of safe conduct, but as soon as he, with his party, reached the tent where the meeting was to take place, the Nawāb gave orders to kill his visitors. Soldiers rushed in from all sides on the unsuspecting visitors and cut down all of them (30 March, 1744). In 1745 there was mutiny in the Nawāb's army. Raghūjī taking advantage of the mutiny, took possession of Orissa and invaded Bihar. Once more Raghūjī dashed to the capital of Bengal (21 December, 1745) only to be driven back. In 1747 there was severe fighting at Medinipur and Burdwan between the two armies. The Marāthās kept on the pressure; they harassed the Nawāb by avoiding open contests but seeking his troops in out of the way places. 'Alī Vardī Khān was now a weary man of 75 without energy to keep up the running flight. At last in May, 1751, a treaty was concluded between the two parties. The following were the terms of the settlement:

- “(1) Mīr Habīb would now become a servant of 'Alī Vardī Khān and act as nāib-nāzim on his behalf. He should pay the surplus revenue of the province to Raghūjī's army as their salary.
- (2) From the Bengal revenue twelve lakhs of rupees a year would be paid to Raghūjī as *chauth* for that province.
- (3) The Marāthā Government agreed not to set foot in 'Alī Vardī's dominions again.
- (4) The frontier of Bengal was fixed at and including the river Suvarnarekha. Thus the district of Medinipur which the Marāthās had overrun, was restored to Bengal.”¹⁰

Raghūjī Bhosle had thus succeeded in winning for himself a kingdom extending from Berār in the west to Orissa in the east and from Garha-Mandla on the north to Chandrapur in the south. In Berār he shared the revenue with the Nizām, but in other regions his rule was supreme. The large and compact territory of Raghūjī Bhosle roused the jealousy of the *Peshwā*. After Raghūjī's death in 1755 the *Peshwā* took advantage of the succession dispute to reduce the power of the Bhosle family and persuade it to accept the *Peshwā*'s primacy.

Raghūjī died on 14 February, 1755 at the age of 60. He had four sons—Jānojī, Mūdhōjī, Bimbājī and Sābājī. Jānojī was the eldest son, but born of a junior wife. Mūdhōjī therefore claimed the patrimony. When the dispute was submitted to the *Peshwā* for decision, he demanded a big *nazar*, claiming himself to be the supreme law-giver of the Marāthā State, and divided the Nagpur principality in two or three parts. Jānojī was to retain the title of *Senā Sāheb Subāh* and to administer the Bhosle territory except Chandrapur and Chattisgarh districts, which were to be placed respectively in charge of Mūdhōjī and Bimbājī Bhosle. The decision was given in 1757 but the actual *sanads* were granted in 1761. The *Peshwā's* decision of dividing the estate among the brothers weakened the chiefship and was not liked by Jānojī or his *Kārbhāris*. There were endless disputes among the four brothers often leading to civil strife. The Bhosles, engrossed in their domestic feuds, took little part in the common affairs of the Marāthā State and even failed to assert their claim to the *chauth* of Bengal. The *Peshwā's* assumption of the leadership of the Marāthā State and his decision in respect of the Bhosle principality so antagonised the Bhosle brothers that they lent a willing ear to the intrigues of the enemies of the Marāthā State.

Jānojī Bhosle, though he had agreed to pay a *nazar* of ten lakhs of rupees on his accession and pay a part of the revenue into the central treasury, never made any payments. On the contrary, in 1762, he joined Raghunāth Rāo in his plot to oust his nephew. Jānojī was to be rewarded with the kingship of Satara. Nothing came out of this sordid intrigue.

Jānojī then made common cause with the Nizām in yet another bid to challenge the *Peshwā's* authority. The combined army of the Nizām and the Bhosle entered the heart of the Marāthā country and burnt suburbs of the *Peshwā's* capital, desecrating many temples in their march. The *Peshwā* used threats and diplomacy to divide his opponents and defeated the Nizām signally at Rākshasbhūvan in August, 1763. Jānojī, as the price for abandoning the enemy, was given in *jāgīr* territory worth 32 lakhs of rupees.

Jānojī was not destined to enjoy the additional *jāgīr* long. Though he had agreed to send a contingent to operate in the Karnāṭak campaign against Haidar 'Alī, he evaded his promises. In Berār again where he shared the revenue with the Nizām, his officers would not allow any collection by the Nizām. The Nizām who had entered into an offensive and defensive alliance with the *Peshwā*

after the battle of Rākshasbhūvan, now called on the *Peshwā* to fulfil the terms of the agreement. The *Peshwā* was keen to punish Jānojī Bhosle for his duplicity and decided to help the Nizām. The *Peshwā*, in October, 1765 at the head of a large force entered Berār by way of Khāndesh. He was joined by the Nizām's *Diwān* Rukn-ud-daulah with a force of eight thousand. Balapur and Akola were laid under contribution. The Bhosle brothers abandoned the capital and with their families sought shelter in the fort of Amner. Not feeling safe, they sent their families to Chandrapur and joined their army. Jānojī realized the weakness of his position and through the *Peshwā's* envoy Vyankat Moreshwar, sought for terms. He pleaded that he was not responsible for the destruction of the *Peshwā's* capital and the *Peshwā's* present proposal of transferring his new *jāgīr* to the Nizām was 'like giving milk to the serpent'. The *Peshwā* relented in order to keep the Bhosle within the confederacy; he allowed him to keep a small part of the *jāgīr*, transferred fifteen lakhs worth territory to the Nizām and himself took over districts worth nine lakhs. The treaty was concluded at Kholapur near Daryapur in January 1766. The Bhosle was supposed to send a contingent to work with the *Peshwā's* army going to Hindustān. But no Bhosle contingent joined the *Peshwā's* army and Jānojī soon reverted to his bad ways and provoked the wrath of the *Peshwā*.¹¹

In 1768 differences arose between the *Peshwā* and his uncle Raghunāth. The uncle aspired for the *Peshwāship*. When he could not get it, he asked for a partition of the *Peshwā's* estate. Such a proposal the *Peshwā* would never entertain and Raghunāth went on scheming against the nephew, seeking aid from the Nizām, Haidar 'Alī, the English at Bombay, and even Marāthā members of the confederacy like the Gaikwār and Bhosle. Raghunāth was defeated in June, 1768 and then the *Peshwā* marched into Bhosle territory. Jānojī sent his *Diwān* Divākar Pant to conciliate the *Peshwā*. But the *Peshwā*, suspecting the bonafides of the *Diwān*, had him imprisoned and continued the march. He had mobilized a strong army to settle the affairs of Hindustān and that army took the field against Jānojī Bhosle. The Bhosle territory west of the Wardha, including his capital was occupied. While a part of the army laid siege to Chanda, the rest started in pursuit of Jānojī Bhosle, who kept up a running flight. Bhandara near Nagpur was reduced by Rāmachandra Ganesh. In another action on 10 January, 1769, at Panchgaon, Narahar Ballāl, a Bhosle Sardar, was defeated with heavy losses. After a month's fighting Jānojī Bhosle was brought to bay near Kanakāpur on the south frontier of his territory. A treaty was con-

cluded on 23 March, 1769. The agreement contains 19 articles written in the form of demands and replies "and amounting in substance to an agreement by Jānojī that he and his house would ever implicitly obey the *Peshwā* as the head of the Marāthā State; that he would not increase the prescribed number of his army; that he would serve the *Peshwā* with five thousand troops whenever called upon to do so; that he would pay a tribute of five lakhs of rupees annually; and that he would conduct no negotiations with any foreign power without the express permission of the *Peshwā*."¹²

According to Sardesai, "this short war marks the signal triumph of the *Peshwā*'s policy. An attempt was for the first time made to define clearly the relations between the central power and its feudatory members."¹³

Jānojī Bhosle did not survive long after the conclusion of the treaty. He died on 16 May, 1772. During his seventeen years' regime he could neither govern his principality well, nor establish cordial relations with his brothers or the *Peshwā*, the chief executive authority of the State. The four brothers quarrelled among themselves; the army was ever ready to break out in mutiny and there was chaos in the general administration. In consequence the Bhosles became ineffective as a military power. The English realized their weakness, refused them the *chauth* of Bengal and often bribed them to act on their pleasure.

Jānojī died without an issue and the question of succession to the Nagpur estate became complicated. Before his death, however, he had informed the *Peshwā* that he desired to adopt Raghūjī, (born 1757), the son of his brother, Mūdhōjī. The formal adoption however did not take place immediately. Therefore not only the father of Raghūjī (Jr.), but Bākā Bāi the favourite wife of Jānojī, and his brother Sābājī, came forward with some kind of claims to be put in charge of the management of the estate. The *Peshwā* went back on his word and suspecting the loyalty of Mūdhōjī, who was a partisan of Raghunāth Rao, sent the robes of the post to his brother, Sābājī. The result was open outbreak of hostilities between the two brothers, Mūdhōjī and Sābājī. The issue became complicated by civil war in the *Peshwā*'s house after the murder of Nārāyan Rāo *Peshwā*. Raghunāth Rāo supported Mūdhōjī, while the *Bārbhāis* or the party of the Poona Court supported Sābājī. Fighting between the two brothers went on intermittently for two years till Sābājī died in the battle of Panchgaon on 26 January, 1775. Mūdhōjī was left without a rival; his son became *Senā Sāheb Subāh* on 24 June,

1775. Mūdhōjī gave a written agreement that he would have no truck with the party of Raghunāth Rāo, but would loyally support the young *Peshwā* and the *Kārbhāris*.¹⁴

But Mūdhōjī had no strong loyalties, no feeling of patriotism. He followed the rule of expediency. In 1777 the British encouraged him to claim the *Satara Gadi*. As a price for the British goodwill Mūdhōjī gave facilities to General Goddard's force to march through his territory to Surat, though it was known that Goddard was going to the west coast to reinforce the Bombay army in its struggle against the *Marāthās*.

The Bengal Government had in 1767 made advances to Jānoji Bhosle to transfer Orissa to the E.I. Company on condition of payment of Bengal *chauth*, but Jānoji had the wisdom to reject them. Warren Hastings made another unsuccessful attempt to rent a tract of country on the Orissa coast from Mūdhōjī. In 1780 when Nānā Phadnis, the great *Marāthā* Machiavelli, formed the quadruple alliance against the British, Mūdhōjī Bhosle as a member of the alliance was asked to despatch a strong force to attack Bengal, while the Nizām, Haidar 'Alī and the Poona Government would exert pressure against British possessions in the South and the West respectively. Mūdhōjī carried the information of the alliance to the British, assured them that he would feign compliance and that his force in Orissa would in no way hinder British movements.¹⁵ The British were more than glad to buy the Bhosle with the paltry sum of two million rupees. Not only did the Bhosle army not attack the province of Bengal but it heartily co-operated with a Bengal force marching southward through Orissa under Col. Pearse.¹⁶ The short-sighted diplomacy of the Bhosle shattered the strength of the alliance.

Mūdhōjī died in 1788 and from that time Raghūjī II began to exert his authority uncontrolled by anybody. He sent his force to fight in the battle of Kharda against the Nizām in 1795. By 1800 Raghūjī's kingdom extended over a vast territory yielding revenue worth a crore of rupees.¹⁷ But the kingdom of Nagpur was ill-managed and its resources were frittered away on a second-rate Court and a second-rate army. The Bhosle realized very late that the *Peshwā's* acceptance of British paramountcy (1802) meant a death-blow to the independence of the whole *Marāthā* State. He attempted to bring about a conciliation between Sindia and Holkar and fought with Sindia's battalions at the battle of Assaye. He was, however, soundly beaten at the battle of Argaon and made peace

by the treaty of Deogaon concluded on 17 December, 1803. By the treaty the Rājā was stripped of the province of Orissa and of the country west of the Wardha and south of the Narnalla and Gawilgarh hills. The treaty was confirmed by the treaty of 1804 made with the *Peshwā*.¹⁸ Its effect was to reduce the revenue of the Nagpur State from about a crore of rupees to sixty lakhs. The Bhosle also agreed to accept British arbitration in any dispute with the Nizām or with the *Peshwā*, not to engage any European in his service without the consent of the British, and renounced adherence to the confederacy formed with Daulat Rāo Sindia. He agreed to the residence of a permanent British Resident at his Court.

Raghūjī died in 1816 and soon his nephew Appā Sāheb concluded a treaty of subsidiary alliance with the British "agreeing to receive one regiment of Native cavalry, six battalions of Native infantry, one complete company of European artillery and one company of pioneers with the usual proportion of field pieces attached and with the proper equipment of warlike stores and ammunition, which force shall be stationed in perpetuity in the Rājā's territory."¹⁹ The benumbed existence of Nagpur State was terminated next year when Appā Sāheb tried to get out of the meshes of the subsidiary alliance. Appā Sāheb went into exile and a puppet occupied the throne till 1853 when the Nagpur State was annexed to the British empire for want of a legitimate issue.

Jenkins in his report on Nagpur (1827) has described the state of affairs at the Court in the following words:²⁰

"From the Rajah downwards to the lowest Mootsuddee, no means of making money, by traffick, was deemed disgraceful, and the revenues of Government, as well as the interests of the industrious classes of the population, were sacrificed to give them monopolies in the various articles which they chose to deal in. Whole bazars in the city were the property of the Rajah himself, his ladies, and his ministers, with various privileges, and remissions of duties, totally subversive of free trade. Rughojee made every advantage of the necessities of his troops and subjects, caused by his own measures. He withheld the pay of the former, and, in the mean time, through his various banking establishments, he lent them money for their immediate subsistence at enormous interest, and when he paid them the arrears, he gave a third in clothes from his own Dookans, at enhanced values. He exacted advances of revenue from his collectors, and was frequently himself the lender of the money to the ryots, like other Sahookars, at high rates of interest,

and frequently forced the grain in his stores on the *Bunneas* of the city, at his own prices. Grass and wood for building, and fuel, were publicly sold by him, and other sales frequently stopped, until his own stock was disposed of; thus taking the bread from the poorest classes of people by competing with them in their traffick in these articles. In short, no source of gain, however trifling, escaped him, or the members of his family and court.

"From this spirit of meanness and rapacity, as well as from his unwarlike character, Rughojee was not unfrequently called, in derision, the great *Bunneah*; and it must be confessed, that in public as well as in private concerns, the love of money has, for the last twenty years, appeared to be the predominating passion in the court of Nagpore, to the exclusion of everything great, liberal, or even respectable."

NOTES

SECTIONS I & II, pp. 225-239: FEUDALIZATION OF MARATHA STATE & THE CHHATRAPATIS OF KOLHAPUR

1. Sabhāsad, *Shiva Chhatrapatiche Charitra*, ed. by Sane (4th edition, 1923), pp. 27-28. Sarkar, *Shivājī* (1948), pp. 350-51.
- 1a. P.R.C. II, p. 132.
2. P.R.C. XII, pp. 87-88.
- 2a. See Francklin's *Shah Aulum*, pp. 29-30.
3. Letter in *Vividh Dnyān Vistār*, Feb. 1924, cited by Sardesai in *Peshwā Balaji Vishwanath*, p. 36.
4. Rajwade, *MIS*, XX, 282.
5. Rajwade, *MIS*, XV, 59; Parasnis, *Itihas Sangraha*, Peshwā Daftar, p. 12.
6. *Kavyetihas Sangraha Patren Yadi*, (1930 ed.), 19.
7. Graham, D. C., *Statistical Report of the Principality of Kolhapur* (1854), p. 492.
- 7a. Graham, *Ibid*.
8. *Kavyetihas Sangraha Patren Yadi* (1930), No. 246, pp. 218-220. Cited by S. M. Garge, *Karweer Riyasat*, p. 151.
9. Sane, K. N., ed. *Thorle Shahū Maharaj Charitra* (3rd Edn.), (1924), pp. 74-75, 82.
10. Parasnis, *Itihas Sangraha*, Vol. VII; Nos. 4-6; also cited in Chitnis *Shahū Charitra*, pp. 134-35, *Pratinidhi Gharanyacha Itihas*, Vol. IV, ab. pp. 213-14.
11. SPD. VI, 1, 2, & XXVI, 17, 28.
12. K.S.P.Y. 71 and S.P.D., XXVI, 163.
13. Graham, D. C., *op. cit.*, p. 496.
14. Sardesai, *Marāthā Riyasat*, (Uttar Vibhag), I, p. 459.
15. P.R.C. VI, p. 123.
16. P.R.C. VI, p. 182.
17. P.R.C. VI, pp. 517-21; *Kavyetihas Sangraha Patren Yadi*, No. 467 gives a detailed account of the battle of Pattankudi and of Bhau's death.
18. P.R.C. VII, p. 36.
19. For British arbitration in the Kolhapur dispute, see P.R.C. XII, p. 80, 159-62, 225-27, 228-29.
20. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrāttās*, Vol. II (1921 Edn.), pp. 422-23.
21. Graham, *op. cit.*, p. 513.
22. Graham, *op. cit.*, p. 537.
23. Graham, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

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SECTION III, pp. 239-249: THE BHOSLE RAJAS OF NAGPUR

1. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. I, (1921 ed.), p. 314; Sabhasad, *Shahu Charitra*, p. 12.
2. Vad, *Shahū Roznishi*, p. 80.
3. *S.P.D.* X, p. 73.
4. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, p. 384.
5. Hatakar, V. G., *The Marāthās and the French*, p. 69.
6. *Mahārashtrā Purana*, ed. by Dimock and P. C. Gupta (1961), pp. 6-8.
7. Sarkar, Jadunath, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. I, p. 92.
8. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 99.
9. *Ait. Patravyawahar*, 35-6.
10. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, p. 166.
11. Kale, Y. M., *Nagpur Prantacha Itihas*, pp. 163-65; Sardesai, *Riyasat, Madhya Vibhag*, IV, p. 152-53.
12. Sardesai and Kale, *Aitihāsik Patravyawahar*, 117-19.
13. Sardesai, *New History of the Marāthās*, II, p. 530.
14. *Nagpurkar Bhosle, Letters*, 7, 48; *Itihas Sangraha*, Aitihāsik Vividh Vishay II, 32.
15. *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. V, 1957.
16. Aitchison, C. U., *Treaties, Engagements & Sanads* (1863), Vol. III, pp. 95-96.
17. Kale, *Nagpur Prantacha Itihas*, p. 382.
18. Aitchison, C. U., *Treaties, Engagements & Sanads*, Vol. III (1863 ed.) pp. 91-97 and pp. 76-78.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 101-7.
20. Jenkins, Richard, *Report on the territories of the Rājā of Nagpur* (1827).

MARĀTHĀ PROVINCIAL DYNASTIES

PART II

IV. *The Sindias of Gwāltor:*

The name Sindia, it is said, is derived from Sendrak, an ancient Kshatriya clan. Many Sindia families rose to eminence in the Bahmani kingdom. One Nemājī Sindia, invaded Mālwa in 1704, reaching as far as Kalabagh. Nemājī was an important chieftain and his early adherence to Shāhū's cause, strengthened Shāhū's position. History does not record the further career of this soldier. The Patels of Kanherkhed in Satara district, were Sindias who had one of their daughters married to Rājā Shāhū while he was in Mughul captivity. Rānoji Sindia was, therefore, not the first in the family who rose to fame, but he was the founder of the family which had left its impress on the course of Marāthā history. Three generations of Sindias served the *Peshwās* loyally and sacrificed their lives in the cause of their master and their country.

Rānoji Sindia was perhaps a junior member of the Patel family of Kanherkhed. To seek his fortune he entered the personal service of *Peshwā* Bālājī Viswanāth. As Malcolm remarks, "it is probable that ambition, not indigence, influenced a member of the Patel family to become, in the first instance, the menial servant of Bālājī Vishwanāth."¹ He was soon promoted as a captain of cavalry under the *Peshwā's* able son, Bājī Rāo.² In 1720 when Bālājī Vishwanāth died and his son's (Bājī Rāo's) succession was under discussion, Rānoji Sindia was a prominent chief in the *Peshwā's* service.³ The *Peshwā's* cavalry assisted the Nizām against Mubārīz Khān in October 1724. Rānoji was wounded in the battle.⁴ Some critical movements depended on him in the *Peshwā's* campaign against the Nizām in 1727-28.

In July 1729 Rānoji was further elevated; he was granted the *saranjām* that was previously enjoyed by Pilājī Jādhav and also received the honour of using the palanquin.⁵ In 1730 the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of *subāh* Mālwa was granted to Malhārjī Holkar.⁶ Next year, on 20 October, 1731, Rānoji Sindia was associated with him with equal powers.⁷ About the same time the *Peshwā's* seals were sent to Rānoji to be used at his discretion.⁸ After this, Mālwa

became the field of Rānoji's activities with Ujjain as his headquarters, where he revived the worship in many ancient temples.⁹ He accompanied the *Peshwā* in his expedition to meet Sawāi Jay Singh in 1735-36 and was left behind to collect the tribute when the *Peshwā* returned to Poona. As the Mughul went back on his word, the *Peshwā* made a dash on the capital, and defeated the forces sent by the emperor. Rānoji was one of the commanders who led the army against the Mughul and also fought against Sa'adat Khan.¹⁰ A year later, Nizām-ul-Mulk, apprehensive of the *Peshwā's* victories in Hindustān, marched northward, was put in command of imperial forces and met the *Peshwā* at Bhopal (January 1738). The *Peshwā* invested the Nizām in that place and Rānoji distinguished himself in the contest.¹¹ The Nizām signed a convention granting the *subāhdari* to the *Peshwā*. The imperial *farman* came three years later. Sindia and Holkar stood guarantee for due performance of duty by the *Peshwā*.^{11a}

The *Peshwā's* victory over the Nizām released large forces locked in that struggle. A large part of them poured into the Konkan theatre of war where Chimnāji Appā was attacking the Portuguese. "Rānoji Sindia invaded Daman district, overpowered the small garrison of Nargol, Khatalwad, Umbargao, Dahanu and laid the enemy's country under fire and sword." His detachment led in the final assault on the mighty fortress of Bassein.¹²

Rānoji Sindia died at Shujalpur in July 1745, while in service. He had three sons from his first wife—Jayappā, Dattāji and Jotibā and two from the second, Mahādji and Tukoji. Jotibā predeceased his father, but the rest distinguished themselves in various fields of operations.

Jayappā succeeded his father in his *jāgīr* which was then worth about Rs. 65 lakhs per annum. His position was made difficult by the new *Peshwā* Bālājī who could not see beyond immediate gains, and who in his inordinate greed for money, forgot the old ideals of forging alliances with Hindu rulers and establishing Hindu ascendancy. The *Peshwā* set aside the sage advice of Jayappā not to support Mādho Singh in his dispute for the Jaipur throne with his brother Ishwarī Singh, and in the end alienated the entire Rājput princely order.^{12a}

The feebleness of the Mughul empire invited foreign invasions from the north-west. Ahmad Shāh Abdālī who had made himself master of Afghānistan on the death of his master Nādir Shāh in 1747, started invading Hindustān and encroaching on Mughul territory.

He found willing allies in the Afghāns who had settled in Rohilkhand. As the Abdālī troops marched into India, the Rohillās would revolt and seize the adjoining districts belonging either to the emperor or his *Vazīr* Safdar Jang. At one stage it appeared that the junction of the two—the Abdālī forces and the Rohillās would engulf Mughul rule and establish Pathān rule in its place. To avoid such a possibility the *Vazīr* invited Marāthā aid against the Afghāns. In two great battles fought in March-April 1751, the joint armies of the *Vazīr* and that of the Marāthā chiefs—Sindia and Holkar, inflicted severe defeats on the Rohillās and almost annihilated their forces. For a time the Pathān danger was averted. The *Peshwā* eulogized the services of his two chiefs in the highest terms.¹³

Next year the two chiefs, Sindia and Holkar, came to the south taking under their wings the Nizām's eldest son Ghāzi-ud-din and proclaiming him *subāhdar* of the Deccan. There was a revolution in the Nizām's Court, both Ghāzi-ud-din and Nāsir Jang were killed. The Marāthā army in which Sindia's contingent took a leading part, surrounded the new Nizām at Bhalki in 1752 and liberated Junnar, Ahmadnagar and Khāndesh districts of Mahārāshtra from Mughul rule.¹⁴

Next year a big army marched into Hindustān under the nominal leadership of the *Peshwā's* brother, Raghunāth Rāo. Jayappā Sindia and Malhār Rāo Holkar were the main advisers. Raghunāth on his arrival in the Jāt country demanded the huge tribute of one crore of rupees. The Jāt Rājā Surajmal pleaded his inability to pay such a big amount and asked the Marāthā chiefs to show some consideration. Raghunāth on the advice of Holkar, refused to budge an inch from his demand and began the siege of the fort of Kumbher wherein the Jāt Rājā was sheltering. The Marāthā army was ill-equipped for siege-operations and made little impression on the Jāt defences. One day a stray shot from the defenders killed Malhār Rāo Holkar's only son Khande Rāo, whose death Holkar vowed to avenge. The siege had dragged on for 3 months keeping a huge Marāthā army tied down. On the intercession of Jayappā Sindia, Raghunāth agreed to accept a much smaller tribute and raised the siege. Sindia's intervention in the dispute is looked on as the beginning of discord between the two houses of Sindia and Holkar.¹⁵

From Kumbher the Sindian force under Jayappā marched into Mārwar where Marāthā aid had been invited by the lawful heir Rām Singh to regain his kingdom of Jodhpur against the usurper Bijay

Singh. Kishangarh, Ajmer, Merta, fell into the Marāthā hands by February 1755 and Bijay Singh was hemmed in the fort of Nagore. When Bijay Singh found that his position was altogether hopeless, he resorted to base means to destroy his enemy. While his envoys pretended to continue negotiations, his agents made a murderous attack on Jayappā as he was finishing his bath. The attack proved fatal and Jayappā died on 25 July, 1755. But the enemy did not benefit by the assassination of the Marāthā chief. Jayappā's brother Dattājī rallied his men, declared Jankojī, Jayappā's son, as successor to the *jāgīr* and continued the siege operations. Fresh troops poured in from the *Peshwā*; Antāji Mānakeshwar, Yashwant Rāo Pawār and Samsher Bahādur arrived with their forces to help Sindia. Bijay Singh at last agreed to surrender half the kingdom of Mārwar to his cousin Rām Singh, cede the forts of Ajmer and Jhalor to Sindia and pay him a tribute of fifty lakhs of rupees. The long-drawn siege was raised and the Marāthā army marched away.¹⁶

The *Peshwā* called the Sindias to Poona where he confirmed Jankojī in Sindia's *jāgīr*. The Sindian force fought with great bravery in the battle of Sindkhed, 12-17 December, 1757. It was despatched to Hindustān in mid-1758 to guard the new Marāthā conquests, to defend the Mughul empire against the Afghān menace and levy tribute from Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. In 1759 Dattājī Sindia marched into the Punjāb, put Sābājī Sindia in charge of the province and then in June crossed the Jamunā to punish Najib Khān Rohillā. The Rohillā chief was already in league with the Afghān king and played a waiting game. By the end of 1759 Ahmad Shāh Abdālī had descended into the Punjāb, and made short work of the Marāthā garrisons stationed in that province. Dattājī Sindia realized too late the treachery of Najib Khān. He broke his camp at Shukartāl, sent away his heavy baggage and non-combatants and moved in the direction of the capital. The Abdālī king, in the meanwhile, had joined Najib Khān in the Doāb and the two together marched on the capital along the eastern bank of the Jamunā. They crossed over at Barāri ghāt on 10 January, 1760 and overpowered Sindia's force. Dattājī Sindia was leading the vanguard and fell a victim to a bullet from the enemy's sharpshooter. Sindia's force 20,000 strong was unable to withstand the overwhelming number of the enemy, armed with muskets and swivel guns.¹⁷ Malhār Rāo Holkar tried guerilla tactics till fresh reinforcements equipped with artillery, arrived in the north. But on 4 March, 1760, he was surprised near Sikandrabad and defeated with heavy losses. The

Marāthā force fled southward to await the arrival of the Bhāu with the *Peshwā's* grand army.

The battle of Pānipat (14 January, 1761) has been described elsewhere. On that fateful day the Marāthā army was annihilated and with it the faithful contingent of the Sindias. Tukojī Sindia died fighting, while Jankojī was wounded, taken prisoner and killed by the enemy. The Sindian force suffered a severe set-back from which it took several years to recover. But from the battle-field providentially escaped Mahādji Sindia, who was later on to build up the vast Sindia State in Hindustān. Raghunāth Rāo desired to put another Sindia in possession of the *jāgīr*, but *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo appreciated the loyal services of Rānoji's sons and appointed, despite his illegitimate birth, Mahādji to the *jāgīr* in 1767.¹⁸ With the death of Malhār Rāo Holkar in May 1766, and Raghobā's defeat at Dhodap (1768) Mahādji was firmly in the saddle. He was already functioning as *de facto* chief of the Sindia *jāgīr* from 1762. In 1766 he succeeded in taking Gwālīor from the Rānā of Gohad and thence began the historic association of Gwālīor with the house of Sindia.

A great Marāthā army led by Rāmchandra Ganesh and Visāji Krishna entered Hindustān at the end of 1769. The *Peshwā* wanted to efface the ignominy of the disaster of Pānipat, punish the treachery of Najib-ud-daulah Rohillā, and regain Marāthā ascendancy in the north. The Jāt army that barred Marāthā progress was defeated on 5 April, 1770. But dissensions then broke among the Marāthā generals. They could not agree on the policy to be followed towards Indian princes, especially Najib-ud-daulah. Holkar was friendly to the Rohillā chief who did his best to defeat Marāthā plans and secretly formed an anti-Marāthā alliance. However Najib died on 31 October, 1770. Rāmchandra Ganesh was recalled and the leadership of the expedition fell to Visāji Krishna and Mahādji Sindia. Mahādji defeated the Pathans near Farrukhabad, and re-occupied the old Marāthā districts in the Doāb. On 10 February, 1771, he took the fort of Delhi by assault and invited the emperor Shāh 'Alam to return to his capital. The exiled emperor entered the city on 6 January, 1772. The Marāthā army then started in pursuit of Zabetā Khān, the son of their avowed enemy, Najib. It defeated him at Shukartāl and overran his place, Najibgarh. Mahādji had the satisfaction to see the deaths of his brothers and nephew avenged. The untimely death of *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo halted further progress of Marāthā arms in Hindustān.¹⁹

The decade from 1772 to 1782 was a period of stress and strain

for the Marāthā State. Nārāyan Rāo, who had succeeded his brother in the *Peshwāship*, was murdered in August 1773. It was soon discovered that his uncle Raghunāth and his wife were the prime movers behind the plot to remove the nephew and usurp the *Peshwāship*. The entire council at Poona felt great repulsion to the base act and vowed to keep Raghunāth out of the *Peshwāship*. They formed the league of the *Bārbhāis*, a regency council, and acting in the name of the infant son of Nārāyan Rāo, sent a force in pursuit of the murderer. Raghunāth Rāo in hopes of winning support from Sindia and Holkar, fled to Indore, but having failed in his expectations, concluded a treaty with the English on 6 March, 1775 at Surat. The treaty lost to Raghunāth what little sympathy he had among his countrymen. For some time Mahādji Sindia was with the Gujarāt army of the *Peshwā*, trying to bring about reconciliation between the Regency Council and Raghunāth Rāo. But Raghunāth showed more faith in his English allies than his own compatriots and took shelter with them. Since then Sindia swung over to the *Bārbhāis* and became their chief military supporter. He overawed a Kolhapur force in 1777 which was harassing the *Peshwā's* territory near its (Kolhapur's) western frontier and arriving at Poona in June 1778, suppressed the insurgency of Morobā Phadnis. He was Nānā's principal adviser when Raghunāth Rāo advanced on Poona at the head of an English force by way of Panvel, Khandala, Kamshet, Wadgaon and Talegaon. While myriads of Marāthā horse closed on the small British force from all sides, the country through which it passed was completely denuded of men, animals and foodgrains. The Regency Council adopted a scorched-earth policy. Even the capital of Poona was evacuated and large buildings were filled with hay and combustibles. The English force which had been assured of a cordial welcome and hearty co-operation by Raghunāth and his friends, was almost overwhelmed, and concluded on 16 January, 1779, the convention of Wadgaon, agreeing to the surrender of Raghunāth Rāo, evacuation of Salsette and other islands and return of the Bengal force to its base. Mahādji Sindia was the architect of this debacle of English arms at Wadgaon.²⁰

The Governor-General not only rejected the humiliating terms of the convention but sent a force to attack Mahādji Sindia's *jāgīr* and cripple his sources in Mālwa. Col. Popham surprised the fort of Gwālīor on 3 August, 1780 and Hastings called it the most gallant enterprise nearly equal in its advantage to the battle of Plassey. Sindia, who had been fighting in Gujarāt, now arrived in Mālwa in

June 1780 to defend his territory.²¹ Hastings despatched Col. Camac and Col. Muir to support Col. Popham's offensive. The British force then advanced to Sironj and later surprised Mahādji Sindia on 24 March, 1781 near Kolaras.²² Sindia improved his position by constantly harassing the enemy's flanks and inflicting a defeat on 1 July, near Sipri.²³ On 13 October, 1781 a temporary truce was effected between Mahādji Sindia and Col. Muir on terms of no gain, no loss to either party.²⁴

By this time the Governor-General had become aware of the grand alliance formed against the East India Company by the country powers, and knowing English inability to fight on several fronts simultaneously, was anxious to come to an understanding with the Marāthās. The temporary truce of 1781 was spelt out in a formal treaty of seventeen articles at Salbai on 17 May, 1782, and ratified by the Governor-General, on 6 June, 1782. By the 16th article of the treaty, Mahādji Sindia agreed to be "the mutual guarantee of both parties for the perpetual adherence to the conditions of the treaty." The English surrendered Raghunāth Rāo, the root-cause of the seven years' war, and all the territories occupied by them except Salsette and two other islands near Bombay.²⁵ "Sindia was given to understand by the Governor-General that his government would not interfere with his views at Delhi."²⁶

The situation at Delhi was very favourable to recover the lost ground and regain Marāthā ascendancy in the imperial court. Shāh 'Alam had bartered away to the English the *Diwāni* of Bengal for a pension of 26 lakhs of rupees and a promise to lead him back to the capital. His demand for the fulfilment of the promise had been met with all kinds of excuses by the English. The emperor had become sore with the English and had often thought of taking refuge with the Marāthās, and lending his name and support to their ambitious plans in Hindustān. His *Vazīr*, Mirza Najaf, had starved the emperor, his vast harem and his dependants. In agony the emperor cried out, "I am sick of this life—no subsistence money, overwhelming debts to the bankers and traders of Delhi. I cannot bear the shame of it any longer." He felt that the Marāthās alone would save the situation and a vast Marāthā army would silence the English guns.²⁷

Mirza Najaf Khān, the emperor's Regent, died on 6 April, 1782, a month before the treaty of Salbai was concluded. Mahādji Sindia was now free to prosecute his ambitious plans in Hindustān. The two years from the conclusion of the treaty with the English to his

meeting with the emperor at Āgra on 14 November, 1784 he spent in consolidating his position in Mālwa and Bundelkhand. He put down the petty chiefs of Bhopal, Datia, Chanderi, Narwar, Khechi and Gohad. Gwālīor fort was reoccupied on 31 July, 1783 and Gohad was reduced on 26 February, 1784. Mahādji wrote to the Poona Minister that Hastings had arrived at Lucknow and the English would gladly advance to Delhi if the Marāthās refused to support the emperor. Nānā urged Sindia to take the initiative and establish Marāthā influence in Delhi.²⁸

Of the four lieutenants of the dead Regent, two—Mirza Shafi and Afrāsiyāb Khān met with violent ends. Muhammad Beg Hamdāni was in revolt and Najab Quli was sunk in debauchery. There was none left to take up the responsibility of managing the emperor's affairs. Shāh 'Alam now turned to Mahādji for protection and for regulating his empire. On 1 December the emperor at a public *darbar* appointed the *Peshwā* as his Deputy (*Nāib-i-Munāib*) as well as Commander-in-Chief (*Bakhshi-ul-Mamālik*) subject to the condition that Mahādji Sindia himself should be permanent agent of the *Peshwā* in discharging the functions of these two offices. On the 3rd of the month the emperor appointed Sindia *Vakil-i-Mutlaq*, Regent plenipotentiary, direct from himself. The Poona Minister Nānā Phadnis protested that Sindia had accepted honours higher than the *Peshwā*, and later on, the honour of *Vakil-i-Mutlaq* was conferred on the *Peshwā*, with Sindia as his deputy.

As a result of the agreement, Sindia obtained the executive authority of the Mughul empire such as it was, the command of the imperial army and of the two provinces of Delhi and Āgra. The Marāthās at last seemed to have realized their long-cherished dream of ruling from Delhi. Their constitution was so elastic that it did not matter how many overlords Mahādji Sindia, their chief in Delhi, had.

Unfortunately Mahādji Sindia and the Poona *Darbar* miscalculated his gains from the new venture. The devastation by constant war and the maintenance of armies by Mirza Najaf Khān and after his death by his four lieutenants, had left little money in the royal exchequer. Sindia's own resources were not equal to his vaulting ambition and he soon found he could pay regularly neither the emperor for his subsistence, nor the Mughulia troops, nor his own troops. If he had succeeded in establishing Marāthā supremacy in Delhi, "it was", wrote Browne, the British agent at Delhi to the Governor-General, "more by a concurrence of fortunate events than

by any great exertions of his own. The Musalman chiefs, dispersed and deprived of their power, want nothing but a head to enable them yet to assert their own independency".²⁹ To the hostility to Sindia on religious grounds, there was another and a stronger reason, for their animosity. Sindia, to raise funds, started investigating the titles of the Mughul nobility to their *jāgīrs*³⁰ and pressed the Rājput chiefs for the arrears of their tribute due to the emperor.³¹

An inquiry into the titles of the *jāgīrs* was perfectly justifiable. Under the Mughul emperors *mansabs* were given only for life and were resumed on the death of the recipients. The emperors did not want to create a feudal aristocracy which would threaten their authority. But in the disintegration of the empire what had been granted temporarily or for life, had come to be regarded as having been ceded in perpetuity. Sindia could make the two provinces granted to him viable and pay his military expenses, only if he could get rid of these usurpers and utilize the revenue to raise a new force loyal to him. No wonder the Musalman chiefs lined themselves up against the Marāthā Regent of the emperor.

The Rājput Rājās of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur, though Hindus, had suffered much from the rapacity of the Marāthās, detested them and had no intention of paying the imperial tribute to strengthen the hands of the Marāthā Regent of the emperor.

The emperor had broken with the English and left their protection because they would not pay his allowances regularly nor take him to Delhi. He expected Sindia to make regular payments towards the maintenance of his household and his dignity. Suspicion and indecision were the hall-mark of his character and even his best friends and well-wishers could not be sure of his constancy.³² Besides, Nānā Phadnis, the Marāthā Machiavelli, though he professed to rejoice at Sindia's success and rise to power in the imperial court, inwardly felt jealous of him and was reluctant to support him unless Sindia agreed to share that power with the *Peshwā's* government, which really meant subordinating himself to the dictates of the minister.³³

Then there were the Sikhs who made raids on the imperial provinces of Delhi and beyond and who refused to abide by any agreement made with some of their chiefs.

Mahādji thus had to steer his course through dangerous waters. He had to create instruments which could help him coerce all opposition into submission. He had observed the superior fighting

qualities of disciplined troops of the East India Company in Gujarāt and in Mālwa, and had made up his mind to build his army on the new model. He was fortunate in acquiring the services of the Savoyard soldier, De Boigne. Count Benoit De Boigne first joined Sindia's service at the end of 1784 and raised for him two battalions of infantry with proper equipment of cannon, etc. These battalions first saw service in Bundelkhand under Appā Khande Rāo. Later at the battle of Lalsot (28 July, 1787) when the Mughul troops started deserting Sindia, De Boigne's battalions saved the situation in the course of the fighting and during the subsequent retreat.^{33a}

The Marāthās, long used to horsemanship and predatory warfare, looked with disdain on the infantry and refused to be recruited in De Boigne's *Campoos*. The Savoyard, therefore, was obliged to fill up his battalions from non-Marāthā elements—Rājputs and Musalmans hailing from Awadh, Rohilkhand and the Doāb. Two battalions, though they held back the Rājputs at Lalsot, counted for little in the sea of Marāthā cavalry. At the end of 1788 De Boigne asked for permission to raise a full brigade of ten battalions, but was refused, and left Sindia's service for a short while. In 1789 he was recalled, given a *jāidād* and asked by Sindia to raise a *campoo* (a brigade) to meet his enemies in the field. This was done and within the course of the next five years De Boigne raised three brigades officered by European soldiers. The new army brought Sindia spectacular successes against Indian rulers, but during the process, the military became completely denationalised. The brigades when pitted against British armies at Assaye and Laswari in 1803, failed miserably, because the European officers deserted them and the rank and file had not grasped the higher tactics and strategy. The famous Marāthā cavalry had lost its élan.

But let us revert to the main narrative. The battle of Lalsot against Rājput combination turned out to be almost a second Pānipat on account of the desertion of the emperor's Hindustāni battalions—about 14,000 infantry with 80 pieces of cannon, only two days after the fighting commenced. Mahādji broke off the engagement, sent away his heavy baggage, females and non-combatants to Gwālior by way of Khushalgarh. He himself retreated to the protection of the Jāt Rājā's fortress of Dig, recalled his detachments from the north and the east, deposited heavy guns in the fort of Bharatpur and strengthened the garrisons of Aligarh and Āgra.³⁴

For a year Sindia remained in the wilderness. "He showed great fortitude and conduct during the crisis."³⁵ He sent fervent

appeals to the Poona Minister to rush him reinforcements and treasure if he desired him to re-establish Marāthā supremacy at the Mughul Court. "Mahādji happened to remark that the Sindia family had made the supreme sacrifice on several occasions previously. Everybody advised him to retreat before the advancing enemy, but to save himself by retiring, he felt, was worse than death.... Ten thousand Marāthā troops were surrounded by one hundred thousand Hindustāni troops and the Sardar (Mahādji) was therefore anxiously awaiting succour from the South. His condition was like that of the *Gajendra* who was being dragged into the deep pool by the crocodile."³⁶ "We serve", appealed Mahādji, "a common master; let our exertions be directed to the common cause. Let the cause of the Marāthā nation be upheld in Hindustān and prevent our empire from being disunited and overthrown."³⁷

Nānā's response was tardy; he despatched some treasure and asked 'Ali Bahādur and Tukoji Hōlkar (Sindia's rival) to march to the help of Mahādji. 'Ali Bahādur reached Sindia after a year and Holkar six months later. Mahādji had to act on his own with great circumspection.

Ismāil Beg who had succeeded to the leadership of the Hindustāni forces, was joined by the Rohillā Ghulām Qādir, and they proceeded to recover Mughul provinces from the Marāthās. Aligarh at once yielded, the small Marāthā force at Delhi fled, only Agra held out under Lakhbā Dādā. Ismāil Beg with the Rohillā Ghulām Qādir, moved out against Sindia's forces marching to the relief of Agra. At Chaksana, eight miles from Bharatpur, the two armies met (April 1788). The Marāthā cavalry cracked before the furious onslaught of the Musalman chiefs, but the day was saved by De Boigne's battalions; the Marāthā army withdrew in the failing light of the evening.

The Sikhs were reported to have invaded Ghulām Qādir's *jāgīr* whereupon he marched away to its defence. Sindia's forces once more took the field and this time destroyed Ismāil Beg's army on the plains of Agra (18 June, 1788).

Sindia would not proceed to the capital in the wake of the defeated army. He was uncertain of the king's attitude and wanted to stabilise his position at Agra before moving north. This delay and indecision on the part of Sindia brought disaster on the king and his family. The two desperate Musalman chiefs marched to Delhi, obtained entrance into the red fort through the treachery of Nāzir Manzūr 'Ali and asked the king to discover to them the hidden treasure in the fort. When the poor man denied knowledge of any con-

cealed wealth, he, with his sons and female members of the family, was beaten, tortured and disgraced. In a fit of anger the ruffian Ghulām Qādir, plucked out the eyes of the monarch. Such ill treatment of the royal family was unheard of and Ismāil Beg separated from the Rohillā. Ghulām Qādir now knew that the net was closing round him; he sent the plundered wealth to his fort in his ancestral *jāgīr* district and fled from the palace on the night of 1 October. The Marāthā army which arrived the next day found the fort strangely silent. The imprisoned princes implored the Marāthā general to enter the fort and occupy it.

Now began the pursuit of the Rohillā chief which ended with his capture on 31 December, 1788 and his decapitation and death two months later under the king's orders. Mahādji arrived in the capital and reinstated the emperor with great pomp. He received, in return, confirmation of the dignities of *Vakil-i-Mutlaq* and *Nāib-i-Munāib* conferred five years back.

But this did not put an end to his difficulties. 'Ali Bahādur and Tukoji Holkar who had ostensibly come to Hindustān from the Deccan to help Sindia, wanted the glory of conquest without the pains and toil of campaigning; they began demanding equal shares in the conquests and openly encouraged Sindia's enemies. Mahādji now realized what a false friend Nānā was and decided to go it all alone. De Boigne, who had left Sindia's service at the end of 1788, was recalled from his exile at Lucknow and was asked to raise one or two brigades in full strength.

Ismāil Beg, the Hindustāni chief, and the Rājput Rājās were preparing for the coming contest and were sending agents to the British Resident at Lucknow and the Governor-General, soliciting British aid to drive away the Marāthās beyond the Narmadā. In February 1790, they invaded the country of the Jāt Rājā, Sindia's firm ally. It was the beginning of May when Sindia's army under Gopāl Bhāu left Gwālīor. Ismāil Beg was strongly entrenched at Pātan, 80 miles north of Jaipur, and his army—30,000 infantry and 17,000 cavalry—looked almost invincible. But De Boigne's brigade closed in on the enemy and stormed his lines (20 June, 1790). The enemy gave way on all sides and fled from the field leaving their guns, baggage, behind. 'Ismāil Beg's fine army was annihilated and Jaipur was knocked out of the ring.'³⁸

In the battle of Merta fought on 10 September, 1790 the flower of Rāthor cavalry was destroyed by De Boigne's disciplined troops and the Rājā of Jodhpur begged for terms. He was heavily fined;

the fort and the district of Ajmer were surrendered to Sindia as also Sambhar and the surrounding districts. The power of the Rājput Rājās was broken in one decisive campaign. Ismāil Beg was pursued into the fort of Kanud and was at last seized in April 1792. He spent the rest of his life as a prisoner in Āgra fort where he died in 1799.

Mahādji after reducing Chitorgarh and restoring it to its rightful owner, marched to the Deccan. He was now the master of Hindustān and he wanted to draw full support for himself from his master the *Peshwā* and put an end to the sniping of the minister. He reached Poona on 12 June, 1792 and remained in the capital till his death in February, 1794. He wanted a fair and frank discussion of the entire political situation, of the administration of his new conquests, of the rivalry between his house and that of Holkar, of the expenditure incurred by him in raising troops for his new responsibilities and of the tribute to be paid by him.³⁹ The minister was afraid of losing his position and evaded open discussion. On one occasion "he enumerated his faithful and important services to the *Peshwā* and his house, declared that he had no object but the augmentation of the power and possessions of the State and if the *Peshwā* wished that his rival should triumph over him, he was prepared to resign his authority and possessions into his hands. This artful speech made a visible impression on the mind of the young *Peshwā* and caused him shed tears."⁴⁰ In July 1793 Palmer was to report to his superiors of the three chiefs (Mahādji Sindia, Nānā Phadnis and Haripant Phadke) entering into mutual engagements to reconcile their differences to support the *Peshwā's* Government, to confirm the authority of Sindia in Hindustān and to accommodate the dispute between him and Holkar.⁴¹ It is idle to speculate on what happened during the meetings. Seven months later Mahādji was still in Poona. He died at Wanawdi on 12 February, 1794, after a short illness.

Mahādji's death brought all powers into the hands of Nānā Phadnis which he directed against the Nizām, the festering ulcer of the Marāthā State. The Nizām was defeated and lost half his kingdom. But Nānā's glory was short-lived. The *Peshwā* from whom he derived support, accidentally fell down from a palace window or committed suicide (27 October, 1795). The great minister's wings were clipped and he found himself pitted against lying conspirators and ruffians of the worst type. The dismal story of the last days of the *Peshwā's* rāj has been told elsewhere in this book. Suffice it to say that the last decade of the eighteenth century was one "of con-

stant clashes between Sindias and Holkars, of civil dissensions, monotonous in repetition and appalling in brutality. The brutality stands out because in comparison with the hideous cruelty of Asiatic contemporaries, the Marāthā record has been generally humane. But during the last decade of the eighteenth century, as one after another every respectable leader passed away, the nation lost its honourable characteristics, including its humanity. On occasions, Marāthā executions vied in cold-blooded ferocity with the worst of other lands."⁴²

Mahādji Sindia died in February, 1794, and was succeeded by his grand-nephew, a boy of fifteen years. Daulat Rao Sindia's one aim was to obtain ascendancy in the Poona Court, but Nānā Phadnis's to retain it in his hands. But Nānā so far had derived his strength from the dead *Peshwā*. The new *Peshwā*, Bājī Rāo Raghunāth, refused to be a tool in the hands of Nānā and secretly won over Daulat Rāo Sindia by promising him fabulous treasure which he did not possess. So when Bājī Rāo was seated on the *musnad* with Sindia's aid (December, 1796) he gave the latter a free hand to realise the amounts from his erstwhile minister, his friends and the rich residents of the capital of Poona. This work Sindia assigned to Sharzā Rāo Ghātḡ, his new favourite whose pretty daughter he married. Ghātḡ was a monster in human form; he let loose on the city the fury of hell. The fair capital of Poona suffered at the will of its own master horrors similar to those suffered by Delhi at the hands of Nādir Shāh.⁴³

The widows of Mahādji Sindia made loud complaints that Daulat Rāo was not attending to their needs and had cut down their allowances. Sharzā Rāo Ghātḡ who was asked to settle the dispute, dragged the ladies out of their tents and had them whipped. A feeling of horror went up in Sindia's army where the ladies had sympathisers. They raised the banner of revolt and thus commenced the "widows' war" which added to the general confusion.

But what brought down the gigantic fabric of Sindia's empire, reared with such great toil by Mahādji, was Daulat Rāo's vain attempt to subordinate the house of Holkar. Tukoji Holkar died in 1797 and Daulat Rāo Sindia immediately took up the cause of the imbecile Kāshi Rāo Holkar. The other Holkars refused to recognize this succession; their camp was attacked, Malhār Rāo II was killed and the force dispersed. One of the Holkars had the misfortune to be captured by the *Peshwā*'s troops. He was brought to Poona and was trampled to death by an elephant under the orders of the *Peshwā* like

an ordinary felon. His brother Yashwant Rāo who escaped to Khāndesh, raised an army amongst Holkar adherents and laid waste Sindia's territories in Mālwa. To meet the Holkar challenge, Daulat Rāo Sindia at last left Poona in November 1800, and marching leisurely northward, started sending his battalions in small batches over the *Tāpi*. Yashwant Rāo recognizing the folly of his opponent, hurled his cavalry against the scattered battalions of Daulat Rāo Sindia and destroyed them piecemeal. MacIntyre was defeated at Newri on 25 June, and on 18 July, 1801, Holkar and his ally Amir Khān advanced on Hessing's battalions drawn up under the walls of Ujjain. Holkar dispersed Sindia's horse and a charge made by Amir Khān annihilated the battalions, Hessing alone escaping. Ujjain, Sindia's capital, was laid under a heavy fine.⁴⁴

Daulat Rāo Sindia calling in his forces from Hindustān and the Deccan, overwhelmed Holkar at Indore on 14 October, 1801, scattered his battalions, captured his guns and sacked the city of Indore. But Daulat Rāo was too indolent to pursue his enemy and allowed Holkar to slip away to Khāndesh and raise another formidable army to challenge Sindia once more on the plains of Hadapsar (25 October, 1802). Yashwant Rāo asked the *Peshwā* to arbitrate in the dispute with Sindia. He wanted to be declared as Regent to the child Khande Rāo in Holkar's Mālwa *jāgīr* and sought parity with Sindia in Hindustān, thus sharing his conquests. The *Peshwā* was in no position to arbitrate even if he meant to. When Holkar's army defeated the joint forces of Sindia and the *Peshwā* at Hadapsar, the *Peshwā* took to flight and from Bassein negotiated with the English the subsidiary alliance with which to obtain their help to regain his *Gadi*.

The English were determined to be the dominant power on the Indian continent and too willing to give such help. They took the *Peshwā* under their protective wings and asked the Marāthā confederates to abide by the treaty made with the *Peshwā*. Sindia understood that the treaty spelt an end of his supremacy and evaded reply to gain time to build an alliance with Bhosle and Holkar against the English. The British would not put up with the delay and declared war on him. At the same time, they issued a proclamation asking Sindia's European officers (about 300) to leave him. In two sanguinary battles fought at Assaye (23 September, 1803) and at Argaon (28 November), Sindia's French-trained *campoos* in the Deccan were soundly beaten. In the northern theatre his general Perron abandoned the army at the eleventh hour and the leaderless host was almost annihilated by the English C-in-C, Lord Lake,

in the battles of Aligarh (4 September), Delhi (11 September) and Laswari (1 November, 1803). In twelve weeks' fighting Sindia's army numbering 43,000 infantry, 35,000 cavalry and 464 guns were destroyed. By the treaty of Sarje Anjangaon concluded on 30 December, 1803, Sindia "ceded to the Company all his forts, territories and rights in the country situated between the Jamunā and the Gangā, also his territories with forts in the countries to the northward of those of the Rājās of Jaipur and Jodhpur. He likewise ceded to the Company the fort of Broach and territory depending thereon, the fort of Ahmadnagar and surrounding territory, all territories southward of the Ajanta hills including Jalnapur and Gandapur districts. He also renounced all claims on the British Government and their allies, the *Subāhdar* of the Deccan, the *Peshwā* and Anand Rao Gaikwār." Sindia found it difficult to reconcile himself to such huge losses (almost one crore and 25 lakhs revenue) but the return of Gwālior and Gohad and the conciliatory policy initiated by Cornwallis brought him round and in 1804 he accepted even a subsidiary force of 6,000 regular infantry.⁴⁵

The next ten or fifteen years Daulat Rāo employed in reducing the numerous petty chieftains of Central India and adjoining territories who owed him tribute. The curious may read of his activities during the decade in Broughton's *Letters from the Mahratta Camp*.

Two events during the period deserve notice. One was Sharzā Rāo Ghātge's violent end in 1809. Sharzā Rāo was killed by two of Sindia's chiefs in a scuffle; and the other was Daulat Rāo Sindia selecting a site near Gwālior in 1810 for pitching his camp. The camp developed into the chief town, superseding the former capital of Ujjain.

The result of Sindia's warfare in Central India was all-round devastation and the rising menace of the Pindāris. Once he was free from the Nepal war, Lord Hastings made grand preparations to put down the Pindāris. He peremptorily demanded of Sindia to join the British force or be prepared to face the consequences. Sindia meekly signed the treaty of Gwālior in November 1817, promising the fullest co-operation. A readjustment of boundaries was effected. Daulat Rāo died in March 1827 at the comparatively young age of forty-eight. A life of pleasure cut short a career which had witnessed momentous events. Broughton thus describes his appearance in 1809. "He is turned of thirty; about five feet five inches in height and inclined to be fat. His complexion is rather dark and

his features agreeable. But his appearance indicates a debauchee. He was dressed in a plain manner but wore several strings of pearls and uncut diamonds round his neck, of which he is particularly vain."⁴⁶

The Gwālīor state about the middle of the last century was said to contain 2,500,000 souls and to yield a revenue of Rs. 95,00,000, quite considerable taking into account the losses incurred by the treaties of 1803, 1817 and 1844.

V. *The Holkars of Indore:*

The Holkar family is wide-spread all over Mahārāshtra. They belong to the shepherd caste, a sturdy tribe with habits of outdoor living and moving from one pasture to another. The transformation of the Dhangars into Marāthā warriors was therefore smooth and easily accounted for. The first of the Holkars to rise to eminence was Malhār Rāo. The family's first place of residence was Wafgaon in Khed taluka near Poona from which they moved to Hol Murum near Jejuri on the Neera river, forty miles south-east of Poona. The Holkars take their name from the village of Hol where Malhār Rāo Holkar's father, Khandūjī, was a respectable cultivator and *chaugula*. To him was born Malhārī on 16 March, 1693. The father died when Malhārī was barely three years old. The mother then left the village to stay with her brother Bhojrāj Bārgal at Talode in Khāndesh district. The district was no man's land, both the Mughuls and the Marāthās claiming overlordship of the territories. Bhojrāj instead of tending sheep, had raised a *pathak*—a body of mounted troops with which he served under Kanthājī Kadam Bānde, and in which he accommodated his nephew as soon as he could ride a horse and wield a lance. The story recorded in *Holkar Kaifiyat* and repeated by Malcolm in his *Central India*,¹ of Malhārī tending a flock of sheep, falling into sleep and being protected by a cobra from the sun's rays is apocryphal. Malhār Rāo Holkar came to the notice of Peshwā Bājī Rāo when he fought the Nizām in 1720. In 1721 Malhār Rāo fell out with Bānde² and entered the Peshwā's services. His local knowledge of Khāndesh topography was of great use to the Peshwā and his rise from that year was meteoric. In 1725 he was granted the command of 500 horse and was active on the northern frontier of Khāndesh. Holkar with Rānojī Sindia and Udājī Pawār took a leading part in the battle of Amjhera (29 November, 1728) in which the *Subāhdar* of Mālwa, Girdhar Bahādur,³ and his army defending the province were destroyed. From

that date Malhār Rāo became the right hand man of the *Peshwā* in Mālwa and all other northern enterprises. In 1730 he was appointed *Subāhdar* of Prant Mālwa and was made responsible for the collection of *chauth* from that province, with Rānojī Sindia as his collaborator.⁴

In the absence of the *Peshwā* in Mālwa between 1729-1735 Malhār Rāo Holkar kept the Marāthā flag flying in that region. He made the governorship of Muhammad Khān Bangash (1729-32) difficult by attacking him at Sarangpur in June 1731 and marching to Sironj next year. Bangash realised that he was no match for the numerous cavalry led by Holkar and came to an understanding with the latter by granting him the *chauth* of Mālwa.⁵

In October, 1731, the *Peshwā* divided the work of realising the *chauth* of Mālwa between Holkar, Sindia and the Pawārs.⁶ In 1733 a Marāthā force under Holkar and Sindia surrounded the new *subāhdar* of Mālwa, Sawāi Jay Singh, near Mandasor and levied tribute from 28 *parganās* of the province. In 1734 they again entered Mālwa, marched up to Bundī and seated on the *Gadi* the rightful heir, Budh Singh.⁷ In February 1735 Holkar led a force against Khān Daurān *Mir Bakhshi* and crossing the Mukundra pass, cut the Mughul army's line of communication. Khān Daurān's allies, the Rājput Rājās, became anxious to save their kingdoms from devastation. The *Mir Bakhshi* thus finding fighting to be useless, agreed to pay the Marāthās 22 lakhs of rupees as *chauth* for Mālwa and went back.⁸

In 1736 when the *Peshwā* led an expedition to the north, Holkar worked under him. As Abhay Singh of Mārwar was opposing Marāthā ambitions and had joined the Turāni party at the Court, Holkar at the head of a large force marched into Mārwar. He visited and laid under contribution Merta, Nagore, Ajmer. The talks with Sawāi Jay Singh proved inconclusive and next year the *Peshwā* marched on to Delhi. Malhār Rāo took conspicuous part in the fighting with Sa'adat Khān and the imperial force outside the walls of the capital.⁹ Next year he was present at the battle of Bhopal.¹⁰ After defeating the Nizām, Holkar and Sindia were sent against Kota.¹¹ When in 1741 the royal orders were issued appointing the *Peshwā* governor of Mālwa, Holkar and Sindia appeared in the deed as guarantee for the *Peshwā's* loyalty.¹²

Peshwā Bājī Rāo passed away in 1740 to be succeeded by his son Bālājī. Bālājī lacked the statesmanship and military leadership of his father and was not clear about Marāthā ideals. His grand-father

and father had established friendly relations with the Rājput chiefs and it appeared that the Marāthās in alliance with the Rājput chiefs, would form a great confederacy and bring Mughul rule under their joint control. But Bālāji on the advice of Malhār Rāo Holkar, worked against the healthy tradition of fraternising with the Rājput chiefs and started levying heavy tribute on them under the pretext of mediating in their succession disputes. Thus Jaipur, Jodhpur, Udaipur, Bundī, Kota and other Rājput states were alienated and the Marāthās came to be looked on as enemies and found themselves isolated.¹³

Another reason for Marāthā isolation was their association with the adventurer, Ghāzi-ud-Din, the most unscrupulous man to become *Vazīr* of the Mughul empire. He despoiled the royal palace, murdered one emperor and grossly mismanaged affairs. The support lent to this diplomat brought great odium on the Marāthās and made them enemies of the Mughul nobility. When Ahmad Shāh Abdālī invaded India on the appeal of Najib Khān, formed a league with the Rohillās and other Muslim chiefs, and surrounded the grand Marāthā army at Pānipat, no Indian power came to their rescue and their army was annihilated on 14 January, 1761.

It was fortunate that Abdālī did not stay in India after his victory at Pānipat. Holkar who had escaped unscathed from that carnage, defeated a great Rājput rising at the battle of Mangrol (30 November, 1761).¹⁴ He went to the Deccan and helped the *Peshwā* win his spectacular victory over the Nizām at Rākshasbhūvan on 10 August, 1763.¹⁵ But Holkar's cavalry armed mainly with swords and lances, was in no position to face the East India Company's force fighting in formations with long-range fire arms like guns and cannon. Shujā-ud-daulah who had suffered at the hands of the English at the battle of Buxar in October, 1764, called in Malhār Rāo Holkar to his aid. The British force advanced to Kora and routed the Marāthā horse (3 May, 1765).¹⁶ "The guerilla warfare of the Marāthās was doomed."¹⁷

Malhār Rāo Holkar died next year at Alampur (40 miles from Gwālior) on 20 May 1766.¹⁸ His only son, Khande Rāo, had predeceased him, being killed by a stray shot fired from the walls of Kumbher. The succession descended to Malhār's grandson, Māle Rāo. Māle Rāo sank into insanity and died within a year of his succession.¹⁹ Khande Rāo's widow, Ahalyā Bāi, who was managing the *jāgīr* during Malhār Rāo's last days, now became the head of the administration defeating the intrigue of Raghunāth Rāo and the Hol-

kar's *Diwān*, Gangādhār Yashwant, to seize Holkar's private treasure and put a minor on the Holkar *Gadi*.²⁰

She had offered to do *Sati* on the death of her husband but had been dissuaded from the extreme sacrifice by her grief-stricken father-in-law. She combined talent, virtue and energy which made her a blessing to the country over which she ruled.

Ahalyā Bāi appointed Tukoji Holkar, a trusted officer of Malhār Rāo Holkar but no relation, to the command of the army. The divided authority continued for about thirty years undisturbed by jealousy or ambition.²¹ The main reason for this was the competence with which Ahalyā Bāi managed the civil affairs, the support she gave to Sindia (Rs. 30 lakhs in loan)²² and the sanctity she gained by her charities. Tukoji who owed his elevation to the lady, remained content with military command.

The private hoard of the family calculated at 20 lakhs of rupees remained with Ahalyā Bāi. Besides, she had personal estates yielding annually about four lakhs, which with the above hoard she expended at her discretion. All the rest of government revenue was brought into a general account and applied to the general expenditure of the government. Accounts were kept with scrupulous exactness. After paying civil and military charges Ahalyā Bāi sent the balance to supply the exigencies of the army employed abroad.²³

"The character of her administration was for more than 30 years the basis of the prosperity which attended the Holkar dynasty; it continued to sustain its rank during her life as one of the principal branches of the Marāthā empire. The management of all the provinces in Mālwa and Nemaūr was her peculiar department and her great object was, by just and moderate government, to improve the condition of the country, while she promoted the happiness of her subjects. She maintained but a small force, independent of the territorial militia, but her troops were sufficient, aided by the equity of her administration to preserve tranquillity; and she relied on the army of the State actively employed in Hindustān and the Deccan, and her own reputation, for safety against all external enemies.'²⁴

Ahalyā Bāi took upon herself the direct management of affairs and sat everyday for a considerable time in open Durbar, transacting business. Her first principle was moderate assessment and sacred respect for the rights of village officers and proprietors of land, and quick justice. She referred cases to courts of equity and arbitration (*Panchāyats*) and to her ministers for settlement, but

when appeals were made to her decision, she heard every complaint in person with great patience.

The success of Ahalyā Bāi in the internal administration of her domains was altogether remarkable. Rajwade in the introduction to the first volume of his *Sadhanen* traces the failure of the Marāthās in Hindustān to their failure to work out the ideal of *Mahārāshtra Dharma* in a wider perspective. If only they could have emulated Ahalyā Bāi and succeeded in evolving good and just administration in their northern conquests as the lady did, the people of Hindustān might have gladly accepted their rule. So efficient were the relations which Ahalyā Bāi established with foreign powers that her territories were rarely invaded during her life-time. She was indulgent to the peaceable class and just and considerate towards the predatory. She had no occasion to change her minister or her revenue collectors. Her capital, Indore, she always regarded with particular consideration; and under her fostering care, from a village, it developed into a prosperous city and wealthy mart for Mālwa products. The fond object of her life was to promote the prosperity of all around her; she rejoiced when she saw bankers, merchants, farmers and cultivators rise to affluence and considered their prosperity a legitimate claim to increased favour and protection.

When the family treasure came into her possession, she appropriated it for the purpose of charity and good works. She built several fords (Ghāts) and at that of Jaum, constructed a linking road with great labour and cost over the Vindhya range. She spent considerable sums on religious edifices at Maheshwar and built many temples, rest-houses (*Dharmashālās*) and wells throughout the Holkar dominions. But her munificence was not limited to her own territories; at all the places of Hindu pilgrimage in the east, west, north and south—Jagannāth Puri, Dwārakā, Kedārnāth and Rāmeshwar—she built holy edifices, maintained establishments to feed the poor and the brahmins, and sent annual sums to be distributed in charity. Besides fixed annual disbursements to her establishments at the holy shrines of India, proportionate sums were remitted to other sanctuaries. She also took pleasure in supplying holy Gangā water to many shrines in the south to wash the sacred deities. Religion was one of the elements which inclined her to these charities and good deeds; but they also proceeded from wisdom and benevolence. Like St. Francis of Assisi her compassion extended not only to her own kind but also to beasts of the field, birds of the air and fish of the river. “The peasant near Maheshwar used

in hot days to see his yoke of oxen stopped during their labour to be refreshed with water brought by a servant of Ahalyā Bāi; while fields she had purchased were covered with flocks of birds driven by cultivators from destroying their grain."²⁵ She refused to be drawn in rivalry with Mahādji Sindia when he was extending his influence over imperial affairs and raising *campoos* (European trained infantry) to beat down his enemies. Foreign diplomacy and conquests of the Marāthā State she left to such stalwarts like Mahādji Sindia, Nānā Phadnis, Haripant Phadke and Parashurām Bhāu. On charities she spent from her private sources. State revenues she applied to State administration and this was the field in which she excelled. Under her careful management, the territories of Holkar enjoyed peace and prosperity unknown before and which no amount of military expenditure could have secured. She seems to have anticipated long before, Morley's dictum that "the distinctive mark of the true statesman is a passion for good, wise and orderly government."²⁶ She won empire over the hearts of the people and was held in the highest regard by the neighbouring rulers, the *Peshwā*, the Nizām and even Tipū Sultān, and was sanctified during her life time. Sardesai's judgement that "the pious lady Ahalyā Bāi could hardly control the disorder in her own house or the external politics in which Sindia now attained prominence; while she was lavish in her charities, she did not see the necessity of improving her armies on the new model or of co-operating with Sindia,"²⁷ seems very uncharitable and perverse. To Sardesai perhaps, the blaring of war trumpets, the clattering of war horses and the roar of cannon sounded sweeter than the ringing of temple-bells and laughter of children in their farm-houses.

The above eulogy of Ahalyā Bāi should not mislead the reader into the belief that Holkar's force was turned into a peace corps after the death of Malhār Rāo. It participated in the great northern expedition of 1769-72, fought in Gujarāt, Konkan and at Talegaon, in the first Anglo-Marāthā war. It again saw some fighting when the *Peshwā* led his forces against Tipū Sultān in 1786.

The years 1788-93 the Holkars wasted in meaningless rivalry with Mahādji Sindia at Nānā's bidding. At Lākheri (1 June, 1793) the Holkar troops led by the braggart Malhār Rāo Holkar were soundly beaten, thus ending a long family dispute. It was sad to see the two main props of the Marāthā confederacy working against each other and in the end weakening the entire structure. Mahādji died in 1794 to be followed by Ahalyā Bāi next year. Tukojī Holkar lingered on for another two years, but was too old and ill to take

any effective part in the diplomatic game that was then being played between the great Nānā Phadnis, the wicked Bājī Rāo Raghunāth Peshwā and the youthful but unwise Daulat Rāo Sindia. Nānā was imprisoned and sent to Ahmadnagar fort. Two of Tukoji's sons were eliminated in the time's confusion.²⁸ The paralytic and imbecile Kāshi Rāo became a tool in the hands of Sindia.

But the adherents of Holkar's house gathered round the flag of Yashwant Rāo Holkar who fled from Poona to Nagpur and then reappeared in Mālwa. Yashwant Rāo gave out that he was fighting on behalf of the young Khande Rāo to preserve the honour of the Holkar house. He raised an army into which all classes—Pindāris, Bhils, Afghāns, Marāthās and Rājputs were indiscriminately admitted. Yashwant Rāo had no fixed country, so he sustained his huge army by all-round plunder. Holkar's war with Daulat Rāo Sindia has been treated in gruesome detail elsewhere (Chapter XV). From their time began what is known in Marāthā history as *Gardi Ka Wakt* or the period of trouble (1800-1818). Mālwa never witnessed such devastation as it did in the two years, 1801 and 1802 when Sindia and Holkar were struggling to get the better of the other. Sindia offered to release Malhār Rāo Holkar's infant son and with him all the Holkar possessions if Yashwant Rāo would cease from further spoliation of his territories. But the latter now came forward with fresh demands of cessions from Mahādji Sindia's new conquests. On this being refused, Yashwant Rāo prepared to carry on the war on an extended scale in a new theatre of war. He moved southward to the Deccan asking the Peshwā to mediate in the dispute.²⁹ The Peshwā, even if he meant to do so, was in no position to dictate to his powerful feudatories. A battle was fought between the two sides at Hadapsar on 25 October, 1802, in which the joint forces of the Peshwā and Sindia suffered a total defeat and Daulat Rāo's friend, the Peshwā, fled the capital. Yashwant Rāo Holkar sent many messages to the Peshwā to return to his capital, assuring him of his loyalty and devotion. But the Peshwā felt he could save himself and fight the peril only by purchasing military aid from the English. The latter were only too glad to extend to him the subsidiary alliance, make the Peshwā their subordinate and break the power of the Marāthā confederacy. Holkar tried to build an alliance sending envoys to the Nizām, Sindia and Bhosle. But such was the deep-rooted jealousy between the parties that they could not agree on a common programme. While the British were making military arrangements to break the power of the Marāthā confederates, the Marāthās wasted time in fruitless negotiations.

The *Peshwā* himself was dismayed by some of the articles in the treaty of Bassein. He sent out secret messages to Daulat Rāo Sindia and the Bhosle to do something to save him from the British clutches. Daulat Rāo Sindia came to the Deccan and made appeals to all Marāthā chiefs to rescue the *Peshwā* from British captivity. But the appeal fell on deaf ears. Anand Rao Gaikwār and the Nizām had already bartered away their independence, the Patwardhans and the Rāstes had been won over, and British diplomacy took care that Holkar would not join the confederates by putting in his hands some incriminating correspondence in which Sindia had declared his intentions of pursuing Holkar as soon as the English were out of the way. The new model army on which Sindia prided himself, was made innocuous by persuading the European officers to leave their commands. In five months' campaigning, four major battles and three secondary actions had been fought. Sindia's army of 40,000 infantry and 60,000 cavalry was ground to dust and lost upwards of a thousand field guns. The only help Holkar gave to Sindia was his advice to fight in the Marāthā style and not face the English with his regular army—advice to which Sindia did not pay much attention.

With superb Machiavellianism Yashwant Rāo Holkar had held aloof from the confederacy in the hope that the war would be a long-drawn affair and that he would join it when both sides were exhausted and he could claim the credit for ultimate victory. The speed of the British victories however left him no chance to intervene. Overlooking the divided counsels among the Marāthās he attributed the British success to the treachery of the French officers in Sindia's service and the imbecility of the confederates in not pursuing the traditional warfare and foraging in the enemy's country with their light cavalry and conserving their infantry and guns under the protection of their forts.

Meanwhile when Sindia and Bhosle were fighting the British, Holkar left the Deccan, plundered Ujjain, Mandasor and then marched towards Jaipur levying tribute on the Rājput Rājās. The Rājputs had accepted British suzerainty and Holkar's action was thus a challenge to the Company's authority. The British for a time took no notice of Holkar's activities as they had the war on their hand. But Lord Wellesley, Governor-General, had marked out Yashwant Rāo Holkar for punishment when a convenient time came. He wrote to Lord Lake on 9 January, 1804, "the authority exercised by Jeswant Rāo Holkar, in the name of Khande Rāo over the possessions of Holkar family is manifestly an usurpation of the rights of Cashi Rāo Holkar,

the legitimate heir and successor of Tukojī Holkar. Consistently therefore with the principles of justice no arrangement can be proposed between the British Government and Jeswant Rāo which would exclude Cashi Rāo from his hereditary dominions.”³⁰

“Under the *Peshwā*’s authority the British Government would be justified in adopting measures for the limitation of Jeswant Rāo’s power and the restoration of Cashi Rāo’s rights either by force or compromise, and the spirit of our engagements with the *Peshwā* imposes on us obligations to comply with a requisition from the *Peshwā* of this sort.”³¹ The real reason for the Governor-General’s solicitude for Kāshī Rāo Holkar’s legitimate rights was Yashwant Rāo Holkar’s “enterprising spirit, military character and ambitious views which rendered the reduction of his power a desirable object with reference to the complete establishment of tranquillity in India,” or in other words, British supremacy in India.

By article 12 of the treaty of Bassein, the *Peshwā* “engaged never to commit any act of aggression against any of the principal branches of the Mahrāttā empire”, and Arthur Wellesley was assuring Holkar that ‘so long as you do not interfere with the legitimate interest of the Company, or their allies, we have no desire to come in your way’. The Governor-General, however, took the opposite view and told Lord Lake on 17 January, 1804 to convey to Yashwant Rāo Holkar that “the British Government was disposed to arbitrate the differences between him and his half-brother and to adjust the claims of the several branches of the family on the principles of equity and justice.” Wellesley held that it was his business to settle every one else’s business on the lines that seemed to him right—on the lines that gave the British supremacy on the Indian continent. Yashwant Rāo Holkar not only rejected the offer, but sent his *vakil* to Sindia proposing an alliance and renewal of war. He also wrote letters to the Rājās of Nagpur, Jodhpur, Macheri and several other chiefs calling upon them to rise against the all-grasping power of the British. Wisdom had dawned on Yashwant Rāo rather late and the appeal had been made to the victims of his rapacity, and they were too glad to forward these letters to the British Commander-in-Chief, Lord Lake.

To Lord Lake who had offered to mediate in his dispute and arrange his affairs, Yashwant Rāo sent in March, 1804, several extravagant proposals. He asked for Haryana and territory in Bundelkhand, and districts in the Gangā-Jamunā Doāb formerly held by his family, as well as what he now occupied; also that his

right to levy *chauth* on other districts should be recognised.³² These proposals were rejected and Holkar was asked to return to his own dominions before any talks could start with him. Holkar wrote to Arthur Wellesley and the Governor-General in defiant terms. If his request was not acceded to, he declared "countries of many hundred coss should be overrun and burnt. That the Commander-in-Chief should not have leisure to breathe for a moment and that calamities should fall on lacs of human beings by the attacks of Holkar's army which overwhelms like the waves of sea."³³

On 16 April, 1804, war was declared against Holkar both in Hindustān and the Deccan. "The basis of that plan was a combination of the movements and operations of the British troops and those of Daulat Rāo Sindia and Gaikwār acting against the forces and territories of Holkar from Gujarāt, Mālwa and the Deccan, while the main British army pursued Holkar from Hindustān."³⁴

But nothing worked according to plan. "Holkar's power resided not in the extent of his territory, but in the number of his adherents. His standard was the common rallying point of all the disbanded soldiery of upper India and such other restless spirits. His empire indeed was the empire of the saddle. Holkar was bold, lawless and unscrupulous and he had sixty-thousand horsemen and an imposing park of artillery at his call."³⁵ Holkar was not going to fight pitched battles and throw his men against cannon; he reverted to guerilla tactics and fought in the traditional Marāthā style.

There were four main phases of the war. Lake opened the offensive with a thrust southwards through Central India, preceded by a detachment under Col. Monson, while Col. John Murray began an advance on Indore with another force from Gujarāt. Monson and Murray were to join their forces. But the plan miscarried and Monson after having advanced fifty miles in Holkar's territory beyond Mukundra pass, began his disastrous retreat on 8 July. Holkar's full fury was let loose on his five battalions, six companies and 3,000 irregular horse. Next day the irregular horse was attacked and destroyed. The Rājā of Kota refused to give shelter to Monson's battalions and the troops plodded on through the quagmire that Mālwa had become in torrential rains. The rivers had swollen and become impassable. Guns had to be spiked and abandoned. While crossing rivers and *nallahs* British troops were attacked by Holkar's hordes at Rampura, Khushalgarh and Hindaun. On 31 August the broken army reached Āgra in a state of utter demoralisation and disorder.

Yashwant Rāo Holkar was now the man of the hour. Round his standard gathered thousands of soldiers released from service in the armies of Sindia and Bhosle. With his ranks swollen to nearly 1,00,000 men Yashwant Rāo returned to Hindustān, flushed with victory. He triumphantly marched to Mathurā, which the British abandoned. All Hindustān lay within Holkar's grasp and for a moment it looked as if "he would succeed in restoring Marāthā supremacy over India."³⁶

But Holkar made a serious mistake; he remained revelling at Mathurā for four precious weeks with the stocks of wine and liquor abandoned by the British. Thus, when he made an attempt to storm Delhi and take possession of the emperor in October, it was too late. The enemy had used the respite to put the capital's defences in proper shape.

In the meanwhile the British Commander-in-Chief was not lying idle. He left Kanpur on 3 September and arrived within the vicinity of Agra on 22 September. He pushed on to Delhi and on 18 October Delhi was relieved.

Foiled in his attempt to occupy the capital, Holkar now determined to harass the enemy in the true Marāthā style. He sent his infantry and heavy artillery to the protection of the fort of Dig and himself moved northward and then crossed into the Doāb below Pānipat. Lake was confronted with a difficult choice; he had to pursue Holkar and at the same time destroy his infantry. He divided his forces, sent Col. Frazer with infantry and artillery against Dig, while he himself started in pursuit of Yashwant Rāo who threatened to lay waste the Doāb and the Nawāb *Vazīr's* territory. Holkar's infantry was brought to battle on 13 November and scattered to four winds. Four days later at Farrukhabad, Lake was able to surprise Holkar's cavalry while the men were lying asleep. The 60,000 cavalry force which had accompanied Holkar to Farrukhabad was reduced to half its size.

Holkar's power was broken. For a while he sustained his position by the valiant defence his force, joined by the Jāts, made at Bharatpur. Sindia declared that he intended to march to Bharatpur to mediate between the warring parties. But the Jāt Rājā made a treaty with the British on 17 April 1805 and Holkar retreated from Hindustān with an army defeated and disgraced and with its equipment lost.

The two defeated leaders met at Sabalgarh in May; despite early fraternizing, differences soon appeared. Sindia did not like

to be "subjected to frequent demands of a pecuniary nature and the outrageous insolence with which these requisitions are insisted on by Jaswant Rāo Holkar."³⁷ Sindia and Holkar parted company, Holkar resting with his diminished army in Mewār. He then proceeded to the Punjāb hoping Ranjit Singh and the Afghāns beyond Punjāb might rise with him against the British. But Ranjit Singh gave no encouragement to Holkar's chimerical scheme and Yashwant Rāo was too glad to come to an understanding with the British by the treaty of Rajpooor Ghāt on 24 December, 1805.³⁸ By the treaty Yashwant Rāo was recognised as the legal ruler of the Holkar family in Mewār, Mālwa and Haroti; Chandore and Amber were to be restored to the family after two years.

Yashwant Rāo's health had been undermined by nine years' long struggle and habits of a dissipated life. After returning from the Punjāb he started casting cannon and attempting improvements in his army with an ardour and violence that indicated the onset of insanity. The defeat had unsettled his mind and he soon sank into complete insanity in which condition he lingered till his death on 20 October, 1811.

Yashwant Rāo Holkar is idolised in certain quarters because he inflicted a crushing defeat on a British force and gave them some anxious time. But after watching his career one cannot but come to the conclusion that he was not the man who could have revived Marāthā glory. He lacked Shivājī's virtue and his organizing capacity.

Yashwant Rāo left behind a son, Malhār Rāo. During his minority the regency was assumed by Yashwant Rāo's favourite mistress Tulsā Bāi. But there was utter chaos in the State and the army became insubordinate. When Tulsā Bāi tried to come to an understanding with the British Government she was murdered. Holkar's army sustained a complete defeat at Mahidpur. On 6 January, 1818, the treaty of Mandasor was concluded by which Holkar gave up all his claims to territories in Rājputāna, Khāndesh, Bundelkhand, agreed to keep a small force of 3,000 and accepted a subsidiary force.³⁹ Holkar's independence was gone and the State lingered on as a feudatory of the British Government.

VI. *The Gaikwārs of Baroda:*

The house of the Gaikwārs of Baroda was considered as one of the four pillars of Marāthā Confederacy, though the Gaikwārs, for

a long time, did not owe allegiance to the *Peshwās*, considering themselves as subordinates to the *Senāpati*. After the defeat and death of Trimbak Rāo Dābhāde *Senāpati* in April 1731 at the battle of Dabhoi, the house of the *Senāpati* exerted little influence over the army or the province of Gujarāt. It was in 1751 that Damājī Gaikwār who had revolted against the *Peshwā*, was brought to heel, surrendered half of Gujarāt to the *Peshwā* and agreed to accept his hegemony.

The Gaikwārs were the hereditary Patels of Dāvdi, a village near Talegaon in Poona district, and rose in the services of *Senāpati* Dābhāde. They were associated with the *Senāpati* from the beginning in the conquest of the province of Gujarāt. The founder of the house was Damājī, grandson and son of Nandājī and Kerojī respectively. He so distinguished himself in the battle of Balapur (1720) that on his return to Satara, the *Senāpati* recommended his lieutenant to the Rājā's notice, in the warmest terms.¹ Unfortunately Damājī died too soon to enjoy the favours of the Rājā. Khandé Rāo Dābhāde was advanced in years and though he participated in the Karnāṭak campaign of 1725-26, and in the Palkhed campaign (1728), against the Nizām, he had lost his vigour and left affairs to his son Trimbak Rāo and his subordinate Pilājī Gaikwār.

The decade from 1721 to 1731 forms a period of great confusion in the history of Gujarāt. Marāthā armies had entered the province of Gujarāt and levied contributions there since the first decade of the 18th century. Rājā Shāhū, therefore, in the draft treaty he sent to Sayyid Husain 'Alī in 1718, had demanded the *chauth* of Gujarāt and Mālwa, along with that of the six *subāhs* of Deccan. This had been refused in the final treaty, the emperor conceding only the *chauth* of the Deccan. But Baglān and Gujarāt were assigned to *Senāpati* Dābhāde as his sphere of activity and he was asked to make good his claims by arms. This was the time when the Mughul empire was crumbling and governors of distant provinces like Nizām-ul-Mulk, 'Alī Vardī Khān, Sa'ādat Khān and others were becoming independent and carving out kingdoms, and petty Musalman Amīrs like the governors of Surat, Broach and Cambay were becoming Nawābs. The Marāthās posed a serious challenge to Mughul authority. *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo, Malhārjī and Pilājī Gaikwār invaded Mughul provinces of Khāndesh, Balaghat, Gujarāt and Mālwa.

The last three had for their objective the conquest of Gujarāt which they carried out sometimes in combination, sometimes independently of each other. The prize in the beginning was not the

acquisition of territory, but the right to extract from the emperor's viceroy the *chauth* or fourth part of the revenues.

Pilājī, the adopted son of Damājī, was first given the command of about fifty horse and was stationed at Navapura. Pilājī soon joined the main force of the *Senāpati* at Talegaon. Owing to his sagacity and energy he rose to the leadership of a *pāgā*. He took his post at Songarh (border of Surat district), a hill in the wilderness difficult of access, belonging to Bhils and Kolis of the region. Songarh henceforth became the cradle of the Gaikwār house.

Pilājī conciliated the local hill-people and made an alliance with the Rājā of Rājpiplā, and started systematically encroaching on Gujarāt. In 1720 he made an excursion into northern Gujarāt and obtained a portion of the *chauth* of that part of Gujarāt. In 1723 he marched on Surat and defeated the governor of that place, Momin Khān, after which his levy of *chauth* in Surat *athavisi* became a regular feature. In his enterprise he was joined by the Desais or Patels of Padra, Chhani and Bhayali in the Baroda *parganā*. Their local knowledge of the region was of great value to Pilājī Gaikwār.

While Pilājī was operating in south Gujarāt, the *Peshwā* invited Udājī Pawār to co-operate with him in Mālwa and the bordering districts of north Gujarāt. He gave him a letter (3 December, 1722) that the Pawārs would receive for their services twenty-five per cent of the entire *mokassa* or revenue of Gujarāt. Another chief who was active in the region was Kanthājī Kadam Bāndé who had established himself in north Khāndesh and carried raids both in Mālwa and Gujarāt.

The situation in Gujarāt became further complicated by the frequent changes in the governorship of the province. Haidar Qulī Khān, emperor Muhammad Shāh's favourite, took over as *Subāhdar* in June, 1722, but quit the province within less than a year (16 February, 1723). Nizām-ul-Mulk who was then functioning as *Vazīr*, took upon himself the governorship and appointed his uncle Hamīd Khān as deputy governor (12 February, 1723). Nizām-ul-Mulk did not retain the province long. He resigned the office of *Vazīr* and with it the governorship of Gujarāt and Mālwa in December, 1723.

Sarbuland Khān Mubārīz-ul-Mulk was the next governor. He nominated Shujā'at Khān, a local nobleman, as his deputy and Rustam 'Alī Khān as governor of Surat. The official orders about the new changes reached Ahmadabad in August 1724. The new deputy asked peremptorily the man in office, Hamīd Khān, to vacate the

governor's palace in the city. He trained guns on the palace to force Hamīd Khān to leave the city immediately. Hamīd Khān left the city and reaching Dohad, 110 miles from the capital, reported the matter to his patron, Nizām-ul-Mulk. The Nizām was sour with the Court for the shabby treatment meted out to him and to his followers and entered into engagements with Kanthājī Kadam Bāndé offering him the *chauth* of Gujarāt in return for assistance to his uncle Hamīd Khān. At the end of the rainy season Kanthājī joined Hamīd Khān with 20,000 horse and marched on Ahmadabad. Shujā'at Khān was taken unawares. About four *kos* from the city his force was attacked and dispersed by the allies, Shuja'at Khān himself being killed. On the next day (17 December, 1724) Hamīd Khān re-entered the city from which he had been driven out five months back. The *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of Gujarāt was granted to Kanthājī. He sent out his agents to Viramgaon to levy ransom. Meanwhile Hamīd Khān turned out the imperial officers and took possession of the province. Henceforward the revenues of the province were lost to the emperor.

As soon as the news of the revolt of Hamīd Khān reached Delhi, orders were issued by the Court to Rustam 'Alī Khān, Governor of Surat, to draw money from Surat treasury and raise a force to oppose Hamīd Khān. He offered terms of alliance to Pilājī Gaikwār, and with his new ally, marched from Surat to Ahmadabad. The two forces sighted each other near Aras on 7 February, 1725. During the night Hamīd Khān sent his agents to Pilājī Gaikwār and won him over. When, on the next day, issues were joined, Rustam 'Alī Khān found himself deserted by his Marāthā ally and was overwhelmed by the joint forces of Hamīd Khān and Kanthājī Kadam Bāndé. Then Hamīd Khān bestowed on Pilājī Gaikwār half of the *chauth* of Gujarāt which he had promised to Kanthājī. Naturally the two Marāthā allies of Hamīd Khān came to blows over the spoils and fought each other near Cambay. Hamīd Khān needed the support of his two allies, and interceding, granted the *chauth* of north Gujarāt to Kadam Bāndé, and of south Gujarāt to Pilājī Gaikwār.²

Sarbuland Khān's governorship proved altogether ineffective. He drove out Hamīd Khān but was powerless against Marāthā hordes. He came to an understanding with the *Peshwā* by granting him *chauth* of Gujarāt. Dābhāde *Senāpati* resented this intrusion in his sphere. The rivalry between the two Marāthā chiefs ended in the *Senāpati's* defeat at Dabhoi in 1731. (For details see Chapter IV). The *Peshwā's* action was resented at the Court and he was asked to restore the Gujarāt tribute to the *Senāpati's* successor.

Having established his primacy among Marāthā chiefs, *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo in deference to the Rājā's wishes, withdrew from Gujarāt for a while. The post of *Senāpati* was conferred on Trimbak Rāo's younger brother, Yashwant Rāo. Umā Bāi, the mother of Trimbak Rāo, became the guardian of the young man, and Pilājī Gaikwār worked as his deputy. The Gaikwār had now at his disposal the resources of the *Senāpati*. He was the master of Songarh, Baroda and Dabhoi, and was the ally of the Bhils and Kolis of the region and the friend of the local *zamindārs*. He almost overwhelmed the *Subāhdar*, Abhay Singh. Abhay Singh resorted to treachery to get rid of his enemy. He invited Pilājī to a conference at Dakore and had him murdered. But the foul deed brought him no advantage. Pilājī's son, Damājī, took the field against the *Subāhdar*, and with his allies of the hills, marched on Ahmadabad, sending a part of his horse into Mārwar. Abhay Singh retired to Jodhpur to defend his patrimony, leaving Ratan Singh Bhandāri to oppose the Marāthās. Ratan Singh could not succeed where his master, with greater resources, had failed. Baroda was reoccupied by the Gaikwārs in 1734. In 1735 the *chauth* of the northern half of Gujarāt passed to the Gaikwār after he had defeated his rival Bāndé at Anand Mogri, 25 miles south-east of Kaira and expelled him from that district. In 1737 the viceroyalty of the province was transferred to Momin Khān, the Governor of Cambay. Finding that he could not drive out the Mārwaris without external aid, he invited Damājī Gaikwār to his help promising him half the revenue of Gujarāt, except that from his own *jāgīr* lands in Ahmadabad and Cambay. The alliance was kept up till the death of Momin Khān, which occurred in 1743. In 1738 Ratan Singh Bhandāri was driven out of Ahmadabad. Damājī Gaikwār came to occupy half the city of Ahmadabad, suppressed Kolis round Viramgaon, increased his hold over Sorath and took Bansda. He became master of considerable territory in Gujarāt and the real chief of his party, as Yashwant Rāo Dābhāde though nominally *Senāpati*, was lacking in the qualities of leadership. The next Viceroy, Fakhr-ud-daulah continued the alliance with the Gaikwārs and granted them the districts of Borsad and Nadiad for the aid he received.³

The years 1750-52 were a critical period in Marāthā history and proved a turning point in the fortunes of the Gaikwārs. Rājā Shāhū died in December, 1749 and was succeeded by Tārā Bāi's grandson, Rām Rājā. Tārā Bāi nursed ambitions to carry on the administration in the name of her grandson. She clashed with the *Peshwā* who had become the hereditary chief minister of the *Chhatrapati*.

Tārā Bāi tried to align the Marāthā chiefs against the Brahmin *Peshwā*. The only Marāthā chief to respond to her call was Damājī Gaikwār who considered himself as deputy of the *Senāpati* and as such standing in special relationship with the Crown.

Damājī Gaikwār responded to the dowager queen's call and with an army of 15,000 strong, started raiding the *Peshwā*'s territory. On 18 February, 1751, an action was fought between the *Peshwā*'s troops and those of the Gaikwār at Bahadurpura in Khāndesh. Brushing aside the *Peshwā*'s troops Damājī marched on to Satara by way of Sangamner, Davdi, Pabal. The *Peshwā*'s forces challenged the Gaikwār on the Venya river near Satara, defeated him and trapped his force in Satara on 15 March, 1751.⁴ At the end of April the *Peshwā* arrived on the scene and demanded twenty-five lakhs of rupees as military reparations and half of the province of Gujarāt. When the Gaikwār would not consent, the *Peshwā* plundered his camp on 30 April and confined Damājī Gaikwār and his nominal master, Dābhāde. After much parleying between the two sides which dragged on for a year, the Gaikwār "agreed to pay fifteen lakhs as arrears; he also agreed to maintain 10,000 horse and to aid the *Peshwā* when called on to do so; his yearly tribute was fixed at five lakhs and twenty-five thousand rupees, besides a sum for the maintenance of the Dābhāde *Senāpati*. Above all, he consented to part with half of his dominions and to account for all future conquests in money or in land at the same rate. In return, the *Peshwā* bound himself to assist Damājī in the capture of Ahmadabad and the expulsion from Gujarāt of the Mughul government". By the arrangement, the *Peshwā* obtained in Gujarāt territory worth Rs. 24,68,700 and the Gaikwār Rs. 23,72,500. The curious may obtain the details of the transaction from Appendix IV in Elliot's book.⁵

From this date, the Gaikwār became a subordinate tributary of the *Peshwā* paying him tribute or falling in arrears. The subordinate position was acknowledged by the Gaikwārs, but it needed one more struggle and defeat to rivet it firmly. After this event which occurred in 1768 just before Damājī's death, the *Sanad* of appointment of successive Gaikwārs was granted by the *Peshwā*, exacting a *nazarānā* on the occasion, up to the end of 1798. The Gaikwārs paid the *Peshwā* in tribute Rs. 2,96,98,644. A sum of Rs. 65,70,000 was remitted and still there was a balance of Rs. 39,82,798, which was never paid.

The partition of Gujarāt took place in 1752. Immediately after the release of Damājī in 1753, a combined Marāthā army led by

Damājī Gaikwār, the *Peshwā's* brother Raghunāth Rāo, Vithal Shiydeo Vinchurkar and Nāro Shankar Rāje Bahādur, undertook the siege of Ahmadabad. The capital of Musalman kings for over three centuries was stoutly defended by Jawān Mard Khān Bābi. After a long investment Bābi surrendered the capital city on 20 March and retired to his *jāgīr* at Radhanpur.

In 1756 the Nawāb of Cambay seized the city while the Marāthā *Subāhdar* was away at Poona. Damājī Gaikwār recovered it from the Nawāb after some arduous fighting.

In 1760 Damājī joined the *Peshwā's* army marching to Hindustān to seek the Abdālī. He gave a good account of himself in the bloody battle of Pānipat, assisting Ibrāhīm Khān Gārdi to destroy the right wing of the enemy's army. He was one of the chiefs who returned home unscathed. Immediately after the disaster of Pānipat, the Nawābs of Radhanpur, Palanpur, Cambay and other places rose against Marāthā rule. Damājī put down the revolts; between the years 1763-66 he dispossessed the children of Kamāl-ud-din Bābi of Patan, Visalnagar, Vadnagar, Kheralu and Vijapur. In 1763 he took part in the battle of Rākshashbhūvan against the Nizām, and his horse materially contributed to the final victory.

Damājī Gaikwār had come to cultivate friendly relations with Raghunāth Rāo since 1753. He supported the uncle Raghunāth against the *Peshwā*. At the battle of Dhodap in 1768, a Gaikwār contingent under Damājī's son Govind Rāo, fought against the *Peshwā* and was defeated. Govind Rāo was taken prisoner. "For his part in the civil strife Damājī was fined Rs. 23,25,000 and his arrears of tribute for three years preceding were fixed at Rs. 18,75,000."⁶ The annual tribute was raised to Rs. 7,79,000 but his military service was reduced to four thousand cavalry.

Damājī died on 18 August, 1768, before the agreement had been finally concluded. By far he was the ablest of the Gaikwār family. He brought practically the whole of Gujarāt, including Kathiawār under his rule, expelling the Muslim nawābs of the province. His acceptance of the overlordship of the *Peshwā* brought him in the Marāthā confederacy and was a source of strength so long as the confederacy remained united and an active force. His friendship and loyalty to the uncle Raghunāth drew on him the wrath of *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo and the Gaikwār State was burdened with huge demands by way of outstanding tribute, fines and *nazarānās* in the next two decades. In fact, the history of the State till the close of the century is not the story of further conquests and wise adminis-

tration, but a sickening tale of fratricidal strife between members of the Gaikwār family, and the intercession of the *Peshwā's* government and the Company's government to satisfy their own ends, of which we will take only a brief notice.

After Damājī's death, the *Peshwā* decided the succession in favour of his son, Govind Rāo, who agreed to serve the *Peshwā* with 4,000 horse, pay a fine of 23 lakhs of rupees, a *nazarānā* of twenty lakhs and the balance of last year's tribute of seven lakhs—altogether fifty lakhs of rupees in cash. Govind Rāo, who had been detained in Poona after the battle of Dhodap, was unable to raise such a huge amount. His younger brother, Fateh Singh, who was ambitious and could change sides quicker than the chameleon his colours, now came forward to negotiate another settlement in favour of the eldest son Sayājī, born of the second wife of Damājī. Sayājī had been passed over because he was an imbecile. But he obtained recognition by the settlement of 1771, effected by Fateh Singh. Fateh Singh paid the *nazarānā* on succession and became the *Mutaliq* or deputy to the *Senakhaskhel*. Under the new arrangement, Govind Rāo was to remain satisfied with a *jāgīr* worth three lakhs per annum and was to stay at the ancestral place of the Gaikwārs, Davdi. The two brothers Govind Rāo and Fateh Singh became bitter enemies and fought on opposite sides in the first Anglo-Marāthā war. Their wrangling continued even after the conclusion of Anglo-Marāthā hostilities. Another member of the family, Khande Rāo, a brother of Damājī took sides in the dispute of the brothers as suited his interest best.

Fateh Singh when he returned from Poona in 1772, secured also non-compliance of the service clause on condition that he paid annually a sum of Rs. 14,54,000 for the tribute and remission of service as well. Though unhappy with the burden, Fateh Singh, for the time being, pretended to be pleased with the terms.

In the meanwhile a civil war had broken out at Poona. Mādhav Rāo *Peshwā* died in November, 1772, and his brother Nārāyan Rāo who had succeeded him in the *Peshwāship*, was murdered in August, 1773. Raghunāth Rāo who became *Peshwā*, immediately recognised Govind Rāo as *Senakhaskhel* and chief of the Gaikwār fief and sent him to Baroda to claim his patrimony. Raghunāth was not destined to remain *Peshwā* for long. A league of the *Kārbhāris* (councillors) known as the *Bārbhāis* was formed against him and drove him out of Poona. Raghunāth Rāo fled before the confederate army, and with a small force, joined Govind Rāo Gaikwār at Baroda on 3 January, 1775. Here he was pursued by the army of the confede-

rates and defeated at Anand Mogri near Aras on 17 February, 1775. Raghunāth fled by way of Cambay to Surat, and Govind Rāo Gaikwār with the remnant of the army, fell back on Kapadvanj. At Surat Raghunāth Rāo concluded a treaty with the English on 6 March, 1775, invoking their military aid in his hour of crisis. An English force of 2,500 strong, with cannon and other military equipment was to take the field on his behalf, for which he agreed to pay a lakh and a half rupees per month, and to cede in perpetuity Bassein with its dependencies, Salsette and other islands, the districts of Jambusar, Olpad and part of Ankalesar.⁷

Col. Keating's campaign against the Marāthās was not much of a success; in three months' time the force had marched from Cambay to Dabhoi, a distance of about 100 miles only.⁸ The Supreme Government at Calcutta on being informed of the proceedings of the Bombay Government, declared the treaty concluded with Raghobā (Raghunāth Rāo) invalid and the Marāthā war as 'impolitic, dangerous, unauthorized and unjust', and asked the 'Bombay Government to withdraw its force to its garrison'.⁹ However, there was one distinct gain. Fateh Singh Gaikwār had changed sides and gone over to the English.

When war again broke out between the Marāthās and the English two years later (1778), Gujarāt became the battle-field and General Goddard found it easy to win over the old ally, Fateh Singh Gaikwār. A treaty of offensive and defensive alliance was concluded between the two parties on 26 January, 1780 at Kandila near Dabhoi. By the treaty the *Peshwā's* share of the territory north of the Mahi river was to be given to Fateh Singh, in lieu of which he agreed to cede his share of the revenue of the districts known as Surat *Athavisi*, of Broach and of Sinnore on the Narmadā to the British. Fateh Singh was to aid Goddard with three thousand horse.

After the conclusion of the treaty, the allies marched on Ahmadabad and took it by assault on 15 February, 1780, whereupon it was delivered to Fateh Singh.¹⁰ He, in turn, surrendered to the English the districts in Surat *Athavisi*, retaining only Songarh. Goddard later tried to surprise Mahādji Sindia and Holkar, but the fighting was inconclusive. Fateh Singh, to the end, succeeded in defending Gujarāt against the allies' troops. In the year 1781 fighting moved away from Gujarāt to Konkan. Goddard's troops were much harassed by Marāthā horse when they tried to cross the Ghāts. Nānā Phadnis, in the meanwhile, to remove the enemy's pressure, forgetting old animosities, forged an alliance with Haidar 'Alī, the

Nizām and the Bhosle of Nagpur. The resources of the Company's government were stretched to the utmost limits and Hastings in order to detach the Marāthās from the alliance, concluded with them a treaty (Treaty of Salbai) on May 17, 1782. Article VIII of the treaty provided that "the territory which has long been the *jāgīr* of Sayājī and Fateh Singh Gaikwār, shall forever hereafter remain on the usual footing in his possession; and the said Fateh Singh shall pay for the future to the *Peshwā* the tribute as usual previous to the present war, and shall perform such services and be subject to such obedience as have long been established and customary. No claim shall be made on the said Fateh Singh by the *Peshwā* for the period that is past."¹¹ Thus after a five years' war, Fateh Singh was left in possession of all the territory he possessed at its commencement, while the *Peshwā* was not to claim from him any arrear of tribute which had fallen due during the period of the war. The Gaikwār's status was acknowledged to be that of a *jāgirdār* of the Marāthā State and he was to render the usual service to the *Peshwā*.

Fateh Singh died in December, 1789. Between the period of the conclusion of the treaty of Salbai (1782) and his death, he conducted the administration with great cleverness and prudence. For defence of his *jāgīr* he began engaging large bodies of foreign mercenaries and others, who later were to bring on the State disaster and ruin. Fateh Singh can be credited to have managed the State with ability during his stewardship.

Govind Rāo was by far now the most lawful heir. But he lacked monetary resources, and another son, Mānājī, conducted the regency for the next four years, by promising to pay the Poona Court the huge sum of sixty-nine lakhs of rupees by way of *Nazarānā* and arrears of tribute. Mānājī died on 1 August, 1793 and Sayājī predeceased him in 1792. The field was now clear for Govind Rāo. But the Poona Government would not recognise his right to succession unless he agreed to pay a *nazarānā* of Rs. 56,38,000, the arrears of Rs. 43,00,000 which represented tribute and the remission for service, and the debts of Mānājī amounting to Rs. 20,00,000, altogether amounting to a crore and twenty lakhs of rupees. For meeting these demands he was asked to surrender all jewellery, treasure and cloth in the Baroda treasury and palace and to part with the Gaikwār territory south of the Tāpi river. The impression spread that Nānā Phadnis was resolved to ruin the Gaikwār family by the dismemberment of the Baroda State. But the British Resident at Poona intervened; Malet reported that "a formal retraction (of its

usurpation of Gaikwār territory) was effected by his interposition in a very delicate manner."¹²

Fateh Singh Gaikwār, despite his unscrupulous ways, had managed his State in a competent manner. Not so Govind Rāo, who had been kept waiting for the *Senakhaskhelship* for twenty-five years. He brought his *Kārbhāris*, *Diwan* Rāojī Appājī, Majumdar and Phadnis from Poona, and their mutual rivalries and ambitions brought the State to the verge of ruin. The Poona Court had obtained ascendancy over the *jāgīr* and was burdening it with all kinds of claims. "The evil was intensified by son striving against father, brother against brother, cousin against cousin, while wives and mothers pushed the interests of their husbands and sons with an entire disregard of justice or the common good of the family."¹³

Govind Rāo's promises to pay the Poona Court the sum of a crore and twenty-lakhs of rupees, forced the State into a very abject position. By 1797, he had paid the *Peshwā* Rs. 78,33,212, had been excused from paying another sixty lakhs, and yet he owed Poona Rs. 39,82,789.¹⁴

Even on his entry in Baroda in December, 1793, Govind Rāo met with opposition from his son Kānhōjī. However, Kānhōjī was betrayed by his mercenary troops and placed in confinement. He escaped to the hills, was joined by the Bhils and ravaged Sankheda and Bhadarpur. He was subsequently joined by Malhār Rāo, son of the late Khande Rāo of Kadi, who commenced hostilities against Govind Rāo for not granting him certain favours.

In 1794 the Gaikwār forces attacked Cambay, but were turned off by the English. In 1795 they were present at the battle of Kharda.

In 1800 when Nānā Phadnis died, *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo asked Govind Rāo Gaikwār to eject Ābā Shelukar (Nānā's nominee) from Ahmadabad and take the *Peshwā's* share of the province in farm. One consequence of this was that the Gaikwār obtained the administration of that half of northern Gujarāt which belonged to the *Peshwā* and did away with the evil of divided authority. Gaikwār's commander Bābājī defeated Ābā Shelukar, took him prisoner and kept him at Borsad.¹⁵

The great anxiety of the Gaikwār to keep the farm, the interest of the Bombay Government in continuing the arrangement, and the policy of *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo to resume Gujarāt districts, led ultimate-

ly to the rupture between the *Peshwā* and the British Government and the independence of the Gaikwār.

Govind Rāo Gaikwār died in October, 1800.¹⁶ The State or rather the *jāgīr* had been impoverished by the huge tribute of 78 lakhs of rupees exacted from him by the Poona Government.¹⁷ "The treasury was empty; almost all the districts were mortgaged to creditors and the few remaining ones were farmed to unscrupulous men who made haste to extort money; the tributary states withheld their tributes with impunity. The maintenance of the army alone exceeded the receipts of the State; no attention was given to the administration of justice, the protection of the subjects and such other matters; there was, properly speaking, no government, for all power lay in the hands of rapacious and overbearing Arab soldiery and the government was distrusted most of all. Meanwhile Sindia and the *Peshwā* were watching the dissolution of the State with interested views."¹⁸

The greatest evil from which the State suffered was the mercenary force first introduced by Fateh Singh Gaikwār. Govind Rāo and his *Diwān* Rāoji Appājī went on increasing their number, which in 1800 stood at 13,126 foot and 3,730 cavalry. Their monthly expenses were Rs. 2,99,642. The most esteemed among them were pure Arabs hailing from Arabia. Arab garrisons held the forts of Baroda, Borsad, Sankheda and other strongholds. They were amenable only to their pay-masters—Mangal Parekh and Samal Bechar, the two *Sāhukārs*, who supported the administration of any ruler, who could pay them best. The Arab soldiery was looked on as guarantee (*Bahandari*) for any promise made by the Government, which invested their leaders with unlimited powers to interfere in the day to day administration.

During the prevailing confusion Govind Rāo died and was succeeded by his son Ānand Rāo, another member of the Gaikwār house of feeble mind, rendered infirm from addiction to wine and opium. Rāni Gahinā Bāi, with the minister Rāojī, his brother Bābājī, Mir Kamāl-ud-din and the two pay-masters, formed a regency. But Kānhōjī (the eldest illegitimate son of Govind Rāo) who returned to Baroda, gained the confidence of Ānand Rāo and became *Mutaliq*, pushing out the members of the regency. But Kānhōjī did not retain his authority for long. The main problem was to raise money to meet the demands of the soldiery. For this Kānhōjī treated harshly most of the members of the Gaikwār family and respectable men in Baroda and mulcted them of money and jewellery. He went to the length of confining the chief, Ānand Rāo himself. The Arab

soldiers got tired of him and seizing him, liberated Ānand Rāo; Rāoji Appājī was again brought in to run the administration.

Rāoji found that his *Diwānship* was not a bed of roses. The Arab troops demanded their arrears. The *jāgirdār* of Kadi, Malhār Rāo Gaikwār, was up in arms and was demanding the remission of his *peshkash*. Other members of the family were demanding something from Rāoji, while he had nothing to give. Rāoji turned to the Company's Government to help him out of the predicament, offering to surrender the *Chaurasi parganā* (the district surrounding Surat) and the Surat *chauth*. Malhār Rāo also sent an agent to Surat.

The Governor of Bombay, Duncan, sent Major Walker to arbitrate between Rāoji and Malhār Rāo Gaikwār. Major Walker reached Baroda on 29 January, 1802, met the Mahārājā (Ānand Rāo) and held several discussions with him. He found the State sunk in debt, the soldiery in mutinous condition and the entire administration in a state of suspended animation. Walker sided with the minister and entered into a convention with him at Cambay in March, 1802 by which Rāoji agreed to receive a subsidiary force of two thousand sepoy and to cede territories for the expenditure of the troops. On 3 May, 1802, Malhār Rāo was defeated and his place Kadi was taken. Another rebel Ganpat Rāo Gaikwār was likewise disposed of.¹⁹

But the third and the most difficult problem was the disbanding of the Arab soldiery. On 18 December, 1802, the fort of Baroda was invested and after much fighting the Arabs agreed to evacuate it on getting their arrears. The arrears (17½ lakhs) were paid and Ānand Rāo returned to Baroda as a British protégé. He had already (6 June 1802) entered into a subsidiary alliance with the East India Company, taking a force of two thousand British sepoy with a battery of European artillery, for which he ceded territory worth Rs. 7,80,000 (Dholka 4½ lakhs, Nadiad 1½ lakhs, Vijapur 1.3 lakhs and Kadi Rs. 25,000) to the British. They had before this obtained *Chaurasi parganā* and the Surat *Athavisi*, and the *parganās* of Chikhli and Kheda, altogether worth Rs. 2,58,000.²⁰

The revenues of the Gaikwār State amounted to fifty-five lakhs of rupees; out of which it now gave away ten lakhs for the subsidiary force. The rebels Malhār Rāo and Ganapat Rāo were taken care of, as also the Arab soldiery. The debts, exclusive of the heavy balance claimed by the *Peshwā*, were compromised for a sum less than forty-two lakhs, and money was raised on the security of the British Gov-

ernment for its liquidation. Major Walker also paid much attention to the collections from Kathiawar. From all these considerations Baroda State fell under the control of a regency consisting of the British Resident Walker, Carnac and William.

The treaty of Bassein between the *Peshwā* and the East India Company in its 14th article recognised the existence of the treaty between the Company and Ānand Rāo Gaikwār and directed that the demands and papers of account between the *Peshwā* and his erstwhile feudatory should be examined and adjusted by the British Government.

Peshwā Bājī Rāo after 1813 became anxious to resume his share of Gujarāt districts, cancelled its farm to the Gaikwār Government and brought huge claims against that Government for arrears.²¹ When Gangādhār Shāstri visited the Poona Government for the adjustment of claims and counter-claims, he was murdered, but his murder absolved his Government from any claims of the Poona Court. Within a couple of years of the perpetration of the heinous crime, the *Peshwā* was bundled off to Bithur and British influence became supreme at Baroda. The Gaikwārs became one of the subordinate allies of the British.

VII. *The Angrias of Kolaba:*

The conquest of Konkan brought Shivājī early in conflict with the Sidis of Janjirā who commanded the western coast and taught him the necessity of building a strong navy. As Sir Jadunath Sarkar has remarked, "to the owner of Konkan it was essential that the Sidi should be either made an ally or rendered powerless for mischief. Without a navy his subjects on the sea-coast and for some distance inland would remain exposed to plunder, enslavement and slaughter at the hands of the Abyssinian pirates. The innumerable creeks and navigable rivers of the coast, while they naturally fostered the growth of rich ports and trade centres, made it imperatively necessary for their protection that their owner should rule the sea."¹

The year 1659 marks the date of the beginning of the Marāthā navy. The shallow ports of Pen, Panvel, Kalyan, Bhiwandi saw considerable activity in building small crafts for the Marāthā navy and by 1664 Shivājī was able to fit out a fleet of sixty frigates for a distant expedition. "The English President describes the Marāthā vessels as pitiful things, so that one good English ship would destroy a hundred of them."² Though the small Marāthā vessels appeared

insignificant to the English merchants in comparison with their ocean-sailing ships, they were active enough in harassing the Sidis and their new master, the Mughul emperor. Within twenty years Shivājī's fleet had grown to 400 vessels, most of them small *galbats* not more than fifty tons. The fighting strength of the navy was, according to the English factory reports, represented by about 160 vessels.³

The fortunes of the Marāthā navy reached their lowest ebb by 1690. Shambhūjī, the king of the Marāthās, was captured and executed by the Mughuls; their strongholds in the upcountry were occupied by them. A formidable army under Mātabar Khān pressed the Marāthās from the north; the Sidi found the opportunity to assert himself; he recovered the territory lost during the last regime and his fleet scourged Marāthā vessels and swept them off the sea. At a time when the political existence of the Marāthā State was at stake, it was not to be expected that the Marāthās would have the will or find means to save their fleet. The whole naval establishment crashed and went to pieces. In this critical condition the Marāthā flag was kept flying aloft over the sea by the daring, resourcefulness and initiative of the famous Kānhojī Angria of Kolaba.

Little is known of the family and early days of Kānhojī. His daring activity and skilful seamanship are traced by European writers to his Abyssinian parentage, but nothing can be far from the truth. The Angrias, whose family name is Sankhpal, hail from a tiny village, Angarwādi, in the Māwal hills, six miles from Poona. They are blue-blood Marāthās and would spurn to marry in families lower than those of Deshmukhs, Jādhavs, Jagtāps and Shītoles.⁴ Tukoji Sankhpal took service under the great Shivājī about 1658 and distinguished himself in several actions. He was rewarded with a command of 200, and posted at Suvarnadurg, an important naval post which occupied a menacing position hardly twenty miles south of the Sidis' frontier. Here Kānhojī first opened his eyes and passed his childhood. Here he watched Marāthā ships making out for the open sea and falling upon the enemy's fleet, and here he received the practical training of seamanship from the uncouth but faithful Kolī sailors.

Kānhojī made his mark during Shivājī's time and is honourably mentioned in the *Chitnis Bakhar*.^{4a} The family history would have us believe that the *Kiladar* of Suvarnadurg, Mohite, being hard-pressed by the Sidi, proposed surrendering the place. Kānhojī sent news of this treachery to the authorities and seized this chicken-heart-

ed fellow. Taking on himself the command, he not only declined yielding the place, but boldly attacked the besiegers. In one of the sorties he fell in the enemy's hands, but extricating himself from his confinement, Kānhojī managed to reach the walls of the castle and beat off the Sidi's attack. He was then appointed second in command to Sidojī Gujar, the *Sar-Subha* of the Marāthā navy. When the latter died in 1698, he succeeded him in the entire command of the navy, making Kolaba his headquarters.⁵

His task was not an easy one. The central Marāthā authority had disappeared; the Konkan province had been overrun and devastated by the Mughuls. There were no allies to help, no resources to rely upon and no reinforcements to be expected. On the other hand, in the absence of human allies, his sea-girt castles and their geographical situation in a far-away corner afforded Kānhojī excellent protection, and from here he sallied forth to attack enemy ships and prey upon their merchantmen. By 1700, Kānhojī is mentioned in foreign records as one of 'the most daring pirates' that infested the Malabār coast and made commerce hazardous.

To get a right perspective of Angria's maritime activities they must be viewed as a part of the general struggle of the Marāthā nation against the Mughul conquest of their homeland. This explains Angria's inveterate hostility to the Sidis who were the Mughul representatives afloat. The chief objective to which his policy was directed was to recover Marāthā territory occupied by the Sidis during the interim that followed Shambhūjī's execution, drive the Sidi to his island retreat, annihilate his independence and render him powerless for mischief. The western seas were to be Marāthā waters and all who visited ports established in them, were to be taught to respect Marāthā sovereignty and secure his permission for trading in those waters by buying his passes. Whatever power refused to conform to his orders, would do it at the peril of bringing on its merchantmen his strong hand. His claim was challenged by the Sidis as well as the Western powers—the Portuguese, the English and the Dutch, who on account of the important trading interests they had established in western waters, found such a demand most galling and injurious to their commerce. With their strongly built ships they were confident of their strength on the sea, manned as their ships were by skilful sailors and equipped as they were with far superior armaments. Their chief factories being established in the Mughul's territory they were afraid that their recognition of Marāthā claim and any assistance given in pursuance thereof, would antagonise them with the emperor and draw upon them

his wrath. Their interests, therefore, dictated that they should range themselves on the side of the enemies of the Marāthās when they could not maintain their neutrality. During the fifty years of *Sarkhelship* in the Angria family the Marāthā power increased and almost overshadowed the Mughul empire. This growth of Marāthā power is reflected in the annihilation of some of the maritime rivals of the Angria and the submissive attitude of the remaining in the halcyon days of its rule.

Angria's heavy hand soon fell on the Sidi and the Mughul. In January, 1700, the Bombay Factory recorded "that Kānhojī Angria was at war with the Sidi and he was getting better of his enemy." The war went on intermittently. Though the Sidi sought the help of the Portuguese in the contest with the Angria, he was not able to make much headway against him and was forced to yield to his opponent two-third of the revenue of Kolaba, Khanderi and Sagargarh and part of the revenue from Chaul.⁶

As his resources increased Kānhojī began challenging foreign merchantmen that ventured on the sea without his passes. In 1702 a small trading vessel from Calicut with six Englishmen fell into his hands and was carried into one of his harbours. To a demand for its release he sent a reply 'that he would give the English cause to remember the name of Kānhojī Angria'. In 1703 the Viceroy of Goa found it necessary to address him a friendly letter.⁷ "Two years later he is described as a rebel 'independent of the Rājā Shivājī', and Mr. Reynolds was deputed to find him and tell him that he would not be permitted searching, molesting or seizing vessels in Bombay waters, to which he returned a defiant answer, that he had done many services to the English, who had broken faith with him and henceforth he would seize their vessels wherever he could find them."⁸ In 1707 the *Bombay* frigate was blown up in an encounter with Angria's ships. In 1710 a Dutch sloop of war was captured and the *Godolphin* narrowly escaped the same fate. In 1711 the Directors were told that Angria could take any ship except the largest ones; "along the coast from Surat to Dabul he takes all private merchant vessels he meets". The next year he captured the Governor of Bombay's armed yacht and the *Anne* of Karwar⁹ and attacked the *Somers* and the *Grantham*, *East Indiamen*. While thus already contending with the Sidi, the Portuguese and the English, he was in 1713 embroiled in the civil war between Tārā Bāi and Shāhū. Kānhojī Angria, a staunch partisan of Tārā Bāi, advanced to Rajmachi, defeated Shāhū's *Peshwā*, Behrō Pant, and threatened to march on Poona.

Though he had succeeded so far, Kānhojī knew the limitations of his strength. He understood that when a sea-power acquired territory on land with a frontier open to the attack of a military state, it incurred a great danger. It was necessary for his success on the sea that his back-door should be secure with a friendly neighbour guarding the western passes. Bālājī Vishwanāth, Shāhū's new *Peshwā*, convinced Angria of the wisdom of subordinating to his master, assured him how an alliance with Shāhū would benefit both parties and finally won him over (28 February, 1714). In consequence, while Angria acknowledged allegiance to Shāhū, he was confirmed in the command of the fleet, granted twenty six forts and fortified places in Konkan, among which was Khānderi, hardly ten miles from Bombay. He was also promised assistance in a contest with the Sidi. As some of the places that had been made over to Angria by the treaty were yet in the hands of the Sidi, hostilities followed. The Sidi, being no match for the joint forces of Angria and the *Peshwā*, was defeated, and surrendered to Kānhojī valuable territory on the mainland.¹⁰

While the negotiations with Shāhū demanded his attention Angria was wise enough to patch up his differences with the English. He invited an English agent to Kolaba and agreed that "in future English ships should be free from molestation, that no ships of any nation coming into Bombay harbour should be interfered with between Māhim and Kennery, that English merchants should have liberty of trade in Angria's ports on payment of the usual dues, and that Angria should be responsible for any damages done in future by the ships belonging to his Marāthā superiors. In return the Governor engaged to give passes only to ships belonging to merchants recognised by the Company and to allow Angria's people full facilities in Bombay."¹¹

The treaty concluded with the English proved but a temporary truce. With the arrival of Charles Boone in December 1715, as Governor, the Bombay settlement began to show great activity in equipping its fighting marine. The immediate cause of hostilities was the capture of three merchantmen, the *Success*, the *Robert*, and the *Otter* by Angria.¹² Kānhojī contended that these vessels belonged to foreign merchants, and though laden with the goods of the Company, could claim no exemption from his passes. The English retaliated by the seizure of one of Angria's *shibar* that visited Māhim and by attacking his coastal towns. The war against Angria in 1718 failed. The causes of the failure were obvious. The batteries the English ships carried, though effective against Angria's floating

castles of wood, were powerless against the rocky walls of his castles. The Company's soldiers at this period were ill-paid, ill-disciplined and had little training. The men in command were mere clerks, and the trappings of military dress could not transform them into soldiers who could hold their own against the astute Angria. While the English squadron attacked more than a hundred miles away from its base, the communications of the fort with land remained safe so that it continued to draw support from the mainland.

Least disheartened by this failure, the English now turned their attention nearer home. On the close of the monsoon another expedition was fitted out against Khānderi.¹³ After a fruitless bombardment against the island and Kolaba, the fleet sailed southward and visited Gheria (Vijayadurg) and Kārwar and then returned to Bombay (November, 1718-January, 1719) to defend it against Angria's fleet which had been called north from Vijayadurg. Angria then for a time lulled the Bombay authorities with talks of peace, but when the danger blew away he withdrew his offer.

The English Governor was determined to destroy Gheria which he regarded as the nest of the pirate Angria, and despite his two failures, fitted another expedition against that place. It consisted of nine ships of the line and several fishing boats for landing troops. On board were about 600 picked soldiers commanded by Walter Brown, one of the Bombay Factors.

On 19 September, 1720, the fleet arrived in sight of Gheria. The shells from the *London* and the *Prahm*, a floating battery, burst in vain against the solid rocks of the Victory fort (Vijayadurg). The only alternative left to the besiegers was to destroy Angria's ships that had retired up the river; for attacking the castle from the land the party was altogether inadequate. The fort on the landside was covered by the town which had to be occupied before the walls could be assaulted. The fleet divided, a part of it sailed in the harbour skirting the walls of the castle and opened fire. A number of Angria's ships were destroyed, but this made little impression on the castle. Brown was no soldier, knew nothing of strategy, nor how to handle the men, and had no consistent plan of attack. The first attempt at landing having failed disastrously, the men refused to embark on another fruitless trial. The squadron, after making a demonstration against Deogarh, prepared to retire to Bombay when as ill-luck would have it, it fell in with pirates and was dispersed. Thus ended most ignominiously the attempt on Vijayadurg.¹⁴

Angria's career was unchecked and he now threatened to march

his men to Bombay. The two heavy defeats made the English forget for a time their jealousy of the Portuguese and seek their co-operation in crushing their common enemy. The repeated losses Portuguese shipping had suffered, persuaded the Goa authorities to accept the overtures of the English, and a treaty providing for a joint attack on Kolaba was concluded on 20 August, 1721.

In consequence, there was feverish activity in Bombay, Bassein and Goa, and news of the hostile preparations soon reached Angria. He immediately made offers to compose his differences with the Portuguese; threw provisions and ammunition in the fort of Kolaba and requested King Shāhū to succour him.

The arrival of a royal squadron in Bombay under Commander Mathews further added to the strength of the allies. On 29th November the expedition sailed from Bombay and joined the Portuguese force at Chaul. The English contingent consisted of over 2,400 men amply provided with artillery. The Portuguese assembled a still larger force which carried over 30 field guns. The combined army, 6,000, assisted as it was by a powerful fleet, appeared invincible.¹⁵

The country between Chaul and Alibāg, a span of ten miles, is covered with wood and is swampy near Kolaba. The crossing of the *Kundalika* and the march to Kolaba with the heavy guns delayed the army on the road for over a fortnight. The time gained was sufficient for Pilājī Jādhav and *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo to pour their horsemen through the Konkan passes, and when the allies appeared before Kolaba on 12 December, 1721, they found themselves in great danger of being outnumbered by Marāthā cavalry. While the Portuguese commander was surveying the field accompanied by Mathews, a Marāthā horseman suddenly sprang upon the party from behind a bush and wounded Mathews with his lance.

As the enemy's strength was daily increasing it was necessary to deliver the attack without loss of time. Not estimating the number of the army that was opposing them, the allies divided their force; the English undertook to assault the fort, while the Portuguese were to hold at bay the enemy that was encamping outside, and to defend the camp and the rear against surprise. The superiority of the allies lay clearly in their artillery, and their neglect of this advantage rendered them helpless against Marāthā cavalry. While the little English party attacked the walls, Bājī Rāo threw himself against the Portuguese column and sent it flying. The assaulting party under Col. Braithwaite met with a hail of shot and

stone and when the Portuguese force dispersed, its rear was threatened and it was obliged to fall back. "All the field guns and a great deal of ammunition fell in the hands of the Marāthās."¹⁶

There were now bickerings among the allies; the English laid the blame for the miserable episode on the Portuguese, charged them with cowardice and their commander in a fury rushed at the Portuguese captain and roughly handled him. This insolent behaviour was not calculated to hold together the loosely knit alliance. *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo on behalf of Angria made overtures of peace which were honourable to both the parties and were readily accepted by the Portuguese on 9 January, 1722. The alliance that had been heralded with so much *éclat*, broke up without achieving any of its objects.¹⁷

The war with the English continued with pauses at intervals. When pressed in other quarters Angria would hold forth the olive branch and express willingness to make peace on his own terms. Such an attempt was made in 1724 when Kānhojī wrote a friendly letter to the new Governor Phipps and requested him to depute an agent of credit to discuss terms of peace. The Governor turned down his request, charged him with piracy, asked him to renounce war and demanded a proof of his sincerity, by immediately setting at liberty English prisoners. This called forth Kānhojī's ire; he replied that "it little behoved merchants to say that his government was supported by violence, insults and piracies; for the great Shivājī founded his kingdom by making war against four Kings; and that he himself was but his humble disciple; that he was very willing to favour the merchants trading according to the laws of his country," and offered to release the English prisoners if his men, imprisoned by the English, were set at liberty. The negotiations were completed and an exchange of prisoners effected in 1725.¹⁸

The vessels Angria developed and used for fighting his enemies were of various types—the *Pal*, the *Shibar*, the *Machwa*, the *Galbat* or *Gallivat* and the *Ghurab*. The chief war-vessels were the *ghurab* (grab) and the *galbat* supporting the *ghurab*, and acting as its scout. The *galbats*, according to Low, were large row boats built like *grabs* but smaller, not more than seventy tons. They had two masts, a strong main mast and a slight mizzen mast, the main mast bearing a large triangular sail. Forty or fifty stout oars could send a *galbat* four miles an hour. Some large *galbats* had fixed decks, but most had spare decks made of split bamboos. They carried six to eight three or four pounders.

"Angria's grabs were of two classes, two masters upto 150 tons (600 *khandis*), and three masters upto 300 tons. They were broad in proportion to the length and drew little water. They narrowed from the middle forwards, where instead of bows, they had a prow of a Mediterranean galley. Two nine-to-twelve-pounder cannon were planted on the main deck under the forecastle, pointing forward through port holes cut in the bulkhead and firing over the prow. The cannon on the broad sides were from six to nine pounders."

In its method of fighting, Angria's navy reproduced the guerilla tactics which had proved so successful on land. The light Marāthā boats sailed faster, and sailed round the clumsy merchantmen, and if pressed, could find safety in the shallow creeks and river mouths along the coast where the European men-of-war could not pursue them. When the heavy enemy ship was becalmed in the sea and could not move, the small Marāthā vessels, moved as they were by oars and not dependent on wind, found their opportunity. They prowled out of their hiding, and reaching the stern of the enemy vessel, one by one they unloaded their prow-guns at a close range and sheered off to load their guns and return to the attack. Their strategy consisted in avoiding the fire from the broadsides of the enemy's ships. After the enemy guns were silenced, two or three of the grabs ran aboard their victim and attacked sword in hand.

Kānhoji's relations with the central authority were marked with the greatest cordiality after the treaty of 1714. That treaty allowed him full independence in the management of his fief and assured him ample resources for the navy so long as he acknowledged the king of Satara as his liege-lord and paid him tribute. Shāhū respected the Admiral who, almost single-handed, recreated the navy and when the two met at Jejuri in March, 1718, the occasion was marked with great ceremony and pomp.

The last few years of Kānhoji's life were years of comparative peace. He had many sons of whom Sekhōjī, Sambhājī, Mānājī and Tulājī maintained their father's tradition of seamanship. He died on 20 June, 1729.

On his father's death, Sekhōjī Angria succeeded to the admiralty, receiving the investiture robes from the king on 5 August, 1729.¹⁹ As a loyal feudatory he agreed to participate in the problems facing the Marāthā State. The first occasion arose when the Marāthās attacked in 1731 places in the Portuguese province of the North near Kalyān. In support of the attack on land Sekhōjī at-

tacked Portuguese vessels at sea and captured two merchant *Pals* and one *gallivat*.²⁰ The attack on the province of the north was not pressed home and hostilities were soon stopped.

Much more serious was the Marāthā attempt on the Sidi's territory and castle of Janjirā. The attack was discussed for years from 1727 onwards; when Sekhōjī visited Rājā Shāhū at Satara in 1731, the former agreed to support the expedition with his fleet. The details of the attack were, however, never discussed. In February, 1733, the head Sidi—Sidi Rasul—died and there was a split among his commanders about the successor. Rājā Shāhū despatched a force under the *Peshwā* to capture the enemy's castle of Janjirā and overrun his territory. Sekhōjī was asked to cooperate in the venture. The *Peshwā* descended into Konkan in May, 1733, and seized Rajpuri and Khokri on the mainland opposite the castle and a part of the Sidi's fleet lying in the harbour. He invited Sekhōjī Angria to help him blockade the castle of Janjirā.²¹

The attack on the castle came at an odd season of the year when the sea was rough and Sekhōjī was not willing to risk his fleet in the enterprise. He pleaded his inability to support the *Peshwā* immediately. He however, occupied lower Chaul, Thal and Rewās near his headquarters Kolaba. As the Sidi was a protégé of the English, he (Sekhōjī) sent agents to Bombay to secure their neutrality in the forthcoming contest with the Sidis.²² But the English refused the guarantee and with the Sidi's consent, occupied the island of Underi at the entrance of Bombay harbour on 16 July, 1733. The English presence at Underi caused great consternation in Angria's camp. Before he could achieve anything, Sekhōjī died on 28 August, 1733 after a short illness.²³ As he had no child of his own he was succeeded to the admiralty by his brother, Sambhājī.

The importance of Angria's house started declining with the death of Sekhōjī Angria. There were two reasons for this. Civil war broke out among the brothers; Mānājī Angria sought help not only from the *Peshwā*, but from the English and the Portuguese—the sworn enemies of the family. Both were jubilant and glad to extend help to Mānājī and thus reduce the strength of the Marāthā navy. The *Peshwā*'s moves in the dispute were deplorable. Instead of supporting the naval strength of the Marāthā State represented by Sambhājī, he took Mānājī under his protective wing and did everything to reduce Sambhājī Angria's strength. The *Peshwā* was fast developing as the chief executive authority of the Marāthā State and sought to bring the Angrias under his influence. Sambhājī refused

to accept the *Peshwā's* leadership and was twice foiled (1735 and 1740) in his attempts to gain the possession of Kolaba, which place had been associated with the chiefship of Marāthā navy. So Sambhājī Angria's exploits at sea remained isolated instances of his prowess, but did not contribute to the advancement of Marāthā power. A few details in the career of Sambhājī would clarify the issues.

In May, 1734, the Bombay Government reported that Angria's whole fleet stationed at Gheria consisted of 13 *grabs* and 30 *gallivats*, and it feared that he would be out earlier than usual, trusting to the superiority of his number. But within a few months its fears were laid at rest as civil war broke out between the two brothers—Sambhājī and Mānājī. Sambhājī suspected Mānājī of secretly plotting against his life with the support of his arch enemies—the English and the Portuguese. Mānājī, when Sambhājī called him to account for his action on his visit to Kolaba at the beginning of 1735, sought the shelter of the Portuguese at Revdanda. The *Peshwā*, keen to have a deciding role in Konkan, visited Kolaba from February to April, 1735 and divided the Angria *jāgīr* between the two brothers. Mānājī was resettled in the possession of the northern Konkan with its headquarters at Kolaba, with the title *Vajarat-maab*. Sambhājī as *Sarkhel* was allowed to keep the main fleet with his headquarters at Vijayadurg.²⁴ His possessions narrowed down to a barren strip in south Konkan stretching from Bankot to Mālwan, the revenues of which were hardly adequate to keep his fleet afloat.²⁵ The days of the Marāthā navy as a powerful arm of the Marāthā State, were over.

The result of the division made by the *Peshwā* was that Sambhājī Angria lost all interest in the prosecution of the war against the Sidis of Janjirā. He earned the odium of being in league with them—the enemies of the Marāthās. When Sidi Sa'at's force was destroyed in the battle of Charhai Kamarle by Chimnājī Appā in April, 1736, a contingent of Mānājī Angria fought by the side of the main force led by Chimnājī and Mānājī's stock went up at the King's Court. When Sambhājī tried to bring his ships to the attack of Anjanwel, he was foiled by the English navy. His difficulties were not appreciated at the Court where he became suspect of dereliction of duty and neglect of his responsibilities. All this caused great vexation to Sambhājī Angria.

Sambhājī retaliated against the English by the capture of the Company's ship *Derby* under the command of Capt. Anselm. On the morning of 26 December, 1735, the ship was sighted near Suvarna-

durg. The wind had fallen and the sea was becalmed. Angria's *gallivats* sallied forth to attack the ship and in a hard fight lasting over ten hours, shot away all the *Derby's* masts, boarded it and captured it. About 115 sailors were taken prisoners. After six months' imprisonment, Capt. Inchbird negotiated their release, promising peace for the next six months and discussion of other disputed points.²⁶ But the English soon went back on their word on a paltry excuse and started attacking Angria's ships at sea.

Sambhājī Angria was the arch-enemy of the English and they were always deliberating his destruction. One such deliberation took place on 8 July, 1737, when according to information "the enemy had constantly in pay fifteen or sixteen thousand men and could easily raise another six thousand on a short warning. It was therefore thought convenient to lay aside all thoughts of making an expedition by land against the enemy."

The motion "whether destroying the enemy's *grabs* in his ports could not be effected being next taken into consideration the commanders of the cruisers acquainted with the situation of Gheria, informed the Board that when the enemy's *grabs* were in the river, they were constantly hauled up into a bay round the fort which formed a half moon and they lay close to two lines of guns near the water side and a new tower lately built which commanded the river and the bay where the *grabs* lay. That on dark nights there were lights constantly burning upon the river and a careful watch was kept by the enemy. It was thought that making an attempt on the fortifications would prove ineffectual and was therefore dropped."²⁷

In 1738 Commodore Bagwell was ordered to blockade Angria's fleet at Gheria. But the Commodore failed miserably, reporting that the Company's marine was not strong enough to withstand Angria's fleet and that Angria was a stronger enemy than the Bombay Government thought him to be.²⁸

All the while Sambhājī's fleet was also chasing Portuguese merchantmen and in 1738 he even captured the Portuguese warship *Sao Miquel* near Gheria. Soon after that Sambhājī seized two Dutch vessels. In reprisal the Dutch sent a fleet against Gheria, but the fleet could make little effect on the place and sailed away.²⁹

From March, 1737 to May, 1739, the Marāthās were at war with the Portuguese over their Province of the North (Salsette-Bassein district). In the war the Angria brothers did make an attempt to capture Portuguese ships carrying succour to Bassein, but lacking a

concerted plan, their fleets were in no way helpful to Marāthā armies lying before Bassein.

In January, 1740, Sambhājī Angria's fleet was seen prowling near Bombay and made an unsuccessful attack on the English squadron, but his real objective was Kolaba. He seized Hirākot, Sagarharh and Chaul and besieged the fort of Kolaba. When the news reached Chimnājī Appā, within five days he appeared near Kolaba with a much superior force, seized Pāli, Mirgarh and Uran belonging to Mānājī Angria and defeated Sambhājī's small force. The English also sent assistance to the beleaguered garrison and Kolaba was saved for Mānājī.³⁰

Sambhājī was not reconciled to the loss of Kolābā and opened negotiations with the Sidi, the English and the Portuguese to secure their neutrality in his domestic dispute.³¹ But before anything could be done in the matter, a fire broke out in his fleet about September, 1741, by which he sustained considerable loss; many of his seasoned sailors left him on account of his poverty.³² Proud man that Sambhājī was, he could not stand the barbs of misfortune; he died on 12 January, 1742.³³

The death of Sambhājī Angria did not restore peace and greatness to the house of Angria. Mānājī sent his agents to Satara to obtain the *Sarkhelship* but the king conferred it in 1743, on Tulājī Angria, Sambhājī's brother, who worked with him, exhorting him to do something worthy of the honour. Tulājī was brave like his brothers, and despite enemy opposition, succeeded in capturing the fort of Anjanwel lying at the mouth of the Vasishthi river, and Govalkot near Chiplun on 25 January, 1745.³⁴ Two years later he visited Satara to pay homage to the king. He also paid his respects to the Rājā's two wives.

About the end of 1747 a great dispute arose between Tulājī Angria, the *Pratinidhi* of Vishalgarh, *Amātya* of Bāwdā and Sāvānt of Wādi over Angria's capture of Mudagarh. Making Mudagarh his base, Tulājī started an all-round aggression and came in conflict with the petty feudatories in the region.³⁵ Tulājī was defeated when the feudatories received aid from the *Peshwā*.

In 1748 Tulājī was again defeated with heavy loss at Kudal by a Sāvāntwādi force and was pursued as far as Sangva near Ratnagiri and his country was laid waste.³⁶

But Tulājī Angria's career at sea was unchecked. He was an intrepid seaman and would not easily give up the claim of the

sovereignty of the sea made by his father Kānhojī and his brothers Sekhōjī and Sambhūjī. In April, 1743 he engaged the Ketch *Salā-mander* and forced it to seek the shelter of Kolaba. On 22 November, his squadron of seven *grabs* and eight *gallivats* fell in with an English convoy and exchanged gun fire with it for twelve hours. On 1 December three *grabs* and four *gallivats* of Angria were sighted off Mangalore and chased away by English vessels.³⁷ Another squadron consisting of seven *grabs* and seventeen *gallivats* attacked Portuguese men of war between Honavar and Goa, carrying on the fight for two days and two nights. Despite Tulājī's offer of peace, the English sent the *Restoration* and the *Bombay grabs* in December, 1744, to assist the Sidi to foil Tulājī in his attempt to seize Anjanwel and Govalkot. Rājā Shāhū sent a message to the English Governor at Bombay not to afford any assistance to the Sidi at Anjanwel. But the Governor obdurately replied that Tulājī and his predecessors had committed untold miseries on the Company's trade and obliged them to spend immense sums for its protection. He had therefore no option but to take all opportunities of distressing the Angria.³⁸

Tulājī however captured Anjanwel and Govalkot on 25 January, 1745, and continued to challenge English ships at sea. In December, 1745, there were reports from Tellicherry that Angria's ships were near the place looking out for merchant vessels, and seized the *Princess Augusta* and the *Expedition*.³⁹ In February, 1746, he took three out of five Gujarāt vessels. In November, 1746, Angria landed his force at Mangalore and laid waste the place.⁴⁰ In January his fleet seized two Dutch sloops between Calicut and Tellicherry. He was again active in 1748 and in December his fleet was cruising off *Mount Daily* near Cannanore. In October, 1749, he attacked Commodore James' fleet and took the *Restoration grab* near Gheria. "The engagement began at night and on the 13th about noon it being calm, she was boarded on all quarters and the vessel was taken."⁴¹ Next year Tulājī was bold enough to attack Commodore Lisle in command of several vessels. Again in February, 1753 he attacked three Dutch ships of fifty, thirty-six and eighteen guns, burnt two large ones and took the third as prize.⁴² So great was Angria's strength and such were his movements from Cochin in the south to Diu in the north that for forty years the E. I. Company incurred heavy expenditure (Rs. 5,00,000 per annum) to protect her trade.⁴³

Elated with his successes Tulājī built several new vessels and boasted that he would soon be master of the west coast. Tārā Bāi, the Regent Queen, knowing Angria's hostility to the *Peshwā*, encouraged him to attack the *Peshwā's* places in Konkan. In February,

1753, Tulājī besieged Vishalgarh but was driven off.⁴⁴ By 1754 Tulājī Angria's cup was full; the European powers—the English, the Dutch, the Portuguese—hated him like poison. His warships sailing from Cochin to Diu threatened the very existence of their commerce. From the time of their conquest of Salsette-Bassein, Chimnājī Appā had suggested to the English a joint expedition against the Angria.⁴⁵ So long as Rājā Shāhū was alive, he would not allow the Angrias to be annihilated. But after his death in December, 1749, the *Peshwā* was free to follow his own line with the recalcitrant feudatories. The succession dispute, the Gaikwār's revolt and the Nizām's activities made him overlook Tulājī's insolent behaviour. In April, 1753, he made it plain that he would not permit Angria's persecution of Brahmins and *vatandārs* any longer.⁴⁶ In early 1754 Bālājī Bājī Rāo sent letters to the Bombay Council, "earnestly desiring us to join our forces with theirs to demolish Tulājī Angria".⁴⁷ The *Peshwā's* *Subāhdar* Ramājī Mahādeo pressed the English to attack Gheria and bring about the total destruction of Angria. A treaty was concluded on 19 March, 1755, by which it was settled that the English should be in charge of naval operations and that ships, treasures, guns etc., captured from the Angria should be equally shared.⁴⁸

By 7 April, 1755, Suvarnadurg and three other castles to the north had fallen to the joint attack. As the monsoon was now advancing, the English squadron under Commodore James returned to Bombay. But the *Peshwā's* land troops pressed on the campaign, overran Angria's territory and captured Angria's stronghold of Anjanwel, Govalkot and Ratnagiri.

After the monsoon of 1755, the allies renewed their attack on Angria's headquarters—Vijayadurg. Admiral Watson had arrived in India with a royal squadron and he was directed by the Madras authorities to go to the west coast to join the attack on Angria. With him sailed the hero of Arcot, Clive, with a battalion of 800 Europeans and another of 1,000 sepoys. According to Ives, the Marāthā army consisted of 6,000 horse and the same number of foot. Ives seems to have left out of account the army that was already operating in Konkan under Khandōjī Mānkar and Samsheer Bahādur. The Marāthā fleet cooperating with the British squadron consisted of four *ghurabs* and fifty *gallivats* lying in the Rajapur creek, four miles north of Gheria.

The British fleet joined by the Company's marine, sailed from Bombay on 7 February, 1756, and arrived before Vijayadurg four days later. The cannonading of the castle started on 12 February. At

four in the afternoon, a chance shot falling on one of Angria's ships, set fire to his entire fleet cooped up in the bay, and in a short time all the seventy ships lying in the harbour belonging to Angria were burnt down. Tulājī Angria had no allies left, his country was over-run by the *Peshwā's* armies and his headquarters surrounded by the enemy. His predicament was a hopeless one and he gave himself up to the Marāthā commander. In his absence the fort could not hold out long. Clive landed his troops on the 13th and encamped on grounds between the fort and the town, from where the *Peshwā's* troops could not communicate with the besieged. The same evening, the British took possession of the 'impregnable' fort wherein they found 250 guns, considerable amount of gunpowder, six brass mortars, ten lakhs of rupees in cash and about four thousand pounds worth of goods and valuables. They now demanded the surrender of Tulājī Angria who was in the Marāthā camp. The Marāthā commander refused the English demand on which the English declined to hand over the fort to the Marāthās.

The *Peshwā* entered a strong protest to the Bombay Government about its breach of a solemn promise, after which the allies came to an understanding and Vijayadurg was restored to the *Peshwā* on 12 October, 1756. In lieu of it, the English obtained Bankot and ten surrounding villages.

Tulājī Angria remained in custody of the *Peshwā* till his death in 1786. His sons, however, escaped to Bombay.

After Tulājī's subjugation the southern Konkan was put under the command of Ānand Rāo Dhulap. Rāmājī Mahādeo, who was *Subāhdar* of north Konkan obtained Suvarnadurg. After Rāmājī's death, Phadke held charge of North Konkan.

The *Peshwā's* relations with the other branch of the Angria family—Manājī Angria—were not very happy. He was always encroaching on Angria's territory and took a number of outlying forts. Manājī died in 1758 as a feudatory of the *Peshwā* and was succeeded by Raghūjī. Raghūjī was a good ruler and did much to improve the land from the salt-marsh. In 1776 he seized the impostor of Sadāshīv Rāo Bhāu and handed him over to the Poona Government. Forbes who visited his country has given a pleasant account of it. Raghūjī died in 1793, after which there was great confusion in the succession to the title. The Marāthā navy was no longer the terror that it was to foreign rulers and in 1839 the small *jāgīr* of Mānājī Angria lapsed to the British Government for want of a direct heir and became a part of the present Kolaba district.

SECTION IV, pp. 250-266: THE SINDIAS OF GWALIOR

1. Malcolm Sir John, *Memoir of Central India*, Vol. I (1880), p. 95.
2. *S.P.D.*, XXX, p. 246.
3. *K.S.P.Y.*, No. 496.
4. *S.P.D.*, XXX, p. 270.
5. *S.P.D.*, XXX, pp. 290-94.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 300.
7. *Ibid.*, pp. 304-06.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 306.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 321.
10. *Brahmendra Swaminche Charitra*, No. 27; *S.P.D.* X, XV, pp. 37-49.
11. *Br. Ch.*, No. 33-38.
- 11a. Malcolm J., *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79.
12. *S.P.D.*, XVI, 127; *K.S.P.Y.*, no. 31; *Salsette Chronicle*, p. 48; *Pissurlencar, Marāthās & Portuguese*, p. 68.
- 12a. *Aitihasik Patravayawahar*, Nos. 68, 76.
13. *K.S.P.Y.* (1930 Ed.), pp. 87-89.
14. *S.P.D.*, XXV, pp. 144-49; XXVI, p. 202.
15. *Bhau Sahebanchi Bakhar* (Ed. by S. N. Joshi, 1959), pp. 4-7; but from *Aitihasik Patravayawahar*, 41, 76, (1933), the differences began much earlier.
16. Rajwade, *M.I.S.*, Vol. I, 37, 39; *K.S.P.Y.*, pp. 128-39; *S.P.D.*, II, pp. 48-65; XXI, pp. 70, 82, 83; XXVII, pp. 105-10.
17. Rajwade, *op. cit.*, 156, 165; *S.P.D.*, II, p. 114; XXI, p. 181, 182, 185; XXVII, 247; Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, II, pp. 220-22.
18. Rajwade, *M.I.S.*, XIII, nos. 59-60.
19. *S.P.D.*, XXIX, 219-80; *Persian Calendar*, III, 544, etc.
20. Gleig, G. R., *Warren Hastings*, II, p. 39.
21. Sardesai, *Hist. Papers Re: Mahadji Sindia*, (1937), Nos. 103-109.
22. *Ibid.*, Nos. 134-46, 152.
23. *Ibid.*, No. 154.
24. *Ibid.*, Nos. 182, 188-90.
25. Aitchison, *Treaties & Engagements*, etc. (1863), Vol. III, pp. 49-54.
26. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, Vol. II (1921), p. 153.
27. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, Vol. III, p. 200, 221, 289-90.
28. V. V. Khare, *Life of Nānā Phadnis* (1927), p. 137; Nānā Phadnis to Mahadji Sindia, printed in an Appendix in *Life of Mahadji Sindia* by V. R. Natu (1894), pp. 296-7.
29. Browne to Macpherson, G. G., cited by Desmond Young, *Fountain of Elephants*, p. 83; also see Brown's letter to Hastings 10 January, 1785, *Browne Correspondence*, pp. 266-74.
30. *P.R.C.*, I, pp. 69-70.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 61.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 64, 81.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 178-79, 387, *P.R.C.*, II, pp. 258-59, 288-89.
- 33a. For De Boigne's career as Sindia's general see Desmond Young, *Fountain of Elephants*, pp. 74-175.
34. *Hist. Papers of Mahadji Sindia* (Ed. Sardesai, 1937), Nos. 503, pp. 692-97.
35. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 182.
36. Cited by Sardesai in *Marāthi Riyasat*, Uttar Vibhag, II (1929), p. 127.
37. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 183.
38. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, IV, p. 26.
39. *P.R.C.*, II, pp. 254-55, 258-59; also Sardesai, *New History*, Vol. III, pp. 228-42; Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, IV, pp. 127-30.
40. *P.R.C.*, I, pp. 388-89.
41. *Ibid.*, p. 390.
42. Thompson, Edward, *The Making of the Indian Princes*, pp. 11-12.
43. V. V. Khare, X, pp. 5309-18.
44. *P.R.C.*, IX, 28; Malcolm J., *Central India* (1880), I, pp. 175-76.
45. Aitchison, *Treaties & Engagements*, etc. Vol. IV, pp. 221-25, 233-43.
46. Broughton, T. D., *Letters written in a Mahratta Camp* (Constable and Co.), p. 28.

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SECTION V, pp. 266-277: THE HOLKARS OF INDORE

1. *Holkaranchi Kaifiyat* (1954, Ed. by Y. N. Kelkar), pp. 1-2; John Malcolm, *Memoir of Central India* (1826, reprint 1880), I, pp. 117-19; *Shahu Chhatrapati Diary*, pp. 83-84.
2. *S.P.D.*, XVII, 1.
3. *S.P.D.*, XIII, 31-38 and *Jaipur Akhbars*.
4. *S.P.D.*, XXX, p. 285, 292, 300, 304.
5. Irvine, William, *The Bangash Nawābs of Farukhabad*, J.A.S.B., 1878, pp. 316-21.
6. Peshwā's letter in Appendix IV of Barve's *Life of Malhār Rāo Hōlkar*.
7. *S.P.D.*, XIV, 11, 18; XV, 1; Jadunath Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, I, pp. 249-52.
8. *S.P.D.*, XIV, 21, 23; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 285.
9. *S.P.D.*, XV, 47 *Tarikh-i-Hind* in Elliot & Dowson, Vol. VIII.
10. *S.P.D.*, XV, 68.
11. *Brahmendra Charitra*, App. 52.
12. Malcolm, *Central India*, I, pp. 78-79. 121; *S.P.D.*, XV, p. 86.
13. *Aitihāsik Patravayawahar*, 68; *S.P.D.*, II, pp. 129-33. See also Dr. Raghubir Singh's Paper, *Rajput-Marāthā Relations*, *Marāthā History Seminar*, 1971.
14. *S.P.D.*, XXI, 92-94.
15. Khare, V. V., I, 333-35; *S.P.D.*, XXXVII, 105-06.
16. *B.I.S.M.Q.*, IX, No. 2, pp. 31-32. *S.P.D.*, XXIX, 90, 98, Khare, 575.
17. Sardesai, *New History*, II, p. 505.
18. *Chandrachud Daftar*, I, 104-5; Parasnis, *Maheshwar Darbarchi Batamipatren*, 204.
19. *Chandrachud Daftar*, 202.
20. *Holkar Kaifiyat*, pp. 42-47; *S.P.D.*, XXIX, 176, 180.
21. Malcolm, *Central India*, I, pp. 129-60. Malcolm was the Political Agent from 1818-25 and drew up the report which was the basis of his *Memoir of Central India*, 1826. This was reprinted in 1880 in two volumes which have been used for the section. Nānā Phadnis often tried to pension off the lady and make Tukōji the sole administrator of the Jagir. But Ahalyā Bāi refused to oblige the Poona Gooti (See Sardesai, *Marāthi Riyasat*, Uttar Vibhag, pp. 1-11).
22. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, I, p. 149.
23. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, I, p. 136; See also *Holkar Kaifiyat* (1954), p. 121.
24. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, I, 143-49.
25. Malcolm, *ibid.*, p. 155.
26. Morley, John, *Burke*, p. 130.
27. Sardesai, *New History*, III, p. 211.
28. *P.R.C.* VI, pp. 24-25, 405.
29. Khare, Y. V., *Aitihāsik Lekha Sangraha*, Vol. XIV, pp. 7404-36.
30. Martin, *Wellesley Despatches*, Vol. IV.
31. Martin, *Wellesley Despatches*, IV, 4 ff.
32. Malcolm, *Political History of India* (1970, reprint), Vol. I, p. 150.
33. Martin, *Wellesley Despatches*, IV, p. 107.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 322.
35. Kaye, *Life of Malcolm*, I, p. 305.
36. Malcolm, *Central India* I, p. 209.
37. *P.R.C.*, XI, p. 199.
38. Aitchison, *Treaties, Engagements, etc.*, Vol. IV (1864), pp. 289-93.
39. Aitchison, *op. cit.*, pp. 294-97.

SECTION VI, pp. 278-290: THE GAIKWARS OF BARODA

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2. *S.P.D.*, XXX, 312, p. 271, Irvine, William, *Later Mughals*, II, pp. 170-71, *Bombay Gazetteer*, Vol. I, Pt. I, pp. 302-318.
3. Elliot, F. A. H., *The Rulers of Baroda* (1934), p. 32.
4. *Purandare Daftar*, I, 322-33, 335-43.
5. Elliot, *op. cit.*, p. 35; K.S.P.Y., 99; Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas*, I, p. 467.
6. Elliot, *op. cit.*, p. 39.

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7. Aitchison, C. U., Vol. III, *Treaties, Engagements etc.* (1863), Vol. III, pp. 24-30; Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas* (1921), Vol. II, pp. 23-30.
8. Duff, *op. cit.*, 34-42.
9. Duff, *ibid.*, p. 49.
10. Sardesai, *Hist. Papers Re: to Mahadji Sindia*, 1937, pp. 72-75.
11. Aitchison, C. U., *Treaties, Engagements, etc.* (1863), Vol. III, p. 51.
12. P. R. C., II, p. 314.
13. Elliot, F. A. H., *op. cit.*, p. 57.
14. P. R. C., XII, p. 277.
15. Khare, V. V., *Aitihāsik Lekha Sangraha*, XIII, pp. 6936-37.
16. P. R. C., VI, pp. 600-02.
17. P. R. C., XII, p. 279.
18. Elliot, F. A. H., *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64.
19. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 320-27.
20. Duff, *ibid.*, P. R. C., VII, pp. 20-21.
21. P. R. C., XII, pp. 275-92, 301-09, 324-26.

SECTION VII, pp. 290-305: THE ANGRIAS OF KOLABA

1. Sarkar, Jadunath, *Shivāji and His Times*, (4th Edn.), p. 244.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 249.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 247.
4. Mawji and Parasnis, *Kaifiyats and Yadis*, p. 1.
- 4a. Chitnis *Saptaprakaranatmak Charitra* (ed. Hervadkar), pp. 203.
5. Chitnis, *Thorle Shahu Maharaj Charitra*, p. 38.
6. Biddulph, John, *Malabar Pirates*, p. 76.
7. Sen, S. N., *Military System of the Marāthās*, p. 194.
8. Sen, S. N., *Early Career of Kanhoji Angria and other Papers*, pp. 8-9.
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10. Foster, Introduction to Downing's *A History of the Indian Wars*, pp. xii-xiii; Chitnis *Thorle Shahu Charitra*, pp. 37-40.
11. Foster, *ibid.*, p. xii; Sen, *op. cit.*, pp. 197-98.
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13. For Khanderi expedition, see Sen, *Early Career of Kanhoji Angria, etc.*, pp. 12-19.
14. Bombay Records, *Public Deptt. Diary*, IA, p. 150, 228, 242-64; Clement Downing, *A History of the Indian Wars*, pp. 29-30.
15. Downing, *op. cit.*, pp. 53-57.
16. *Ibid.*
17. Downing, *ibid.*, S.P.D., XXX, 63.
18. *Public Deptt. Diary*, 2A, pp. 118-66 and Hamilton, *A New Account of the East Indies*, Vol. I, p. 245.
19. S. P. D., XXXIII, 1.
20. Sen, *Military System, etc.*, p. 215.
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22. S. P. D., III, 63, 64.
23. S. P. D., III, 72-89.
24. Rajwade, *M. I. S.*, II, p. 71; *Br. Charitra*, 130.
25. S. P. D., XXIV, 4. Tulaji Angria's complaint of insufficiency of resources. Also *Public Dept. Diary*, 9A, 8 Dec. 1735, p. 291.
26. *Pub. Dept. Diary*, 9A, p. 3, 21, 50, 374, 704.
27. *Ibid.*, 10B, pp. 286-88.
28. Sen in the *New Indian Antiquary*, Vol. I, No. 2, pp. 122-24, Sambhaji Angria.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 124-125.
30. *Ibid.*; also *Pub. Dept. Diary*, 13A. B, pp. 209-276.
31. S. P. D., XXXIII, 457.
32. *Pub. Dept. Diary*, 14C (1741), pp. 491-93.
33. Rajwade, *M. I. S.*, III, 308, 345.
34. *Waidya Daftar*, cited by Sardesai in *Riyasat*, Vol. V, p. 109.
35. S. P. D., XXIV, 46-52; *Aitihāsik Patravayawahar*, 39, 80; *Bālāji Bāji Rāo, Diary I*, 34.
36. *Ratnagiri Gazetteer* (New Series), pp. 167-68.
37. *Pub. Dept. Diary*, 16A, pp. 48-49.

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38. *Ibid*, 17E (1744), pp. 426-40.
39. *Ibid*, 18A, p. 35, 19A, p. 31.
40. *Ibid*, p. 502.
41. *Ibid*, 24A (1749), p. 303, 24B, p. 484; *Shrivastava, Angreys of Kolaba*, p. 129.
42. *Milburne, Oriental Commerce*, I, p. 294.
43. *C. R. Low, History of the Indian Navy*, I, p. 124.
44. *Shahu Chhatrapati Roznishi*, pp. 110-11.
45. *Pub. Dept. Diary*, 13B, pp. 330-39.
46. *Shahu Chhatrapati Roznishi*, p. 111, No. 240.
47. *Sec. and Pol. Dept. Diary*, I, pp. 1-2.
48. *Ibid*, pp. 1-35 (printed by Forrest in the Marāthā Series), *Ive, A voyage from England to India*, p. 88, *Orme, History of Hindostan*, I, pp. 407-17, *S.P.D.*, XXIV, 164, 171, 173. For a general account of the Angrias of Kolaba, see *Dhabu, Kulabkar Angre*, *Manohar Malgonkar, Kanhoji Angrey*.

CHAPTER IX

THE ENGLISH, THE FRENCH AND OTHER EUROPEAN COMPANIES IN INDIA

ANGLO-FRENCH CONFLICT UP TO 1763

I. *The English Presidencies upto 1746:*

The increasing disintegration of the Mughul empire became marked after 1720 and was conducive to the growth of the English settlements in Bengal and on the Coromandel Coast. The over-running of many parts of the country, particularly of Bengal and the Karnāṭak, by the Marāthās, further contributed to the disintegration of the Muslim power over them and to the growing assertiveness of the Presidencies of Fort St. George and Fort William. The Nawābs of Bengal were greatly weakened by domestic squabbles and Hindu disaffection. In the Karnāṭak the situation was even worse, and further complicated by the turbulence of the poligars and the suppression of the old Nawāyat ruling family by the new dynasty of Anwar-ud-din Khān.

In England itself the wisdom and policy of Sir Robert Walpole encouraged a policy of peaceful trade. The Government supported the Company against the claims of the Ostend Company formed by the Austrian emperor Charles VI in 1717, and contrived the formation of a triple alliance of France, England and Holland which forced the emperor, among other things, to wind up his Company which was suspended in 1727 and suppressed four years later.¹

The E.I. Company got from King George I a charter of confirmation with ampler powers, among which was a provision for the starting of Mayor's Courts in the three Presidencies and extending its life to 1766, with the usual stipulation of three years' notice before termination. In 1742 the Company offered to the Government a loan of one million sterling on condition that its monopoly should be extended to 1780 and even then it should continue to be a trading body without the monopoly.

The growth of the three Presidencies was well marked during the period 1708-1746. Madras was fortunate in its succession of Governors which included men like Thomas Pitt, Edward Harrison,

Joseph Collet, James Macrae and Richard Benyon. Harrison (1711-1717) strove hard with the Nawāb to secure the grant of some suburban villages. The Madras *farman*, comprehended in the Imperial grant secured by John Surman, exempted the Company's goods from customs in all the ports of Golconda and confirmed the grant of the suburban villages. Governor Collet planted the first large suburban village of weavers so necessary for the cloth trade of the settlement. In the time of Governor Macrae (1725-30) a royal charter reconstituted the Corporation and remodelled the Mayor's Court which had been in existence from 1687. Governor Morton Pitt (1730-35) arranged for the policing of the Black Town (occupied by Indians) of the settlement. His successor Benyon (1735-44) was faced with the threat of Marāthā attack and with growing anarchy in the Karnāṭak.

Nawāb Zu'lfīqār Khān who established Mughul dominion over the Karnāṭak was followed by Dā'ud Khān Panni, who transferred the headquarters of the Karnāṭak *Subāh* from Jinjī to Arcot. Dā'ud Khān's *Diwān* and *Faujdār*, Muhammad Sayyid, later Nawāb Sa'adatullah Khān, was the acknowledged Nawāb of the Karnāṭak during 1710-32; and he was confirmed by Nizām-ul-Mulk when the latter established his authority in the Deccan. The rule of Sa'adatullah was noted for its justice and equity.²

In 1725 the Trichinopoly country was ravaged by one Iwaz Khān; and Sarfojī Rājā of Tanjore who belonged to a collateral branch of the Bhosle family, appealed for help to Rājā Shāhū who sent Fateh Singh with an army. The Marāthās exacted tribute from the regions of Bidnur and Seringapatam.

Nawāb Sa'adatullah appointed to the charge of many *killas* (forts) in his *subāh* his own followers of the Nawāyat community. On his death, Bāquir 'Alī, a nephew, who was the killedar of Vellore, became his successor; but he gave up the *masnad* to his younger brother, Dost 'Alī Khān, and retired into private life. Dost 'Alī had an only son, Safdar 'Alī, and five sons-in-law, of whom the eldest was the infamous Ghulam Murtazā 'Alī of Vellore and third was the well-known adventurer, Chandā Sāhib.

In 1734, Safdar 'Alī and his brother-in-law Chandā Sāhib went on a roving expedition to the South. Our sources of information are not agreed as to the sequence of the events that led to the unscrupulous seizure of Trichinopoly by Chandā Sāhib from the hands of Rāni Mīnākshi, the widow of Vijayaranga Chokkanātha, the last Nāyak of Madurā. Chandā Sāhib advanced to Trichinopoly a second

time in 1736, captured Madurā and Dindigul and became master of the Nāyak kingdom, while Rāni Mīnākshi committed suicide in despair, and Bangāru Tirumala, the father of her adopted son, sought refuge into the forests of Sivagangā. The great Marāthā invasion of the Karnāṭak in 1740 was instigated by, among other factors, Bangāru Tirumala; Raghuji Bhosle, the leader of the Marāthā army, directed Murāri Rāo Ghorpade who was made the Governor of Trichinopoly, to place Bangāru on the Nāyak throne. When Nizām-ul-Mulk came down to the south country and seized Trichinopoly (1743), Bangāru sought Marāthā assistance but in vain. With him disappeared the last vestige of Hindu rule in the southern district.³

According to the historian Mark Wilks, Safdar 'Ali and Mīr Asad, the *Diwān* of the Nawāb, had secretly invited the Marāthās; but the defeat and death of Dost 'Ali in the pass of Damalcheruvu foiled their plan by which the invaders were to have by-passed the Nawāb quietly and made an attack on Chandā Sāhib at Trichinopoly. On his father's death, Safdar 'Ali shut himself up in Vellore, negotiated with the invaders through Mīr Asad and got a secret understanding with them by which they were to get a large portion of the dominions under Chandā Sāhib as the price of his effectual removal from the country. After some time the Marāthās renewed their pillaging operations in the coastal districts. Chandā Sāhib had provisioned Trichinopoly against a likely siege; but being deceived by the temporary withdrawal of the Marāthās, he sold off the provisions. His negotiations to avert an attack, did not succeed, and after his brother Bade Sahib was defeated and killed by the enemy, he surrendered Trichinopoly in March 1741.⁴

The weak rule of Safdar 'Ali gave a chance to his crafty cousin Murtazā 'Ali of Vellore to supplant him. The Nawāb was assassinated when he visited Vellore on a feast day (October 1742); but the usurper could not secure the *masnad*. The nobles represented to the Nizām that the elder of the two sons of the murdered Nawāb should be raised to the dignity.

Nizām-ul-Mulk advanced to the Karnāṭak in the early part of 1743; he put the elder son of Safdar 'Ali in charge of one of his own officers and restored a semblance of order (August 1743). He then proceeded to Trichinopoly which he contrived to secure, after six months of desultory operations. Khwājā 'Abdullāh Khān who was in charge of the Arcot *subāh*, was commissioned to re-establish Mughul authority in the east. The Nizām left Arcot for Hyderabad after formally appointing 'Abdullāh Khān as the *Nazīm*, but the

latter died all of a sudden (it was alleged of colic in March 1744); and another noble in his service, Anwar-ud-din Khān, who was greatly conversant with the politics of the Deccan, was immediately appointed. Anwar-ud-din took charge of the Karnāṭak *subāh* in April 1744, as well as the boy-prince. Soon after, the boy-prince (Sa'adatullah Khān II) was assassinated by some discontented Afghān troopers during a marriage festival (July 1744); and Anwar-ud-din was suspected of having had a hand in the tragedy.⁵

Anwar-ud-din was confirmed in his post; he tried to deprive the old Nawāyat ruling family of all chances of regaining power. He was, however, ignorant of the conditions prevailing in the European settlements on the coast and unable to keep the chiefs and poligārs in submission and order. Hence his administration was not efficient.⁶

It was soon after the accession of Nawāb Anwar-ud-din when Nicholas Morse had succeeded Benyon as the Governor of Madras that news reached the coast that England and France were at war. But the English Presidency was then more concerned with Marāthā and Karnāṭak politics than with distant European affairs.

In Bengal the English power grew up steadily in strength and prosperity. There were constant rumours, during the War of the Spanish Succession, that French privateers would attack English shipping in the Hughli river. Nawāb Murshid Quli Khān (1704-25) was a little jealous of the English, particularly when, as a fruit of the embassy of John Surman to Farrukh-siyar, they obtained a *farman* ordering the Nawāb not to meddle with them and empowering them to continue to enjoy all their existing privileges.⁷

The Nawāb granted the English the right of free trade only on payment of a large sum. His successor, Shujā Khān, (1725-39) was more favourably disposed towards the Europeans; but he was indolent and guided wholly by two brothers, the younger of whom, the famous 'Alī Vardī Khān contrived to get the succession on his master's death. 'Alī Vardī Khān respected the privileges of the European settlements, as he appreciated the benefits accruing from their trade and he is even said to have foreseen their coming supremacy over the country. He fought several campaigns against the Marāthās who invaded Orissa and Bengal from their base at Nagpur. During one of these invasions the English at Calcutta were permitted to dig an entrenchment round the city, the remnants of which are still to be seen and the memory of which is kept up in popular memory as the *Marāthā Ditch*. Though Calcutta grew rapidly in population, its fort remained relatively weak. On 'Alī Vardī Khān's death in

1756, the English were more concerned with the doings of the Nawāb than with the activities of the Dutch and the French in the province.⁸

In Bombay since 1690 the English position continued weak. The trouble from Kānhoji Angria persisted; he frequently threatened the safety of Bombay itself from the island of Khānderi; and his depredations injured the subordinate English agencies at Surat, Karwar, Tellicherry and Anjengo. Further trouble came from the Arab pirates of Muscat. Kānhoji's successors continued to be hostile. After some time the position improved; the English made a treaty of friendship with the *Peshwā* in 1739 after his conquest of Bassein. Bombay, however, was the weakest of the three Presidencies, though from the point of view of its fortifications it was superior to both Madras and Calcutta. The destruction of the Angria power and the storming of their fortress Vijayadurg (Gheria) in alliance with the *Peshwā* were effected in 1756. Thus only gradually did the English free themselves from every one of the dangers that beset them, viz., the Angria power, the Sidis, oppressive control of the Mughuls which now disappeared from Gujarāt after 1737, and the *Peshwās* who were now befriended.

Already the effect of European trade was seen in the smothering of the Indian hold on trade and shipping. The local carrying and foreign trade slipped more and more from Indian hands and the loss became steadily greater. It was more marked in the field of foreign trade. The Dutch were the first to enforce the most thorough-going action in this field. But the English quickly followed and outpaced them. The growth of the Company's trade and shipping while having an adverse effect on Indian shipping and trade, strengthened largely the mercantile marine of England.⁹

II. *French Fortunes down to 1746:*

After the death of Martin, Pondicherry deteriorated. Chevalier Hebert who was Governor in the years 1708-13 and 1715-18, strove to raise funds and improve trade. He invited prominent Indian merchants from Madras to settle at Pondicherry. Among these was Tiruvengadam Pillai who laid the basis for the influence and power which his famous son, Ananda Ranga was to enjoy later as Dubāsh and Courtier. Lenoir, during his first governorship (1721-23) built up French credit with the Indian merchants despite lack of a regular supply of goods and bullion from home. In his time the commerce of Pondicherry began to revive rapidly.

Lenoir was Governor for the second time for nine years (1726-35), and further increased the prosperity of Pondicherry.¹⁰ His successor, Benoit, enlarged French influence and secured for it considerable political power. It was during his time that Karikal¹¹ was acquired and the bonds of French friendship with the rulers of the Karnāṭak were strengthened.

In the face of the Marāthā invasion of 1740 Dumas offered a refuge to the families both of Safdar 'Ali and of Chandā Sāhib within the walls of Pondicherry and defied boldly the Marāthā demand for their surrender, for which he got the personal title of Nawāb and the rank of *Mansabdār* of 4,500 horse.

Dupleix who succeeded Dumas perceived that the affairs of the Karnāṭak were rapidly drifting into anarchy and determined that Pondicherry should be strengthened against possible attacks by Indian powers or European rivals. He was convinced that in the event of an attack by an European power, the reputation and the position of the French would depend much upon the Indian estimate of the French power and therefore he strove hard to gain the esteem of the Indian rulers. While he carried out the orders of the Directors to reduce expenditure, he ignored their instructions to stop all further fortifications of Pondicherry which he completed with moneys from his private purse.

At the outbreak of the war in Europe between England and France (March 1744) the English and the French Companies were in possession of about equal power and equal extent of territory. But the advantage really lay on the English side, in respect of financial stability, commercial prosperity and material resources. Both were suffering from a chronic lack of resources and were bitterly jealous of each other. Each attributed its failure in commerce to its inability to maintain a strict trade monopoly between Europe and India due to the jealousy and opposition of the other. Both were unscrupulous in the methods of trade and diplomacy. Dupleix had, for the present, the idea of creating "power by means of native alliances and of making France a great power in India by the side of native powers." The English were, in a military sense, powerless, so far as their strength then stood to seriously injure their rivals, but expected that the European war would bring reinforcements.

As early as 1742 the French, fearing that hostilities might damage their power in India, had approached the English Government for a convention of neutrality between the two Companies. The

French Ministry was so sure of obtaining this convention that it ordered their Directors to instruct Dupleix to cut down expenditure and to stop the work of fortifying Pondicherry which was going on. On the other hand, the English who were then eager for war, rejected the French offer and despatched a naval squadron under Commodore Barnett to intercept and capture French vessels in the eastern seas and to help the English in crippling French commerce in South India. Dupleix now tried every possible means to bring about a convention of neutrality as between Pondicherry and Madras; but Morse refused to agree. Dupleix's alternative hope was that La Bourdonnais, the enterprising Governor of Mauritius and Bourbon who had provided himself with a fleet of cruisers and aimed at a dash on the English settlements, might come to his help. But this hope ended also in disappointment, as La Bourdonnais was just then ordered to send his ships to France. Dupleix, however, was not daunted. He appealed to Nawāb Anwar-ud-din to prohibit the English from attacking the French within his jurisdiction. The Nawāb sent a letter to the English Governor that the English would be punished for any injury that they might inflict on the French; and in answer to Morse's protest that he had imperative orders from England to attack the French, the Nawāb replied that it was the duty of the English as settlers on the Coromandel Coast to obey his commands (July 1745).¹² Consequently Commodore Barnett who had reached the coast had to sail away without attacking Pondicherry which he could have easily captured. Meanwhile La Bourdonnais had managed to fit out another squadron at the Islands with which he reached the Coromandel Coast in July 1746. He met the English fleet under Peyton (who had succeeded Barnett) off Negapatam in an indecisive engagement. Peyton thereupon made for Trincomalee to repair his ships, and La Bourdonnais reached Pondicherry. In August he again encountered the English squadron near Negapatam, but Peyton refused action under the impression that the French ships had a heavier complement of guns, and made for Pulicat, from where though he learnt that Madras was about to be attacked by the French squadron, he quickly sailed for Bengal. The urgent appeal of Governor Morse to him came too late and Peyton escaped it by the haste of his departure.

III. *The Anglo-French Struggle: First Phase (1746-1749):*

From the arrival of La Bourdonnais on the coast the commencement of the actual struggle between the English and the French in India may be reckoned.¹³ La Bourdonnais made Pondicherry safe for the time; his fleet commanded the whole coast, while Madras was

unprotected. Morse promptly claimed the protection of the Nawāb which he had promised to extend to the English in such a contingency.

But the Nawāb gave no definite answer to the English appeal and was wavering in mind; nor would he order the French not to attack the English territories in his province. But Dupleix and La Bourdonnais had all along regarded the capture of Madras as the certain fruit of a decisive French victory at sea; and both regarded it as a certainty from the moment of the retirement of the English squadron. La Bourdonnais' fleet, supplied with additional guns, ammunition and men from Pondicherry, appeared in the roads of Madras in the middle of September 1746. The French erected batteries, and after a short bombardment received the surrender of the Fort from the English (September 21). Now began a bitter quarrel between the two French leaders as to the disposal of the captured place.¹⁴

The real facts of the case seem to be something like this. As soon as Dupleix received La Bourdonnais' first letter announcing the capture of Madras, he was overjoyed. La Bourdonnais himself was at first disposed to be guided by his advice and said that he had some discussion with the English regarding the ransom of Madras, but had entered into no definite agreement with them as yet. Dupleix had resolved from the very first that all discussion about ransom should be abandoned; he claimed that he had supreme authority as Governor-General of French India to decide the fate of Madras, and that La Bourdonnais was subject to his authority. Dupleix pleaded at length with La Bourdonnais, how, with Madras in French hands, Fort St. David could not long resist capture, and it would be easy to capture even the settlement of Calcutta. Further he argued that if Madras were restored to the English for a ransom, the latter as soon as their fleet should return, would try to capture Pondicherry itself. La Bourdonnais, partly unwilling to submit to Dupleix's authority and also because he might have received a private present from the English, declared that he had already pledged his word for a ransom, hastily concluded an agreement for the French evacuation of Madras by January 1747, and left the coast soon after.¹⁵

Dupleix was unshaken in his determination to retain Madras and treated the English at Madras as prisoners of war. But he had lost the help of the fleet, while the Nawāb held that his action was but a trick to cheat him out of Madras. He sent a strong force under his eldest son Mahfuz Khān to wrest Madras from the unfaithful French. The details of the battle¹⁶ of Adyar river between Mahfuz

Khān and Paradis, are told at length in the *Private Diary* of Ānanda Ranga Pillai. The French fire was too hot and quick for the Muhammadans.

Dupleix, now free from all immediate danger on the Nawāb's side, was emboldened to proceed to the attack of Fort St. David, the only remaining possession of the English on the coast. He had already directed two futile attempts on the fort before March 1747. Now Admiral Griffin arrived with a powerful British squadron on the coast, saved Fort St. David for the time, and in a short while, closed the seas to all French trade. Each succeeding attempt of Dupleix to capture Fort St. David angered the Nawāb against him more and more; and each failure increased the deadlock of the struggle. Though the French enjoyed military superiority, they had to garrison Fort St. George, in addition to Pondicherry and Karikal, and could not get provisions and other things by sea. In January 1748 Dupleix personally commanded the third expedition against Fort St. David; but it fared no better than the previous ones, since an English squadron approached the coast. For some months the deadlock continued; in June a French fleet reached the coast and Dupleix launched yet another attack on Fort St. David at a time when the English fleet was away. The attempt could have succeeded, but for the skill of Major Lawrence who had assumed command of the English garrison and forced the French to retreat. In the meantime an English fleet under Admiral Boscawen reached the coast in July, with the definite aim of reducing Pondicherry before the rains should set in. But as the English fleet had been long expected and as Dupleix had taken measures to strengthen his fortifications, the English attack could make no impression and had to be withdrawn with considerable loss through sickness and lack of caution. Dupleix's reputation stood greatly enhanced after this set-back for the English.

News of the conclusion of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle reached India when Dupleix, much elated by his late success, began to plan yet another attack on Fort St. David. There was mutual exchange of prisoners and places taken in the war. The English got back Madras and the French, Cape Breton Island in North America. Thus closed the first phase of the Anglo-French struggle.¹⁷

IV. *The Renewal of the Struggle—The War down to the recall of Dupleix (1749-1754):*

The temptations which prompted both the English and the French to interfere in the politics of the Indian powers were very

strong and not easily resisted. The English were the first to move. Shāhūji, the exile Rājā of Tanjore, had offered to cede to them the port Devikottai at the mouth of the Coleroon and to pay their expenses, though Pratāp Singh, the actual ruler, had been in correspondence with them and they had courted his assistance as against the French. The expedition which they sent against Devikottai failed. But a second one succeeded. The English thus secured the reward without performing their part of the bargain. When Pratāp Singh promised to confirm the English in their new possession, the latter not only renounced the cause of Shāhūji but agreed to keep him in confinement in Madras. Comment on this action is needless.¹⁸

On the death of the aged Nizām-ul-Mulk in June 1748, his second son Nāsir Jang, who had been for the greater part in the Deccan and had acted for his father, promptly seized the treasury and assumed the powers and title of *subāhdar* of the Deccan. But a favourite grandson of Asaf Jāh, Muzaffar Jang by name, who had been governor of Adoni and Bijāpur for some years, claimed the *subāhdari* on the ground that his grandfather had nominated him his successor by a will.

Affairs were also taking a serious turn in the Karnāṭak. Dupleix had clearly seen that Anwar-ud-din was not to be depended upon as a firm ally and was disinclined to value or solicit European aid. The name of Sa'adatullah Khān was still popular and the members of the Nawāyat group to which he belonged were still in control of numerous strong forts. Chandā Sāhib had been till recently prisoner of the Marāthās in the Deccan. His wife and family had been sheltered at Pondicherry since 1740, and through them Dupleix had maintained a close correspondence with him. Largely through his good offices, Chandā Sāhib was liberated in the early part of 1748 and even furnished with some Marāthā troops. After some movements in which his help was solicited by both the rulers of Chitaldurg and Bidnur and he lost his eldest son Abid Sāhib in the battle of Myconda, he contrived, according to Orme, in obtaining a complete victory for his Chitaldurg ally and raised a force of 6,000 men. Chandā Sāhib then joined Muzaffar Jang and persuaded his ally to venture upon the claim to Hyderabad. Early in 1749, French negotiations with Chandā Sāhib were complete, by which French help was promised to him in his plan of attack against Anwar-ud-din.¹⁹ Chandā Sāhib persuaded Muzaffar Jang to begin their combined operations in the Karnāṭak where the former's influence would be of great help to the latter. In June 1749 they moved together towards the Karnāṭak and were joined by a small French force. Anwar-ud-din

was now thoroughly alarmed and tried to prevent their entry into the Payen Ghāt or lower Karnāṭak country. At Ambur, 50 miles to the west of Arcot, Anwar-ud-din was defeated and slain, the defeat having been due to the treachery of Husain Khān Tāhir, the *Jāgīrdār* of Ambur. Mahfuz Khān, the elder son of the Nawāb, was made prisoner and the younger, Muhammad 'Ali, escaped to Trichinopoly, of which he was the governor (August 1749). The victors entered Arcot in triumph and Chandā Sāhib was formally installed as the Nawāb of the Karnāṭak by Muzaffar Jang. After spending some time in receiving the homage of their vassals, the victors proceeded to Pondicherry where they indulged in a round of festivities; and Chandā Sāhib made a grant to the French of eighty villages in the vicinity of Pondicherry, while Muzaffar Jang declared his intention of giving the districts round Masulipatam to them as soon as his authority should be established in that quarter. Dupleix urged that the victors should advance without the least delay against Trichinopoly and drive Muhammad 'Ali out of the place. But when Muzaffar Jang and Chandā Sāhib actually set out from Pondicherry in December 1749, they turned towards Udaiyarpalayam and Tanjore where they expected large contributions which would relieve them from their intense financial embarrassments. At Tanjore their doings were not fruitful; the Rajā procrastinated, Muzaffar Jang was not amenable to the directions of either Dupleix or of Chandā Sāhib and suddenly news reached that Nāsir Jang was fairly well on his march into the Karnāṭak with a huge army. When the latter reached Chengamah in March 1750 Chandā Sāhib retreated in haste from Tanjore across the Coleroon, dragging Muzaffar Jang along with him and exposed him to stray attacks from the Marāthā adventurer, Murār Rāo of Gooty. Even when protected by the guns of Pondicherry, Muzaffar Jang was restive and surrendered to his uncle Nāsir Jang and was kept a captive. The French troops who were to help Chandā Sāhib refused to continue in camp on account of some grievances.

In the meantime, the English were not idle. Madras was restored to them in August, 1749, and all its old inhabitants whom Dupleix had tried in vain to seduce to Pondicherry, readily returned to it. After the battle of Ambur, Dupleix had tried to secure San Thomé which would serve as a standing check on Madras, but the English cleverly forestalled him by seizing the place by virtue of a grant made to them from Muhammad 'Ali. They sent troops to help their ally at Trichinopoly.²⁰

The actual entrance of Nāsir Jang in the Karnāṭak was preceded by the rush of Marāthā horsemen under Murār Rāo. Chandā

Sāhib aimed at avoiding encounter with the huge army of Nāsir Jang and hoped it would eat up the resources of the country and then withdrew. In spite of the retreat of the French commander D'Auteuil to Pondicherry when Nāsir Jang advanced near it, and of Muzaffar Jang's surrender to his uncle, Chandā Sāhib continued unshaken in his loyalty to Dupleix who was not at all disheartened and kept up high pretensions in his negotiations with Nāsir Jang insisting that, as a necessary condition to any peace, Nāsir Jang should recognise Chandā Sāhib as the rightful Nawāb of the Karnātak and no member of the family of Anwar-ud-din should be appointed Nawāb (March-April 1750). When negotiations broke off, Dupleix resorted to intrigue and undermined by bribes and other inducements, the loyalty of the Pathān Nawābs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savanur; and the court of the Nizām was split into two factions, of which the pro-French one was headed by Shāh Nawāz Khān and his crafty *Peshkar*, Rāmdās Pandit.

Captain Cope who assisted Muhammad 'Ali, fought an indecisive action with the French who did not fail to profit by the indolence into which Nāsir Jang fell. In July Dupleix sent some French troops to Masulipatam and occupied it. He followed up this success by the capture of the temple fortress of Tiruviti from which Muhammad 'Ali had to flee to Jinjī, where his troops reassembled. A small French force under D'Auteuil and Bussy then advanced against Jinjī; and their assault and capture of the place in the course of a night attack greatly raised their fame.²¹ These exploits, besides raising the reputation of the French, roused Nāsir Jang from his fancied security. The latter marched from Arcot whither he had retired towards Jinjī; but as the monsoon set in, his movements became difficult, and his army suffered from scarcity and sickness. In these circumstances, he opened negotiations with Dupleix, who insisted as before, upon the recognition of Chandā Sāhib as the rightful Nawāb, the liberation of Muzaffar Jang and the cession of Masulipatam and Jinjī to the French. During the progress of these negotiations, Dupleix had time to enter more fully into intrigue with the treacherous Pathān Nawābs. Before Nāsir Jang had time to make new proposals, the French commandant of Jinjī advanced in his unwieldy and sprawling camp. In the midst of the confusion, Nāsir Jang was shot dead through the heart by one of the Nawābs and Muzaffar Jang was released from prison and promptly elevated to the throne. Chandā Sāhib, on hearing of this revolution, hastened to Pondicherry where he and Dupleix embraced 'like two friends, escaped from shipwreck.' (December, 1750).²²

Dupleix had now attained the summit of his ambition. The Karnāṭak was in a manner his own and the Deccan was under his influence. Two days after his elevation to the *masnad* of the Deccan Muzaffar Jang was received at Pondicherry with acclamation, confirmed Chandā Sāhib in the Nawābship of the Karnāṭak and appointed Dupleix to be his representative in the whole of the country up to the south of Krishnā. Muhammad 'Ali's hold on Trichinopoly, to which he had escaped from the camp of Nāsir Jang, was the only obstacle to Dupleix. He had been negotiating that Dupleix would persuade Muzaffar Jang to give him a governorship in any other part of his dominions, as the condition of his surrender of the place. This point was the height of the ascendancy of the French power in India.

Muzaffar Jang left Pondicherry for his capital in January 1751 and was accompanied by a French force under Bussy on whom his hopes of secure power and even personal safety depended. He had scarcely traversed some distance from Pondicherry when the Pathān Nawābs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savanur who were discontented with their share of the spoils raised a *mélée* in the Cuddapah district in the course of which Muzaffar Jang was cut to pieces. In the confusion Bussy persuaded the nobles to agree to the choice of Salābat Jang, one of the surviving sons of Nizām-ul-Mulk, who promptly confirmed the French in all their privileges.

Now the English perceived the gravity of their situation. Saunders, the English Governor of Madras, despatched a body of English troops and sepoys under Captain Cope to Muhammad 'Ali's assistance. The latter, taking courage, had broken off all negotiations with the enemy, and when Chandā Sāhib, after receiving the submission of the chiefs to the north of the Coleroon, prepared to march against Trichinopoly in person, the English sent an additional contingent to Trichinopoly, which, after a surprise attack at the hands of the French near Valikandapuram, reached Muhammad 'Ali with great difficulty (July 1751).

The operations round Trichinopoly which now commenced and lasted for nearly three years, were very complicated. They are narrated in great detail and with splendid animation by the contemporary historian, Robert Orme.

Chandā Sāhib and the French occupied the island of Srirangam, drove the English from the fortress of Koiladi and encamped on the south bank of the Kāveri to the east of Trichinopoly. The English were twice reinforced, but the enemy troops were far more numerous

and there were no deceiving operations for some time. Meanwhile the diversion on Arcot was planned. Muhammad 'Ali, to whom the credit for this suggestion should really go, had been of the view that troops from Madras could take possession of several places in the Arcot country and thus compel the enemy to desist from marching. After the English reverse at Valikandapuram, Saunders appreciated the value of the Nawāb's proposals. But still he doubted whether even the combined forces of the English and Muhammad 'Ali, even if they should take Arcot, might be strong enough to keep it and collect the tributes from the poligars without considerably diminishing the garrison at Trichinopoly and thereby facilitating the enemy. Muhammad 'Ali strongly urged his plan and Saunders entrusted Clive, who now came into prominence, with the task of the capture of Arcot.

The capture of Arcot by Clive²³ (August 1751) assisted by the Nawāb's troops did not make any impression on Dupleix who believed that the place could be easily retaken. The subsequent siege of Arcot by Razā Sāhib, assisted by French troops lasted 50 days. Murtazā 'Ali quarrelled, or pretended to quarrel with Rāzā Sāhib, while Murār Rāo definitely went over to the side of the English. On the 24th of November the enemy raised the siege and retreated—the event being deemed to be 'the turning point in the eastern career of the English'. Clive pursued the retreating enemy through Chettupattu to Jinjī. After a short stay at Fort St. George, he reassembled his troops as the enemy began to ravage the neighbourhood. In February 1752, Clive won the victory of Kaveripauk. Just then he was summoned to lead a body of troops to relieve Trichinopoly which was still besieged. He accompanied Major Lawrence who had assumed the command and reached the place by the end of March 1752. Muhammad 'Ali's chief reliance was on the help from Nanjarāj of Mysore. The accession of Mysore to his side was followed by that of the Rājā of Tanjore and of Murār Rāo. But all this was little avail so long as the French were superior in regular forces. Dupleix, anxious to retain the superiority, had strictly ordered Law, the French commander at Trichinopoly, to attack and intercept the advancing forces of Lawrence. But Law was unenterprising while Lawrence cleverly distracted his attention and by-passed him. Law now foolishly resolved to retreat into the island of Srirangam, which was within actual cannon-shot and could be cut off from all supplies and communication. Chandā Sāhib protested against this suicidal course; and Dupleix held it to be the worst piece of folly that Law could commit and urged him that if he should retreat at all, he should

march back on Pondicherry so as to allow reinforcements joining him at a distance from Lawrence's forces. Clive took up a strong position to the north of Srirangam and on the road to Pondicherry, with a view to cut off any reinforcements from Dupleix reaching Law. He also repulsed a surprise attack made on his position. Law's only hope of safety now lay in his conjunction with D'Auteuil who headed the convoy from Pondicherry. But Captain Dalton tricked D'Auteuil into the belief that the entire British army was advancing against him and forced him to retreat, leaving all his stores and ammunition in English hands.

The communications of the enemy were now completely cut off; and most of Chandā Sāhib's adherents now deserted him. He had frequently urged upon Law the necessity of their making a final effort to break away. But repeated failures had depressed his mind and undermined his health. He attempted to gain over the Tanjore general to his side, in the hope that the latter might aid his escape to Karikal. But when he surrendered, he was promptly imprisoned. Lawrence proposed that Chandā Sāhib should be given over to the English for safe custody; but the proposal was unacceptable to all his native allies, especially to Muhammad 'Ali. Ultimately Chandā Sāhib was killed, it is said, at the instigation of Muhammad 'Ali (June 1752).²⁴

Thus ended the French siege of Trichinopoly. No such blow had fallen on the French since they entered the field of Indian politics. Their ally, Chandā Sāhib, was no more, and their military prestige was vastly lowered. The triumph of the English was great; their representative, Muhammad 'Ali, was now the undisputed master of Trichinopoly. Bussy, the only capable general on the French side, was by the side of the Nizām far away from Pondicherry. Pondicherry itself had been denuded of its garrison; and Jinjī and other places in French possession were equally unprotected.

V. *French influence in the Deccan:*

But French influence in the Deccan continued to be in the ascendant. The events which followed Salābat Jang's elevation strengthened the French hold over him. Scarcely had he crossed the Krishnā on his march to his capital, when the *Peshwā* attacked his dominions, having come to a secret understanding with Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khān, the eldest son of Nizām-ul-Mulk who had hitherto remained at Delhi and now put forward a claim to his father's throne; but

domestic troubles forced the Marāthās to retire to Poona for the time. The threatened arrival of Ghāzi-ud-din, the possibility of a renewed Marāthā invasion and the spirit of disaffection which prevailed in the northern part of his dominions compelled Salābat to set off for Aurangābād where Bussy restored discipline among the troops and won, by his tact, the respect of the nobles. When the Marāthās renewed their invasion, Bussy pursued the war into the enemy country and defeated the retreating Marāthā troops very near Poona itself (December 1751). The Marāthās lost heavily and Bussy's fame resounded throughout the land. Rājā Rāmdās who was now in great power at the Nizām's court, was sincerely devoted to French interests and almost an agent of Dupleix; and Salābat Jang reconfirmed the cession to French of the territory round Masulipatam and conferred the government of Karnāṭak on Dupleix and his successor.

When Rājā Rāmdās was killed by assassins (7 April, 1752), Salābat Jang retreated to Ahmadnagar and submitted to an armistice and Bussy cleverly conciliated Sayyid Lashkar Khān, the new minister, who was inimical to the French. Within a few months Ghāzi-ud-din Khān appeared in person at Aurangābād armed with a grant from the titular Mughul emperor appointing him to be the Nizām. He was quickly joined by the *Peshwā*; and when his offer to Dupleix on condition that French assistance was to be withdrawn from Salābat Jang was refused, he gave a formal grant to Muhammad 'Ali of the Nawābship of the Karnāṭak. The contest between Nāsir Jang and Muzaffar Jang seemed now about to be repeated. But the situation was saved by the sudden death of Ghāzi-ud-din by poison.²⁵ Bussy, influential as ever, defeated Raghūjī Bhosle of Berār who was ravaging the northern districts and came to an understanding with the *Peshwā* and Bhosle at Bhalki (November 1752). As his reward, Bussy got the grant of an extensive district on the right bank of the Krishnā, which he immediately made over to his nation. It was his wish to take Salābat Jang to the Karnāṭak where French affairs had badly deteriorated. But a sudden revolution at Hyderabad where Sayyid Lashkar Khān contrived to take advantage of Bussy's retirement to Masulipatam for recouping his health, scattered the French troops in different parts and induced Salābat Jang to dismiss his French bodyguard and even enter into an active correspondence with the English.

Dupleix saw the seriousness of the situation, directed Bussy to proceed forthwith to Hyderabad and learnt with satisfaction that the latter had succeeded in overawing his enemies and in making Sayyid Lashkar Khān, the new minister, to submit to a settlement.²⁶

The French occupation of the Northern Sarkārs was not entirely peaceful. The local Muhammadan governor and the powerful Rājā of Vizianagaram were subdued only after great difficulty. Meanwhile Bussy was engaged in various punitive campaigns in order to reduce the half-independent *zamindārs* and hill-chiefs of the interior. He also adjusted several disputes which had arisen between Salābat Jang and the Rājā of Mysore and Murār Rao.

To revert to the Karnāṭak affairs: Lawrence thought that he had nothing more to do, now that Chandā Sāhib had disappeared, than to put Muhammad 'Ali in possession of all his territories. But he soon perceived that serious dissensions had arisen between the Nawāb and his other allies, the Mysoreans and the Tanjoreans. Nanjarāj, the Mysore general, demanded the cession of Trichinopoly and its dependencies to himself, while the astute Murār Rāo, offering to mediate between the Nawāb and the Dalwāi, only made the breach wider. The Nawāb protracted negotiations and the Dalwāi tried to persuade Lawrence to return to Madras, because on the English departing, he could easily secure Trichinopoly either by force or fraud.

Dupleix now got some reinforcements and profiting by these dissensions, audaciously claimed the right to act in the name of Salābat Jang, and even proclaimed Rāzā Sāhib, the son of Chandā Sāhib, to be the rightful Nawāb of the Karnāṭak. An English attempt to reduce Jinjī was repulsed; and elated by this success, Dupleix sent a force to march against Fort St. David, which was however compelled to retreat. Lawrence refrained from an actual violation of French territory, observing the rules of war then in force, but contrived to induce the French to come out of Pondicherry and severely defeated them at Bahur (near Pondicherry). Clive reduced the forts of Covelong and Chingleput and then retired on sick leave to England; and Lawrence went back to Fort St. David for the monsoon season.

Meanwhile Dupleix reopened negotiations with the Mysore Dalwāi and persuaded Murār Rāo²⁷ to join him openly. In December, 1752, the Madras Council declared Nanjarāj to have become an open enemy. After a few skirmishes the English were compelled, on account of their poor strength, to remain on the defensive; while the Mysoreans began so close a blockade of Trichinopoly, that when Lawrence proceeded to its relief early in 1753, he had to remain inactive for some time, and his supplies from the friendly Rājā of Pudukottah were attempted to be cut off by Astruc, the astute French commander.²⁸

In other parts of Karnāṭak also, affairs were moving badly for the English. Tiruviti fort to the west of Cuddalore, fell into French hands. Tiruvannamalai was threatened by them and Muhammad 'Ali's troops were driven from Arcot and Dupleix sent a strong reinforcement to Astruc which rendered the position of Lawrence most perilous. The latter however launched an unexpected attack against a strong rock position which struck the French with panic and created dissensions between them and their allies. He also gained the Rājā of Tanjore over to his side and got reinforcements from Fort St. David, and in a few days was able to inflict a second defeat on the enemy, following it by driving the French out of an entrenched position. When Astruc retook the command, Lawrence again launched a sudden attack on the French position, dispersed their allies and took Astruc himself prisoner. But Dupleix sent every available soldier to Srirangam where the French were then encamped, and in a sense of over-confidence, they attempted to storm the fort, but only exposed themselves to a severe and devastating fire. This success saved Trichinopoly from the most serious danger that had befallen it during the course of the war (November 1753) and Captain Dalton, "the hero and defender of Trichinopoly", beat up the Mysore camp and expelled from the city all Mysoreans. (Letter from Lt. J. Harrison, dated 13 December, 1753—in Orme, MSS, India III, 26).

The acute part of the struggle was now over. But though Lawrence could defeat the French in the field, he could not drive them away being deficient in cavalry. On the other side, Dupleix also was at the end of his resources. In the beginning of January 1754, commissioners from Madras and Pondicherry met at the Dutch settlement of Sadras to adjust the claims of the English and Muhammad 'Ali as against those of Salābat Jang and the French. But the basic demands of the two parties were quite irreconcilable with each other from the outset.²⁹

At the same time the English negotiated with the Mysoreans. Lawrence continued on the defensive trying to secure supplies from Tanjore and Pudukottai. In the course of these operations Lawrence was helped by a brave Indian soldier, Muhammad Yusuf Khān, who was the captain of the sepoy in the English service and later became the Nawāb's governor of Madurā and Tinnevely. At last the French, disheartened by their repeated failures, attempted to destroy the dam across the Kāveri river on which the prosperity of the kingdom of Tanjore depended. This act threw the Rājā of Tanjore firmly into English hands. But before a decisive struggle could be fought, the rains had begun and operations had to be suspended.

Lawrence retired to winter quarters; and about the same time a strong English fleet under Admiral Watson reached Madras. Immediately afterwards, news was received of the recall of Dupleix and of the conclusion of a truce preparatory to a final peace between the two Companies.³⁰

VI. *Events down to the advent of Lally (1754-58):*

Before his departure from Pondicherry, Dupleix gave Godeheu, his successor, a detailed account of the military operations in progress and advised him to maintain Bussy at the Nizām's court to strengthen the French hold over the Northern Sarkārs, to push on vigorously the operations against Trichinopoly and to send there the reinforcements that came along with him before the expected arrival of Admiral Watson. Godeheu gave no indication of the course that he intended to pursue. The provisional treaty of January 1755 between himself and the English Governor declared that both the Companies should renounce all Indian governments and dignities and not interfere in the disputes of the Indian powers; and both parties should restrain their native allies from carrying on the war. No mention was made of Muhammad 'Ali and not a single reference was there as to the pretensions of Dupleix to the rulership of the Karnāṭak.

Dupleix declared that Godeheu signed away in this treaty "the ruin of the country and the dishonour of the nation" and held that when Godeheu landed at Pondicherry in August 1754, French affairs had already taken a turn for the better. Even Cultru, a recent French exponent of Dupleix's genius and work, leans to this view. Godeheu himself found "on his arrival the greatest confusion, the army clamouring for pay, and the treasury empty" and was convinced that it would be folly to continue the war. The Pondicherry Council wrote to Paris immediately after the provisional treaty of January 1755 that nothing more fortunate could have happened to the French. The English were also of the same opinion. They held that the peace was unduly favourable to the enemy. Admiral Watson loudly declared that the treaty tied his hands and robbed the English of further victory. Edward Ives, who came to India with Watson's fleet in the latter part of 1754 wrote thus: "The peace was by all deemed to have been a masterly stroke of French politics."^{30a} Orme, the contemporary historian of the Anglo-French Wars, is also of the same opinion; and he wrote that the English were obliged to conclude "a truce on such precarious and unequal terms as would enable the French to recommence the war with double strength if

the conditional treaty were not accepted by their ministry in Europe." It must also be remembered that Godeheu at first stood out for higher terms, and it was only after the arrival of Watson's fleet with a strong force on board that he came down in his demands. It is also a mistake to suppose that the peace was in any sense humiliating to the French or deprived them of their possessions and power to an undue extent. "Godeheu fully appreciated the work of Bussy, who himself had no illusions as to the critical position of affairs; and in spite of the clause against interference in native politics, the latter was left undisturbed at Hyderabad. Finally the peace was only provisional and required ratification, which never came, for the outbreak of the Seven Years' War occurred before the decision of the home authorities was known. Therefore, even the slight territorial changes suggested in the draft treaty were never made.... and it was the outbreak of hostilities in 1756, and not Godeheu's treaty which ruined the French settlements in India."

An enthusiastic French admirer of Dupleix says that "the English have charged themselves to prove to the world that Dupleix was no dreamer and that his plans were never chimerical; on the contrary the English themselves have adopted them; they were his disciples."

Opposed to this view is the reverse side of the picture, which paints Dupleix in comparatively dark colours. Thornton, the eminent historian of British India, declares that in Dupleix's character, ambition, vanity and duplicity formed predominant elements. His ambition was that of a man who aspires to sudden greatness. His vanity was well-known to his contemporaries; and his duplicity was carried in some instances to a very bad extent. Major Lawrence wrote of him a few months before his departure, that "he neither values men nor money, nor anything but what can gratify his own ambition.... he talks not like the Governor of Pondicherry, but as the prince of the province." Dupleix treated the Directors and ministers at Paris as if they were persons of no importance at all. He withheld from them information as to the real state of affairs, informing them of his victories, but concealing from them his reverses.

Dupleix's policy was not so consistent and far seeing as has been alleged sometimes. His plans of an extended dominion and of the destruction of the English power are not traceable distinctly before 1746. With many splendid gifts he was defective in calm and plain judgment. His plans were boldly outlined and skilfully formed, but the course which he pursued was not cautious and definite.

His ostentatious parade of Mughul dignities and of sovereign power and his intrigues with the Indian princes were blunders, because a European governor ought to rule on European principles and by European forms.

Yet in spite of his many defects and his final failure, Dupleix is a striking and brilliant figure in Indian history. The mature judgment of Elphinstone pays a warm tribute to the memory of the great French Governor thus: "We look with admiration on the founder of the European ascendancy in India, to whose genius the mighty changes which are now working in Asia owe their being; the first who made an extensive use of disciplined sepoys; the first who quit-
ted the ports on the sea and marched an army into the heart of the continent; the first above all, who discovered the illusion of the Mughal greatness, and turned to his own purposes the phantom." (*The Rise of the British Power in the East*, pp. 226-27).

Soon after the conclusion of the Treaty both parties began to regard it as a mere truce, and while pretending to adhere to its provisions, each tried to secure for himself special advantages, the French in the Deccan and the English in the districts of Madurā and Tinnevely where by subduing the poligars for their Nawāb, they hoped to gain financial benefit. Godeheu and Saunders left India soon after the peace; and De Leyrit, the new Governor of Pondicherry, was soon convinced that a further war with the English was inevitable.

When news of the outbreak of the Seven Years' War reached India towards the end of 1756, De Leyrit learnt that France was preparing to send a powerful armament and sent all available troops against Trichinopoly which was then but weakly garrisoned. The French contrived to occupy several strong positions to the east and south of the city. But a relieving English force under Caillaud entered Trichinopoly cleverly and forced the French to retreat to Pondicherry (June 1757). After this the French concentrated all their forces on the relief of Wandiwash fort which was then threatened by the English. They followed up this operation by capturing Tiruvannamalai and several neighbouring forts. When Lally landed at Pondicherry in April 1758, the situation had veered round definitely to the advantage of the French. All the strong forts of the Karnāṭak with the exception of Arcot, Vellore, Conjeevaram and Chingleput were in their hands. The English forces were shut up in Trichinopoly; they had to garrison Madras and Fort St. David and their available troops had been despatched in the previous year to

Bengal, while the fleet under Watson was in the Hughli. For the moment, on the Coromandel Coast the French were not only masters on the land, but were also supreme at sea up to the end of 1758.

VII. *Deccan affairs:*

Both De Leyrit and Godeheu maintained Bussy and the French contingent at the Nizām's court. But Dupleix's departure shook the confidence of the Nizām and his advisers in the strength of the French, and when Bussy announced to Salābat Jang the terms of the Treaty of Pondicherry, the latter significantly remarked: "You know that the state of my affairs necessarily demands the support of European power; on this condition I am able to govern. Either you must remain here or I must enlist the English in my interest." Bussy's prompt help to Salābat Jang who marched against Mysore for claiming all arrears of tribute, his success in protecting the country along the march from plunder and pillage and in bringing about peace with the Mysoreans, as well as the Marāthās who made a simultaneous attack, enabled French influence to continue unabated in 1755. In the next year Shāh Nawāz Khān and the anti-French party in the Deccan got the ears of Salābat Jang who was then staying at Aurangābād, turned his mind against the French and applied to the *Peshwā* for assistance in driving them out. The latter most readily accepted the invitation and cleverly made an offer to Bussy that he should enter the Marāthā service. Bussy, who was then at Masulipatam, made his way to Hyderabad where he determined upon the bold expedient of attacking the city itself and there standing on the defensive. The reinforcements sent to him in time from Masulipatam succeeded after much fighting into forcing their way to his camp. This bold stand of Bussy impressed the feeble mind of Salābat Jang. On the same day, when Bussy was joined by the reinforcements under Law, his rank and honour were fixed as high as before at a public *darbar* (August 1756). But he no longer experienced or retained that complete hold which he had hitherto enjoyed.³¹

Salābat Jang's reconciliation was chiefly due to the revolution in Bengal and the capture of Calcutta by Siraj-ud-daulah and the diversion to Bengal of the proposed English expedition. Bussy spent some months in the subjugation of the unsettled parts of the Northern Sarkārs. He made a triumphal progress through the country and met with no resistance at all, except at Bobbili where, at the instigation of the crafty Vijayarāma Rāju of Vijayanagaram, he put to the sword all the brave defenders.³² He secured Vizagapatam and

other settlements of the English in the Sarkārs. He was even tempted by Siraj-ud-daulah to march into Orissa and Bengal and help him against Clive who had arrived at Calcutta at the head of the avenging expedition. But he soon learnt that Clive had forestalled him, coerced the Nawāb into submission and taken by assault Chandranagur, the French settlement on the Hughli. He proceeded to attack the English establishments within the Sarkārs and captured all of them (1757).

While Bussy was thus occupied with the affairs of the Sarkārs, a conspiracy was formed against Salābat Jang by Shāh Nawāz Khān for raising Nizām 'Ali, his younger brother, to power and expelling the French with the assistance of the Marāthās. Bussy quickly marched to the rescue of his master. The presence of the French army and the personal influence of Bussy tore the conspiracy to shreds. Salābat Jang, who had been reduced to impotence, was restored to power, and Nizām 'Ali was forced to take refuge in flight (February 1758). Bussy succeeded in restoring some degree of order and stability in the state and returned in triumph to Hyderabad, where he received from Count de Lally, who had just then landed at Pondicherry, orders to return to the Karnāṭak with all his troops.

VIII. *Lally and the End of French dominion (1758-61):*

Count de Lally was descended from an Irish *émigré* family and had distinguished himself in the War of the Austrian Succession, and accompanied Prince Charles in the Rebellion of the Forty-five. He was a brave, conscientious and incorruptible soldier, but insolent, irritable and destitute of comprehension and extended vision. His voyage to India was protracted and attended by the loss of a good proportion of his men. But when he landed at Pondicherry in April 1758, the bulk of the English troops and their whole fleet were away in Bengal with no prospect of their speedy return. Only a portion of the English fleet returned from Bengal and met the French squadron that carried Lally's expedition, in an indecisive engagement near Cuddalore. Immediately after his landing, Lally marched a portion of his army against Fort St. David. He became impatient over the preparations for the expedition with De Leyrit and indiscriminately impressed many Indian inhabitants of Pondicherry. When the weak garrison of Fort St. David capitulated, after a short resistance, Lally was overjoyed and immediately despatched a detachment to Devikottai which also surrendered. It was expected that he would now turn to the capture of Madras whose Governor,

George Pigot, had appealed to Clive for reinforcements. But the latter was convinced that Lally could not take Madras as it was well supplied with provisions and declined to weaken his own position in the imminent crisis he had to face. Meanwhile Lally had quarrelled most violently with De Leyrit as he was unable to furnish him with money or means of transport, but found that he could do nothing except lose his temper. D'Aché, the French Admiral, was also obstructive. Lally resolved to march into the Tanjore country to enforce from its Rājā the payment of a bond executed by him in 1750 to Chandā Sāhib for 56 lakhs of rupees which had been handed over to Dupleix. He proceeded to Karikal, ravaged the country along his march to Tanjore, and after fruitless negotiations, began a regular siege of the fort. But after some days, on account of lack of ammunition and provisions, and because the English fleet now actually threatened Karikal, which was his base, he spiked his guns and retreated in haste to Pondicherry, closely followed and harassed by the enemy (July-August, 1758). D'Aché after fighting an indecisive engagement with the English, decided to quit the Coromandel Coast for Mauritius, against the united opinion of Lally and the Pondicherry Council. From this time (August 1758) the English had the undisputed command of the sea. In April 1759, D'Aché appeared again on the Coromandel Coast, but his stay was short, and after a feeble encounter with the English fleet, he quitted never to appear again.

Lally's ineffective entry into the Tanjore country discredited him very much. Another great mistake he committed was the recall of Bussy and Moracin, the Governor of the Northern Sarkārs, to join him with all their troops, leaving at Masulipatam only a small force under the capable Conflans.³³

A few days before the battle of Condore, Lally began the long-pending siege of Madras (December 12), which was defended by Colonel Lawrence and Colonel Draper under the invigorating inspiration of Pigot. The French occupied the Black Town to the north of the fort and indulged in a continuous cannonade of the fort for ten weeks. Meanwhile Caillaud, joined by Muhammad Yusuf and 'Abdul Wahāb Khān, repulsed a French force in the neighbourhood (December). When the English fleet under Admiral Pocock was sighted off the coast, Lally precipitately raised the siege and moved to Arcot which he had captured previously and wherein he was joined by Bussy and proclaimed Rāzā Sāhib as the rightful Nawāb.

The war in the Karnāṭak dragged on. The French troops became utterly demoralised. The garrisons in some forts even made

overtures to the enemy. After D'Aché's departure from the coast in April 1759, there was absolutely no hope of further reinforcements from France, while the estrangement between Lally and the Pondicherry Council grew rapidly worse. Kaveripauk was evacuated in July. But the English capitulated at Tyagadurg. Colonel Eyre Coote, now in command, resolved to strike a blow at the fort of Wandiwash which, with the exception of Arcot, was now the most important place. Lally made an attempt to recover it. In the battle which followed, Coote won a decisive victory, while Lally lost heavily in men and guns, Bussy himself being among the prisoners taken (January 1760).³⁴ The moral effect of the English victory was great. Lally was forced to fall back on Pondicherry with a demoralised army and disabled from attempting any operation in the open field. Coote followed up his victory by capturing most of the remaining fortresses in French hands, like Arcot, Tiruvannamalai, etc. Even Pondicherry would have fallen easily, but for the unexpected emergence of a new ally to Lally in the shape of Haidar 'Ali of Mysore.

Towards the end of August 1760 an English fleet appeared on the coast. With its co-operation, Coote proceeded to an active investment of Pondicherry. He soon captured all its outposts and instituted a strict blockade. After more than four months of desperate resistance, Lally, sick and worn out with despair and exhaustion, surrendered unconditionally (January 1761). The English ruthlessly demolished all the fortifications of the city. Tyagadurg and Jinjī, the two remaining fortresses of the French in the Karnāṭak speedily surrendered and Mahé was also reduced. By April 1761, not a single place remained to the French in India. They never recovered from the ruin into which they were plunged. The treaty of Paris restored to them Pondicherry and other settlements. But they were restored "dismantled and defenceless, with their trade annihilated, with their influence gone, with the curse of their defeat and failure stamped upon their habitations." The English had by this time, become dominant in Bengal and firmly rooted in the Karnāṭak. There were later attempts of the French made from time to time to regain their dominion till the era of Napoleonic wars. Financial weakness, slack trade, lack of sea-power and of protection against naval attack and communications with home, were the main causes of the defeat of the French. The English displayed a commendable military superiority and in all the phases of the struggle their fleet came to their rescue. Clive's services in the most critical situations of the struggle should be remembered. Bengal gave them after

1757 an invincible strength of force and an overwhelming superiority in finance.

NOTES

1. The Ostend Company's trade was vigorous during the few years that it lasted and it managed to pay good dividends to its shareholders. Its settlement at Bankibazar in Bengal was destroyed by the Nawāb at the instigation of the English and the Dutch.
2. The rule of Nawāb Sa'adatullāh as Nawāb (1710-32) is praised in the *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi* of Burhanuddin. (Pt. I, tr. by S. M. H. Nainar, 1934), p. 68.
3. Conflicting versions are given of the course of events that led to the extinction of the Nāyak line by the indigenous chronicles—that of Nārāyana Kone and the *Telugu History of Karnatak*, and by writers like Wilson (*The Pandian Chronicle*), Orme and Wilks.
4. Great uncertainty prevailed as to what the Marāthās would do. One view was that the Hindu chiefs and the Tanjore Rājā who assisted the Marāthās stipulated that Trichinopoly should not be left in Muslim hands. Both the English and French letters graphically describe the anarchy prevailing in the country and the poverty and impotence of Nawāb Safdar 'Ali. The adventurer, Murār Rāo, was left in charge of Trichinopoly till he was forced by Nizām-ul-Mulk to evacuate it in the latter part of 1743. The Marāthā campaign enabled Raghūji Bhosle to secure over the mind of Rājā Shāhū, as powerful a hold as that enjoyed by Bājī Rāo Peshwā himself.
5. The contemporary letter from Fort St. George (dated Sept. 5, 1744), absolved Anwar-ud-din from all share in the guilt though he had an idea of settling the succession to the Nawābship after himself in favour of his son Māhfuz Khān. It says that Murtāza 'Ali hired Pathāns to assassinate Anwar-ud-din also.
6. Paupaya the Younger, who was the Company's interpreter at Madras and who prepared a manuscript history of the Karnatak in 1749 (now preserved among the Orme Manuscripts in the India Office) held the rule of Anwar-ud-din in scanty estimation and declared that it was "the most spiritless, covetous, severe and unjust.... among all the late governors of the Carnatic." (Orme, MSS, Pt. II: India, Vol. I(2), pp. 5a-100 (1-50): *History of the Carnatic to 1749* by Paupa Bramin.
7. John Surman was accompanied on his mission by an Armenian, Khwāja Sarhad. The plan of the embassy was originally conceived by Governor Thomas Pitt of Madras. See *Diary of Messrs. Surman and Stephenson*, Pt. II in C. R. Wilson's *Early Annals of the English in Bengal*, Vol. II, ed. by W. Irwin, 1911.
8. For the Nawāb's relations with the English and other Europeans, see Chap. V of K. K. Datta's *Alivardi and His Times* (1939) based on the records and on the observations of Jean Law, Scrafton, Hill and others, and on the *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*.
9. "The constant depredations, frequent piracies, naval fights, sporadic hostilities of these Europeans amongst themselves and with the Asiatic powers, intimidated Indian merchants and shippers. A positive discouragement was the result of the stringent measures which were deliberately adopted, to monopolise, corner and control the purchase and sale of important merchandise, so that Indians and generally all Asiatics were excluded from every lucrative branch of the foreign trade of the country. Along with these are to be counted the great concessions of lower customs duties, freedom from transit dues, as well as from harassment and delay on the way at the numerous toll-houses. These three categories of causes narrowed down the activities of Indian merchants to the inland trade alone." Balakrishna, *Commercial Relations between India and England*, pp. 163-74.
10. He was able to transmit to Europe 31 lakhs of rupees of merchandise and carried out those improvements in the town which had been in contemplation from the time of Martin.
11. Karikal gave the French a port on the rich Tanjore coast.
12. In September 1745 the Nawāb made a state entry into Pondicherry and was royally received by Duplex.
13. This struggle lasted for about 16 years, from the French capture of Madras in 1746 down to the English capture of Pondicherry in 1761.

The whole course of the struggle may be divided into three periods. The first of these divisions lasted from the commencement of active hostilities in 1746 down to the conclusion of the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748, which restored, for both the combatants, the conditions existing before the war. The second period began almost immediately after the conclusion of the treaty and was terminated by the Treaty of Pondicherry in 1754. This period saw the contest waged in another form, that of an indirect struggle in which both the nations, nominally at peace in Europe, were allies of warring native powers, but scarcely less vital. It ended with the French Company's recall of Dupleix and its attempt to reverse his policy. The third stage began with the declaration of the Seven Years' War in Europe in 1756 and lasted until the final destruction of French power in 1761.

14. Early English historians were inclined to exonerate La Bourdonnais from all blame; afterwards opinion changed and Dupleix was praised, and La Bourdonnais blamed as the chief cause of the quarrel. Truth lies probably in a middle course—See for a detailed discussion—Misunderstandings between Dupleix and La Bourdonnais, pp. 32-37 of C.S. Srinivasachari's *Ananda Ranga Pillai: The Pepys of French India* (1940).
15. One reason that he assigned for his hasty departure was that the north-east monsoon rains were approaching and had already damaged some of his ships. La Bourdonnais had studied the memorandum and plan prepared by Paradis, who had made a secret visit to Madras under instruction of Dupleix and he had early explained his project to capture the place when war should be declared. He found the plan of Paradis feasible even before his earlier return from the coast to Mauritius after re-establishing the French Factory at Mahe. Dupleix himself had had Madras once more thoroughly inspected and produced a plan of the place from his step-daughter, who had married an Englishman. (G. W. Forrest: *The Siege of Madras in 1745 and the Action of La Bourdonnais* 1908).
16. The battle is regarded by Malleson as a most memorable one. The same significance was expressed by Dupleix himself in his own *Memoires*. It reversed the relative position of the Nawāb and the French; and every subsequent battle of the Europeans with the Indians was half won even before it was fought.
17. The European treaty made a direct attempt to place the English and French Companies in India in the positions which they occupied before the war, and to persuade the rivals to settle down peacefully to commerce.

It is of course true that the French had the best of it in the late war. Their capture of Madras, their victory over Māhfuz Khān and their successful defence of Pondicherry raised their military prestige. Dupleix had trained on the European model a considerable number of spoys, and his political ambition now soared higher than ever.

18. For the identification of the Tanjore pretender, see Note 18, pp. 93-95 of *Ananda Ranga Pillai: The Pepys of French India*.
19. Dupleix's close attachment to Chandā Sāhib through all the vicissitudes of his fortune, is a well rooted idea, but must be modified in the light of facts.
20. In fact, the English learnt Dupleix's lesson with greater promptness than they have usually been credited with. They saw at a glance the advantages which would accrue to the French from the establishment of a French Nawāb. They also saw the advantages that the English would obtain if they assisted in the overthrow of the usurper (Chandā Sāhib) The English governor sent help to Muhammad 'Ali, confident that at Nāsir Jang's coming, the rebellion (of Chandā Sāhib and Muzaffar Jang) would collapse with hardly a struggle.... They did all in their power to hasten the coming of Nāsir Jang.... When Nāsir Jang at last arrived in the Karnatak they sent Lawrence to join him with a body of troops. (*Anand Ranga Pillai's Diary*, Vol. VI; *Dodwell's Introduction*, pp. xvii and xviii).

For the English seizure of San Thomé, see Extract from Despatch from Fort St. David, October 18, 1749, in Vol. II of Forrest's *Bengal and Madras Papers* (1688-1757).

21. Orme, *Hindustan* (Vol. I. pp. 151-52); and A. Martineau's *Dupleix et l'Inde Française*, Vol. III, 1749-54, pp. 134-38.
22. A. Lehuraux's *La découverte de Dupleix Fathabad* (1944) on the place of Nāsir Jang's death.

23. See *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XIV, pp. 545 et seq: (Nawāb Muhammad 'Ali and the Siege of Arcot by C. S. S. Chari); and *The Proceedings of the All India Modern History Congress*, Poona, 1956, Pt. II, pp. 10-23; also Percival Spear, *Master of Bengal*, (1975), pp. 50-51.
24. Fort St. George, *Diary and Consultation Book—Military Department*, 1752, pp. 51; *Tuzuk-i-Walajahi*, Vol. I; Orme, Vol. I, pp. 236-42 and Wilks, Vol. I, p. 177; also R. C. Cambridge, *War on the coast of Coromandel*, 1761, p. 28.
25. *Madras Military Consultations*, 1752, p. 41. The date of his death is 16 October, 1752.
26. The settlement was: (1) that four districts near Masulipatam should be assigned to the French for the maintenance of their army; (2) the Nizām's person should be protected by a French bodyguard; (3) the Nizām should, in no way, interfere with the Karnatak, and (4) all the affairs of the state should be carried on with Bussy's advice. The districts newly ceded to the French together with those already possessed by them, were known as the Northern Sarkārs, and extended from Guntur to the neighbourhood of the Chilka Lake. They were about 450 miles long and varied in breadth from about 30 to 80 miles and possessed an area of 17,000 sq. miles. Their situation made them very convenient to an European power and they contained a population of three million and yielded an annual revenue of over half a million pounds sterling. Moreover they were protected on the interior by natural barriers of jungles and mountains.
27. Martineau, *Dupleix et l'Inde Francaise*, Vol. III, pp. 308-09 and p. 310.
28. Martineau writes that "it is not to be doubted that Dupleix was thinking of Trichinopoly on his own account, if chance should favour him."
29. The English insisted as a preliminary basis for negotiations that Muhammad 'Ali should be recognised as the Nawāb of the Karnatak and the Rājā of Tanjore should be guaranteed in his kingdom. The French demanded that Salābat Jang should be recognised as the Nizām and should be left free to arrange for the government of the Karnatak. The conference failed.
30. The Directors of the French Company were filled with delight and admiration at Dupleix's successes in the first years of the war. They procured for him in 1752 the title of Marquis and promised him liberal support. But the failure of the French before Trichinopoly in 1752 and the surrender of Law shook their confidence in Dupleix.
- 30a. Edw Ives, (1773), *A voyage from England to India*, p. 46.
31. Bussy could not get the removal of Shāh Nawāz Khān from office, nor the surrender of Muzaffar Khān who had left him.
32. The tragedy of Bobbili (January 1757) was a momentous historical event in the annals of the Northern Sarkārs and still survives in the popular ballad, entitled "*Rangarāyacharitam*."
33. No sooner did Bussy depart for Pondicherry, than Ananda Rāj, the Rājā of Vijayānagaram revolted, assaulted Vizagapatam and sent urgent appeals to the English at Calcutta and at Madras for assistance in expelling the French. The Madras authorities were not in a position to lend him any effective assistance; but Clive decided to send from Calcutta a strong force under Captain Forde. Forde quickly joined the rebel chief, attacked the French who were strongly posted at Condore about 40 miles from Rajahmundry, and secured a decisive victory. The battle of Condore is one of the most important fought by the English in India; it struck the first severe blow to the ascendancy of the French in the Deccan and finally destroyed the confidence that the Nizām reposed in them. Forde pushed forward his success and got possession of the fort of Rajahmundry; while Conflans fell back on Masulipatam with the wreck of his forces. Forde was unable to proceed further owing to want of funds and vacillation on the part of Ananda Rāj (October 1758).
34. Muirland' *Baillie-ki-Paltan*, (1759-1930), p. 80; Wyllie, *Life of Sir Eyre Coote* (1922), pp. 72-78. The victory caused in Madras "joy almost equal to that of Calcutta on the victory of Plassey".

CHAPTER X

CONSOLIDATION OF BRITISH POWER IN BENGAL (1757-1772)

PART I

On 23 June, 1757, took place one of the decisive events in world history. Nawāb Siraj-ud-Daulah, the *Subāhdar* of Bengal, found himself deserted in the field of battle by the general under whom was ranged the major part of his forces, discovered that he was the victim of a conspiracy, lost his nerves and fled, leaving the field to the English as victors and to the traitor Mīr Ja'far as an abject suppliant for Col. Clive's favour. From the military point of view the battle of Plassey was an insignificant engagement. The English gathered an undeserved victory on account of the Nawāb's order of recall to his attacking troops at a moment when he should have seen that, even without Mīr Ja'far, his victory was certain. Nor could it be said that Bengal lay at the feet of the English by right of conquest. A revolution had been effected at the centre and the English were just one of the conspirators who had taken part in it. For their participation in the conspiracy they got their reward according to the terms of their agreement. They were entitled to nothing further. Apart from their position as mere traders, they were no more than one of the *Zamindārs* under the *Subāhdar* of Bengal. Before Plassey, they were *Zamindārs* of the three villages of Kalikata, Sutanati and Govindpur paying an annual rent of Rs. 1,200 a year. After Plassey, the 24 *Parganās* were added to their *Zamindāri*.

Whatever their apparent position, in fact, they had become as a result of the sequence of events which culminated in Plassey, the real masters of Bengal. They had overthrown one Nawāb and set up another in his place. They had backed Mīr Ja'far as he seemed to them to have the largest public support. They might as well have set up Yār Lutf Khān, the nominee of the Seths, and managed to keep that *bete noire* on the *masnad* of Bengal. Mīr Ja'far did not dare to seat himself on the throne till Clive arrived at Murshidabad and conducted him to the *masnad*. And then Mīr Ja'far had to pay the price with which he had purchased his position. The treasury was exhausted in satisfying the English demands. The specie was

inadequate, and the English did not hesitate to accept jewels and plates instead. Even these were not sufficient to fulfil the promises made and it was agreed to receive the remainder in instalments and assignments were obtained on the future revenues. The Nawāb of Bengal was financially crippled and his army, for want of regular pay, became a mutinous rabble. Mīr Ja'far had no other alternative than to lean on the help of the English.

Bengal was in a condition of anarchy, and a strong military force was needed to restore order. The English were the only party which had such a military force and it was only with Clive's assistance that Mīr Ja'far could quell the rebellion of the Rājā of Midnapur and the insurrection at Dacca. There was trouble at Purnea. But when the troops were ordered to march they refused to do so unless their arrears were paid. It was only after partial payments that their reluctance was overcome.

Mīr Ja'far weakened his position considerably by conceiving hostile designs against the two most powerful Hindus of the time, Rājā Rāmnārāyan of Bihar and Rājā Durlabh Rām, and thereby throwing these Hindus on Clive's protection. Rāmnārāyan had been appointed deputy governor of Bihar by 'Alī Vardī Khān and there were reports of his intriguing with the Nawāb Vazīr of Awadh to overthrow Mīr Ja'far. As such there were grounds for action against Rāmnārāyan. But to Rājā Durlabh Rām, the *Diwān*, Mīr Ja'far was under the deepest obligation and it is difficult to understand his resolve to crush him. Anyway Rājā Durlabh soon found conspiracy gathering round him, and finding his personal safety threatened, resigned himself to the care of the English. Similarly Clive also took Rāmnārāyan under his wings and procured for the Bihar governor an assurance of security of tenure so long as he paid his revenue and did not intrigue with foreign powers. Clive found the means of benefiting the English out of this last transaction. He secured for the East India Company the monopoly of the trade in saltpetre which was produced in North Bihar.

Thus, thwarted in his wanton acts of aggression, Mīr Ja'far grew restless of English protection. He is reported to have declared "that if a French force would come into the province he would assist them, unless the English released him from all their claims of money, territory and exemptions", and actually entered into relations with the Dutch. But events proved his absolute dependence on the English. The Shāhzādā with the assistance of Muhammad Qulī Khān, *subāhdar* of Allahābād, and the encouragement of the Nawāb Vazīr of

Awadh advanced towards Bengal. Mīr Ja'far was unable to withstand an invasion unaided and his only hope of succour lay in Clive. A joint army of the Company's and the Nawāb's troops marched to Patna, which had been besieged by the Shāhzādā. At this time fortune favoured both Clive and Mīr Ja'far and the invaders withdrew for their own reasons. Mīr Ja'far, grateful for his deliverance, bestowed on Clive the rent which the Company as *Zamindār* was bound to pay the Nawāb for the lands which they held around Calcutta (June 1759).

The significance of Clive's participation in the opposition to the Shāhzādā's entry into Bengal was indeed very great. He had opposed the legal heir to the Mughul throne in his claim to the submission of one of the provinces of his empire. This was rebellion. But Clive knew that "there will be no difficulty in obtaining the absolute possession of these rich kingdoms". As to what should be the right course of action at this critical juncture, Clive had not as yet been able to make up his mind. It was possible for "the Company to take the sovereignty upon themselves" of these provinces. This he thought could be confirmed by securing a *sanad* from the emperor on promise of payment of annual tribute. He had been offered the high dignity of *Diwān* of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. "But this high office" Clive wrote to Pitt, "I have been obliged to decline for the present, as I am unwilling to occasion any jealousy on the part of the *Subāh*, especially as I see no likelihood of the Company's providing us with a sufficient force to support properly so considerable an employ and which would open a way to securing the *Subāhship* to ourselves". At the moment however it seemed to him that the best course was for the ministry in England to take upon itself the government of the territories over which the Company exercised its control on payment of an annual tribute to the emperor.¹ This was what he actually suggested to Pitt, but Pitt was afraid that this might lead to infringement of the legal rights of the Company and kept silent.

As yet it was necessary that appearances must be kept up and the real power in Bengal must remain in disguise. The danger of arousing the jealousy of the other European powers was soon demonstrated by the Dutch invasion of Bengal. The Dutch, envious of the recent successes of the English and solicitous for the future of their trade interests in this province, became anxious to supplant English influence in Bengal. As has been already noted, they started negotiations with Mīr Ja'far and received encouragement from him. An expedition was despatched from Batavia, but delayed so

long at Negapatam and at the mouth of Hughli that Clive got sufficient time for preparations and to bring up reinforcements, with the result that the Dutch were badly defeated and humbled (December 1759).

While the position of the English in Bengal was thus still uncertain and depended on the adroitness with which Clive managed the self-seeking cowards at the helm of affairs in Bengal, an important change took place in the Company's government at Fort William. Clive suffering from indifferent health and, angry with the Court of Directors, left India in February 1760. It was at his request that two of the Company's Madras servants were brought over to Bengal to take charge of the military command and the civil administration. Caillaud arrived before Clive left, to take the command of the troops, but Vansittart did not reach Bengal till July 1760. In the meanwhile Holwell acted as Clive's successor in the civil government.

The Shāhzādā had again invaded Bihar, and Caillaud with Miran had taken the field against him when Clive left Bengal. The Shāhzādā was beaten in an engagement at Sirpur, but Miran would not follow up the victory and withdrew to Patna to nurse some slight wounds which he had received. This gave the Shāhzādā the opportunity to raid into Bengal but he was so closely followed by Caillaud that he had to withdraw. Not only was Miran reluctant to support Caillaud but Mīr Ja'far entered into correspondence with the Shāhzādā "declaring, it was believed, that his resistance was solely due to the insistence of the English".

As we have seen, the relations between Mīr Ja'far and the English under Clive had been far from friendly. The situation grew worse with Clive's departure. Holwell could not secure "that deference to his advice which the Nawāb had yielded to Clive's commanding talents".² The Nawāb allowed the payments for the maintenance of the Company's troops to fall into arrears and the English had to take a loan from the Seths for the purpose. To the English who found the Nawāb so difficult to manage, their policy of controlling Bengal politics through a protected prince seemed to have failed. We have already noticed Clive's letter to Pitt suggesting that the state could take upon itself the sovereignty of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Within a year and a half from the battle of Plassey, he had felt that the revolution of 1757 could not be a permanent arrangement. The reasons for thinking so are clearly stated by Clive himself in the course of that letter. He wrote: "The reigning *Subāh*,

whom the victory at Plassey invested with the sovereignty of these provinces, still, it is true retains his attachment to us, and probably while he has no other support, will continue to do so, but . . . should he ever think it his interest to break with us, the obligations he owes us would prove no restraint; and this is very evident from his having lately removed his Prime Minister, and cut off two or three principal officers, all attached to our interest, and who had a share in his elevation. Moreover he is advanced in years; and his son so cruel, a worthless young fellow, and so apparently an enemy to the English, that it will be almost unsafe trusting him with the succession.”³ After Clive’s departure the need for a change was more keenly felt. Holwell was of opinion that “the country will never be in a settled peaceful state whilst this family is at the head of it”, but that no useful purpose will be served by replacing the present Nawāb by another. His solution was to secure a *farman* from Delhi appointing the Company “perpetual *subāh* of the province”.⁴ This was an anticipation of the settlement of 1765. Had this plan been carried out the Mīr Qāsim episode in the history of the English conquest of Bengal would not have taken place. But Mīr Qāsim’s stars were ascending and he so successfully exploited the differences between the English and the Nawāb that Holwell and his associates changed their views so far as to bring about a revolution, not in order to assume the responsibility for the administration of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa on themselves, but to set up Mīr Qāsim—no weakling like his father-in-law—on the *masnad* and thereby virtually effected a counter-revolution.

At first Mīr Qāsim’s ambition was limited to securing the deputyship of Bihar in place of Rāmnrāyan. But in July 1760 Miran was killed by lightning. This event at once brought into prominence the question of succession to Mīr Ja’far. Mīr Qāsim’s ambitions were now raised. He had already ingratiated himself with Holwell who was supporting his pretensions, and he now desired that he should be named the *Diwān* and Mīr Ja’far’s successor. At this juncture, the new governor Henry Vansittart arrived from Madras. He was a believer in the policy of non-intervention and he agreed to Holwell’s schemes of supporting Mīr Qāsim. No wonder, therefore, that on 11 September, 1760 the Select Committee at Fort William resolved that it was not desirable to seek any independent powers from the Shāhzādā. They declared: “Our views in adopting this system should be directed rather to strengthen than weaken or overthrow the present *nabob*. All we desire is to see the powers removed out of the hands of that sort of men who now rule and direct his

affairs".⁵ On 27 September a treaty was signed between Mīr Qāsim and the English by which the English agreed to appoint Mīr Qāsim to the post of *Diwān* and promised him the succession to Mīr Ja'far, while Mīr Qāsim agreed to cede to the English the districts of Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong. So far the intentions of the English were only to substitute the Nawāb's advisers, by Mīr Qāsim. But Mīr Ja'far, who saw clearly that the appointment of Mīr Qāsim as his *Diwān* would mean complete loss of his powers, could not be persuaded to give effect to the new arrangement. When persuasion failed, force was applied and Mīr Ja'far after some hesitation resigned his office altogether and placed himself at the mercy of the English. He came down to reside at Calcutta under English guard and Mīr Qāsim was installed on the *masnad*. The presents which the Governor and his Councillors accepted as the price of installing Mīr Qāsim casts a sordid shadow over the whole business. But the English paid dearly for it. From the English point of view the step taken was a blunder. It was, in fact, a retrograde one which delayed the slow process of the consolidation of English power in Bengal and prolonged the sufferings of the people of this province by protracting the struggle of the two opponents for mastery of their land. The position of the English in Bengal and their relation to the Nawāb remained undefined as before, while the *masnad* went to a man who was endowed with far greater personal capacity than Mīr Ja'far. Mīr Ja'far, as we have seen, had felt the English as very uncomfortable friends. He had obstructed them, and on more than one occasion sought the alliance of their enemies. Nevertheless he had always yielded, especially to the far superior personality of Clive. With smaller men now to contend with and possessing greater talents than his predecessor, Mīr Qāsim could easily defy the English and aim at complete independence of their control. In this he was not a little assisted by Vansittart's weak policy.

The Shāhzādā was still in Bihar and military operations were afoot against him. Caillaud was recalled to Madras and Major Carnac took command of the English troops at Patna. On 15 January, 1761, Carnac inflicted a severe defeat on the Shāhzādā who soon offered terms and accompanied Carnac to Patna. Before his elevation to the *masnad* Mīr Qāsim had agreed to the proposal of the English to make peace with the Shāhzādā and assist him to establish himself as emperor at Delhi.^{5a} Mīr Qāsim now became greatly suspicious of English designs. He felt nervous that the English might obtain for themselves the *subāhdari* of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa from the Shāhzādā, and he hastened to Patna to take part in the negotia-

tions. At Patna however Mīr Qāsim refused to visit the Shāhzādā in his camp and an interview had to be arranged between the two in the hall of the English factory. Mīr Qāsim promised to pay annually twenty four lakhs of rupees to the Shāhzādā as his sovereign on condition of receiving investiture as *subāhdar* of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Mīr Qāsim however refused to proclaim him as the emperor. After sometime the Shāhzādā, at the invitation of the Nawāb Vazīr of Awadh and some Afghān chiefs retraced his steps towards Delhi. Major Carnac escorted him to the borders of the province.

It was only after the Shāhzādā had left the province that Mīr Qāsim declared him emperor. Even this was done under threat from Coote who had in the meanwhile superseded Carnac. Mīr Qāsim was perhaps justly afraid of the friendship between the Shāhzādā and the English. The Shāhzādā had, it seems, actually offered at different times to grant the *Subāhdari* and the *Diwāni* of the provinces to the English whenever they should ask for it. Whether Mīr Qāsim's suspicions were right or wrong, he had his way and it was mainly owing to his disinclination that the English had not been able to render the Shāhzādā that assistance to recover the throne of Delhi which they had intended to give. The English would have acted foolishly if they had embroiled themselves in the politics of northern India by championing the cause of the Shāhzādā, but they were prevented from doing so, not because of their foresight, but on account of what may be called a lucky defeat before the superior will of the new Nawāb.

Mīr Qāsim had thus successfully overcome the first hurdle in the race for consolidation of his position. Unlike Mīr Ja'far he was clear sighted enough to see that he must appease the army and rid himself of his financial obligations to the English. He found the treasury practically empty. However, by systematic spoliation of the office-holders of the old regime on the ground, right or wrong, of embezzlement of public money, and also by stringent economy in the administration and in the expenses of his household, Mīr Qāsim was so far able to improve his financial position that he had within a few months of his accession, paid up the arrears of the English troops and, to a large extent, met the debts of his predecessor and his own. He also paid five lakhs to the Company in discharge of his promises and also made presents of large sums to the members of the Select Committee. He suppressed with a strong hand the *zamindārs* of Birbhum and Burdwan who had taken up arms in furtherance of the Shāhzādā's plan to invade Bengal simultaneously

with a band of Marāthās, and also expelled the Marāthās from the province.

Mīr Qāsim felt that he could not establish his control over the administration of Bihar so long as Rāmnārāyan was there in charge. Here was a subordinate of the Nawāb who enjoyed a peculiar position. He was an official whom the English had always used as a powerful counterpoise against the Nawāb of Bengal. The protection he had received from Clive had prevented Mīr Ja'far's attempt to ruin him. And the same protection had been guaranteed to him by Vansittart. Unless removed, Rāmnārāyan would be a perpetual source of danger to Mīr Qāsim. The loyalty of Rāmnārāyan to the *subāhdar* was always open to question. His opposition to the Shāhzādā had often been half-hearted. Mīr Qāsim had been from the first hostile to Rāmnārāyan. One of his earliest plans in his adventurous career had been to supplant Rāmnārāyan in the administration of Bihar, and he now decided to crush him altogether. The method which the Nawāb followed was to call on him to account for his revenues. Only the accounts of the last three years had not been settled. During this time it had been extremely difficult for Rāmnārāyan to collect the revenues on account of the constant depredations of the Shāhzādā. Besides, his coffers were drained by the necessity of keeping an army in the field to cope with the invaders. Mīr Qāsim however insisted on his pound of flesh, and sent his complaints against Rāmnārāyan to Governor Vansittart. Vansittart informed the Nawāb that Rāmnārāyan was a friend of Clive and the Nawāb should settle affairs amicably with him (22 April 1761). At the same time Coote was instructed that "Rāmnārāyan was to be protected from injustice and preserved in his government." But the Nawāb was unceasing in his complaints, and in May 1761 Vansittart though urging a friendly settlement, permitted the Nawāb to act as the best interests of the government might require. In June, the Nawāb suspended Rāmnārāyan from his office, to which the Select Committee agreed. In despair, Rāmnārāyan sought Coote's protection, to secure which he began to influence Coote against the Nawāb. But in July Coote was recalled and Rāmnārāyan found himself alone and friendless. In August Rāj Ballabh was appointed *Naib* in place of Rāmnārāyan with Vansittart's approval. Rāmnārāyan's property was then confiscated, he was imprisoned and subsequently put to death. Thus Mīr Qāsim demonstrated to his subjects that English protection counted no longer and that their lives and properties depended on his goodwill.

By the end of 1761 and the beginning of 1762, Mīr Qāsim was so far established in his position as to regard infringements on his sovereign rights as unbearable. He had removed himself from too close a proximity to the seat of English authority and had made his headquarters at Sasaram and Monghyr. And what was far more important, he had disbanded the useless rabble of 90,000 men known as the Nawāb's army and created a new army of much smaller size trained along western lines by the Armenian, Gurgin Khān, and independent of foreign supply by reason of having its own factories for casting cannon and manufacture of muskets.

The time had now come for an open challenge and the arbitrament of the sword to decide whether Bengal, Bihar and Orissa belonged to the English by virtue of Plassey or the Nawāb was to be supreme in his own territories.

The final phase in the story of the Nawāb's assertion of complete independence of English interference began with his resentment at the conduct of the Company's servants in connection with their claim to take part in the inland trade free of duties. This claim was an unjustifiable application of the *farman* which the English had obtained from the emperor Farrukh-siyar to trade duty-free throughout the empire. Murshid Qulī Khān, *Subāhdar* of Bengal, had insisted that the privilege conferred should be restricted to the Company's export and import trade, and the E. I. Company not interested in the internal trade, had acquiesced in this limitation. However, the Company's servants had occasionally engaged themselves in the internal trade and abused the Company's passes to trade free of duty and even sold them to other merchants to the detriment of the Nawāb's revenues and the trade of the province. On his accession to the *masnad* in 1757 Mīr Ja'far re-affirmed the right of the Company to trade free of duty. Mīr Ja'far's *sanad* added "Whoever acts contrary to these orders, the English have power to punish them". The *sanad* which was vaguely worded did not expressly authorise the inland trade and Clive seems to have held that the English had obtained no new privileges from Mīr Ja'far. But the Company and its servants continued to participate illegally in the inland trade and to abuse the free passes for the export and import trade. Mīr Ja'far complained, but his protests were of little avail, and the Company's servants continued to amass fortunes with remarkable rapidity.

Mīr Qāsim acquiesced in this situation until he felt himself strong enough to thwart the English, and then he set himself to stop

the abuses. Mīr Ja'far's concession to the English that cases of dispute in trade matters arising between the Nawāb's officers and the Company's agents were to be decided by the English, was inconsistent with the independence of the Nawāb of Bengal, and Mīr Qāsim justly claimed the right to administer justice himself. The constant complaints of the Nawāb against English agents and the interference of the Nawāb's officials in the legal and illegal trade of the English, created a strained situation which made it necessary for Vansittart to visit Mīr Qāsim at Monghyr at the close of 1762. The Nawāb agreed to levy not more than 9 per cent on the inland trade of the English while as much as 25 per cent or more were to be paid by native merchants. Vansittart, on his side, conceded that cases of disputes arising on trade matters were to be decided by the Nawāb's officials. The Council at Calcutta was indignant, refused to ratify the agreement and resolved that the English would pay only 2½ per cent on salt and that the agents of English traders were to be tried by the English alone. Mīr Qāsim replied by abandoning all transit duties on inland trade and thus placing the native traders on the same footing as the English. The Council, Vansittart and Hastings dissenting, took up the absurd position of denying the right of the Nawāb to abolish all inland duties and interpreted this as an act of enmity to the English nation. Among these members of the Council the predominant feeling was that either Mīr Qāsim must do what they dictated or he must be overthrown. With the object of taking stock of the situation by direct conversation with Mīr Qāsim, a deputation consisting of Mr. Amyatt and Mr. Hay was sent to Monghyr (4 April 1763). In the meanwhile the attempt of Mīr Qāsim to stand forth as the Nawāb was leading to cases of violence. The whole atmosphere had changed. The English no longer received that deference to which they had become accustomed since the revolution of 1757. The spirit of independence flowed downwards from the Nawāb to his officials. The English trade was being interfered with, sometimes rightly and sometimes wrongly, and the English *gomastas* were being harassed. The English were replying by seizing, binding and beating the Nawāb's officials. The atmosphere was surcharged with the smell of war. The Council discussed military measures that were to be adopted in the event of the outbreak of war, and Mīr Qāsim realising that the two years had not been enough time to consolidate his position sufficiently for a contest with the English, sought the assistance of the emperor and the Nawāb Vazīr of Awadh. In such an atmosphere the deputation could not hope for success. Mīr Qāsim rejected all the demands of the Council as designed to deprive him of his authority and permit-

ted Amyatt and his suite to commence the return journey only on condition of leaving Hay behind as a hostage for the Nawāb's officials whom the English held as prisoners in Calcutta. This was in the last week of June 1763. Few weeks ago some boats laden with arms for the English garrison at Patna had arrived at Monghyr. Mīr Qāsim had allowed them to pass after retaining them for some time, but he was extremely nervous about Ellis, the chief of the English factory at Patna, whose attitude towards him was known to be inimical. On 21 June, Mīr Qāsim sent some troops to Patna. On the news of their arrival Ellis took the precipitate step of seizing the city by a *coup de main* and the killādār of Patna fled. The war had thus begun.

Mīr Qāsim issued orders that Englishmen wherever they were found, were to be seized and imprisoned. In consequence Amyatt and his party were stopped near Murshidabad. Amyatt attempted resistance and in the struggle he and some of his men were killed. Patna was recovered with ease by Mīr Qāsim's troops in no time and the factory at Kasimbazar was plundered and the English made prisoners. The English army now took the field. The Nawāb's army was routed at Katwa, at Murshidabad and at Udaynalla and the English then laid siege to Monghyr. Mīr Qāsim had withdrawn to Patna. Overcome with despair and anger at his defeat he caused Gurgin Khān, his Armenian Commander-in-Chief, the Seths and then his English prisoners, to be murdered in succession, and when the English army carried Patna by storm, Mīr Qāsim escaped into Awadh. Here the treasures that Mīr Qāsim carried, purchased for him the alliance of Shujā-ud-daulah, the Nawāb of Awadh, and the emperor Shāh 'Alam joined the allies. Had the motives of Shujā-ud-daulah been sincere the English would have had to contend with a serious situation. This could have been treated as the first alliance of Indian powers against the political ambitions of the British in India. But Shujā-ud-daulah was not honestly espousing Mīr Qāsim's cause and even opened negotiations with the English for personal gains.⁶ Anyway, after long delay on the border of Bihar, the English army under Major Munro invaded Awadh and on 22 October, 1764, completely defeated the allies at Buxar. Before the battle Mīr Qāsim had been imprisoned and deprived of his possessions by Shujā-ud-daulah. The hapless prince was therefore not even interested in the issue of the battle. However he was allowed to escape from the battle-field, led a wandering life for some years till he met with his end near Delhi in 1777. Thus ended the last

efforts of a Bengal prince to maintain his independence of English control.

On the outbreak of the war with Mīr Qāsim, the choice of the King-makers at Calcutta had fallen for the second time on Mīr Ja'far. For this favour Mīr Ja'far confirmed Mīr Qāsim's grant to the English of the revenues of Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong, exempted the trade of the Company's servants from all duties except 2½ per cent on salt and agreed to cancel Mīr Qāsim's ordinance remitting all commercial imports, to pay the Company 30 lakhs of rupees as compensation and 5 lakhs per month towards the expenses of the war, to reimburse individuals for personal losses and to allow no Europeans except the English to erect fortifications in Bengal. In spite of these very generous concessions the financial demands on Mīr Ja'far were continually increased in the most shameless manner. "The Company", said Clive, "became possessed of one half of the Nawāb's revenues". He was allowed "to collect the other half for himself, but in fact he was no more than a banker for the Company's servants who could draw upon him as often and to as great an amount as they pleased."⁷ Indeed, finding Bengal at their mercy, the Company's servants spared no occasion to suck her life-blood and the instalment of a Nawāb was a splendid chance every time for a fresh draw. Not only was the Nawāb embarrassed with financial demands which he could not meet, but the Company's servants carried on their private trade in a manner which ruined the commerce and industry of the province. In this orgy of spoliation, the importance of determining the relationship between the Nawāb and the Company was forgotten and the only step taken was to appoint Samuel Middleton as Resident at the *Darbar* to safeguard English interests there. The choice of his ministers still rested with the Nawāb and the English devised no means of controlling his government. That they were likely to be in the same difficulty which they had experienced in the period of Mīr Qāsim's rule was shown when in spite of information that Mahārājā Nandkumār, whom Mīr Ja'far had appointed as his chief minister, was carrying on negotiations with Shāh 'Alam, the Nawāb *Vazīr* of Awadh and Mīr Qāsim, they were unable to secure his removal.

Mīr Ja'far who was old and very ill died in February 1765. The English now decided to establish their control definitely over the government at Murshidabad. Four councillors were deputed to Murshidabad to instal Mīr Ja'far's son Najm-ud-daulah and to get him to sign a treaty in accordance with their new plan. A deputy *subāhdar* who was to be a nominee of the English was to be appoin-

ted and he was to have immediately under the Nawāb, the chief management of all affairs. Nandkumār was deprived of his great position and Muhammad Rezā Khān, *naib* of Dacca, was appointed deputy *subāhdar*. The business of revenue collection was divided into two branches and Nandkumār and Rāi Durlabh were appointed in charge of each with equal powers. The appointment and dismissal of the principal revenue officials and the allotment of their districts were to be made by the Nawāb but with the approval of the governor and council. The new Nawāb was not allowed to maintain any troops except such as were required "for the dignity of his person and the business of his collections throughout the provinces". Further the Nawāb was to make no application to the emperor for *sanads* except through the English.

The Nawāb's hesitation to accept the treaty and his unwillingness to agree to Rezā Khān's appointment were of no avail and he found that there was no other alternative but to agree. The man who stood to the last behind the young prince before he was reduced to a mere figurehead was Nandkumār, and the counter-actions to the English plans came from this quarter. In order that he might preserve his *de jure* position, Najm-ud-daulah had applied, on Nandkumār's advice, to the emperor of Delhi for a *parwānah*. The members of the deputation however did not allow the Nawāb to receive the *parwānah* and themselves proceeded to instal him publicly. Nandkumār then tried his best to prevent the English from obtaining an idea of the state of the collections. He continued to exercise the powers of the chief minister and the officers of the *cutchery* would not make their usual acknowledgements to Rezā Khān. The members of the deputation reported to Fort William, "...all the people about the Nawāb's person are absolutely devoted to Nandkumār and enemies to this change...". The English therefore revived the old charge against Nandkumār of conspiring with the Nawāb *Vazīr* of Awadh and removed him in spite of the utmost unwillingness of the Nawāb. They also proceeded to establish a large number of their own nominees in the collection of the revenues.⁸

In May, 1765 Clive arrived at Calcutta to commence his famous second administration. Najm-ud-daulah met him at Calcutta and laid before him his grievances. Clive thereupon proceeded to modify the arrangements made by Spencer's government. The newly created post of deputy *subāhdar* was abolished. A sort of a cabinet consisting of Muhammad Rezā Khān, Rāi Durlabh and the Seths was set up to assist the Nawāb in the administration. Muhammad Rezā Khān was to be *naib*, Rāi Durlabh the *Diwān* and the Seths were to

act as chiefs of trade. It was decided that each should enjoy an equal share of power and authority. The appointment and dismissal of the officers and the management of the entire revenue administration were to be in their hands. If they disagreed among themselves or failed to keep law and order, the governor and council were to take measures that were found to be necessary. Further, a member of the council was to reside at Murshidabad, paid suitably according to his rank out of the Nawāb's treasury and "the accounts of the receipt and expenses for the business of the government, etc. shall be laid before him monthly for his perusal."⁹ Najm-ud-daulah also agreed to make over all the revenues to the Company, accepting a pension of 50 lakhs of rupees for himself. Thus nothing was left to the Nawāb but "the name and shadow of authority". The administration was to be carried on by nominees of the English, subject to English supervision, though in the name of the Nawāb.

It was practically this position which Clive legalised when he met Shāh 'Alam at Allahābād in August 1765 and obtained from him a formal grant of the *Diwāni* of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.

Clive strengthened the position of the English in Bengal still further by a wise settlement with the Nawāb of Awadh. Spencer had promised Awadh to Shāh 'Alam. But Clive realised that it was not possible for Shāh 'Alam to maintain himself in Awadh without English assistance. Bengal was more than what the English could manage at the time and it would have been dangerous for them to get embroiled in the affairs of northern India by taking such a step. Clive therefore restored Awadh to Shujā-ud-daulah. Shujā-ud-daulah agreed to pay 50 lakhs to the Company by instalments and entered into a defensive alliance with the English. Thus the English got a grateful ally on the border of Bihar. Handsome provision was made for the emperor, to whom were given the districts of Kora and Allahābād taken from the Nawāb of Awadh.

For the first time since Plassey the position of the English in Bengal had come within some definition. By assuming the office of the *Diwān* they had become servants of the Great Mughul. In the Mughul imperial system the Nawāb was the *Nazim*. He was responsible for law and order and the administration of criminal justice. The *Diwān*'s office was separate. He was responsible for the collection of the revenues and for the administration of civil justice. There was obvious advantage in theoretically being the *Diwān*. It served as a mask for the political power which the Company actually wielded and guarded the Company not only against the jealousy of the

French and the Dutch, who had possessions in Bengal, but also protected them from the interference of Parliament.

As yet the English had neither the inclination nor the capacity to take upon themselves the administration of the province. They had only devised a method of holding safely their power in Bengal, so that, as Clive fixed the desideratum, they may "always have it in our power to overcome the very Nawāb we are bound by treaty to support".¹⁰ In consequence, power was divorced from responsibility and all the evil results thereof followed. The Nawāb's administrative organisation was paralysed; a new one was not set up in its place, and Bengal lapsed into a state of anarchy with attendant suffering for her people.

Having effected the political settlement, Clive proceeded to reform his own house. It is easy to realise the extent to which the Company's officials had been demoralised by the atmosphere in which they worked. Their salaries were low, but easy wealth could be had by the game of Nawāb-making and by participation in trade. The Court of Directors had prohibited the acceptance of presents. But this had remained unheeded. Clive made the Company's servants, civil and military alike, to sign covenants agreeing not to accept presents in future. Clive realised that it was not possible to prevent the Company's servants from taking part in the internal trade unless adequate salaries were paid to them. But he knew that the Directors could not be persuaded to do it. He therefore, hit upon a novel device. He instituted a society of trade for carrying on the trade in salt which was a government monopoly. This trading company was to be under the control of the council. Shares were issued to the principal civil and military servants. Clive intended that the profits from these shares were to be allowances, though in an indirect form, to supplement their salaries. The Directors disapproved of this scheme and ordered that the internal trade was to be abandoned entirely. So far, Clive was dealing with illicit gains. But when he came to deal with acknowledged allowances because their payment strained the Company's purse, he met with serious resistance. The military officers had been accustomed to receive a 'batta' or field allowance to cover the extra cost when they were not living in garrison. These allowances had been paid by the Indian princes and now it had become a charge on the Company. The Directors ordered the payment of the field allowance to be stopped. When Clive proceeded to give effect to these orders, several army officers combined to resist by throwing off their commissions simultaneously. Clive met the situation with firmness, and

the resistance melted away. Severe measures were taken against some of the officers and others were pardoned.

Clive finally left India in February 1767. The five years between the departure of Clive and the assumption of the office of governor by Warren Hastings witnessed the failure of the dual system of government which Clive had brought into being in Bengal. Under the terms of the treaty of Allahābād, the English as *Diwān* had guaranteed to pay out of the revenues 26 lakhs of rupees to the emperor, 50 lakhs to the Nawāb of Bengal and keep the remainder to themselves. The Company received their revenues but left the work of collection to the existing machinery. In his parting advice to the Calcutta Council Clive said: "To appoint the Company's servants to the offices of the Collector, or indeed to do any act by an exertion of the English power, which can be equally done by the Nabob at our instance, would be throwing off the mask, would be declaring the Company *subāh* of the provinces. Foreign nations would immediately take umbrage and complaints preferred to the British Court might have very embarrassing consequences."¹¹ The Court of Directors also enjoined their servants not to interfere with the business of government. Their views of the new position were clearly expressed in their despatch to Calcutta dated 17 May, 1766. They wrote: "We conceive the office of *Diwān* should be exercised only in superintending the collection and disposal of the revenues; which office, though vested in the Company, should officially be exercised by our Resident at the Durbar, under the control of the Governor and Select Committee, the only bounds of which control should extend to nothing beyond superintending the collection of the revenues and receiving the money from the Nawāb's treasury to that of the *Dewannah* or the Company.... This we conceive to be the whole office of the *Dewanny*. The administration of justice, the appointment to offices or Zemindaries, in short, whatever comes under the denomination of civil administration we understand is to remain in the hands of the Nawāb or his ministers". Thus the English as *Diwān* contented themselves with receiving the revenues through the existing *Diwāni* executive headed by a deputy for each part of the province—Muhammad Rezā Khān for Bengal, Shitāb Roy for Bihar and Rāi Durlabh for Orissa. Not only were the English unwilling to exercise their responsibilities as *Diwān*, but they had crippled the *Nizāmat* side of the administration by paralysing the source from which all authority emanated. The result was complete absence of government and consequent anarchy. The situation is well summarised by Monckton Jones. "The whole horde of minor

officials, Muttasaddis, Kanungos, Amils, Zemindars, etc. were let loose to raise what they pleased from the cultivators and traders. If the victims appealed to the *Nāib Nāzim* or his *faujdārs*, these had not the land servants or peons by means of whom they had formerly enforced justice and if complaints were addressed to the only man who heard them, the English Resident, he could not tell right from wrong, and was besides peremptorily forbidden to interfere. The peasants were without appeal, and many in despair deserted their holdings, became vagabonds or dacoits or were merely starving".¹² After nearly four years' operation of the dual system, Becher, Resident at Murshidabad, made the most crushing comment when he wrote, "...this fine country which flourished under the most despotic and arbitrary government, is verging towards its ruin while the English have really so great a share in the administration". (Becher to Select Committee of the Council at Calcutta, 24 May, 1769).

Gradually the contrast between the wretched condition of the *diwāni* lands and the comparative prosperity of the English *zamin-dāri* of 24 Parganās and the ceded districts of Burdwan, Midnapur and Chittagong, where the English had started direct administration, became apparent to the Court of Directors. In their famous despatch dated 30 June 1769 they wrote: "The like abuses which have been corrected in these districts are still severely felt through all the provinces of Bengal and Bihar.... To correct abuses of so long a growth will require much time and industry and above all a patient and moderate exertion of the powers invested in us by the grant of the *Diwāni*, for we do not mean by any violent and sudden reform to change the constitution, but to remove the evil by degrees by reducing the immense number of idle sycophants who.... are placed between the tenant and the public treasurer....". Accordingly they suggested a plan for a Committee at Murshidabad and another at Patna to look after the *diwāni* revenues of Bengal and Bihar respectively.

Before these instructions could reach India the Calcutta Council had sown the first seed of the English administrative organisation in the *diwāni* provinces. In August, 1769 they appointed European servants of the Company throughout the whole country to superintend native officers in their work of revenue collection and administration of justice. These new officials were called Supervisors. Their first task, it was pointed out to them, was to secure information. They were to prepare a history and make a complete economic survey of the districts assigned to each. It was essential for a

foreign nation, whether starting a new administrative machinery or supervising the old, to know all the facts relating to the lands, viz., what was the amount of the cultivated lands, to whom they belonged, what was their yield, the customary demands on the ryots, the method of collecting the revenue, etc. This information they wanted the Supervisors to compile. But it was not to the interests of the *Zamindārs* and the *Qanungos* to let their new masters have the knowledge and the Supervisors never had the correct information they needed. The best way of knowing the facts was to undertake a general survey of the lands, but this the Company never did, because they never had the European staff necessary for the supervision of such a huge project. In consequence they remained in ignorance and their land revenue arrangements were always open to objections.

In order that the Supervisors might be free to engage themselves in the important researches they had been directed to make, they were to have in the first instance, as little to do with the collections as possible. However, they were to have a controlling power over the collections; that is to say, the revenue officials were to "consult and mutually act on every occasion with, and report all transactions to the Supervisors, and in case any points of difference should arise, the Supervisor must have a negative voice until he can report his reasons for such negative to the Resident at the Durbār, and receive from him the orders of the ministry on the occasion. The Supervisors should also have the same negative voice in all judicial proceedings."¹³ In the exercise of these powers also the Supervisors met with opposition. The revenue collectors had been entirely without control since 1765. The interference of the Supervisors seemed to them to be intolerable and they now protested that it was impossible to collect the revenues. In many cases their protests must have been genuine, for the Supervisors were young servants of the Company with little or no experience of the revenue system and it is not unlikely that they often misused their checking powers. Anyway, a deadlock ensued. The Resident at Murshidabad reported that, "the *Zamindars*, *amils* and farmers appear unwilling to enter into any engagements for the revenues of the approaching season unless they can be assured of being supported in their authority in the province and offered to make their collections without interruptions from the Supervisors or their people."¹⁴ Further, "On the footing you have directed the Supervisors to remain, the business of the collections cannot proceed.... You must either proceed further and have the Supervisors to make the settle-

ments in the different districts or you must recede in part for the present.”¹⁵ As a result the controlling powers of the Supervisors were withdrawn, except in the case of four experienced men who held the posts. These men were not only continued in their office, but they were allowed to make the revenue settlements themselves in their districts. At this point an unfortunate quarrel arose between the Select Committee and the Council at Fort William over their respective powers and functions. As against the Select Committee, the Council contended that they were competent to deal with *Diwāni* matters and accordingly gave effect to the orders of the Directors conveyed in their letter of 30 June, 1769 by appointing Councils of Revenue at Murshidabad and Patna. In contradiction to the orders of the Select Committee restricting the powers of the Supervisors, the Council confirmed their controlling powers and even directed the Councils of Revenue to “represent what addition to that authority you think necessary.” According to the Council the Supervisors were to act under the Council of Revenue. The Select Committee, not recognising the Council’s authority, instructed the Supervisors to act independently. The Directors to whom this quarrel was referred upheld the steps taken by the Council, expressed their disfavour of the members of the Select Committee, and directed the Governor, Mr. Cartier, to resign, appointing Mr. Hastings in his place (1772).¹⁶

While the servants of the Company were thus wrangling over fine points of jurisdiction, one of the worst tragedies of human history befell Bengal. This was the Begal famine of 1770 in which nearly a third of the population is said to have been swept away. The absence of a government, properly speaking, and the action of self-seeking men in cornering grains, intensified the severity of the famine.

The next year the Directors took the momentous step of deciding that they could not shirk their responsibility any longer. Clive’s dual system had failed, the failure of the Supervisors was apparent, and decreased revenues and lower profits on their investment brought home to the Directors the conviction that they must go a step forward and take upon themselves actively the administration of these provinces. In their letter dated 28 August, 1771, the Directors ordered the Governor and Council at Calcutta “to divest Muhammad Reza Khān and every person employed by or in conjunction with him, or acting under his influence, of any further charge or direction in the business of the collections” and announced their famous resolution “to stand forth as *duan*, and by the agency of the Com-

pany's servants, to take upon ourselves the entire care and management of the revenues." Mill describes this change as "a revolution much greater probably than any previous conjuncture—than even the change from Hindu to Mahomedan masters had been able to create."

The Directors had recommended a total change, but they had not laid down the details of the future system of Government. This was left to the judgment and discretion of the new governor Warren Hastings. The reforms in Bengal that followed are therefore in their details the work of Hastings. For Hastings to proceed with, there was nothing but the administrative structure of a commercial corporation and the remnants of a broken-down government. His task was to build up a new structure on the remains of the old. The enormity of such a task can easily be realised.

Hastings proved that he was a man of insight and vision. He did not attempt to introduce a purely English system, as perhaps others less gifted might have done. He saw that the new scheme must not involve a break with the past, and that the administration must continue to be in form and in principle Indian. Discussing the measures which he proposed to adopt, Hastings wrote in a letter to Colebrooke, Chairman of the Board of Directors: "Many other correspondent regulations will be necessary, but not one perhaps which the original constitution of the Moghul Empire hath not before established and adopted and thereby rendered familiar to the people. But it is unnecessary to mention them because none of them can be now carried into execution. All that can be attempted at this time, will be to alleviate the effects of the present system. To change so much of it as shall be found hurtful to the country or prejudicial to the interests of the Company, and to establish such partial or temporal regulations as the letter and evident spirit of the Company's orders shall admit of, for the ease of the inhabitants and the improvement of the revenue."¹⁷

Actively administering the provinces "by the agency of the Company's servants" meant not only drastic changes in internal government, but also throwing off the mask by which power in Bengal was held, which in its turn involved a readjustment of foreign relations. If Clive's dual system of government had to be abandoned, it only followed logically that his external engagements required modification. The emperor was at this time practically a prisoner in the hands of the Marāthās. To continue to pay homage to him by sending the annual tribute had become dangerous. The tribute was

not only a financial loss to Bengal but a gain to the Marāthās. Hastings decided that "not a rupee should pass through these provinces till they had recovered from the distresses which lavish payments to him had principally contributed", and refused to pay the tribute when demanded.¹⁸ At the same time Hastings strengthened Awadh as a buffer state by returning to the Nawāb Vazīr the districts of Kora and Allahābād and by lending a brigade of the Company's troops to protect his territories. The emperor's enmity was secured against Shujā-ud-Daulah, and with the Marāthās and Rohillās menacing his border, his position as a suppliant for English help was assured. As to the Nawāb of Bengal the stipend of 50 lakhs which Najm-ud-Daulah had enjoyed had been reduced already to 32 lakhs after Mubarak-ud-Daulah's accession. This was now further reduced by order of the Court of Directors to 16 lakhs. The Company no longer needed to pose as humble servants of the Nawāb. Moreover, the *Nazim* had become powerless, and the new policy formulated by the Directors implied that the English were to be responsible for the whole administration. It was, therefore, decided that the Nawāb could do with very much less than he had enjoyed before. The management of the minor Nawāb's household had been in the hands of Muhammad Rezā Khān who was now to be tried. The charge of the household, therefore, was given by Hastings to Munni Begam, widow of Mīr Ja'far. As a lady could not be expected to transact all the business in this connection, Rājā Gurudās, son of Maharājā Nand-kumār, was appointed to act under her.

As regards internal changes, the first to take place was the abolition of the office of *naib diwān* of Bengal and Bihar. The two deputies were by order of the Court of Directors prosecuted and tried for peculation. Their only fault, it seems, was that they were responsible for carrying on administration under a system which had failed. The Directors need not have indicated their recognition of the failure of a system by making scapegoats of those whom they had charged with operating it. They were subjected to the ignominy of a long trial and were then acquitted. Like the offices of the deputy *diwān*, the Councils of Revenue at Murshidabad and Patna were also done away with. The revenue administration was placed under the direct control of the Governor and Council who formed themselves for the purpose into a Committee of Revenue. This Committee of Revenue was to audit the accounts of the *Diwāni* assisted by an Indian Officer called the *Rāy-rāyan*. The salary of this post was Rs. 5,000 a month and the first holder was Rājā Rāj Ballabh. The "Super-visors" were to be called "Collectors" and they were to be helped

and checked in their work by Indian officers appointed for each district styled *diwāns*. The work of these *diwāns* was to be supervised by the *Rāy-rāyan* who was to receive from them the accounts in the Bengali language and to transmit to them copies of such orders as the Committee of Revenue might issue to the Collectors. The *Khālsā* or Exchequer was removed from Murshidabad to Calcutta, which not only strengthened the Council's direct control over the revenues, but openly declared the English as masters. The Governor and four members of the Council constituted themselves a Committee of Circuit to tour the districts and form the revenue settlements. It was felt that the best method of finding out the real value of the lands was to farm them out to persons making offers. At the same time the principle was laid down that "a settlement with established *zamindārs* and *talukdārs*, on conditions similar to those required from the farmers was preferable to letting the lands to other persons". Accordingly as the Committee toured from place to place advertisements were put up, offers received and the lands settled for a period of five years. In many places settlement was made with the existing *zamindārs* and *talukdārs* who were in those places either the highest or the only bidders.

The entire system of the administration of justice required to be overhauled. Courts situated at a distance from Murshidabad had fallen in abeyance. In their places justice was being dealt out by revenue officers of the *zamindārs* and local magnates without any legal authority to do so. This was of course better than total anarchy, but a very rough and ready sort of justice could be obtained in these courts. There was enough room for bribery and corruption and for the rich to oppress the poor. Hastings set himself to revive and reform the native system of justice. He established two courts in each district, the *Mofussil Diwāni Adālat*, to decide civil suits, and the *Faujdāri Adālat* to try criminal cases.. The *Diwāni Adālat* was to be presided over by the Collector who was to be assisted by the *Diwān* and officers of the cutchery. The *Faujdāri Adālat* was to be presided over by the *Kāzi* or *Mufti* of the district and two *maulvis*, but their proceedings were to be supervised by the Collector. In order that it might not be necessary for the peasants to leave their lands and travel to the district headquarters for justice in small matters, it was laid down that cases up to the value of ten rupees were to be decided on the spot by the head farmer of each *parganā*. Collectors were to avoid summoning cultivators to the District Court during the harvesting months. In all cases of disputed accounts, partnerships, debts, non-performance of contracts,

etc., the Collector was to encourage the parties to submit their disputes to arbitration. In order that the injured might prefer their complaints to the Collector without fear or hindrance, it was provided that "a box shall be placed at the door of the Cutchery in which the complainants may lodge their petitions at any time or hour they pleased". While Hastings sought in this manner to make justice cheap and easily available to rich and poor alike, he took steps to discourage useless litigation. The broad principle adopted by him was that justice should be administered with the advice and help of Indians and according to the laws and customs of the country. He specially enjoined that "in all suits regarding inheritance, marriage, caste and other religious usages and institutions, the laws of the *Koran* with respect to Mahomedans and those of the *shaster* with respect to Jentoos shall be invariably adhered to; on all such occasions the Moulvies or Brahmins shall respectively attend to expound the law, and they shall sign the report and assist in passing the decree".¹⁹

Two superior courts were established at Calcutta. The *Sadr Diwāni Adālat* heard appeals from the mofussil *Diwāni Adālat*s. The Governor and two members of the Council assisted by the *Rāy-rāyan* and officers of the cutchery constituted the court.

There was also to be a *Sadr Nizāmat Adālat* to hear criminal appeals and to investigate into capital sentences passed by the district courts before they could be referred to the *Nazim*, who was to be assisted by the Chief *Kāzi*, the Chief *mufti* and three capable *maulvis*.

The Company as *Diwān* had nothing to do with the administration of criminal justice. The Company's servants, therefore, did not form a part of the criminal courts. As in the districts the criminal courts were supervised by the Collector, so also at the *Sadr* Hastings provided that the Governor and Council would only watch the proceedings of the *Nizāmat Adālat*, "so that the Company's administration in the character of the king's *dewān* may be satisfied that the decrees of justice on which both the welfare and safety of the country so materially depend, are not injured or perverted by the effects of partiality or corruption".

In effect, Hastings had only revived some of the native courts which had fallen into desuetude, required the Collectors to preside in the local civil courts, and to prevent miscarriage of justice in the local criminal courts, transferred the appeal courts from Murshidabad to Calcutta and provided for the same control as in the dis-

tricts. This was in accord with his policy of remedying the defects without destroying the traditions of the indigenous system. The native magistracy was retained as well as the laws to which the people were accustomed.

The judicial reforms of Hastings have received a very high measure of praise, but his revenue reforms have met with severe criticism. The two main grounds of such criticism are, first, that by adopting the farming system he had placed the ryot at the mercy of unprincipled speculators and second, that the lands had been very much over-assessed.

We have Hastings' own defence on record. He wrote: "It is true that the lands were let in general too high... The exact value of the lands was known only to the *zamindārs* and old farmers from whom it was not to be expected that they should part with their knowledge. To find out the real value the most probable method was to let them to the highest bidders". Where lands were over-rated, he added, "abatements have been allowed... and a competent knowledge has been obtained of the stated capacity of the lands throughout the provinces which will be of great advantage in forming the next settlement when the term of the present shall have expired".²⁰ Again he asks his opponents: "Are they certain that they would have considered themselves better qualified to judge of the real value of the land than those who offered to farm them? Would they have informed a *zamindār* or farmer who proposed to pay a revenue of 20 lakhs of rupees that he had offered five lakhs too much? When they declare that they would have proportioned their demands to abilities of the people, I have a right to ask them by what rule their ability could have been ascertained. When they assert that they would have collected a less revenue, I have a right to expect that they will point out how the service of government might have been reduced in the same proportion?"²¹ Mr. Ramsbotham's remarks may be quoted here with profit. "The revenues had been farmed long before the Company's days but the farmers had been selected by government from men of position, who knew the land. The new regulations... made it possible for any man to bid for the land... the land revenue was placed at the mercy of every kind of disreputable gambler... If farming was necessary, it could have been carried out on different lines, working with the assistance of men of substance and with the existing *zamindārs*, many of whom found themselves ousted.... The problem was very difficult. Hastings and his Committee tried to solve it by concentrating power at headquarters and by an efficient control of the

Khālsā; experience was to show that efficient district Officers and a judicious decentralisation were the real solution. . . ."²²

When all is said, the fact remains that Hastings faced boldly and with the best of intentions a problem which presented enormous difficulties. He laid down as a fundamental for the quinquennial settlement which he made in 1772 that, as far as practicable, settlements were to be made with the existing *zamindārs* and *talukdārs* and in many cases this was done. A large number of vexatious levies were abolished and deductions allowed on their account. Where the *hustabood* was fixed at the same amount at which it had stood before the famine, reductions were considered. Nevertheless, it is true that in their anxiety to have the lands, farmers as well as *zamindārs* in many places settled at so high a value that the amount could not be realised and modified settlements had to be made. Hastings' anxiety for the protection of the ryots from undue exaction and the encouragement of cultivation is manifest in the leases given to the farmers in 1772. The lease ran: "should it be known that you exact more, you will not only have to repay the ryots the sum which you have so exacted but also to make a proportional forfeit to government, and if it is represented that you a second time are guilty of any oppression on the ryots, your farm shall then be made *Khas* and you shall pay a fine to government. . . . On the other hand, if by promoting cultivation and agriculture you can by any legal means reap any advantage from your farm you have nothing to pay to government, exclusive of the *malguzzary*, that advantage will be your own."²³ That these leases failed to protect the ryots, that many of the salutary regulations passed by the Committee of Circuit in 1772 remained pious wishes, and the fact that the settlement of 1772 was open to serious objections, do not deprive Hastings of his right to be praised for an honest attempt to solve a very intricate problem. He, like his colleagues, was groping in the dark. In the next few years alternative schemes were tried, none of which could be said to have succeeded until the English grew tired of this vexed problem and shelved it permanently in 1793.

Before assuming his office as Governor, Hastings had protested against the despotic powers which the Supervisors exercised in the districts and the want of control over them by the Council at Calcutta. To Mr. Purling, Chairman of the Court of Directors, he had written in March 1772: "The obvious remedy to these evils is to redeem the authority of the government by abolishing the Boards of Revenue, recalling the Supervisors, and bringing the collections to

Calcutta". When later on in the year he carried out the reforms of 1772 in accordance with the orders of the Directors, he abolished the Boards of Revenue and centralised the revenue administration, but he could not dispense with the district officers, though he sought to check abuse of their powers. In January 1773, Hastings wrote to Dupre: "We have suffered one capital defect to remain in our constitution—I mean the collectors.... It was once intended to withdraw the collectors entirely. They monopolise the trade of the country. They are most of them agents of their banyans and they are devils.... It appeared that there were among them so many sons, cousins, or relatives of directors and intimates of members of council, that it was better to let them remain than provoke an army of opponents.... They continue, but their power is retrenched and the way paved for their gradual removal, and the Court of Directors have sufficient arguments furnished them to order their recall immediately."²⁴

The Directors in their letter to the Governor and Council at Fort William dated 7 April, 1773, ordered that the Collectors may be withdrawn as soon as possible and asked them, "to substitute some other plan for making yourselves acquainted with the exact value of every district and for giving relief to the inhabitants, till we shall be able to send you complete regulations for conducting this branch of our affairs which we have now under consideration." Hastings realised that the immediate recall of the Collectors and a drastic change following so soon after the changes of the previous year, would not be wise. So it was decided to adopt certain temporary measures preparatory to the introduction of the change. The final plan was to leave the districts entirely in charge of Indian subordinates and to exercise control by means of a Committee of Revenue at Calcutta assisted by occasional inspectors. This was not applied before 1781 and will be discussed in the next chapter. In the meanwhile as a temporary measure the three provinces were divided into six divisions, each under a provincial council. A *diwān* was appointed to each of the provincial councils. As soon as the Collectors had adjusted their accounts, they were to hand over charge to *naib diwāns* who would be appointed by the provincial councils to take charge of the collectorate. These *naib diwāns* were also like the Collectors to preside over the district *diwāni adālat*s. To keep the judicial administration in line with the revenue, provincial *diwāni adālat*s as intermediate courts between district and *Sadr* courts had been constituted. Appeals from the district courts were to lie to these provincial *diwāni adālat*s.

Such changes only touched the surface of the problem and failed to improve the condition of the people of the country. The very basis of a satisfactory settlement, viz., exact information of what was due from the ryots and what was actually levied from them by the farmers remained to be collected. Soon the Regulating Act of 1773 came into operation. As a result, a new Board of Revenue took charge. Their attempts to tackle the problem will be reviewed in the next chapter.

NOTES

1. Malcolm, Sir John, *Life of Clive*, Vol. II, pp. 119 et seq., Clive to Pitt, 7 Jan. 1759.
2. Dodwell, H. H., *Dupleix and Clive*, p. 194.
3. Malcolm, *op. cit.*, p. 120.
4. Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 197.
5. Dodwell, *op. cit.*, p. 203.
- 5a. His father had been murdered on 29 November, 1759, by his Vazir.
6. Chatterji, N. L., *Mir Qasim*, (1935), pp. 252-58.
7. Mill, *History of British India*, Vol. III, p. 316-17.
8. Dasgupta, A. P., *Studies in the History of the British in India*, pp. 36-45.
9. *Ibid*, pp. 50-53.
10. *Ibid*, p. 55.
11. Monckton-Jones M.E., *Warren Hastings in Bengal*, p. 62.
12. *Ibid*, pp. 63-64.
13. Resolutions of the Select Committee, Calcutta, Dec. 15, 1769, see Monckton Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 89.
14. Monckton-Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 90; Resident at Murshidabad to Select Committee, Calcutta, 9 June, 1770.
15. *Ibid*, pp. 90-91. Resident at Murshidabad to Select Committee, Calcutta, 21 June 1770.
16. Dasgupta, *op. cit.*, pp. 12-32.
17. Monckton-Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 151; Hastings to Colebrooke, 26 March, 1772.
18. Monckton-Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 169.
19. Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit at Kasimbazar 15 August, 1772 (Pub. Govt. of Bengal, 1926).
20. Minutes of 8 March, 1775.
21. Minutes of 29 May, 1776.
22. Ramsbotham, *Studies in the Land Revenue History of Bengal (1769-1787)*, pp. 30-31.
23. Proceedings of the Committee of Circuit at Krishnagar (Pub. Govt. of Bengal, 1926), pp. 17-18.
24. Gleig, G. R., *Memoirs of Warren Hastings*, Vol. I, p. 268.

CONSOLIDATION OF BRITISH POWER IN BENGAL (1773-1784)

PART II

The consolidation of the British position in Bengal depended largely on a successful frontier policy. In order to understand the frontier policy of Warren Hastings, it is necessary to recount the political settlement made by Clive after Buxar. The battle of Buxar had placed Awadh at the disposal of the English Company, and Shāh 'Alam had thrown himself on their protection. How could the English utilise this situation to their best advantage. They had become the virtual rulers of Bengal and Bengal needed protection from the attack of other Indian powers—especially the Marāthās. The English decided that the best way to protect themselves from the jealousy of Indian and foreign powers was to conceal their real position and to pretend to be a servant of the emperor of Delhi. The English, therefore, by the Treaty of Allahabad (12 August, 1765) and by subsequent arrangements with the emperor, secured from him a *farman* to act in perpetuity as his *Diwān* for the collection and administration of the revenues of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. As *Diwān*, the Company stipulated to pay the emperor a tribute of 26 lakhs of rupees a year. Two Awadh districts, namely Kora and Allahābād, were given to the emperor for the support of his dignity and expense and a brigade of the Company's troops was stationed at Allahābād for the protection of the emperor. With the exception of Kora and Allahābād, Awadh was restored to Shujā-ud-daulah. Though Shujā-ud-daulah had acted inimically to the English even after Buxar, the English were shrewd enough to see that Awadh under Shāh 'Alam would never serve as an efficient buffer against Marāthā encroachments. Rājā Balwant Singh of Banaras who had befriended the English in their campaign against Mīr Qāsim and his allies, was to be maintained in his *zamindāri* though it was still to remain part of Awadh. Shujā-ud-daulah was to pay an indemnity of 50 lakhs of rupees for the Company's expenses in the late war and as soon as the last instalment of this indemnity was paid the English would withdraw all troops from Awadh, with the exception of a garrison at Chunar and the troops for the emperor's protection at Allahābād.

The alliance with Shujā-ud-daulah was a defensive one. The Company would assist him in any war for the defence of his dominions, but they were not bound to go to his aid if he waged war for the extension of his dominions. The settlement had two points of weakness. It was necessary for Awadh to have Rohilkhand in order to obtain a strategic frontier and it would have been better to keep Kora and Allahābād with Shujā-ud-daulah as the handing over of these districts to the emperor was unsound from the military point of view. Both these points cropped up during the administration of Warren Hastings.

For the first few years this arrangement worked well. Then it was upset by the Marāthās. In 1769, the Marāthās who had withdrawn into the Deccan after the disaster at Pānipat, again advanced into northern India and in 1771 occupied Delhi. In May of that year Shāh 'Ālam left the protection of the English and proceeded towards Delhi where he was installed on the imperial throne by the Marāthās. Shāh 'Ālam soon found that he was virtually a prisoner in the hands of the Marāthās who forced him to make over to them the districts of Kora and Allahābād. This situation made the continuation of the settlement of 1765 concluded by Clive, impossible. Both the Rohillās and Shujā-ud-daulah became nervous at the advance of the Marāthās. In June 1772 Shujā-ud-daulah entered into a treaty with the Rohillās which stipulated that if the Marāthās entered Rohilkhand, Shuja-ud-daulah would go to the help of the Rohillās for which he was to get 40 lakhs from them. Sir Robert Barker, Commander-in-Chief of the British army in Awadh, was present at the signing of this treaty which led Shujā-ud-daulah to believe that the treaty had the approval of the English.

Therefore, when early in 1773 the Marāthās crossed the Gangā into Rohilkhand, Shujā-ud-daulah was pledged by the treaty to go to the assistance of the Rohillā chiefs. The boundary between Rohilkhand and Awadh lay in an open plain without natural defence and Hastings, who was then Governor of Fort William, became concerned for the safety of the frontier. Barker was given instructions to enter into a treaty with the Rohillās for the protection of the part of Rohilkhand, lying on the same side as Shuja-ud-daulah's territories. Barker was not to cross the Gangā in the Rohillā districts beyond that river. He was to avoid embroiling the Company in any offensive war with the Marāthās. In March of the same year the combined forces of the English and Shujā-ud-daulah entered Rohilkhand and advanced in the direction of the Marāthā camp. The Marāthā forces hastily retreated. For the time being, the Marāthās ceased to be a

menace. With the melting of the snows the Gangā became unfordable. Moreover the murder of *Peshwā Nārāyan Rāo* and the internal dissensions which followed at Poona again obliged the Marāthās to withdraw from northern India.

This temporary freedom from danger, however, was no reason for indefinitely postponing plans for strengthening the defence of Awadh. The political settlement of 1765 needed revision in the light of changed circumstances. Moreover, the arrangements had proved a heavy drain on the financial resources of Bengal. Shujā-ud-daulah was paying only the extraordinary expenses of the Company's troops employed by him. Hastings argued that he should bear all expenses of such troops, not merely the extraordinary. The Company had kept a considerable part of their army at Allahābād for the protection of the emperor. This had cost the Company nearly eighty lakhs of rupees in three years, all of which had been remitted in specie from Bengal.

In June 1773 Hastings left Calcutta for Banaras for conference with Shujā-ud-daulah. The result of this conference was the treaty of Banaras signed on 7 September, 1773. Shujā-ud-daulah was given Kora and Allahābād for which he was to pay 50 lakhs of rupees. If Shujā-ud-daulah required the use of the Company's troops he was to pay at the rate of 2 lakh ten thousand rupees per month. This was calculated on the basis of all expenses for the troops including pay, *batta*, stores, and all contingencies. The Nawāb of Awadh agreed to receive a servant of the Company to be deputed by Hastings to reside near his person. The Company was to cease to pay tribute to Shāh 'Alam. By a special agreement Chait Singh was confirmed in his father's *zamindārī*. There was also a verbal agreement by which Hastings was to assist Shujā-ud-daulah against the Rohillās for which the Company was to receive forty lakhs of rupees.

Hastings had been always opposed to the payment of the tribute to the emperor and the Company did not pay any tribute to Shāh 'Alam after he became Governor at Fort William. Now that Shāh 'Alam had gone over to the Marāthās, the continuation of the tribute was dangerous. On this subject Hastings wrote: "... his late conduct has forfeited every claim to it, and made it even dangerous to allow it... It is unjust to argue in support of his pretensions on the Company, that the tribute is no more than a reasonable acknowledgement for the favour which they received from him in the grant of the *Diwāni*. They gave him all, they received nothing from him

but a presumptuous gift of what was not his to give, but what they had already acquired by their power, the same power to which he was indebted for his crown, and even for his existence.”¹

As regards Kora and Allahābād, Hastings rightly argued that these districts had not been given in exchange for the grant of the *Diwāni*. They were given without any consideration, for the support of his dignity and expenses. Moreover, Shāh ‘Alam had made them over to the enemies of the Company by which act a powerful force had been placed on the borders of Awadh thus facilitating their attack on Bengal. Again the English had recovered them not from the emperor, but from the Marāthās and, therefore, had the right to dispose of these districts as they liked. In selling Kora and Allahābād to Shujā-ud-daulah Hastings’ object was two-fold. He wanted to strengthen Shujā-ud-daulah, as he rightly believed that a strong ally was a better one than a weak ally. Besides, he had the shrewd feeling that the addition of these districts to Awadh would be an additional cause of friction between the Marāthās and Shujā-ud-daulah and increase his dependence on the Company. Hastings explains his action thus:

‘By ceding them (to Nawāb of Oudh) we strengthen our alliance with him, we make him more dependent upon us, as he is more exposed to the hostilities of the Marāthās; we render a junction between him and them, which has been sometimes apprehended, morally impossible, since their pretensions to Kora will be a constant source of animosity between them; we free ourselves from the expenses and all the dangers attending either a remote property or a remote connection; we adhere literally to the limited system laid down by the Honourable Court of Directors... .

We provide effectually for the protection of our frontier, and reduce the expenses of our army, even in employing it, and lastly we acquire a nett sum of 50 lacs of rupees most reasonably obtained for the relief of the Company’s necessities.”²

Soon there were other developments. The Rohillās had not paid the forty lakhs promised to the Nawāb of Awadh for his assistance. Added to this cause of grievance was the attempt of the Rohillās to take advantage of the confusion in the affairs of the Marāthās and occupy the Doāb, on which region Shujā-ud-daulah also had his eyes. The Nawāb, therefore, called upon Hastings to assist him as promised at Benaras, in expelling the Rohillās from Rohilkhand. Hastings and the Select Committee decided that they were bound by pro-

mise to help him. Hastings made it clear to Shujā-ud-daulah that though he was pledged to assist him in Rohilkhand he would not take any part in the operation in the Doāb which would involve him in a war with the Marāthās. Without English assistance Shujā-ud-daulah expelled the Marāthā garrisons from Etawah and the neighbouring Doāb districts. Shujā-ud-daulah then decided to march into Rohilkhand. The English now ordered Col. Champion, who was then Commander-in-Chief, to march to the Nawāb's assistance (February, 1774). On 17 April, 1774, took place the battle of Miranpur Katra in which the Rohillā chief, Hāfiz Rahmat Khān, was killed and the Rohillās were totally defeated. About twenty thousand Rohillās were driven out of the country. Rohilkhand was annexed to Awadh with the exception of only a small portion including Rāmpur which was given to Faizullah Khān, son of the founder of the Rohillā power, who entered into a treaty with Shujā-ud-daulah agreeing not to form any alliance with surrounding powers, not to retain more than 5,000 troops in his service and to provide Shujā-ud-daulah with two to three thousand troops when he went to war.

Hastings has been severely condemned by some historians for the Rohillā war, while others have put forward strong arguments in his defence. The charges against Hastings and the points in his favour have been ably summarised by P. E. Roberts in the *Cambridge History of India* (Vol. V) and by Davies in his excellent work entitled *Warren Hastings and Oudh* and need not be repeated here. The chief object of Hastings was to provide Awadh with an easily defensible frontier. If money had been the main consideration, he would have accepted the offer of Faizullah Khān to pay the Company eighty lakhs of rupees, double of what Shujā-ud-daulah was to give, if he was given Rohilkhand. Before the acquisition of Rohilkhand Shujā-ud-daulah had been exposed to attack not only from the Rohillās but also from the Marāthās. Now a constant source of uneasiness to Shujā-ud-daulah and therefore to the English had been removed and Shujā-ud-daulah had obtained, in the words of Hastings, "a complete state, shut in effectually from foreign invasion by the Ganges, all the way from the frontier of Behar to the mountains of Tibet."³

So long Warren Hastings had wielded unquestioned supremacy in directing the affairs of the presidency. The Regulating Act of 1773 however altered the position and Hastings found himself criticised and thwarted in every direction. The Rohillā war came in for severe criticism by his new colleagues in the Council and his Awadh policy was partially reversed.

The circumstances under which a bill for better regulation of the affairs of the East India Company had been introduced in the English Parliament need not be discussed in detail here. The East India Company was no longer only a chartered company of traders. It had in fact established an empire in India whatever might have been the legal status of its possessions. It had become impossible for the Home Government to allow, at the risk of a dangerous shifting of the centre of political gravity, this empire to remain outside the sphere of its control. The result was Lord North's Regulating Act of 1773.⁴ The monopoly of trade, the disposal of patronage and details of administration were left to the Company, but the state was to exercise a control over all the higher affairs of government. The principal provisions of the Act with which we are concerned were the following.

The Governor of the Presidency of Fort William was renamed the Governor-General. The Governor-General was to be assisted by four Councillors. Decisions were to be taken by a majority of votes. The Governor-General was to have a casting vote in case of equal division of opinion. The Governor-General and Council was given a very limited amount of control over the subordinate presidencies of Madras and Bombay. The Governments at these presidencies were forbidden from issuing orders commencing hostilities or declaring war against, or concluding any treaty with, any Indian power without the previous consent of the Governor-General and Council. This restriction was not to apply in case of imminent necessity and the receipt of special orders direct from the Court of Directors. In case of violation of these restrictions a President and Council could be suspended by the Governor-General and Council. The subordinate presidencies were to transmit regularly to the Governor-General intelligence of all transactions relating to the Government, revenues or interests of the Company. The Crown was empowered to establish by a Charter a Supreme Court of Justice consisting of Chief Justice and three puisne judges. All the above provisions of the Regulating Act were mischievous in their effects as they led to the most unseemly quarrels between the different organs of the Government. The Governor-General and members of the Council were soon at loggerheads. Disputes ensued in no time between the newly created central authority and the subordinate presidencies endangering the safety of the Company's possessions. The Supreme Court arrogated to itself a position which led to serious conflicts with the Council and brought about a situation in Bengal akin to anarchy.

The story of Warren Hastings' Governor-Generalship is largely woven around the conflicts generated by the Regulating Act.

The Governor-General and the four members of the Bengal Council were named in the Act. Warren Hastings became the Governor-General. Philip Francis, Sir John Clavering, Colonel Monson and Richard Barwell were appointed Councillors. They were appointed for five years. Any casual vacancy in the membership of the Council could be filled by the Directors with the assent of the Crown. After five years the Company was to have the full patronage.

Francis, Clavering and Monson were men without Indian experience. They came out with a preconceived and unaltering notion that everything in the conduct of affairs here was vicious and deserved to be condemned. Barwell was the only new Councillor who was already resident in India. He was at first critical of Hastings, but later became his staunch supporter.

The majority of the Council being hostile to Hastings, the Governor-General found himself counteracted in every direction and a bitter struggle between him and the majority ensued, which for six years seriously endangered the affairs of the Company in India. The quarrel was embittered by acute personal enmity and things came to such a pass that for four days in June 1777, Clavering contested with Hastings for the Governor-General's chair and in July 1781 Hastings forced Francis to a duel in which Francis was badly wounded, and after sometime, returned to England.

One of the first acts of the new Council was to condemn the Rohillā war, to order the withdrawal of the Company's troops from Rohilkhand, at the same time to demand from the Nawāb of Awadh the forty lakhs which he had promised and to reverse the arrangement made by the former administration in Awadh. Middleton, who had been appointed by Hastings as Resident in Awadh in terms of the Treaty of Banaras, was recalled and Bristow, a protégé of Francis, was appointed in his place. In January 1775 Shujā-ud-daulah died and was succeeded by his son Asaf-ud-daulah. The majority in the Council forced a treaty on the new Nawāb imposing fresh conditions on him different from the treaty of Banaras. This treaty was settled by Bristow, acting under orders of the Council, with the Nawāb in May 1775 and is known as the treaty of Fyzabad. The Council guaranteed to Asaf-ud-daulah the possession of the *subāh* of Awadh and subject to ratification of the treaty of Banaras by the Court of Directors, the possession of Kora and Allahābād. The Council was

unwilling to accept responsibility for the defence of the Rohillā country and the recent conquest in the *doāb*, though they finally agreed to send troops to defend these unguaranteed parts of his dominions. Asaf-ud-daulah ceded to the Company in full sovereignty all the territories of Chait Singh together with the mint and the *Kotwāli* of Banaras. The subsidy for a brigade of British troops which was Rs. 2,10,000 was now raised to Rs. 2,60,000 per month. All foreigners in the employ of Asaf-ud-daulah were dismissed and the Company's consent was made essential to the employment of any European. Thus the majority showed themselves to be more greedy than Hastings by increasing the tribute from Awadh and forcing the Nawāb to cede a part of his dominions.

The acquisition of the new territories comprising the *zamindāri* of the Rājā of Banaras made it necessary for the Company to enter into an arrangement with Chait Singh. Francis Fowke, son of Joseph Fowke, who was co-defendant with Nandkumār in a suit brought by Hastings, was chosen by the majority to proceed to Banaras and deliver to Chait Singh his *sanads* of investiture as *zamindār*, *amin*, and *faujdār* of Banaras and certain other districts. Chait Singh was to have the mint i.e., the privilege of coining and *Kotwāli* of Banaras for which he was to pay a fixed annual compensation in addition to the tribute that he was to pay as *zamindār*. The total annual tribute was fixed ultimately at 22½ lakhs of rupees. The Rājā was to pay *nazrānā* to the Company and issue a proclamation explaining his actual position to the inhabitants of his *zamindāri*. He was forbidden, on the point of forfeiture of his *zamindāri*, to carry on negotiations with the enemies of the Company and he was to maintain a body of 2,000 cavalry, disciplined and equipped after the European fashion, for the protection of his territories. It will be seen from the above that Chait Singh was left free to mint coins and to collect revenues and exercise police jurisdiction within his *zamindāri*, but the exercise of these functions rested on grants from the Company in whom vested the sovereignty over these territories. It would not be correct, therefore, to describe him as an independent prince.

One very unfortunate result of the quarrel in the Council was the use made by the majority of Maharaja Nandkumār and his victimisation by Warren Hastings. In March 1775 Nandkumār brought against Hastings the charge of having received from Munni Begam a bribe of Rs. 3,54,105 for appointing her guardian of the young Nawāb. When the majority of the Council entertained the charge, Hastings was furious. In April Hastings, Barwell and Vansittart

charged Joseph Fowke and Nandkumār for endeavouring to coerce one Kamāl-ud-din to accuse Hastings and Barwell of having received other bribes. In May one Mohan Prasād brought a charge of forgery against Nandkumār, and two judges of the Supreme Court sitting as magistrates committed Nandkumār for a trial on the forgery charge. Nandkumār was tried by the Supreme Court, and a jury entirely consisting of Eurasian inhabitants of Calcutta under English law which was of doubtful application at the time in India, and was sentenced to death on the charge. Nandkumār appealed piteously to Francis from prison, but neither Francis nor his friends, Monson and Clavering, raised a finger to come to Nandkumār's assistance and back an application for reprieve. Hastings had made no secret of his detestation of Nandkumār and was glad that he was being removed from his way. One of his dependants even exerted himself to prevent a petition of reprieve from being presented. Thus ended the life of a true patriot as the victim of a conspiracy.

One of the reasons for parliamentary interference in the affairs of the Company was the desire of the people in England to check the abuse of authority by the servants of the Company in this country. For this purpose the existing judicial arrangement in Bengal was considered unsatisfactory. The Mayor's Court which administered English law, had authority only over the town or district of Calcutta and its subordinate factories. There were many British subjects resident in Bengal who did not fall under the jurisdiction of English law. Again, the fact that the judges of the Charter Courts were subject to removal by the Governor-General and Council made it difficult for them to punish the Company's servants without fear of consequences. The Regulating Act, therefore, provided for a judiciary emanating directly from the Crown. The Act, however, failed to define clearly its jurisdiction or its relations to the Governor-General and Council and the existing judiciary. The Supreme Court was constituted of a Chief Justice and three puisne judges appointed by the king from barristers of five years' standing, to hold office at pleasure. The Court had authority over all European and British subjects resident in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. It could decide suits brought against any British subject in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa as well as suits against any person employed by or in the service of the Company. It could also decide any suit brought by a British subject against any inhabitant of India within Bengal, Bihar and Orissa on any contract in writing agreeing that in case of dispute the matter should be determined in the Supreme Court, provided the cause of action exceeded five hundred rupees. The rules,

ordinances and regulations for the good order and civil government of Fort William and the subordinate factories were not to have effect until registered in the Supreme Court with its approval. Thus the Court was to serve as a check on hasty legislation.⁵

The Parliament, says Mills "saw not that they were establishing two independent and rival powers in India, that of the Supreme Council and that of the Supreme Court, they drew no line to mark the boundary between them; and they foresaw not the consequences which followed, a series of encroachments and disputes, which unnerved the powers of government and threatened their destruction".⁶ The Supreme Court started to exercise its powers pedantically. The Court was a king's court and the judges were the king's judges. They derived their power from a source which was superior to the power from which the position of the Governor-General and Council emanated. They claimed that they were here to afford protection to whomsoever sought it and went so far beyond the vaguely defined limits of their jurisdiction that they paralysed the work of the Company's Government and even challenged the Nawāb's authority over the *nizāmat*. Though, in April 1775, Hastings seemed so pleased with the Court as to mention to Lord North "the protection which it affords to the weak against oppression", he did not hesitate to tell the sponsor of the Act as follows:

"It appears to me defective only in the inadequacy of its natural powers to the extent of its jurisdiction. I much fear that it will be found scarce possible in practice to make the distinction intended by the Act, and Charter, between such persons as are employed in the service of the Company, or of British subjects, and other native inhabitants. The mutual concerns and connexions of two classes so formed of the same people will bring about every man of property within the sphere of the Supreme Court, independently of the necessity to which it seems unavoidably liable of exercising a temporary authority, even over those not subject to it by the Act for the purpose of ascertaining their exemption from it. The geographical measurement of the provinces of Bengal exceeds, perhaps that of Great Britain, and the number of litigable disputes is at least as great. Judge then, my Lord, how incompetent a single court, however composed, must be for the efficient distribution of justice to such a nation?"⁷

To remedy the defect in the Act, Hastings suggested to Lord North that the Company's Civil Courts may be made dependent on the Supreme Court and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court may

be given a seat on the Council Board.⁸ Firminger correctly interprets the intentions of the framers of the Act when he says:

“That the Court was not intended to hold an unlimited jurisdiction throughout the province is clear from the repeated references to European and British subjects, to natives under the protection or in the employment of British subjects. The Supreme Court was in fact to occupy the position of the Mayor’s Court and its institution was believed to be necessary because the Mayor’s Court had been found an insufficient deterrent to wrong doings on the part of the company officials. . . . It was not intended to supersede or trespass upon the judicature deriving their authority from the Moghul Sovereignty by practically edging it into limbo. The establishment of the Supreme Court enabled the Directors to take the trial of alleged offences of its servants out of the hands of a complacent Council Board and have such cases determined by the Court of puisne justices of the Crown.”⁹

Again what law the Court was to administer was not settled in the Act, probably because the assumption was that the Court was meant for those who were actually or constructively British subjects and therefore required English law. There was no idea of introducing English law with all its technicalities throughout the whole of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa.

Soon the defects in the Act pointed out by Hastings became apparent. The Court gave the widest interpretation to the word ‘British subjects’ and persons in the employment of the Company and all persons connected with the collection of rents and Indians imprisoned by those collectors were all brought within their jurisdiction. As a matter of fact, writs of *habeas corpus* were freely granted to public debtors so imprisoned.

The work of revenue collection and administration of civil justice was nearly brought to a standstill. The Governor-General and Council declared, “By the several acts and declarations of the judges, it is plain that the Company’s office of Dewan is annihilated; that the country government is subverted and that any attempt on our part to exercise or support the powers of either, may involve us and our officers in the guilt and penalty of high treason”.

For the judges of a Court in the constitution of which the sovereignty of the king of England over Bengal might be construed, it was difficult to understand the peculiar status of the Nawāb of Bengal and the *de jure* position of the Company in this province.

The anxiety of the Company to keep up the appearance of the *Nizāmat* was not understood by them and they claimed jurisdiction, civil as well as criminal, over the whole of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Mr. Justice Hyde declared publicly on the bench, "The Act of Parliament does not consider Mubaruck-ud-Dowla as a sovereign prince; the jurisdiction of this Court extends over all his dominions."

Let us now illustrate the effects of the interpretation given by the judges of the Supreme Court of their powers and functions. The Patna case illustrates how a thirst for enlarging its jurisdiction led the Supreme Court to interfere with the administration of justice by the Company's Civil Courts. On the death of a rich Mahomedan, both his widow and his nephew claimed his whole property. The Provincial Council at Patna, before whom the case came up in January, 1777, deputed, according to usual practice, a *Kāzi* and two *Muftis* to enquire into the claims of the parties according to Mahomedan Law. The *Kāzi* and the *Muftis* reported that the property should be divided into four parts and one part given to the widow and three parts given to the brothers of the deceased and father of the nephew. The Council considered the report, heard the parties and ordered the distribution of the property as recommended. The widow refused to submit to the decision of the Provincial Council and to accept her share and brought an action in the Supreme Court against the nephew, the *Kāzi* and the *Muftis* for the part they had taken in carrying out the orders of the Council. The objection raised by the nephew to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was overruled by the judges who declared that every renter was a servant of the Company. The *Kāzi* and the *Muftis* pleaded that they had acted regularly in their judicial capacity in obedience to the lawful orders of their legal superiors. The judges decided on the maxim of English law that the provincial council could not delegate any authority to the *Kāzi* and the *Muftis*, even as their agents, and therefore all that they had done was without authority. The nephew and the *Kāzi* were arrested at Patna. The bail demanded was four lakhs of rupees. The Council of Patna decided to offer bail for the prisoners. The Governor-General and Council resolved that "they be supported and indemnified by Government from all consequences from which they can be legally indemnified". The Supreme Court gave judgment against the defendants who were to pay to the widow 3 lakhs of rupees as damages and 9,208 rupees as costs. The defendants except the *Kāzi* who was an old man and expired on the way, were then conveyed to Calcutta under a guard of sepoy and lodged in jail. They were released in 1781 by the interference of the Bri-

tish Parliament and granted a pecuniary compensation. The *Muftis* were not only reinstated but promoted.

Not satisfied, the widow also brought an action against the members of the Provincial Council in the Supreme Court and obtained damages amounting to 15,000 rupees which money was paid from the Company's treasury.

The Dacca case is an example of the interference of the Supreme Court with the jurisdiction of the Criminal Courts functioning under the *Nizāmat*. A 'Paik' or messenger had been convicted in the *Faujdāri* Court at Dacca for a misdemeanour and put into jail. This man brought a suit before the Supreme Court against the *diwān* of this Court for trespass and false imprisonment. One of the judges of the Supreme Court issued a process of arrest against the *diwān* (1777). An attorney of the Supreme Court residing at Dacca deputed his bailiffs for executing the process of arrest. The bailiffs proceeded to the *faujdār's* house and attempted in a violent manner to seize the *diwān* who was present there. The *faujdār* refused to allow the *diwān* to be arrested, whereupon the attorney proceeded to the house in person with a large number of attendants, broke down the gate and forcibly entered the house. The result was an affray in which the *faujdār's* father was wounded in the head with a sword by an attendant of the attorney and the attorney himself shot the *faujdār's* brother-in-law with a pistol and wounded him dangerously. Justice Hyde highly approved the conduct of the attorney and promised him the Court's support. The Provincial Council bailed the *diwān* and wrote to the Governor-General and Council that "all criminal justice is at a stand, and seems not likely to be resumed until the decisive consequences of the present disputes shall be publicly declared and known."

The Supreme Court was at open war with the Supreme Council when in 1779 it proceeded against a *zamindār* of Midnapur, the *Rājā* of Kasijora, on the complaint of *Kāsināth Bābū*, his agent at Calcutta. When the *Rājā* evaded arrest by absconding, the Court issued a writ to sequester his land and effects. The Sheriff despatched to Kasijora an armed force for the execution of the writ. Under orders of the Governor-General and Council their party was seized and detained by the officer commanding the troops at Midnapur. The Supreme Council notified all *zamindārs* and *tahsildārs* in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa that except in the two cases of being the Company's servants or bound by their own agreement, they were not to consider themselves subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The pro-

vincial Chiefs were forbidden to lend any military force to assist in the execution of the orders of the Court. The Supreme Court took revenge by committing the Company's attorney to jail and serving summons individually on the members of the Supreme Council to answer to Kāsināth Bābū for trespass. The members of the Council refused to submit to the Court in any proceedings brought against them as individuals.¹⁰

Hastings was anxious to put an end to this intolerable situation and at the same time to improve the judiciary. The *Sadr Diwāni Adālat* had been kept in abeyance because the Governor-General and Council had no time for judicial duties. The Provincial Courts also, it was admitted, had not been working satisfactorily. On 11 April, 1780, the Governor-General and Council passed a series of regulations for the administration of justice. The six provincial councils which were supervising the district *diwāni adālat*s were to remain courts of justice for the trial and decision of cases relating to public revenue only. There were to be six divisional *diwāni* courts to try all other civil suits. These courts were to be presided over by a covenanted servant of the Company with the title of the Superintendent of the *Diwāni Adālat*. Provisions were laid down to avoid clashes between the Superintendents of the *Adālat*s and the Provincial Councils. The *Sadr Diwāni Adālat* was now revived and it was laid down that in cases of sums exceeding Rs. 1,000 appeals were to lie to "The Governor-General and Council in their department of *Sadr Diwāni Adālat*. Such appeals must go through the Chief of the provincial council of revenue."

Though the *Sadr Diwāni Adālat* had been revived, the pressure of business prevented the members of the Council from actually sitting as a court and important cases were decided on the recommendation of the Keeper of *Khālsā* Records without the members hearing the evidence at all.

On 29 September, 1780, therefore Hastings brought forward his famous scheme for the revival of the *Sadr Diwāni Adālat*. The *Sadr Diwāni Adālat* was a Court of Appeal. It had also to exercise a general supervision over the inferior courts. This authority the Board was incapable of exercising. Therefore, he suggested that the Chief Justice be requested "to accept of the charge and superintending of the office of the *Diwāni Adālat*" and be styled the judge of the *Sadr Diwāni Adālat*. Wheler and Francis objected to the proposal, and Hastings supported by Sir Eyre Coote carried the proposal

with his casting vote and in October Impey accepted the post offered him.

Wheler was right in contending that the appointment would be contrary to the spirit of the Regulating Act. The Supreme Court had been set up to deal with complaints against the Company's servants. The Chief Justice would be now in the pay of the Company and at the head of the Company's judiciary which was staffed by those very servants. Obviously Impey had placed himself in an invidious position. He was open to the charge that he had been bribed by Hastings and had forfeited his judicial independence.

Impey's appointment was looked upon with disfavour in England and the Court of Directors and the House of Commons petitioned the Crown for his recall. Impey left India in 1783 to answer charges against him. In the meanwhile orders from the Directors arrived instructing the Council to resume its jurisdiction.

In the meanwhile a petition had been sent by the principal British inhabitants in Bengal to Parliament against the exercise of their powers by the Supreme Court. The Governor-General and Council had also petitioned the Directors. These together with a petition from the East India Company were placed before the House of Commons and were referred to a Select Committee. The result was the Act of 1781 amending the Constitution of the Supreme Court. The Act provided that:

- (i) The Governor-General and Council were not to be subject to the Supreme Court for acts done by them in their official capacity.
- (ii) The Supreme Court was to have no jurisdiction in matters concerning the revenue or its collection.
- (iii) Mere employment by the Company or by a native of Great Britain should not render a person subject to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court except in actions for wrongs and trespasses and also except in any civil suit by written agreement of parties to submit to the Court's decision.
- (iv) Persons exercising judicial offices in the Indian *adālat*s and persons acting under such authority were not to be amenable to actions for wrong or injury in the Supreme Court.
- (v) The Supreme Court was to have jurisdiction over all inhabitants of Calcutta, but Hindu or Muhammadan laws were to be administered in cases of inheritance, contract and succession.

Thus the powers of the Supreme Court were at last defined and the court was kept away from mischief. The need of a central authority to control the dealings of the British Presidencies with the Indian powers, with a view to secure a uniform policy, had been felt for sometime before the Regulating Act and Lord Clive had suggested that such an authority should be established in Bengal.¹¹ The Regulating Act provided that the Governor-General and Council of Bengal shall have "power of superintending and controlling the Government and management of the Presidencies of Madras, Bombay and Bencoolen respectively so far and insomuch as that it shall not be lawful for any President and Council of Madras, Bombay or Bencoolen to make any orders for commencing hostilities or declaring or making war against any Indian Prince or power, or negotiating or concluding any treaty of peace or other treaty with any such Indian Princes or powers, unless the consent and approbation of the said Governor-General and Council had been obtained first, except in such cases of imminent necessity as would render it dangerous to postpone such hostilities or treaties until the order of the Governor-General and Council might arrive; and except in such cases where the said presidents and councils shall have received special orders from the said United Company...." A penalty was prescribed for disobedience of the orders of the Governor-General and Council, which was suspension from office. The Presidencies were to transmit regularly to the Governor-General and Council advice and intelligence of all transactions and matters whatsoever that shall come to their knowledge relating to the Government, revenues, or interests of the said United Company."¹² It will be seen that no positive power was given to Bengal. The Governor-General and Council could only say 'Yes' or 'No' when matters relating to commencement of hostilities or negotiations of treaties were referred to them. The pleas of imminent necessity and orders from the Directors could be preferred at every step by the subordinate presidencies, leaving the central authority powerless while the subordinate presidencies brought the affairs of the Company to a critical position. On the other hand, a responsibility for "the security of the possessions and revenues of the Company" had been thrust upon the Governor-General and Council by the Directors. This made it necessary for the Governor-General and Council to intervene in the affairs of the subordinate presidencies even in matters in which their legal powers could be questioned. The financial resources of Bombay and Madras were meagre and they depended for men, money and supplies on Bengal in times of war. The Supreme Council could be asked to finance a war for which they were not responsible. There would

be the natural temptation, after help had been sent, to seek to regulate the conduct of the war and to decide when, how and on what terms a treaty was to be concluded, for which the Supreme Council had no legal power. This absurd position led to the most unfortunate relations between the Central Government and the Governments of Bombay and Madras and on occasions endangered the safety of the British possessions in India. A detailed discussion of the relations between the Central Government and the subordinate presidencies under the Regulating Act of 1773 is beyond the scope of this chapter. It is sufficient to say that the Company's possession of so rich a province as Bengal enabled it to finance the wars undertaken by the Bombay and Madras presidencies and to save the British position in India. When the revenues of Bengal were not enough to make up the money required for these wars, Hastings had to adopt questionable methods of extortion of money as in the case of Chait Singh and the Begams of Awadh.

We have now to resume the account of the efforts made by the Company's servants towards devising an efficient system of land revenue collection at the point at which it was left in the preceding chapter. The results of the quinquennial settlement of 1772 were proving more deplorable each year. The necessity of devising some fresh method had become imperative. Accordingly in March 1775 Hastings invited the opinions of the members of the Council on the subject. Hastings and Barwell presented a joint plan in which they practically adopted the principle of a permanent settlement by recommending leases for life or for two joint lives, forming such settlements with *zamindārs* wherever possible. Francis opposed this plan and in January 1776 brought forward his own plan. He proposed that the new settlement was to be based on an estimate of the actual requirements of the Company instead of being based on an estimate of what the lands could bear. The amount Government needed to raise by way of land revenue was to be ascertained. The contributions of the districts would be settled accordingly and fixed for ever. This fixed settlement was to be made with the *zamindārs*, who he argued were the lawful owners of the soil. To guard against deficits he proposed that the *zamindāris* which defaulted were to be sold. As to the machinery of revenue collection, Francis contended that the institution of the Provincial Councils was fundamentally wrong and recommended the reappointment of Supervisors. Francis' views, which he publicised in England, exercised a great influence in preparing the revenue policy dictated by Pitt's India Act of 1784.

The quinquennial settlement was coming to an end in 1777 and a fresh settlement had to be made. Before the settlement could be made it was essential to obtain accurate information as to the real value of the lands, as an assessment based on faulty information would be disastrous. Hastings proposed the appointment of a commission to undertake the task. An additional object of the proposed commission was "the better and more effectual regulation of *pottahs* for the security of the ryots in the perpetual and undisputed possession of their lands". David Anderson, George Bogle and Charles Croftes were appointed members of the Commission. Henry Vansittart was the Persian translator and Gangā Govind Singh was appointed *Peshkar*. The Governor-General was to be in direct control of the proceedings of the Commission.

As in the case of all other proposals put forward by Hastings, Francis came out with his objections to the appointment of this Commission and was supported by Clavering and Monson. Hastings was obliged to get the matter through the Council by means of his casting vote. The Commission immediately got to work and sent out *amins* into all the districts to collect necessary accounts and papers. The report of this Commission, known in history as the *Amini Commission*, was completed in March 1778.

"The *Amini* Report was the first technical and professional explanation of the system employed in collecting the land revenue of Bengal that was placed before the Company..... The various classes of landlords and the different forms of land tenure are set forth, together with a description of the hereditary and temporary agencies that existed for administering and collecting this revenue at the time when the Company assumed the *Diwāni*. The accounts of a district are explained in detail, their *modus operandi* and their interdependency. The decline in administrative efficiency, resulting in oppression of the ryots and the defrauding of Government is related with comments showing how the *zamindārs* trusting to the want of information in Government had deliberately increased the areas of land alleged to be free from taxation, because they were ostensibly used for religious uses. The report lays stress on the necessity of expert and continual supervision by responsible officers of the revenue collections, and concludes by suggesting a few general principles to be observed in assessing the land revenue of a district."¹³

Unfortunately the Directors disapproved of the appointment of the Commission as they saw no reason why after so many years

of investigation further information should be still required. Confused as they were by the conflicting opinions of their servants on the spot, they were unable to take any definite decision and decided to mark time. Accordingly in December 1778 they sent orders for the land revenue to be settled annually.

It will be remembered that the machinery for revenue collection which was in operation was a temporary arrangement pending the application of a more permanent plan kept in readiness. The essence of this permanent plan was 'that all the collections of the provinces should be brought down to the Presidency and be there administered by a Committee of the most able and experienced of the Covenanted servants of the Company under the immediate inspection of, and with the opportunity of constant reference for instruction to, the Governor-General and Council.'¹⁴ In February 1781, it was decided to give effect to this plan. Accordingly—

- (i) A Committee of Revenue consisting of four Covenanted servants of the Company was constituted. The first to be appointed to the Committee was David Anderson, John Shore, Samuel Charters and Charles Croftes. Gangā Govind Singh was appointed *diwān*. The Committee was to be entrusted with the charge and administration of all the public revenues under the control of the Governor-General and Council.
- (ii) The Provincial Councils were dissolved, but the chiefs of the Councils were to remain in the temporary charge of the respective divisions under the authority of the Committee.
- (iii) The office of the Superintendent of the *Khālsā* records was abolished and the functions of *Khālsā* were transferred to the Committee of Revenue.
- (iv) The office of the *Rāy rāyan* was placed under the Supreme Council and its holder was forbidden to interfere in the business transacted by the *diwān* of the committee.
- (v) The Collectors were replaced in all the districts.
- (vi) The *Kanungos* were reinstated.

Though the collectors were reappointed, they were denied any interference with the new settlement of the revenues. Even as the collecting agencies, the local collectors were not trusted. The new collectors were mere figureheads. The mofussil *Kanungos* who

were reappointed to assist the Collectors were under the control of the *Sadr Kanungos* who bowed at the feet of the Committee of Revenue. This extreme centralisation led to the failure of this scheme. The Committee of Revenue became a tool in the hands of the *diwān*. It could not discover the real state of any district, nor could it distinguish truth from falsehood. Without an effective local agency, the ryots could not be protected from oppression, and regular realisation of the revenues could not be secured.

The settlement of 1781 was made principally with the *zamindārs* for varying periods, not exceeding three years in different districts. For the years 1784-86 annual settlements were concluded by special officers deputed by the Committee.

Warren Hastings left India in February 1785. With his departure, the coming into operation of Pitt's India Act of 1784 and the arrival of Lord Cornwallis as Governor-General, a new epoch in the history of the East India Company's administration of its possessions in India begins. It is, therefore, necessary at this stage to examine how far the English had consolidated their position in Bengal at the end of Hastings' period of rule. The security of the province of Bengal had been obtained by the judicious creation of Awadh as a buffer state. The English had stopped payment of the tribute to the Mughul emperor and no longer felt it necessary to masquerade as mere servants of the Great Mughul. The process of erosion of the sovereignty of the Nawāb of Bengal was almost complete and he was now only a pensioner of the Company. The Company's authority over Bengal had been firmly established. The task of revenue collection and the administration of civil justice was fully exercised by the Company, and the administration of criminal justice and the police of the districts was under their control, though still in theory with the Nawāb. It was left for Cornwallis to do away with the small remnants of the rights vested in the Nawāb as *Nāzim*.

No account of the administration of Warren Hastings can be complete without a reference to the spirit in which he approached his great task of governing a subject people. The voluminous records of his administration evince his solicitude for the people he was called upon to govern, his desire to respect their customs and past traditions and to associate the natives of the soil with the administration. In the copious minutes and notes relating to local revenue administration, Hastings' concern for the security of the ryots is evident. The affection and esteem for the people of Bengal which

he developed while he lived among them as a humble clerk of the Company survived his elevation to a position of great power.

Hastings knew Bengali and Persian very well. He had a working knowledge of Urdu and knew a little Arabic. Though he never learnt Sanskrit, he associated with the well-known pundits of his time and his unbounded admiration for the philosophy of the *Gītā* and for Sanskrit learning is brought out abundantly in his introduction to Wilkins' translation of the *Gītā*, where he says that "the philosophy of the *Gītā* has a permanent value and will continue to influence the world long after the British empire will have been forgotten." Hastings' interest in the civilisation, thought and languages of India led him to encourage the study of Persian at Oxford. He established the Calcutta *Madrasah* in 1781. Inspired by his respect and zeal for oriental learning, a number of the servants of the Company began to take to oriental studies. Halhed translated the Digest of Hindu Law from Persian into English. Halhed's grammar of the Bengali language was printed in 1778 with type cast by Wilkins. Wilkins was proficient alike in Persian and Sanskrit and translated the *Bhagavad Gītā* from Sanskrit. The great orientalist Sir William Jones arrived in 1783 and with the assistance of Pundit Jagannāth Tarkapañchānan began the translation of the Laws of Manu. Hastings, Jones, Wilkins and Halhed joined in founding the Asiatic Society for the furtherance of the knowledge of the East. Thus it will not be inaccurate to say that the Indian Renaissance which blossomed in the 19th century had its roots in this period of Hastings' administration.

NOTES

1. Davies, C. C., *Warren Hastings and Oudh* (1939), p. 36.
2. Forrest, G. W., *Selection from State Papers, etc.*, Vol. I, p. 50.
3. *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V, p. 219.
4. Keith, A. B., *Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy*, Vol. I, pp. 49-59.
5. Keith, A. B., *Constitutional History of India*, p. 75.
6. Mill, *History of British India*, Vol. V, Chap. xxx, p. 268.
7. Gleig, *Memoirs of the Life of Warren Hastings*, Hastings to Lord North (2 April, 1775), Vol. I, pp. 540-41.
8. *Ibid*, pp. 541-42.
9. Firminger, *Introduction to the Fifth Report*.
10. Mill, *op. cit.*, Bk. V, Chap. VI, pp. 282-96.
11. Dasgupta, A. P., *The Central Authority in British India, 1774-84*, pp. 2-4.
12. Keith, A. B., *Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy*, Vol. I, pp. 46-47.
13. Ramsbotham, *Studies in the Land Revenue History of Bengal*, pp. 96-97.
14. *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. V, p. 427.

CHAPTER XI

MARATHAS AND THE NORTH INDIAN STATES (1772-1799)

Confusion in Mughul Court:

Northern India had passed through a series of political convulsions and moral degeneracy during the reigns of Farrukh-siyar and Mūhammad Shāh. Masters of Gujarāt, Mālwa and Bundelkhand, the Marāthās had demonstrated the weakness of the empire by suddenly appearing in the environs of Delhi in 1737. Nādir Shāh's invasion of 1739 was a mighty blow, but the empire survived it, somehow. In 1748 the Mughuls exhibited a flicker of their former strength by scoring a victory over the Afghāns at Sirhind. But in 1752 the resourceful Afghān—Ahmad Shāh Abdālī—annexed the two frontier provinces of Lahore and Multan. The helpless Mughul emperor Ahmad Shāh craved Marāthā protection and entered into an agreement with Malhār Rāo Hōlkar and Jayappā Sindia in May 1752. The Marāthās gained from the emperor the *chauth* of the Punjāb, Sind and the Doāb, in addition to the *subāhdari* of Ajmer and Āgra; in exchange the Marāthās agreed to protect the emperor against external enemies and recalcitrant subjects. This agreement has been described as “a defensive subsidiary treaty”.¹

The risky commitment to which Sindia and Holkar agreed could only have been successfully carried out had they acted in close co-operation and received adequate support from Poona. It was, therefore, no wonder that the Marāthās had to succumb to the combination of Indian Muslim chiefs and the Afghān adventurer, Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, on 14 January, 1761, on the fatal field of Pānipat, despite the extension of their power up to the river Chenab, effected mainly through the agency of the *Peshwā's* brother, Raghunāth Rāo. The battle of Pānipat left the Rohillā chief, Najib-ud-daulah, Abdālī's Indian supporter, as the undisputed master of Delhi during the next nine years. The Marāthās were so emasculated that everywhere in Hindustān—in the Gangetic Doāb, in Bundelkhand, in Rājputānā and in Mālwa—the dispossessed rulers and petty landlords raised their heads.

From this perilous situation the Marāthās recovered slowly. A spasmodic start had been made by Malhār Rāo Holkar who defeated

Mādhō Singh of Jaipur at Mangrol near Kota (29 November, 1761). An indirect recognition of the continuity of Marāthā power in north was provided by the formal acceptance of *status quo* by Ahmad Shāh Abdālī in 1763. Three years later the Marāthās—led by Raghunāth Rāo, Malhār Rao Hōlkar and Mahādji Sindia—reappeared on the northern political spectrum but only to withdraw a year later following a revival of the Abdālī menace.

Najib's death in 1770 induced the Mughul emperor, Shāh 'Alam, who had been living in exile at Allahābād as a pensioner of the East India Company, to think seriously of coming back to Delhi, where he could regale himself with the yet visible symbol of imperial sovereignty. He had been repeatedly duped by the British promises of help; he, therefore, turned expectantly towards the Marāthās. On 12 February, 1771, the emperor ratified a formal agreement with the Marāthās and left Allahābād two months later. Mahādji Sindia met him at Anupshahar and the exiled emperor entered Delhi on 6 January, 1772, as a Marāthā protégé. At last *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo had the satisfaction of having effaced the ignominy of Pānipat and restored Marāthā power once more to its unenviable position. The policy laid down by Bājī Rāo I and extended by his son now seemed to be reaching fulfilment.

No sooner did the Marāthās begin to reassert their power in Hindustān than they were diverted to momentous issues in the south which engulfed the Marāthās following the murder of *Peshwā* Nārāyan Rāo (30 August 1773) and the outbreak of the first war with the English. The emperor was a mere puppet in the hands of the all-powerful chieftain, Mirzā Najaf Khān. But this chief died on 6 April 1782, and the emperor once more exhibited a pathetic picture of indolence and vacillation.

Confusion reigned supreme in the Mughul Court and there was no semblance of law and order in the city of Delhi. "The Sikhs have plundered the country close to the city, and the Mewatis and Gujars, who are common robbers, so totally infest the country on every side... that travellers cannot pass from any one city to another; this, joined to the failure of the harvest, has produced a famine at Delhi; so that the distresses of that capital are extreme".²

The British were not slow to take advantage of the emperor's miserable plight. Warren Hastings, now emerging from the Marāthā War, sent Major Browne to the emperor, in the summer of 1782, on an exploratory mission. He was asked to study the character, connection, influence and power of the several competitors for the

possession of the King's favour or the exercise of his authority, and the views of foreign powers. His offer of military aid was conditional and limited.

Having reached Delhi early in 1783, Browne warmly advocated the emperor's cause and tried to quicken Hastings' zeal by his eloquence. He observed: "The whole Mughul empire looks to you for redemption from the utmost distress and confusion".³ But Hastings did not wish to be drawn into a situation by any unwise or wrongful action; even Browne's request in early 1784 to form an alliance with Shāh 'Alam and Afrāsiyāb Khān, the adopted son of Mirzā Najaf Khān, met with no response from Hastings. In April, 1784, the whole situation took a sudden turn by the flight of Prince Jahāndar Shāh (Jawān Bakht), the emperor's son and heir to the throne, to the protection of the *vazīr* and the British in Lucknow. Mahādji Sindia, who had now been able to consolidate his position in Mālwa, suggested to Hastings that the British should dissociate themselves from the Prince and the latter be restored with Marāthā assistance. Meanwhile 'Abdul Ahad, the emperor's minister and a henchman of the British, had been imprisoned by Afrāsiyāb Khān on 30 May 1784. Hastings had to give up with reluctance his cherished desire of turning the Mughul emperor into a stooge of British imperialism. He refused to undertake fresh commitments, exhausted as the Company had been by the Marāthā-Mysore wars. To Hastings it also appeared that Sindia, through whose mediation the treaty of Salbai had been concluded, would be too preoccupied in numerous difficulties to embark on any adventure either against the English or their ally the Nawāb-Vazīr of Awadh.

Mahādji becomes Supreme:

Meanwhile the imperial court was riven by two factions—one headed by Afrāsiyāb Khān, mentioned above, and the other by Muhammad Beg Hamdāni, Governor of the Province of Āgra. Mahādji was sensitive to British infiltration in Delhi politics and asked Afrāsiyāb Khān to remain vigilant and to keep the emperor under his control. Mahādji apprised Afrāsiyāb that the emperor should be arrested if necessary but must not be allowed to seek British sanctuary.⁴ Proceeding from Gwālior on 5 October 1784, Mahādji advanced towards Āgra where the emperor was halting. On 23 October, Mahādji met Afrāsiyāb in the vicinity of Fatehpūr Sikri. But hardly had Afrāsiyāb conferred with Mahādji when he was murdered by Zain-ul-abdin on 2 November. Mahādji acted promptly and succeeded in capturing the fugitive. By this stroke Sindia

established his unquestioned supremacy in imperial politics. Browne reported from Delhi on 12 November:

“From Gujarāt to Jammu, and from Attock to Rohilkhand, there is no power but Sindhia and the Sikhs, every thing else is but a name. If they should dispute, the contest will be serious and important: should they unite, their strength will be irresistible”.⁵

The death of Afrāsiyāb Khān left the emperor with no capable deputy and he looked to Mahādji as the deliverer from all misfortunes. The emperor met Mahādji at Fatehpūr Sikri (14 November, 1784) and appointed the *Peshwā* as his deputy (*Nāib-i-Munāib*) as well as Commander-in-Chief (*Mir Bakhshi*). Mahādji, on behalf of the *Peshwā*, should discharge the actual functions of these exalted offices. The emperor also honoured Mahādji Sindia with the title of *Vakil-i-Mutlaq*, or Regent Plenipotentiary, the highest post in the imperial government.* The importance of this momentous step was emphasised by Browne who wrote as follows:

“This office being superior to even that of Vizier, Sindia by this step raised the Mahratta power above every other in the empire; and by taking this office for the *Peshwā*, he has given himself good ground to expect the support of the whole Mahratta state, in case of any attempt of any of the neighbouring states to reduce his power; while from the *Peshwā*’s youth, and the weak state of his ministry, Sindia is pretty certain of enjoying all the benefit of the office himself for many years”.⁶

Sindia’s difficulties:

All these seemingly impressive grants brought little gain to Mahādji. The two nerve centres—Delhi and Āgra—were still held by Afrāsiyāb’s men. The imperial territories had been sucked dry and could contribute but little either in military strength or in revenues. The Mughul nobles looked sulkily towards Mahādji and were eager to throw off their present thraldom. The Sikhs were no less troublesome and were harrying the environs of Delhi and northern parts of the Doāb. The Rājputs were trying to shake off the Marāthā yoke.

Mahādji faced the new situation with stubborn resolution. He struck first against the fortress of Dig which surrendered on 30 December, 1784. Āgra also capitulated on 27 March, 1785, after a feeble resistance. The *subāhdari* of Āgra province was conferred on

Akbar Shāh, the emperor's second son, and the deputyship on Lādoji Deshmukh, Sindia's son-in-law. Rāyāji Pātil was appointed governor of the fortress. But Sindia found it difficult to reduce the fort of Aligarh as its commandant Jahāngir Khān received secret encouragement from Cummings, British General at Anupshahar. Mahādji protested against this and the Governor-General recalled Cummings. Rāyāji besieged the fort which surrendered on 20 November.

Sindia now turned towards the Sikhs whose friendship he valued most. A preliminary treaty of peace was concluded between Ambāji and the Sikh chiefs through the intervention of the Macheri Rājā, Pratāp Singh. The Sikh chiefs agreed to receive one-third of the territories jointly conquered with the Marāthās. The friends and enemies of both would be mutual. The preliminary treaty crystallised into a final agreement between Mahādji and the Sikh chiefs on 10 May. On joining Sindia with 5,000 cavalry the Sikh Chiefs were to receive a *jāgīr* worth 10 lakhs.⁷ They were not to create any disturbance in the dominions of the English and the Nawāb of Awadh who were friends of Sindia. The treaty was an event of great significance: directly it strengthened Sindia as the latter hoped to utilise the Sikhs against Jaipur and Mārwar and indirectly afforded the Marāthā chief an opportunity for territorial aggrandisement in the Sikh dominions as their leaders were engaged in mutual dissensions. The English could not view the newly established friendship between the Indian powers with equanimity. They expected the break-up of the union and in that event they could count upon Sikh support. To a certain extent the British assumption was proved right. Though some Sikh chiefs like Bhangel Singh, Rāy Singh and Goordut Singh became friends of the Marāthās, the others continued to create troubles for them. Mahādji, therefore, had to take preventive measures against the malcontent Sikhs by deploying forces under Dhārrāo Sindia.

Throughout 1785 Mahādji had to struggle against heavy odds. His troops were engaged in different places like Aligarh, Rāghogarh, Jaipur and Pānipat. Even the British Resident, Anderson, apprehended that Sindia might be involved in difficulties from which it would well nigh be impossible for him to extricate himself. Anderson expressed his misgivings on 8 September in no uncertain terms:

"In setting on foot so many distant expeditions, Sindia seems to have departed from his usual wisdom . . . and a defeat of any of these detachments to which they are at all times liable, might involve the ruin of all his schemes".⁸

Mahādji's primary concern was to secure the territory of Rāghogarh as it commanded the strategic areas of northern and central India. His next objective was to subjugate the Khichi Rānā Balwant Singh who had helped the British in the first Marāthā War and whose ancestors had long acknowledged Marāthā overlordship by paying tribute. After a prolonged siege in which Ambāji Ingle played a conspicuous role, Rāghogarh surrendered and the Rānā was kept a prisoner in Gwālior fort. In June 1785 Mahādji had to deal with two powerful unscrupulous nobles—Gosavi Umrāogīr and Anūpgīr (the latter being popularly called Himmat Bahādur). For ten months they harassed the Marāthās and when Devji Gauli was sent to chastise them their spirit of resistance wore down. They at last found refuge with the Nawāb-Vazīr of Awadh. Some other chiefs in Bundelkhand, who had created troubles were also quickly put down.

It was against this backdrop of Marāthā supremacy in North India that the Governor-General Macpherson thought it wise to recall Browne from Delhi. For the time being, the British had to reconcile themselves to the changed pattern of political set-up in north India. They maintained a dignified aloofness in north Indian politics and the British ambassador Anderson repeatedly discouraged the Nawāb-Vazīr of Awadh from entering into any hostility with Sindia. He wrote to Macpherson on 8 May, 1785:

“There is no pretext on which the English could take a part with him (Nawāb Vazīr of Oudh) in any offensive war at present and whether we should be successful or miscarry in it, effects almost equally fatal would be the probable result of it. Were we to take up arms in vindication of the rights of the King with the professed intention to free him from his present thralldom we might soon succeed in this object; but incapable as he is of governing himself we should be under the necessity of either abandoning him again to the usurpation of others or of keeping a large body of troops constantly employed for his support at a great expense and subject to many risks.”⁹

Rājput war: Battle of Lalsot:

Throughout 1785 the question that dominated the thoughts of Mahādji was the reduction of Jaipur. The Rājā of Jaipur, Prithvī Singh (7 March, 1768-16 April, 1778) was succeeded by his dissolute brother, Sawāi Pratāp Singh, although the former had left behind a son named Mān Singh, then about six months old. Matters be-

came complicated when the erstwhile Jaipur vassal Rāo Rājā Pratāp Singh Narukā made himself independent at Macheri in the vicinity of Alwar. He bore implacable enmity to the Jaipur ruler, ingratiated himself with the emperor and Sindia and offered his help in replacing Pratāp Singh by Mān Singh.

Mahādji's interference in Jaipur affairs stemmed from its ruler's vassalage to the emperor and to the Marāthās. As the Jaipur Rājā could not repay the tributes which he owed to both these powers, Mahādji, on becoming supreme administrator in the imperial government, claimed payment of these arrears. But the Rājā was not in a complaint mood. Instead he enlisted the support of Rājā Bijay Singh of Mārwar and made frantic attempts to obtain armed assistance from the emperor, the Nawāb-Vazīr and the English.

Early in 1786 Mahādji took up the challenge. Arriving with the emperor at Sanganer, seven miles south of Jaipur, he demanded the arrears of tribute amounting to 3 crores and 40 lakhs of rupees. Discussions commenced on 10 March through intermediaries and after considerable exacerbation it was agreed that the Jaipur Rājā should pay 63 lakhs of rupees. Rājāji Pātil was left in the Jaipur territory to recover the dues, while Mahādji and the emperor returned to Mathurā and Delhi respectively.¹⁰

Despite his apparent submission the Jaipur Rājā had no wish to honour the settlement. Apart from forming a defensive alliance with Jodhpur, he endeavoured to secure British assistance to overawe Sindia. In April 1786, Anand Rām, his agent at Lucknow, made an attempt to rouse the British feelings against the Marāthās, but failed as the Company's Government had already been wedded to a policy of neutrality in Indian affairs. Even the arrival of Daulat Rām, ex-Diwān of the Jaipur Rājā, at Lucknow in May did not affect the policy of the Company already decided upon. Harper, the British agent at Lucknow, reminded Daulat Rām of the traditional bravery of the Rājputs and dispelled the illusion of entertaining any hope of assistance from foreign powers. In an allegorical style Harper observed: "Sindia's name only may be literally said to be as great a bugbear to the different powers of Hindustān, as the stories of Hobgoblins which nurses use in our country to frighten children".¹¹

Mahādji's settlement with the Jaipur Rājā proved to be illusory. The Rājā had no intention of paying anything. Instead he remained entrenched in his capital and asked his countrymen to resist the Marāthās by force. Mahādji also prepared for the coming struggle by effecting junction with the emperor, by subjugating the

Mewātis and taking suitable steps to curb the Sikhs. Proceeding by way of Dig, Sindia reached Daosa, 38 miles east of Jaipur, on 24 March, 1787. In early April he advanced further and lay encamped at Moti hill, 14 miles from Jaipur. Diplomacy now became active to avert the threatened conflict. Agents of Jaipur met Sindia on 5 April and proposed to pay the tribute amounting to 12 lakhs; 4 lakhs immediately, 2 lakhs afterwards, and the remaining 6 lakhs in assignments. The envoys conducted the negotiation with an air of superiority and continued it with so much vehemence that Sindia at last refused to treat with them.

On 8 April Sindia proceeded to Bhankri, only 13 miles from Jaipur, his agent, Rāyāji Pātil, having already advanced to the gates of Jaipur. Sindia reopened the negotiation. The Jaipur agents offered to pay 4 lakhs of the dues and demanded the surrender of Khushhālī Rām Bohrā, the dismissed prime minister of Jaipur. Sindia rejected the proposal outright.

From the beginning the prospects of Mahādji looked grim as his Hindustāni troops began to waver in their allegiance. His army lacked efficient artillery and was composed of disparate elements and was disaffected owing to arrears of pay. Sindia, therefore, fell back from his advanced position and began to harass the Rājputs by seizing the fortresses in the neighbouring areas. On 6 May Zu'lfiqār 'Ali Khān and Manzur 'Ali Khān, two Hindustān Captains, defected to the enemy; but the worst disaster that happened was the desertion of Muhammad Beg Hamdāni on 27 May.

Taking advantage of the weakness of Sindia, the Rājputs boldly came out of their entrenched position. This was Sindia's opportunity to strike at his opponents in the open country. He, therefore, advanced on 15 June, 1787, to Lalsot, situated about 30 miles south-east of Jaipur. By the middle of July, Sindia had been strengthened by the arrival of Khande Rāo's division from Bundelkhand, the two battalions of infantry trained under De Boigne and Ambāji Ingle's army. The two parties manoeuvred for a vantage position for winning success. At last the trial of strength between the Marāthās and the Rājputs took place on 28 July on the plain of Tunga, about 14 miles north-east of Lalsot. The battle commenced with the usual cannonade, but the Rājput guns being bigger in size, played havoc on Sindia's army. Four thousand Rāthors flung themselves desperately before the artillery of Khande Rāo Appā. Even De Boigne with his sepoy fell back in confusion. The cool Savoyard reformed the survivors and opened small arm fire. After a sanguinary contest, the

Rājputs retired. The death of Hamdāni who was struck by a cannon shot, broke the spirit of Rājput resistance. The Marāthās could not pursue the fugitive Rājputs as it started raining in the afternoon.

But Mahādji could not afford to rejoice on his victory over the Jaipur Rājā. Seven thousand Hindustāni troops whose loyalty had long been wavering, now demanded their arrears of pay at gunpoint, and refused to listen to any appeal. Instead of yielding to the request lest it should encourage other troops to make similar demands, Mahādji disbanded the rebel troops and allowed the latter to join the Rājputs. It was an anxious moment for Mahādji as any hasty action at this stage might create another Pānipat. He extricated himself from this critical situation with uncommon fortitude and began his retreat on 1 August after destroying his baggage. "Throughout the ten days following the battle of Tunga, the phantom of Pānipat kept haunting the memory of every Deccani in his camp. But if Lalsot did not prove a second Pānipat, it was because Mahādji Sindia was no Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu and he had better subordinates than that hero of the Chitpāvan tragedy".¹² Retiring from Lalsot, Sindia at first proceeded to Dig from where he went to Macheri territory. Here he remained from the end of August to the beginning of November 1787 as an impotent spectator of his deeds being undone by vicissitudes of fortune.

Ghulām Qādīr's brutalities:

Lalsot emboldened Ghulām Qādīr to resume his offensive operations. Suddenly he appeared before Delhi. Lādojī Deshmukh and Shāh Nizām-ud-din, the Marāthā agents at Delhi, fled precipitately on 24 August. Deprived of Marāthā tutelage, the emperor became helpless and had to invest Ghulām with the dignity and office of *Amir-ul-umara* and *Mir Bakhshi* in the beginning of September. The emperor could thus postpone the impending danger, but the day of reckoning was soon to follow. Sindia's star had now sunk to the lowest ebb while Ghulām's was on its way to meridian. Forster, an acute observer, described the political scene with candour:

"Ghulām Qādīr is now the established master of Delhi, having obtained by a bold effort and peremptory language, the office of *Amir-ul-umara* or Captain General. His military spirit, his station in the upper part of India, with the aid of family pretensions, have elevated him to the rank made vacant by the misfortunes of Sindia. I am here, prompted, my Lord, to draw your attention to a view of the effects of the late Revolution

which conspicuously exhibit the miserable policy of an Hindustān Government, its instability, and the rapid transition of fortune, which involve its rulers. Sindia, who, but yesterday, possessed a numerous respectable army, with funds for its support, who had absorbed in himself the executive administration of the empire, is now stripped of power, sheltering the remains of a broken, dispirited army in the territory of a chief, branded throughout the country for his treachery, cruelty and private vices".¹³

Misfortunes which enveloped Mahādji after Lalsot continued unabated for a few months more. On 16 September Ismā'il Beg, who was acting in co-operation with Ghulām Qādīr, occupied the city of Āgra, while Lakhbā Dādā continued to maintain a desperate resistance to save the fort from Mughul forces. Ajmer was similarly occupied by the Rājā of Jodhpur on 27 August. Ambāji Inglé who had been commissioned to ravage Jaipur territory, was severely defeated and forced to retire to Alwar. Mahādji made a spasmodic effort to free the emperor from his abject condition by himself moving from Alwar on 28 October and by deputing Ambāji Inglé with necessary forces to Delhi. But the situation became so unpropitious that he had to abandon his designs for the time being. The emperor, expecting to be relieved of his distress by Prince Jawān Bakht, invited the latter who had been living at Banāras on British pension. He arrived at Delhi in December, but instead of relieving the situation, became a source of irritation to the emperor. In order to avoid his unwelcome presence, the emperor conferred on him the *subāhdari* of Āgra which was in possession of Ismā'il Beg. The Shāhzādā tried unsuccessfully to get the city of Āgra and even tried to befriend Ghulām Qādīr. But an effeminate adventurer like him could hardly expect assistance from any quarter and the Prince had to go back in despair to British protection in February, 1788.

Marāthā overlordship in Hindustān seemed to be threatened not only by Rohillās, Rājputs and Mughuls, but also by the Afghāns. Rājā Bijay Singh of Jodhpur requested Timūr Shāh Abdālī to take up arms against the Marāthās and offered passage through his territory if the Sikhs should obstruct Abdālī at Lahore. Even if Timūr Shāh could not come personally, the Jodhpur Rājā said, Shāhzādā Humāyūn Shāh should be allowed to take up the project of invading India. But the danger blew over as quickly as it had come as Timūr Shāh expressed his inability to spare himself or Humāyūn Shāh owing to preoccupations elsewhere.¹⁴ All these sombre developments could not escape the attention of ever-observant Hingné, the Marā-

thā envoy at Delhi. He could not feel comfortable about the British despite their rigid adherence to neutrality in the imperial concerns. He had reasons to feel chary about the British as the latter had tried earlier to infiltrate into Delhi politics. His words of wisdom to Nānā go to prove that the Marāthās were not oblivious of the importance of imperial politics in the north:

“The two enemies of the emperor are Abdālī and the English. Abdālī is far away and is not likely to come to Delhi. The English are near-by and very clever too. But they are awaiting instructions from London. If they enter Delhi politics, India is lost to us. We should therefore control Delhi so that we can assert our right over Bengal”.¹⁵

Nānā Phadnis was not impervious to the dangers that had overtaken Mahādji after his retreat from Lalsot. War with Tipū had just been concluded and Nānā arranged the despatch of forces under Tukoji Hōlkar and ‘Ali Bahādur. He also remitted 5 lakhs of rupees to replenish the depleted resources of Sindia. But it is doubtful whether Nānā sincerely wished to help the cause of Mahādji. It was rightly suspected that Nānā’s seeming concern for Marāthā affairs in the north by sending two leaders from the south was in reality a camouflage to circumvent Mahādji’s growing power.

Having failed to rescue the emperor from the clutches of Ghulām, Sindia had retreated to the south of the Chambal at the end of December 1787. He was not prepared to imperil his position unless reinforced by men and unless he could consolidate his position in Mālwa. By the end of March 1788, he had gathered strength to resume his offensive operations north of the Chambal after subduing the rebel chiefs in the Gwālīor region and after receiving reinforcements from Jamgaon under the command of Devji Gauli on 16 March.

Sindia’s first attempt after a lull of one year was to recover the city of Āgra then under Ismā’il Beg. Ghulām Qādīr’s sudden appearance in Āgra completely changed the situation and the Marāthā troops under Rānā Khān and Rāyāji Pātīl fled towards Bharatpur. From the middle of March to the end of April 1788 sharp encounters took place between the opposing forces in the neighbourhood of Bharatpur in which the Marāthās were at a disadvantage. Ismā’il Beg and Ghulām Qādīr thereafter unsuccessfully attacked Bharatpur and Dig, the latter being heroically defended by the Jāts and the Marāthās.

After being strengthened by the much-awaited reinforcements from the south, Mahādji adopted the strategy of dividing the enemy

by attacking the Rohillā possessions in the Doāb and by intercepting their supply lines. The Marāthās occupied Mathura and Vrindāban and dispersed the Rohillās at Mot and Mahaban. The city of Koil was also plundered. Ghulām, therefore, hastened back to secure the safety of his own dominions. Ismā'il Beg, who was left alone at Āgra, found it hard to maintain his position and in a decisive encounter on 17 June he was defeated. Ismā'il first went to Ghulām and thence to the emperor at Delhi to crave the latter's indulgence. But he was forced back from Delhi by Himmat Bahādur.

Sindia was now in the saddle and tried to ensnare Ghulām Qādīr. Rāyāji Pātil with his forces was closely pursuing him. Ghulām was defeated when he came out of Aligarh; from there he retreated with a slender force to Khurja, many of his soldiers deserting him on the way for non-payment. On 1 July, 1788, he arrived in the vicinity of Delhi and formed a pact with Ismā'il for enriching themselves by plundering the royal treasury.

The emperor was in great alarm. In his predicament he implored Sindia to come to Delhi. Sindia could spare only a small force of 2,000 under Ravlōji Sindia and Bhagirath Sindia. Ismā'il successfully won over some of the Mughul nobles, and Himmat Bahādur along with his forces, fled to Faridabad, 17 miles south of Delhi. The Marāthās thus completely lost grip over the situation leaving the emperor to his fate. On 15 July the emperor was forced to grant an audience to Ismā'il and Ghulām. On 18 July they occupied the city and on 30 July took possession of the fort and the palace inside. Ghulām Qādīr deposed the emperor and on 1 August placed Bidār Bakht, the son of Ahmad Shāh, on the throne. Shāh 'Ālam and his nineteen children were imprisoned. Ismā'il Beg did not approve of Ghulām Qādīr's action as the former contemplated to put Mirzā Sulaimān Shukoh, the son of the deposed monarch, on the throne. Ghulām Qādīr's chief object was to appropriate the emperor's wealth and to achieve this object he unleashed indescribable cruelties on the Begums and the princes. On 10 August when he persisted in demanding money from the emperor the latter replied bitterly: "I have kept it in my stomach. Whatever was in my house, you have taken".¹⁶ At last on the same fateful day the hapless emperor was blinded. But Ghulām Qādīr was not destined to enjoy the fruits of his ghastly crime; estrangement grew between him and Ismā'il over the division of the spoils. Ismā'il began to feel that Ghulām Qādīr was a dangerous associate. He separated from the faithless Rohillā and joined the Marāthās. Mahādji rewarded his

defection by giving him 50,000 rupees for his expenses and the territory of Ghausgarh.

After undue vacillation Sindia stirred himself to activity. On 28 September the Marāthās occupied Old Delhi and the city proper on 2 October. Ghulām managed to escape from the palace—Red Fort on 10 October. The next day Himmat Bahādur, Ravlōji Sindia and Rānā Khān entered the fort and found the blind emperor in a miserable plight. On 16 October Rānā Khān seated the phantom emperor on the throne with every mark of respect.

Now began the frantic hunt for Ghulām Qādīr. Rānā Khān, Rāyāji Pātil, Jivbā Bakhshi, and later on 'Ali Bahādur were engaged in tracking down and intercepting the fugitive criminal. Aligarh, his stronghold, surrendered to the Marāthās on 20 October. Thereafter he took shelter in Meerut fort with 15,000 forces and 100 guns which the Marāthās besieged for six weeks. While affecting to negotiate with Rāyāji Pātil, Ghulām Qādīr slipped out of the fort with 500 horsemen and fled to Ghausgarh. He was hotly pursued by Jivbā Bakhshi, and after a short encounter in which he lost his followers, he concealed himself in the house of a Brahmin at Bam-nauli, 24 miles from Meerut. The Brahmin conveyed the intelligence to 'Ali Bahādur whose forces captured him on 19 December. He along with his followers, Manzūr 'Ali, Maniyār Singh, Bilās Rāi and other Rohillā chiefs, who were also seized, were sent to Mahādji at Mathura on 31 December 1788. For two months Mahādji tried to extort from Ghulām the hidden treasure. Then under an express order of the King, Sindia asked Hakim Akmal and the emperor's chief secretary, Mir Ghālib 'Ali, to go to Ghulām's prison, extract his eyeballs, cut off his ears and nose and put them in a casket for being sent to the emperor.¹⁷ The order was executed on 3 March. Then the mutilated rebel was taken to a place 12 miles from Mathura and was put to death. "When the casket reached the Delhi palace, Shāh 'Ālam's revenge was gratified as the blind old man fumbled its grisly contents and felt that his enemy had been paid back in his own coin".¹⁸

The Marāthā position in the north had been considered highly critical before the middle of the year 1788. Mahādji's troops had been fighting without any break since 1780 without any prospect of relief from Poona. Mahādji expected to retrieve the situation with the help of detachments from Poona under the commands of 'Ali Bahādur and Tūkoji Holkar. But the reinforcements arrived only after the enactment of the cruel tragedy in the House of Timūr in

August 1788. Being discouraged by the receding prospect of receiving reinforcements from Poona, Sindia endeavoured to obtain the assistance of the English and their protégé, the Nawāb-Vazīr of Awadh, in restoring Shāh 'Alam to the throne. The British Resident Palmer thwarted Sindia's move by declaring unequivocally British reluctance to interfere in the contest for the Delhi *masnad*.

The arrival of 'Ali Bahādur and Tūkoji Holkar did not mitigate Sindia's difficulties as was expected. Nānā Phadnis directly instigated 'Ali Bahādur and Tūkoji Holkar against Mahādji and thus ruined the hard-earned prestige of the Marāthās in the north. In utter disgust Mahādji meditated to retire to the south after placing 'Ali Bahādur in charge of northern affairs. He even expressed surprise at Nānā's silence over Hōlkar's clandestine relations with Jaipur and Jodhpur chiefs¹⁹ which in his opinion, should have deserved scathing censure.

But neither the Poona Court nor 'Ali Bahādur felt strong enough to contend with so many difficulties in the north. 'Ali Bahādur, conscious of his limitations, refused to take up the responsibility of Delhi affairs. Even Nānā who had baulked Mahādji in various ways, was not blind to the realities of the situation. The crisis was not yet over and the recalcitrant nobles, though subdued, were waiting for an opportunity to assert themselves. On 21 December, 1788, Nānā, therefore, cautioned 'Ali Bahādur: "Administration of the territories will be weakened in the absence of Mahādji and you may court a failure".²⁰ The misunderstanding between Mahādji and 'Ali Bahādur which had been brewing for some time, came to be temporarily adjusted in the beginning of April 1789. Sindia tried to come to an understanding also with Holkar by sharing with the latter the new conquests, on condition that Holkar should maintain harmonious relations with him (Sindia) and should support him in all his undertakings. Even the pious lady Ahalyā Bāi put some feelers for reconciliation between Sindia, Holkar and 'Ali Bahādur, though without any apparent success.

Sindia asserts himself:

Before the year 1788 ended Sindia had the supreme satisfaction of rehabilitating Marāthā power in north India. He remained in Mathurā for a few months and employed his diplomatic tact to crush the surviving independent chiefs of Hindustān by setting them against one another. Mahādji's sojourn at Mathurā was disturbed when he fell seriously ill in the month of June.²¹ For a while the

people gave up any hope of his recovery and the British Resident Palmer dreaded the consequences of his death in North India. "In case of his demise", Palmer wrote on 25 June 1789, "the Marāthā power and influence in Hindustān would probably be almost instantly annihilated..... The united force of 'Ali Bahādur and Holkar would not be adequate to the maintenance of their authority in the Mogul Government".²²

Sindia's ailment could not be diagnosed properly. In those superstitious days it was attributed to black magic performed by a woman at the instigation of Himmat Bahādur Gosāvi. Sindia had overlooked the Gosāvi's previous disloyal conduct, but it became a serious matter when he was engaged in secret intrigues with Holkar and 'Ali Bahādur and even with the Nawāb-Vazīr of Awadh, in whose dominion he had earlier found political asylum. Himmat Bahādur was arrested. But when he was being conveyed to Mahādji's camp, he found means to escape to 'Ali Bahādur's camp. In vain did Sindia protest as 'Ali Bahādur refused to surrender the fugitive without the *Peshwā's* order. Moreover, 'Ali Bahādur received covert encouragement from Nānā in his defiance to Mahādji. It was more in sorrow than in anger that Sindia expressed his sentiment to Nānā: "It is surprising that you should help a man who tried to murder me. This is against brotherly relations".²³

It was in this embarrassing situation that Sindia considered it wise to conciliate Tukoji Holkar by granting him *jāgīr* worth 10 lakhs in North India. Mahādji even went to the length of appeasing 'Ali Bahādur by assigning to him the district of Aligarh-Koil. But 'Ali Bahādur's uncompromising attitude did not change thereby: 'Sindia must not lay hands on Himmat Bahādur (Gosāvi) and should remove the guard from around his family'. Towards the end of January 1790, 'Ali Bahādur asked Mahādji to make a settlement with the Gosāvi and tried to cajole him by arguing 'if the *Peshwā* sent a robe of honour to Himmat Bahādur, what face would be left to Mahādji Sindia'?²⁴ At last a compromise was effected. On 6 February, 1790, Sindia visited the camp of 'Ali Bahādur when the Gosāvi Himmat Bahādur was introduced to him. Sindia pardoned all his offences, gave him a robe of honour and released his family members.

Sindia's alliance with Ismā'il Beg had been a makeshift arrangement intended to counteract the enemies of the Marāthās. Ismā'il also felt sore about his friendship with Sindia. He suspected that Sindia might have had a hand in Kāshi Rāo Holkar's occupation of

some of his posts in Mewāt. Though Ismā'il was strong enough to drive away the usurpers, he made no secret of his feeling when he censured Mahādji for his questionable conduct: "If you want to dismiss me, say so, and I shall go elsewhere for service. If you want to fight me, come on. But do not set other people against me."²⁵ At last Ismā'il's defection to the Rājputs took place in February 1790 when the Rājās of Jaipur and Jodhpur agreed to relieve his financial liability by partly defraying the arrears of pay of his troops.

Battles of Pātan and Mertā:

The Lalsot episode had left ineffaceable memories on Mahādji. He was determined to retrieve the situation and for this he made adequate preparations. He raised a corps of infantry consisting of six battalions armed and disciplined in the European manner under the supervision of the Frenchman De Boigne. The Rājputs also did not lag behind. They were strengthened by Ismā'il's adherence and were moving heaven and earth to mobilise themselves.

The campaign opened in May 1790. The Rājputs and the Mughul soldiers encamped at Pātan, 60 miles north of Jaipur, in the vicinity of a hill. Mahādji after harnessing all his available resources waited for the denouement in a place about eight miles east of Pātan city. A decisive battle was fought on 20 June in which the Marāthās charged the Rāthors in the centre and later on pretended to give way just to draw the enemy out of their sheltered position. The strategy met with unqualified success. The Rājputs descended into the plain and De Boigne's muskets played havoc on them. Ismā'il Beg with only 14 men fled precipitately to Jaipur. Finding resistance useless, the Rājā of Pātan, Rāo Sampat Singh, surrendered the fort. Palmer's despatches contain the following observation about the battle of Pātan:

"The victory obtained by the Marāthā army over Ismail Beg and the Rajpoots seems to have been complete and decisive; all the artillery has fallen into their hands and ten corps of infantry have been compelled to surrender and deliver up their arms".²⁶

The battle of Pātan was not the grand finale. Though the Jaipur Rājā was forced to remain in utter inactivity for a decade, Rājā Bijay Singh of Jodhpur still hoped to hold his own against the overwhelming Marāthā superiority. On 21 August Sindia's generals laid siege to Ajmer fort. At the same time Sindia took effective steps to neutralise the Jaipur Rājā by mobilising forces on the eastern fron-

tier of the Jaipur State. The Marāthā forces under Lādōji Deshmukh, Gopāl Rāo Chitnis, Jivbā Dādā, Kāshi Rāo Holkar cantoned at Mertā, rightly called the gateway of Mārwar. After reaching Mertā on 9 September, De Boigne made a surprise attack in the early hours of the following day. The Rāthor cavalry charged desperately 'with the full violence of the waves of the sea' till they were all overwhelmed by grapeshots. Gangārām Bhandāri surrendered the Mertā fort.²⁷

While Mahādji by his circumspection and the assistance of the formidable brigade of De Boigne had won the battles of Pātan and Mertā, his misunderstanding with 'Ali Bahādur and Tukojī Holkar nearly blighted his prospects in Rājputānā. It was in vain that Mahādji attempted to win over 'Ali Bahādur for expedition against Jodhpur by offering two lakhs of rupees. 'Ali Bahādur exposed himself fully when he recalled his forces from the battle-field of Mertā. Mahādji remonstrated ineffectually: "He ('Ali Bahādur) betrayed the oath taken in the name of the *Peshwā*. Confidence cannot be achieved in this circumstance".²⁸ Besides this, 'Ali Bahādur had accepted presents from the Jaipur Rājā when Sindia's forces were fighting at Pātan. It was too much for Nānā to swallow this bitter pill and he who had formerly instigated 'Ali Bahādur now upbraided the latter in the following words: "Let Holkar follow his own way, but it is regrettable that you have accepted presents from the Jaipur Rājā".²⁹

Holkar's conduct was no less reprehensible. Sindia's assiduous attempt to secure Holkar's support against Jodhpur by assigning to the latter territories in Saharanpur and Mewāt was of no avail, and he recalled the forces from Mertā. While withdrawing, his forces harassed the chief of Kishangarh who was Sindia's ally. Thus a rapprochement between the three chiefs—Sindia, Holkar and 'Ali Bahādur—seemed to be almost impossible as they refused to work in harmony for the common cause of the Marāthās in North India. Mahādji lamented to his agent in the Deccan, Rāmji Pātil:

"Holkar and 'Ali Bahādur who were described by you as our brother and nephew have behaved in a questionable manner. How can we remove suspicions from our minds? We are serving the government to the best of our ability. The two Sardars should be asked to do their duty. It is impossible for us to work together any longer".³⁰

On account of these unseemly dissensions in the Marāthā camp the battle of Mertā lost its practical utility. Bijay Singh, the Rājā

of Jodhpur, seduced Kāshi Rāo Holkar by a bribe of four lakhs of rupees for espionage in Sindia's forces. The Jodhpur Rājā also welcomed Ismā'il Beg and spurred him against Sindia. But things did not assume serious proportions because of Sindia's prompt handling of the situation. He came to Sambhar on 29 December, 1790, and the Jodhpur Rājā opened negotiations with Sindia through his agent Budh Singh. On 6 January, 1791, the following terms were agreed upon: Bijay Singh was to pay by instalments 40 lakhs of rupees in one year. A tribute of 20 lakhs was imposed upon the Rājā and for this amount Sambhar, Parbatsar and two other *mahals* were given in assignments; the amount was to be realised in four years. In addition, Ajmer fort was to be handed over to the Marāthās who would then give up Mertā to the Rājā. Sindia was put in possession of the Ajmer fort on 7 March, 1791.³¹ Bijay Singh did not live long after this treaty; he died in July 1793.

The Jaipur Rājā, being left alone, thought it necessary to come to an agreement with Sindia. He attempted to do so but did not succeed till February 1791 when an agreeemet was made with Sindia through the instrumentality of his minister Rodojī Khawās.³² The Jaipur Rājā agreed to pay three lakhs in cash and one lakh in kind. Sindia was allowed to collect eleven lakhs from the *jāgīrdārs* of the Jaipur Rājā. The Rājā promised to pay fifteen lakhs as compensation for the guns that were handed over to him by Hindustāni rebels in the battle of Lalsot. To the Mughul emperor the Rājā was liable to pay sixty-three lakhs as arrears of tribute. This he promised to settle by annual payments. He also pacified Holkar by ceding the district of Rampura in lieu of monetary contribution.

The magnificent achievements of Mahādji and his vast military resources made a profound impression on Timūr Shāh, ruler of Afghānistan. He sent peace overtures to Mahādji by proposing that the Marāthās should extend their dominion up to Lahore and the Shāh should have control beyond that territory. Both should agree to help each other in times of danger. The Afghān ruler would assist Sindia with 10,000 cavalry if required to do so. Though nothing tangible resulted from these offers, it showed that Sindia by his courage and indomitable will had made the Marāthās formidable and respectable in North India. Writes a contemporary: "Such moves are new and are the result of increased prestige of the *Peshwā*".³³

Mahādji now found it easy to deal with Ismā'il Beg. The latter was now a spent force, and moved from place to place in his futile

bid to receive assistance from any power. His only possible supporter, Najaf Qulī, died on 23 August, 1791. At last he received summons from the widow of Najaf Qulī to take possession of Kanud. But before he could reach Kanud, Khande Rāo Hari intercepted him and on 4 December, 1791, inflicted a heavy defeat on him. But he (Ismā'il Beg) succeeded in escaping to the fort of Kanud with a few horsemen. It was alleged that Holkar secretly helped Ismā'il to move towards Kanud. Khande Rāo successfully besieged Kanud and on 15 April, 1792, Ismā'il gave himself up to Perron, the officer second-in-command to De Boigne. Ismā'il was kept a prisoner in Āgra fort where he died in 1799. Thus "the Mughal name was entirely sunk and lost in political estimation by the capture of Ismā'il Beg, the last leader who contended even for its nominal existence".³⁴

Having performed prodigies of strength and valour in Northern India Mahādji intended to repair to Poona. But when he came to Pushkar in March 1791 to celebrate the spring festival, he was approached by Bhim Singh, Rānā of Mewār, to save the State from internal crisis. The Mahārānā, through his envoy Zalim Singh of Kota, sought Mahādji's help to recover Chitor which had been usurped by Bhim Singh Salumbar. In the middle of September Mahādji, accompanied by the Mahārānā, came to the celebrated fort of Chitor and subjected the fort to intensive siege operations and heavy bombardment. At last on 17 November Bhim Singh Salumbar surrendered the fort and agreed to pay an indemnity of 12 lakhs. Mahādji could feel gratified at the reduction of the fort when he reminded the *Peshwā*: "The fort which Akbar took twelve years to reduce was captured by your blessing in a few days".³⁵

Sindia now bade adieu to his northern dominion and set out for Poona on 6 January, 1792. Although the rapid development of Sindia's power was unwelcome to the British, it did not affect the British policy of non-intervention. Palmer did not foresee any portent of danger to British interests as he was conscious that the baffling problems of administrative reorganisation and revenue collection in Hindustān would be too much for Sindia to contend with in a country harassed by warfare and desolated by famines. Palmer was a shrewd judge of political affairs. The departure of Sindia for the south marked the beginning of the process of disintegration of the Marāthā power in the North.

Sindia-Holkar rivalry:

Sindia's absence from the north provided Tukoji Holkar a convenient opportunity of interfering in the region to the detriment of

Marāthā interests. As long as Sindia was present in the north, he avoided an open rupture with Tukoji by a policy of appeasement. But no sooner had he left for Poona, than the rancorous jealousy between the two chieftains burst forth in uncontrolled fury. Tukoji Holkar began to interfere in the Alwar State following the death of Rāo Rājā (24 November, 1790), who had been a devoted ally of Sindia. He even started intriguing with the English for aid against Sindia.³⁶ It was a perilous moment for Sindia. He had not yet been able to come to a settlement with the Poona Government while his hard-earned settlement in Rājasthān seemed to be threatened by Holkar's opposition. Sindia's generals—Gopāl Bhāu and Jivbā Dādā—faced the situation with great resolve. They advanced from the north-east of Jaipur and made a surprise attack on 8 October, 1792, on Holkar at Suravali in the region of Sawāi Madhopur, south of the river Banās. Tukoji's camp was thrown into confusion. The affair was temporarily closed when Bāpū Holkar and Pārāshar Dādāji, on behalf of Tukoji, made a working compromise with Sindia's generals.

The defeat at Suravali embittered the mind of Tukoji. He tried to fan the anger of the saintly Ahalyā Bāi by observing that "if the defeat was not avenged, Sindia would be so powerful as to annihilate the Holkars. So they should fight to the last".³⁷ It was curious that when the enmity between the two chieftains was reaching a critical point, the Poona *darbar* made no serious effort to stop the mutual antagonism. Perhaps it wanted to utilise Holkar as a barrier against the overwhelming power of Sindia. The situation took a sudden turn when Malhār Rāo Holkar, Tukoji's impetuous young son, thought of making short-work of Sindia's army with his light cavalry. Assuming the chief command of army, Malhār Rāo advanced to Panchilas village to meet Sindia's force. Early on 29 May, 1793, De Boigne with his infantry and light guns successfully attacked Holkars' front and the latter fled away with the broken remnant of his army to Lākheri, near Ajmer. Three days later, on 1 June, a pitched battle took place at Lākheri. Despite a formidable force consisting of 30,000 cavalry and four battalions of Chevalier Durence with 38 guns, Malhār Rāo could not make any headway against the disciplined valour of De Boigne's contingent. "Hemmed in front by De Boigne's ten battalions and on the two flanks and rear by Gopāl Bhāu's cavalry, with sixty light guns firing on them at point-blank range, Holkar's northern sepoys fought on till they were almost all annihilated".³⁸

Lākheri expedited Mahādji's settlement with the Poona *Darbar* for which he had been labouring so long since his arrival at Poona.

But by an unfortunate coincidence hardly had he reached the acme of political greatness, when his life was cut short by a fatal illness. He died on 12 February, 1794 in his camp at Wanavdi near Poona at the age of 67. A few months before his death he had adopted his nephew's son, Daulat Rāo, then about 14 years old.

Death of Mahādji Sindia: Consequences:

Mahādji's death was a turning point in the history of the Marāthās. The removal of this great Marāthā chieftain did away with the major barrier to the expansion of British power in the north. Historians feel amazed when they think of his strategy, comprehension of responsibilities, steady perseverance, and infinite resourcefulness. One cannot but feel wonder at Sindia's grasp of diverse political and military problems when in 1785 he distributed his forces numbering 1,57,000 in different parts of Northern India. His success depended to a large extent on De Boigne who entered his services at the end of 1784 and built up a vast military engine of great efficiency. His unflinching loyalty to Sindia saved the latter from many pitfalls. Compton observes: "As a general he may take his stand amongst the greatest India has ever produced. In times of crisis and sudden danger his presence of mind was incomparable".³⁹ A recent judgement by a military expert declares him "to possess all the necessary qualities, including the rare and invaluable one of pre-science, and that what he had to do he did with classic efficiency".^{39a} Sindia rewarded his services by granting him *jāgīrs* worth 35 lakhs of rupees situated partly in Mewāt and partly in the Doāb.

The successive British Residents with Mahādji—David Anderson, James Anderson, William Kirkpatrick and William Palmer—were men of varied elements, yet their conflicting views were reconciled by Macpherson, Cornwallis and John Shore. James Anderson was embittered in the last stage by the refuge given by Sindia to Faqir Khair-ud-din and his brother Salih-ud-din who had long served the former (Anderson) as writers and diplomatic agents, but it did not diminish the personal regard entertained by the Resident towards Sindia. To his successor Kirkpatrick, James Anderson wrote on 5 December, 1786:

"Sindia, altho' in the eagerness of ambition he may have committed many imprudences with respect to us, has never actually been guilty of a breach of faith, but has, on the contrary, in the course of our connection given several instances of uncommon liberality".⁴⁰

Kirkpatrick, on the other hand, viewed with concern the growing power of Sindia. He decried the British policy of appeasement towards Sindia and regretted that Sindia had never suffered any rebuff from the British in his North Indian adventure. In his opinion the establishment of Marāthā power in the Doāb should have been opposed either by arms or by negotiations. It was his conviction that Sindia was the prime mover in the emperor's claim of tribute on Bengal in 1785. Though the British remonstrance made him disavow his connection, yet there were ample grounds for the British to feel uneasy about his intention. Kirkpatrick faithfully portrayed his feeling when he wrote:

"Sindia has experienced so much overstrained complaisance from us, that he may be compared to the spoiled child who after being indulged in a variety of demands cried at last because it could not obtain the moon".⁴¹

Kirkpatrick's overweening conduct so much strained the relations between the Company and Sindia that he gave up his assignment in October 1787. Major Palmer, who succeeded Kirkpatrick, was a man of rare refinement and enjoyed implicit confidence of the Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis.

For more than a decade Mahādji Sindia held North Indian political fabric under the surveillance of the Marāthās and had re-established the Marāthā power in an unenviable position. But with his death tragical events followed in close succession. The emperor keenly felt the absence of a strong personality. The Marāthā power in the north, which had withstood so many shocks, now suddenly found itself confronted with hostile forces. In his confidential talks with Hingné in May 1794, the emperor complained of an incident which, though trivial in its nature, was typical of the tensions which were afflicting the Marāthā state in the changed set-up:

"For twelve years Mahādji served the emperor unflinchingly without ever disowning the *Peshwā's* authority over Hindustān. The job of *Kulmukhtyāri*, a delicate one of revenue-management, which Mahādji had entrusted to Bālobā Pāgnis, could not be performed by the incumbent with diligence. Abā Chitnis, therefore, stepped into his place and he proved the right man for it. After Mahādji's death, Chitnis carried on his job. We were pleased to hear this. But now it is reported that Pāgnis had ingratiated himself with the impressionable Daulat Rāo and his lieutenant Sadāshiv Malhār. And now comes the shocking news that Daulat Rāo has insulted Chitnis on Pāgnis'

advice. So long the *Peshwā's* decision was to be obeyed without any murmur and it is an excruciating experience that the *Peshwā* could now no more restrain his servant from interfering with Chitnis' work. The Marāthā interests in the north would suffer irreparably if all these unseemly wrangles were allowed to thrive with impunity. The cohesion of the Marāthās in the north showed signs of cracking up which must have emboldened the disaffected elements to take advantage of the situation. The *Peshwā* must maintain control over Hindustān in order to keep in check the fleeting elements".⁴²

Daulat Rāo Sindia's ineptitude:

The history of North India after Mahādji's exit from the political spectrum offers a disconsolate picture. Mahādji had maintained a harmonious balance in his ministry by delegating civil administration to the *Deshastha* Brāhmins while placing his army under the *Shenvi* Brāhmins. But after Mahādji's death, his successor, Daulat-Rāo, a pleasure-loving young man, did not have the capacity to maintain the delicate balance, and caste rivalry reared its head again with disastrous consequences to the Marāthās. Abā Chitnis, Krishnobā Chitnis and Gopāl Bhāu—men belonging to the *Deshastha* group were superior to the *Shenvis* in administrative ability and political understanding. But Daulat Rāo in his blind ignorance allowed the latter to gain full control of the political lever. The *Shenvis*—Jivbā Dādā, Jagū Bāpū, Lakhbā Dādā, Bālobā Tātyā Pāgnis and Sadāshiv Malhār (popularly known as Bhāu Bakhshi)—were openly countenanced. Abā Chitnis resigned his post in sheer disgust, Gopāl Bhāu was removed from the supreme command in Northern India, and the *Shenvi* generals—Lakhbā Dādā and Jagū Bāpū—were appointed in their stead. Bālobā Pāgnis and Sadāshiv Malhār were appointed *mukht-yārs*. De Boigne lost no time in protesting against the hasty decision of Daulat Rāo in removing Gopāl Bhāu from the chief command as it was he who had faithfully discharged his duties. But Daulat Rāo shut his eyes and pursued his course with blind obstinacy.

Like others, Shāh Nizām-ud-din, the keeper of the blind emperor, keenly felt the change of Marāthā leadership in the north. He expected his own fall, but never faltered in the discharge of his duties in the midst of personal crisis. Nothing could prevent Nizām-ud-din in issuing sermons to Hingné on 14 September 1794: "Under the present multiple leadership of Sardars, administration has been difficult. The English, Rohillās and other enemies are awaiting to

enter the field. Ruining the empire will bring down the high prestige of Sindia."⁴³ But his words of wisdom could do nothing to prevent his downfall. In June 1796, he was dismissed and Jaswant Rāo Sindia, a great-grandson of Mahādji, assumed his office.

Lakhbā Dādā in collaboration with his colleague Jagū Bāpū, became Daulat Rāo Sindia's viceroy in Northern India in November 1794. He felt the magnitude of the problem and found it an insuperable task to conduct the administration with even a semblance of authority. The report which Palmer wrote from the Marāthā camp at Mathurā on 6 April 1795, highlighted the Marāthā mal-administration in North India:

"The officers who have lately succeeded to the administration of the Marāthā affairs in Hindustān found them in a state of very alarming disorder; the revenues grossly mismanaged or embezzled and the collections so reduced as to be very inadequate to the expenses of Government. The Deccan troops and Hindustāni irregulars, mutinous and disaffected for want of pay, and with difficulty restrained from the greatest outrages by the corps under M. De Boigne; the tributary Rājāhs retaining their respective contributions and preparing to resist the future exactions of them; the Sikhs ready to invade and ravage the western provinces.... The Marāthā State.... is but ill-qualified for permanent conquest or civil administration, however formidable may be the means which it possesses of ravage and devastation. The country under its subjection from the Chambal to the Ganges is in the most miserable state of neglect and disorder, the lands deserted and the cultivation so scanty as scarcely to supply subsistence to the remaining inhabitants, the roads infested with numerous bands of robbers.... particularly in the neighbourhood of Delhi, where they are so formidable as to set the forces of the Government at defiance and to menace even the city itself".⁴⁴

The unfortunate set-back in Marāthā affairs in North India encouraged the Rājputs to free themselves from the trammels of the Marāthās. The Rājās of Jaipur and Kota tried to cultivate British friendship in their bid to defy the Marāthās, but without any success. The threatened invasion of Zamān Shāh Abdālī in 1795 and 1796 so greatly overawed the Marāthās, Rājputs, Sikhs and the British, that it stimulated a spate of speculations. But nothing concrete emerged as a result of this threatened danger, and the alarm died

down. Perhaps Palmer was right in drawing the following conclusion:

“My own opinion is that the Shāh will never invade Hindoostan, and it is formed on my knowledge of the difficulties he will have to surmount both in advancing and returning, and of the little inducement which Hindoostan holds out to such an undertaking”.⁴⁵

But Palmer's calculation did not diminish the great alarm with which Zamān Shāh's presence in India was viewed by all his Indian contemporaries. The probability of his invasion of India still remained and in that case Palmer thought it wise to form a defensive alliance with the Marāthās. It would, Palmer believed, deter the Abdālī from executing his warlike projects on India and would perhaps hold the disaffected Afghāns of Rohilkhand and Farukhabad as well as the Nawāb-Vazīr's subjects—who might be disposed to join the Abdālī—in awe and restraint.⁴⁶ Palmer's remedy against this threatened danger knew no ambiguity when he wrote to Shore on 9 February, 1797:

“If it should be your final determination to oppose the entrance of the Shāh into Hindoostan, under whatever profession he may attempt, an alliance with the Marāthās appears to me the best, and indeed the only one which you can form for that purpose with any prospect of success. Of their fidelity and hearty co-operation little doubt can be entertained, when their own preservation will be the first consequence of their combination”.⁴⁷

But Shore did not like to enmesh the Company in an alliance with the Marāthās as Abdālī's invasion seemed to him as a distant and airy project. He expressed his feelings in a minute on 25 January, 1797:

“We have always considered an invasion of Hindoostan by Zamān Shāh, as highly improbable. His object in such an attempt must be either permanent conquest or predatory acquisition.... The supposition of a predatory incursion beyond Punjab without subduing the Sikhs seemed still more improbable. Delhi from its poverty has no temptation, and although the plunder of Lucknow or Benares might repay an expedition against either, it is contrary to every maxim of policy to suppose that Zamān Shāh would advance so far whilst he left behind him a numerous and warlike people unsubdued, not to mention the Mahrattas and the opposition of the Company's arms. It is

obvious therefore to conclude that the projects assigned to Zamān Shāh would prove as chimerical this year, as reported invasions for so many preceding seasons".⁴⁸

Shore concluded that Abdālī's scheme of re-establishing the family of Shāh 'Ālam on the throne appeared not only a romantic and unprofitable object, but in the highest degree improbable, unless the Sikhs were previously subdued. It was Shore's belief that Zamān Shāh would hardly be able to secure the co-operation of the Sikhs or their consent to allow him an unmolested passage through their dominions. Shore made a comparison between Zamān Shāh's projected invasion of India with Ahmād Shāh's. He wrote on 4 July, 1797:

"On a comparison of circumstances now, and those at the time of Ahmād Shāh Abdālī, it may be observed that the power of the Marāthās was then in its zenith, but the dominion of the Sikhs is now more extensive and better established; that although they are distracted by internal dissensions, the pressure of external danger might unite them, and nothing is wanting but union to render their power formidable; that Zamān Shāh wants the experience, resources and abilities of his grandfather, nor can he expect a similar co-operation from those whose assistance so materially promoted the success of Ahmād Shāh or equal advantages from success".⁴⁹

Shore understood the numerous difficulties which Zamān Shāh would have to face when invading India. He, therefore, did not suggest any defensive preparations to meet the conjectural danger.

With the arrival of Lord Mornington as Governor-General in 1798, the British policy of non-intervention underwent a radical transformation. The Governor-General had received a letter from Zamān Shāh in which the latter requested the assistance of the British and Nawāb-Vazīr of Awadh for restoring Shāh 'Ālam to the throne of Delhi unfettered from Marāthā bondage and for expelling the latter from the North-west frontier of India. The new Governor-General did not want to leave things to chance. According to him it was unquestionable that Zamān Shāh entertained a design on India and for which he justified with admirable reason, the adoption of military preparations and conclusion of defensive engagements with Sindia as well as with other allies of the British Government.⁵⁰ Dundas was also sensitive to the Abdālī menace and admitted with candour that were that adventurer able to gain a material footing in Hindustān, Sindia's expansive dominion must fall the first victim to

his ambition. It was Dundas' personal wish that instead of immersing in meandering politics of Poona which Daulat Rāo Sindia had been pursuing with remorseless perfidy and intrigue, he should be persuaded to return to the north which was considered to be his patrimony. The Abdālī menace, Dundas said, foreshadowed infinite evils to the Company's Government. He struck a note of warning to the Governor-General when he observed on 9 October, 1799:

"It is impossible for the British power in India to be an indifferent spectator or inattentive to the consequence of so powerful and restless a chief (Zamān Shāh) coming on the back of our territories. He would not long remain quiet, but the country of Oudh would be the immediate object of his ambition, and I need not detail to your Lordship the fatal consequences to our Bengal province, if ever he should be successful in such an enterprise. Such an attempt must be met and resisted in the first and in every stage. . . . Our own resources alone in the Bengal province would be sufficient for the object, and as the Mahrattas, particularly Sindhia, have so manifest an interest in the question, there seems no reason to doubt his cordial concurrence in the resistance of such an invasion. But I do not think even there it ought to be allowed to rest: for by keeping up a connection with the various tribes on the north-western part of India, it is not a difficult matter to find him at all times in business at home to prevent him from hazarding so dangerous an enterprise at so great a distance from home. With this view allow me to direct your attention to the Indus river and those who inhabit the borders".⁵¹

But the intended invasion of Zamān Shāh never took place although it did not fail to produce infinite perplexity to the Company, the Marāthās and the Sikhs. Zamān Shāh ceased to be the ruler of Afghānistan in May 1801 and his successors, gravely embarrassed by local dissensions, abandoned the design on India.

The new Marāthā viceroy in North India, Lakhbā Dādā, found his task irksome because of the impoverished state of the country and the prevalence of simmering jealousy among Sindia's generals. He could expect no relief either from Poona or from his master, Daulat Rāo, all of whom were embroiled in Poona politics following upon the death of *Peshwā* Sawāi Mādhav Rāo (27 October, 1795). Despite his meritorious service in occupying Sabalgarh fort situated in the Kerauli State (August 1795) and the town of Narwar (October 1795), Lakhbā Dādā could not tolerate the inconsistent actions of

Daulat Rāo. Bālobā fell out of favour with his master when he could not provide the latter with necessary funds. He was placed under arrest on 26 October, 1796. Bālobā was Lakhbā's patron and the former's humiliation brought about the simultaneous degradation of the latter. Lakhbā with his sane and reasonable temperament, did not want to sully his reputation by resisting Daulat Rāo, and he chose to lead a quiet and retired life in Gopālgarh. Lakhbā's fall struck a grievous blow to Sindia's prestige in Hindustān. In those days of divided loyalties and of criss-cross ties, Lakhbā Dādā's imperturbable loyalty elicited admiration from Palmer when he wrote on 8 November, 1796: "I lament the fall of Lakhbā Dādā on account of his personal character which for mildness and moderation exceeds that of any Marāthā I know".⁵²

But Lakhbā was not allowed to remain in passivity. Zamān Shāh's reported move to Lahore and Delhi in December 1796 made Daulat Rāo panicky and the latter requested Lakhbā to ward off the coming danger. But Lakhbā could not be hustled to activity, and during his political eclipse Jagū Bāpū exercised the supreme power in Hindustān. But in the next year when Zamān Shāh occupied Lahore (3 November) and the Rājput Rājās showed impatience to throw off the Marāthā yoke, Daulat Rāo well understood the portents of danger. He asked General Perron and other officers commanding the trained corps to consider themselves under the supervision of Jagū Bāpū and Lakhbā Dādā, while the latter were requested to march to Mewāt and Jodhpur.

Sarzā Rāo Ghātge in power:

But as soon as the Durrāni menace disappeared, Daulat Rāo, under the debasing influence of Sarzā Rāo Ghātge (who became all-powerful at Sindia's Court because of the marriage of his daughter Bāiza Bāi to Daulat Rāo Sindia) unleashed a reign of terror in Poona (February 1798). Palmer gives us first-hand account from Poona:

"Sindia is principally occupied in raising money to appease the clamours of his troops for their arrears. For this purpose he employs Sarzā Rāo Ghātge, his father-in-law, who seems to be as fit an instrument of rapine as can be found. This man has taken up his residence in the house of Nānā whence he issues orders for the seizure of all persons of reputed wealth, and by violence extorts, or endeavours to extort from them individually, such portion of it as he arbitrarily demands, without even

the pretext of right or any other plea than the necessities of Sindia. It is not however very probable that Sindia will obtain any considerable relief from these odious and unjustifiable practices. The Mahrattas are remarkably tenacious of their property and will frequently part with their lives rather than surrender the small portion of it to violence and injustice".⁵³

At the instance of Ghātge, his evil genius, Daulat Rāo asked his chiefs Lakhbā Dādā and Ambājī Ingle to come to Poona; they however, evaded the order when they understood that Sindia's real object in calling them to Poona was to extort money from them. Next, Lakhbā and Jagū Bāpū marched towards Bhopal where they had been invited to interfere in the succession dispute. Hardly had they reached Sagar when they were arrested by Harji Sindia (10 March, 1798), and under direction of Daulat Rāo, Ambājī assumed charge of northern affairs. Gopāl Bhāu was restored to Sindia's confidence and Narayana Rāo Bakhshi, son of Jivbā Dādā, was imprisoned.

Daulat Rāo's folly led the Marāthās to further trouble. He provoked the wrath of Mahādji's widows—Bhāgirathi Bāi, Yamunā Bāi, and Lakshmi Bāi—by refusing to give them a sufficient maintenance allowance which he had promised before his adoption. The widows' cause appeared to be just and popular and most of the old Sardars—Abā Chitnis, Nārāyan Rāo Bakhshi and army captains of Sindia—arrayed themselves in their favour. With a large following these ladies marched from the north upon Poona in order to seek redress of their grievances. Daulat Rāo was unduly alarmed at the news. In the last week of March 1798, many prominent persons—Deoji Gauli, Rāyāji Pātil and Rāmji Patil—suspected of partisanship with the ladies—were arrested by Ghātge and on 6 April Nānā Phadnis (who had been seized in December 1797) was confined at Ahmadnagar fort.⁵⁴ As Palmer reported:

"Sindhia's having for sometime past devolved the management of his affairs upon persons of obscure and profligate character by whom most of the old and respectable ministers of his Government have been plundered, confined or driven into exile, universal discontent and distrust prevails throughout his service, which in all probability will soon produce a general defection and terminate in the subversion of his dominion and the transfer of it to some other member of his family".⁵⁵

On the approach of Sindian ladies Sarzā Rāo Ghātge duped them with false hopes and on 15 May, 1798, personally ill-treated them. On 25 June in a battle at Bhamburda the widows were defeated.

Thereafter they took to a running fight for which Daulat Rāo's trained battalions were altogether unsuitable. Meanwhile Jagū Bāpū succeeded in escaping from confinement on 5 August and Lakhbā Dādā was released three days later. They espoused the widows' cause and gained the city of Ujjain (15 September) without striking a blow. But three months later Bālā Rāo Inglé, Ambāji's brother, succeeded in recovering the city.

Daulat Rāo's difficulties seemed to be insuperable. "In his Northern dominions", Bradshaw reported on 27 May, 1798, "dislike to his government prevails thick and I have reason to believe that Mah-ratta supremacy is equally obnoxious to both Hindu and Mussul-man".⁵⁶ With a force numbering about 20,000, Lakhbā began his campaign in January 1799 in Mālwa and outmanoeuvred Bālā Rāo Inglé in more than one engagement. On 8 March Lakhbā overpowered the troops of Bāpū Sindia and Satvāji Pātil, who were proceeding to reinforce Bālā Rāo. In the beginning of April Lakhbā entered Mewār and attacked Hamirgarh.

Ambāji Inglé's only chance of success was swiftness and audacity and he sadly lacked those qualities. As Lakhbā's rebellion assumed a wider dimension, the officers in charge of Āgra, Aligarh and Delhi refused to deliver these forts to Perron. Daulat Rāo in utter bewilderment sought reconciliation with Lakhbā and the widows and, therefore, released Bālōbā Tātyā from confinement.⁵⁷ Moreover Yashwant Rāo Holkar's restless ambition and Lakhbā's alliance with him made Daulat Rāo nervous.

Bālā Rāo Inglé, who had made an armistice with Lakhbā on 15 May began several parleys with him. Daulat Rāo assuaged the wounded sentiment of Lakhbā by appointing him once again his viceroy in Hindustān. But Ambāji would not part with his vicerealty over Mewār. He was a powerful chieftain and it could hardly be expected that he would compromise his position. The territory which he held on behalf of Sindia extended from Ajmer to Gohad, including the forts of Gwālīor and Narwar, yielding a crore of rupees; besides this he entertained a numerous force. Though he professed attachment to Daulat Rāo, his secret ambition was to establish an independent government of his own in place of what he now administered in subordination to Sindia. In September 1799, Ambāji was deprived of his authority over Mewār by Daulat Rāo, and the latter appointed Lakhbā Dādā and Jagū Bāpū as his deputies in Hindustān in a bid to win their allegiance. A peaceful settlement was made between Lakhbā and Perron at Muzzamabad (mid-

way between Kishangarh and Jaipur) on 27 October on the following terms:

- (1) Lakhbā Dādā was acknowledged by all parties to be Sindia's deputy in Hindustān and the detachment of Perron's army commanded by Sutherland was to remain under Lakhbā's order.
- (2) Perron was to retain possession of the forts of Delhi, Āgra and Aligarh until Daulat Rāo's final decision on this point be known.
- (3) Ambājī Ingle was to remain in undisputed possession of Gwālior and all other districts which he held formerly, but give up Mewār and every *parganā* taken from the party of widows.⁵⁸

Lakhbā Dādā's second term of viceroyalty, which began in November 1799 augured well for Sindia's North Indian dominions. The widows had been temporarily pacified and Yashwant Rāo Holkar's mischievous activities had somewhat abated. With the restoration of Bālobā Tātyā as *Diwān* of Sindia, Lakhbā's position became strengthened and he ruled over Hindustān with tact, vigour and prudence.

Sikh revolt:

Despite the peace that had been concluded between the Marāthās and the Sikhs in May 1785, the latter continued to make occasional raids in the upper Doāb and North Delhi districts in the following years. Though Bāghel Singh was the first Sikh chief of considerable importance to welcome Mahādji's authority, the *jāgīrdars* in the cis-Sutlej country became defiant and refused to pay tribute due to the emperor. It was with great effort that Mahādji could keep the Sikh chiefs in apparent subordination when he granted a large *jāgīr* to Bāghel Singh. But the Marāthās could only maintain a semblance of authority in the Upper Doāb as many of the newly recognised Sikh chiefs of that region were unable to keep in check the restless elements from harassing the Marāthā territories. The Sikhs were kept in check for some time when De Boigne's disciplined brigades were stationed at Sonapat (April 1792). After the death of Mahādji, Lakhbā's Deputy, Nānā Rāo—who was posted at Karnal—made an attempt to collect the revenues due from the cis-Sutlej country. This provided an excuse for war. In October 1795, the Patiala queen and Bhangā Singh of Thaneswār assailed the Marāthās so fiercely that Nānā Rāo beat back a hasty retreat to Delhi.

Immediately after this a body of five thousand Sikhs swept through the Upper Doāb like a hurricane. But the courage of George Thomas, supported by Apā Khande Rāo, stemmed the onslaught; for this glorious service Thomas was appointed by Lakhbā as Warden of the Marches to guard the Jamunā frontier of the Doāb and was assigned the *parganās* of Pānipat, Sonapat and Karnal for the maintenance of his army. "Up to the end of 1797, George Thomas had been a regular servant of some lawful authority or other. But when Apā Khande Rāo's successor (Wāman Rāo) terminated his services, Thomas became a private robber-captain for his living".⁵⁹ He made Haryana, with Hansi as its capital, the centre of his roving raids. The Marāthās having sacrificed Thomas, could not fare well with the Sikhs in April 1798 and entrenched themselves at Saharanpur.⁶⁰ Thereafter, desultory war took place between them without any positive advantage to either.

The Marāthā affairs in North India in the last quarter of the eighteenth century assumed importance on account of the admirable success which they had won, largely owing to the resourcefulness and sagacity of Mahādji Sindia and the military efficiency of his French-trained battalions commanded successfully and successively by De Boigne and Perron. The fleeting appearance of Ghulām Qādir on the North Indian horizon, the treachery of his Hindustāni troops just immediately after the battle of Lalsot and the covert opposition of Nānā Phadnis and faithlessness of 'Ali Bahādur and Tukojī Holkar sometimes bedevilled Mahādji, but on the whole he surmounted all these obstacles with rare equanimity and inflexible resolution. It was indeed true that the disunity and dissension among the Rājputs considerably helped Mahādji to raise the Marāthās to the amazing height of glory; and the decade spanning the battle of Mertā (1790) and Malpura (1800) saw no major contest between the Rājputs and the Marāthās.

The death of Mahādji Sindia in 1794 created many vexatious problems for the Marāthās to the solution of which Daulat Rāo, a pleasure-loving, thoughtless young man, proved utterly unequal. In the unusual situation at Poona, he engaged himself in unseemly political squabbles, while allowing his North Indian domain to drift towards anarchy and chaos under his lieutenants. His rashness provoked the enmity of Mahādji's widows, and the simmering distrust among his lieutenants was glaringly revealed with the outbreak of open hostility between Lakhbā and Ambājī. Collins, British ambassador with Daulat Rāo, did not fail to notice all these symptoms

of danger. He submitted a dreary report to the Governor-General on 22 July, 1799:

“Unless Sindia should effect a cordial relation with the Bais, by which event he would be enabled to return to Hindustān, his possessions in this quarter can never be restored to tranquillity, the Government thereof being contested by two chieftains, each of whom seems determined on supporting his own authority, though both must be sensible that the consequences of their dissensions cannot but be ruinous to the interests of their master”.⁶¹

It is an irony of history that the Marāthās who had restored the Mughul emperor, Shāh ‘Ālam II, to the *masnad* of Delhi in 1772 and again in 1788 after his temporary eclipse for a few months, allowed him to languish in the palace with a niggardly allowance under the grasping guardianship of Shāh Nizām-ud-din. By propping up the imperial edifice the Marāthās had derived considerable advantage, but it was a sad commentary that they did not mitigate the King’s pecuniary distress. This sordid policy had not only disgusted the royal house of Timūr, but had also roused the indignation of many Muhammadans in Hindustān, who felt for the abject condition to which the imperial family was subjected. It was, therefore, not unnatural that in September 1803 the hapless Mughul emperor welcomed the English as deliverers.

Few stories in our history are more politically instructive than the last few years’ pitiless apathy of some Marāthā leaders to the broader political problems when the new Governor-General Wellesley subdued the Nizām with the chains of subsidiary alliance on 1 September, 1798, and annihilated Tipū Sultān a few months later. “Henceforth, the Peshwā and Sindhia seemed to act like birds fascinated by the blazing eyes of a python and walking unresisting into its open jaws”.⁶² Only Nānā prophetically observed: “Tipū’s defeat is not a good omen for the Peshwā”.⁶³ Bājī Rāo II lay supine while Daulat Rāo, with seeming unconcern, pursued the vain dream of controlling the Peshwā’s government. At last being conscious of his peril, he (Daulat Rāo) left Poona in December 1800, only to paper over the cracks which had already manifested in North India.

NOTES

1. Rajwade, *MIS.*, I, 1, Shejwalkar, Panipat (1961), p. 5; also Sardesai, G. S.: *New History of the Marāthās*, II (1948), pp. 365-66.
2. Bhargava, K. D. (Ed.): *Browne Correspondence*; Browne to Hastings, 2 November, 1782, letter No. 2.
3. *Ibid.*, Browne to Hastings, 16 September, 1783, letter No. 51, p. 108.
4. Sardesai, G. S. (Ed.): *Historical Papers Relating to Mahādji Sindia* (1937), p. 408.

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5. Bhargava, K. D. (Ed.) *Browne Correspondence: Browne to Hastings*, 12 November, 1784, No. 114. Later on, at Nānā's insistence, the Peshwā obtained the title 'Vakil-i-Mutlaq' and Sindia became his Naib or Deputy.
6. British Museum, Add. MSS., No. 29, 209.
7. P.R.C., Vol. I, pp. 25-6, 30.
8. Foreign Dept. Secret Consultation, 11 October, 1785, No. 4.
9. *Ibid*, 26 May, 1785, No. 5.
10. Sarkar, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, III, pp. 344-45.
11. Foreign Dept. Secret Consultation, 23 June, 1786, No. 30.
12. Sarkar, Jadunāth, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, III (1938), p. 388.
13. Foreign Dept. Secret Consultation, 3 October, 1787, No. 14.
14. Parasnis, D. B. (Ed.): *Dilli Yethil Marāthyanchi Rajkarane*, I, No. 266.
15. *Ibid*, No. 238.
16. Sarkar, Jadunāth, *Delhi Affairs, Persian Records of Marāthā History*, I, p. 199.
17. Poona Residency Correspondence, Vol. I, letter No. 244.
18. Sarkar, Jadunāth, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, III (1952), p. 230.
19. Sardesai, G. S. (Ed.): *Historical Papers Relating to Mahādji Sindia*, No. 517.
20. Bhagwat, A. N. (Ed.): *Holkarshahichya Itihasachi Sadhane: Patravayavahar Purvardha Khand*, I, Letter No. 20.
21. *Ibratnamah*, Asiatic Society of Bengal MSS. No. 178; Sindia's illness, Fol. No. 303A-309A.
22. Foreign Dept. Secret Proceedings, 8 July, 1789, No. 5.
23. Sardesai, G. S. (Ed.): *Historical Papers Relating to Mahādji Sindia* (1737), No. 561.
24. Sarkar, Jadunāth (Ed.): *Sindia as Regent of Delhi, Persian Records of Marāthā History*, II, p. 34.
25. Parasnis, D. B. (Ed.): *Dilli Yethil Marāthyanchi Rajkarane*, I, Letter No. 371; also *Historical Papers Relating to Mahādji Sindia*, Nos. 570-71, quoted in *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, IV (1950), p. 17.
26. P. R. C. Vol. I, pp. 368-70; for details see De Boigne's letter in Desmond Young, *Fountain of the Elephants* (1959), pp. 115-20.
27. *Historical Papers of Mahādji Sindia* (Ed. Sardesai), pp. 829-30; also Desmond Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 123-28.
28. Sardesai, G. S.: *Ibid*, p. 862.
29. Bhagwat, A. N. (Ed.): *Holkarshahichya Itihasachi Sadhane: Patravayavahar Purvardha Khand I*, Letter No. 57.
30. Sardesai, G. S. (Ed.): *Historical Papers Relating to Mahādji Sindia*, p. 846.
31. *Ibid*, pp. 855-57, 864.
32. Sardesai, G. S. (Ed.): *Ibid*, Letter No. 591, pp. 862-65.
33. *Ibid*, p. 864.
34. Foreign Dept. Pol. Cons. 27 June, 1792, No. 5; Palmer to Malet, 17 May, 1792; also Grant Duff's *History*, Vol. II, pp. 223-24.
35. Sardesai, G. S. (Ed.): *Historical Papers Relating to Mahādji Sindia*, p. 874.
36. *Calendar of Persian Correspondence*, Vol. X, p. 236.
37. Thakur, V. V. (Ed.): *Holkarshahichya Itihasachi Sadhane*, Vol. I, Pt. II, Letter No. 385.
38. Sarkar, Jadunāth, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, IV (1950), p. 95. Sarkar describes the battle in detail at pp. 89-96.
39. Compton, H., *A Particular Account of the European Military Adventurers of Hindustan*, p. 105.
- 39a. Desmond Young, *op. cit.*, p. 128.
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41. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 288 August, 1787, No. A.
42. Parasnis, D. B. (Ed.): *Dilli Yethil Marāthyanchi Rajkarane*, II, Letter No. 121.
43. *Ibid*, Letter No. 130.
44. P.R.C. Vol. VIII, No. 11, pp. 33-35.
45. *Ibid*, Vol. VIII, No. 53; Palmer to Malet, 26 Dec. 1796.
46. For. Dept. Pol. Cons., 24 February, 1797, No. 95.
47. *Ibid*, 6 March, 1797, No. 15.
48. For. Dept. Sec. Cons., 25 January, 1797, No. 1.
49. *Ibid*, 7 July, 1797, No. 1.
50. British Museum, Add. MSS., No. 13, 456; Mornington to Dundas, 28 February, 1798.

51. *Ibid*, No. 37, 274: Dundas to Mornington, 9 October, 1799.
52. P.R.C., Vol. VIII, No. 42.
53. For. Pol. Dept., 9 July, 1798, No. 33; Palmer to Sir Alured Clarke, 13 April, 1798.
54. Khare, *Aitihāsik Lekha Sangraha*, X, Letter No. 4194.
55. For. Pol. Dept., 9 July, 1798, No. 33.
56. *Ibid*, 9 July, 1798, No. 112.
57. Khare, *Aitihāsik Lekha Sangraha*, XI, No. 4860.
58. P.R.C., Vol. VIII, No. 185.
59. Sarkar, Jadunāth, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, IV (1950), p. 236.
60. P.R.C., Vol. VIII, No. 217.
61. *Ibid*, No. 158, p. 197.
62. Sarkar, Jadunāth, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, IV, p. 156.
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CHAPTER XII

MARĀTHĀS AND THE SOUTH INDIAN STATES (1772-1799)

From 1772 to 1799 during which the sway of the Marāthās became paramount in North India, their power in the South was somewhat limited in extent. Their relations with the two foremost southern powers—Mysore and Hyderabad—alternated with fluctuating periods of friendship and hostility. Their ephemeral friendship with Mysore in 1780 was followed by their alliance with the Company against that indigenous power which in a way altered the balance of power in the Deccan. Mysore, crippled in wars with the British, ceased to be a rival to the Company, and the Nizām, emasculated by the Marāthās in 1795, maintained a pitiful existence till 1798 when he was the first among the Indian powers to embrace the subsidiary alliance of Wellesley. The Marāthās looked on South Indian States as their subordinates, which did not foster mutual understanding and respect. The divergence of interest among the South Indian powers ultimately weakened them all and enabled the British to impose their authority upon them. The story of Marāthā relations with South Indian States is, therefore, a sad tale of Marāthā collaboration with the British against Mysore and the crippling of the Nizām in 1795. The Marāthā aloofness from the last war with Tipū showed their lack of foresight and when they realised their mistake, the inexorable force of circumstances gripped them more strongly than ever before, from which they could not extricate themselves.

Marāthā-Mysore Relations:

For several generations, Marāthā-Mysore relations had been very unfriendly. *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo had been granted Khāndesh and Mālwa as his field of activity and his appearance in the south was in a secondary capacity as an aid to the *Pratinidhi* and Fateh Singh Bhosle. He had turned only cursorily to the south, and in 1726 exacted contribution from Mysore. With the passing away of Shāhū Rājā in December 1749, the *Peshwā* took over Karnāṭak, and in four swift campaigns, brought much of the province under Marāthā sway. The battle of Pānipat (1761) meant not only the temporary eclipse of the Marāthā power in the north, but the rise of Haidar 'Alī which checked the Marāthā expansion in the south as well. *Peshwā*

Mūdhav Rāo, therefore, was forced by the political situation to spend the best part of his life in immobilising Haidar 'Āli and putting a curb to his aggressions. Haidar 'Āli was completely defeated in 1764-65, but Raghunāth Rāo prevailed upon the *Peshwā* to grant him easy terms. Another campaign in 1766-67 further weakened Haidar. The Marāthā expedition in 1769-72 was eminently successful under the generalship of Trimbak Rāo Pethé who rendered meritorious service in the Karnāṭak with the co-operation of the Patwardhans. On 5 March, 1771, he inflicted upon Haidar a crushing defeat near Seringapatam in the battle of Moti Talao (or Chinkurli). But, in spite of this reverse, Haidar showed unexpected sign of fortitude by opposing the Marāthās with sullen obstinacy. In the meantime the *Peshwā*, who was ailing for some time, became increasingly apprehensive of his approaching death and asked Trimbak Rāo to conclude peace by whatever means possible (April, 1772). Moreover, with its depleted resources, Poona could not carry on the war indefinitely. Haidar was also wearied with a hopeless war involving terrible exhaustion of his resources. So Trimbak Rāo concluded a treaty with Haidar by which the latter agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 31 lakhs in cash and surrender valuable territories south of the Tungabhadra. "Mādhav Rāo, the greatest of the *Peshwās*, must be regarded as the most formidable antagonist whom Haidar had to meet on the battle-field. Haidar was no doubt defeated by Smith as also by Sir Eyre Coote, but he could keep the influence of these defeats confined within a narrow sphere. But Mādhav Rāo inflicted on him defeats in the field and followed up each blow by the recovery of valuable territory".¹

The premature death of *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo (18 November, 1772) and the succession of his brother Nārāyan Rāo, an incompetent, fickle-minded young man, emboldened Haidar 'Āli to take full advantage of the embarrassing situation at Poona. He sent his troops to Chitaldurg and Sāvanūr and threatened to attack Sira, Maddagiri and Gurramkonda. The Marāthās made feeble efforts to counteract Haidar by appointing Trimbak Rāo as the chief commander and sending some forces under Muhammad Yūsuf. Nārāyan Rāo asked Haidar to pay the arrears of tribute amounting to 50 lakhs of rupees. But the *Peshwā* was rebuffed when Haidar replied that the demand would be met on the restoration of places conquered by the late *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo.

The short but uneventful *Peshwāship* of Nārāyan Rāo was highlighted by the eruption of domestic discord that had been brewing for a long period. There was avowed enmity between the *Peshwā* and his unscrupulous uncle Raghunāth Rāo which culminated in the

assassination of Nārāyan Rāo (30 August, 1773). After years of impatient waiting and ceaseless intriguing, Raghunāth Rāo at last became the *Peshwā*, but he was not destined to enjoy the dignity for long. A well-concerted opposition grew up against Raghunāth Rāo, and in order to deflect the attention of the Poona Council he set out on foreign expeditions expecting to rehabilitate himself by strokes of victories over the Nizām and Haidar 'Ali. He defeated the Nizām but granted him such easy terms that they betrayed his weakness and lack of foresight. Meanwhile news trickled through, that most of the important ministers were rallying round Gangā Bāi, the widow of Nārāyan Rāo, now known to have advanced in pregnancy. Raghunāth Rāo was too eager to settle matters with Haidar, and agreed to receive from him 72,000 rupees as tribute from Bellary.² In his eagerness to mitigate his acute financial distress, Raghunāth Rāo gave up all claims to the Marāthā districts of Maddagiri, Hoskote and Chandragiri upon Haidar's paying 25 lakhs of rupees. By the treaty of Kaliandurg, Haidar recognised Raghunāth Rāo as the *Peshwā* and agreed to pay him an annual tribute of 6 lakhs. The territory conquered by Mādhav Rāo was ceded to Haidar.^{2a}

The birth of Sawāi Mādhav Nārāyān, the posthumous son of Nārāyan Rāo, threw Raghunāth Rāo into political limbo. In despair he tried to secure the military assistance of the East India Company by concluding with the Bombay Government the Treaty of Surat on 6 March, 1775. He also importuned Haidar to assist him with military and financial help and to take possession of the Marāthā territory up to the right bank of the Krishnā. In March 1776 the Treaty of Surat was substituted by the Treaty of Purandhar by which the Calcutta Council agreed to renounce the cause of Raghunāth Rāo. "The death of Mādhav Rāo, the murder of Nārāyan Rāo and the quarrel between *Bārbhais* and Raghobā, gave Haidar a welcome respite from Marāthā invasions and an opportunity not only to regain what he had lost to the Marāthās but also to conquer Coorg and reconquer Malabār".³

In March 1776 Haidar captured Gooty and imprisoned its irrepressible ruler, Murār Rāo along with his two sons. He also created troubles in the Marāthā territory north of Tungabhadra. Throughout 1776 the Marāthās had been busy in subduing an impostor who posed as Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu. But the tragic end of Murār Rāo in prison, roused the Marāthās to feverish pitch of anger and excitement. The menacing activities of Haidar produced an alliance between the Poona Government and the Nizām and it was decided they should share the conquered territory equally. The Marāthās

assembled an important galaxy of prominent generals in the persons of Patwardhan chiefs like Pāndurang Rāo, Konher Rāo as well as Krishna Rāo Pānse, Sivarām Ghorpade (nephew of Murār Rāo), Nilkanth Rāo Sindia, the Desai of Nargund and chiefs of Dharwar district. The Nizām's general Ibrahīm Khān Dhausa and the Marāthā commander Haripant Phadke were to move in complete concord against the Mysore ruler.

Haidar's triumph became unmistakable when he succeeded in defeating the Patwardhans in a sanguinary contest on 8 January, 1777, at Saunshi, near Dharwar. Konher Rāo was killed and Pāndurang Rāo was taken captive with some of the Ghorpades. The Marāthās endeavoured to keep up the morale of the troops in high key by sending Parashūrām Bhāu Patwardhan, who at once began the celebrated Marāthā system of guerilla warfare. But the outbreak of domestic dissensions in Poona in the first half of 1778 obliged the Bhāu to fall back and emboldened Haidar to achieve his obvious objective. With his well-trained force of cavalry and infantry, Haidar conquered important places in the Krishnā-Tungabhadra Doāb. The Chiefs of Nargund, Shirhatti and Dammal tendered submission and were confirmed in their respective territories on promising to pay usual tribute to Haidar. The resistance of Dharwar for a considerable period was the only flickering light of courage and resolution in the pervading gloom of despair and tame submission. Thus Haidar was able to move forward along the path of his heart's desire when he annexed the territories up to Tungabhadra as well as between the Krishnā and Tungabhadra at a time when the Marāthās were passing through a domestic ordeal. The days of Mādhav Rāo were obviously over when the relentless Marāthā pressure on Haidar had kept the latter in perpetual dread of the Marāthās. The internal crisis that gripped the Marāthās from 1774 to the middle of 1778 favoured Haidar in his much-coveted design of recovering the lost territories and conquering new ones.

The outbreak of the First Anglo-Marāthā War effected a radical change in the policy of the Marāthās when the latter, with good sense dawning on them, projected a rapprochement with Haidar in the beginning of February 1780. Nānā's diplomatic genius brought about a coalition of Indian powers consisting of the *Peshwā*, Bhosle, the Nizām and Haidar 'Alī, which threatened to shake the very foundations of British power in India. In this broad-based coalition it was decided that the grand army under Sindia and Holkar was to oppose Goddard, Mūdhōjī Bhosle to invade Bengal and its dependencies, Nizām 'Alī the Northern Sarkars and Haidar the Karnāṭak.

A series of incidents shook the complacency of Haidar 'Āli. By the treaty which Haidar concluded with the British in 1769, he was to receive military aid from the Company in time of need. The Marāthās attacked him in the next year and the British betrayed him by not sending any succour. With the outbreak of war between England and France in 1778, the English besieged Pondicherry which fell in a short time. The Madras Government cast a covetous glance on Mahē, the last citadel of French power in the south. Haider lost no time in sending a note of warning to the Madras Government. "Should the English create a disturbance in the French factory of Mahē, he would punish them by devastating the whole country from Madura to Madras. He would totally efface them from the face of the earth. The defeat which they received at the hands of the Mahrattas would be completely eclipsed by what he should inflict on them".⁴ In the treaty concluded with the Marāthās on 20 February, 1780, Haidar offered to pay the latter fifteen lakhs of rupees 'in settlement of their former accounts', while he also promised them an annual tribute of twelve lakhs. The Poona *Darbar* recognised Haidar's sovereignty 'on this side of the Tungabhadra as also on the other side'; his right to the Marāthā territories south of the Krishna was also admitted. Both parties agreed not to make separate peace with the English.⁵

It is paradoxical that the treaty of Salbai (17 May, 1782) which put an end to the First Anglo-Marāthā War, was concluded not only without reference to Haidar 'Āli, but with a specific provision that the *Peshwā* would compel him to relinquish all his conquests in the Karnāṭak and to release all prisoners within six months of the ratification of the treaty. In addition to this specific article (Art. 9) Mahādji Sindia solemnly promised that if Haidar 'Āli should refuse to abide by the terms of the treaty, the forces of the *Peshwā* would join the English in compelling him to accept them.⁶ Thus by his clever diplomacy the Governor-General, Hastings, succeeded in fulfilling the intention of his friend Sullivan who had comprehended the destruction of Haidar in close collaboration with Poona, Berār and Hyderabad. To Sullivan, Haidar was an anathema and he was convinced that "Haidar must be destroyed to secure our own power. There is no medium. Mysore reduced in strict alliance with Berār, Hyderabad and Poona, with proper bridles upon all, will be the only system of duration".⁷

Hardly had Haidar died (7 December, 1782) when his son Tipū began to show scant regard to the treaty of Salbai. Consequently, a new treaty was concluded on 28 October, 1783, between the Marā-

thās and the English. In case of Tipū's refusal to accede to the terms of the treaty of Salbai, the *Peshwā* would assist the English and make war against him; territories conquered from Tipū would be jointly shared by them 'according to the vicinity of their respective situation'.⁸ Grant Duff's comment on this transaction is weighty and carries conviction: "It was as much the wish of Nānā Furnuwees as of Sindia to oblige Tippoo to conform to the terms of the treaty of Salbye, in order that he might appear to the other powers of India a Marāthā dependent as well as a tributary".⁹

While the Marāthā preparations for commencing hostilities against Tipū were well under way, the Madras Government was compelled to conclude with him the treaty of Mangalore on 11 March, 1784, which provoked the ire of Warren Hastings. The Poona Government were left ignorant of the transactions as it had already sent its forces under Haripant Phadke to oppose Tipū. The treaty of Mangalore, however, did not put a brake on Nānā Phadnis' warlike preparations. He urged Tukoji Holkar to join Haripant while he himself along with Parashurām Bhāu met the Nizām at Yādgir in the Raichur district on 16 May, 1784. After protracted negotiations "the conference terminated in a general treaty of alliance, the particulars of which were to be specified as soon as they found themselves prepared to enter upon its execution".¹⁰

Tipū reacted promptly when he called upon the Nizām to hand over to him Bijāpur. He at once followed up the threat with an attack on the Nizām's territories south of the Krishnā, while sending Burhān-ud-din to besiege Nargund. Nānā's preparations in the initial stage were not adequate as he was deluding himself to arrive at a compromise with Tipū for which the latter was negotiating through his agent at Poona. He agreed to pay two years' tribute to the *Peshwā* provided Nargund was left to his discretion. Nānā was quick to seize this proposition anxious as he was to get the money and to protract matters till the end of the rainy season. Scarcely had Tipū practised this monumental deceit when he captured Rāmdurg (5 May, 1785) and Nargund (29 July, 1785), consigning the latter's Brahmin ruler Vyankat Rāo Bhāve and his *Diwān* Kālopant Pethé to prison at Seringapatam. By the end of December 1785, Dodwad, Dharwar, Sampgaon and Jamboti had passed under the occupation of the Mysoreans.

Tipū's activities shook Nānā's complacency. He now turned to the British at Bombay for armed help and offered them any sea-port in Tipū's dominions provided his territories were conquered. But Nānā's expectations of British help were blown over when Boddam,

the Bombay Governor, reiterated the Company Government's policy of neutrality. Mahādji Sindia harped on the treaty of Salbai which obliged the English to enter into hostilities with Tipū whenever the latter should break the peace with the *Peshwā*.¹¹ The Calcutta Council said in reply that Mahādji was wrongly interpreting the treaty of Salbai, as by the treaty of Mangalore, the British were required not to assist the enemies of Tipū. But the British policy gained a sudden momentum when it was apprehended that the Marāthās, being disgusted with the British, might draw closer to the French. Moreover the presence of the French agent, Montigny, at Poona increased the apprehension of the Franco-Marāthā collaboration. British imagination also became active when it suddenly heard the reported news of Tipū's death. Though the news was later found to be false, the immediate reaction was a sense of utmost concern to the British as the Mysore Government, distracted by this calamity, might form a dangerous coalition with the French. It was this sheer necessity, the Calcutta Council observed on 14 February, 1786, that forced the British to deviate from the policy of neutrality. And it decided to offer the Marāthās the assistance of three battalions of sepoys with the important reservation that they should not be employed offensively against the Mysore Government but only in defence of the *Peshwā*'s person or of any of his forts within his own dominions. The British flattered themselves with the following reflection:

"We consider the Marāthā Government as the natural allies of the English in India for the two Governments united can give law to India. . . . The Government of the *Peshwā* is permanent, as it is so far like the Government of the English that no changes of the rulers affect either nation. The Governments of other states of India depend on the continuance of particular rulers".¹²

The British offer of aid was Macpherson's doing. The next successor, Lord Cornwallis who assumed office in September 1786, came to India with instructions to adhere scrupulously to Pitt's India Act which forbade the Company to declare war or conclude treaties with any Indian power without the consent of the Court of Directors. In a minute dated 27 September, 1786, the new Governor-General explained:

"We cannot give the three battalions without going to war. We cannot go to war without offending the laws of our country. It is therefore high time to extricate ourselves from our present critical and dangerous situation the continuance of which will

not only give the most just grounds of offence to Tippoo, but will probably produce a quarrel with the Poona ministers who already express a diffidence of our sincerity".¹³

The British ambassador to Poona, Malet, performed the delicate task of conveying to Nānā Phadnis the newly oriented British policy. Emphasising on change of circumstances as Franco-Mysore coalition appeared by now chimerical, Malet dwelt on the necessity of strict adherence to treaties. But this did not assuage the frayed temper of Nānā who failed to see any rectitude in the British diplomacy.^{13a} He would not concede that this should happen when Macpherson had already agreed to assist the Marāthās.

Meanwhile, the Marāthās had begun to make brisk preparations for their struggle with Tipū. It was with great difficulty that Nānā could obtain Mūdhōjī Bhosle's co-operation. He agreed to give up Garha-Mandla to Bhosle and the latter agreed to collect 15,000 horse and to pay Rs. 32 lakhs. Nānā also craved Holkar's co-operation and it was only after considerable monetary sacrifice amounting to ten lakhs of rupees which Holkar required for discharging the arrears due to the army that Nānā could obtain his concurrence. On 15 February, 1786, Nānā and Nizām 'Āli once again met at Yadgir. Nānā almost ruined the prospect of success of the meeting when he expressed his desire to return to Poona after leaving the command of the army to Haripant Phadke. Nizām 'Āli loudly expressed his resentment at this conduct of Nānā and the latter therefore decided to stay on. It was agreed after long parleys that the Nizām and the *Peshwā's* Government were to divide the conquests equally among themselves.¹⁴ It is curious indeed that it was the Nizām and not Nānā who left the camp in the month of April by leaving the command of his forces under Tahawar Jang.¹⁵

At this crisis Tipū made frantic efforts to dissolve the confederacy or at least to avert the war. But the situation was past beyond reconciliation. Nānā pursued his war efforts with relentless zeal by sending his agents—Krishna Rāo Ballāl to the Nizām and Balwant Rāo to Holkar—to push them along the path of action.¹⁶

Despite the concourse of prominent personalities, the Marāthā army presented a distressing spectacle. According to a newswriter:

"The Mahrattas seem at a stand what to do, and the whole of their affair in a state of suspense, their opinion much divided and whatever Nānā proposes to the *Peshwā's* chiefs, is paid little or no attention; their troops much in arrears, and little or no

money in their camp to pay them, and every necessity amazingly dear, and they by no means prepared to attack their enemy, and it is imagined without a speedy change in their present mode of conduct that Tipoo will in the course of a few months, enlarge his dominions at their expense".¹⁷

Military operations began on 1 May with the investment of Badami. The fort capitulated after being subjected to three weeks' incessant bombardment. The fall of Badami might have generated a feeling of complacency among the Marāthās as Nānā set off for Poona, Mūdhōjī Bhosle to Nagpur and Parashūrām Bhāu to Tasgaon. Hari Pant marched on Gajendragarh, a town in the Dharwar district, in June 1786 and the fort surrendered. Tukoji Holkar had also been able to secure every part of the Kittur district except the fort of the same name.

To offset these losses, Tipū made a surprise move by suddenly appearing before Adoni, a strong post of Nizām 'Alī. Despite the allied efforts to protect Adoni, it could not be saved. On 29 June Tipū appeared before the fort and occupied it without firing a shot. Nānā Phadnis felt mortified at the loss of Adoni which he called the key of the Deccan. To retrieve the situation Hari Pant arrived with his forces before the strong fort of Bahadur Benda and on 17 August the fort surrendered.

While Hari Pant was relaxing at Bahadur Benda, he received the news that Tipū had performed a daring feat by crossing the Tungabhadra in the rainy season with the help of basket boats. Hari Pant changed his ground for the convenience of forage and proceeded to Sāvanūr, the Nawāb of which had beseeched him to come to his rescue against Tipū's attack.¹⁸ Tipū encamped about 8 miles from Sāvanūr when he was soon joined by Burhān-ud-din and Badruz-Zamān Khān who arrived with a large convoy of provisions from Bidnur. The Marāthās became reinforced by the arrival of Raghunāth Rāo Patwardhan from Koppal as well as by Tukoji Holkar who came with 50,000 men.

On 1 October a little before dawn Tipū's columns enveloped the Marāthā camp. The Marāthā force, being unable to sustain the fierce attack of the Mysoreans, was obliged to retreat. Tukoji's heroism made no impact in the complexion of the war. By the beginning of October 1786 the Marāthā army left Sāvanūr along with its Nawāb, Hakīm Khān and the place surrendered on 6 October. Hari Pant afterwards moved to Shirhatti, a fortified town about 20 miles north-east of Sāvanūr. On 11 November Hari Pant invested

the fort which surrendered on 14th after a feeble resistance.

On 24 November the Marāthās left Shirhatti. On 2 December it was decided at a council of war to make a general attack on Tipū. But on the next day the Marāthās, for some inexplicable reasons, began to falter and made preparations to march back. This was Tipū's opportunity and by constant barrage of rockets he threw the Marāthā camp in confusion. Tipū's forces became master of the whole baggage. But the most heinous deed was committed by Tukoji's cavalry who plundered the Marāthā camp as much as the enemy did. The suspicion gained credence when it was found that Holkar did not suffer any loss during Tipū's attack.¹⁹ In the unimpeachable account of contemporary observer, Yvon, we find the following clue to the treachery:

"The treason carried on in this army is evident, and for the present has rendered the army incapable of coming to action. Tukoji Holkar and Bonsla are the principal traitors who carry on open correspondence with Tippoo, and have voted for a conclusion of peace".²⁰

This disgrace rankled deeply in Hari Pant's mind and he was determined to achieve some brilliant military strokes. By sending the artillery and superfluous baggage to Badami, Hari Pant lay encamped at Bahadur Benda and afterwards between Gajendragarh and Koppal. Meanwhile Tipū had advanced to Bahadur Benda and occupied it after a week's siege. On 16 January Tipū made an abortive attempt to surprise the Marāthā camp.

The Marāthā-Mysore war lacked any dramatic element in which neither party gained any positive advantage over the other. As the war continued, Tipū's increasing concern was that the British might not remain aloof in the contest and inevitably would support the cause of the confederates. It was this anticipated British collaboration with the Marāthās that made Tipū to broach peace proposals to the different personalities—Holkar, Hari Pant and Rāste—despite his slight edge over the confederates in fighting. But it was only in December 1786 that the Marāthās listened to peace overtures from Tipū with all seriousness. Tipū proposed that the Marāthās should recognise his sovereignty over the territory between the Krishnā and the Tungabhadra. In return he would pay 48 lakhs of rupees as arrears of tribute—32 lakhs immediately and 16 lakhs after six months.²¹ But Hari Pant refused to accept the proposal as it fell far short of his Government's expectation. It had been its desire to re-

sume all the territories possessed by the Marāthās during the days of Mādhav Rāo, to which Tipū would not agree. But Tipū dared not cut off the process of negotiation; instead he sent Badr-uz-Zamān and 'Ali Rezā who arrived in the Marāthā camp towards the last week of January 1787.

Quite unexpectedly a settlement was reached in March 1787 at Gajendragarh between Tipū and the Marāthās. This *volte face* is explained by the fact that the fear of British intervention lurked more in Tipū's mind than the hostility of the Marāthās, and he naturally desired to compromise with the latter. By this treaty the Marāthās regained possession of Badami, Nargund and Kittur.²²

Adoni was restored to Mahābat Jang, nephew of Nizām 'Ali. Tipū was to retain possession of Sāvanūr, Dharwar, Bahadur Benda and all the forts situated between the Krishnā and the Tungabhadra. He also agreed to pay four years' arrears of tribute amounting to 60 lakhs of rupees which his father had stipulated to pay.²³ From the total a deduction of 15 lakhs was obtained by Tipū in compensation of damages sustained by him during the war. Of the remaining 45 lakhs, 30 lakhs were paid and the remainder promised at the expiration of the year. Nizām 'Ali was included in the treaty.

Thus ended a war in which Tipū had a decided superiority over the Marāthās. As Wilks has put it: "The success of his night alarms, in the late campaign, had been considerable, and he is diffuse in his description of various stratagems, by which he kept his enemies perpetually awake. . . . it is certain from the impression produced in every part of India, by the events of this campaign, that it must have been conducted, on the part of the Sultān, with a degree of energy and enterprise which established a general opinion of his military superiority".²⁴ Tipū had triumphed over the confederates and kept the Marāthā army on the defensive. The continuance of war seemed to Nānā an expensive affair and he was eager to get out of it. "In fact", as Malet reported on 24 March, 1787, "the Poona Government was reduced to the necessity of adopting so disagreeable an alternative. Nānā cannot but have perceived that the progress of the army was by no means proportioned to the excessive expenses of its maintenance. He must have had some reason to doubt the abilities of his commander, the good faith of his allies and even some of his own chieftains".²⁵ But the situation turned in favour of the Marāthā Government when Tipū on his own initiative opened peace negotiations. Tipū made his choice of befriending the Marāthā Government to subvert the power of the English.

But success eluded him as events moved in such devious ways that the Marāthā Government and the Nizām, instead of supporting an indigenous neighbour, fell victims to foreign wiles and walked into the British web of alliances.

Though the British studiously kept aloof from the war between Tipū and the Poona Government, they were ever watchful of the conduct of Tipū lest he might be strengthened by the French. Rumours of French designs were rife in 1787 and Cornwallis immediately instructed Malet at Poona to secure the co-operation of the Marāthā Government, if the Franco-Mysore combination was ever to take place. Cornwallis made tempting offers to them—territorial compensation and reimbursement of war expenses. But the British reservation that they should not be forced to assist the Marāthās in the event of their being attacked by Tipū alone, made Nānā Phadnis cynical about the proposal. Cornwallis could feel the pulse of the Marāthās when he wrote to Dundas on 16 November, 1787:

“There appears such a jealousy and coldness in the disposition of the Marāthās towards us, that I do not flatter myself, in the event of a breach with Tippoo, that we could derive any immediate assistance from them”.²⁶

But despite Nānā's apathy to an alliance with the British, he was willing to consider it only on the following conditions.²⁷ In case either of the contracting parties should be attacked by Tipū, the other should ask him to desist and in case of non-compliance should join the party attacked to punish him. Nānā further pledged himself for Nizām 'Alī's acceding to this defensive alliance. Nānā's definition of the defensive alliance—the protection of the contracting parties against any attacks of Tipū, singly or jointly with the French, left no room for evasion and put the British in a tight corner. Cornwallis could not visualise an alliance with the Marāthās on such terms and, therefore, rejected Nānā's proposal.

In October 1787 the British were on the brink of war with France over the Dutch affair. But in the beginning of 1788 peace was established between England, France and Holland. Cornwallis, therefore, could afford to be negligent in cultivating the friendship of the Marāthās. But events moved inexorably towards a war and Tipū felt that Cornwallis was bent on hostilities when he proposed (on 7 July, 1789) unqualified military assistance to the Nizām against Tipū. Towards the close of December 1789, Tipū, therefore, made a surprise attack on Travancore, an ally of the Company.

War with Tipū being now inevitable, Cornwallis began to lean towards the Marāthās with intense ardour. The value of Marāthā friendship had not been perceived by Cornwallis alone. In England Dundas had been voicing this sentiment with utmost frankness:

“I feel that an alliance with Mahrattas of the closest kind is all that is required to keep the whole world in awe respecting India. The aid of their cavalry seems all that is wanting to make our power complete”.²⁸

Malet who had been striving hard to secure the alliance of Marāthās now found to his delight that they were solicitous to enter into alliance with the British. On 1 June, 1790, a treaty (called the Treaty of Poona) was, therefore, concluded between Malet on the part of the Company and Nānā Phadnis on the part of the *Peshwā*. It was stipulated that the forces of the *Peshwā* and the Nizām numbering about 25,000 should assist the Company in invading the territories of Tipū. The British were to assist both the powers with two battalions of the Company's forces and their expenses were to be borne by the *Peshwā* and Nizām 'Āli respectively. All conquests were to be equally shared and the poligars and *zamindārs* formerly dependent on the *Peshwā* and the Nizām were to be reinstated on paying a *nazar* which was to be equally divided among the allies. Peace should be made by mutual consent and if after the conclusion of peace with Tipū, he should attack either of the contracting parties, the others should join to punish him.²⁹

The British Resident at Hyderabad, Kennaway, found it easy to seduce the Nizām who was considered to be a spent force in South Indian politics. The Nizām's increasing anxiety was to secure himself against future Marāthā attacks to which Cornwallis could not, with propriety, agree. But the Nizām raised so many objections to the Treaty of Poona that Kennaway was obliged to conclude a separate treaty with him (Treaty of Pangal, 4 July, 1790) the terms and conditions of which were nearly the same as those of the treaty signed by the *Peshwā* on 1 June. It was this alliance with the *Peshwā* and the Nizām, reinforced by friendship of the Rājās of Coorg, Cochin and Malabār Chieftains, that heartened Cornwallis to expect the most promising support in the war.

Cornwallis entered the war with the zeal of a crusader. To Pitt, he assured: “I will not quit the helm in time of danger unless I am required to do so and I will spare no pains to bring the war to a speedy and honourable conclusion”.³⁰ He received hearty co-opera-

tion from all his colleagues—General Medows and General Abercromby, the Governors of Madras and Bombay Presidencies respectively, as well as from military commanders like Kelly, Maxwell, Floyd and Hartley.

In 1790 the march of events was not altogether unfavourable for the British. They had established unquestioned supremacy in Malabār, though they had not fared well in Coromandel. On 10 December Hartley utterly routed Tipū's forces at Calicut and four days later Abercromby reduced Cannanore. But the British resources without the co-operation of the *Peshwā* and the Nizām were wholly inadequate against the mounting pressure of Tipū's attack.

Parashurām Bhāu assumed the chief command of the Marāthā forces. Strengthened by the Marāthā contingents under Rāste and *Pratinidhi* and British troops under Captain Little, Bhāu proceeded towards Dharwar. Meanwhile the Marāthā forces had been able to occupy Hubli as well as Kittur. From the beginning Dharwar exercised a magic spell on the mind of Parashurām Bhāu as the latter considered it a place of strategic importance. Truly did Little observe from Dharwar: "By report it is well supplied with artillery, ammunition and a great store of provisions. On this place the enemy put their whole dependence for the defence of the country on this side of the Tungabhadra".³¹ The fort was so well-stocked with men and provisions that it was least expected that its commandant, Badruz-Zamān Khān, would placidly relinquish its possession.

On 18 September the Marāthā army reached the fort and started bombardment. But neither did it cause any damage to the fort nor did it create a sense of perplexity to its sturdy defenders. The Marāthā army lacked efficient artillery and gunpowder. They were constrained to admit:

"We have only ten guns—one of them is already broken, two are very small, five are made of cast iron and the remaining two are only made of metal. The fort is very strong and the enemy have 40 guns. Our preparations are meagre".³²

On 13 December the town was stormed by the combined forces of the Marāthās and the English. But the siege of the fortress was carried on in such a half-hearted manner that it drew from Lt. Moor a cryptic comment "that the Marāthās would not with twenty guns against the present garrison, approach and breach Dharwar in twenty years".³³ The arrival of Lt. Col. Frederick from Bombay

did not improve upon a situation which was truly considered hopeless for the Marāthās. Chagrined by the failure to surprise the fort, Frederick suggested the withdrawal of forces. Bhāū's conscience was assailed. He harped on the consequences of withdrawal—disgrace and dishonour to the armies of both nations.³⁴ Frederick did not live long to see the reduction of the fort which capitulated on 3 April.

Meanwhile, the war assumed a new complexion with the assumption by Lord Cornwallis of the chief command of the forces. In a letter to Henry Dundas, Cornwallis wrote on 12 November, 1790:

“That we have lost time, and our adversary has gained reputation, which are two most valuable things in war. It is vain now to look back; we must only consider how to remedy the evil, and to prevent the ill effects which our delay may occasion in the minds of our allies. It immediately occurred to me that nothing would be so likely to keep their spirits, and to convince them of our determination to act with vigour, as my taking the command of the army”.³⁵

Cornwallis clearly perceived the British limitations in the exertions of the war. He was also conscious of the lukewarm attitude of Nānā Phadnis; but against this hazard he could do nothing as he himself admitted: ‘I know of no remedy that it is in our power to apply.’³⁶

On 29 January, 1791, Cornwallis assumed command of the army and came dashing against Bangalore which he carried by assault on 21 March. Nānā might have brooded over the British efforts in the war and these must have led him to despatch Hari Pant Phadke on 1 January, 1791, with 30,000 forces. Marching through Kurnool, Hari Pant proceeded to Pangal to consult with the Nizām about the future course of action. “At this conference it was agreed by Nizām Ali and Hurry Punt, on the part of his master the *Peshwā*, that they should abide by the terms of the treaty with the English, but only so far as might humble Tippoo, without absolutely annihilating his power”.³⁷ The Marāthā Government was anxious to resume its territory south of the Krishnā acquired by Bālājī Bajī Rāo and Mādhav Rāo with much fighting and seized by Haidar and Tipū after the murder of Narāyān Rāo in 1773.

Having secured Bangalore, Cornwallis at once proceeded towards Seringapatam, the fall of which would have enabled him to

make short work of the enemy. He, therefore, made pressing application to Hari Pant to come to his relief. But Hari Pant made a pretence of joining Cornwallis and wasted precious time in desultory operations. Bhāu also followed the same lackadaisical policy of engaging his forces in reducing minor forts. Little, who accompanied Bhāu's army, made a despairing comment to Cornwallis on 30 April, 1791:

"I am apprehensive we may be delayed some time by the reduction of several small forts in the way to Seringapatam which I was at first given to understand would be avoided. Some time also has been lost lately by unnecessary halts".³⁸

But Bhāu found it difficult to stave off the greater needs of the war when he heard the news of Cornwallis' march to Seringapatam. He hurried to join Hari Pant and at Nagamangala, about 20 miles from Seringapatam, the Marāthā forces were united. But Tipū's vigilant intelligence service prevented the Marāthās from conveying any news of their approach to Cornwallis, who was then engaged in a desperate battle with Tipū at Seringapatam. In the third week of May Cornwallis, finding his position untenable, began to retreat after destroying the whole of the battering train and equipment of the army.

Hardly had Cornwallis abandoned his design in despair when news was received of the arrival of the Marāthās. On 28 May Cornwallis met Parashurām Bhāu and Hari Pant Phadke at Melkote. The arrival of the Marāthās at this juncture was a welcome relief to the half-starved British army. What followed next could best be described in Dirom's graphic language:

"The famished followers of our army now ran to the Mah-ratta camp in thousands, and were happy to purchase grain at any rate. Luckily the want of money was none of our difficulties, else we should have profited little by this supply; for the chiefs... sold everything at the most exorbitant rates. Three seers of rice, and six of raggy or gram, for a rupee, was the common, and in general, the lowest price. But grain was now worth its weight in gold; and, while this lasted, there was no hesitation in making the exchange".³⁹

Cornwallis would not have forsaken his grand design had he got timely intelligence of the arrival of the Marāthās. It was a sad commentary on the inadequate communication service which frustrated Cornwallis' cherished object for the time being.

The onset of the monsoon kept the allied army in a state of enforced inactivity. The Marāthā army commanded by Parashurām Bhāu and the Bombay Brigade of three battalions under Little separated from the grand army on 8 July and proceeded towards Sira and Chitaldurg. Nijgal surrendered to Bhāu. But the Marāthās found it difficult to reduce the hill fort of Devarayadurg which they had to abandon. Proceeding from Devarayadurg and Sira, the latter being formerly occupied by Hari Pant, the army marched to Erode, which secured Bhāu's protection by paying a considerable sum. But this did not prevent the Marāthās from ransacking the town.

Early in August the army arrived in the neighbourhood of Chitaldurg. "Chitaldurg has ever been deemed the strongest hill in India; indeed, if properly defended, there appears no possibility of taking it".⁴⁰ The fort was garrisoned by 10,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry under its commandant Daulat Khān who was firm in his determination to repel the attack. Finding it difficult to reduce the fort either by assault or siege, Bhāu moved off on 2 November and halted at Chandgiri till the middle of December. Then he moved to the eastern bank of the Tungabhadra, about eight miles from Hole Honnur. The Marāthās wrought such havoc in this rich part of the country that it earned for them opprobrium from Moor.

"This part of the country was the richest we had yet seen, abounding in villages and towns, so thick that the night we came to this ground we counted ten villages in flames at the same time. It was by no means uncommon to see six or eight burning at once in several parts of this fine country. In this style do the Mahrattas carry on a war. It is indeed the only way in which, as enemies, they are at all formidable; they can pour on an enemy's country in inundation of a hundred thousand horse; and when we consider the ruin and devastation spread by such a host of locusts, we are inclined to think that the curse of God could not have fallen in Egypt in a more destructive form".⁴¹

Bhāu was required to operate on the right flank of the British army between Sira and Sivaganga, effect a junction with Abercromby and proceed to Seringapatam. But nothing could persuade Bhāu to give up his desultory operations on the Tungabhadra.⁴² However, he endeavoured to give a good account of himself when on 18 December, 1791, he appeared before Hole Honnur, situated at the confluence of the Tungā and Bhadrā. On 21st morning the place was carried by storm. After three days Benkipur surrendered

without any resistance to the Bhāu. Advancing along the left bank of the Tungā, Bhāu arrived at Shimoga, a place noted for its strong fortifications. The place being flanked on the right by the river Tungā and on the left by a very thick jungle, enabled its commandant, Muhammad Rezā, to repulse the combined attack of the Marāthās and the English. But the exemplary conduct of Little who rallied the whole force, broke the back of the enemy's resistance and the fort capitulated on 3 January. Grant Duff pays Little a glowing tribute:

"The whole conduct of Captain Little on this occasion was most exemplary; it reminds us of the generalship of Lawrence or of Clive and of itself entitles him to a very respectable rank in the military annals of British India".⁴³

Bhāu loitered at Shimoga until the middle of January 1792 and got possession of several neighbouring forts which he captured without serious efforts. Next he proceeded towards Bidnur and had the satisfaction of capturing Kumsi and Anantapur with surprising ease. On 28 January he arrived within sight of Bidnur and was about to invest it when suddenly he abandoned the project. Leaving sufficient garrisons to protect Hole Honnur, Shimoga and the neighbouring areas, Bhāu began his march to Seringapatam on 10 February. He had been repeatedly urged by Cornwallis to co-operate in the grand undertaking by remaining in the vicinity of the English army. Bhāu could afford to ignore Cornwallis' summons, but he found it hard to resist the pressure of Hari Pant when the latter asked him to proceed without a moment's delay to Seringapatam. Hari Pant's importunities had a ring of sincerity:

"I have been praying God for your immediate arrival and was glad to receive your letter informing that you will be coming to Pattan".⁴⁴

The operations of Cornwallis, after his retreat from Seringapatam, were confined to the limited sphere of Baramahal. In July the British troops occupied Hosur and Rayakotta. Cornwallis next succeeded in reducing the hill-forts interspersed between Bangalore and Gurramkonda and between Bangalore and Seringapatam. The capture of these strong fortresses increased the security of the convoys and enabled Cornwallis to strike the final blow with great confidence. He wrote to Pitt on 23 January, 1792:

"If we can subsist in the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, there is in my opinion no doubt of our complete success, and I

have taken so many precautions to insure the safety of our supplies, that I trust it is hardly possible that they should fail".⁴⁵

While Cornwallis was engaged in occupying the hill-forts, he was fretting with impatience about the arrival of the Marāthā detachment under Parashurām Bhāu and the Nizām's forces under Prince Sikandar Jāh. Though a part of Nizām's army joined Cornwallis on 25 January near Outradurga, Bhāu appeared on the scene when the war was over. Cornwallis appeared before Seringapatam on 5 February. Dividing the army in three columns—the right under General Medows, the left under Col. Maxwell and the centre under his personal care—Cornwallis on the following night occupied Lalbagh, Tipū's beautiful garden and Shehar Ganj.⁴⁶

The realities of the situation now prompted Tipū to offer peace overtures and he sent Ghulām 'Ali and 'Ali Rezā to the allies respectively—Kennaway representing the English, Govind Rāo Kālē and Bachāji Mehendale representing the *Peshwā* and Mīr 'Alam representing the Nizām. Being left without any choice Tipū hastened to conclude the preliminary articles of peace on 23 February and the final treaty on 18 March. Tipū agreed to cede to the allies half the territory from the countries adjacent to their respective boundaries; to pay three crores and thirty lakhs of rupees, one half immediately and the rest by three instalments within a year; and to release all prisoners of war held since the time of Haidar.⁴⁷ He also agreed to deliver two of his sons, 'Abdul Khaliq and Muiz-ud-din as hostages for the due performance of the stipulations. The boundaries of the Marāthā state were again extended to the Tungabhadra and now included Sāvanūr, Lakshmeswar and Kundgol in the *subāh* of Dharwar. The Nizām obtained Cuddapah, Gooty with the districts between the Krishnā and the Tungabhadra. The British acquisitions were substantial—the rich districts of Baramahal, Dindigul, Salem, a large slice of the Malabār Coast, including the ports of Calicut, Cannanore and the territory of Coorg. Cornwallis, therefore, could feel gratified when he wrote to Dundas on 4 March, 1972:

"We have at length concluded our Indian war handsomely and I think as advantageously as any reasonable person could expect. We have effectually crippled our enemy without making our friends too formidable... I shall therefore only express my hopes that the Gentlemen who talked so much nonsense about the balance of power and the barrier of Tippoo will have the grace to be ashamed of themselves".⁴⁸

By the end of March, the allied army dispersed for their respective cantonments. Before Hari Pant Phadke left, Tipū found a pretext to visit him, and cautioned him in a prophetic vein: "You must realise that I am not your enemy. Your real enemy is the English".⁴⁹ The intended visit of Mahādji to Poona was a source of great irritation to Nānā and the latter asked Bhāu to bring Little's platoon to the Marāthā capital. But this did not seem to happen and Little was given a send-off at Moti Talav.⁵⁰ This war so dramatically altered the political balance of India that superiority irrevocably passed to the British, and the Marāthā Government had to play a second fiddle to the overgrown power of the Company.

It is an irony of history that from the middle of 1792 the Marāthās began to entertain a soft attitude towards Tipū. Rumours were rife of a coalition between Tipū and the Marāthās against the British and the Nizām. With the arrival of Wellesley and the unfolding of the ingenious plan of subsidiary alliances, Tipū could well understand the deep-laid schemings of the Company. But he showed an unbecoming diffidence of coming to grips with the Company, crippled as he was after his defeat in 1792. He missed the opportunity of improving his relations with the Marāthās and when his agents Ahmad Khān and Fakhr-ud-din arrived at Poona towards the end of December 1798, the die had already been cast. The object of the agents was not merely to secure the Marāthā aid, but also the *Peshwā's* mediation between their master and the British. Bājī Rāo did indeed propose a mediation but that was spurned by Wellesley with the following observation:

"How could the *Peshwā* undertake the office of mediation without the most flagrant inconsistency? As a member of the Triple Alliance he has already declared himself to be an aggrieved party".⁵¹

The British attempt to court the friendship of the Marāthās was not destined to be successful. It was alleged that the *Peshwā's* neutrality had been purchased by Tipū for a sum of 13 lakhs of rupees. Moreover, Bājī Rāo's vacillating conduct, whether to help the British or to remain neutral, frustrated Anglo-Marāthā partnership in the last war against Tipū. Bājī Rāo perhaps thought that the war would go on for quite some time and he would determine his policy according to the exigencies of the situation. But the sweeping and rapid victory of the British arms and the death of Tipū Sultān on 4 May, 1799, upset all Bājī Rāo's calculations. To Nānā the British appeared as a formidable power and his warning to Bājī Rāo fell

on deaf ears. It failed to save the latter from the clutches of the British in December 1802:

“Tipū is finished; the British power has increased; the whole of east India is already theirs; Poona will now be the next victim. Evil days seem to be ahead. There seems to be no escape from destiny”.⁵²

Marāthā-Nizām Relations:

We can now turn to Marāthā-Nizām relations which in the last quarter of the eighteenth century fluctuated between friendship and hostility. In 1773 there was an open war between Raghunāth Rāo and the Nizām. In 1779 the Nizām took an active interest in the formation of the anti-British confederacy in collaboration with the *Peshwā*, Haidar and Bhosle. The Treaty of Yadgir concluded in June 1784, the object of which was the humiliation of Tipū, marked the culmination of Marāthā-Nizām friendship. In the 8th article of the treaty it was laid down: ‘Neither party shall ever adopt any measure of hostility against the other’. In the middle of 1790 both the powers bound themselves in separate treaties to co-operate with the British against Tipū.

Poona-Hyderabad partnership disappeared with the defeat of Tipū. The Poona Government now began to press forward its ancient claims on the Nizām. It was Bājī Rāo I who had first imposed *chauth* upon the Nizām’s dominions; his successors Bālājī Bājī Rāo and Mādhav Rāo had brought the Nizām’s power to exhaustion and the *chauth* to be paid by him now accumulated to huge amounts. To all intents and purposes the Nizām was a tributary of the Marāthās; but the Nizām, strengthened by acquisitions from Tipū’s dominions and by alliance with the British, fondly hoped to shake off the Marāthā tutelage.

The Nizām found it difficult to evade the demands of the Poona *Darbar*, especially the *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of Bidar, Adoni and Berār. Mir ‘Alam, the Nizām’s agent, recognised the justice of the demand, although he expected moderation from the Poona Government. But once the propriety of Poona Government’s claims was accepted, the quarrel could have been settled had there existed mutual goodwill between the respective ministers of the two courts—Nānā Phadnis of Poona and ‘Azim-ul-Umara of Hyderabad.

The British Governor-General, Sir John Shore, wedded to the policy of non-intervention, was reluctant to interfere in the Marāthā-Nizām dispute, except in case of extreme necessity. But he did

not question the legality of the *Peshwā's* demand; the fact was irrefragable and the 'quantum of the demand upon the Nizām' was only to be assessed.⁵³ Meanwhile it had been decided to send Mir 'Alam in an embassy to Poona to adjust the dispute between the two Governments. The British Government decided to countenance Mir 'Alam through its Residents at Poona and Hyderabad to help him arrive at a mutual settlement of the dispute. "This circuitous mode of moderating between the parties", Kirkpatrick, the British Resident at Hyderabad observed, "was preferable to a direct or formal offer of our mediation".⁵⁴ It would prevent the Company from tying itself with the Nizām and would not be able to injure the Marāthā susceptibilities.

It was in this deepening crisis that the Nizām craved the protection of the British. On 29 May, 1794, the British Resident, Kirkpatrick met 'Azim-ul-Umara; the latter tried to rouse the British sympathy by insinuating that he had incurred the displeasure of the *Peshwā* by maintaining close connections with them. He, therefore, could reasonably claim the Company's protection and was prepared to obtain it at any cost. 'Azim-ul-Umara wanted to ascertain the British attitude towards the dispute and to what length they would go in Nizām 'Āli's support. To this crucial question, Kirkpatrick evaded answer and urged the minister to expedite the deputation of Mir 'Alam: "Unless he agreed to it and that readily, it would be himself and not the Marāthās that would be open to the suspicion of insincerity".⁵⁵

The Marāthā-Nizām dispute centred round the personal rancour between Nānā Phadnis and 'Azim-ul-Umara. It is doubtful whether any rapprochement was possible unless the Nizām sacrificed his minister. Uthoff, the acting Poona Resident, discussed the situation in all its facets: 'The Poona Court might, perhaps, be induced to acquiesce in an accommodation, if His Highness would concede the two points of sacrificing 'Azim-ul-Umara and commuting the current claims and those in arrear for the cession of a tract of country'.⁵⁶ It must be remembered that Kirkpatrick was not disposed to see the humiliation of the Nizām at the cost of reconciliation between the two ministers, but nevertheless he inveighed against 'Azim-ul-Umara, whom he considered as the root of all troubles in Hyderabad. He was, therefore, prepared to accept the disgrace of the minister, if it could lead to a happy solution of the dispute. He observed in this connection:

"I am further ready to grant that if the sacrifice could be supposed to be in the end inevitable, it would be wiser in His

Highness to make it at once than after a struggle which would, in this case, only serve to rivet his chains still stronger. In fine, I heartily wish the appointment of a better minister than 'Azim-ul-Umara'.⁵⁷

In despair, the Nizām invoked the 6th article of the treaty of 1768 in which it was declared that the friends and enemies of one of the contracting parties were to be deemed the friends and enemies of the other. Kirkpatrick brushed aside the stipulation of the treaty by quoting Cornwallis' explanatory letter of 7 July, 1789, which forbade the employment of the Company's forces against any power in alliance with the British. In any case, the British refused to be drawn in the dispute and Kirkpatrick blasted the illusory hope of the Hyderabad Government by denying any hope of British assistance.

Towards the close of July 1794 Mir 'Alam, accompanied by Rāi Rāyan arrived at Poona. But his powers were so circumscribed that he was not authorised to settle the *Faisleh Kuleat* or general political problems; he could only adjust minor details or *juziat* claims. The restriction of Mir 'Alam's powers was undoubtedly 'Azim-ul-Umara's creation who made the former's task more delicate by employing too many emissaries at Poona. Mir 'Alam, Rāi Rāyan, Govind Bhagwant, Raghunāth Rāo—men of different characters representing various shades of opinion—raised doubts about the practicability of any satisfactory solution. Malet could doubt the success of Mir Alam's mission when he observed: "What good can be expected from an assemblage that has not a single atom of concord in its whole composition?"⁵⁸

It was only after wasting two precious months that Mir 'Alam could begin negotiations when he had fulfilled the semblance of diplomatic etiquette as required by the Poona *Darbar*. He was given full latitude to prosecute the *juziat* negotiations; but as to the *Kuleat*, he was to seek previous permission of the Nizām. Negotiations began in early October on the Adoni article. The Poona *Darbar* claimed from that district about 1,75,000 rupees which the Hyderabad Government was ill prepared to grant. The Bidar article met with a similar fate. The Nizām's agents could not agree to the Poona *Darbar*'s demand of one-fourth of its revenue. Negotiations drifted towards a deadlock when proposals and counterproposals were submitted by both parties with no signs of settlement.

Meanwhile the armies of the *Peshwā* and the Nizām marched to advanced positions. Mir 'Alam met the *Peshwā* and his ministers

on 10 December and expressed the futility of conducting the negotiations when military preparations were set afoot by both parties. The Poona Government assured Mir 'Alam that it was prepared to maintain the *status quo* despite its military movements, provided similar assurance was given by Hyderabad. It is curious that the article in regard to the *chauth* of Bidar was settled at Hyderabad through the mediation of the Poona agent, Govind Rāo Kāle.

Mir 'Alam had to suffer disappointment in his fresh negotiations at Poona. The Poona *Darbar* refused to suspend its warlike preparations by countermanding the march of forces from northern India as well as from Berār. Jivbā Bakhshī's troops on their way to the south laid waste the Nizām's border territories in the Daulatābād region and Holkar's forces also plundered Malkapur, another territory of the Nizām. Though the Bidar article was settled at Hyderabad, the *Peshwā* did not take any notice of it. The Poona *Darbar* continued negotiations with Mir 'Ālam on other points of dispute, e.g., Berār and Berār Balaghat.

Meanwhile British relations with the Poona Government had been somewhat strained owing to the former's feeble attempt at mediation in the Marāthā-Nizām dispute. Shore, the British Governor-General, decided to leave no stone unturned in removing the lingering misunderstanding by his unequivocal declaration. On 29 December, 1794 he said:

"Ignorant as we are of the true grounds of disagreement between the *Peshwā* and the Nizām and of the right of their respective claims, we could take no part with either, unless we were to exclude the consideration of justice and equity, and determine to interfere on the principle only of assisting the weakest.... Having adopted a system of neutrality, our adherence to it has been strict and every appearance of partiality has been avoided".⁵⁹

Though the British neutrality seemed to be threatened by the reported move of a coalition between Tipū and the Marāthās to be directed against the Nizām, Shore was not in a mood to jeopardise British interests by risking a war in support of the Nizām. Shore knew too well the magnitude of the resources of the Marāthās and the decrepit state of the Nizām's administration, apart from the fatal result that would ensue to the British in carrying on war against the united forces of the Marāthās and Tipū. To Shore the paramount object was to preserve inviolate the British dominion. He struck the key-note of British policy by observing: "We must attend to self-

preservation including the permanency of the British possessions in India".⁶⁰

In weighing motive for keeping the Company uninvolved in the Marāthā-Nizām quarrel, Shore was guided by the strategic necessity of appeasing the Marāthās at any cost. He understood that nothing decisive could be gained by the Nizām's friendship as he was considered to be the weakest among the Deccan powers. Shore enunciated the central theme of British policy:

"The consolidation of our alliance with the Marāthās is an object of the first importance to us. With their aid which we might expect we could always hold Tipū and any European power; from Tipū, we could never hope for assistance, or scarcely neutrality".⁶¹

All things conspired to the inevitable conflict between the Marāthās and the Nizām. Nizām 'Āli was the first to move with the hope of taking the Marāthās at a marked disadvantage. Proceeding along the banks of the Manjra, he advanced from Bidar towards the Marāthā frontier. The Marāthās harnessed all their resources in their struggle with the Nizām. All the principal feudatories of the empire—Tukoji Holkar with Dudrence's forces, Sindia's army under the command of Jivbā Bakhshī, Perron, Devjī Gaulī, Raghūji Bhōsle, Govind Rāo Gaikwād's forces, Parashurām Bhāu and Bābā Phadke (son of Hari Pant)—congregated under the banner of the *Peshwā*. The great Southern *jāgīrdars* belonging to the Brāhmin families of Patwardhan and Rāste, the *Pratinidhī*, the *Pant Sachāv*, the Mankaris—Nimbālkar, Ghātge, Pawār, Thorāt with many others of less eminence, swelled the Marāthā ranks.

The Nizām's army numbering about 110,000 men encamped on the river Khar below the Mohri Ghat, about 2 miles from Kharda. The Marāthā army under the command of Parashurām Bhāu mainly occupied the bank of the Sinā river. After initial skirmishes lasting for two or three days, the final battle took place on 11 March, 1795. Finding his position precarious, the Nizām began to move in the direction of Parenda, situated 26 miles south of Kharda. The unwisdom of the Nizām's action now became plain. Severe fighting ensued and Sindia's forces forced back the Nizām's troops. The Nizām took shelter in the small fort of Kharda during the night. The Marāthās at once invested the fort. There were no provisions in the fort and no water, and the Nizām realised the futility of resistance and requested for a cessation of hostilities.^{61a}

The cease-fire took place on 13 March, 1795, but the final treaty was not concluded till 10 April. The Nizām employed the intervening period in averting the disgrace of his minister, 'Azīm-ul-Umara. But the Marāthā attitude was explained by the emphatic repudiation of this idea. In vain did the Nizām employ various persons—Tahawar Jang, Rāo Rambhā—to postpone the dishonour of dismissal of his favourite. Since the Marāthās would not be coaxed, 'Azim-ul-Umara tried to ingratiate himself with Nānā by sending him his own *Diwān* Neem Want. The agent made tempting offers—two crores and a half and territories worth 8 lakhs in annual value—to Nānā on condition of 'Azim-ul-Umara's retaining the lever of Nizām's administration. Nānā Phadnis, in the temper with which he glowed, fired back: "That even should he agree to pay one hundred crores and surrender all his master's territory his being permitted to remain in the management thereof was inadmissible".⁶² When 'Azim-ul-Umara felt that nothing on earth would change the irrevocable decision of Nānā, he arrived in the Marāthā camp on 27 March and was received by Nānā. "Thus has ended," as Kirkpatrick rightly said, "and not less ingloriously for the Nizām than miserably for himself, the administration of 'Azim-ul-Umara".⁶³ Mir 'Alam, stung by the fall of 'Azim-ul-Umara, was scornful of the British policy of non-intervention in the dispute.

'Azim-ul-Umara's surrender removed the main cause of deadlock between the Marāthās and the Nizām. A treaty was concluded on 10 April on the following terms:

- (1) Territories yielding an annual revenue of about 32 lakhs of rupees in the quarter of Daulatabad and Parenda, including the fort of Daulatabad, were to be ceded to the *Peshwā*.
- (2) Nānā Phadnis and other ministers were to receive territories yielding an annual revenue of about two and half lakhs of rupees.
- (3) Raghūjī Bhosle was also to be given some territorial concession.
- (4) An indemnity of one crore and another crore for accumulated arrears of tribute were to be paid to the *Peshwā*.
- (5) About a crore of rupees was to be given to Daulatrao Sindia and Raghūjī Bhosle, including the *darbar* charges.
- (6) A time limit of three years was fixed for all these pecuniary payments.

- (7) Marāthā-Nizām relations with Tipū were to be regulated according to the treaties of Poona, Pangal and Seringapatam.^{63a}

The Nizām had no intention to execute the terms of the treaty. He begged to be excused on account of a domestic trouble in which he was involved owing to the rebellion of his son 'Ali Jāh. The Marāthās retaliated by forcibly occupying the fortress of Daulatābad. Govind Rāo Kāle gave a good account of Nizām 'Ali's pusillanimous conduct after the conclusion of the treaty:

"Nizām Ali has set his heart upon getting out of these harsh conditions. He is not inclined to fulfil the terms. Honesty, promise, pledge have no value with him, steeped as he is in crafty devilry. On his return from Kharda his look changed. He says he must meet the *Peshwā* personally before he can execute the treaty. He goes on delaying these matters. His son's rebellion has added to his troubles".⁶⁴

The Nizām did not rest satisfied submissively. He was reported to have started secret negotiations with Tipū Sultān. He dismissed the British battalions and augmented the corps of the French adventurer, Monsieur Raymond.

Reports soon gained credence that the Nizām might seek assistance from the French. But all his subtle calculations went awry with the outbreak of 'Ali Jāh's rebellion. Once more the Nizām sought the military assistance of the English and the latter were ready to give it. 'Ali Jāh was captured but he took away his own life.

The battle of Kharda seemed to ruin the semblance of Nizām's independence. Its immediate consequence to the Marāthās was also not a little flattering. Nānā Phadnis was now at the zenith of power, thanks to the energy and political sagacity which he had exhibited against the Nizām. The British attributed the formidable state of the Marāthā Empire in 1795 to Nānā's great statesmanship, critical comprehension and measurement of all the forces at work. Grant Duff was not partial when he wrote:

"Nānā Furnuwees was now at the summit of prosperity; without the intervention of a foreign power he had obtained every object of his ambition. Daulat Rāo Sindhia was favourably disposed towards him. Tookajee Holkar had become imbecile, both in mind and body, and his officers were subservient

to Nānā. Rughoojee Bhonslay was completely secured in his interests, and the Brahmin Jagheerdars were of his party".⁶⁵

The short but dramatic period which engulfed Poona affairs after the death of Sawāi Mādhav Rāo enabled the Nizām to defy the harsh stipulations of the treaty of Kharda. From his sanctuary at Mahād, Nānā arranged through Govind Rāo Kāle a secret treaty with the Nizām. By this contract which was signed on 7 October, 1796, all the territories ceded to the *Peshwā* by the convention of Kharda were to be restored and the balance of the tribute remitted, on condition that Nizām 'Ali supported Nānā in installing Bājī Rāo in the *Peshwāship*. The treaty was made subject to ratification by Bājī Rāo when he became the *Peshwā*. Thus, owing to fluctuating fortunes in the politics of Poona, the ruler of Hyderabad was saved from being overwhelmed by Marāthā encroachments.

The Nizām could save himself from Marāthā thralldom thanks to fortuitous circumstances, but he could not stand against the irresistible pressure of the Company. Immediately on his arrival Wellesley bound the Nizām with the subsidiary alliance on 1 September, 1798, and substituted his French force with that of the British. Dundas congratulated Mornington in the following words:

"I have long felt unhappy from the circumstances of the French force in the service of the Nizām. . . . Your treaty with the Nizām effectually puts an end to every alarm upon that part of the business, and whether you consider it negatively as removing the French force from our neighbourhood, or positively in respect of the additional strength it affords to ourselves and the aid it gives to our finances, it is a transaction which tells in our favour in a variety of ways and was well worth accomplishing at any risk, even if the Mahratta powers had been dissatisfied with it".⁶⁶

Thus the Marāthā relations with the South Indian States have a melancholy interest for the historian. It was an irony of history that the anti-British confederacy organised in 1780 among the Indian powers—*Peshwā*, Bhosle, Nizām and Haidar—could not be repeated in the following years. Ignoring this make-shift coalition, the *Peshwā* signed the treaty of Salbai in complete disregard of Haidar 'Ali. Mahādji Sindia went a step further by concluding a new treaty (October 1783) with the English to enforce the treaty of Salbai on Tipū. The way by which Cornwallis enmeshed the *Peshwā* in the cobweb of British alliance against Tipū in 1790 reflects the bankruptcy of Marāthā diplomacy. The Nizām in his blind

rage for the Marāthās entered into the Company's fold in the same year against Tipū, although he had been divested by the Company of the Guntur Sarkar in 1788.

For the last time the Marāthās presented a solid front when they met the Nizām in 1795 in the battle-field of Kharda. It was the last flicker of Marāthā unity. Harsh fate was to envelop them in no time when they relapsed into petty squabbles and moral degeneracy in total ignorance of nascent British imperialism that was unfolding itself in a devious way. Marāthā resentment against Tipū in 1790 and the Nizām in 1795 was a sad testimony of their inability of comprehending the seamy side of British diplomacy. With the death of Tipū in 1799 and the defeat of the Marāthās in the first decade of the nineteenth century, the South Indian politics pivoted round the unassailable sway of the Company.

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CHAPTER XIII

MYSORE: HAIDAR 'ALĪ AND TIPŪ SULTĀN

The State of Mysore, situated at the junction of the Eastern and Western Ghāts, was ruled over by the Wodiyar dynasty from the fourteenth century. Between 1731-34 the Government of Mysore was usurped by two brothers—Devrāj and Nanjarāj, who left to the King Chik Krishnarāj only the exterior appendages of royalty. Devrāj was the *Dalwāi* or Commander-in-Chief and Nanjarāj was the *Sarvādhikāri* or Controller of revenue and finance. But from 1746, Devrāj, grown old, allowed his brother to lead distant expeditions, himself taking charge temporarily, during his absence, of revenue and finance.

In the service of Nanjarāj there was a young volunteer horseman named Haidar, serving in a detachment led by his own brother Shahbaz. In 1749, he caught the eye of Nanjarāj in a shooting competition at Devanhalli, was promoted to the command of 50 horse and 200 peons. Between 1750-60 Haidar, known in the early days of his military career as Haidar Naik, came steadily into prominence and rose from prominence to power. Circumstances were favourable. *Peshwā* Bālājī Bāji Rāo began to pursue a policy of southward expansion, without abandoning his forward policy in the north. Mysore was invaded by the Marāthās in 1753, 1754, 1757 and 1759. Nizām-ul-Mulk regarded Mysore as Mughul territory and his successors also considered that Mysore was a part of their territorial legacy. Thus Mysore was drawn within the circle of the conflict between the *Peshwā* and the Nizām. To add to the complications, Nanjarāj conceived the project of seizing Trichinopoly with its dependencies by taking part in the struggle between the French and the English in what is known as the Second Karnāṭak war. Muhammad 'Alī offered him this bait and he eagerly swallowed it. From February to December, 1752, the Mysoreans and the British fought as allies against the French at Trichinopoly. But later Nanjarāj changed sides and through 1753 and 1754 he was the ally of Dupleix as against Muhammad 'Alī, backed by the English. The Mysorean had to become the ally of the French when he found that Muhammad 'Alī would not hand over Trichinopoly to him and the British associated themselves with this "Fraud of Trichinopoly". Nanjarāj was recalled by Devrāj in April, 1755 to meet an invasion of Mysore by

Salābat Jang, guided by Bussy. The heavy expenses estimated at 3 to 4 crores incurred in the Trichinopoly venture, the drafts twice made by the Marāthās, a sum of 56 lakhs that had to be paid to Salābat Jang—all combined to make the very solvent Mysore State of 1752 almost bankrupt in 1755.¹ The Government was unable to pay its soldiery and defray its expenses. Thus were created those conditions that brought about the subversion of the existing authority.

Haidar was with Nanjarāj throughout the Trichinopoly campaign. There Haidar was not merely conspicuous for his intrepidity and daring, but was also successful in securing rapid promotion, as also a considerable share of plunder. Towards the end of his stay there, he was officially at the head of 1,500 horse, 3,000 regular infantry and 4 guns. He was now appointed as the *faujdār* of Dindigul, a rock fort belonging to Mysore, 65 miles south-east of Trichinopoly.² It is relevant to note that at Trichinopoly Haidar learnt his lessons in the art of war. He was an eye-witness of the attacks and counter-attacks of Clive and Lawrence as also their French opponents. Ambitious, able to take advantage of his opportunities, he learnt what the art of war meant in those days in the western sense of drill, discipline, attack and defence.

While he was consolidating his position at Dindigul during the years 1755-57 Devrāj and Nanjarāj quarrelled and Devrāj withdrew from Mysore to Satyamangalam, leaving Nanjarāj as the undisputed usurper. But Nanjarāj could find no opportunity of consolidating his position. The Marāthās again invaded in 1757 and Nanjarāj agreed to pay them 32 lakhs, but could pay only six, and for the payment of the balance handed over fifteen taluks as security. Shortly after this, Haidar came to Mysore and advised Nanjarāj to expel the Marāthā garrisons from those taluks on the approach of the rains. Nanjarāj acted according to this advice and this made inevitable another Marāthā invasion of Mysore. When the Marāthā army came in 1758, as the Mysore troops were still in arrears, none of the old veterans agreed to take command of the army; Haidar took personal responsibility for arrears and was placed in charge of the field army. He somehow held his own, remained on the defensive, hoping thereby to wear the Marāthās out. The Marāthās agreed to withdraw if they were paid thirty-two lakhs. Half of this was paid by raising forced contributions. For the remainder, Haidar gave his personal security and he took the thirteen ceded districts under his control. His next step was to oust Nanjarāj. This he managed very adroitly with the assistance of his *Diwān* Khande Rāo who had won over the nominal King in the interest of Haidar. Deserted by the soldiers at whose

head he now found Haidar, Nanjarāj decided to retire. He was given a *jāgīr* and he promised to withdraw to Coonoor; but on the way he entrenched himself at Mysore. He failed, however, to maintain his position because the Portuguese Officer commanding his white troops proved to be a traitor. He had to capitulate and withdraw to Coonoor. The King now found that he had only exchanged one master for another. Haidar had now in his direct possession more than half of the kingdom and the King discovered that under the new dictator he continued to be a figure-head as he had been in the previous regimes of Nanjarāj and Devrāj.³

As the *de facto* ruler in Mysore Haidar had now to consolidate his authority. But in the meantime the Court party in league with Khande Rāo came to an understanding with the Marāthā Chief Visājī Krishna and tried to launch a concerted attack on Haidar. On 12 August, 1760, a cannonade was opened from the ramparts of the fort of Seringapatam on Haidar's residence near the modern Darya Daulat Bagh. Haidar was taken by surprise. The Marāthās could not arrive in time. Haidar ran away leaving his family at Seringapatam.⁴ He reached Bangalore. His brother-in-law, Makh-dum 'Ali, had been sent to help the French at Pondicherry in the Third Karnāṭak war. He was not asked to return. But the Marāthās defeated him on his way back at Anekal. A relieving force sent by Haidar 'Ali from Bangalore to his aid was also defeated. Haidar's career appeared to be approaching its close when suddenly the Marāthās expressed their willingness to withdraw on his paying 51 lakhs and ceding Baramahal. Visājī Krishna had to withdraw because of the serious aspect of Marāthā affairs in the north which culminated later in the disastrous Marāthā defeat at Pānipat.⁵ When Haidar heard about it, he refused to hand over the Baramahal districts. Khande Rāo, left alone, was unable to cope with the wily Haidar, who had even induced Nanjarāj to join him and bless his cause. When Haidar besieged Seringapatam, the King made an abject surrender and handed over Khande Rāo. Nanjarāj was sent back to Coonoor to fade into complete obscurity. Khande Rāo was kept a prisoner in a cage in which he languished for a year and died.⁶ Haidar could now feel that he was safely established in Mysore.

Between 1761-63 Haidar succeeded in conquering Hoskote, Dod Ballapur and Sera with its dependencies. The Poligar of Chik Ballapur exasperated Haidar by his tough resistance and was despatched as a prisoner to Bangalore⁷ while the Poligar of Raidurg for his willing submission was generously treated. Haidar next took up the

cause of Chen Basavaiya, who was believed to be the fugitive boy-king of Bednūr, adopted son of the deceased Bednūr Chief Basavappa Nāyak. The queen of Bednūr could offer but feeble resistance. After the conquest of Bednūr was completed in the name of the boy-king, Haidar declared him an impostor and threw him into prison.⁸ According to Wilks the loot of Bednūr alone brought Haidar 12 million sterling. Haidar next conquered Sonda, the king of Sonda, Savāi Immadi Sadāsiv, flying to the Portuguese for protection and surrendering to them his territory below the Ghāts in return for an asylum and a stipend.⁹

Haidar had now to reckon with the Marāthās with whom he had to fight at very frequent intervals from 1764-1779. He was unable to cope with *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo and it was only the premature death of that great ruler that saved Haidar from annihilation. Haidar's recent conquests, his plan to extend his frontier up to the Tungabhadra and even beyond, brought him into collision with the Marāthā power, recovering from the stunning blow of Pānipat, under the wise guidance of Mādhav Rāo. Haidar 'Ali was defeated in an engagement at Ratehalli, 70 miles south-east of Dharwar on 3 May, 1764. He had to fall back to an entrenched fort at Anavatty. But here too, he found his position untenable and suffered a complete defeat. The *Peshwā* made a triumphant march towards Bednūr. At this stage, Raghunāth Rāo, uncle of the *Peshwā*, thought it necessary to intervene and a treaty was concluded by which Haidar paid 28 lakhs as tribute and restored all the territory of Murār Rāo of Gooty beyond the Tungabhadra, as also the territory of the Nawāb of Sāvanūr between the Krishnā and the Tungabhadra, because these two chieftains were in Marāthā interest.^{9a} The *Peshwā* marched against Haidar again in November, 1766. He succeeded in persuading the Nizām, Nizām 'Ali, to join him in a scheme of offensive alliance against Haidar. But Nizām 'Ali soon after concluded an alliance with the British and he hoped to dictate in any scheme of the partition of Haidar's territory. But this at once made Mādhav Rāo determine to act on his own. He marched very quickly, realizing tribute from most of those places south of the Tungabhadra that had recently submitted to Haidar. Haidar sued for peace. He agreed to pay a tribute of 33 lakhs to the *Peshwā* and got back most of his territory including Sera, Chik Ballapur and Kolar, but the Marāthās retained Dod Ballapur, Hoskote and some other places. Nizām 'Ali was outwitted and *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo without waiting for his ally went away. Nizām 'Ali thought it proper to come to terms of accommodation with Haidar.

Mādhav Rāo invaded again in 1769. Haidar's persistent and systematic encroachment on the Marāthā sphere of influence could only be countered by a relentless offensive against him. Haidar had even compelled Sāvanūr and Gooty to pay him tribute. The campaign of 1769-70 kept Haidar on the defensive. But the *Peshwā* became so ill that he could not lead the campaign of 1770-71. Trimbak Rāo, who was left in command, defeated Haidar completely in the battle of Chinkurli or Moti Talao on 5 March, 1771, almost within the sight of Seringapatam. Haidar lost his entire equipment, his store and all his artillery. He and his son Tipū narrowly escaped being taken prisoners. But so tough and stubborn was Haidar that this defeat was not followed by a collapse of his military power. The Marāthās were so much intent upon plunder that they let ten precious days pass before they laid siege to Seringapatam. After besieging Seringapatam in vain for a month and ten days, Trimbak Rāo withdrew to Bellur, in view of approaching rains. He began campaigning again in September, 1771, but the *Peshwā's* condition worsened and the campaign had to be abandoned. The Marāthās retained Sera, Hoskote, Dod Ballapur, Kolar and Gurrumkonda and gave up the rest.¹⁰ Haidar promised to pay sixty lakhs. During the prolonged campaign of the Marāthās Haidar was expecting British aid because he had concluded a defensive alliance with them. The British did not come to his aid and this partly explains the strong anti-British turn which Mysore foreign policy took later.

Fortunately for Haidar *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo died in November, 1772, and the chaos that now began in Marāthā affairs, helped Haidar 'Alī not merely to regain his lost ground but also to conquer and consolidate his sway up to the Tungabhadra, and extend his conquests up to the Krishnā. He took the fullest advantage of the chaos and confusion in Mahārāshtra caused by the murder of Nārāyan Rāo, opposition to the regime of Raghunāth Rāo and the resultant civil war. Haidar recognised Raghunāth Rāo as the *Peshwā* and agreed to pay him an annual tribute of 6 lakhs. The territory conquered by Mādhav Rāo in his three expeditions was ceded to Haidar. Between February 1774 and April 1776, Haidar not only recovered all that *Peshwā* Mādhav Rāo had taken but also annexed Bellary, Cuddapah, Gooty and Kurnool. He also annexed Coorg in 1780. With the fall of Gooty Haidar got under his control all that was included within the Marāthā sphere of influence south of the Tungabhadra. The Poona Ministry learnt to their dismay that Haidar began in 1776 to conquer Marāthā territory between the Krishnā and the Tungabhadra. They could not, however, organise an expedition before

1777. Hari Pant was commissioned to oust Haidar from Marāthā territory in concert with Nizām's general Ibrāhīm Khān Dhausa. But the troops of Hari Pant were in arrears, Dhausa was lukewarm, the emissaries of Haidar were at work and nothing very effective could be done during the year 1777-78. In the meantime, at Poona Nānā Phadnis, who seemed temporarily to be eclipsed by his cousin Morobā, resumed his former power. Haidar took advantage of these complications in Marāthā affairs to seize all the important places in the Krishnā-Tungabhadra Doāb. In view of the British supporting the cause of Raghobā which resulted in the first Anglo-Marāthā War, Nānā was on the look out for allies, and that great Marāthā statesman had to recognise all these acts of aggression in order that he might enlist the support of the Mysoreans against the British.¹¹

Haidar's relations with the British prior to the outbreak of the second Anglo-Mysore war are best studied separately. It would be a mistake to think that Haidar was anti-British from the very beginning of his career. No doubt Haidar gave the French some help in the Third Anglo-French War but that was because the French supported him in his usurpation and promised him valuable territorial cession in case of a favourable termination of their conflict. At the time of the Khande Rāo impasse the British carried on some negotiations with the king of Mysore, no doubt with the object of temporizing at the end, but this left a trace of bitterness behind. French influence in Haidar's Court began to increase and French officers like Chevalier Du Mouhy, De La Tour and others joined him. Haidar gave shelter to Mahfuz Khān, the elder brother and necessarily an enemy of Muhammad 'Ālī, Nawāb of Arcot. He also entertained in his service Razā Sāheb, son of Chandā Sāheb, Muhammad 'Ālī's mortal enemy. There were also territorial disputes between Arcot and Mysore. But all this would not possibly have led to open war between the British in Madras and Haidar 'Ālī in 1767 if the British had not made the mistake of concluding a treaty with Nizām 'Ālī in 1766 and helping him with a detachment of their troops in his operations against Haidar. It is relevant to note that in May, 1766, Haidar had offered to the British a defensive alliance against the Marāthās and the Nizām. His exasperation naturally knew no bounds when he found the Nizām backed by the British engaged in operations against him in apparent concert with the Marāthās.¹² He concluded a separate treaty with the Marāthās, won the Nizām over and persuaded him to join an offensive alliance against the British and Muhammad 'Ālī. Together they carried the war into the territory of the Nawāb of Arcot.

In the first battle of the war, Colonel Smith won a nominal victory over Haidar 'Āli and Nizām 'Āli at Changama. It was on the whole a very indecisive affair. Strong in cavalry, the confederates had no difficulty in getting into Karnāṭak. The next engagement was at Trinomali, where also the confederates were defeated. Thereupon Nizām 'Āli withdrew from the conflict. But Haidar 'Āli continued to maintain his offensive. There were engagements at Vaniambadi (December, 1767), at Mulbagal (4 October, 1768), at Ariyalur (22 November, 1768). Haidar was not successful in any of these, but neither was he worsted. He was unable to cope with Col. Smith but he was more than able to hold his own against other commanders like Wood and Lang. His cavalry gave him greater mobility and he made excellent use of rapidity of movement in the closing stages of the war. Having successfully screened his movements from the British field army, he appeared before the gates of Madras. The panick-stricken Madras Government was induced to sign a treaty on 4 April, 1769, that provided for mutual restitution of conquests and a defensive alliance. The Court of Directors later remarked that the Company's interest and influence suffered much diminution and discredit as a consequence of this war and the treaty that ended it.¹³

This defensive alliance with the Madras Government was regarded by Haidar as the sheet-anchor of his foreign policy. But in January, 1770, when the Marāthās invaded his territory, the British would not go to his help. He solicited the assistance of the Company again and again. In the twenty-fourth month of this long protracted war, the Madras Government at last asked him what money and provisions he could provide if they were to assist him and they informed him sometime afterwards that the Home Government had forbidden any assistance. Besides this infringement of the treaty of 1769, there were other sins of omission and commission that ultimately made Haidar 'Āli conclude that it would be a mistake to depend upon British friendship. The British would not supply him guns, saltpetre, lead and such other things that he required, but the French from the port of Mahé supplied him liberally. He repeatedly attempted to renew the violated conditions of the Treaty of 1769 but met with prevarication on the part of Muhammad 'Āli. Between 1775-79 many events happened that stiffened Haidar's attitude. When war began between England and France, the British led an expedition against the French possession of Mahé which fell on 19 March, 1779. Haidar's *vakil* had earlier protested that his

master regarded all trading settlements on the Malabār Coast as under his protection. Haidar's troops actually assisted in the defence of Mahé and his flag had been hoisted over it. The Madras Government had also foolishly assured Basālat Jang of Adoni, a brother of Nizām 'Alī, unconditional defence of the place. They even advanced detachments to his place through the territory of Haidar 'Alī and Nizām 'Alī. This aroused the antagonism of both. Basālat yielded to their joint pressure and the march of the British detachment had to be countermanded. Besides these episodes there were boundary disputes. In July 1780 Haidar launched his war flooding the Karnāṭak with immense armies. Their activities have been described by Burke in his famous speech indicting Warren Hastings. "A storm of universal fire blasted every field, consumed every house, destroyed every temple. The miserable inhabitants fleeing from their flaming villages were either slaughtered or swept into captivity." An English brigade under Baillie was surrounded and cut up. Munro, the victor of Buxar, smirched his reputation by abandoning his artillery and retreating in panic to Madras. However, on 1 July, 1781, a very important battle was fought at Porto Novo which Coote won by consummate generalship. Coote turned Haidar's entrenched position, forced him in the open field, and against odds, made the best possible use of the echelon formation. It was a great tactical victory for the British, but it had no important strategic effects. In 1781, Coote defeated Haidar on two other occasions in the second battle of Pollilore (27 September) as also at Solingar (27 October). These two defeats in succession gave a great shock to Haidar's prestige. Vellore, besieged by Haidar, was relieved by Coote and this closed the campaign of 1781. But early in 1782, a disaster befell the British. Col. Braithwaite, while encamped with a detachment of the British army south of the Coleroon, was surprised and cut down by an army led by Tipū. Braithwaite was taken prisoner. Admiral Suffren, one of the best seamen that France ever produced, arrived off Pulicat on 15 February at the head of 12 ships. Five naval engagements took place between Admiral Suffren and Admiral Hughes, without any decisive result. But Suffren succeeded in seizing Trincomali in Ceylon which, as a base for French maritime operations, was immensely superior to distant Mauritius. Haidar's heart was growing sick and his trust in the French was evaporating. He was, however, reassured by this brilliant French admiral that Bussy would soon arrive with reinforcements. But Bussy did not actually arrive until after Haidar's death. The most important action in the campaign of 1782 was that of Arni, which in the words of Fortescue, "produced no result beyond the heightening of

Coote's reputation in the eyes of Haidar". Haidar had also to detach Tipū with reinforcements to Malabār where the British were trying to create a diversion by sending a detachment under Humberston and McLeod. But on 7 December, Haidar died and Tipū had to hasten back to join the main army. He was quietly proclaimed and his succession was accepted without any opposition. Brigadier-General James Stuart, who had now succeeded Sir Eyre Coote as the British Commander-in-Chief on his death in April 1783, failed to take advantage of the consternation in Mysore caused by the rumours of the death of Haidar and the possibility of a disputed succession.

On 28 June, news arrived that peace had been concluded between the English and the French in Europe. The British were now free to deal with Tipū. General Matthews, Commander-in-Chief of the Bombay Presidency, was leading the British army in Malabār. He was asked to abandon operations on the coast and push on to Bednūr. This he did successfully and took Bednūr. On the western coast Mangalore was also taken by the British. But Tipū now advanced with his full force, invested Bednūr and compelled the British to capitulate. It is said that safe conduct was promised to the British but Tipū violated the terms. Almost all the conquests of Matthews were retaken by Tipū, and Mangalore alone held out. Tipū besieged Mangalore and the siege lasted from 20 May, 1783 to 30 January, 1784. Campbell, who defended the place capitulated on condition that the English garrison should be transported to Tellicherry. The terms were faithfully observed. Negotiations had already been begun by Macartney, Governor of Madras. Tipū at last agreed to make peace. There was to be a mutual restitution of conquests. The prisoners were to be restored. The Treaty was signed on 11 March, 1784.

After the conclusion of the Treaty of Mangalore, it might have been expected that Tipū would remain quiet for sometime and try to make friends with the Marāthās and the Nizām. But it was very difficult in the existing circumstances for these three Indian powers to co-operate. The Nizām had not, in any sense, played the part he had agreed to play as one of the confederate anti-British powers. The Marāthās had concluded even before the death of Haidar the Treaty of Salbai (May 1782) which was, of course, ratified after Haidar's death. Nānā Phadnis was anxious to get back the region between the Krishnā and the Tungabhadra and Nizām 'Ali was further alienated and alarmed by Tipū's assertion of claims over Bijāpur. Tipū, lacking in moderation, created fresh grounds of dispute.

The Desai of Nargund, connected by marriage with one of the leading Marāthā chiefs, had been compelled to transfer his allegiance from the Marāthās to Mysore when Haidar annexed the Krishnā-Tungabhadra Doāb. The Marāthā government was assured by Haidar 'Ali that all the chiefs in the Doāb area, who had been dependent upon the Marāthās, would be fairly treated by him. But Tipū is said to have seized the Desai of Nargund by treachery and the whole family was put in the Mysore State prison. The Desai of Kittur was also overwhelmed. Three years' tribute at the rate of 11 lakhs a year remained unpaid to the Marāthā *Darbar*. Nānā Phadnis knew very well that the circumstances leading to the Treaty of Mangalore and the treaty itself were regarded by Englishmen as humiliating. As Nānā and Nizām 'Ali drew closer together they presumed that in case Tipū proved to be very much superior, or in case he was effectively helped by the French, they might even get English help.

In 1786, Tipū's answer to this Marāthā-Nizām coalition was to complete his preparations and to read the *Khutba* in his own name because "Shāh 'Alam in whose name the *Khutba* was so long read was the prisoner or servant of Sindia". In the war that ensued, the confederates took Badami. But while they were being watched by a Mysore army, Tipū by forced marches advanced from Bangalore to Adoni, the most important fort of the Nizām, south of the Tungabhadra. Tipū could not carry the place by assault and had to raise the siege as the confederates marched to its relief. But as no arrangements had been made for a prolonged campaign, south of the Tungabhadra, the confederates evacuated the place which fell into the hands of Tipū. Immediately after they recrossed the river, it was in spate and they expected that they would have a free hand in the Doāb. But Tipū performed the very remarkable feat of crossing the river which was in flood in basket boats and rafts. The Sultān succeeded in repulsing the confederates near Sāvanūr which he entered without opposition. He next made a very successful night attack in which he got possession of the camp equipage of Tahavar Jang, who commanded the forces of Nizām 'Ali. Tipū, however, expressed an anxious desire for peace because he was apprehensive, in spite of the pacific professions of Lord Cornwallis that the English would most probably join the confederates. English military establishments were being reorganised and this perhaps made the Sultān believe that they were preparing for war. Tipū agreed to pay arrears of tribute. Badami was ceded. Adoni, Kittur and Nargund were to be restored. Wilks distinguishes between the political and military

conduct of the war. The generally accepted opinion was that Tipū concluded a successful campaign by an inglorious peace. But Malet, British Resident at Poona, thought that the treaty was highly advantageous to Tipū. "He has dissolved a formidable confederacy and dissipated an immense army, the members of which, embittered against each other by mutual distrust, dispirited by ill success, disgusted by disappointment, were not likely to be so formidable again".¹⁴ It is only relevant to note that the rapid and accurate fire of Tipū's artillery, directed by French officers, very much impressed the Marāthā Chiefs and can be said to account for Marāthā eagerness for British help in the later stages of the war.

Lord Cornwallis arrived in India in 1786. He perceived from the beginning that a war between the British and Tipū was inevitable. Malet, ambassador at Poona, told him "Tipū is prompted to conquests by the ambition of a despot and the wild enthusiasm of a bigot, supported by a consciousness of superior military talents, founded on frequent success".^{14a} Cornwallis wrote to Malet in December, 1787: "As the French policy has been generally extremely ambitious and as there appears to be no bounds to the designs of Tipū, the violence or injustice of either of these powers, may soon remove the present political restraints of this government and leave us free to form the closest alliance with the Marāṭṭās".¹⁵ The settlement of the Guntur Sarkar with the Nizām provided Cornwallis with an opportunity of winning him over against Tipū. He elucidated ambiguous articles of the British treaty of 1768 with the Nizām in a way that really led to the formation of an alliance against Tipū. Tipū's diplomatic manoeuvres, on the other hand, failed. He had sent an embassy to Constantinople in 1784 and another in 1785. Only 68 men out of 1100, sent to Constantinople in 1785 actually returned. He also sent an embassy to the French King in 1785 with valuable presents of jewels, and the bonds given by the general officers for supplies to the French troops during the last war were cancelled, as a proof of his esteem for the French. But nothing tangible could come out of these diplomatic feelers.¹⁶ After the termination of the war of 1786-87 an attempt was also made in 1788-89 to bring about a union between Nizām and Tipū, the two powers to pledge on the *Quran* to form a strict and indissoluble union. The Sultān proposed an intermarriage between the two families, but Nizām 'Alī was unprepared for this social degradation.¹⁷ Thus Tipū was left politically isolated as the British, the Marāthās and the Nizām drew closer together.¹⁸

The immediate cause of the war was Tipū's attack on Travancore lines on 29 December, 1789. The Rājā of Travancore was included in the Treaty of 1784 among the friends of the English. The Travancore lines were 30 miles long, extending eastwards from the island of Vipeen. A part of these lines was within Cochin. But Jaikottai and Cranganore belonging to the Dutch in Cochin were situated close to these lines and were necessary for their defence. Alarmed by Tipū's attitude the Rājā induced the Dutch to sell these places to him. Tipū regarded Cochin as a tributary state and gave out that this was the purchase and sale of a part of the kingdom of Mysore.

Isolated and apprehending a concerted attack, Tipū's plan was to secure every part of Travancore, if possible in December, 1789, invade the southern provinces of the British and by the time the British would be prepared, he would be able "to begin his war with the Kaveri as his frontier towards Coromandel, a boundary anxiously and incessantly desired by the rulers of Mysore since 1751". Tipū's first attack on Travancore lines failed.¹⁹ He gave out that he was searching for fugitives. His next attack came in April, 1790.²⁰ He carried everything before him and the Travancoreans retreated to their fortresses in the south. Cornwallis made his treaty with the Marāthās on 1 June, 1790 and with the Nizām on 4 July, 1790. The war had actually begun in May, 1790.

This war lasted two years. The British plan was that the Madras army under General Medows would seize Coimbatore and thence invade Mysore from the south after an ascent via Gazalhatti pass. Colonel Kelly with three brigades would guard the passes leading from Mysore to the Karnāṭak, and if possible, penetrate to Baramahal. General Abercromby with the Bombay army would subjugate Malabār. General Abercromby would perform his part of the task quite easily. Medows succeeded in capturing the posts extending to the Gazalhatti pass. The British army did not meet with any opposition so far. Tipū's corps of observation under Sayyid Sāheb was driven across the Bhavāni by Floyd who took Satyamangalam. But the British troops were dispersed in three divisions at Palghat, Coimbatore and Satyamangalam. Tipū saw his opportunity and inflicted swift blows in quick succession on the three dispersed detachments. Floyd had to retreat precipitately. Medows advancing, was for sometime unable to establish any contact with him and a repetition of the Munro-Baillie affair was barely averted. Kelly's detachment, commanded by Maxwell also barely escaped disaster. Tipū next made a raid on Trichinopoly, turned back after plundering

Srirangam and, in the style of Haidar, kept the British army under Medows dancing about him in the Karnāṭak. The Governor-General, who was also the Commander-in-Chief decided to take the command himself.

The new British plan of campaign was to evacuate all the posts captured by Medows in the last campaign except Palghatcherry and Coimbatore, to divert a part of Tipū's forces from the main army under Cornwallis, and with that end in view the Bombay army under Sir Robert Abercromby was to advance from Tellicherry upon Seringapatam by the pass of Periapatam. The Marāthās and the Nizām besieging Dharwar and Koppal, were to invade Tipū's dominions from the north. Cornwallis himself advancing with the main army towards Seringapatam succeeded in deceiving Tipū as to the exact route he would take, and ascended by the Pass of Moogli, thus opening the campaign very skilfully. There was really no opposition until the British reached Bangalore, which important place they succeeded in taking without much difficulty. But as Cornwallis marched in the direction of Seringapatam, Tipū's plan of campaign was revealed. On 13 May Cornwallis was at Arikera, nine miles from Seringapatam. Tipū made it impossible for Cornwallis to secure supplies and forage. Tipū's excellent intelligence service kept concealed from Cornwallis all news about Abercromby's movements as also those of the Marāthās coming to join him. In an action at Arikera Tipū could not maintain his ground and had to withdraw to Seringapatam. Rains fell and the "utter failure of all the equipments of the English army" compelled Cornwallis to retreat and his cup of misery would have been full but for the opportune arrival of the Marāthās with plentiful supplies. His siege train having been destroyed, Cornwallis was not in a position to renew his attack on Seringapatam and fell back to Bangalore. Tipū recaptured Coimbatore. After the rains, Cornwallis began his preliminary operations. A line of posts was established preparatory to a final advance upon Seringapatam. With an army of 22,000 together with 18,000 horse furnished by the Nizām and a detachment of the Marāthās, Cornwallis began his advance towards Seringapatam. Tipū trusted too much to the defences of Seringapatam, where his father had so often defied his enemies, but, as Wilks says, unlike his father who extracted some advantage from every discomfiture, he was intoxicated with success and desponding in adversity. When the most important of his redoubts, called the Sultān's redoubt, was taken by Cornwallis and Abercromby formed a successful junction with the main army, Tipū offered terms. Half of his territory he surrendered, to

be divided equally among the three allies. Marāthā dominion extended to the Tungabhadra. The Nizām got territory extending from the Krishnā to beyond the Pennār with the forts of Ganjikotta and Cuddapah. The British got Baramahal, Dindigul, as also Malabār. Tipū had also to give independence to the Rājā of Coorg, and had to pay an indemnity of three crores and thirty lakhs of rupees. Tipū was still left with sufficient territory "to make him respectable and still in some degree formidable to his neighbours", thus leaving unaffected the balance of power in the south.²¹

The fourth Anglo-Mysore War seven years later ended in complete collapse of Tipū's power. The situation is best described in the words of Wellesley: "Tipū has preserved without abatement implacable sentiments of revenge since the hour of his last defeat. It has always been well understood that Tipū Sultān's resentment was not to be appeased by any conciliatory advances on our part, nor by any other means than the recovery of lost power, the disgrace of the British army, and the ruin of British interests in India. His intrigues at the courts of Hyderabad and Poona, together with his embassy to Zamān Shāh, were sufficient indications of an hostile mind." But the immediate reason for this declaration of war was that he sent an embassy to the Isle of France which according to the Governor-General, proposed an offensive and defensive alliance against the British in India and levied a military force which was actually landed in Tipū's country. Wellesley admitted that the succour received was inconsiderable but he thought that this must be regarded as "a public, unqualified and unambiguous declaration or act of war".²² Wellesley apprehended that Tipū's earliest hostile movements would lead to the general hostile movements of the French adventurers in the Indian Courts and more effectual French succour might arrive. Wellesley's aim was to bring such a reduction of Tipū's power as would establish a permanent restraint upon his future means of offence, to seize his whole maritime territory, to compel him to defray the expenses of war as also to compel him to admit permanent Residents at his court from the British and their allies. Tipū in reply said that "forty persons, French and of a dark colour, of whom ten or twelve were artificers and the rest servants paid the hire of the ship, came here in search of employment".²³ As Mill says about this Mauritius episode, it really disclosed that the connection between Tipū and the French was very trifling and their mode of intercourse childish. There may be some difference of opinion as to the nature and extent of the French menace. But it cannot be denied that in the existing circumstances war was inevitable.

Tipū was an enemy of the British, beaten on his own ground yet able to hurt. He would not consent to sink to the level of the Nizām and he believed that he was destined by the English to the fate of a pensioned Nawāb.

Tipū was completely outmanoeuvred and out-generalled. He had no allies to help him. The Nizām's army did not play much effectual part on the British side and the *Peshwā's* troops were not there to help the British. But the organisational work was this time very efficient. Tipū was defeated by Stewart at Sedasere and by Harris at Malavally. He was driven to the defences of his capital, of which the siege was begun on 17 April and the assault was made on 4 May, 1799. Tipū fell fighting bravely. His sons surrendered and the rule of the dynasty came to an end. The Wodiyars, who were nominal rulers in the days of Haidar 'Ali and in the early years of Tipū Sultān's regime, were restored to a portion of the dominions ruled by the Sultān and his father. Besides Kanara, Coimbatore, Wynaad and Dharapuram, the entire sea coast of the kingdom of Mysore was annexed by the British. By Article 8 of the Subsidiary Treaty with the Rājā of Mysore the East India Co. was "to undertake the defence and could garrison in whatever manner they may judge proper all fortresses and strong places in the Mysore territory." Arthur Wellesley, later famous in English history as a soldier and a statesman, first came into prominence as the leader of the Hyderabad contingent in this Anglo-Mysore War and then played a prominent part along with Col. Close, the Resident, and Purnaiya, the old finance minister and now the *Diwān*, in the establishment of the new order in Mysore. Tipū's family was sent to the fort of Vellore, which was appropriated for their residence. Sir Arthur Wellesley thus summarises the Governor-General's first year's work: "Our principal ally, the Nizām, was restored to us, the French State growing in the peninsula of India was destroyed, our formidable native enemy Tipū, the ally of the French, was subdued".²⁴

Wilks says that "the decision of history will not be far removed from the observation almost proverbial in Mysore that Haidar was born to create an empire, Tipū to lose one. Haidar was an improving monarch and exhibited few innovations, Tipū was an innovating monarch and made no improvements".²⁵

In civil administration the first thing to note was the difference in the attitude of the father and son to the nominal king. Haidar never openly assumed the royal title. He maintained an attitude to the old dynasty more or less like that of the *Peshwās* to the successors

of Shivājī. Tipū dethroned the Rājā, made him practically a state prisoner and openly assumed the title of Sultān in 1786. The coins of Haidar 'Alī are remarkable for their conservatism. He exercised the sovereign right of striking coins in his own name for the first time in Bednūr which he described as his *swarājya* and whose name he changed to Haidarnagar. None of Haidar's coins anywhere exhibit more than the initial letter of his name and in associating his coins with Hindu deities, he showed very remarkable toleration.²⁶ Tipū had even a new calendar based on the *mauludi* year. He changed the names of the mint towns as well. Kirkpatrick says in this connection that Tipū's calendar was that in common use in Mysore but he substituted Arabic names for Hindu ones, assigned to the cyclic years and months.

Haidar's finance was also characterised by his conservative traditional outlook. He would rent his country in large districts to *amildars*. His terms were favourable. They paid regularly but succeeded in amassing large sums even after payment of public revenues. Haidar's spies would inform him. The *amildars* would be asked to attend the *Darbar*, compelled to disgorge their wealth, given a small present and sent to other districts. Tipū changed the institutions of his father and also changed his own pretty often. He wanted to introduce a system of checks and balances. In each area the military were under an officer called *Sudur*, the civil under an officer called *Asaf*. The Killadars were under the former. The *Asaf* had the tahsildars and head farmers under him. The *Sudur* and the *Asaf* had their cutcheries in the same hall. But as has been said, "all these checks served only to diminish the revenue. All parties soon found that it was wiser to agree and divide the public money than to quarrel and send their complaints to the Sultān. The *Asaf* and the *Sudur* with their cutcheries, the tahsildars and their cutcheries and the head farmers and the accountants of villages, all had their respective shares which were as well ascertained as their pay. The whole amounted on an average throughout the extent of Tipū's dominions to above 30 per cent."

The Mysore government under Haidar was a very simple and despotic monarchy. Every department, civil as also military, felt the touch of the genius of the great ruler. Justice was impartially administered. Every important officer owed his position to his ability, not to his social position, and most of the trusted men were raised from obscurity. In these circumstances his Government had a vigour unexampled in India. Tipū's great drawback was his restless spirit of innovation and the increasing bigotry of his later years.

Sir Thomas Munro wrote to his father: "The great blow of the loss of half of his country seems to have confounded him. He never had the talents of his father but he had always till that event paid his army regularly, kept it in good order, gave a good deal of his attention to business and managed his finances tolerably well." It is no wonder that the dominions of Tipū showed indications of good government that surprised the British invaders. The revenues of Tipū's dominions, according to the terms of the Treaty of 1792 were 2 crores and 37 lakhs of rupees.^{26a}

In connection with Haidar's public works we should specially mention *Dariya Daulat* and *Lalbagh* and the establishment of a grand bazar town named *Ganjam Sahr*. It is relevant to note that in 1774 when the house of Kadimuddin at Seringapatam caught fire, many buildings including a portion of the temple of Rangaswāmi were destroyed. Haidar rebuilt the temple in so short a period as one month. Tipū's most important constructive work was in Malabār. He was the pioneer of Malabār roads. There were no highways in Malabār before him. Tipū projected and constructed an extensive chain of roads there. The intolerance of Tipū Sultān has been very much exaggerated. The Śringeri letters of Tipū Sultān show that Tipū carried on a correspondence with *Jagadguru* Shri Shankaracharya in a spirit that we can associate only with a very religious prince. The monastery suffered much in 1791 at the hands of Marāthā pindāris. The *Guru* was supplied by Tipū with necessary funds for replacing the displaced image and for necessary ceremonies. In 1793, Tipū wrote to him, "You are the *Jagadguru*. You are always performing penance in order that the whole world may prosper and the people may be happy". These letters prove definitely the sincerity of Tipū's tolerance and do not fit in well with the details of persecution with which we are familiar. Political, military and administrative considerations were responsible for some of the measures of persecution of Haidar and Tipū—transplantation and forcible conversion of rebels and the formation of Chela battalions of captive converts like the Turkish janissaries. It would be a mistake to regard these measures as indications of their attitude to their Hindu subjects.²⁷

The efficiency of the military system of Haidar 'Ali and Tipū Sultān cannot be denied. But in this sphere too Tipū departed to a large extent from the principles of his father. In 1767, at the time of the first Anglo-Mysore War Haidar had 210 Europeans, 800 excellent Mughul horse, 12,000 other cavalry, 5,000 grenadier sepoy, 8,000 sepoy with European muskets, 1,000 topasses and 4,000 matchlockmen. In 1780, when he entered the Karnāṭak he had, as

has been mentioned, about 90,000 troops with him. At the outbreak of the war in 1790 Tipū's force was 45,000 regular infantry and 20,000 horse, exclusive of irregular peons. In 1793, after the loss of half of his territory, his army consisted of 30,000 regular infantry, 7,000 regular cavalry, 2,000 artillery and 6,000 irregular horse, besides a large number of peons. Besides the field army Haidar and Tipū had to maintain garrisons in times of war at Seringapatam, Sera, Bednūr Sonda, Chik Ballapur, Dod Ballapur, Kolar, Hoskote, Bangalore, Dindigul, Coimbatore and Mangalore.²⁸

In the days of Haidar the British army, small in numbers, was composed almost wholly of infantry. Haidar was strong in horse, though not strong enough in infantry and artillery. He lost many battles without injury to his affairs because the British were unable to pursue. A single big victory in the field over Sir Eyre Coote would have made him master of almost every place in the Karnāṭak. But the situation of the British Government with regard to Indian powers changed completely in the days of Tipū. Cornwallis took with him quite a big army and he was helped by the cavalry of the Marāthās and the Nizām. But in 1799, the British army was by itself quite strong both in infantry and cavalry, in quality and number. The superiority was so great that the issue could not be doubtful. Tipū's artillery and infantry showed the effects of intensive training by Frenchmen, but in the altered circumstances this could not avail. It has been said that his grand military mistake was the neglect of his cavalry, a proper use of which would have made his defeat a much more difficult proposition. The organisation of the army showed traces of weakness. His army was overstaffed. He had about 150 general officers for an army, less numerous than what his father took into the Karnāṭak in 1780 and for which he had only ten generals. Tipū's army also fell more and more into arrears and when Seringapatam was attacked by the British, it had received only two issues of pay in 14 months. He went on adding to the defences of Seringapatam for which he spent about 12 lakhs of pagodas. After the opening of the campaign he did nothing effective to retard the progress of the British armies. He had seen his father defy his exultant enemies by shutting himself up in his capital until the rains. He perhaps hoped to repeat his father's performance. But circumstances were changed and he also was very much unlike his father "whose equanimity was uniform in every aspect of fortune and who generally extracted some advantage from every discomfort."

In connection with the navy of Haidar and Tipū it is necessary to note that Haidar and Tipū commanded the entire sea board from Sadashivgarh to Cochin. Haidar's conquest of Bednūr and Sonda in 1763-64 brought the ports of Honavar, Mangalore, Bhatkal, and Sadashivgarh in his possession. He could now have a fleet of his own and in 1765, according to the Portuguese, he had thirty vessels of war and a large number of transport ships. In 1766, his fleet was of very considerable help in the conquest of Malabār. It consisted of 80 vessels, 13 top-sail vessels, several *machwas* of war, besides a great many *shibars* and small crafts. The conquest of North Malabār and South Malabār completed, Haidar had more ports under his control. In 1769, Haidar temporarily abandoned Malabār, which he reconquered soon after the Marāthā menace was over. The Moplahs were great navigators and they formed excellent sailors. Haidar's fleet had two commanders—Stannett and Latif Ali Beg. In 1768, when the Bombay government sent a squadron of ships to the Malabār coast with European troops and sepoy, Haidar's naval power collapsed. The British expedition failed on land but Stannett proved to be a traitor. He joined the British with a part of his fleet. Undaunted by this collapse of his naval power, Haidar began another ship-building programme. With the help of some Portuguese and Dutch ship-builders he strove to realize an ambitious scheme of ship-building. But he could not realise his plan. Sir Edward Hughes in 1780 entered Mangalore harbour and destroyed the enemy's ships he found there. Thus failed the second attempt of Haidar. Tipū, however, walked in the footsteps of his father. General Mathews on getting possession of some of his seaports in 1783 found 19 large ships, some completely built and others in great forwardness. In 1796, Tipū established a Board of Admiralty and planned the erection of 20 lines of battle ships and 20 frigates. Neither Haidar nor Tipū had the necessary respite that alone could have enabled them to equip a fleet strong enough to hold its own against the British on the west coast.²⁹ Unable to build a strong navy of his own, Haidar depended in his campaigns of 1781 and 1782 very much on French naval support and he occupied Porto Novo in order to provide the French with the necessary landing facilities. The French never gave him adequate naval support and in spite of the triumphs of Suffren at sea, there must have been profound distrust in his mind of the French promises and it was perhaps in this mood that he remarked to Purnaiya about the British naval power—"I can ruin their resources by land but I cannot dry up the sea."

NOTES

1. *Diary of Ananda Rānga Pillai*, Vol. IX, pp. 369-70 & S.P.D., XXVIII, Nos. 111-13.
2. Wilks, *Mysore*, Vol. I, p. 352.
3. Sen, S. N., A Portuguese Account of Haidar Alī, *Calcutta Review*, 1937.
4. S.P.D., XXVIII, 266; Wilks, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 418.
5. Parasnis, *Itihas Sangraha*, Ait. Tippanen, II, 16, 17; *Ibid*, Peshwā Daftarantil Mahiti, p. 44.
6. Peixoto, Book 1.
7. *Nishan-i-Haidari*.
8. Orme, MS, Vol. 72. Peixoto, Book II.
9. Pissurlencar, *Antigualhas*, II & LXXXI.
- 9a. S.P.D., XXXVII, 60-63.
10. See Chap. VII, *Peshwā Mādhav Rāo* for Marāthā campaigns against Haidar 'Alī.
11. Mawji and Parasnis, *Treaties, Engagements, etc.*, p. 85. Rajwade, X, 235.
12. Madras Records, *Military Consultations*, Vol. XXIV, p. 615.
13. Sinha, N. K., *Haidar 'Alī*, pp. 91-94.
14. *Poona Residency Correspondence Series*, Vol. II, p. 122.
- 14a. P.R.C., *Ibid*, No. 32, p. 68.
15. P.R.C., III, p. 24.
16. P.R.C., III, pp. 8-10, 45-46.
17. *Ibid*, p. 28.
18. *Ibid*, III, pp. 42-45, 74-77.
19. *Ibid*, pp. 49-52.
20. *Ibid*, p. 113, 129-30.
21. *Ibid*, p. 501.
22. Wellesley Despatches (Martin), Vol. I, p. 159. Pp. 448-53 contain the declaration of Governor-General against Tipū Sultān.
23. *Ibid*, p. 382.
24. Owen, S. J., *A Selection from the Wellington Despatches*, p. 10.
25. Cited in *Mysore Gazetteer*, Vol. II (1930 ed), p. 2671 and p. 2674.
26. For Haidar's civil administration, see N. K. Sinha, *Haidar 'Alī*, pp. 233-45.
- 26a. Sinha, N. K., *op. cit.*, p. 249.
27. Wilks differs from this view, see *Mysore Gazetteer*, Vol. II, pp. 2668-74. A large number of people from Malabar and Southern Marāthā country were forcibly converted to Islam.
28. Mohibul Hasan Khān, *History of Tipū Sultān* (1951), p. 351.
29. *Ibid*, pp. 352-53.

CHAPTER XIV

PROGRESS OF THE BRITISH POWER (1785–1798)

British Relations with the Marāthās:

Warren Hastings left India in February, 1785. Macpherson as senior member of the Council officiated as Governor-General until the arrival of Lord Cornwallis in September, 1786. Macpherson, according to Cornwallis (1 November, 1789) "was the most contemptible and the most condemned Governor that ever pretended to govern". He was indifferent to anything except his personal interests. The administration of Macpherson saw no departure from the principles and policy of Warren Hastings. According to the system established by the Treaty of Salbai, Sindia was the most important ally of the British. The Court of Directors wrote to Cornwallis on 21 July, 1786: "It does not at present occur to us that almost any system of politics can soon take place in India which with the aid of Sindhia we may not be able to counteract, if in its tendency (it is) prejudicial to us".¹ The position accorded to Sindia in the scheme of things associated with the Treaty of Salbai best illustrates subsequent history. Burke said that the negotiations of Warren Hastings with the Mughul Court covered "an insidious design to betray" Shāh 'Alam into the hands of Sindia. On this charge Hastings replied, "I declare that I entered into no negotiations with Madajee Sindhia for delivering the Mughul into the hands of the Marāttās, but I must have been a mad man indeed if I had involved the Company in a war with the Marāttās because the Mughal as his last resource had thrown himself under the protection of Madajee Sindhia." It was, therefore, not unnatural in these circumstances, that Sindia's demand on behalf of Shāh 'Alam of the tribute due to the Great Mughul from Bengal should be refused peremptorily by the Government of Macpherson. Hastings had also declared in 1783 that British connection with the Mughul had long been suspended and he wished never to see it renewed, as it had proved a fatal drain to the wealth of Bengal and the treasury of the Company. Besides this refusal of tribute, the Government of Macpherson was also responsible for another move to checkmate the ambitious designs of Mahādji Sindia. Ambāji Inglé, Mahādji Sindia's *Subāhdar* of the *mahāls* bordering on Sikh territories succeeded in negotiating a treaty with the Sikh

chiefs in March, 1785. It contained the following clause: "of whatever territory on his side or that side of the Jumna, independent of the royal territories, may be taken in concert with each other from the Hindus and Mussalmans, one third should be given to the Sikh chiefs".² Macpherson's Government saw in this a danger to the political interests of the East India Company and to the territory of the Nawāb-Vazīr. Pressure was brought to bear upon Mahādji. A satisfactory explanation was demanded of his late negotiations with the Sikhs. Mahādji Sindia agreed to include the East India Company and the Nawāb-Vazīr as his friends and to add "Let there never be any injury offered to their country." The Sikh Sardars received some encouragement from Lt. James Anderson, Company's Resident at the Court of Sindia, broke away from Mahādji, made an offer of an alliance to the Company through Sir John Cumming, who commanded the Company's detachment on the frontier of the Vazīr. Macpherson's Government which did not desire any friendly connection between the Sikhs and the Marāthās, assured the Sikh chiefs that under no circumstances would the English take any part against them and this helped materially to complete the estrangement without any commitments.³

War with Tipū Sultān:

Lord Cornwallis was responsible for the following moves in his relations with country powers: (1) non-participation in the war between the Marāthā-Nizām coalition and Tipū, (2) successful negotiation with the Nizām regarding Guntur Sarkar and arrears of *peshkush*, (3) formation of triple alliance and war with Tipū, and (4) securing of the assignment of the Karnāṭak revenue in 1792 and a new settlement with Awadh.

The Marāthās at this stage did not meditate any attack on the powerful East India Company, and their policy seemed to be directed to the conquest of the weaker neighbours in the north and south. The systematic encroachment of Tipū led to the formation of an alliance against him of the Nizām and the Marāthās. But the Marāthā attempt to enlist British support against Tipū was not successful. The British expressed willingness to assist the Marāthās in case of a joint attack from Tipū and the French, but beyond this they would not go. The British attitude towards the Marāthā-Mysore war is best described in the words of the Secret Committee to the Governor-General and Council: "Your principal attention must be to avoid shaking the friendship and confidence of the Marāthās and at the same time to remove, if possible, any unfavourable impression

which your assurance (if published) may have made upon Tipū".⁴ In spite of the anxiety and chagrin caused by the rejection of Marāthā request for British help Nānā Phadnis was not antagonised.⁵ But Tipū must have formed a very unfavourable impression of British attitude and this perhaps explains his anxiety to conclude the war with the Marāthās and the Nizām.

Cornwallis had explicit orders to demand from the Nizām the Sarkar of Guntur. By the treaty of 1766 with the Nizām as revised in 1768 the British held the Northern Sarkars except Guntur which they were to have after the death of Basālat Jang to whom it had been granted for life. They paid a tribute of seven lakhs to the Nizām for four of the five Sarkars and they were to pay two lakhs more when they would get Guntur. Basālat Jang died in 1782. But Nizām 'Ali retained the possession of the *Sarkar* and the British withheld the *peshkush*. Capt. Kennaway was sent by Cornwallis to negotiate. The Nizām was also eager to negotiate. His renters mismanaged collections and he was not getting much from Guntur. He could also see for himself that he would gain rather than lose from a connection with the English. He surrendered the *Sarkar* in September 1788. The necessary financial adjustment was made not long after on the basis of the payment of the arrears of *peshkush* and the balance from the revenue of Guntur since the death of Basālat Jang. The Nizām also evinced a great anxiety to enter into a defensive alliance which would ensure his security against Tipū Sultān and the Marāthās. In this connection Cornwallis wrote to the Secret Committee on 1 November, 1789: "As his Highness' political situation with the Marāthās has long approached almost to a state of dependence on the Poona Government, we make no alteration in the terms of our agreement with the Nizām without its being construed by the *Peshwā's* ministers as an attempt to detach him from them." Cornwallis considered that a rupture with Tipū was almost inevitable in the near future. He, therefore, did not want to antagonise the Marāthās and was not unwilling to reassure the Nizām. His expedient amounted in the words of Malcolm to a trespass on the spirit of non-intervention as proclaimed by Parliament in the Act of 1784. He wrote a letter to the Nizām in July, 1789 in which he asserted that the treaty of 1768 was still effective. The Nizām would get the help of two battalions of sepoys and six cannon whenever he would apply for them provided they were not employed against the Company's allies viz., the Marāthā chiefs, the Nawābs of Awadh and Arcot and the Rājās of Travancore and Tanjore.⁶ Tipū's name was not included. Article 10 of the treaty of 1768 provided for the trans-

fer of the Karnāṭak Balaghat to the Company, at that time possessed by Haidar 'Āli. The Nizām now wanted that this article should be carried into effect. Cornwallis wrote, "circumstances have totally prevented the execution of these articles and the Company are in full enjoyment of peace with all the world. But should it hereafter happen that the Company should obtain possession of the country mentioned in these articles, with your Highness' assistance, they will strictly perform the stipulations in favour of your Highness and the Marāthās".⁷ In the words of Wilks all this amounted to the conclusion of "a very intelligible offensive alliance"^{7a} against Tipū and it was well calculated to produce a war with him.

Tipū's attack on Travancore on 29 December, 1789, precipitated matters and led to the stabilization of British alliance with the Nizām and the Marāthās. In June 1790, the Treaty of Triple Alliance was completed.⁸ In Lord Cornwallis' letter, the treaty with the Nizām was declared a fourth treaty, the three former treaties being those of 1759, 1766 and 1768. The league was formed with a view to punish Tipū and "deprive him of the means of disturbing the general tranquillity in future". Article 13 of the treaty further provided: "If after the conclusion of peace with Tipū, he should attack or molest either of the contracting parties, the other shall join to punish him, the mode and conditions of effecting which shall be hereafter settled".⁹ In connection with the Third Anglo-Mysore War it is necessary to ascertain why Cornwallis spared Tipū. Sir John Shore thus analysed the motives of Cornwallis in his political reflection on the state of Hindustān written about 25 March, 1793.¹⁰

- (1) "An entire partition would have thrown a decided weight in the scale of the Marāthās, already too powerful.
- (2) "Policy certainly dictated the propriety of an independent sovereign over the Mysorean State, possessed of power sufficient to serve as a barrier, but inadequate to the object of a successful invasion. The question could only be in this case whether that independency should be left with Tipū or be transferred to the ancient sovereigns of Mysore.... his substitute must have been supported by the same power, which restored him to the throne."

Cornwallis boasted not without reason: "We have effectually crippled our enemies without making our friends too formidable".

After the outbreak of the war with Tipū, Cornwallis thought it necessary to assume the direct administration of the Karnāṭak on the lines followed by Macartney during the Second Anglo-Mysore War.

The entire revenues of the Nawāb had been restored to him in 1785. In February, 1787, it had also been arranged by the Governor of Madras, Sir Archibald Campbell, that the Nawāb was to get nine lakhs of pagodas from his revenues and 12 lakhs were paid each year by the Nawāb to his creditors according to the arrangement of the Board of Control. When war came in 1790 Cornwallis assumed possession of the revenues of Karnāṭak. It was further provided by treaty in 1792 that the Company was to have entire control of the Karnāṭak in case of war but was to restore it to the Nawāb on the conclusion of peace. The Company was empowered to occupy specified districts in case the Nawāb's payment fell into arrears. The Nawāb was to pay to the Company in future nine lakhs during peace and $4/5$ of his revenues in war. He was to pay his creditors six lakhs instead of 12 in future. As Mill said, "Cornwallis did not see far beyond first appearances—management during a limited and precarious period precluded that minute knowledge on which alone could be founded an assessment, just either to the Company or to the inhabitants." An efficient administration by Indians was also impossible in view of the provision of war emergency, and even during the war emergency people "had an interest in courting the Government which they were again to obey".

Settlement with Nawāb-Vazīr:

Cornwallis was also responsible for a new settlement with the Nawāb-Vazīr of Awadh. In this connection he referred to Macpherson's system as "the dirtiest jobbing". Asaf-ud-daulah was negligent, profuse and debauched. But his personal character alone does not explain the evils from which Awadh suffered. Macpherson, on the testimony Cornwallis himself, was only too ready to provide for persons not in the Company's service, riding contracts, monopolies and other privileges to be secured from the Nawāb. British contractors claimed there a right of pre-emption, of exemption from duties in their provision for investment. Between September 1793 and February 1794 an enormous sum of 2 crores and 39 lakhs were exported in specie and this immense and constant drain of specie added to the prevailing distress. To this estimate of the export of specie should be added the sum sent down to Calcutta to answer bills drawn for the payment of troops and on private account. Asaf-ud-daulah wanted the additional brigade at Fategarh to be withdrawn and his pecuniary burdens reduced. Cornwallis agreed to make a reduction of the sum payable by the Nawāb from 84 lakhs to 50 lakhs, but he refused to remove the detachment at Fategarh as he

considered that one British detachment in Awadh was not sufficient, British military prestige having suffered considerably during the Second Anglo-Mysore war.

In connection with Cornwallis' relations with country powers we should note that he tried very much to have a treaty of guarantee as between the Marāthās, the Nizām and the British. Article 10 of the Treaty of 1792 included a mutual guarantee against the sovereignty of Mysore.¹¹ He tried to secure an express treaty with that single object in view. The Governor-General knew that the Indian horizon was never free from clouds and he did not want to have an entangling alliance. He wanted to include in the proposed treaty an article by which the allies were not to assist one another "until they were convinced that the party requiring assistance had justice on his side and all measures of conciliation had proved fruitless".¹² Cornwallis was anxious to conclude this treaty. The Nizām was also eager to have it. But the Marāthās were really disinclined to enter into it as it would mean security for the Nizām against Marāthā attacks. The Marāthās claimed the recognition of their right to levy *chauth* on the Indian powers. Cornwallis wanted that the British power should assume the position of a mediator between the various Indian chiefs. Naturally there could be no treaty of guarantee. Lord Cornwallis wrote,¹³ "with regard to the presumptuous Marāthā claim of *Chauth*, I wish that as far as relates to ourselves, it should not only be treated with contempt but the Marāthās should also know that it can never be mentioned by them without exciting our displeasure and indignation, and it may likewise be proper that they should clearly understand that we do not look upon ourselves as in the most distant degree engaged to support them in such a claim upon any other power in India."

Administrative Reforms:

But Lord Cornwallis' term as Governor-General is better known for the internal reforms that he carried out. Whether all of them benefited the people of India is disputable, but there can be no doubt that they strengthened the foundations of British Government in India, raised its prestige and gave it a long lease of a century and a half.

The first crying evil was the corruption among the civil servants of the Company and the private trade they carried on to the detriment of the Company's interest. As conquerors the civil servants thought themselves as superior to the natives of the country

and as foreigners subject to no local restraint. The Company's servants felt that they had come to India to shake the pagoda tree and return to the home country with as big fortunes as they could collect by devious means. Even highly placed officers like Clive, Members of the Bengal Council and Judges had joined the race and went home laden with their ill-gotten wealth, lived in great style, bought parliamentary seats and were spreading their pestilential influence in the English society of the day. Cornwallis abolished sinecures, put an end to private trading, packed away the most corrupt officers and granted generous salaries for covenanted servants of the Company, expecting in return that they administered their charge with clean hands. The Collector was given an important place in the district hierarchy. He at first presided over the old civil and new revenue court. But soon Civil Zillah courts were set up which dealt with both civil and revenue matters. They were supervised by four provincial courts at Calcutta, Murshidabad, Dacca and Patna. Appeals in important cases lay to the Supreme Council sitting as the Supreme Court. The Collector, however, retained his magisterial powers for retaining prisoners under trial or execution of sentences; dealt with cases of affray and inflicted punishment within certain limits, the more serious cases being referred to *Faujdāri Adālat*.

The conduct of criminal justice was also investigated by Cornwallis. He found defects both in the law and its administration. Criminal justice was in the hands of Indians, mostly Muslims, and punishments were at variance with English ideas of justice. "I conceive", Cornwallis wrote on 2 August, 1789 "that all regulations for the reform of that department would be useless and negatory whilst the execution of them depends on any native whatever". So Cornwallis changed the personnel—Muhammad Rezā Khān who presided over the *Nizāmat Adālat* was removed in 1790 and the court reestablished under the Governor-General and Council aided by a *Kāzi* and two *Muftis*.

In the place of district courts with Indian *Darogas* four courts of circuit were established. Each was presided over by two covenanted civil servants assisted by Indian advisers. The courts were to make tours twice a year throughout the districts. Appeals from them lay to the Supreme Court. An elaborate Code of Regulations drawn up by George Barlow was printed and published to guide the officials of the new courts.

Important police reforms were carried out to supplement the judicial changes. In 1791 Superintendents of Police were created

for Calcutta with the function of maintaining order and arresting criminals. Next year in the districts powers of criminal jurisdiction were taken away from the *Zamindārs* and small districts were put under a *daroga* subject to supervision by the Company's representative. This system was perpetuated in the Regulations of 1793.

Special attention must be devoted to Cornwallis' Permanent Settlement of Bengal land revenue. Jonathan Duncan, John Shore and Charles Grant who had made a special study of revenue collection, were his main advisers. In 1790-91 the *subāh* of Bengal yielded land revenue of Rs. 2,68,00,000. In place of annual settlements, Shore had suggested decennial settlements. Cornwallis, faced with a country in ruins, decided on Permanent Settlement making the *zamindārs* or rent collectors permanent land-owners. The settlement secured for the Company a fixed amount of revenue without fluctuation and with the prospect of expansion when more land would be brought under the plough. There was also advantage arising from the abolition of the entire revenue machinery—*Tahsildārs*, *Qānungos*, *Patwāris* and a host of revenue officials. The *zamindārs* were given property rights, not theirs, and relapsed into a selfish careless class. The ryot who toiled on the land and created wealth for the *zamindār* and the government was sadly neglected under the settlement. The status of the ryot was impaired and it was not until 1859 that the Bengal Land Act afforded him some relief.

Sir John Shore succeeded Cornwallis. He was famous for his unrivalled knowledge of the revenue system of India. He was chosen for his pacific habits. At the time of the passing of the Charter Act of 1793, the Company's spokesmen in Parliament had referred alluringly to "a large superabounding sum which would be annually received from India". They hoped that Sir John Shore would make good this assurance.

Battle of Kharda:

The most important event of Sir John Shore's administration was the Nizām's defeat at Kharda in March, 1795 by the Marāthās in consequence of the adherence by Shore to the policy of non-intervention. This British failure to maintain the integrity of the Hyderabad State has been condemned by most British historians. As the proposed Treaty of Guarantee could not be effected, the Nizām remained exposed to Marāthā attacks. On 1 January, 1794, Kennaway, Resident at the Nizām's Court, described him to the Governor-General as prepared to form with the English engagements which would

render them masters of his country for ever. The Marāthā claims over the Nizām had been temporarily relaxed during the war with Tipū. Now they wanted to assert their claims. The English Government's offer of mediation was treated with "frigid indifference" by the Marāthās. Was Shore justified, from the British point of view, in abandoning the Nizām to his fate? The arguments for British intervention in the Nizām-Marāthā conflict can be thus summarised.

The Nizām had declared at the time of his entry into the alliance against Tipū that he did it only because of the confidence he reposed in English faith. As he was received into the alliance upon this declaration it was a virtual pledge for protection. At the time when he agreed to be the ally of the British in the war with Tipū, his alliance was so valuable that the British would have been ready to make it an offensive and defensive alliance if he had insisted on it. The Nizām was in urgent need of protection. He had been led to expect it. After the war was over, expectations were kept alive by the negotiations of Cornwallis. The cession of Guntur and adjustment of the *peshkush* gave him some claims on British support. The abandonment of the Nizām brought the British down from the high station in which they had overawed the princes of India. According to Sir John Malcolm, the English could have prevented hostilities by the terror of their interference. He wrote, "no ground of political advantage could be abandoned without being instantly occupied by an enemy; and to resign influence, was not merely to resign power but to allow that power to pass into hands hostile to the British Government".¹⁴

As against these arguments it is only proper to note that Shore weighed very carefully the reasons suggested for and against interference by the Residents at Hyderabad and at Poona; and his decision to agree with the conclusion of Malet, Resident at Poona, was the result of very mature consideration and justified by him on grounds of expediency. This 'inept' policy of non-interference in the Nizām-Marāthā conflict was not due to the incapacity of a civil servant in his exalted position to deviate from the instructions of his superiors but was the mature conclusion of a statesman who weighed very carefully the pros and cons. Shore wrote in a letter in February 1795: "We were not bound by the terms of any existing treaty to defend the Rājāh of Travancore, but the former treaty of peace with Tipū placed him specifically under our protection; and the relative situation of that Rājā and the Nizām is very similar as regards the principle of an authorised interference". The Poona Court re-

garded the Nizām as its tributary and dependent. The Nizām's Government according to Shore was 'flimsy', its policy characterised by "temporary expediency and palpable chicane". Shore also admitted that "the Marāthā influence over the Nizām's country is so incorporated with the internal administration that it requires uncommon abilities, energy and perseverance to destroy it, and as it exists the Nizām can scarcely be called an independent prince". Grant Duff admits that the Court of Hyderabad was trying "to effect an evasive purpose and if British interference had enabled the Nizām to do this, it would have been regarded as an injustice to the Marāthās"¹⁵ and it could not be denied that the Nizām's minister precipitated this war by insult and defiance. Shore's arguments on the ground of expediency were the following: The Nizām being weak, the Marāthā power alone would serve as a counterpoise to Tipū. He, therefore, wanted to retain the friendship of the Marāthās. Tipū, maimed and mauled, had not yet ceased to be dangerous and he was moving heaven and earth to secure allies. The death of Mahādji Sindia, instead of weakening the Marāthā State, tended to concentrate all civil and military power in the *Peshwā's* hands, a state of things which was sufficiently menacing to the British. If the Marāthās, provoked by British interference joined Tipū, it would be very difficult to sustain a war against them.¹⁶ The Governor-General thought that the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Robert Abercromby, was not equal to the situation. He wrote, "I know not one equal to the conduct of a war and if the Marāthās or Tipū were to attack us we should be in a deplorable situation". Moreover, the mutinous discontent of the Bengal army further incapacitated Shore from taking any decisive action. Shore also believed that "victors in a native war would eventually quarrel over the spoils".

All this shows that Shore had very good grounds for this decision not to interfere in the war between the Nizām and the Marāthās. The increase of French influence in India in consequence of this non-interference has been largely exaggerated. Subsequent events proved that the basis of French influence in India was very unsound. But the loss of British prestige resulting from non-interference cannot be denied.

In the Nizām's war with the Marāthās the British subsidiary force did not accompany him. On his return from this disastrous campaign, the Nizām informed the British that the services of the two British detachments were no longer necessary. The Nizām also moved the corps under the command of the Frenchman Raymond

to Cuddapah near the British frontier. But the rebellion of his eldest son 'Ali Jāh made him once again eager to seek British favour. He agreed to recall Raymond's corps from Cuddapah and asked for the return of the British detachments. Before the British troops could arrive, 'Ali Jāh had been worsted and committed suicide. There was another rebellion of a member of his family shortly afterwards. The British detachments helped him very considerably in this war. British influence in the Nizām's court was, even after Kharda, not inconsiderable, though the British plan of encouraging English adventurers to take services under him, was not successful. The Nizām was always eager to dismiss his French Corps provided the number of British troops was increased and the troops were available for the purposes of defence against all enemies. This, of course, the British were not at this stage willing to do and the French Corps under Raymond, therefore, remained at Hyderabad. Thus French influence at Hyderabad existed only because the British would not undertake the defence of the Nizām and when they decided to do it, the French Corps could be easily surrounded and disarmed.

Fortunately for the British, the death of *Peshwā Mādhav Rāo Nārāyan* in October 1795 caused the most serious division among the Marāthā chiefs. The Nizām rapidly recovered from the blow of Kharda. At the same time the conditions that determined the foreign policy of Shore disappeared. The influence of Nānā Phadnis was subverted and as Malet had foreseen, there was no longer that consistency and moderation which characterised Marāthā counsels and there was instead in the words of Malet, "a wildness of spirit, prompted by the boundlessness of ancient and recent pretensions not containable within the limits of good order and good neighbourhood".¹⁷

Spoliation of Awadh:

Even the mild, non-interventionist Governor-General joined in the game of spoliation of Awadh, his excuse being the threatened invasion of Zamān Shāh. In 1797, he paid a visit to Lucknow. The *Vazīr* had to agree to increase his military establishment by adding one European and one native regiment of English cavalry and for this he had to raise his former subsidy. But shortly afterwards Nawāb-Vazīr Asaf-ud-daulah died. Shore, acting on reports from Lucknow recognised Mirza 'Ali, better known as Vazīr 'Ali, as his successor. But very soon there was a spate of rumours about the 'spurious birth' of the new Nawāb. Shore once again went to Luck-

now. He wrote about the succession dispute, "I never was involved in a scene of more perplexity and profligacy." Vazir 'Ali was deposed and pensioned off, Sa'adat 'Ali, a brother of the deceased Nawāb, was raised to the throne. The annual subsidy payable to the British was raised to 76 lakhs and the fort of Allahābād was made over to the English. The English regular army in Awadh was to be about 10,000. The number of the *Vazīr's* troops was to be strictly limited. The Nawāb was not to have any communication with a foreign power, nor to have any European in his service, nor to permit any to settle in his dominion. The Court of Directors and the Board of Control approved of his arrangement and praised very much "the temper, impartiality, ability and firmness" displayed by the Governor-General who was, in recognition of his Awadh settlement, raised to the peerage as Lord Teignmouth. But the extraordinary maladministration in Awadh went on unchecked. For this, as has been shown, the British were as much responsible as successive Nawāb-Vazīrs. The British were providing against Durrāni menace at the expense of Awadh and the military burden imposed was too much for the resources of that State. A prodigal Government, an impoverished people, a bloated military expenditure, a combination of causes, some local, some due to British connection, made maladministration in Awadh almost the worst in the history of British rule in India.

Sir John Shore's vigorous action in Awadh was due to the Durrāni menace. Zamān Shāh, grandson of Ahmad Shāh Abdālī, ascended the Afghān throne in 1793. He wanted to revive the tradition of Ahmad Shāh Abdālī. Soon after his accession he came to Peshawar in 1794, reconquered Kashmir, whose governor had revolted after the death of his father. In 1795, he retreated precipitately after a week's stay at Hasan Abdal as he heard the news of the invasion of West Khorasan by the King of Persia. His next Indian invasion took place in 1796-97. His route was Hasan Abdal-Rawalpindi-Rohtas-Gujarāt-Gujranwala-Lahore. Zamān Shāh had the intention of marching on to Delhi and actually pitched his tent four or five *kos* further onwards on the side towards Delhi. But there were commotions in Kabul and Zamān Shāh instead of advancing, had to go back. He left behind him a detachment under Ahmad Khān Shāhānchi in the Doāb. But these troops were overwhelmed by the Sikhs. Zamān Shāh invaded for the last time in October 1798, and reoccupied Lahore, but very soon he received the unwelcome news that his half-brother Shāh Mahmud had induced

the King of Persia to invade Afghānistan. This was his last invasion and his reign came to an inglorious close in 1799.

Sir John Shore regarded this revived Durrāni menace not of course with unconcern, but he refused to believe that these ill-directed and ill-timed attempts of Zamān Shāh were serious enough to alarm the English. He, however, strengthened the military defences of Awadh. He wrote in September, 1796 about Zamān Shāh: "The execution of his intention will be hazardous unless he can obtain the co-operation of the Sikhs and hostages for the continuance of it and I have great doubt as to its success". In 1797, Sir John Shore took a more serious view and wrote, "many circumstances concur to make me suspect that the Shāh's views are more extensive than the mere expulsion of the Marāthās from Hindustān and his expedition is planned in concert with Tipū for the ultimate purpose of depressing the British power in India" and he added, "it is certainly the duty of this Government to extend its vigilance and precaution". His very vigorous action in Awadh can be explained by the reappearance of the Afghān threat.

Sir John Shore was succeeded by Lord Wellesley in May, 1798 and he thought of checking the Durrāni monarch at the greatest possible distance from the British frontier. Major General Craig regarded British alliance with the Sikhs and the Rājputs as impracticable. Lord Wellesley claimed that the missions he sent to Persia first of Mehdi 'Ali Khān and then of Malcolm "were responsible for the active measures adopted by the Court of Persia that produced the salutary effect of diverting the attention of Zamān Shāh from his long projected invasion of Hindustān. The assistance afforded by Mehdi 'Ali Khān under my orders to Prince Md. Shāh originally enabled that prince to excite those commotions which have recently terminated in the defeat of Zamān Shāh, in his deposition from the throne and in the entire extinction of his power. To the consolidated and active Government of Zamān Shāh has succeeded a state of confusion in the country of the Afghāns highly favourable to our security in that quarter".¹⁸ Lord Wellesley makes an exaggerated claim of having contributed to the disappearance of the Durrāni menace. "Many and various things brought about the collapse of Zamān Shāh's empty schemes of ambition."

In Sir John Shore's administration no attempt was made to straighten out the problem of British relations with the Nawāb of the Karnāṭak and the ruler of Tanjore. Muhammad 'Ali died in October, 1795 and Umdat-ul-Umara succeeded him.

NOTES

1. P.R.C., II, p. 28, Court of Directors to Governor-General, 21 July, 1786.
2. P.R.C., I, 15A.
3. P.R.C., I, 14.
4. In this connection see Governor-General's letter to the Poona Resident of 26 Feb. 1787, P.R.C., II, 54.
5. P.R.C., II, 37, 39, 42, 54.
6. Cornwallis' letter of 1 July, 1789.
7. P.R.C., III, pp. 42-45; Cornwallis to the Nizām, 7 July, 1789.
- 7a. Wilks, *Historical Sketches*, III, 38.
8. P.R.C., III, pp. 115, 117, 118, 145-52.
9. Aitchison, C. U., *Treaties, Engagements* (1863), pp. 58-59.
10. P.R.C., II, p. 345-46.
11. P.R.C., II, p. 257.
12. Cornwallis to Malet, 7 Aug. 1792 cited by Malcolm, J., *The Political History of India* (Reprint 1970), p. 67.
13. P.R.C., II, p. 256, also pp. 245-48.
14. John Malcolm, *Sketch of the Political History of India*, p. 225.
15. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas* (1921), II, p. 242.
16. P.R.C., IV, Introduction, pp. xiv-xv.
17. Malet to Lord Cornwallis, 5 April, 1793; P.R.C., II, No. 175, p. 282.
18. Martin, *Wellesley Despatches*, II, p. 134, 155-56.

CHAPTER XV

DECLINE AND FALL OF THE MARĀTHĀ POWER (1799-1818)

1. *Decline of the Marāthā Power (1799-1802):*

When Napoleon was on the point of crossing the 'French Lake' to make a grandiose effort of expansion and glitter in the Levant, Lord Wellesley arrived in India to assume charge of the Company's government. The imperial tide set in with the arrival of Lord Wellesley in India as Governor-General. "Evil days seem to be ahead. There seems to be no escape from destiny"—in these words at that time Nānā Phadnis, in the sunset of his life, scanned the horizon of future and spoke about his disturbed spirit and the fate of the Marāthā State.

A sinister warning which sounded like the whispering of nemesis was given by Tipū to Hari Pant Phadke: "You must realize that I am not at all your enemy. Your real enemy is the Englishman of whom you must beware".¹ *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo II, Daulat Rāo Sindia and Raghūjī Bhosle II had sent *vakils* to Tipū Sultān on the eve of the Fourth Mysore War and the latter had requested the former to remain neutral in the war against the English.² The *Peshwā* is reported to have said that Tipū's death had been like the loss of his right arm.³ It was Nānā Phadnis who had prevailed upon Bājī Rāo II to dismiss Tipū's *vakil*.⁴ But the readings of history were clear to Nānā Phadnis when he warned the *Peshwā* saying: "Tipū is finished; the British power has increased; the whole of east India is already theirs. Poona will be the next victim".⁵

It is true that Lord Wellesley's first problem in the south was the Tiger of Mysore, but very few Marāthā statesmen could guess that the Governor-General was at the same time studying their motives and watching their activities. In his numerous despatches, Lord Wellesley referred to the 'treachery, low cunning, captious jealousy and perverse policy' of the Marāthās.⁶ The pivot of his Marāthā policy was to treat the members of the Marāthā state as independent powers and to weave a cobweb of engagements with them. On the fifth day after taking office, Lord Wellesley impressed upon the *Peshwā* the necessity of continuing friendly relations with

the Company and returned the jewellery which Raghunāth Rāo had pawned with the British Government.⁷ As early as 8 July, 1798, Wellesley directed Palmer, the Resident at Poona, to make a treaty with the *Peshwā* to exclude the French from his army, and to furnish him with a strong force from Bombay on the condition that the *Peshwā* should arrange for the regular payment of the troops.⁸ The 'just, reasonable, temperate and moderate proposals' for a secret treaty with the *Peshwā* were renewed in 1799,⁹ on 12 April, 1800 and on 30 November, 1801.¹⁰ Col. Close made friends with the European officers of Daulat Rāo Sindia who importuned the *Peshwā* not to negotiate any treaty with the English without his concurrence.¹¹ It is significant to note that Wellesley transferred Palmer for his failure to manoeuvre the *Peshwā* into the acceptance of British suzerainty.¹²

Lord Wellesley obtained a stranglehold over the Gaikwār State in 1802.¹³ Anand Rāo Gaikwār sought financial and military assistance from the British at Cambay against his cousin, Malhār Rāo Gaikwār and Arab mercenaries. Jonathan Duncan, the Governor of Bombay, sent Major Walker with a force of two thousand to Baroda. Walker concluded a treaty with Anand Rāo Gaikwār's Dewan at Cambay and brought Malhār Rāo Gaikwār of Kadi to submission.¹⁴

To Colebrooke, the Resident at Nagpur, Raghūjī Bhosle I expressed his desire to join in an alliance against Tipū and become a mediator between the Company and the *Peshwā*. But as his conduct during the whole course of negotiations appeared to be insincere and illusory,¹⁵ Colebrooke urged Lord Wellesley to abolish the residency of Nagpur. These facts clearly indicate how Lord Wellesley was preparing patiently for a judicious final stroke. His sound impulses and unfailing sense of reality in politics did not play him false.

The Marāthā state, like the Holy Roman Empire, was 'a curious and baffling political puzzle'. Its whole texture was neither solid nor rational. There were cross purposes at work and the degeneration was emphasised by internal convulsions. Shāhū II, the *Chhatrapati* of Satara, was a prisoner in his palace; and he was looked upon by the *Peshwā* as a costly appendage. Shāhū's brother Chhatra Singh reacted violently against the wretched condition to which the Rājā had been reduced. The two brothers were anxious to free themselves from the thralldom of the *Peshwā* and regenerate the Marāthā State by bringing about the cohesion of the several members of the state. They overpowered the *Peshwā*'s managers, Apte

and Abhyankar, at Satara in March 1798: Shīvāji III, the *Chhatrapati* of Kolhapur, his able minister Ratnākar Pant and the widows of Mahādji Sindia made a common cause with Shāhū II and Chhatra Singh. Their combined army defeated the *Peshwā's* commander Mādhav Rāo Rāste, on 16 June, 1798. Parashurām Bhāu of Tasgaon, who was then confined at Mandavgan, was released by the *Peshwā* to restore the situation. Parashurām Bhāu broke down the Satara Rājā's resistance.¹⁶ But he was defeated and killed in an encounter with the joint forces of Kolhapur and Chhatra Singh at Pattankudi on 17 September, 1799.¹⁷ After Parashurām's death, his son Rāmachandra Pant along with his three valiant brothers besieged Kolhapur. The *Peshwā* and the Sindia despatched Mānājī Phakde, Māloji Ghorpade, Vinchurkar, the *Pratinidhi* and Captain Brownrigg with a strong artillery and trained battalions to the assistance of Parashurām's sons. The *Chhatrapati* of Kolhapur was defeated in December 1799, and compelled to take shelter at Panhala.¹⁸ Lord Wellesley watched with great interest these domestic entanglements and distractions in the Marāthā State.

Peshwā Bājī Rāo II, son of Raghunāth Rāo, was the villain of the piece. He was installed as the *Peshwā* at the age of twenty-one on December 5, 1796, by Nānā Phadnis with the consent of the great feudatories of the State—Sindia, Holkar, Bhosle and the Nizām. Elphinstone has painted his character in the following words:

"He is eager for power, though he wants the boldness necessary to acquire it, and is tenacious of authority, though too indolent to exercise it. Even his indolence is broken in by his habits of suspicion and vigilance, and there is no part of his character that is to be found unmixed and entire. His love of consequence makes him fond of the company of low dependants, where he can enjoy his superiority unrestricted.

"He is vindictive to the extreme, he never forgets an injury, and spares no machinations to ruin the object of his resentment. To his habitual insincerity he joins a talent for insinuation and a natural love of artifice and intrigue. He has a general distrust of others.

"He is a slave to superstition; half of his life is spent in fasts, prayers and pilgrimages. A large part of his revenue is consumed in magical practices. His superstition, however, imposes no restraint upon his pleasures and the greater part of his time that is not occupied by religion is devoted to vicious indulgences. Though he affects great purity in his own person, scarcely a day passes that he does not spend some hours with his favourites in large assemblies of wo-

men, when he enjoys the coarsest buffoonery and witnesses most disgusting scenes of debauchery".¹⁹

The author of *Peshwanchi Bakhar*, Krishnāji Sohoni, who was an officer in the last days of the *Peshwā* and therefore, a close observer of events, was constrained to remark, "words fail to describe *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo, who unlike any other member of the family, was lacking in manly character, suspicious of nature, incapable of choosing wise advisers and was altogether wanting in military talent".²⁰

He was not the man who could arrest the decay and dissolution of the Marāthā State that had set in before his accession, but he accelerated it by his antics. In the new administration Nānā Phadnis became his Prime Minister, with Trimbak Rāo Parchure as his assistant. The *Peshwā* was jealous of Nānā Phadnis; but at the same time, he was constantly hard-pressed by Daulat Rāo Sindia for money. Nānā Phadnis, Bālobā Tātyā, the chief minister of the Sindia, and Parashurām Bhaū were all supporters of Bājī Rāo II's rival brother, Amrit Rāo. On 31 December, 1797, Nānā Phadnis was arrested by Michael Filose, an officer of Sindia, and was sent a prisoner to Ahmadnagar. Being distracted by the clamour of soldiers for payment of arrears, Daulat Rāo Sindia employed his father-in-law Sarzā Rāo Ghātge to raise money from Poona. For three months Sarzā Rāo created a reign of terror in the Marāthā capital like that of Nādir Shāh in Delhi.²¹ Responsible opinion now came to Nānā's side and Daulat Rāo Sindia had to release him on 15 July, 1798. On 17 January, 1799, Bājī Rāo II reluctantly gave formal leave to Daulat Rāo Sindia.

The last phase of Nānā Phadnis' administration (1798-1800) was not a fitting epilogue to his career. He was only a puzzled and ostensible Prime Minister, and he left the administration in the hands of Nāro Pant Chakradeo.²² In his last days the precision and punctiliousness of the 'Marāthā Machiavelli' weakened and he ruined Marāthā national interests by selfishness and want of statesmanlike vision. After Nānā Phadnis's death in March 1800, Daulat Rāo Sindia managed the *Peshwā's* administration, but his measures did not lead to any wholesome change. Shortage of money led to daily mutinies by the Sindia's long unpaid soldiers. The *Peshwā* and the Sindia quarrelled over the treasures of Nānā Phadnis. Fearing that the *Peshwā* intended to fly from Poona, Daulat Rāo Sindia kept a guard for some time over his palace.²³ Bājī Rāo II now followed the imbecile policy of making Sindia and Holkar dependent on the Poona

Government by encouraging their friction in Mālwa. Obviously, the Marāthā State was rapidly heading for the crisis of 1802.

The affairs of Daulat Rāo Sindia, who possessed eastern Mālwa, the territory west of the Jamunā and the upper Gangā-Jamunā Doāb, were not very satisfactory. Daulat Rāo Sindia (son of Mahādji Sindia's nephew Anand Rāo) was officially installed as successor to Mahādji Sindia on 10 May, 1794. Dull of intellect and with practically no education, he had fallen in public esteem by his debauchery, vices and frivolous amusements like kite-flying and jackal-hunting.²⁴ There was also a growing discontent among the subjects against his father-in-law Sarzā Rāo Ghātge who ill-treated the widows of Mahādji Sindia (Lakshmi Bāi, Yamunā Bāi, Bhāgirathi Bāi and Kesar Bāi) by entering their apartments, whipping them and dragging them out for being sent off to some prison fort. The Shenvi party headed by Lakshman Anant Lād (popularly known as Lakhbā Dādā), Nārāyan Rāo Bakshi, Devji Gauli, Rayāji Pātil, and Rāmji Pātil rallied round the widows who were held in high esteem. A civil war on a vast scale, known as the Widows' War (1798-1802) now broke out against the grinding tyranny of Daulat Rāo Sindia and his stooge Sarzā Rāo. Daulat Rāo Sindia subsequently realised that he was only sinking deeper and deeper into the quicksands of that war.²⁵

Holkar's territories embraced the south-western part of Mālwa, and these were governed by Tukoji Holkar from 1795 to 1797. After the death of Ahalyā Bāi in 1795, there was chaos in Holkar's State. Tukoji Holkar passed away on August 15, 1797. After his death violent quarrels broke out among his two legitimate sons, Kāshī Rāo Holkar and Malhār Rāo Holkar. Kāshī Rāo was a weak-minded cripple and Malhār Rāo Holkar was a ruffian; "his insane pride, reckless violence, habitual drunkenness and addiction to the predatory way of life had brought him to the level of a Pindari looter".²⁶ Yashwant Rāo Holkar, the third son of Tukoji, born in 1776, was full of adventure and resourcefulness; Vithoji, the youngest son of Tukoji, trained for no worthy work, took to the predatory way of life.²⁷ Yashwant Rāo and Vithoji were passionately attached to Malhār Rāo. Kāshī Rāo purchased for 14 lakhs of rupees the help of Daulat Rāo Sindia against Malhār Rāo, who was killed in a surprise night attack at Bhamburda on 14 September, 1797.²⁸ It was but natural for Yashwant Rāo to make an attempt to thwart the ambition of Daulat Rāo Sindia to reduce the House of Holkar in vassalage to himself. Yashwant declared Khande Rāo Holkar, the infant son of Malhār Rāo Holkar II, as the lawful head of the House

of Holkar, with himself as regent and working head of the State.²⁹ His bold challenge to Sindia rang throughout the Marāthā empire.

As fugitives from Bhamburda, Yashwant Rāo and his faithful follower Bhawāni Shankar were pursued from September 1797 to June 1798, but they managed to escape. Yashwant captured Maheswar in January, 1799, and wrought widespread ravages in Mālwa. His success as a leader of brigands drew to his side ambitious adventurers like Shāhmat Khān, Vazir Hasan, Mihrbān Singh, Zamān Khān, Fateh Singh Māne and others. Most valuable among the new adherents was Mīr Khān, a rising leader of Pathān brigands, who was a source of strength to Yashwant Rāo Holkar.³⁰ Daulat Rāo Sindia refused to release Khande Rāo Holkar who had been kept confined in the fort of Asirgarh. He also refused to confirm the agreements between Mahādji Sindia and Tukoji Holkar and levied contributions by raiding Holkar's villages in Mālwa and Khāndesh. In reprisal Yashwant Rāo took to plundering Sindia's possessions north of Ujjain³¹ and defeated Sindia's officer MacIntyre at Newri (16 miles north-west of the Unchaud pass) on 25 June, 1801.³² But near Satwas, Captain Brownrigg, another officer of Sindia, defeated Yashwant Rāo on 4 July, 1801.³³ Yashwant Rāo redeemed his honour by the capture of Ujjain on July 18, 1801.³⁴ Though aided by the July shower, Yashwant displayed remarkable originality, boldness of plan, an eye for strategic situations and rapidity of movement. Yashwant Rāo, however, suffered a defeat at the hands of Sarzā Rāo Ghātge on 14 October, 1801,³⁵ but he was still potent for mischief. He carried on a roving predatory campaign in Mālwa, Khāndesh and the Desh districts of Mahārāshtra.

While Yashwant Rāo was menacingly advancing towards Deccan, all was not well at Poona. Vithoji provoked the wrath of the *Peshwā* by his devastations round Pandharpur. He was captured alive by Bāpū Gokhale, given 200 stripes on his body, tied to the foot of an elephant and killed with horrid cruelty.³⁶ Bājī Rāo II and his favourite Bāloji Kūnjar gleefully watched the sight. In this context, Yashwant's final warning to the *Peshwā* should not be overlooked: "If you wish to avoid bloodshed, send to me at once Bāloji and Dājibā Deshmukh on your behalf, and Bāburāo Āngria and Nīmāji Bhāskar on behalf of the Sindia to negotiate terms". These were the persons who were responsible for the murder of Vithoji.³⁷ Outwardly Yashwant assured the *Peshwā* that he would serve him faithfully,³⁸ but covertly he made preparations to avenge his brother's death.

The *Peshwā's* Kārbhāris had foolishly persuaded him to under-rate the strength of Yashwant Rāo Holkar. On 8 October, 1802, Fateh Singh Mane scattered the forces of Nānā Purandare, the commander of the *Peshwā*, at Bārāmāti (40 miles s.w. of Poona).³⁹ This was followed by Yashwant's victory over Sindia's general Sadāshiv Bhāskar in the plains of Hadapsar on 25 October, 1802, incidentally also the day of Diwali.⁴⁰ The *Peshwā* fled from Poona. On 27 October, 1802, he crossed the Western Ghāts at midnight, spent a month at Birwadi near Mahād spinning out negotiations with the English for their support.⁴¹ The Civil War in Mahārāshtra in 1802 was the outcome of calamitous follies of the *Peshwā* and his great feudatories. Yashwant Rāo Holkar's triumph at Hadapsar drove the *Peshwā* into the arms of the English.

In the new regime at Poona Yashwant Rāo reserved for himself the general command of the troops, while Amrit Rāo assumed the headship of the State. They used every possible argument to convince Col. Close, the British Resident, of the justice of the cause of the party in power at Poona. Col. Close had remained attached throughout to the cause of Bājī Rāo II and continued to guide him from Poona.⁴² The Resident was allowed to leave Poona on 28 November. He met the *Peshwā* at Bassein on 16 December and next day began the discussions with him regarding the terms of the proposed treaty in the light of instructions received from the Governor-General. Balwant Rāo Nāgnāth and Raghunāth Janārdan, the two advisers of the *Peshwā*, lost no opportunity of convincing their master of British integrity, magnanimity and regard for the plighted word, and the *Peshwā* signed an agreement which went far beyond his original intention of hiring British troops for a limited purpose.⁴³

The proposals which the *Peshwā* had made on 25 October, 1802, supplied the basis for the treaty of Bassein which was "constructed after the latest and most approved model of subsidiary alliances".⁴⁴ It was signed before the commencement of the New Year and ratified by the Governor-General on March 18, 1803. By this treaty, the *Peshwā* agreed to receive from the Company on a permanent basis no less than 6,000 regular native infantry with the usual proportion of field pieces and European artillerymen attached, and with the proper equipment of warlike stores and ammunitions. For the payment of these troops, the *Peshwā* agreed to cede in perpetuity to the Company's Government, territories yielding an annual income of 26 lakhs of rupees. These territories were situated in four different parts of the *Peshwā's* possessions—Gujarāt, the territories to the south of the Tāpti, territories between the Tāpti and the

Narmadā and the territories near the Tungabhadra. Bājī Rāo II relinquished for ever his right over the city of Surat. The *Peshwā* agreed to accept British arbitration in cases of disputes arising with the Nizām and to give up all claims for *chauth* on the Nizām's dominions. He was to respect the treaty of friendship already contracted (June 1802) between the Gaikwār and the English. The *Peshwā* was not to keep in his employment any European hostile to the English and was not to engage in negotiations with other States without previous consultation with the Company's Government.⁴⁵

The Treaty of Bassein was something more than a defensive alliance. Wrote Valentia, a contemporary English traveller: "The treaty of Bassein has in fact annihilated the (Marāthā) Empire".⁴⁶ Lord Castlereagh, the President of the Board of Control, pointed out that it tended to involve the English 'in the endless and complicated distractions of the Marāthā Empire and hostility with the three greatest military powers'. He also deprecated the article in the treaty of Bassein by which the *Peshwā* was bound to accept a British arbitration in all disputes.⁴⁷ Arthur Wellesley's private opinion was that 'it was a treaty with a cipher who, in the shape of a friend, is our worst enemy', but in public, he offered the best defence he could for his brother's policy.⁴⁸ It has to be noted that Arthur wrote in 1806: "Upon the whole, then, I conclude that the treaty of Bassein was wise, just and a politic measure".⁴⁹ Perhaps it would not be overemphasising its importance if we say that the treaty of Bassein put an end to Marāthā independence,⁵⁰ gave the Company "the unquestionable supremacy over the Marāthā State,"⁵¹ and by its direct and indirect operations gave the Company the empire of India.⁵² There is no denying the fact that by this treaty, the head of the Marāthā confederacy was brought under the complete control of the Company and the latter got a "lawful right to take steps for the *Peshwā's* authority".⁵³

2. The Second Anglo-Marāthā War:

The new regime of Yashwant Rāo Holkar at Poona was a flimsy structure—his approach to various problems was characterised by short-sighted opportunism. His financial difficulties became acute with the increase in his forces to meet which he heaped terrible misery upon the city of Poona.⁵⁴ Yashwant Rāo failed to seat Vināyak Rāo, son of Amrit Rāo, in the place of Bājī Rāo II. While he was trying to organise a Marāthā confederacy he was writing to the British Resident requesting his help in an adjustment with the *Peshwā*.⁵⁵ Yashwant's negotiations with the Sindia were very slow

and not fruitful either.⁵⁶ In the words of Lord Wellesley, "the situation of Holkar is precarious and accidental".⁵⁷ Yashwant Rāo left Poona on 25 February, 1803,⁵⁸ leaving a small corps under Harnāth Singh. Then he took the road to Hyderabad and Ahmadnagar to maintain his huge army by plundering.⁵⁹ Amrit Rāo left Poona for Junnar on 20 April, 1803. On 13 May, 1803, declared a lucky day by the astrologers, the *Peshwā*, backed by British bayonets, entered Poona. The restoration of the *Peshwā* was largely due to the consummate planning and skilful execution by Arthur Wellesley.⁶⁰ The latter assured Amrit Rāo of British protection against the *Peshwā* and also other chiefs.⁶¹

Daulat Rāo Sindia was now called upon by Lord Wellesley through Collins, the Resident at Sindia's court, either to give his consent to the terms of the treaty of Bassein and take a decision 'upon terms of equality and honourable to all parties' or to be prepared for a war.⁶² Daulat Rāo was singled out by Lord Wellesley for the use of pressure tactics as he was convinced that the former alone possessed the means of offering any serious opposition to the British.⁶³ It was also Wellesley's ambition to destroy the French party at Sindia's court.⁶⁴ Daulat Rāo and Raghūjī Bhosle exerted all their ingenuity to form a Marāthā coalition.⁶⁵ They instigated Gosain Himmat Bahādur and Gani Beg in Bundelkhand to prepare for a war against the British.⁶⁶ A conspiracy for the overthrow of British influence was afoot at the court of Baroda.⁶⁷ The Nizām seemed a bit inclined to support the confederates.⁶⁸ Yashwant Rāo Holkar alone stood aloof. Daulat Rāo, in response to the Holkar's demands, released the infant Khande Rāo and agreed to settle the differences through the mediation of Raghūjī Bhosle.⁶⁹ Bhosle's ministers presented to Yashwant an order from Daulat Rāo releasing Holkar's territory in Mālwa which Sindia had occupied after his victory at Indore.^{69a} But while their negotiations were proceeding at a slow pace, Lord Wellesley was going ahead with his plans. On 7 August, 1803, he issued a proclamation of war; but Yashwant Rāo still showed no disposition to join the Sindia and the Bhosle. He turned towards Burhanpur and then encamped at Bhikangaon.⁷⁰ Sir Thomas Munro observes, "Had Holkar taken a decided part against us or had the French been able to land a strong detachment, our difficulties would have been so much increased, that I doubt if we should have made any new conquests".⁷¹

Various explanations have been given for Holkar's not showing any 'disposition to fulfil his word',⁷² and betraying the confederates. According to Duff, Yashwant excused himself on the ground that if

all were to be engaged in the Deccan War, no one would be able "to take care of Hindustān".⁷³ Besides, Yashwant knew that Daulat Rāo's first object after re-establishing his influence at Poona would be a war of extermination against him.⁷⁴ Malcolm tells us that Yashwant wrote a long letter to Sindia explaining his absence for want of money.⁷⁵ Pearse holds that Yashwant Rāo Holkar was afraid of assisting Daulat Rāo Sindia lest he should become the chief power in India.⁷⁶ Arthur Wellesley and Collins believed that Yashwant's "object was to keep himself out of the contest while urging others into it".⁷⁷ In explaining the absence of Holkar from the coalition, Sardesai attaches considerable importance to Arthur Wellesley's letter to the former dated 16 July, 1803. "I am anxious", wrote Arthur, "to cultivate the good understanding which subsisted between the Company's Government and you".⁷⁸ It is significant to note that on the eve of the war, Amrit Rāo intercepted a letter in which Sindia wrote to the *Peshwā*: "Let us make a show of satisfying his demands. After the war is over, we shall both wreak our full vengeance upon him (Yashwant Rāo)".⁷⁹ Amrit Rāo placed that letter in Arthur's hands, and the latter had it diverted to Yashwant Rāo.⁸⁰ Then Yashwant Rāo wrote to Sindia and Bhosle from Bhikangaon: "I am ready to join you in this business according to your letter. But you, in spite of all your promises and oaths, have a different intention and do not consider an alliance with me advisable".⁸¹ The primary responsibility of the break-up of the Marāthā coalition rests on Daulat Rāo Sindia.

Daulat Rāo Sindia and Raghūjī Bhosle met with quick reverses. Arthur Wellesley captured Ahmadnagar on 12 August, 1803. His problem was to guard among a hostile population the famine-stricken Poona district and the Nizām's territory.⁸² The essence of Arthur Wellesley's rule of war was never to let the Marāthā raiders remain undisturbed, never to attack them when holding a strongly defended position, to force them on to move, and to strike them when thrown into disorder.⁸³ Stevenson fought skirmishes against the foraging parties of the Pindāris at Jafarabad. On 23 September, 1803, in the hotly contested battle of Assaye (a village situated about forty-five miles north-east of Aurangābād), the combined army of Sindia and Bhosle led by Gopāl Rāo Bhāū and Vithal Pant Bakhshi was soundly beaten by Arthur Wellesley. 'It was a triumph more splendid than any recorded in Deccan history',⁸⁴ but achieved at an enormous cost of men (663 Europeans and 1,778 Indian killed or wounded). Stevenson captured Burhanpur on 15 October, 1803, and Asirgarh on 21 October, 1803. Wellesley's and Stevensons'e com-

bined army decisively defeated Bhosle at Argaoon on 29 November, 1803. Bhosle's troops behaved with conspicuous gallantry. Arthur and Stevenson captured Gawilgarh on December 15, 1803.

In the northern theatre of war, Lake launched his attack with impetuous vigour and captured Aligarh on September 5, 1803. Perron, the French adventurer, who was responsible for managing the northern possessions of Sindia, selfishly removed the most seasoned battalions far from the expected point of attack. Lake then defeated M. Louis Bourquien, Perron's successor of Sindia's army, at Patparganj near Delhi on 11 September, 1803.⁸⁵ Lake personally headed every charge of his infantry. Two days later he took into his possession the blind eighty-three year old Mughul emperor, Shāh 'Alam II, and left Colonel Ochterlony in command at Delhi. Having concluded a treaty with the Rājā of Bharatpur, Lake captured Āgra on October 17, 1803. The remaining forces of Sindia were finally vanquished at Laswari (20 miles south of Bharatpur) on 1 November, 1803.⁸⁶ Ambāji Inglé, who held the *Subāhdari* of the Sindian province south of Āgra and the whole of Mālwa, fled from the battlefield. The battle of Laswari completed the destruction of Sindia's power. The victory was purchased by Lake at a heavy price (822 men killed and wounded including Major-General Weir and Major Griffiths).⁸⁷

Success attended the arms of the English in Gujarāt, Bundelkhand and Orissa. Colonel Murray captured Broach on 29 August, 1803, Champaner and Pavagad on 17 September, 1803. The province of Cuttack including Balasore was conquered in October, 1803. A large number of minor chiefs such as the Rājput and Jāt princes, the Nawābs of the Doāb, the Bundela chiefs, Himmat Bahādur and Shamsheer Bahādur, and Ambāji Inglé were detached from Marāthā allegiance.

Lord Wellesley desired that Sindia and Bhosle should be sent to Calcutta to beg for peace at his feet. But Arthur Wellesley considered it a better policy to make the subdued chiefs innocuous than to humiliate them. By the treaty of Deogaon (19 December, 1803), Raghūjī Bhosle II ceded to the British Government the province of Orissa with its whole coast including Balasore, and the whole of the territory and share of the revenues to the westward of the river Wardhā and south of the hills on which stand Narnaulla and Gawilgarh. However, he retained in his possession the two forts with districts below with a revenue of four lakhs. The province of Western Berār up to the river Wardhā was ceded to the Nizām. Bhosle was

to respect all the treaties concluded with his feudatories by the British Government. No British subject, European or American, was to be entertained by him without the consent of the British Government. Raghūjī renounced his adherence to the Marāthā state, recognised the treaty of Bassein and admitted Elphinstone as the British Resident in his court.⁸⁸

Daulat Rāo Sindia sent his agents Kamal Nayan Munshi and Vithal Pant who concluded the treaty of Surji Anjangaon on 30 December, 1803. He recognised the treaty of Bassein and surrendered his territories between the Yamunā and the Gangā and all those situated to the north of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Gohad. He ceded to the British Government Ahmadnagar, Broach and his possessions between Ajanta and the Godāvarī. Sindia renounced his claims on the British Government, the *Peshwā*, the Nizām and Gaikwār. He confirmed all treaties made by the British Government with his feudatories and recognised their independence. He agreed never to retain in his service any European, American or any British Indian subject, and he renounced his control upon the Mughul emperor. Daulat Rāo admitted Malcolm as British Resident in his court, but he refused to accept a British subsidiary force. On his representation, Burhanpur, Pavagarh and Asirgarh were restored to him. By a separate treaty concluded on 27 February, 1804, Sindia entered into a defensive alliance with the English.⁸⁹

During the first phase of the second Anglo-Marāthā War, Yashwant Rāo Holkar's conduct had been rather favourable to British interests. After the defeat of Sindia and Bhosle, he tried to raise a coalition of Indian rulers and entered into secret correspondence with the Rājās of Jaipur, Jodhpur and Udaipur, Begam Samru, the Rājā of Machery, the Rohillā chief Ghulam Muhammad and the Sikh chiefs Rāo Singh, Mir Singh, Gulpāl Singh, Bangā Singh and Jadu Singh.⁹⁰ Yashwant sent an envoy to Daulat Rāo on 5 February, 1804, in order to persuade him to withdraw from the British alliance. Daulat Rāo promptly acquainted the British with these overtures.⁹¹ Yashwant thought that he would now be singled out for attack by the English and he was not unwilling to enter into a defensive alliance with the British Government on the same terms as had been the case with Sindia. But as a preliminary to peace with the English, Yashwant Rāo demanded that the British should not interfere with his traditional claims of *chauth* upon some Indian chiefs. The territories which were actually in his possession should be guaranteed to him, and the territories formerly held by the Holkar family in the Doāb and Bundelkhand such as Etawa and Haryana should be

restored to him. If his request was not acceded to, he declared that "...countries of many hundred kos should be overrun and plundered and burnt. That he (C-in-C) should not have leisure to breathe for a moment, and that calamities should fall on lacs of human beings by the attacks of Holkar's army which overwhelms like the waves of the sea".⁹² The high tone of the demands foredoomed the negotiations to failure. In March 1804, Holkar ravaged Pushkar and Ajmer. His acts of brigandage at Jaipur were a direct challenge to the British Government as the Rājā of Jaipur had already accepted a British subsidiary force.⁹³ Another act of his barbarity was the murder of his three British officers—Vickers, Dodd and Ryan—who had expressed their desire to resign from his service in obedience to the proclamation of the Governor-General.⁹⁴ War was declared against Holkar in April, 1804. On 5 June, 1804, the Governor-General in Council wrote to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors: "The reduction of that predatory power was manifestly a measure not only of just policy and necessary security but of ultimate economy with reference to the finances of the Honourable Company".⁹⁵ Lord Wellesley thought that one action was sufficient to annihilate the army of Holkar.⁹⁶ Arthur Wellesley also opined that a war against Holkar should not be more than a 'Polygar War',⁹⁷ and should not last even a fortnight.⁹⁸ Brigadier Monson advanced about 50 miles from the Mukundra pass (about 30 miles south of Kota) and was defeated by Holkar. Monson was obliged to retreat to Agra towards the end of August, 1804, losing five battalions and six companies. Yashwant adopted the old Marāthā predatory tactics and tried every means to crush the enemy. To his long catalogue of errors, more than to any other cause, the disastrous retreat of Monson must be ascribed.⁹⁹

Monson's defeat encouraged Holkar to return to Hindustān. He had 60,000 cavalry, 16,000 infantry and 192 guns. Lieutenant Col. Ochterlony and Lieutenant Col. Burn repulsed the attack on Delhi by Holkar's commander Harnāth Singh.¹⁰⁰ The latter suffered a reverse at Dig on 13 November, 1804. Holkar himself was routed by Lake at Farrukhabad on 17 November, 1804,¹⁰¹ and was compelled to turn to Ranjit Singh, the Rājā of Bharatpur, for supplies of money and arms. Ranjit Singh assigned the fort of Dig to Holkar and placed his *diwan* Rāi Singh and his son Lachman Singh with two fully armed battalions under the Marāthā chief.¹⁰²

Dig was captured on 23 December, 1804, and the remnant of Holkar's army took shelter in the fort of Bharatpur. The siege of Bharatpur by Lake began on 7 January, 1805. Three attempts to take

the fort by assault having failed, Lake converted the siege into a blockade.¹⁰³ The Jāts of Bharatpur revealed the grim resolution of their race. Lake made hurried and overconfident attempts with an insufficient battering train.¹⁰⁴ Holkar's forays against the besiegers failed. The Rājā of Bharatpur, despite his success, realised he could not stand up to the British and sued for peace. He sent his *vakils* to Lake's camp on 10 March, 1805, and exactly after a month concluded a treaty. He paid twenty lakhs to the Company's Government, renounced his alliance with the enemies of the British Government and his claim to advantages secured by the former treaty with Lake. The fortress of Dig was to remain with the English, and a son of Ranjit Singh was to reside with the commanding officer of the British forces in suburbs of Āgra and Delhi. From the British point of view, the treaty of Bharatpur was an honourable settlement. In the siege of Bharatpur, however, 3,203 men including 103 European Officers were killed and wounded.¹⁰⁵ This had something to do with the recall of Lord Wellesley in July, 1805 by the Court of Directors. Under the pressure of Wellesley's forward policy, the debt of the Company increased from 17 millions in 1797 to 31 millions in 1806. Pitt thought that Lord Wellesley had acted most imprudently and illegally.¹⁰⁶

Then began the last phase of Yashwant's career. Through Sarzā Rāo Ghātge, Yashwant Rāo received a cordial reception in Sindia's camp at Sabalgarh. But he achieved nothing tangible because of the temporising policy of Ambāji Inglé, the rekindling of old Sindia-Holkar rivalry and above all because of Sindia's conviction that it was futile to fight against the English.¹⁰⁷ Daulat Rāo Sindia concluded the treaty of Mustafapur with the Company's Government on 21 November, 1805. Gohad and the fort of Gwālior were restored to him. But he renounced his claims on the territories north of the Chambal. The Company was not to enter into treaties with the Rānā of Udaipur, the Rājās of Jodhpur and Kota and make claims on the territories south of the Chambal.¹⁰⁸ Meanwhile Lake had pursued Yashwant up to Amritsar, where the latter proceeded expecting help from the Sikh chief, Ranjit Singh. Yashwant Rāo was compelled to conclude the treaty of Rajpurghat with Lake on the banks of the Beas on 24 December, 1805. He renounced his rights to every place to the north of the Chambal and all claims on Poona and Bundelkhand. He agreed not to employ any European in his service without the consent of the Company's Government and never to admit Sarzā Rāo Ghātge into his counsel or employment. Yashwant Rāo was allowed to return to his own dominion by a route prescribed by the

British Commander. The Company's Government agreed not to interfere in Holkar's territories south of the Chambal. The forts and territories belonging to the Holkar family in the Deccan excepting Chandor, Ambar, and Shegaon, were to be restored to Yashwant Rāo Holkar. This was a conditional measure adopted as a security for Yashwant's good behaviour during the period of 18 months.¹⁰⁹ Sir George Barlow made an alteration in the treaty and restored to Holkar Tonk, Rampura and all the territory north of the Bundī hills. Thus the Rājā of Bundī, who had rendered valuable help to Monson, was abandoned to his fate. The declaratory article to the treaty of Rajpurghat, which was ascribed to the dread of the military talents of Yashwant Rāo Holkar¹¹⁰ came as a surprise to the latter. The treaty of Rajpurghat rang down the curtain on Yashwant Rāo Holkar's conflict with the English.

3. *Fall of the Marāthā Power (1806-1817):*

Sir George Barlow's uncalled for generosity rekindled Yashwant's ambition to reunite the members of the Marāthā confederacy. He commenced a complete reorganisation of his army and opened a gun factory at Bhanpura.¹¹¹ Sindia did little except holding whispered conferences.¹¹² The ceaseless campaigning, the dissipating habits and the frustration of his plans affected Yashwant's mind and he sank into insanity from which he never recovered. There was complete anarchy in Holkar's State during the period of his insanity (1807-1811). Death put an end to his sufferings on 27 October, 1811 at Bhanpura—he had not completed the 35th year of his life. The *Peshwā*, who had described Yashwant as a monster, stopped his *naubat* (band) for three days on hearing of his death.¹¹³

Tulsā Bāi, a mistress of Yashwant Rāo, now assumed power in the name of his son, Malhār Rāo, a four-year-old son of Yashwant from another wife. Tulsā Bāi managed the Holkar state with the help of Mir Khān, Ghafur Khān and Zālīm Singh of Kota. She possessed beauty, talents, winning manners and learning; but at the same time she was cruel and dissolute.¹¹⁴ Her difficulty was want of funds to meet the demands of the army. At the same time Sindia was attacking the defenceless possessions of Holkar in Mālwa. Tulsā Bāi was therefore in favour of accepting the terms of an alliance offered by the English in 1817. But her mutinous soldiery urged a recourse to hostilities with the English. Roshan Beg was at the head of the disciplined regiments of Holkar. Ram Din, a north-Indian Brahmin, commanded Holkar's cavalry. They carried Tulsā Bāi to

the banks of the Siprā at Mahidpur (about 30 miles north of Ujjain), struck off her head, and cast her body into the stream.¹¹⁵

Daulat Rāo Sindia's indolent optimism had been severely shaken in the war against the English. After the death of Yashwant Rāo, he attacked the undefended possessions of Holkar and even made an attempt on the lives of Tulsā Bāi and Malhār Rāo Holkar III. The Governor-General, however, reduced the power of Daulat Rāo Sindia by the treaty of Gwālior on 5 November, 1817. By the treaty, Sindia agreed to assist the English against the Pindāris, and not to interfere in the internal affairs of Udaipur, Jodhpur, Kota and Bundī.¹¹⁶

In the regime of Major Walker at Baroda, Anand Rāo Gaikwār and his brother Fateh Singh Gaikwār were virtual prisoners under the British guards. Walker's appointment of a Regency Commission in 1806, and the high-handed policy of his successor Captain Rivett Carnac provoked the formation of an anti-British party at Baroda headed by the Rānīs of Anand Rāo Gaikwār, Sitarām Rāoji, Govind Rāo Bandhūjī and Bhagwant Rāo Gaikwār. The crisis was averted by Gaikwār's principal minister, Gangādhār Shāstri,¹¹⁷ who kept the Resident of Baroda well informed with the details of their secret activities. By a treaty with the Company on 6 November, 1817, the Gaikwār agreed to add 1,000 regular infantry and two regiments of cavalry to his subsidiary force, cede some of his districts to the Company for additional expenses and discharge a part of his irregular troops.

Raghūjī Bhosle II maintained an attitude of sullen indifference and refused to accept a subsidiary alliance. In 1809 he compelled Mīr Khān to retreat from Nagpur. The efforts of Bhonsle and Sindia to capture Bhopal in 1813-1814 were foiled by Nawāb Vazīr Muhammad. Raghūjī died in March, 1816. After his death his son, Parsoji Bhosle succeeded to the chiefship. He was sick, blind and paralytic and his cousin Appā Sāheb became the regent of the State. The struggle for supremacy between Appā Sāheb and Raghūjī's widow, Bākā Bāi, drove Appā Sāheb into the arms of the British with whom the Regent concluded a treaty of subsidiary alliance on 27 May, 1816. Soon after the event Appā Sāheb succeeded to the *Gādi* on the death of Parsoji on 1 February, 1817. In July 1817, Appā Sāheb had secret meetings with the *vakils* of the *Peshwā* and Sindia. He also befriended the Pindāri leader Cheetu. All this came to the knowledge of the British Resident whereupon the Governor-General issued a stern warning to the Nagpur Rājā.¹¹⁸ On 24 November,

1817, Appā Sāheb, against the wishes of the British Resident, received robes of *Sena Saheb Subāh* from the *Peshwā*. The Bhosle gradually became restive of British control.¹¹⁹

4. *The Third Anglo-Marāthā War:*

The first few years after the conclusion of the second Anglo-Marāthā War (1803-09) were marked by the greatest cordiality between the *Peshwā* and the English. Released from the galling tutelage of Nānā Phadnis, as well as the dreaded rivalry of his powerful feudatories, the *Peshwā* was free to follow his inclination in the arrangement of his affairs. He selected men after his own heart for office in government and gave himself up entirely to a life of vicious pleasure alternated by religious observances. The British Resident at Poona took care to see that he did not involve himself in foreign intrigues and was kept in good humour, and the presence of the subsidiary force hastened the restoration of tranquillity in the *Peshwā's* dominions. Out of the revenue of 12 million rupees per annum the *Peshwā* saved almost half and his treasury was now overflowing. The *Peshwā* was profuse in expressing his gratitude to the British "for saving him from destruction and demanding nothing in return".¹²⁰

But the honeymoon did not last long. Col. Close had avoided discussion of unpleasant topics in which he had been helped by the non-interference policy of Barlow and Minto at the head of the Company's Government. But all this changed with the appointment of Elphinstone as Resident at the Poona Court in February, 1811. His direct dealing with the visitors to the Residency, his settlement of the *Peshwā's* dispute with the Southern *Jāgīrdars*—the Patwardhans, Rāstes, Desāis of Kittur and Nipani—were highly displeasing to the *Peshwā*. The treaty of Pandharpur, as the settlement was called, obtained for the *jāgīrdars* a pledge of security from the Company's Government. This pledge of security to the *jāgīrdars* made a mockery of the *Peshwā's* authority over his subjects. It was not so much their allegiance that he desired as their destruction. The arbitration effected by the Resident embittered the *Peshwā's* mind. This was the first serious rift between the *Peshwā* and the English.¹²¹

The discussion of the *Peshwā's* claims on the Gaikwār of Baroda led to further deterioration in the Anglo-Marāthā relations. Gangā-dhar Shāstri, the Gaikwār's envoy who came to Poona with British guarantee to discuss the *Peshwā's* financial claims over the Baroda state, was foully murdered at Vithoba's temple at Pandhar-

pur on 20 July, 1815. Elphinstone immediately demanded punishment of the authors of the crime. He asked the *Peshwā* to confine Trimbakji Denglé, his favourite, who, the Resident declared, was condemned by the universal voice of his subjects. After much protracted negotiations the *Peshwā* yielded. But the arrest and imprisonment of his favourite was looked on by the *Peshwā* as his own disgrace. At the same time the Governor-General conveyed to the *Peshwā* a message telling him that his authority no longer extended over his former feudatories, and the Company's Government would not restore the old order of things.¹²² This the *Peshwā* felt as a deliberate insult added to injury, and his thoughts now turned to revenge and retaliation. Bāloji Kunjar, his favourite minister, made a tour of the Marāthā States and Bājī Rāo put a crore of rupees at Bāpū Gokhale's disposal.¹²³ The *Peshwā* increased his revenues and forces, repaired his forts, and made fresh recruits at the annual fair of Mahuli.¹²⁴ He sought the co-operation of the Burmese King,¹²⁵ Ranjit Singh of Lahore, the influential people in Nepal,¹²⁶ Bhosle, the Rājā of Satara and Sindia, against 'the dwellers of the waters'. Bājī Rāo also made friendly gestures to the Patwardhans, the Pānses, the Rāstes and Appā Desāi of Nipani. He also attempted desertion among the sepoys and European soldiers in the British army through his agents.

All these preparations could not escape the vigilance of the British Resident who reported them to the Governor-General. Circumstances compelled Lord Hastings to take up the broken thread of Wellesley's Marāthā policy. He wrote on 23 March, 1816: "Enough, however, had been detected to make it expedient that I should write to the *Peshwā* for the purpose of showing him that we are apprised of what he had been doing".¹²⁷

On 10 May, 1817, Lord Hastings instructed Elphinstone to circumscribe the *Peshwā*'s power and to obviate inconveniences found to exist in the performance of the articles of the treaty of Bassein. The *Peshwā* was compelled by Elphinstone to sign the treaty of Poona¹²⁸ on 13 June, 1817. His moral influence received a deadly blow and his material interests were affected seriously. The *Peshwā* declared Trimbakji Denglé as the murderer of Gangādar Shāstri and promised to deliver him to the English. Until Trimbakji's delivery, his relations were to remain as hostages of the Company's Government. The *Peshwā* recognised the dissolution in form and substance of the Marāthā confederacy and confirmed the treaty with the Southern *jāgīrdars*. His claims on Baroda were commuted to an annual payment of four lakhs of rupees. The *Peshwā* agreed

to let the farm of the revenues of Ahmadabad to Gaikwār for a sum of 4½ lakhs of rupees annually. He ceded in perpetuity to the Company the fort of Ahmadnagar and surrendered his rights, interests and pretensions over Bundelkhand, Mālwa, territories to the north of the Narmadā except those he possessed in Gujarāt, and also the fort of Mailghat, a possession on the Nizām's frontier. The article in the treaty of Bassein regarding his obligation to send a contingent to act with the subsidiary force was annulled. The *Peshwā* ceded in perpetuity to the Company territory yielding 34 lakhs of rupees for the maintenance of a force of 5,000 cavalry and 3,000 infantry with sufficient military stores and ordnance. He promised not to maintain a foreign agent at his court. For the *Peshwā*, the terms of the treaty of Poona 'made the British control more difficult to resist, but more irksome to bear'.¹²⁹ The third Anglo-Marāthā War was indeed the aftermath of a decade of British diplomacy at the Court of the *Peshwā*.

It has been pointed out that the hunt of the Pindāris became merged in the third Anglo-Marāthā War.¹³⁰ The Pindāris, who were a horde of obscure freebooters and cruel marauders and heard of as auxiliaries in the Marāthā army as early as 1689, rose like 'masses of putrefaction in animal matter out of the corruption of weak and expiring States'. They had neither the tie of religion nor that of national feeling. They were all mounted on horse; they avoided pitched battles and their sole object was plunder. Their rendezvous was at Nemawar. Prolific in crime, their accursed prominent leaders like Herā Buran, Cheetu, Karim Khān, Dost Muhammad, Wāsil Muhammad, Shaikh Dullo and Nāmdar Khān turned Mālwa, Rājasthān and Madras Presidency into wilderness. The Pathān condottiere like Shāhmat Khān and Mīr Khān extorted money from merchants by tying cotton to their fingers and then setting it on fire. They extorted treasure from princes and men in power, and moved about with the materials of regular battles and sieges. Lord Hastings' plan was to round up these predatory hordes and all those elements that were abetting them. Malcolm met the *Peshwā*, the Nizām and Appā Sāheb Bhosle for this purpose. There was no sufficient response from the *Peshwā* and Appā Sāheb. Metcalfe formed special treaties with the chiefs of Kota, Bhopal, Bundī, Udaipur, Jodhpur and Jaipur so that none of them could harbour the Pindāris. According to the terms of the treaty of Gwālior, Sindia agreed to extend his co-operation for the suppression of the Pindāris. Lord Hastings moved first to the British camp on the Yamunā opposite Agra and later to Bundelkhand. He gathered together a huge army

of 113,000 men and 300 guns. The army of Hindustān consisting of four divisions were commanded by Lord Hastings and General Ochterlony. The army of the Deccan consisting of five divisions was under Sir Thomas Hislop with Malcolm as his political agent. Lord Hastings opened the campaign on 16 October, 1817. Karim Khān and Wāsil Muhammad were routed on 13 December, 1817, at Shaha-bad near Jhalwar. Karim Khān submitted to Malcolm on 15 February, 1818, and he was given a small estate near Gorakhpur. Wāsil Muhammad surrendered to Sindia and then committed suicide after an unsuccessful attempt to escape. On 3 February, 1818, Nāmdar Khān submitted to Colonel Adams at Devrapur near Bhopal. Mir Khān accepted the Nawābship of Tonk in November, 1817; Cheetu was devoured by a tiger in March, 1818. According to Sardesai, the Pindāri war was only a grand British plan for extinguishing all vestiges of the Marāthā power and establishing British supremacy in India. He says that the Pindāri war and the Marāthā war form complements of one and the same objective.¹³¹ It is true that Bāloji Kunjar met Cheetu at Nemawar and Trimbakji planned to unite the Pindāris against the English.¹³² The *Peshwā* also sent an emissary to Mīr Khān.¹³³ But it has to be noted also that the Pindāri chiefs tried to secure the support of the Marāthā chiefs, but received only a partial response.¹³⁴ The *Peshwā* himself gave useful suggestions to Elphinstone for the suppression of the Pindāris. It is also significant that one of the favourite plans of Yashwant Rāo Holkar was the complete extirpation of the Pindāris whom he never allowed to sit down in his presence. Holkar even reproached Sindia for the encouragement he had given to the Pindāri chiefs.¹³⁵ The Pindāri war gave the *Peshwā* an opportunity 'to wipe out his disgrace and recover his possessions',¹³⁶ and 'to recruit a large army under pretence of helping the British Government in suppressing the Pindāris.'¹³⁷ Prinsep rightly says that during the Pindāri war, the *Peshwā* and Bhosle reckoned with certainty on their ability to overwhelm the small British force stationed at their respective capitals.¹³⁸

It is not clear whether Elphinstone exasperated the *Peshwā* to violate the treaty of Bassein and thus offer a pretext to the English to declare war against him.¹³⁹ It is certain, however, that Elphinstone found it impossible to keep peace with the *Peshwā*¹⁴⁰ who behaved with studied disrespect towards the former.¹⁴¹ Bājī Rāo II misjudged the political situation, played into Elphinstone's hands, and supplied the legal justification for war. The slowly growing resolution of the *Peshwā* ripened to action on 5 November, 1817, when his military adviser Bapū Gokhale set fire to the Residency build-

ings. Bapū Gokhale with 18,000 horse, 8,000 foot and 14 guns launched an unsuccessful attack on the small force led by Captain Burr, who had 3,000 men and 5 guns on the plains extending from the Chatushringi hill to Kirkee near Poona.¹⁴² In the battle of Kirkee, the British losses were 86 killed and wounded as against 500 of the Marāthās. From Sirur General Smith arrived at Kirkee, defeated Bapū Gokhale at the battle of Yeravda on 15 November, 1817, and compelled the *Peshwā* to retreat to Purandhar.

Appā Sāheb, too, rose in arms against the British, but he betrayed 'the greatest weakness and want of judgment'. He took advantage of the small British force, and with the help of three or four thousand Arabs, captured the Sitabaldi hill on 26 November, 1817. Captain Fitzgerald and the Bengal cavalry bravely defended the Residency of Nagpur.¹⁴³ Appā Sāheb, who had 18,000 men and 26 guns, was defeated after fierce fighting at the battle of Sitabaldi (2 miles west of the old city of Nagpur) on 27 November, 1817. He surrendered on 16 December, 1817, and accepted the conditions offered by Resident Jenkins. Lord Hastings directed Jenkins to confine Appā Sāheb in the fort of Allahābād. Raghūjī Bhosle II's grandson Bājibā Gujar (son of his daughter Banu Bāi) was adopted by Parsoji's wife Durgā Bāi, and seated on the throne at Nagpur as Raghūjī III on 16 June, 1818. On way to Allahābād, Appā Sāheb effected a romantic escape from Raichur and took shelter in the Gond country of the Mahadev hills.¹⁴⁴ On 8 April, 1819, General Doveton, with the help of Sir John Malcolm, wrested Asirgarh from its commandant Yashwant Rāo Lād. In vain did Appā Sāheb retire to Una in the Punjab hills to seek the assistance of the Sikhs.¹⁴⁵ Subsequently, he sought shelter with Mān Singh, the Rājā of Jodhpur, and passed away in 1840.

'Little flickers of sympathetic revolt burned in Indore'. Young Malhār Rāo Holkar III, his brave widowed sister Bhimā Bāi, Vithoji Holkar's son Hari Rāo Holkar, and Rāmdin fought with desperate courage at Mahidpur on 21 December, 1817, and suffered a decisive defeat. Their artillerymen stood to their guns till they were bayonnetted. Malhār Rao, seated on an elephant shed tears on seeing his troops routed.¹⁴⁶ Negotiations for peace were opened by Malcolm with Tāntia Jog. By the subsidiary treaty of Mandasor (6 January, 1818),¹⁴⁷ Malhār Rāo Holkar III agreed to accept the British suzerainty, limit his troops to three thousand, maintain a British subsidiary force, submit all his foreign affairs to the arbitration of the Company, renounce all rights to the territories of Mīr Khān and to all of Holkar's territory north to Bundī and South of the Sātpurā

range. Ghafur Khān received a *jāgīr* at Jawra. Rāmdin alone with his impetuous courage and relentless energy proceeded to join the fugitive *Peshwā*.

Bāpū Gokhale and Trimbakji Denglé continued to harass the British forces. Nāro Pant Apte fetched *Chhatrapati* Pratap Singh, his mother and two brothers from the fort of Wasota and joined Bapū Gokhale on 14 December, 1817. On 11 February, 1818, Elphinstone issued a proclamation urging the subjects of the *Peshwā* not to afford any assistance to him.¹⁴⁸ A number of *jāgīrdars* left the *Peshwā's* standard.¹⁴⁹ Elphinstone rescued the Rājā of Satara and treated him with courtesy. On 20 February, 1818, Bāpū Gokhale was overtaken by General Smith at Ashta and killed in a hotly contested battle.¹⁵⁰ Bājī Rāo II was surprised by Colonel Adams near Shevni on 17 April, 1818. He surrendered to Malcolm at Mhow near Indore on 3 June, 1818. The *Peshwā* lost his title 'Srimant'. His military following was disbanded. Trimbakji was condemned to life-long imprisonment in the fort of Chunar. *Chhatrapati* Pratap Singh was set up as a ruler of a small principality "as a sop to Marāthā sentiment". Munro's suggestion that the Company should stand forth as the *Peshwā*, was not accepted by Lord Hastings. The Governor-General at the request of Malcolm reluctantly guaranteed the *Peshwā* a pension of eight lakhs of rupees per annum.¹⁵¹ Bājī Rāo II was allowed to live at Bithur, 12 miles north-west of Kanpur, for more than thirty years in splendid isolation till his death on 14 January, 1851. There is no doubt that "the year 1818 marks a watershed in the history of British India. In that year the British dominion in India became the British dominion of India."¹⁵²

5. Causes of the Fall of the Marāthā Power:

The history of 'Sunset over Maharashtra' with its dramatic climax and grim aftermath has no simple explanation. It is a complex phenomenon and various explanations have been advanced to explain the fall of the Marāthā power. "The rottenness at the core of Indian society",¹⁵³ "the non-progressive social forces of the Marāthās, their stagnant social order, their decadent social institutions",¹⁵⁴ "the lack of rational outlook and scientific knowledge",¹⁵⁵ the lack of artillery as the vital basis of warfare, and well-trained soldiers equipped with up-to-date arms and led by competent officers,¹⁵⁶ the want of requisite knowledge of military strategy and the scientific processes in the use and manufacture of superior arms, "the value attached to trained battalions on the European model and elbowing out of the native infantry and cavalry ele-

ments,"¹⁵⁷ "the insensate dissensions, inordinate folly and criminal self-seeking"¹⁵⁸ have been mentioned as some of the responsible causes for the decline and fall of the Marāthā power. These views no doubt reflect a facet of the truth. But if any one of them is open to criticism, it is their emphasis on a single factor to the exclusion of others. N. C. Kelkar enlarges the discussion and focusses our attention on inordinate passion for separate domain, the absence of national patriotism, well-drilled army, and modern guns.¹⁵⁹ According to Sir Jadunath Sarkar "the victories of Shivājī and Bājī Rāo I created a reaction in favour of Hindu orthodoxy, it ran counter to the homogeneity and simplicity of the poor and politically depressed early Marāthā society. It sapped the foundations of success"¹⁶⁰ thus encouraging forces of separatism.

It is indeed difficult to find out a definitive 'starting date' of the decline and fall of the Marāthā power. Sen maintains that in the very prosperity of the Marāthā empire lay the germs of its disintegration, decline and decay. "While engaged against a powerful external enemy the Marāthās, for the time being, could forget their private differences, but hardly was the crisis over when they prosecuted their quarrels recklessly, oblivious of everything else".¹⁶¹ Tarachand finds unmistakable signs of the 'cracking of Marāthā polity' before 1761.¹⁶² Sharma asserts that the Pānipat disaster, Rāghobā's desertion to the English and the treaty of Bassein were the obverse and reverse of the same coin.¹⁶³ In his opinion, "the greatest blunder" committed by the Marāthās was their northern adventure. 'Marāthā barbarism' in the north created a host of enemies and they failed to organise their conquests. Commenting on the consequences of the third battle of Pānipat, Sarkar says: "But what a change from the Indian world of 1760! The contrast can be most easily realised if we imagine that the Marāthās had triumphed on that 14 January".¹⁶⁴ Sardesai, however, thinks that the Pānipat disaster decided nothing, but it marks a turning point by ushering in a new participant (the English) for Indian supremacy.¹⁶⁵ To Duff, "the plains of Pānipat were not more fatal to the Marāthā empire than the early end of Peshwā Mādhav Rāo on November 18, 1772".¹⁶⁶ Sardesai and Banerjee maintain that had Mādhav Rāo I been alive, Haidar and Tipū would not have been able to reign unmolested, the British power would not have been able to come forward so easily and there would have been no treaty of Bassein. Sardesai asserts that in eastern lands individuals alone can make or mar a nation's fortunes.¹⁶⁷

Individual failings, however, arise from the social background. We should bear in mind that the Marāthā state was gradually converted in consequence of the *saranjāmi* system from an 'organic whole into an inorganic mass', and 'a loose confederacy of ambitious feudal chiefs'.¹⁶⁸ In the last decade of the eighteenth century, like the *Chhatrapati*, the *Peshwā* too became the powerless head of the Marāthā confederacy.¹⁶⁹ The new nobility—the Sindias, the Holkars, the Rāstes, the Phadkes, the Patwardhans, the Bundelas and the Purandares—formerly regarded the *Peshwā* as their master whose bread they ate. But gradually they were influenced by the example of the old nobility—the Gaikwārs, the Dābhādes, the Bhosles—who claimed to hold their possessions by virtue of Shāhū's *sanad* and regarded themselves as equals of the *Peshwā*. Consequently all *sardars* began to think of themselves as independent rulers of their own principalities.¹⁷⁰

The Marāthā polity dissolved through internal stress. The conflicts between Nānā Phadnis and the House of Sindia, between the *Peshwā* and the *Chhatrapatis* of Satara and Kolhapur, between Daulat Rāo Sindia and Yashwant Rāo Holkar, between Malhār Rāo Holkar II and Kāshi Rāo Holkar, between Parsoji, Bākā Bāi and Appā Sāheb, between Tulsā Bāi and Rām Din, between Ānand Rāo Gaikwār and Kānhōji Gaikwār, are some instances of this suicidal schizophrenia.

It is difficult to overstate the evils which originated from the Sindia-Holkar rivalry. Its genesis is to be found in the political psychology of the times. It started as a race for obtaining power in Mālwa and ended with a struggle for ascendancy in the *Peshwā's* *Darbar* at Poona. The Poona *Darbar* followed the imbecile policy of maintaining its hold by encouraging this friction. Nānā Phadnis made Tukoji Holkar his instrument against Mahādji Sindia. It is tragic indeed that even pious Ahalyā Bāi Holkar constantly egged on Tukoji Holkar to assert himself on terms of equality with Mahādji Sindia.¹⁷¹ Surprisingly enough, a point of prestige rather than any substantial material gain was sometimes the cause of this conflict. The Sindia-Holkar rivalry disturbed the peace of the land, bred suspicion, fostered internal dissensions, hampered the establishment of Marāthā hegemony in North India, and finally broke up the Marāthā coalition against the English.

The internal stress in Marāthā State was emphasised by administrative anarchy. "Nothing could exceed the state of anarchy which prevailed throughout the country; at the court, bribery, exe-

cution and murders; in the provinces violence, rapine and bloodshed".¹⁷² It is significant that when *santoshpatti* or contentment tax was imposed as a mark of popular delight on *Peshwā Bājī Rāo II's* accession, the shopkeepers of Poona closed their business and went on strike.¹⁷³ The *Huzur Daftar* or the Imperial Secretariat was sadly neglected. "People were even permitted to carry away the records, or do with them what they pleased".¹⁷⁴ We hear of so many cases of the failure of justice for the lack of settled procedure. Prinsep rightly pointed out that the army of Sindia and Holkar were the whole machinery of their government and were at all times kept in motion for the purpose of enforcing contributions from reluctant tributaries.¹⁷⁵ In *Poona Residency Correspondence Volumes* and Broughton's *Letters Written in Mahratta Camp*, we read the unending intrigues among Sindia's counsellors, the bankruptcy of his government, the disorder in his territories, the chronic mutiny of his troops and the sufferings of the traders and tillers of the soil. Yashwant Rāo Holkar, too, had no settled government. His empire was the empire of the saddle. George Forster wrote to Charles Malet, describing how the administration of Bhosle was fast declining in strength and activity. He referred to Raghūjī Bhosle II's seeming incapacity of governing and common dislike of his person.¹⁷⁶ The domestic policy of the Baroda Government was equally deplorable. Palmer rightly remarked that the Marāthā State was "ill-qualified for permanent conquests or civil government, however formidable might be the means which it possessed of ravage and destruction".¹⁷⁷

The Marāthā chiefs believed that the highest political wisdom consisted in finesse or diplomatic intrigue.¹⁷⁸ But diplomacy in their hands stooped to the low level of playing a waiting game, base treacheries and selfish intrigues. The methods employed by Marāthā diplomats were extremely crude. Against this the diplomacy of the English was remarkable as they were always careful to win over a section of the opponents. Lord Wellesley made two timely proclamations on 29 August and 16 September, 1803, and approached the Rājput chiefs, the Rājā of Bharatpur and Bhaktwar Singh, the Rājā of Macheri, in order to effect the diplomatic isolation of the Marāthā chiefs. Lord Hastings and Elphinstone kept strict watch over the *Peshwā's* communications. Elphinstone had a regular postal system for communication with 'native Courts of India'. There was hardly any chief in the *Peshwā's* services who had not been won over by British money.¹⁷⁹

The military organisation of the Marāthās was ill-organised, ill-equipped and ill-disciplined.¹⁸⁰ In the army of *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo II, the rank of officer was given to men like Qādir Khān who was a butcher.¹⁸¹ Discipline was lax and the emphasis was on pomp and display. Forbes tells us that the tails of grey horses were frequently dyed red and their manes plated with silk ribands and interspersed with silver roses.¹⁸² At Laswari, Ambāji Ingle's richly caparisoned elephant drew everyone's attention. The Marāthā chiefs and soldiers became addicted to the vices of camp-life. In 1800, Daulat Rāo Sindia covered the 140 miles between the Tāpi and the Narmadā in 18 days, whiling away his time in attending to dance and music of dancing-girls, tiger-shooting and kite-flying. Bhosle's troops were imperfectly disciplined. Yashwant Rāo Holkar commenced a complete reformation of his army only after his defeat in 1805. Elphinstone described the Marāthā army as a "loose and straggling mass of camels, elephants, bullocks, nautch-girls, fakeers and buffoons, lancemen and matchlockmen, banyans and mootasuddis".¹⁸³

According to some Marāthā scholars, the Marāthās neglected to develop artillery as their main support of defence. But Ranade rightly says that the Marāthās did not possess the requisite knowledge of scientific processes in the use and manufacture of superior arms.¹⁸⁴ The Marāthās were also not very skilful in plying long-range guns; they lacked good gunners and artillerymen; they were handicapped by the absence of galloper guns; there were no pioneers attached to Marāthā artillery to repair roads. They were also far behind the British sepoy in the accuracy and rapidity of their fire. Daulat Rāo Sindia had a splendid park of artillery at Assaye.¹⁸⁵ At Patparganj, Laswari and Mahidpur, the British army was subjected to tremendous fire from the formidable train of Marāthā artillery,¹⁸⁶ but the European commanders in Marāthā service left on the eve of the war, and their trained battalions, for want of leaders, went down fighting against better-led and better-disciplined armies.

In fact, the Marāthās became obsessed with the belief that artillery was everything in war. They had not been trained for the push of the pike or for the crossing of the bayonets.¹⁸⁷ They forgot that a cavalry with galloper guns could successfully oppose numerous heavy artillery. There was no perfect coordination of action in the Marāthā army between cavalry, infantry and the advance of artillery in close support of moving infantry. With the notable exception of Yashwant Rāo Holkar, who had 60,000 horsemen, the Marāthā chiefs did not maintain the efficiency of cavalry.¹⁸⁸ Sindia's cavalry was weak in number and poor in quality. Ambāji Ingle's cavalry fled

away from the battle-field without plying their swords. The 29th Light Dragoons scattered Gulāb Rāi Kadam's cavalry like chaff. In contrast to all this, the British cavalry at Laswari covered 42 miles in 24 hours, though their horses were not watered or fed for 20 hours. The spearhead of the British attack at Laswari was a single cavalry regiment—the 29th Light Dragoons. Deliverance came to Arthur Wellesley at Assaye from his cavalry. The Marāthā cavalry was useful for light raiding only, and it was never trained to deliver shock attacks.¹⁸⁹ Our attention has also been drawn to the fact that the Marāthā chiefs' lack of knowledge of the geography of the country was suicidal for successful military operations.

A nation's liberty cannot be preserved only by foreign mercenaries. The Marāthā army was not homogeneous in composition—the Marāthā chiefs recruited the Arabs, the Sikhs, the Rājputs, the Sindhis, the Rohillās, the Abyssinians, the Pathāns and the Topiwalas or Europeans in large number to strengthen their army. There were about 5,000 Arabs in the forces of Nānā Phadnis.¹⁹⁰ In the first decade of the nineteenth century there were European officers, the Hindustāni sepoy—mostly Purbias or men of Awadh, the Rājputs and the Pathāns in the Marāthā army. The force which Bāji Rāo II raised in February, 1813, was composed mostly of North Indian men.¹⁹¹ It is remarkable that there was not a single man of the Marāthā race in Sindia's infantry and artillery that fought at Laswari.¹⁹² Preference for foreign mercenaries in the Marāthā army is obvious from the rates of pay of soldiers. An Arab soldier was paid Rs. 18 a month, a Christian and Portuguese soldier Rs. 15, a Hindustāni sepoy Rs. 8 and a Marāthā and Deccani soldier Rs. 6.

The Marāthā chiefs made a serious mistake in entrusting the defence of their country to foreigners.¹⁹³ Lake remarked that if Sindia's army had been sincerely led by French officers, the success of the English would have been extremely doubtful. Pohlmann, who had one full brigade at Assaye, marched away from the battle-field with his forces intact.¹⁹⁴ It was a French deserter who informed Lake about the difficulties and disorders within the fort of Aligarh. Captain Lucan, an Irish deserter from Sindia's army, guided the British storming party at Aligarh. Louis Bourquien fought half-heartedly at Patparganj on 11 September, 1803, and gave himself up as prisoner to the English. The general view was that Perron's conduct assured the English the supremacy of Hindustān. He gave anti-British counsels, but removed the best and the most seasoned battalions of Sindia's corps from the expected points of attack. Napoleon rightly denounced Perron as a traitor to his profession.¹⁹⁵

There were discordant elements and ignominious betrayers among the Marāthās too. Natū, Yashwant Rāo Ramchandra, Yashwant Rāo Ghorpade, and Daulat Rāo Ghorpade supplied valuable information to the British Residents.¹⁹⁶ Ambāji Ingle took to flight from Laswari at the first sign of battle. The Marāthā chiefs failed to secure the willing allegiance of their followers. The Marāthā nation, as a whole, did not participate in the Anglo-Marāthā wars.

Elphinstone observes: "The Marāthās had at their command ample means of waging a successful war—armies, arms, ammunitions. Everything was ready. They only lacked a leader". He says that "it was the good fortune of the British that neither Bājī Rāo II nor Daulat Rāo Sindia possessed the strength and spirit to stand forth boldly at a critical moment. If there was any other more intrepid man occupying the *Peshwā's* position at that time, it was not difficult to conceive how the British would have fared".¹⁹⁷ The *Peshwā* was notorious for his hasty retreats from battle-fields or watching them from the top of hills. Sindia's actions were marked by delay, indecision and theatrical demonstrations. As his dominions lay in the centre of the country, he had the advantage of operating on short inner lines, but this favour of geography was nullified by his imbecility and slackness. Yashwant Rāo Holkar was the last typical Marāthā soldier to make a name in history.

On the British side, the military preparations, the tactical moves and the most extraordinary exertions and gallantry were worthy of a race that deserves to win an empire. Lake gave constant exercise to his regiments according to a uniform system and personally headed every charge of his infantry. At Laswari, Lake rode in the front rank. He had two horses shot under him, and turning to look at his dying son, he led the infantry to the charge on the right of the 76th British Foot. Arthur Wellesley's war preparations were perfect. He made Ahmadnagar his fortified depot for food and munitions, organised the famous Mysore bullock teams and designed coracles and pontoons of copper-sheet barrels. Arthur always forced the Marāthās to move in order to throw them into disorder. In the second Anglo-Marāthā war, British officers like T. V. Vandeleur, Maxwell and Macan displayed amazing combativeness. Success was achieved by the most extraordinary exertions and determined fighting of the 19th Light Dragoons, the Madras Cavalry, the 8th Light Dragoons, the 29th Light Dragoons and the 76th British Infantry. In the third Anglo-Marāthā War, the campaigns of Lord Hastings and General Smith are notable instances of inspired leadership, resolution and movements.

Some historians are of the opinion that the Marāthās made a mistake by the untimely abandonment of their old guerilla tactics. Bājī Rāo II, Yashwant Rāo Holkar and Sarzā Rāo Ghātge advised Daulat Rāo Sindia to adopt guerilla tactics. Holkar exasperated Lake so much with his guerilla tactics that the latter wrote to Lord Wellesley, "I never was so plagued as I am with the devil".¹⁹⁸

For such tactics, only Holkar's myriads of light forayers and indigenous cavalry were well suited. But even Holkar and the Pindāri hordes were ultimately firmly dealt with by the Company's war machine.

From the economic point of view, the Marāthā State had no stable basis. Agriculture was dependent upon precarious rainfall. Commerce was subjected to harassment. There was little industry. The evils of the feudal system were too deeply entrenched. The cultivator's marginal existence was jeopardized by farming and *saranjāmi* system, numerous civil wars and the exactions of the *kamavisadars* and the *mandlois*. Accounts were not properly maintained. Nānā Phadnis' hoarded treasure ran into several crores. It is true that there are numerous evidences to show the *Peshwā's* concern for his ryots. But their agrarian legislation was inadequate. The Marāthā chiefs even authorised the plunder of their own territories for the subsistence of the troops. Their elastic sources of revenue were *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi*. The desultory warfare in the Marāthā State in the last years is a gruesome tale of murder, pillage and desolation throughout Mālwa, Khāndesh and Desh districts of Mahārāshtra. The Marāthā chiefs were greatly embarrassed for want of money. Their camps were never free from creditors. Sometimes, they had to raise money by mortgaging the future revenues of their territories. Their unpaid soldiers used to stage *dharnas* (coercive demonstrations) against their employers.¹⁹⁹ Daulat Rāo Sindia had to face severe financial crises, submit to *dharnas* on many occasions and rely on rich money-lenders and bankers like Gokul Parekh. His unpaid soldiers staged a *dharna* before the battle of Assaye.²⁰⁰ The keepers of Asirgarh surrendered the fort on receiving cash from Arthur Wellesley to clear up the arrears of the garrison amounting to seven lakhs. But Daulat Rāo Sindia possessed a privy purse of 50 lakhs of rupees which no distress was sufficient to dislodge. Other Marāthā chiefs were not so fortunate in having a surplus or reserve fund to fall back upon.

Much has been written on the ample financial resources of the Company. It is true that in the period following 1793, the major

portion of India's European trade passed into the hands of Great Britain. But it is true as well that at the end of the second Anglo-Marāthā War, Lake's army was five months in arrears.²⁰¹ To meet the dire want, a sum of 25 lakhs was taken out of the cash meant for China. Under the pressure of Lord Wellesley's forward policy, the Company's debt increased from 17 millions in 1797 to 31 millions in 1806.²⁰²

Various forms of moral cankers were also eating into the vitals of Marāthā society—the popularity of erotic compositions of Anant Phandi and Rām Jōshi, the wide-spread belief in witchcraft, the great demand of the services of astrologers, marriages of infant girls. Concrete instances are on record of excessive indulgences in sensual pleasures, drunkenness and frivolous enjoyments of the most degraded type on the part of top-ranking Marāthā leaders like *Peshwā Bājī Rāo II*,²⁰³ Nānā Phadnis, Daulat Rāo Sindia and Yashwant Rāo Holkar.

The Marāthas lacked the corporate spirit so essential for their national independence. To every one in that age his own fief (*watan*) was the only reality. Feudal system fostered individual selfish tendencies. The Marāthā chiefs also failed to protect their subjects from excesses of their own armies. Peasants tended to turn towards anyone who could give them protection. The Marāthā government was not influenced by the people and so the people did not take any interest in its permanence.²⁰⁴ The cohesion of the Marāthā people was not organic but artificial, accidental and therefore, precarious. The Marāthā chiefs could not sink their differences and unite, even in times of common danger, for the service of the State and nation. Nationalism of the 19th century was unknown to them.

Casteism also added to want of social cohesion. Caste jealousy did play a part in the conflict between the Angrias and the *Peshwās*. As between caste and caste, the later *Peshwās* did not always maintain the balance evenly.²⁰⁵ The partiality towards Brahmins imposed a heavy burden upon the finances of the Government. As Ranade remarks, "the infusion of the racial and caste elements among the military leaders of the nation was the most distinguishing mark of the latter half of the century. Ramdas's high ideal was lowered and the usual consequences followed, such as decadence of virtues."^{205a} In the regime of *Peshwā Mādhav Rāo I*, we find Brahmins claiming commutation for money payment as a customary favour shown to them. *Peshwā Nārāyan Rāo* took up the orthodox party's cause. Under the order of the *Peshwās*, the Paithan Brah-

mins who refused to accept the verdict of the *Śastras* were ex-communicated. The British Resident at Poona thought that all members of the Brahmin caste were more or less benefited by the *Peshwā* regime which was "after all a Brahmin raj".²⁰⁶

It has been said that the religious policy of the *Peshwā* was "reactionary to the extreme".²⁰⁷ It should be called static rather than reactionary. We do not come across any punitive legislation against non-Hindus except in respect of cow-slaughter. The Muslims were not debarred from holding offices under the *Peshwā's* government. They were allowed free exercise of their religion without payment of any special tax. There were no discriminating tariffs. The *Peshwās* officially recognised the festival of *Id-ul-Fitr*. They paid homage to the *dargas* of Sayyid Sa'adat and Shaikh Salla at Poona. *Khairat Kharch* or charity to Muslim institutions was a special item in their budget. The other Marāthā chiefs were also liberal in their outlook. *Muharram* was the most popular festival at Sindia's capital. Daulat Rāo Sindia always joined the Muharram procession. Yashwant Rāo Holkar fed *faqirs* at Ujjain and visited the tomb of Qutb-ud-din Bakhtyar Kaki in Delhi. The Gaikwārs confirmed to the pious Muslim grantees all their lands, emoluments and privileges which they used to enjoy under the previous government. It was customary for the ruler of Baroda to be present at the time of the *Id* prayer. It would thus appear that the religious policy of the *Peshwās* and other Marāthā chiefs was tolerant of all religions.

Jadunath Sarkar²⁰⁸ and Sen²⁰⁹ hold the view that creative élan was arrested in the Marāthā State as there were no well-thought out schemes of education and that the policies of the Marāthā chiefs proceeded from their intellectual limitations. It is true that the *Peshwās* were never profoundly stirred by winds of change or zest for new education.

Kelkar and Sardesai recognise "the play of the contingent and the unforeseen" in the fall of the Marāthā power. They think that nemesis overtook the destiny of the Marāthā nation with the death of Rām Shāstri in 1789, Harī Pant Phadke in 1794, Ahalyā Bāi Hōlkar in 1795, Tukojī Holkar in 1797, Parashūram Bhaū in 1799 and Nānā Phadnis on 13 March, 1800.²¹⁰

The tragedy of the Marāthā power was the inevitable result of nascent, formidable and aggressive British imperialism bursting upon a sleepy, inert and medieval society. The Marāthā chiefs lived in the lengthening shadows of the medieval feudalism without

any idea of the sweeping changes that were then taking place in the western world.

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CHAPTER XVI

CONSOLIDATION OF BRITISH RULE IN INDIA

(1799–1823)

Subsidiary Alliance System:

Lord Wellesley (Mornington) by his annexations and absorptions, established Great Britain as the ascendant power in India. The outright annexations, made after the war with Tipū, have already been referred to. Lord Wellesley resorted to arbitrary methods by which territorial acquisitions were made. In the case of three States—Tanjore, Surat and Farrukhabad he took over the administration leaving to the ruler his title and a fixed income. But the most important development in British relations with 'country powers'—Mysore, Hyderabad and Awadh, reveal very fully the nature of the subsidiary alliance system. The Treaty of Bassein, concluded by Wellesley with the *Peshwā* precipitated the second Anglo-Marāthā War, and the subsequent subsidiary treaties with other Marāthā Chiefs are best studied in connection with the Anglo-Marāthā conflict.

The subsidiary alliance system did not originate with Lord Wellesley. As Malcolm says "alliances of the same character as those formed by Lord Wellesley had been entered into by almost all his predecessors from Lord Clive downwards". British alliance with Shujā-ud-daulah and his successor Asaf-ud-daulah of Awadh had some of the features of a subsidiary alliance system though in a rudimentary form. The treaty concluded with the Nizām in 1768 also contained a clause assuring him that some British contingents would be sent to his help when called upon to do so. Wellesley's subsidiary alliance system, in its mature form, had the following features:—

- (a) A subsidiary force was permanently stationed within the frontier of the allied State.
- (b) A part of the territory was surrendered for the maintenance of the force.
- (c) The subsidiary State was not to negotiate with any other power without previous consultation with the Company's Government.
- (d) It was not to take any European into its service except with British consent.
- (e) A British Resident was stationed in the subsidiary State.

In this connection it should be noted that there were some variations in the terms of the Treaties with different States. Article 15 of the subsidiary treaty with Hyderabad dated 12 October, 1800, declared: "The Hon'ble Company's Government hereby declare that they have no manner of concern with any of His Highness's children, relations, subjects or servants, with respect to whom His Highness is absolute." But the sixth article of the treaty with Awadh "reserved the positive right of interference in the internal management of that part of the country retained by the Nawāb Vazīr". The subsidiary treaty with Mysore of 13 July, 1799, belonged to a special category. It provided for a suitable subsidiary force for which the Maharaja would discharge the increased expense. "In case the Governor-General in Council apprehended failure in the supply of funds he shall be at liberty to introduce such regulations and ordinances as he shall deem expedient for the internal management and collections".

Mill's comments on this subsidiary alliance system in its mature form deserve to be quoted in full. "The oppressions of the native governments were limited by their weakness. When they received the use of English strength their oppressions were limited by nothing. Among small sovereignties of India misgovernment produced weakness and weakness invited conquest. The misgovernment, for example, of the Karnātak and Awadh would infallibly have produced the conquest of the one by Tipū, of the other by the Marāthās."

The system thus supported weak and vicious rulers. Though all interference in internal government was disclaimed, in some cases interference became generally inevitable. Wellesley's charge against Awadh was chronic misrule. His own brand of subsidiary alliance by sapping the spontaneous energy of the protected state could not certainly improve the character of its government. As no national or patriotic vigour was now necessary, decay became very rapid. Wellesley could, however, justify his subsidiary alliance system in its imperial aspect. It enabled the British to maintain an efficient subsidiary army whose expenses were paid by Indian rulers. Wellington wrote: "The consequences have been that in this war with the Marāthās, which it is obvious must have occurred sooner or later, the Company's territories have not been invaded, and the evils of war have been kept at a distance from the sources of our wealth and power". This policy in its imperial aspect formed the line of least resistance and the military line remained in advance of the political frontier.

The expansionism of Wellesley is best studied in detail in his relations with the Nizām, the ruler of Awadh and the chiefs of Tanjore, Karnātak and Surat. Philip Francis said in parliament in March, 1804, "the fable says the fierce, rebellious lamb would never suffer the mild, gentle, moderate wolf to be quiet". (Hansard: *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. I, pp. 866-67).

The Nizām:

The subsidiary treaty of 1 September, 1798 was of a temporary nature, contracted "for the gentle conquest of an army of 14,000 men under the command of French officers in the service of the Nizām". After the fall of Tipū, Wellesley made his next move. The Nizām was now promised protection against all enemies in a revised subsidiary treaty, clause 2 of which provided that the British Government "would not permit any power or state whatever to commit with impunity any act of unprovoked hostility or aggression against the rights or territories of His Highness". To ensure this protection against the Marāthās the subsidiary force was increased to eight thousand infantry, one thousand cavalry and the usual proportions of artillery. The Nizām assigned in perpetuity all that he had acquired from Mysore in 1792 and 1799. The Treaty of 12 October, 1800, also guaranteed him protection against subjects or dependants who withheld payment of tribute or excited rebellion or disturbance. As payment was made in perpetuity, the Nizām could not fall into arrears. Moreover, the territory he ceded was not traditionally a part of his dominions. Bitterness was not, therefore, generated by this treaty. But the Nizām had to disband large numbers of his own troops and they were responsible for local disorder for a long time. Wellington described the state of the Nizām's country as late as January 1804 as 'chaos itself.'

Awadh:

In January 1799, the Governor-General demanded of Sa'adat 'Alī of Awadh that he should disband his large, useless, expensive but dangerous army, to be replaced by new British contingents in addition to the existing troops of the Company. The Nawāb was unwilling to agree to what Mill calls 'total annihilation of his military establishment'. He was paying the instalments of his subsidy punctually, but it was argued that at one stage while the danger from Zamān Shāh was great, he had demanded the services of a part of British troops in his capital for the protection of his person and authority from his disorderly troops. The British demand amounted actually to "peace-establishment in Oudh to the perpetual extent of war-establishment for defence against the Afghāns". This claim

was based on the 7th article of Sir John Shore's treaty, but the Governor-General very conveniently wanted the 'occasional augmentation' to become a 'permanent establishment'. Mill rightly says "such is the logic of the strong man towards the weak". (*Mill's History of India*, Vol. VI, pp. 142-43).

At one stage of the negotiations the *Nawāb-Vazīr*, in disgust, had perhaps expressed a desire to abdicate. The Governor-General wanted him to abdicate by a secret treaty in favour of the East India Company. "The vivacity of the Governor-General in the pursuit of his object was too great". The *Nawāb-Vazīr* naturally withdrew his offer of abdication.

Wellesley now literally compelled the *Nawāb-Vazīr* to agree to disband his own army and maintain an augmented British military establishment. The Nawāb began to pay his increased subsidies in regular *Kists* and when a demand for territorial cession was made, he protested. But the imperious Governor-General was not to be denied. The Nawāb held out for more than seven months. He wanted an exclusive authority in that portion of his dominion that would be left to him. The Governor-General sent his brother Henry Wellesley to negotiate. He wanted an appearance of consent. The unfortunate Nawāb had to yield, "a passive, helpless and reluctant obedience". In November 1801 a new subsidiary treaty was signed by which he ceded what are now known as Gorakhpur and Rohilkhand divisions, besides the lower portion of the Gangā-Jamunā Doāb. In the remaining portion of his dominion the *Nawāb-Vazīr* was "to act in conformity to the counsel of the officers of the Company". It is relevant to note that the plea of misgovernment which was used against him at one stage of the negotiations does not appear to be a very convincing argument. It was used to reinforce others. The Nawāb was not able to ensure better government in his reduced dominions and he later actually told the Governor-General that he did not possess sufficient authority in his dominions, and that he was galled by the interference of the Resident. But the Governor-General declined to exempt him from a restraint which, in his own words, only ensured "that degree of interference and control which is indispensably necessary for the support of British influence in Oudh". (Martin, *Wellesley Despatches*, Vol. II, pp. 679-80). Wellesley was always thinking imperially and his manner, as Sir Alfred Lyall points out "showed very little patience, forbearance or generosity".

The advantage derived by the British Indian Government from Wellesley's arrangements in Awadh could not be denied. The

Nawāb's military power was now totally extinct. The British maintained a very considerable portion of the Bengal army at the Nawāb's expense and as the territory was permanently ceded, regular payment was also assured. Awadh was now entirely surrounded by British territory except in the direction of Nepal. It was no longer a buffer state and Sindia's possessions in the north and those of the British in this region now lay contiguous to each other. As Wellington put it "the frontier was not increased. The Company were equally bound to defend and had actually defended the same frontier in 1798 and 1799... so that all will gain strength without the smallest degree of disadvantage or weakness".

For the settlement of the ceded provinces, Wellesley appointed a board of commissioners. His brother Henry Wellesley, famous later in England as the diplomat Lord Cowley, was appointed as the Lieutenant Governor. A preliminary settlement was made and in 1803 the Bengal Code of regulations was introduced. It should also be noted that the Nawāb of Farrukhabad, whose territory extended for about 150 miles along the western bank of the Gangā, was persuaded in June 1802 to cede his country in perpetuity to the English in return for a pension. The Nawāb was under the suzerainty of Awadh but was by treaty under special British protection. It should, however, be noted that "the ground upon which the necessity of taking the country was founded, the bad character of the Nawāb, was discovered and that before the conclusion of the business to be false".

Karnātak (Arcot):

Wellesley was perhaps justified in his decision to end the administration of the Nawāb of the Karnātak. The subsidy paid by the Nawāb for the maintenance of the British army bore so large a proportion to his revenues that he was forced to incur debt. The Company's servants becoming creditors, there existed a divergence between their interests and those of the Company. The poor inhabitants suffered miserably. Wellesley decided to end this very undesirable state of things. He might have adopted a straightforward course and "a technical and legal screen need never have been erected". He declared, however, that a mass of papers had been found which proved that a secret correspondence existed between Muhammad 'Alī, his son Umdat-ul-Umarā and Tipū Sultān. A sort of *ex parte* judicial investigation was made. The so-called inimical correspondence was really 'a mass of rubbish'. It contained only expressions of friendly sentiment in the usual flamboyant Persian style. Even then these were merely *Vakil's* reports—second-hand evidence at best. On the basis of this, to declare that Umdat-ul-Umarā was a

public enemy was preposterous. In his usual grandiloquent style Wellesley declared that the Karnātak Nawāb had forfeited his throne. Unfortunately for the Governor-General Umdat-ul-Umarā died on 15 July, 1801, when the decision was to be communicated to him that he was to be pensioned off. Of his boy successor a demand was made in indecent haste to agree to surrender his administration and retain the title and a liberal pension. On his declaring his inability to agree to this arrangement, the offer was made to a nephew of the deceased Nawāb, Azim-ud-daulah. He accepted because he had everything to gain and the whole civil and military administration was taken over by the British. (P. E. Roberts' *India Under Wellesley*, pp. 101-107).

Surat and Tanjore:

Another such unceremonious act of dethronement was that of the Nawāb of Surat. In this case, however, Wellesley made a new claim that the Company succeeded to the power of the Mughul empire. Sarphoji of Tanjore also sank into a pensioner, the terms of the Governor-General being dictated to him.

Awadh, Arcot, Tanjore, Surat and Farrukhabad were too weak to oppose what was demanded of them, but the Marāthā opposition to the establishment of British ascendancy, inevitable after the signing of the Treaty of Bassein on 31 December, 1802, continued even in July 1805 when Lord Cornwallis came to India as the successor of Lord Wellesley. He summed up the position thus—"We are still at war with Holkar and we can hardly be at peace with Sindia". In the despatch which the Court of Directors sent to the Board of Control for their approval, known as Draft No. 128, they censured Lord Wellesley and thus summed up the political situation in India: "The territories which we have lately acquired under treaties and by conquest are of so vast and extensive a nature and the engagements lately concluded with the several chiefs and rajahs so complicated that we cannot take a view of our situation and of the political relation in which we now stand towards the various Indian powers without being seriously impressed with the wisdom and necessity of that solemn declaration of the legislature, 'that to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour and the policy of the nation'." (*Home Mis. Series*, 486, pp. 153-54).

Cornwallis died on October 5, 1805. His successor, Sir George Barlow, in his relations with 'country powers' tried to act according to the declared principle of the foreign policy of the Court of Directors. The Jamunā became the British frontier in the West. Favour-

able terms were granted to Sindia and Holkar. But the treaties of Bassein, Hyderabad and Lucknow remained, and all territorial arrangements made by Wellesley prior to the second Anglo-Marāthā War were left undisturbed.

Three extracts from Sir George Barlow's minutes explain very fully why in some cases he deviated from a system of non-interference and adhered to Wellesley's subsidiary system. Barlow thus wrote about the subsidiary treaty with the Nizām: "The object of this alliance was to combine in perpetuity the interests of the two States, to concentrate their strength for their mutual safety and for the maintenance of peace and participation of the hazard and advantages of unavoidable war; that its stipulations were not conditional but absolute; that it became interwoven in the system of respective governments and complicated with the relations which both governments separately and conjointly bore to other states and that new relations and new obligations of public faith and honour had been engrafted upon it and had grown up with it." He even justified interference in the internal affairs of the Nizām. He wrote, "the adoption of that system necessarily presupposed a just conception on the part of His Highness of the true principles and solid advantages of the alliance and a sincere disposition to maintain it. It presupposed a degree of firmness, discernment and dignity on his part which would lead him to reject the councils of profligate and interested advisers who would endeavour to persuade him that the obligations of dependence and degradation are synonymous". Barlow would not also make any change in the Treaty of Bassein in deference to the wishes of his employers. He wrote, "in the dissolution of the alliance with the State of Poona the question of our public faith is involved not only with the *Peshwā* but with His Highness the Soubahdar of the Deckan, the Treaty of Bassein containing stipulations in favour of His Highness of which the foundations were laid in the Treaty of Hyderabad, concluded in October, 1800".

Sir George Barlow has been described by some as "the meanest of the Governör-Generals". He dissolved the ties es'ablised recently with the chiefs of Rājputānā and the cis-Sutlej Sikh chiefs by Lord Lake. But his policy was not one of total reversal as was proved by his refusal to modify existing relations in the south. According to Barlow's arrangements west of the Jamunā, Macheri and Bharatpur were the only States that continued to have a defensive alliance with the Company. But it was impossible to make the Jamunā a barrier. As Lake had written, "it was fordable in several places above Āgra even before the 1st October and it was not a boundary

of any strength at any place above the junction of the river with the Chambal for more than a few weeks of the rainy season." The Court of Directors themselves felt that Barlow's abandonment of Jaipur to Marāthā attacks was not perhaps proper. In their letter dated 30 October, 1805, they even wrote, "to recede is often more hazardous than to advance".

Lord Minto's Administration:

Lord Minto came to India in July 1807. The period of his administration extends upto October 1813. Sir John Malcolm wrote, (Malcolm, Sir John, *Political History of India*, p. 244): "The Government of Lord Minto had no result more important than the impression it conveyed to the authorities at home of the utter impracticability of perseverance in that neutral policy they had desired to pursue. It was a progressive return to a course of action more suited to the extent, the character and the condition of the British power".

Lord Minto sent Metcalfe as an ambassador to Ranjit Singh. The Treaty of Tilsit, concluded between Napoleon and the Czar Alexander in July 1807, had made the British foreign office nervous. In view of the possibility of a Franco-Russian advance in the direction of India the British Indian Government sought to win over the rulers of Lahore, Kābul and Teherān. Malcolm was sent to Persia, Elphinstone to Kābul, Metcalfe to Lahore. But in the meantime taking advantage of the British policy of non-intervention west of the Jamunā, Ranjit Singh, master of Lahore and Amritsar had attempted in two expeditions in 1806 and 1807 to bring the Sikh chiefs between the Sutlej and the Jamunā under his control. These cis-Sutlej Sikh chiefs, in their alarm had approached the British Resident at Delhi but had received no encouragement. This was the state of things when Metcalfe came to the Punjāb on his mission. Ranjit Singh must have argued in his mind, "if the British really thought his friendship essential he might as well get a price for it." Before the negotiations had advanced, Ranjit Singh embarked on his third cis-Sutlej expedition which has been compared by a contemporary chronicler to an earthquake. All the cis-Sutlej chiefs practically acknowledged his overlordship and paid a *nazarana*. As he came back from the expedition Metcalfe under instructions from the Governor-General demanded that he must surrender all the places he had conquered in his third expedition and that the cis-Sutlej Sikh chiefs "are and will remain under the protection of the British Government". The political situation in Europe had improved for England

on account of the Spanish insurrection, the victories of Sir Arthur Wellesley at Talavera and Bussaco and the signing of the Treaty of Dardanelles between England and Turkey. Lord Minto was no longer anxious to have an anti-Gallican alliance. He rather wanted to check the rising Sikh power, "to oppose the extension on the Indian side of the Sutlej of the ambitious military power which would be substituted upon our frontier for a confederacy of friendly chiefs rendered grateful by our protection and interested in our cause". Ranjit Singh was not prepared for a sudden change in the political situation. At one stage he even meditated war. British troops under Sir David Ochterlony were sent to Ludhiana to back British demands. At last Ranjit Singh yielded. His consciousness of his inability to meet the British power at this moment, his fear that the Sikh chiefs on the other side of the Sutlej would take advantage of the impasse, compelled Ranjit Singh to yield. A treaty was concluded. Ranjit Singh retained the territory he had possessed on the left bank of the Sutlej before the coming of Metcalfe, but he was not to maintain in that territory more troops than were necessary for internal duties. Now the car of Juggernaut rolled over the small cis-Sutlej states. The Sutlej, instead of the Jamunā, became the British frontier.

Lord Minto also took vigorous measures against the refractory chiefs of Bundelkhand, reduced the celebrated forts of Ajaygarh and Kalinjar and established tranquillity in Bundelkhand. Amīr Khān, the Pindāri chief, menaced Berār. The Rājā of Berār did not solicit British aid, but Minto assembled a considerable force on the eastern border of Berār as also on the south-western frontier of Bundelkhand. Colonel Close occupied Sironj, the capital of Amīr Khān. Amīr Khān, however, escaped. Minto could have, with the force at his disposal, conquered Mālwa, but he desisted from an active policy of conquest. Negotiations for a subsidiary treaty with the Rājā of Berār were carried on for some time, but then the Governor-General turned his attention to the conquest of Jāva and the negotiations were not brought to any conclusion. Lord Minto would have perhaps returned to the subsidiary system of alliances if his preoccupations elsewhere had not prevented him. He wrote to the Resident at Poona on 11 Nov. 1811: "It is not the intention of these remarks to question the policy of those subsidiary alliances or the great and beneficial influence on the condition of the British Empire in India in times past, present and to come. They have added most materially to our power and resources and they have placed for ever at a distance dangers far greater than any to be apprehended from

the evils above described. But these arrangements bear within themselves the resources of their own decay and require the application of corrective measures to obviate their natural and progressive tendency to dissolution."

Lord Hastings and the Nepal War:

Lord Hastings, the successor of Lord Minto, was the Governor-General of India from October 1813 to January, 1823. He is famous in Indian history for the suppression of the Pindāris and the final overthrow of the Marāthā power. But his administration's first achievement was the defeat of the Gurkhas. He was well-known for his military services in the American war of independence and later in Flanders. Apprehending trouble the authorities in England appointed him Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of India.

A collision between the British and the Gurkhas was inevitable. "On the edge of this cockpit of north-western Hindustān three nations, the British, the Sikhs and the Gurkhas were seeking an empire. They followed inward among the Himalayan foothills, as well as over the plains, feeling their way as the tide feels it with wide-sweeping fingers. Their vanguards were bound to be in contact soon". With Ranjit Singh Lord Minto had established friendly relations that endured until 1845. But the Gurkha power, extending from Sikkim to the borders of Kashmir, was checked by Ranjit Singh in its westward expansion. He succeeded in ousting the Gurkhas from the Kangra valley. The Gurkhas had already failed in their clash with China in 1792; now after their defeat by the Sikhs in 1809, they turned south to find an outlet for their warlike energy. This state of things brought about the Anglo-Nepalese war. Border disputes were inevitable under such circumstances along the frontier which extended for 700 miles. These disputes came to a head in Gorakhpur and Saran. There was a clash in which a British police force was overwhelmed. British representation to the Nepal Darbar having failed, war began in November, 1814.

Lord Hastings' plan was to attack simultaneously at different points. Four separate divisions advanced. The first under Ochterlony attacked the Gurkha possessions towards the extreme west. The second under Gillespie was to besiege Jaitak, the principal Gurkha station in Garhwal. The third under Wood was to march from Gorakhpur to Palpa. The fourth under Marley was to march through Makwanpur to Khatmandu. The whole British force amounted to 34,000 men with 60 guns. The Gurkha troops did not number more than 12,000 regulars. They had also some very insufficiently

armed troops of local militia. The Gurkhas trusted in their bravery, their very difficult terrain and the inexperience of the British in hill warfare. Gillespie's division made an attack on the small fort of Kalanga. The Gurkha commander, Balbhadra Singh, was a very intrepid soldier. Gillespie attempted an impatient assault, was killed and the British army had to fall back. Another determined assault failing, bombardment was resorted to. The Gurkha commandant abandoned the place with the remnants of his garrison, escaping without much difficulty. Mill says that the moral effect of this brilliant defence of an insignificant entrenchment on the minds of both parties was the principal cause of the protracted continuance of the war. From Kalanga the British force advanced towards Nahan, took it and then moved to Jaitak, but in attempting to assault it they were again defeated. The detachment of Wood was checked before a stockade. Marley accomplished nothing and two of his outposts were overpowered. Ochterlony, in the extreme west, however, succeeded in getting better of Amar Singh Thapa, the most celebrated of the Gurkha commanders. He succeeded in capturing two of the most important Gurkha forts—Nalagarh and Ramgarh. He also succeeded in securing the submission of the chief of Bilaspur, a very steady adherent of Amar Singh Thapa.

At the beginning of 1815 Lord Hastings decided to attack the Nepalese province of Kumaon bordering upon Rohilkhand with a view to isolate Amar Singh. Local levies were raised among the hill people by Major Hearsey. Gardner succeeded in pushing the Gurkhas up to Almora. But Hearsey advancing up the Kali river was defeated by the Gurkhas and taken prisoner. However, British troops coming up, the Gurkhas who were forced back, had to surrender the whole district of Kumaon with all the forts and withdraw to the west of the Kali river. Ochterlony's communications were now clear and he advanced another step. He compelled the Gurkha leader Amar Singh Thapa to surrender the strong fort of Malaun (May, 1815). The Gurkhas returned to the east of the Kali river. Jaitak also capitulated. They opened negotiations. The British terms were—cession of the country from the Sutlej to the Kali river and of the whole *Tarai* extending from the upper Gangā to the Tista; independence of the Sikkim Rājā, who had allied himself with the British; establishment of a British Residency at Khatmandu. But the war party being ascendant at the Gurkha capital, the treaty, though signed, was not ratified there.

A second campaign now began in February 1816. Ochterlony had about 20,000 men, divided into four brigades. One advanced

upon Hariharpur, another up the Gandak to Ramnagar and the main body under Ochterlony marched straight up to Khatmandu. Ochterlony had an uninterrupted career of success. He came up with his enemy at Makwanpur, about 20 miles from Khatmandu and succeeded in defeating them. The rapid success of Ochterlony's operations and the consciousness that the capital now lay open to assault, induced the Nepalese Darbar to ratify the treaty. The treaty of Sagauli signed in March 1816 made some modification in the terms concerning the cession of the *Tarai* "a considerable tract between the Michi and Gandak rivers, exclusive of a small space on the Saran frontier but comprehending Bhotwal, was restored to the Nepalese". A portion of the *Tarai* was given to the Rājā of Sikkim. The Rājā of Sikkim also signed a protective treaty in February 1817. (*History of British India* by H. H. Wilson, Vol. II, pp. 52-53).

It is significant to note that this cession of Garhwal and Kumaon to the west of the Kali river drove a wedge of British territory between Sikh dominion on the one side and Gurkha dominion on the other. Ranjit Singh commented in a private conference in May, 1815: "Though apparently sincere friendship is supposed to exist between myself and the English Sahibs, yet in reality our relations are merely formal and conventional. Therefore, I had thought often to myself that if ever the English Sahibs would act differently in their dealing with me, I would call upon the Gurkhas and make friends with them, and in case they showed any hesitation I intended to make over the fort of Kangra to them to win their comradeship. Now they have gone away from the mountains... I never expected such a thing to happen as would make the mountain regions become empty of them so suddenly". (*Events at the Court of Ranjit Singh*, p. 192).

Suppression of the Pindāris:

After the successful termination of the Anglo-Nepalese war, Lord Hastings reduced Hathras, whose chief, a British tributary, had become contumacious. The next important achievement of Lord Hastings was the suppression of the Pindāris, "who had arisen like masses of putrefaction in animal matter out of the corruption of weak and expiring states". Extension of the subsidiary system and disbandment of the Indian troops of the 'country powers' had considerably increased these lawless elements. As Sir Thomas Munro said, "they had become so amalgamated with the whole of the loose part of the military population of India that it had become a system, not a particular force that was to be subdued". They have been com-

pared to swarms of locusts. The anarchy produced by the Pindāris could be compared to the state of affairs around the shores of the Levant in Pompey's days. The number of these freebooters in Mālwa was estimated by Captain Sydenham at 30,000 horse. Tod's estimate was 41,000. The numbers certainly varied, for their ranks were recruited whenever there was any prospect of plunder from the troops of Sindia, Holkar and Amīr Khān. There were a certain number of leaders, possessing territories and forts and a body of attached adherents. In the time of Lord Hastings the three chief leaders were Cheetū, Wāsil Muhammad and Karim Khān. The connection between Amīr Khān and the Pindāris was very intimate some years before, and even in the days of Lord Hastings they looked up to him and were associated with his followers by similar habits of life. The army of Amīr Khān lived by plunder in a defined sphere. The Pindāris lodged their families and wealth in their haunts "situated upon or near the great range of the Vindhya mountains between which and the right bank of the Nerbudda there intervenes a strip of fertile country interspersed with ridges of low hills and forests". Mālwa, Mārwar, Mewār and other states of Rājputānā were devastated by them. Some of them began to plunder Berār and entered the dominions of the Nizām and the Peshwā. In their quest for new lands to plunder they began to raid the territory of the Company—Mirzapur and South Bihar in 1812 and Northern Sarkars in 1816. The Directors in England at last ordered that necessary steps should be taken to root out this evil. Lord Moira knew that this could not be done by a purely defensive system.

As soon as it was generally known that the British Government was willing to abandon the system of non-interference, the Rājput States, harried and plundered by the Pindāri bands, became anxious to enter into treaties of alliance. Udaipur, Jodhpur, Kota and Bundī and thirteen other Rājput states entered into treaties that guaranteed them protection. The tributes due to other powers were transferred to the British Government, each being guaranteed against any attack, external or internal. Each was definitely told that independent external relations were forbidden. They were at the last gasp of their existence and they were glad to enter the company's system. The Nawāb of Bhopal also signed a treaty and became a British ally. The Jaipur chief for some time procrastinated and was the last of the Rājput States to enter the British political system. Negotiations were also opened with Amīr Khān, the Pindāri chief. In November 1817, his *Vakil* concluded a treaty with Metcalfe. He was recognised

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as the Nawāb of Tonk and got the money to pay his men their arrears. Chiefs on the borders of Bundelkhand or the further limits of Mālwa—Krishnagar, Karauli, Banswara, Partabgarh, Dungarpur also entered into the British system.

The plans of Lord Hastings—political and military, for the extirpation of the Pindāris—were as comprehensive as possible. An army of 1,13,000 men and three hundred guns converged on the Pindāris from all sides, the northern divisions of the army being led by the Governor-General himself, the Deccan army being led by Sir Thomas Hislop. The operations began from Handia on the Narmadā. The Marāthā chiefs, suspected to be kindly to the Pindāris were fenced off by clever strategical movements. By the end of January 1818, the Pindāri bands were completely annihilated. The Pindāri chief, Karim Khān, settled in the Gorakhpur district. Wāsil Muhammad committed suicide and Cheetū was devoured by a tiger in Asirgarh jungles. But the hunt of the Pindāris became merged in the third Marāthā war. As Malcolm wrote, “strong in the approbation of his superiors, Lord Hastings carried the plans of Lord Wellesley to completion on that very theatre where their progress to a successful issue had been arrested twelve years before”. (Malcolm, *Political History of India* (1970), Vol. I, p. 327).

Thus ended the terrible anarchy and disorder of Rājputānā and Mālwa. Central India was tranquillised. The extension of British influence was based in these regions upon the destruction of the predatory system. As it has been said, the political framework of British India was finished in all essentials. During the subsequent years only details were changed. The central power, once dominant, naturally grew and all outside forces shattered themselves against this central power in vain. Lord Hastings’s seal no longer proclaimed that the Governor-General was a servant of the Great Mughul. The supremacy now belonged to the British Government and was accepted by the Indian rulers.

CHAPTER XVII

ADMINISTRATIVE AND MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MARĀTHĀS

Introduction:

Shivāji's kingdom, from a small *jāgīr*, expanded into a big State covering almost half of Mahārāshtra. The administrative and military system of the State grew and changed over a century. It was susceptible to time, place and personalities and bore the marks of the history of the Marāthās. All generalisations about the glories or degradations of the Marāthās are apt to be as false as facile generalisations about anything else. When Vincent Smith or Percival Spear observe that the Marāthās failed to rise above the level of plunderers¹ and echoing them, Irfan Habib asserts that the Pindāris were symbolic of the Marāthā system,² they tend to lose the normal background of an age and perhaps seek to prove too much from too limited a survey. It is, however, but just to remember that Mountstuart Elphinstone, who, after the *Peshwā's* downfall in 1818, was appointed the first Commissioner to administer the Marāthā country and initiate British rule in Mahārāshtra, expressed himself favourably about their administrative system and wanted to preserve as much of it as he could.³ Much source material is available in the *Bakhars* or chronicles of Shivāji's period and old papers of his times published by Rajwade and the Bharat Itihas Samshodhak Mandal of Poona over the last half a century. These sources, supplemented by *Peshwās' Diaries* and the *Selections from the Peshwā Daftar*, edited by Wad and Sardesai respectively (all published by the Government of Bombay) help us in coming to a right understanding of the evolution of Marāthā administration over a century and the changing organization of Marāthā armies. Ranade, Kelkar, Rajwade, Limaye, Sen, Sarkar, Sardesai and modern scholars like Shejwalkar, Gune and Kulkarni, utilizing this new source material, have made admirable attempts to give accounts of the system.⁴ All these sources and the learned books based on them, in addition to *Ājñā-patra*⁵ and Elphinstone's *Report on the Territories Conquered from the Peshwā (1819)*, give us a good account as to how the Marāthā Government functioned in the 17th and 18th centuries and how their armies were mobilized and fought. Shall we ostrich-like bury our

head and ignore this original contemporary material in the Marāthī language and base our conclusions on writings of distant British and Dutch merchants whose trade was thrown in confusion by Shivājī's revolt for the liberation of his homeland, or on the Muslim chronicles which breathe antipathy to the Hindu rebel in every sentence? Vincent Smith and his followers have given a warped view of Marāthā administration as it obtained in the homeland. The time has come to challenge the Vincent Smith School postulates and cultivate a correct perspective, taking account of the newly discovered material and the works of Ranade, Sarkar, Sen and Kulkarni.

Administration: Shivājī's period:

The King:

Monarchy as an art found one of its brilliant exponents in Shivājī. He was truly a Carlylean hero as King. "His mission was order. He was here to make what was disorderly, chaotic, into a thing ruled, regular."⁶ His government was rationally organised and was guided by noble ideals of beneficence. His reforms remind us of measures usually associated with a civilized state. Shivājī attempted to wield the scattered elements of his people into a nation and organize them as a political community. The Marāthā State under him could be described as a national monarchy. The activities of his government were not merely confined to law and order and collection of revenue, but embraced the entire life of the community. As the author of the *Shiva Bhārat* says, "The Mahārāshtra country attained its literal significance, viz., the great nation, on account of Shivājī's efforts. The people of Mahārāshtra became rich and happy."⁷ In every department of administration and grasp of details, Shivājī invites comparison not only with the famous Indian rulers and administrators like Asoka, Akbar and Sher Shāh, but Europeans like Napoleon, Frederick the Great, and Americans like George Washington. He represented the principle of harmony in society and acted as the Protector of *Dharma* (Righteousness). Tradition says that Shivājī offered his kingdom to his Guru Rāmdās and 'acted merely as dust on his Master's feet,'⁸ but in practice he exercised the supreme direction, was the supreme executive and the commander-in-chief of his forces. The author of the *Ājñāpatra* regards him as the creator of an altogether new order.⁹

Since the downfall of the Yādavās in 1318 A.D. the political history of Mahārāshtra is a story of humiliation of the upper classes and degradation of the masses. It was a period of complete national

prostration. Feudalism had become the bane and blight of pre-Shivājī Mahārāshtra. The whole country was covered with petty *Watandārs*, who while pursuing their selfish ends, tyrannized the poor peasantry. The rivalries of these feudal barons were numerous, the feelings were hot and collisions frequent; these feudal lords were always engaged in savage blood-feuds which are recounted in Rajwade's 15th volume of his *Sādhanen* in gruesome details.

To make matters worse, the Deccan at that time was visited by a terrible famine. Thus the prevailing famine and feudalism with its concomitant evils of private war, blood-feuds, anarchy and oppression rendered the life of the masses miserable. Sir Jadunath Sarkar remarks: "In that dissolution of civil administration and social order which marked the twilight before the emergence of Shivājī as an independent king, no justice could be had, no legal rights enforced by normal peaceful agency, because such agencies had perished. The strong alone could hold their own, but they did not stop with self-defence and usually turned into usurpers of other people's rights".¹⁰ Shivājī's organization of a systematic and orderly government with its emphasis on impartial justice and equal treatment to all "was the most conspicuous feature against this background of disorder and anarchy".¹¹ Cosmo de Guarda who wrote his *Vide e accoens do famoso e felicissimo Sevagy* in 1695 observes: "Such was the good treatment Shivājī accorded to the people and such was the honesty with which he observed his capitulations that none looked upon him without a feeling of love and confidence. He was exceedingly loved by his people; both in matters of rewards and punishments he was so impartial that while he lived he made no exception for any person, no merit was left unrewarded, no offence went unpunished." It was his high sense of justice and genuine concern for the welfare of his subjects that made an intense appeal to the people of Mahārāshtra and they hailed him as their emancipator and deliverer. "Shivājī's dominions," remarks Sir Jadunath Sarkar, "first of all spread through the conquests of hearts which the honest and strong administrator alone can achieve among a simple and rustic population".¹²

Another equally striking feature of the New Order was Shivājī's concern for the common man, irrespective of wealth, caste or creed, in his scheme of national regeneration. By setting before them the goal of *Swarājya* (our own government) and by providing them equal opportunities for advancement in life, depending on merit, rather than heredity and pride of pedigree, he converted the extreme individualism and turbulent spirit of the Marāthā character into a

larger and nobler force of liberation of the homeland. "In the end the corporate spirit of the Marāthās was kindled and sublimated; they gloried in the evident fact that they were a nation, at last rousing itself like a strong man after a long and painful sleep under foreign tyranny".¹³

Ashṭa Pradhān Maṇḍal (Council of Eight Ministers):

Shivājī was not merely the leader of the hosts, but his own prime minister like Louis XIV or Frederick the Great. The *Ashṭa Pradhān Maṇḍal* or his Council of Ministers had its beginning in the small group of officers which accompanied Dādājī Konḍadeo from Bangalore to the Poona *jāgīr* of Shāhjī in 1642. Shivājī and his mother Jijā Bāi also returned with Dādājī. At that time for the management of the *Jāgīr* were sent Shāmrāj Nīlkanth Rānzekar as *Peshwā*, Bālkrishna Pant Hanumante as *Mujumdār*, Sono Pant as *Dabīr* and Raghunāth Ballāl as *Sabnis*. This was the nucleus of what later developed into the council of ministers.¹⁴ In those days it was common for Deshmukhs to have a complement of these officers for the management of their *Jāgīrs*.¹⁵

In 1647 after Dādājī's death, Shivājī who had now familiarised himself with civil and military affairs of his *jāgīr*, appointed one Noor Beg as *Sarnobat* of his increasing force. Ten years later by 1657, Shivājī had occupied Javli, assaulted Junnar and Ahmadnagar and acquired much treasure. He looked for a competent *Sarnobat* and appointed Mānakoji Dahātōṇḍe to the post.¹⁶ It is possible Noor Beg died in the meanwhile.

The meeting with Afzal Khān, his death and defeat in 1659, forms a watershed in the career of Shivājī. In a year or two, there was reshuffle in the Rājā's office. Shāmrāj Nīlkanth proved unequal to the rising demands of the duties of his post and was displaced by Mōro Pant Pingle who had distinguished himself by hard work (3 April, 1662).¹⁷ Narahari Ānand and Mahādeo appear to be acting as interim *Peshwās* in 1661.

Another officer who made his mark by dint of hard work was Nilo Sondeo. He was appointed *Surnis* (Sachiv). Gangājī Mangājī was appointed *Waqnis* (Mantri) and Balam Bhat and Govind Bhat were appointed *purohits* and looked after the family's religious functions. Netājī Pālkar became the *Sarnobat* of the cavalry and Yesājī Kaṅk of the infantry.¹⁸

It is surmised that Netājī became *Sarnobat* in 1659. At the time of the meeting with Afzal Khān he had been posted near Pratāpgarh

and was one of the commanders who dispersed the enemy's army. In 1666 he failed to carry out the Rājā's orders promptly and was dismissed from his post. Netājī Palkar was succeeded by Kadatoji Gujar in the post of *Sarnobat*. On his appointment Kadatoji was honoured with the title 'Pratāp Rāo' and is known to history as Pratāp Rāo Gujar. Pratāp Rāo, it would seem, was well-connected and was able to persuade a number of high-class Marāthā families to join the Rājā's cause.¹⁹ Pratāp Rāo was a brave soldier and distinguished himself in a number of hard-fought actions. He was censured by the Rājā for sparing the enemy under Bahlōl Khān at the battle of Umrani (15 April, 1673). Pratāp Rāo was stung to the quick by the censure and rushed at the enemy at Nesari (24 February, 1674) in a wild charge.²⁰ The general was killed, but the disheartened force was rallied by Pratāp Rāo's lieutenant Ānand Rāo Makāji. Ānand Rāo fought desperate actions against Bijāpur forces.

Shivājī regretted the death of Pratāp Rāo Gujar, and after inspection of his troops at Chiplun promoted Hansājī Mōhite to the post of Commander-in-Chief on 8 April 1674. Hambīr Rāo appears to be an honorific title in the family. He remained in the post till the end of the Rājā's death and beyond.²¹ In fact, he swayed the army and assured Shambhūji of his succession against the court party of Soyarā Bāi.

When Jay Singh invaded the Deccan in 1665 to chastise Shivājī, the latter sent to the Rājput prince a learned Brāhmin, Raghunāth Paṇḍit (Atre) with the title Paṇḍit Rāo, to negotiate peace.²² As a result of the negotiations, Shivājī decided to meet Jay Singh. Raghunāth Paṇḍit was confirmed in the post of Paṇḍit Rāo (Ecclesiastical Head) and was one of the eight ministers at the time of Coronation.

Mahadāji Sāmraj was appointed *Surnis* in 1656. After the occupation of Shringarpur in 1661 Niḷo Sondeo took his place. In 1662 Niḷo Sondeo became *Mujumdār*²³ and Annājī Dattō was posted to the *Surnisi*. Annājī Dattō continued in the post right up to the reign of Shambhūji and became famous for the survey and assessment of agricultural land he carried out.

On his return from Āgra the Rājā devoted time to put his administration on sound lines. Among the many innovations that he introduced was the appointment of Nirāji Rāoji, a learned Brahmin, as Chief Justice.²⁴

There is some uncertainty about the post of *Mujumdār* or *Amātya*. The *Sabhāsad* chronicle makes the first reference to the ap-

pointment as under: "When Shivājī was sent back to the Poona *jāgīr* in 1640-41, Bālakrishna Pant, cousin of Nāro Pant Dikshit, went with him as a *Mujumdār*."²⁵

In January, 1660, Moro Pant Pingle, according to *Jedhe Shakāvali* became *Mujumdār*. When on 3 April, 1662, he was raised to the *Peshwāship*, Niḷo Sondeo was made *Mujumdār*.²⁶ The *Mujumdār* kept a big establishment consisting of about 300 clerks. He kept accounts of income and expenditure of the State. Niḷo Pant died about the year 1663 and was succeeded in the post by his two sons, the elder one Nāro Nilkanth being the *de jure* *Mujumdār* and the younger one, Rāmchandra Nilkanth the *de facto* *Mujumdār*, as he possessed the necessary talent.²⁷

The *Qanu Zabta* or Code of Conduct was promulgated by the Rājā at the time of his Coronation.²⁸ Though doubts have been raised about the date of the document,²⁹ the *Zabta* may be considered as a fair exposition of the duties of the eight ministers.³⁰

(1) The *Peshwā* or *Mukhya Pradhān* was to supervise the general administration of the kingdom. His seal on all royal documents was necessary if they were to be effective. He was, when necessary, to lead the armed forces in battles, make arrangements for the administration of newly acquired territories. He was to work with the counsel and co-operation of his colleagues.

(2) The *Amātya* or *Mujumdār* was the Finance Minister. He was to supervise the income and expenditure of the State. For this purpose the record-keepers and accountants of the *Subāhs* were to be subordinate to him. He was required to put his seal on all official documents and the statements of income and expenditure. Like the *Peshwā*, he was not merely a civil officer, but when necessary was to fight and protect territory. At the Coronation the post was held by the two sons of Nilo Sondeo. Nāro Nilkanth was the elder of the two. But as he was lacking in ability, the work of the post was looked after by his younger brother Rāmchandra Nilkanth.^{30a} He fully justified his choice and in later days was the leader of the hosts which defeated Mughul armies.

(3) The *Sachiv* (Persian *Surnis*) was to examine all royal letters and put them in proper shape by carrying out necessary corrections. He was to serve in war and protect the acquired territory. His seal was necessary for all royal documents. Anṇājī Datto was the famous *Sachiv* of Shivājī who carried out survey of land, and his assessment is known as Anṇājī Datto's *Dharā*.

(4) 'The *Mantri* (*Waqnis*) was a kind of Home Minister. He was not a mere chronicler as Sir Jadunath Sarkar would have us believe. According to the *Zabta* he was to deliberate on all political problems. He appears to have had the powers of the Home Minister of the present day. Invitations (to Royal audiences?), chronicling of important events, fell in his province. His seal was necessary for royal documents. He was also required, when called upon, to fight and to protect the *taluka*. Gangāji Mangāji was the first *Waqnis* to be succeeded by Anṇāji Datto in August 1661. Within a year Anṇāji Datto became *Surnis* and his place was taken by Dattāji Trimbak.

The duties of the *Senāpati* (Commander-in-Chief), *Pandit Rāo* (Danādhyaksha) and Chief Justice were clearly cut out. The *Senāpati* was to look after military affairs, deal with the problems of his men and lead the army into battle. The *Pandit Rāo* was the Ecclesiastical head, looking into religious problems. The Chief Justice was to supervise the administration of justice. Justice was, in most cases, locally administered by village and *Parganā Panchāyats* or caste *Panchāyats*. It was only when the party was not satisfied with the decision of the *Panchāyats* that the *Subāhdar* referred the matter to higher authorities who, in the first instance, granted him a fresh *Panchāyat* and when that decision was also not satisfactory, the question came before the entire court. Such occasions must have been rare indeed.

The *Pandit Rāo* was the expounder of Hindu Law and the *Śas-tras*; all matters of religion, religious disputes, grants to holy persons and temples were referred to him.

For the proper administration of the country, the country was divided into three divisions; upper Konkan was placed under Moro Trimbak *Peshwā*, Southern Konkan under Anṇāji Dattō *Sachiv*. The Desh country was put under Dattoji Trimal *Waqnis*. Revenue and other collections were made through *Karkuns*, *Tarafdars* and *Havaldars*. Over them were *Subāhdars* whose work was supervised by the Ministers. These three were to submit to the Rājā the statements of accounts and were to deliver balances into the treasury.³¹ Obviously they did not remain at the court throughout the year, but functioned through their *Mutaliqs* or deputies.

It is said that at the time of the Coronation the eight members of the council got their Sanskrit names and stood round the throne to pour holy water from gold and silver jars on the King's head. They stood in the following order.³²

<i>Right side</i>	<i>Left side</i>
1. <i>Peshwā</i>	5. <i>Senāpati</i>
2. <i>Amātya</i>	6. <i>Sumant</i>
3. <i>Sachiv</i>	7. <i>Pandit Rāo</i>
4. <i>Mantri</i>	8. <i>Nyāyādhish</i>

All these ministers, with the exception of the Commander-in-Chief and the Mantri, were of the Brahmin caste and all, except the last two, led armies on expedition. It is not known what initiative the ministers had when the Rājā himself led armies into battle and conducted negotiations in person. At best, they were his advisors and secretaries who looked to the details, once the Rājā laid down policies. The posts were not hereditary and the holders of the posts were paid regular salaries. None was made a *jāgīrdar* and none left a fortune to his successors.

There is no sufficient evidence to conclude that in establishing the *Ashṭa Pradhān Maṇḍal*, the Rājā was in any way following the injunctions of the *Shukranīti* or any ancient treatise. The titles of the ministers were, no doubt, Sanskritised at the time of the Coronation, but their duties were dissimilar to those of the ministers mentioned in the *Shukranīti*. Perhaps Shivājī was drawing on the model of the Muslim Sultanates known to him.³³

Thus, in Shivājī's State, we find political power resting in the crowned prince. Shivājī's ministers, no doubt, served him well and faithfully and many of them remained in their posts for long periods. But it was the Rājā who directed all the activities of the State and ruled as well as reigned. Though the Rājā received advice from the ministers and often accepted their suggestions, the responsibility for formulating policy was entirely his own. His ministers were his subordinates who carried out his orders. The overriding authority, whatever the *Qanu Zabta* may say, was left in the hands of the sovereign himself. The Council of Ministers functioned at the Rājā's will and had no existence independent of him, as happens in the case of the Cabinet of Ministers where the parliamentary form of government prevails.

Secretaries:

It is reasonable to assume that the position of the *Chitnis* and the *Munshi* (Persian Secretary) who conducted the work of state correspondence, was in no way inferior to *Pradhāns*. The *Chitnis* had to write replies to all diplomatic letters, attend to the Rājā's personal correspondence and issue letters relating to final decisions of the highest judiciary. Balājī Āvjī, the *Chitnis*, was so much trus-

ted by the Rājā that he was entrusted with the task of taking down the behests of Goddess Bhavāni communicated through Shivājī's mouth.³⁴

District administration:

Swarājya is the term applied to those territories of Mahārāshtra which formed the independent kingdom of Shivājī. For efficient administration the entire kingdom was placed under the supervision of three ministers; Moro Pant Pingle *Peshwā* was given charge of North Konkan extending from Kalyan-Bhiwandi to Kolwan-Salher, the twelve Māvals and Lohgarh and Junnar; Anṇājī Datto *Sachiv* looked after the South Konkan extending from Chaul to Koppal and Dattāji Trimbak *Wagnis* or *Mantri* after the Desh country. There was an overall supervision by these three ministers, but the actual administration was carried out by district officers called *subāhdars*. They were assisted by an establishment of *Mujumdār* (Accountant) *Chitnis* (Letter-writer), *Daftardār* (Record-Keeper), *Phadnis*, *Sabnis*, *Potnis* and other clerks appointed by the Central authority.³⁵ Shivājī took particular care in selecting officers for conducting the district administration. He expected the *Mujumdār*, *Havaldār* and *Subāhdars* to be men of highest probity, industry and of an inquisitive bent of mind. The *Mujumdār* was not to be merely literate but expert in accounts.³⁶ The *Havaldār* was in charge of revenue divisions each yielding about 5,000 *hons*. Two such revenue divisions—*Mahāls* or *Tarfs* made a *Prānt* governed by a *subāhdar*. *Chitnis* has given a list of 14 *Prānts* of Shivājī's kingdom³⁷ which has been reproduced with slight modification by Justice Ranade. Thus *Swarājya* was divided into a number of *Prānts* (districts). "Besides his ancestral *jāgīr* about Poona, there was (1) *Prānt Māval*, corresponding with Māval, Sāsbad, Junnar and Khed Talukas of the present day and guarded by eighteen hill-forts; (2) *Prānt Wāi, Satara and Karhād*, corresponding with the western portion of the present Satara district, guarded by fifteen forts; (3) *Prānt Panhālā*, corresponding with the western parts of Kolhapur with thirteen hill-forts; (4) *Prānt South Konkan*, corresponding with Ratnagiri, with fifty-eight hill forts and sea fortresses; (5) *Prānt Thana*, corresponding with North Konkan district with twelve forts; (6, 7) *Prānt Trimbak and Bāglan*, corresponding with the western parts of Nasik with sixty-two hill-forts; (8) *Prānt Wanagad*, corresponding with the southern parts of Dharwar district with twenty-two forts; (9, 10, 11) *Prānts Bidnur, Kolhar and Shrirangapattam*, corresponding with modern Mysore, with eighteen forts; (12) *Prānt Karnātak* being the ceded districts in the Madras Presidency south of the Krishna

with eighteen forts; (13) *Prānt Vellore*—modern Arcot district with twenty-five forts; and (14) *Prānt Tanjore* with six forts. The kingdom covered the Sahyadri range (from Daman to Bidnur) and varied in breadth from fifty to one hundred miles at the most." Dr. Balkrishna would have us believe that the kingdom was divided into 35 districts.³⁸

The average pay of a *Subāhdar* was four hundred *hons* per annum, i.e., about rupees 100 per month. The *Havāldar* received half the amount as his salary and the accountant about one hundred and twenty-five *hons* per annum. The bordering districts were strengthened with larger garrisons.³⁹ It is obvious that the work of the district officers was collection of revenue and maintenance of law and order. But no details are available about the working of the district offices. The main work, however, was to classify lands, inspect condition of crops and make settlement in the presence of village officers and the ryots.

The villages from time immemorial, managed their own affairs. The Patel, Kulkarni and Chaugula collected revenue as settled by government Karkuns and despatched it to the district authorities. They decided minor disputes and levied cesses both on government account and for village expenses such as strengthening the village walls, digging wells for water, maintenance of temples, holding annual fairs or occasional *kirtans*. The village officers and artisans held *inām* lands and the officers received small presents on special occasions. Shivājī did not disturb village government, but expected from the villages loyal service for the peace he assured them. He abolished many extra cesses taken from the peasants. He established direct relations with the ryots doing away with the intermediaries like Deshmukhs and Deshpāndes who in earlier times collected ten times what they paid to government, built strong palaces and defied the government of the day.⁴⁰

As territory, treasure, ministers and army for defence are looked on as essential for a king, it is worthwhile examining the sources of income of the Marāthā kingdom. Land revenue was the chief source, and from a few stray references in the *Bakhars* we get an idea as to how the collection was made.

Public Finance: Land Revenue:

Shivājī's kingdom consisted of territories he wrested from the Sultāns of Ahmadnagar and Bijāpur and the emperor of Delhi. The southern districts bore the mark of Vijayanagar rule. Thus the re-

venue systems of four different States were prevalent in Mahārāshtra. Shivājī tried to bring financial unity in diversity by establishing one common method for collection of revenue. The people of Mahārāshtra had suffered much from the wars between the Nizāmshāhi rulers and the Mughuls. Large tracts of land were lying desolate and agriculture and trade had declined. If these districts were again to be brought back to life and prosperity, they had to be assured of peace and the demand on peasant proprietors had to be a fixed one, settled on easy terms. Shivājī revived the principles of Malik Ambar's revenue system. The *Kāṭhi* or the measuring rod was to be five cubits and five fists in length. Twenty *Kāṭhi* square made a *bighā* and 120 *bighās* one *Chawar*.

The first important step taken by Shivājī was to have a survey of the lands and then to assess the rent and other dues payable by the cultivators. These surveys were made at different times; the first was made by Dādājī Konḍadeo in Shāhji's *jāgīr* at Poona; the second one was begun by Mōro Pant Pinglé; and the last one was carried out by Anṇājī Datto which really covered most of the Marāthā districts.⁴¹ The main features of Ambar's system accepted by Shivājī were "(i) the classification of lands according to fertility; (ii) ascertainment of their produce; (iii) fixing the government share; (iv) collection of rents either in kind or money, and (v) abolition of the intermediate collecting agents as farmers of revenue."⁴² The State claimed two-fifths share of the land produce leaving three-fifths to the peasants. The *Tagāi* and *Istauā* principles were accepted to bring new lands under the plough. New cultivators were given seeds and cattle, and loans advanced to them were recovered over a period of years. The cultivable waste lands were excluded when a village was assessed. When later, some of the waste lands were brought under cultivation, they were taxed moderately to begin with. There is some truth in Lalji Pendse's statement that Shivājī was a conspicuous leader of the down-trodden peasantry against the big landlord class.

Grant Duff has outlined the revenue arrangement of Shivājī. He bases his account on the chronicles and the men who operated the system in *Peshwās'* times and gave him information for his *History* (1826) and may, therefore, be accepted to be fairly correct. He says: "The assessments were made on the actual state of the crop; the proportionate division of this was three-fifths to the ryot and two-fifths to government. As soon as he got permanent possession of any territory, every species of military contribution was stopped; all farming of revenue ceased, and the collections were made by agents appointed by himself.

THE MARATHA SUPREMACY

"Every two or three villages were superintended by a Carcoon under the Turufdar or Talookdar who had charge of a small district and was either a Brahmin or Purvoe. A Marāthā *Havildar* was stationed with each of them. Over a considerable tract there was a Soobahdar or Mamlitdar who had charge of one or more forts in which his collections both of grain and money were secured.

"Shivājī never permitted the Deshmookhs and Deshpandyas to interfere in the management of the country; nor did he allow them to collect their dues until they had been ascertained, when an order was annually given for the amount. The Patels, Khots and Koolkurnees were strictly superintended which (made) Shivājī's government popular with the common cultivators."⁴³

"He discouraged the assignment of revenue or jagirdari system which he felt would cause such a division of authority as must weaken his government and encourage the village and district authorities to resist it.

"His revenue regulations were simple and judicious. But during his short span of life, it is impossible to say how far they were attended to by his officers and what results they produced. Muslim writers and an English traveller, Fryer, describe his country as in the worst possible state, but this is probably due to prejudice. The districts directly under him experienced great benefit."⁴⁴

Besides land revenue there were other sources of revenue which may be classified as under:⁴⁵

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| (1) Customs | (8) Plunder of hostile territory |
| (2) Transit duties | (9) Booty in war |
| (3) Judicial fees and fines | (10) <i>Chauth</i> and <i>Sardeshmukhi</i> |
| (4) Forest revenue | (11) Capture of ships |
| (5) Profits of mintage | (12) Monopolies |
| (6) Presents by subjects and officers | (13) Various kinds of cesses |
| (7) Escheat and forfeitures | |

Customs:

Shivājī became master of coastal territory; the ports of Kalyan, Bhiwandi, Nagothana, Chaul, Dabhol and Ratnagiri came under his influence. Foreign goods entering these ports or going out paid a small customs duty of 2½ per cent. European travellers complained about the harassment of customs officers who perhaps overvalued goods or demanded bribe for their clearance.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MARATHAS

Transit duty known as *Rahdāri* or *Zakāt* was another tax on goods and animals passing from one place to another. The officers operating it made it irksome by insisting on search of packages and persons.

Judicial fees:

In cases that went before a *Panchāyat* appointed by government, the winning party had to pay *Hārki* and the losing party *Gunhe-gāri* or fine for crime. How much was realised thus, it is difficult to say.

Treasure trove, fisheries and mines:

The right to hidden treasure has always been claimed by the State in India from time immemorial. Shivājī claimed treasure troves by right.

Mercantile marine:

From 1659 Shivājī began building a navy, specially to bear down the Sidi's opposition. Some of his ships traded with ports in Arabia and Persia. English records inform us that Shivājī possessed eight or nine ports on the coastal belt and 'from every port he used to send two or three or more trading vessels to Persia, Basra, Mocha, etc.' How much he made out of this trade is not known. But the English records add that "his fleet consisted of very small vessels and with his men totally inexperienced to sea, not much danger could be apprehended from them."⁴⁶

These records mention that the Rājā had the monopoly of salt trade.

Shivājī's navy was active on the sea and captured enemy vessels which were then ransomed by the other party.

Forfeiture of *watans* and *Ināms* were usual for disloyalty. Shivājī followed a conciliatory policy to win over the old aristocracy to his cause and allowed the Deshmukhs to draw their allowances from the land revenue after the general collection was made. At the time of his succession the *watandār* usually offered a small present.

Profits from mints:

"Indian rulers did not set much store on the royal prerogative to coin money. One mint and one currency did not find much recognition in the Deccan."⁴⁷ The Deccan Sultāns and Mughul emperors issued their gold *mohurs* and silver rupees but did not interfere with local currencies. The Government left these currencies to

find their own value in the market. Goldsmiths and Sahukārs (bankers) obtained licence to manufacture coins under conditions and restrictions laid down by the rulers; one of the conditions was to pay the State a licence fee. These coins bore the marks of the manufacturer and the place of their origin. Shivājī had his mint at Rāigarh. His first coins were issued before 1674. Reverend Abbot had made a collection of about 25,000 coins of Shivājī.⁴⁸ All sorts of foreign coins were current in his kingdom. Fryer says that "Shivājī forbids not the passing of any manner of coins."⁴⁹ Sabhasad mentions 32 different kinds of gold coins and different kinds of silver. Gold coins were *Gambars*, *Mohors*, *Putlis*, *Padshah Hons*, *Satlamis*, *Ibrahimis*, *Shivarāi Hons*, *Kaveripak*, *Sangarai Hons*, *Devarai Hons*, *Ramchandra Rai Hons*, *Gooty Hons*, *Dharwar Hons*, *Falams*, *Pralakhati Hons*, *Adoni Hons*, *Jadmal Hons*, *Tadpatri Hons*, etc.⁵⁰ A *hon* was worth Rs. 3-4. The Marāthā *Mohor* approximated to the Delhi *mohur* (Rs. 14.50).⁵¹ *Shivarāi* was the most widely circulated coin. The fractions of a pice were counted in *cowries*.

Shivājī founded a new kingdom practically beginning from a scratch. He had to find means to raise his armies, equip them with arms, build forts, buy guns and ammunition. All these could come from the plunder of the enemy's country and defeat of his forces. It is well known that the Rājā obtained huge quantities of treasure and equipment when he defeated the Ādil Shāhi general Afzal Khān in 1659, Mughul general Kār Talab Khān in 1661,⁵² and Bahādur Khān. He sacked the towns and marts of Kalyan, Bhiwandi in 1657, twice raided Surat (1664 and 1670), Khāndesh and Berār in 1661, plundered Hubli, Vengurla, Raibagh and Dharangaon.

Chauth and *Sardeshmukhi* were the two instruments used by Shivājī to obtain treasure from the enemy country he invaded. He demanded from the subjects of his enemies, tribute roughly equivalent to one-fourth of the estimated revenue of the province to save themselves from harassment of his armies. He seized rich people of hostile territories and obliged them to agree to the ransom. If Shivājī levied this *chauth* as early as 1661 and 1670 as Jadunath Sarkar says,⁵³ all the discussion about its origin from the Rāmnapur Rājā's demand on Daman villages is futile. Shivājī needed money for his wars and demanded it at the point of the sword.

He also posed as *Sardeshmukh* of the Deccan, the supreme revenue collector, and demanded another ten per cent from his conquests.

Under the *Peshwās* the emperor's sanction was obtained to collect *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* from the six *subāhs* of the Deccan for

which the Marāthās agreed to serve the Mughul government with 15,000 horse and pay a small sum as fee. Thus the enemy sources were gradually exhausted and the Marāthās were enabled to extend their boundaries. In this sense Ranade and Sardesai compare the *chauth* with the subsidiary system. However, under the subsidiary system the control of the British over the other party was far more complete and exacting than under the Marāthā system. The Marāthā Government failed to extend the protection given by the British to their subordinate allies.

The total income of Shivājī's State is stated by Sabhasad to be a crore of *hons*⁵⁴ and there the matter must rest in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Sarkar's statement that it was considerably less is his personal guess.

Expenditure:

But it would not be true to say that he amassed this wealth as a personal fortune. He maintained a large army of 200,000, and spent liberally on it.^{54a} He also paid the civil service, spent on building new forts and repairing old ones, tanks, canals and other government buildings, encouraged learning by giving presents to temples and learned Brāhmins.

"Besides regular pays and allowances, soldiers and officials were given additional allowances for meritorious work. Shivājī conferred pensions, bounties and prizes for those who shed their blood for the cause of the Marāthā state. The sons of soldiers who fell on the battle-field were absorbed in the State services. He directed that the widows of the soldiers who had no sons, should be maintained by an equitable pension. The wounded received monetary rewards according to the seriousness of wounds and captains of renown were sumptuously rewarded and given bracelets, necklaces, horses and elephants as marks of distinction".⁵⁵

He arranged for the defence of his forts and territory, made provision for his forces and civil services, moderated the demand on the peasants and ruled justly. Rightly does Chitnis observe that his subjects felt that they must cultivate rectitude of behaviour to uphold the king's rule which was of great beneficence.⁵⁶ Prof. Kulkarni after examining the heads of expenditure comes to the conclusion that the purpose of public expenditure was fully realized in the Marāthā State of 17th century.⁵⁷

Shivājī Successors:

Shambhūjī's succession was contested. Some of the ministers like Mōro Pant Pinglé, Anṇājī Datto suspected to be plotting against

him were thrown into prison. Later, an attempt to poison him so enraged Shambhūjī that he put to death Annājī Datto, his brother Somājī, Hirōjī Farzand, Balājī Āvjī Chitnis, Mahādeo Anant and twenty-five other persons. A Kanoji Brahmin, Kavi Kalash, became his confidant, and naturally senior officers became jealous of an outsider who wielded so much power with their master. Though Shambhūjī tried to run the administration on the lines laid down by his illustrious father, senior ministers and officers felt disgusted with "the Rājā's rudeness, caprice and violence of spirit, and could not render him the same devoted service as they did to the father."⁵⁸

While Shambhūjī was engrossed in his domestic disputes, the Mughul emperor marched to the Deccan at the head of an immense army and arrived at Burhanpur in November (1681). Shambhūjī led futile attacks against the Mughuls and frittered away his resources in wars against the Sidis of Janjirā and the Portuguese. Aurangzīb destroyed the neighbouring kingdoms of Bijāpur and Golkonda in 1684-86 and 1687 respectively, and then turned his full fury against the Marāthā king who had eluded him so far. The net closed round Shambhūjī and he was taken captive at Sangameshwar in January, 1689. After a month and a half, he was put to death in a cruel manner on 11 March, 1689. After this, many forts fell into the hands of the Mughuls and Shambhūjī's successor, Rājārām, escaped to Jinjī.

Feudalization:

In the interregnum from Shambhūjī's capture in 1689 to the home coming of Shāhū in May 1707, conditions in Mahārāshtra were abnormal. The machinery of government as devised by Shivājī broke down. A number of Marāthā captains raised forces on their own, led expeditions in Mughul territory and made collection of revenues from which they reimbursed themselves. Shāhū, when he returned home with a handful of body-guards, was called upon to establish his superior claims against local Mughul officers and the protégé of his aunt, Tārā Bāi, and set up his authority over the warlords. At first the patriotic tradition of his grandfather and the support of the Mughul grandee Zu'lfīqār Khān, enabled him to hold his own against his rivals. But this initial advantage needed to be buttressed by personal valour and leadership in a country bristling with arms. Shāhū lacked the commanding talents and energy of his grandfather, and the patriotic tradition could not help him long; he was scarcely able to hold his own against the party of his aunt when the support of Zu'lfīqār Khān was gone. Bālājī Vishwanāth

who became *Peshwā* in 1713, in face of mounting difficulties, came to realize that it was no longer possible to adhere to Shivājī's old constitution under which the king, aided by his eight ministers, was the sole ruler of his dominions. The king's position as against the warlords who were themselves practically independent in several parts of the Deccan, had deteriorated. The only way to save the kingship being submerged and the country being involved in civil war and turmoil, was to accept the chiefs as vassals with practically free reins in their territory, to acknowledge them as hereditary *jāgīrdars* who would bring their forces to the common standard when called upon to do so, but who otherwise would have a free hand in the management of their *jāgīrs*. Shāhū accepted the advice of the *Peshwā*, concluded an agreement with Kanhoji Angria, Tārā Bai's chief adherent, on these lines, and gave similar freedom of action to other chiefs. A revolution in feudalizing the Marāthā State began.

Shāhū's stay-at-home policy accelerated the process of feudalization and the want of capacity in his successors completed it. The chiefs who raised men and money for realizing the claims of *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* in distant lands on their own, could not be expected to be subservient to royal commands and render minute accounts to court officers, when the sovereign himself gave no directive and showed little interest in distant operations. Bājī Rāo, who succeeded to the *Peshwāship* in 1720, proved himself an able commander and effected large conquests in Hindustān. The *Peshwā* who could have saved royal authority from falling into disuse, himself became the leading feudal chief and kept his conquests on the west coast and Hindustān, and was copied by other ministers and chiefs. The *Pratinidhi*, the *Amātya*, the *Sachiv*, the *Senāpati* and other cabinet members, though they retained their nominal rank, became transformed into hereditary feudatories, and the new warlords that had sprung into existence during the war with Aurangzīb swelled their ranks.

The position was confirmed by Rājā Shāhū himself. On his death-bed he wrote two rescripts. By the first he asked the *Peshwā* to wield supreme authority as there was none of his family to carry on the government wisely. By the second he directed his successors to maintain the *Peshwā* in power.⁵⁹

The Rājā having thus resigned royal authority, it was assumed by the *Peshwā*. Some of the chiefs like the *Pratinidhi*, Raghūjī Bhosle and Gaikwār demurred, but were overawed by a demon-

stration of force. The successor of Rājā Shāhū, Rāmrajā, was an adopted child, born and brought up in humble circumstances. He could not muster force strong enough to oppose the *Peshwā* and gave his written sanction that the *Peshwā's* authority should be obeyed.⁶⁰

The supreme authority that the *Peshwā* came to wield in 1750, he did not enjoy long. The Battle of Pānipat (1761) made a serious crack in his position. His grand army was destroyed. His cousin and his counsellors were all killed on the battle-field and his treasury was empty.

The losses in men and treasure and deaths in his family and among his friends unhinged *Peshwā* Bālājī Rāo's mind and within six months of the Battle of Pānipat, he died a broken-hearted man.

His son, Mādhav Rāo, who succeeded to the *Peshwāship*, was barely eighteen years old. The eldest surviving member of the *Peshwā's* family was Raghobā, Bālājī's brother, who expected the government to be conducted under his direction. Raghobā had little abilities and was unpopular with a party in the *Peshwā's* family. An acrimonious dispute plagued the *Peshwā's* court for over eight years dividing the loyalty of the chiefs. Raghobā was imprisoned in a fort in 1768, but the civil strife in the family did not abate. It was fanned into white heat when Mādhav Rāo's successor was murdered (1773) at the instigation of Raghobā or of his ambitious wife. The court party led by Nānā Phaḍnis made a solemn resolve to drive the usurper from the *Peshwā's* *Gādi* and had to look for support to the powerful Marāthā chiefs and make them concessions. The usurper Raghobā fled from the capital and a newly born child, Sawāi Mādhav Rāo, ascended the *Peshwā's* *masnad*. Sindia, Holkar, Gaikwār, Bhosle, Pawars and other Marāthā chiefs now affected more independence in their own *jāgīrs*, and claimed even the right of interference in the *Peshwā's* domain. All the evils inherent in the feudal system now came to the surface. Though the Marāthā power sprawled over a large part of the country, no centralized authority guided its policies. The different units, small and big, followed their own interests, acting on their own. If the interests of the Poona government were threatened by the Nizām or Tipū Sultān, it could not look to its feudatories to come to its help. The Rājā of Jaipur could with impunity defy Sindia's demands for tribute and he could look to Holkar for support in his defiant attitude. Even the Nizām played the *Peshwā's* feudatories against his *Diwān*, and for years withheld the tribute. The British government took advantage of this position and by the end of the century affected to treat the

big feudatories as equal members of a confederacy and concluded separate treaties with the Gaikwār and the *Peshwā*, thus isolating other units. In the war that followed the treaty of Bassein in 1802 the English fought the feudatories separately. The British army marched through the *Peshwā*'s territory and defeated the armies of Sindia and Bhosle, while Holkar looked on. Holkar's turn came in 1804. He was defeated at the battles of Dig and Farrukhabad. In 1817 the *Peshwā* became restive under British restraint and called on his erstwhile subordinates to join in a general rising against the British. But the call came too late and went unheeded. Sindia and Bhosle had been paralysed and the Pindāri troops which were active, were a mere rabble and hunted down to their lairs by the British. The *Peshwā* himself was run to ground and threw himself on the mercy of his opponent. Thus ended very ignominiously the career of the Marāthā State which once had become the terror to the Mughul empire.

The organization of the Marāthā State was thus very peculiar and without a precedent. The Rājā of Satara, the formal head of State, who bestowed dignities and posts on the *Peshwā*, other ministers and chiefs, looked on himself as a vassal of the Mughul emperor, who himself was a shadowy figure and wielded no power. The Pādishāh was never consulted by his Marāthā vassal on any matter of policy, and after 1750 never mentioned in any of the treaties and engagements relating to the territories in the Deccan. The Rājā was a prisoner and a pensioner of the *Peshwā*. The *Raj-Mandal* or council of ministers ceased to function and its members became *jāgīrdārs* supervising not only revenue collection but also the civil and criminal administration in their assigned districts. The *Peshwā* so long as he retained the primacy, formulated policies and gave direction to state affairs to some extent. But this was gone after the death of Mādhav Rāo *Peshwā* in 1772. The chiefs assumed greater independence and none concerned himself with the commonwealth. The bond of union holding the Marāthā people under one banner snapped completely. "The change meant" as Ranade points out, "the conversion of the organic whole into an inorganic mass".⁶¹ The Marāthā State that spread over more than half of Indian territory, was not one united power directed and operated by one powerful will, but hundreds of big and tiny islands of authority, each following its own course.

Financial weakness:

One result of feudalization showed itself in the weakness of the financial position of the Marāthā State. Shivājī though he was con-

stantly engaged in warfare with his neighbours, left an overflowing treasury.⁶² The balances were frittered away by his son Shambhūji and the long protracted war that followed his death, put a heavy strain on his successor, Rājārām. Rājā Shāhū when he came to the throne in 1707 inherited a great tradition but an empty exchequer. In the arrangements that were later made for his government he had little direct control either over finance or the army. His feudatories were to fight his wars and supply his public and domestic needs. The *Rāj-bābti* or the Rājā's share of the *chauth* was to be collected by the *Pratinidhi*, the *Peshwā* and the *Sachiv*. Other chiefs were also expected to pay a portion of money to the treasury.⁶³ The collections were neither regular nor adequate and the poor Rājā often found himself in dire distress. The State never seems to have had funds adequate enough to perform its duties in a competent manner, though the burden of taxation was in no way light.

Peshwā Bājī Rāo who launched on a vigorous programme of expansion of Marāthā power, had to raise large armies and became involved in debts. A stage was reached when the bankers who had already advanced him lakhs of rupees, refused to make further advances. In his correspondence with his Guru Brahmendra Swāmi, he often complained that while his subordinates were enriching themselves and amassing fortunes, he himself had fallen into that hell of being beset by creditors, and had to pacify Sāhukārs and Siladārs. "I am falling at their feet" he writes, "till I have rubbed the skin from my forehead".⁶⁴

His successor Bālājī Rāo was in no better position. The rivers of gold from Hindustān and the Karnātak, he lamented, only served to enrich his army leaders, but disappeared before they reached the Marāthā country.⁶⁵ According to the *Peshwā Diaries* the debts contracted by this *Peshwā* between 1740 and 1760 amounted to a total of a crore and a half rupees. Owing to the disaster at Pānipat matters became worse in the elder Mādhav Rāo *Peshwā's* time. That prince when he died, left a debt of 24,00,000 rupees.⁶⁶

The system of Marāthā conquests added to the financial difficulties of the State. Marāthā chiefs would invade a part of the country, spread over it like flood-waters and then recede within a few months. The local rulers, to stave off the fury of Marāthā arms, would agree to pay tributes which were recovered only partially and many times remained in arrears. The back of the local resistance was never broken; it raised its head as soon as Marāthā armies retired. The feudal levies, never paid regularly by their chiefs, often

plundered the countryside through which they passed, bringing odium to their leaders.

State Revenue:

Assessment on land was the main source of state income. It absorbed almost forty per cent of the gross income from land. In addition there were professional taxes; customs levied on goods in transit; customs levied at ports, *dahakpaṭṭi* which *jāgīrdars* and *zamindārs* were called upon to pay from time to time; duty on sales in the weekly market; duty on sales of cattle; cess on digging wells; levy on widow marriages; in fact, every economic activity was taxed.

The nominal revenue of the whole Marāthā empire at this time was estimated at ten crores of rupees. Of this, though the actual amount realized was seven crores and a quarter rupees, much of it was minutely sub-divided in grants of *jāgīrs* and *ināms* and barely three crores were received in the *Peshwā's* treasury, which was hardly sufficient to maintain the State in a state of efficiency.

Local administration:

The Village:

The changes at the upper levels in the state did not affect much of its organization in the home country at the lower levels where government impinged on the masses. The self-contained village remained the primary unit of administration. Each village had a headman, the Patel (the *pattakila* of ancient lithic and copperplate records), who came from peasant stock and who combined the functions of revenue officer, magistrate and judge, and acted as intermediary between the village and Government officials. Though he held his office by a grant from the Government, his office was hereditary and was the subject of sale and purchase, and his emoluments, which varied slightly from village to village, consisted of rent-free lands and receipts from every villager of a fixed share of his produce. These receipts ranged from a daily supply of betel-leaves, provided by dealers in *pānsupāri*, to tax on the re-marriage of a widow; and in return for these emoluments and for his recognition as the social leader of the community, the Patel was expected to shoulder the responsibility for the village's welfare and good conduct. The Kulkarni, or village clerk and record-keeper, who was always a Brahmin, was second in importance to the Patel, and like the latter, was remunerated by a variety of perquisites. He was often expected to share the Patel's responsibility for the good behaviour of the village community, and ran an equal risk of oppression

and imprisonment by casual invaders or tyrannous officials. The Mahār was another important functionary of the community. He was the watchman of the village. He knew the boundaries of individual fields, kept an eye on all and sundry passing through the village and was on the look-out for thieves and trespassers. He was the messenger and provided escort for government treasure to the headquarters of the *pargāna*.

Excluding the Chaugulā who had custody of the Kulkarni's bundles of correspondence and who assisted the Patel, the communal duties and wants of the village were performed and supplied by the *Bārā Balute* or twelve hereditary village artisans, who received a recognized share of the crops and other perquisites in return for their services to the community. The personnel of the *Bārā Balute* was not invariably the same in all parts of the Deccan, and in some places they were associated with an additional body of twelve village servants, styled *Bārā Alute*.

As a revenue officer the Patel "allotted the lands to such cultivators as had no landed property of their own, and fixed the rent which each had to pay; he collected the revenue for government from all the ryots, conducted all its arrangements with them, and exerted himself to promote the cultivation and prosperity of the village. Though originally the agent of Government, he came to be regarded as equally representative of the ryots, and was not less useful in executing the orders of the Government than in asserting the rights, or at least in making known the wrongs of the people".⁶⁷

District:

The backbone of the Marāthā district administration was supplied by the *māmlatdār*, who was in charge of a division styled *pargāna* or *prānt*, and by the *kāmavisdār*, his subordinate or deputy who administered a smaller territorial area of the same kind. The *māmlatdār*, who corresponded roughly to the *subāhdar* or *mukhya deshādhikāri* of Shivājī's days, and the *kāmavisdār* were directly subordinate to the *Peshwā*'s secretariat at Poona, except in the case of Khāndesh, Gujarāt and the Karnātak, where a superior official styled *sarsubāhdar* was interposed between them and the government. Originally the *māmlatdār* and the *kāmavisdār* were appointed for short terms only, but in practice they managed frequently to secure renewals of their term of office in a district. As the direct representatives of the *Peshwā* they were responsible for every branch of the district administration, including agriculture, industries, civil and criminal justice, the control of the *sibandī* (militia) and the

police, and the investigation of social and religious questions. They also fixed the revenue assessment of each village in consultation with the Patel, heard and decided complaints against the village officers, and were responsible for the collection of the state revenue, which in case of recalcitrance they were accustomed to recover through the medium of the *sibandi*.

The *māmlatdār* combined in himself executive and judicial functions, but he was not the complete autocrat which this would suggest. His powers were restrained by custom, by the check of the hereditary *zamindārs* and *darakhdārs*—a set of officers appointed from the centre in each *pargāna* or district. In theory the *māmlatdār's* accounts were not passed by the secretariat at Poona, unless corroborated by corresponding accounts from these hereditary officials; and in all disputes regarding land, the Deshmukh was expected to produce his ancient records, containing the history of all *watans*, *ināms* and grants, and the register of transfer of properties, which he maintained in return for the annual fee or perquisites received from the villagers. The safeguards not infrequently proved illusory, for there was nothing to prevent the *māmlatdār* obtaining official approval of his returns by methods of his own while the Deshmukh's registers were irregularly written up and often very incomplete.

The second check upon the *māmlatdār* was provided by a staff of hereditary *darakhdārs* or office-holders, appointed to the various provinces or major divisions of the Marāthā dominions by the Central Government; they were directly subordinate to the *Peshwā*, and reported direct to the Government in Poona. The officials were eight in number, viz., the *diwān* or *māmlatdār's* deputy, *muzumdār*, *phaḍnis*, *daftardār*, *potnis*, *sabhāsad*, and *chitṇis*; and they were expected to act as a check, not only upon one another but also on the *māmlatdār*, who was not empowered to dismiss any one of them.

Huzur Daftar or the Peshwā's Secretariat:

The central authority was represented by the *Huzur Daftar*. Under the supervision of the *Phaḍnis*, 200 Karkuns of the *Huzur Daftar* (*Peshwā's* Secretariat), dealt with the revenue transactions and the expenses of all civil, military and religious establishments. The *Huzur Daftar* was divided into several departments, the chief of which were the *Chālte Daftar* and the *Ek Beriz Daftar*. The *Chālte Daftar* under the direct supervision of the *Phaḍnis* was divided into several branches: (a) the *Phad* checked all accounts and kept *Rozkirds* (records of daily transactions), (b) the *Beheda* framed the estimate budget, depending on the abstract of the actual

receipt and expenditure of the revenue during the past year (*tāle-band*) and the estimate of possible income and expenditure for the current year (*ajmās*), (c) the *Saranjāmi* department kept accounts of *saranjām* and *dumalla* lands (lands under dual authority). In the *Ek Beriz Daftar* were kept classified accounts of all departments. It also framed the *tarjumā* (the total receipt, expenditure and balance of the government income for the year) and the *khatāunis* (abstracts of all expenditure arranged alphabetically under their proper heads). The *Huzūr Daftar* sank into insignificance during the administration of Peshwā Bājī Rāo II, because the Peshwā farmed the revenues of entire provinces.^{67a}

Civil Justice:

The Marāthā judicial system looks rather imperfect to the modern observer used to the paraphernalia of codes and laws passed by the state and the courts of justice which apply these laws to disputes brought before them. Justice was administered in a much simpler way; the community was left to its own resources to get its disputes settled. In villages the complainant took his plaint to the Patel who after trying to get the dispute settled through his own influence, called on a few village elders to sit together and hear the parties. The *sarāunsh* or the summary of the evidence was noted by the village writer with the decision, the execution of which was the duty of the Patel or the *māmlatdār*. In both the cases the main object aimed at was amicable settlement, and arbitration was, therefore, the first step in the disposal of a suit. If arbitration failed, the case was transferred for decision to a *panchāyat*, appointed by the Patel in the village and by the *shete mahājan*, or leading merchant, in urban areas. An appeal lay from the decision of a *panchāyat* to the *māmlatdār*, who usually upheld the verdict, unless the parties concerned were able to prove that the *panchāyat* was prejudiced or corrupt. In serious or important suits, however, it was the duty of the *māmlatdār* to appoint an arbitrator or a *panchāyat*, the members of which were chosen by him with the approval and often at the suggestion, of the parties to the suit. In such cases the *panchāyat*'s decision was subject to an appeal to the Peshwā or his legal minister, the *nyāyādhish*.

The system of *panchāyats* left a good deal to be desired from the standpoint of modern legal administration. These bodies were slow in action and uncertain in their decisions. The attendance of the members was irregular, depending as it did entirely upon the individual's sense of duty or fear of public opinion. The powers of

the *panchāyat* were limited; it was exposed to constant obstruction, and it possessed no authority to enforce its decisions, which were left to the *māmlatdār* to carry out or neglect as he pleased. It had likewise no power to compel the *māmlatdār* or other local official to supply a petty officer for this purpose. Yet despite its primitive character and its liability to be improperly influenced, the *panchāyat* was a popular institution, and the absence of a decision by a *panchāyat* in any suit was almost always regarded as complete justification for a retrial of the issues. Among themselves, within the confines of the self-contained ancestral village, the peasantry did obtain a fair modicum of rude justice from the village *panchāyat*. What they failed to obtain either from the *panchāyats* or from the government was any measure of redress against the merciless oppression of their superiors.

Criminal Justice:

In the *Peshwā's* times the Patel was the unit of the police force. He was responsible for the maintenance of law and order in his village. He was helped by the *chaughulā*, the Kulkarni, and generally by the villagers in general. But his chief resource lay in the village watchman, or Mahār. It was the latter's duty to keep watch at night, scrutinize strangers, and report suspicious individuals to the Patel. When a theft was committed, it was the Mahār's duty to detect the thief. And, as he was always moving about the village either to collect his share of grain or his fee, there was little therein that escaped his observation. He was also a skilled tracker and could often follow the footsteps of the criminal to his home or hiding-place. If the thief's foot-prints led to another village, the watchman of that village had to take up the pursuit, and the last village to which the foot-prints could be traced was held responsible for the losses caused by the theft.

Over the headman was the *Māmlatdār*, who kept up a force of *sibandis*, or irregular infantry, and a small body of irregular horse. They were posted at the district headquarters, but moved out when necessary. They were, however, intended to oppose violence rather than to detect crime. The *Kotwāls* were charged with the comprehensive duties of maintaining public order and supervision of markets in all towns.

This system, rudimentary although it seems, worked admirably well until the time of Bājī Rāo II, when the disorders in the kingdom strained to the breaking point. To remedy the weaknesses of the district police, Bājī Rāo created a body of officials known as

tapāsnavis, who corresponded with the modern Criminal Investigation Department, and whose duty was not only to detect crime, but to prevent it by superior vigilance. This arrangement worked well, and as Elphinstone has admitted, violent crimes were rare and few complaints reached him of the insecurity of property.⁶⁸

The punishments inflicted were confiscation of property, imprisonment for various terms, internment and fines, flogging, mutilation of limbs, slavery, penal servitude, banishment, social boycott and execution. In case of forcible marriage, the usual form of punishment was confiscation of property or imprisonment. Punishment in adultery cases was inflicted by penal servitude or mutilation for female offenders. Fines were imposed according to the resources of the offender. Treason, murder, dacoity and theft were punishable by mutilation. Elphinstone writes that highway robbery was punished with death. Women were never put to death. Brahmin offenders were starved or poisoned to death. Capital punishment was inflicted for various crimes during the regime of Nānā Phadnis. Sometimes *watans* of murderers were confiscated. Political prisoners were imprisoned in the forts. In some cases their irons were not removed except at dinner time. Ordinary prisoners were well-treated. They were permitted to go home to perform religious ceremonies. Sometimes the relations of the prisoners were allowed to live with them and they were fed by the Government.⁶⁹

Marāthā Rule in Hindustān:

After the grants of *Swarāj*, *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of the six *subāhs* of the Deccan were obtained in 1719, the process of conquest of Mughul provinces began. Arrangements were made for the collection, not by one agency, but by different parties, of various shares. Nothing was said in the arrangements about the good government of the country, nor any rules laid down about the civil administration. The districts which paid these claims had thus to maintain two sets of rulers—the local *zamindārs* or Mughul officers who were not displaced and the Marāthā overlords who claimed the *chauth*. The local *zamindār* would not pay unless pressed at the point of the sword. To force the *zamindārs* and princes to pay the *chauth*, annual expeditions were undertaken, which devastated the countryside through which the army marched, and rendered the country poorer. A great anarchy spread in the Mughul provinces of India which made the Marāthās detested outside Mahārāshtra. While the government was mild at home and there was a semblance of regular administration, beyond there was anarchy and disorder. This perhaps explains the

divergence or dichotomy in the description of Marāthā administration as given by Marāthā scholars drawing on Marāthi sources or even by Elphinstone in his *Report*, and that drawn by foreign scholars. While the former dwell on the mild and orderly government in the home country, the latter describe the anarchy outside Mahārāshtra. In this connection Rawlinson remarks, "the chief objection to be urged against the Marāthā system of government is that outside its own territory (*Swāraj* or Mahārāshtra) it was almost predatory.... Other Hindu states took a pride in improving the condition of the territory they conquered. They constructed temples, wells, canals, roads and other public works. The Marāthās did nothing of the kind. Their *mulkgiri* raids by destroying the industries and wealth of the countries overrun, merely killed the goose that laid the golden eggs".⁷⁰

Rajwade and Sardesai say the same thing in a different way. "When *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo and his son Bālājī Rāo overran practically the whole of Hindustān, they were confronted with three tasks: (1) to persuade the conquered people to acquiesce in Marāthā rule, (2) to exhort the military chiefs to work for the common good of the State, and (3) to remain loyal to the Mahārājā of Satara. None of the three objects were properly achieved. The first in importance was acquiescence of the people in Marāthā rule. No institutions were set up to explain to the conquered people Marāthā ideals and Marāthā objectives and rally their support to the Marāthā cause. To the Kannadigas, the Andhras, the Gujarātis, the Bundelas, the Purbias, the Sikhs and the Rangdas, the Marāthās, in their new conquests, remained strangers like their former Muslim overlords and they could never count on local support when threatened by an outside enemy. At the time of the battle of Pānipat the *Peshwā* came to know how unstable was his power in Hindustān".⁷¹

Sardesai has observed that Bālājī Viswanāth and his son Bājī Rāo won Rājput friendship to make progress in their northern enterprise. This asset was lost by the third *Peshwā*'s inept handling of the succession disputes of the Rājput chiefs.⁷² The *Peshwā*'s aim of squeezing huge sums from the parties completely alienated the Rājputs.

The Marāthā chiefs bent on collecting their *chauth* did not care to see in what manner the territory was being administered. As Jadunath Sarkar points out, "the Marāthā Government in Hindustān had no competent civil service, no stable government and no wise foreign policy. Their foreign generals like De Boigne and

Perron gave their *jaidad* lands peace and security for producing crops and paying revenue. Not so the Marāthā chiefs. With the exception of Ahalyā Bāi they were unwilling to undergo the drudgery of daily calling their collectors to account. The revenues were either farmed out to Banias or left to their Brahmin Diwāns and Prabhu clerks; and these men were notorious for their love of speculation and ignorance of the economic law that the revenue could not be increased simply by squeezing the peasantry. The rapacious and inefficient governments of the Marāthā agents in Hindustān kept lawlessness always raging in their *jāgīrs* and the desolate land could yield no produce for feeding the population or paying for the administration."⁷³

Vasudeo Shastri Khare is in agreement with Jadunath Sarkar when he regretfully remarks "that the Marāthā State would have obtained stability had the *Chhatrapati* (the Rājā) asked his chiefs to establish orderly government in their early conquests (in the Deccan) to repress disorders, give peace and prosperity to these territories. Instead they led expeditions to provinces as far distant as Lahore, neglecting the country nearer home. In peace times Marāthā rule prevailed everywhere; in times of confusion it was nowhere. The main reason for this state of things was that Marāthā conquests were superficial and Marāthā rule disappeared as soon as their troops marched away".⁷⁴ The Marāthās could not rise to the new opportunities presented to them by the weakness of the Mughul rule. They could make new conquests but could not consolidate them. As Palmer wrote to the Governor General in 1795 "the Marāthā Government in Hindustān is but ill-qualified for permanent conquest or civil administration, however formidable may be the means which it possesses of ravage and devastation".^{74a}

Military organization—Shivājī's period:

Shivājī started his career as a *jāgīrdar* with a small militia. As a born strategist he knew what he needed to expand his Poona *jāgīr* and utilised indigenous sources for his expanding kingdom. His country was studded with forts which either commanded fords, *ghāts*, or the plain country, and afforded easy protection when pursued by a superior enemy. He would occupy these forts and from there sally forth to attack enemy detachments. In his wanderings in his *jāgīr* he had visited the hilly *māval* country—the western belt of the Poona district, about 100 miles in length and extremely rugged. The climate was dry and invigorating and heat less oppressive than in the plains. The people living in the region were

stronger built, hardier, simpler and spoiled neither by luxury nor vice. He mixed freely with them, made friends with them and from amongst them formed his infantry which would attack the enemy and retire to their inaccessible haunts where cavalry could not pursue them. The foundation of Shivājī's power was thus his infantry, which preponderated over the cavalry. It was formed of the *māwlas* of the *Ghāt Māthā* and *hetkaris* of Konkan. Both of them were expert climbers and excelled in marksmanship. "Their arms consisted of swords, shields, daggers, poniards, straight rapiers, spears, bows and arrows, and when possible, matchlocks. The men brought their own arms and were only furnished with ammunition by government. They were dressed generally in a pair of short drawers coming half-way down the thigh, turban, a cotton frock and a band about the loins and a cloth round the waist. For desperate attack with swords in hands, the *Māwlas* of Shivājī became celebrated."⁷⁵

Every ten men had an officer called a *naik* and every fifty a *Havāldār*. The officer over a hundred was termed *Jumlādār* and the commander of a thousand was styled *Hazārī*. Over the *Hazārīs* was *Sarnobat* who commanded 7,000 infantry. Yesāji Kaṅk was the first *Sarnobat* of the infantry.

"The *Māwlas* sometimes enlisted on condition of getting only a subsistence in grain; but the regular pay of the infantry was from four to twelve rupees a month".⁷⁶ The company commander *Jumlādār* received about one hundred rupees a month. The company had its accountant and commissariat offices. All received regular salaries from government.

Shivājī did not require cavalry in the hilly country and in the inaccessible forests of the Sahyādri range. His numerous forts needed a large force of brave foot soldiers. So, for the first fifteen years of his career, Shivājī mainly recruited, equipped and trained infantry divisions. His organizing capacity, personal bravery and military leadership endeared him to his men and he made heroes of the simple, uncouth but sturdy *māwlas*. To the last, the infantry bore an equal proportion to the cavalry—100,000 infantry and 100,000 cavalry.^{76a}

After his victory over Afzal Khān, the Rājā devoted himself to the raising of cavalry. With the enormous wealth obtained in the Khān's camp and loot captured in subsequent expeditions he increased his military strength. Cavalry was needed for far-ranging

attacks and swift raids in the enemy country and its increase was made possible by the Rājā's victories over Bijāpur armies.

In the cavalry the unit was formed by 25 troopers (*bārgirs*); over 25 men was placed one *havāldār*, over 5 *havāldārs* one *jumlā-dār* and over ten *jumlādārs* one *hazārī*. Still higher ranks were *Pāñch Hazārī* and the supreme commander or *Sarnobat* of cavalry. Netājī Pālkar, Pratāp Rāo Gujar, Hambir Rāo Mohite were some of the famous commanders of the Rājā.

The *Śiladārs*, or troopers who supplied their own horses and arms, were organized on a different plan, but were under the orders of the same *Sarnobat* of cavalry and ranked lower than the *pāgā* horsemen.⁷⁷ "The *pāgā jumlādār* had a salary of 500 *hons* a year and the right to use a *pālki*. Attached to him was a *majumdar* on 100 to 125 *hons*. A *hazārī* drew 1,000 *hons* a year. Under him were *majmudar*, a Marāthā *Karbhari* (steward) and a revenue-writer (*Jama-navis*) for whom 500 *hons* were assigned. The accounts of military income and disbursement had to be made up with the signature of all the four. Every unit of 25 had one farrier and a *pakhālji*. The *Pāñch Hazārī* drew a salary of 2,000 *hons*. To his corps were attached a number of clerks, reporters and spies."⁷⁸

"The troops went into cantonments in the home country during the rainy season. Grain, fodder and medicines were kept in stock for the horses, and the huts of troopers were kept thatched with grass. On the day of *Dussarā* the army marched out from the camp to the country the Rājā had decided to attack. At the time of their departure a list was made of all the property that every man, high or low, of the army carried with himself. The troops were to subsist in foreign parts for eight months and also levy contribution. No woman, female slave or dancing girl was to be allowed to accompany the army. A soldier keeping any of these was to be beheaded. No woman or child was to be taken captive, but only men. Bullocks (not cows) might be taken for transport only. Brahmins were not to be molested. No soldier was to misbehave. On their return after eight months' campaigning, the whole army was to be searched, the property was to be compared with the old list, and the excess found was to be deducted from the salary. Anyone attempting to conceal his booty was liable for punishment on detection.

"The generals on their return were to see the Rājā, deliver their spoils in war in gold, silver, jewels and costly cloth to him, present their accounts and take their dues from the treasury. The officers and men were to be promoted or punished according to their con-

duct during the last campaign. Then they would again remain in camp for four months.”⁷⁹

Without tents and equipage, without provisions and other commissariat encumbrances, without heavy artillery, the Marāthā light cavalry and infantry moved with the greatest celerity. The soldiers gathered their provisions as they went along. Their diet was of the simplest kind. These hardy peasants, subject to all kinds of inclement weather, performed deeds of extreme endurance and valour which astonished the world. Dr. Fryer comparing the Marāthā and Muslim armies, remarks, ‘Sevaji’s men thereby being fitter for any martial exploit having been accustomed to fare hard, journey fast, and take little pleasure. But the other will not miss his dinner, must mount in state and have his arms carried before him, and his women not far behind him with masters of mirth and jollity; will rather expect than pursue a foe; but they stand it out better; for Sevaji’s men care not much for a pitched battle, though they are good at surprising and ransacking; yet agree in this, that they are both of stirring spirits’.⁸⁰

Dr. Fryer also remarks on the Spartan simplicity of the Marāthā army, of the men and the officers. “No intoxicant or drinks were permitted to the officers and no whore or dancing wenches were allowed in the camp”.⁸¹

Abbe Carre observes that “he greatly cherished the officers whom he called his brothers and friends, living familiarly with them and attending to their needs. He conducted himself with such ability, not affecting anything. Always being at the head of his troops, Shivājī knew not pleasure”.⁸²

Shivājī’s cavalry at the end of his career numbered almost 100,000, three-fourths of which consisted of *Bārgirs* mounted and equipped by government and one fourth of *silādārs* mounted at their own expense.

The French envoy, Monsieur Germain who spent three days in Shivājī’s camp on the Coleroon (1677) gives a graphic account of the Marāthā king’s spartan simplicity and efficient arrangements: “His camp is without any pomp and unembarrassed by baggage and women. There are only two tents in it, but of a thick simple stuff and very small, one for himself and the other for his minister. The horsemen of Shivājī ordinarily receive two pagodas per month as pay. All the horses belong to him and he entertains grooms for them. Ordinarily there are three horses for every two men, which contributes to the speed which he usually makes. This chief pays his spies

liberally which has greatly helped his conquests by the correct information they give".⁶³

Forts:

Forts were the basis of Shivājī's kingdom. His strength lay in the everlasting hills of Mahārāshtra which he used as places to shelter from the enemy or points to sally forth to attack. These he strengthened with masonry walls, parapets and bastions, water tanks and gateways. Rāmachandra Amātya in the *Ajñāpatra* says that the master created the kingdom with the help of forts. It was his forts from Ahiwant to the banks of the Kāveri that enabled him to wage a continuous struggle with his enemies. The *Bakhars* give the number of forts as 240.

Every fort was in the possession of the government and defended by a garrison the strength of which depended on the importance of the place. In every fort there were three officers of the same status and joint authority. The *Havāldār* was the head of the garrison and was entrusted with the keys of the fort. It was his personal duty to see that the gates were locked at nightfall and opened at daybreak. The *Sabnis* was in charge of accounts and the *Kārkhānis* of that of commissariat. All the three officers were to work jointly. The letters written for the *Havāldār* were drafted by the *Sabnis* and entered in his ledger by the *Kārkhānis*. The Rājā laid down that the *Havāldār* should be a Marāthā of good family, the *Sabnis* was to be a Brāhmin known to his personal staff and the *Kārkhānis* was to be a Prabhu. If a fort was a large one, the *Havāldār* was assisted by *taṭ-sarnobāts* who watched over the walls at night. The garrison was armed with swords, spears, matchlocks and muskets. Some of the forts had cannon, but the Marāthās were slow in learning the science of fire-arms. Most of their cannon and gunpowder they brought from foreign companies. Stones were heaped and tumbled down when the enemy attacked. The use of fire-arms, especially mortars and long range artillery, reduced the importance of forts. But this was a phenomenon of the late 18th century.

Marāthā Navy:

As the coastal districts came into his possession, Shivājī found the need of building a navy to protect his harbours and towns from enemy ravages. But his main enemies were the Adil Shāhi kingdom and the Mughuls, and to his navy he could devote little attention.

The Marāthā chronicles speak of Shivājī's navy as consisting of seven hundred vessels of various sizes and classes, such as *Ghurabs*,

tarandis, tarambes, gallivats, shibars, pagars, machwas, etc. The English factory records put the strength of fighting vessels at 60 only. They were formed into two squadrons (of 200 vessels according to Marāthi sources) commanded by two Admirals who bore the title of *Daryā Sārang* and *Mai Nark*.

Post-Shivājī period:

The Marāthā army underwent a radical change after Shivājī. It no longer represented the united military might of the national monarchy. The monarchy was eclipsed and the chief executive authority first passed to the *Pratinidhi* and then to the *Peshwā*. A number of chiefs raised forces on their own and fought the Mughul officers wherever they encountered them. Grant Duff presents a graphic picture of the Marāthā armies at the beginning of the 18th century: "Different from the organized bands of Shivājī (they formed) an irregular assembly of several thousand horsemen united by pre-concerted agreement in some unfrequented part of the country. They set off with little provision, no baggage except the blanket on their saddles, and no animals but led horses, with bags prepared for the reception of their plunder. If they halted during a part of the night, they slept with their bridles in their hands; if in the day, whilst the horses were fed and refreshed, the men reposed with little or no shelter from the scorching heat, excepting such as might be found occasionally under a bush or a tree; and during that time their swords were laid by their sides, and their spears were generally at their horses' head stuck in the ground; when halted on a plain, groups of four or five might be seen stretched on the bare earth sound asleep, their bodies exposed to the noon-day sun, and their heads in a cluster under the precarious shade of a black blanket or tattered horse-cloth extended on the points of spears".⁸⁴ Their great object was to seek the enemy in a difficult position. The leaders, though they generally rendered a partial account to the head of the State, embezzled or dissipated the greater part of their collection. The revenues raised by the emperor from his Deccan provinces, dwindled; treasure coming from the north was often attacked by Marāthā force.

Shāhū found it difficult to subdue these irregular assemblies of troopers. His *Peshwā* Bālājī Vishwanāth came up with a clever plan of recognising the conquests made by the chiefs if they agreed to Rājā Shāhū's leadership and surrendered to him a small part of their recoveries, and also to take a supervisory staff from the centre. The feudalization of the Marāthā state, thus begun under the force

of circumstances, never stopped. As Rājā Śhāhū showed little inclination to govern, the chief executive authority passed on to the *Peshwā*. The first four *Peshwās* proved capable men. The Marāthā State expanded under their authority and included almost three-fourths of the Mughul India. But the Marāthā State was an inorganic mass loosely held together by the head. After 1773 when a minor came to govern as *Peshwā*, there was great rivalry among the feudatories to wield the supreme power and they fought it among themselves only to lose to the British.

Orme in his *Historical Fragments*, analyses the strength of Marāthā armies. "The strength of their armies consists in their numerous cavalry, which is more capable of resisting fatigue than any in India, large bodies of them having been known to march fifty miles a day. They avoid general engagements and seem to have no other idea in making war but that of doing as much mischief as possible to the enemy's country. This they effect by driving off cattle, destroying the harvest and by such other means as make the people of the open country take flight on the first rumours of their approach. The rapidity of their motion leaves the prince with whom they wage war little chance of striking a decisive blow against them or even of attacking with effect any of their detachments. Hence the expense of maintaining an army in the field against the Marāthās with very little probability of ever fighting such an enemy; and the greater detriment arising from devastations they commit, generally induces the governments they attack to purchase their retreat with money."

Orme thus brings out two characteristics of the 18th century Marāthā armies. The first was their extreme mobility. They consisted mainly of cavalry without any encumbrance in the form of baggage, tents, supplies or artillery.

The second characteristic was that they always pursued enveloping tactics, intended to harass their enemy and cut off his supplies. They avoided pitched battles as far as possible. Hence the Marāthā army was called by the north Indian people *Ghanimi Fauj*. Vast hordes of horsemen marched long distances with extreme speed and secrecy, dispersed for foraging or bewildering the enemy and yet combined for striking a blow. This mobility also enabled them to break off an engagement at any time they chose and vanish to a safe distance. Sudden surprise of an unprepared enemy by vast bodies of light cavalry and complete envelopment of his position were the secret of success of the Marāthā system of warfare.⁸⁵

The expeditions of Bājī Rāo I in Mālwa and Bundelkhand show the Marāthā system at its best. At Bhopal a vast horde of 80,000 horsemen surrounded the Nizām, starved his army and forced him sign a convention, yielding the *Peshwā's* demand.

Malet, the British Resident at the *Peshwā's* court, sent in a detailed report on the organization of the *Marāthā* army in March, 1795 after the battle of Kharda. On that occasion the Marāthās had brought an army of 127,665 strong against the Nizām. Of this, 70,665 cavalry belonged to the *Peshwā*, 25,000 horse and foot provided by Daulat Rāo Sindia, 15,000 by Raghūjī Bhosle and 10,000 by Tukōjī Holkar and 7,000 by Parashurām Bhāu. Malet remarks:⁸⁶

"The foregoing bodies of troops are either under the command of feudatory chieftains whose authority over their own troops is absolute and without appeal, as the four last and many others, or under leaders of corps paid by Government either in money or land, under the denomination of *Nukdee* or *Tunkaw* (land assignments resumable at pleasure), and in the same manner as the mass of the force of the Mahrāttā Empire is thus composed, so the force of the various chieftains is in like manner composed in a smaller or greater degree of the same materials. Thus, for instance, the general Mahrāttā force is composed of Jagheerdars like Sindia, and Holcar, of *Nugdee* or ready money corps as Shah Meer Khan, Monsieur Noronha and Buchaba Sirolkur or of *Tunkadars* as Bugwunt Singh Wey, Paugeahs, etc. Now all these different descriptions are again detailed in the composition of the Sindian or other *Jagheerdars'* forces; that is to say, it contains every species of service, but the number is generally far short of the quota stipulated by the original feudal tenure. But though the *Nagdee* or ready money corps are not looked upon in so respectable a light as those paid in lands, the general term for which is *saranjamee*, yet are the commanders absolute in the management of them and in the disposal of the sums they receive for their payment, which generally runs to a certain rate per man and a fixed sum for the commander; and, as in the management of these corps the payment by Government is generally very tardy, the commanders have recourse to every trick by which they can possibly elude the checks by which Government attempts to insure faithful service, viz., by the appointment of Duan, Furnavees, etc., government officers to every corps through (sic) whom the most scandalous venality prevails, which is practised in collusion with the commander by which means it happens (but this must be understood more particularly in the *Peshwā's* service) that a corps

of 100 men has seldom more than 50 effectives, while the allowance of Government is reduced to half before it reaches the sepoy.

"The corps of the Paugheas*, that is, commanders of bodies of cavalry paid either in ready money or land assignments or *Tunka*, are smaller or greater according to the interest of the Paughea, as for instance, one has a Paugha of 50, another of 500, reckoning the whole at a certain sum per head, with a distinct allowance for the chief, who again distributes that allowance at his pleasure, giving to one 20, to another 200 rupees per month. Properly speaking, the Paughas should be composed of the horses of the Government or the chief, mounted by *Bargheers*, i.e., hired troopers, but this is not always the case, for *Silladars* (literally, bearers of arms), that is, horsemen with their own horses, often compose a large portion of a Paugha, and though every horseman throughout a Mahrattā army looks upon himself as company for his chieftain and always sits down with him, yet is the *Silladar* looked upon in rather a superior light to the *Bargheer*. To the Paughas, as to the Nugdee corps, there is an establishment of civil officers to enforce justice between Government and its servants, but the multiplication of checks seems to have had no other end than the increase of corruption, for not only is half the grain and forage allowed to the horses embezzled, but horses are changed, reported dead and every species of the most flagitious peculation practised with impunity arising from the general interest and participation therein, insomuch that I have sometimes been inclined to think that the Government must have some mode of reimbursing itself for these palpable dilapidations by withholding the pay due to its troops, for the clamors arise therefrom; yet from the ample profits of peculation, the chief is generally wise enough to keep his complaints within bounds, since his illicit profits are secure, and his tardy receipt of payment from Government furnishes a specious pretext for not paying the poor sepoy who through poverty is often forced to take another service with the loss of all his arrears, which his chief collects as he can, or to compound the whole for a part, which is generally anticipated by loans taken up of his Jummadar (chief) or the Karkuns (civil officers) of his corps at an exorbitant interest.

"Besides *Bargheers* and *Silladars*, there is another description of horsemen known in Mahrattā armies by the denomination *Yekandīa*, which signifies single. These are generally men of family, who with a few attendants, go in quest of service, and are frequently entertained on the footing of companions by the great Chiefs on most

*Commander of a Paugha

ample allowances, for instance, from Rs. 100 to Rs. 1,000 per month with one or two horses from the Chief's stable at their command.

"The arms of the Mahrāttā cavalry are swords, spears (*bhallas*), matchlocks and a few bows and arrows. The sword is universal and indispensable; the matchlock frequent and almost universal in the *Paugahs* and seems to daily gaining ground of the long spear or *bhalla*, long a favourite weapon of the Mahrāttās; but many of the *Silladars*, *Yekandias* and those who claim or affect superiority of birth and rank, seldom encumber themselves with anything but a sword or two. It must, however, be understood that the arms, accoutrements and clothing of the horseman being his own property, there is not the smallest uniformity, every individual being equipped as his taste or circumstances suggest.

"The *Paugahs* have (seldom) more than one large *rouly*, the most common kind of tent, and perhaps a *shameana* or canopy belonging to the *Paugah* pitched at one end of a street formed by the horses of the troops picketed in two lines fronting each other. This *rouly* serves to shelter the troopers and their furniture in bad weather and as a place of assembly for the corps morning and evening. At other times the trooper generally posts himself with his saddle, arms, etc., in front of his horse, where also he sleeps having nothing but what he can conveniently dispose of and convey to any distance on his horse. There are however generally a number of *tuttoos* (little horses) attached to each *Paugah*, that while the army is marching are dispatched with the *syces* (grooms) to forage, by which means they generally get to the ground as soon as the main body of the army reaches the camp laden with provender for the *Paugah* horses, or they sally forth in quest of it as soon as they have disposed of their burthen, though the failure of this reliance would not distress the Mahrāttās, who are not yet sufficiently pampered by wealth to despise that necessary part of military duty or to affect being above providing provender for the noble animal who administers so effectually to their ease and advantage.

"Over and above the foregoing constituent parts of the Mahrāttā army, it is to be observed that they have now introduced large trains of artillery and formidable bodies of regular infantry, the organisation of which being copies of our own, needs no particular explanation.....

"The safety which Mahrāttā armies enjoy as to their communications from the multiplicity of their cavalry, insures them such ample supplies from vast droves of *Bunparries* (grain merchants) con-

stantly marching with and hovering round their armies, as to render them totally indifferent to every other circumstance of encampment but water, and as to magazines either of grain or forage or dependency on the protection or supply of fortified cities, they seem unacquainted with those grand objects of consideration to an European army. This security gives a peculiar character to their camp and armies, for so little danger seems to attach to following their camp that shop-keepers, handicrafts and every species of profession carry on their callings seemingly as much at their ease as in their cities, which gives a conveniency and facility to a military life not to be met with perhaps amongst any other people, and may (added to the simplicity and absence of wants of Mahrāttā manners) account for their spending their lives as happily in the field as other nations do in towns: a circumstance, which while done with so great ease to them, gives them a vast advantage over all other people, who, while they are in the field, are in a constant state of exertion and hostility with their convenience.

“The safety of the Mahrāttā camps is to be attributed to the vast numbers of their cavalry hovering round in every direction, rather than to any of the precautionary measures of trenches, posts, guards, etc., systematically used in our armies. They have indeed, at night, patrols of Horse (*Shabeena*) sent out in different directions. But the ampleness of their equipment, at least of the host with which I marched, and of which I now write, enabled them always to keep up a large army under the denomination of Vanguard (*Harole*) in advance, and when they approached the enemy, to divide that again by an advance under the denomination *Chiny Fouge* or *Fouge Jereed*, which signifies the unencumbered army, being literally so much so as scarce to have a tent in it, every thing but the immediate apparatus for service being left at a convenient distance and under a very slender guard in what they call the Baggage Camp (*Beheer* or *Boonga*) so that at the time of the action with the Nizām on 11 March, the Mahrātā army consisted of 3 camps, the *Peshwā*’s or Head Quarter Camp, being upward of 20 miles in the rear of the *Chiny Fouge* whose *Beheer* or Baggage Camp was between both; it will be easily understood that while this division of force both in marching and encamping opens a field of great advantage to an active enemy provided with cavalry, yet little advantage can be taken of it by armies of infantry or much inferior in cavalry, whose camps must constantly be blockaded if they make a proper use of their advantage by their more numerous cavalry in so much as to prevent the smallest movement without discovery; for exclusive of

their hosts of cavalry serving on pay there are always great numbers of Pindaras or Predatory Horse that march with Mahrāttā armies, who instead of receiving pay, actually purchase the chief privilege of plunder at their own risk and charge, a predicament that gives a singular edge to their appetite for depredation and renders them infinitely more active and destructive than those who by receiving pay have not an equal stimulus to rapacity. They reside principally in Malwa and generally attach themselves to the armies of Holkar and Sindia, and generally speaking they are poor (for those who are lucky enough to get wealth seldom expose themselves while it lasts). Their horses are small but hardy and their equipment mean, so that they are by no means a match for any cavalry tolerably appointed. The depredations of these troublesome people are so dreaded throughout all the countries that are in the habit of being exposed to them that all the villages in such countries are walled, generally have a little citadel or gurry in the center.

Battle order of the Marāthās:

"I have heard but of two instances in which the forces of this State may be said to have engaged in pitched battles; one at Panipat, where, previously reduced to straits by the superior activity of the Pathan and Mogul cavalry, which was numerous enough to beat them in their own style of cutting off their supplies, and failing, were subjected to one of the most bloody defeats that we read of; the other was the battle (of Moti Talao) in which Trimbuk Mamma defeated Hyder, not far from Seringapatam. But I am unacquainted with the order of battle observed on those two occasions. It is reasonable to suppose that the introduction of infantry and artillery, forming so large a part as they now do in armies of this Empire, must cause a material alteration, if not a total change, in this part of their military service; while by giving to their armies a kind of base or center of union it alters their former predatory and desultory style of warfare. And while on one hand, this alteration makes their invasions infinitely more formidable to States unprovided with the means of opposing an increase of that description of strength, I am not without an idea, that as such increase of strength is necessarily attended with increasing incumbrances hostile to rapidity, that increase of strength may be disserviceable to their operations against a State such as ours in the degree that the increase affects the former desultory velocity. The decision of this point in which I suppose, our infantry and artillery are as light and rapid as this State's, whenever the contest happens, will form an epoch of the

most critical interest to the welfare, I may say, existence of our Empire in the East.

"I am, however, from a general observation of the manners of the people and extreme looseness of particular discipline or general arrangement amongst them, strongly of opinion that they would afford very easy conquest to any army of a more rigorous composition that could bring a sufficient number of cavalry to prevent their making a sport of war and retreating, when they are no longer disposed to maintain the contest, in safety and leisure."

Malet proved very much right in his prophecy. The new brigades proved the undoing of the Marāthās when they were pitted against the English. About the middle of the 18th century the Marāthās began to come in contact with the trained battalions of the English and the French. The fire-power of the trained infantry proved its superiority over the old type of Marāthā system using simple weapons like the sword and the spear. The system had failed against walled cities and well-provisioned camps, guarded by artillery. The Marāthās in a haphazard manner attempted to bolster their cavalry with the newly modelled infantry. Mahādji Sindia carried out, on a large scale, the new system of raising disciplined battalions under European officers, supported by artillery. Sindia was fortunate in getting the help of a French soldier De Boigne in raising the brigades, defeating his Indian enemies and making himself the king-maker. But as Lyall has pointed out⁸⁷ "...the regular troops and cannon hampered those rapid daring marches and manoeuvres of light armed cavalry which had for a hundred years won for the Marāthās their victories over the unwieldy Mughul armies, and had on various occasions perplexed and discomfited English commanders. The armaments and tactics of civilized nations imply high proficiency in the art of war, abundant supply of costly material and a strong reserve of well-trained officers. They cannot be adopted by an Asiatic people unaccustomed to such inventions," and ignorant of the physical and chemical sciences on which they are based. The Duke of Wellington expressed the same opinion. Writing to Major Shawe in November 1803, he remarked, "I have no doubt whatever but that the military spirit of the nation has been destroyed by their establishment of infantry and artillery. The destruction of these establishments contributed to the success of the contest".⁸⁸ The Marāthā soldier never enlisted in the Brigades, and the new army of Sindia enlisted men from Awadh, Doāb and other parts of Hindustān. In this manner the foreign element grew rapidly and

the Marāthā armies became denationalised, with their cavalry playing a secondary role.

The mercenary brigades were no match for the East India Company's army. Between the days of Warren Hastings and the coming of Lord Wellesley as Governor General (1784-1798) the Company had taken care to raise regiments of cavalry to meet the Marāthā threat. So when the British and the Marāthās clashed in 1803, Great Britain had superiority in training, fire arms, officers and morale. By issuing a proclamation on the eve of the Second Anglo-Marāthā war the British persuaded most of Sindia's foreign officers to leave his service. So the *Campoos* that fought at Assaye, Argaon, Aligarh and Laswari were sheep led to their slaughter. They fought with the courage of despair. In the battles, though they were sharply contested, British victories were decisive. The blows were delivered at close quarters upon compact bodies of troops which, once they were destroyed, could not be replaced. The defeat of Marāthā chiefs was complete and placed them at the mercy of the conqueror.

NOTES

1. Vincent Smith, *Oxford History of India* (1958), pp. 494-95; P. Spear, *India, A Modern History*, p. 277.
2. Irfan Habib, *The Agrarian System of Mughal India*, p. 351.
3. *Poona Residency Correspondence*, Vol. XIII (Elphinstone's Embassy), p. 410, also Elphinstone's *Report on the Territories conquered from the Peshwā*. Kulkarni, A. R., *Mahārāshtra in the Age of Shivājī* (1969).
4. Ranade, M. G., *Miscellaneous Writings* (1915); Kelkar, N. C., *Marāthās and the English* (1918); Sen, S. N., *Administrative System of the Marāthās* (1925);
5. *Ājñāpatra*, (Moramkar, 1926 edn.).
6. Carlyle, Thomas, *On Heroes and Hero-worship*, etc., (World's Classics), p. 204.
7. *Shiva Bhārat*, 10 32.
8. Ranade, R. D., *Pathway to God in Marāthi Literature*, (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1961), p. 290.
9. *Ājñāpatra*, p. 4.
10. Sarkar, Jadunath, *Shivājī and His Times* (1948), p. 28.
11. Naik, J. V., *Nature and Significance of the New Order Created by Shivājī*. (Bombay University Seminar, 1975).
12. Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
13. Sarkar, *ibid.*, p. 30.
14. Sabhasad, *Shiva Chhatrapatichē Charitra* (4th Edn. 1923), pp. 3-4.
15. Joshi, S. N., *Arvāchīn Maharāshtrētiḥās Kālātīl Rājya-Kārbhārachā Itihās* (1959), pp. 66-69.
16. *Patra Sār Saṁgraha*, 722; Sabhasad says Tukoḷī Chor was the first Sarnobat.
17. *Jedhe Shakāvalī in Shiva Charitra Pradīp*, p. 22; Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, p. 7; Chitnis, *op. cit.*, p. 43; Khare maintains that Mahadeo was the second *Peshwā* of Shivājī from 1662-72. It was only in 1672 that Moropant became the *Peshwā*. See Khare, G. H., *Nivāḍak Lekha*, p. 248.
18. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, p. 87; 91 *Qalmi Bakhar*, pp. 76-77; Sarkar, *op. cit.*, p. 57.
19. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-58.
20. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79. Sardesai, G. S., *New History of the Marāthās*, Vol. I, pp. 202-03.
21. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, p. 80.
22. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, p. 38; Sarkar, Jadunath, *op. cit.*, p. 120.

23. *Jedhe Shakāvalī*, p. 22 and Joshi, *op. cit.*, p. 140.
24. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, pp. 55-56.
25. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, p. 4.
26. *Jedhe Shakāvalī*, p. 27.
27. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, p. 84.
28. *Aitihāsik Patren Yādī Vagaire* (1930 ed.) No. 2; also Chitnis, *Sapatprakarnātmak Charitra* (Hervadkar, 1967), pp. 228-29.
29. Joshi, S. N., *op. cit.*, pp. 51-52.
30. *Aitihāsik Patren Yādī Vagaire*, No. 2.
- 30a. Chitnis, *op. cit.*, p. 176.
31. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.
32. *ibid*, pp. 83-84.
33. For a discussion of this point, see Shejwalkar, *Shiva Chhatrapati*, pp. 538-42; also Kunte *Mahārāshtra State Gazetteers, History*, pt. II, pp. 381-84.
34. Balkrishna, *Shivājī the Great*, pt. IV, pp. 57-58; Chitnis, *op. cit.*, pp. 229-30.
35. Chitnis, *op. cit.*, p. 107.
36. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, p. 28.
37. Chitnis, *op. cit.*, pp. 206-13 and Ranade, *Rise of the Marāthā Power*, (1900 ed.), pp. 117-18.
38. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, p. 43.
39. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, pp. 28-9.
40. *ibid*, p. 30.
41. Chitnis, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-14.
42. Balkrishna, *Shivājī*, pt. IV, p. 108.
43. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas* (1921), I, pp. 182-83.
44. *ibid*, p. 183.
45. Balkrishna, *op. cit.*, p. 119.
46. *English Records on Shivājī*, I, pp. 44-48, 97, 132, 146; II, pp. 6-7.
47. Ranade, M. G., *Miscellaneous Writings*, pp. 331-32.
48. *Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, XX, 109-45.
49. Fryer, Vol. I, p. 206.
50. Sabhasad (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 96-97.
51. Kulkarni, A. R., *Mahārāshtra in the Age of Shivājī*, p. 24.
52. Sarkar, *Shivājī*, (1948), p. 69, 82, 213, et seq.
53. *ibid*, p. 83, 176.
54. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, p. 104.
- 54a. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, p. 97, *Ājñāpatra*, p. 4.
55. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, p. 21, A. R. Kulkarni, *op. cit.*, p. 181.
56. Chitnis, *op. cit.*, (Hervadkar ed.), p. 123.
57. Kulkarni, *op. cit.*, p. 185.
58. Sarkar, Jadunath, *Aurangzib*, IV, p. 253.
59. Parasnis, *Itihās Saṁgraha*, VII, *Aitihāsik Sphuṭa Lekha*, pp. 4-5; also *Shahu Charitra*, pp. 134-35.
60. *Dhākṭā Rāmrajāchi Bakhar* and *Itihās Saṁgraha*, *Peshwā Daftarantīl Māhitī*, pp. 321-51.
61. Ranade, M. G., *Miscellaneous Writings*, p. 349.
62. Sabhasad, *Shiva Chhatrapati Charitra* (1923), pp. 96-97.
63. Chitnis, *Thorle Shāhū Mahārāj Charitra*, (1924), p. 46, Grant Duff, *History*, I, pp. 341-42.
64. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, I, p. 390, f.n. 2.
65. Rajwade, *op. cit.*, VI, p. 160.
66. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, I, p. 584.
67. Elphinstone, *Report, Selection of Papers from the Records of the East India House*, IV (1826), p. 159.
- 67a. Appendix to Elphinstone's Report.
68. Elphinstone, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-67 & 175-83.
69. Tone, *Institutions of the Marāthā People*, pp. 15-16.
70. *Cambridge History of India*, Vol. IV, p. 414.
71. Rajwade, *MIS*, I, Introduction, p. 96.
72. Sardesai, *Marāthī Riyāsāt*, V, pp. 135-36.
73. Sarkar, Jadunath, *Fall of the Mughal Empire*, IV, pp. 112-13.
74. Khare, V. V., Foreword to Kelkar's *Marāthās and the English*, p. 15.
- 74a. *P.R.C.*, VIII, p. 34.
75. Grant Duff, *op. cit.*, pp. 175-76.

76. Grant Duff, *ibid*, p. 179.
- 76a. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.
77. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, p. 25.
78. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-26.
79. Sabhasad, *op. cit.*, pp. 26-27.
80. Fryer, *A New Account of East India & Persia*, p. 175.
81. Dr. Fryer as cited by Balkrishna, *Shivaji*, IV, pp. 70-71.
82. *Hist. Miscellany*, pp. 48-55.
83. *Memoirs of Francois Martin*, II, 113-19 cited by Jadunath Sarkar, *Military History of India*, p. 154.
84. Grant Duff, *History of the Mahrattas* (1921), Vol. I, p. 302.
85. Sarkar, Jadunath, *Military History of India*, pp. 155-59.
86. P. R C, IV, pp. 269-77; Malet's report on the military organisation has been overlooked by scholars so far and therefore is quoted at length. Malet was British Resident at the Peshwā's Court and was present with the Marāthā army in 1795 and describes in vivid detail its organization, weapons, dress of the Marāthā soldiers, etc. James Forbes, however, has included the despatch in the second volume of *Oriental Memoirs* (1813) at pp. 143-157.
87. Lyall, Alfred, *The Rise and Expansion of the British Dominion in India*, (3rd ed., 1905), pp. 225-26.
88. Owen, Sydney, *Selection from Wellington Despatches*, p. 356.
[The Asst. Editor (Dr. Dighe) has drawn on many papers he read at seminars in Bombay, Poona and Delhi for the chapter.]

CHAPTER XVIII

ADMINISTRATION IN BRITISH TERRITORIES IN INDIA : 1707-1818

PART I

Bengal:

The history of the evolution of British administrative institutions in Bengal from 1707 to 1818 may be roughly divided into two periods. The first period in this history may be said to have come to an end in 1774 with the coming into force¹ of what is popularly known as Lord North's Regulating Act of 1773.² The second period began in 1774 with the coming into operation of the Regulating Act, and continued for our present purposes, till 1818.

First Period: 1707-1774:

Before, however, we actually deal with the English political institutions in Bengal during this period, we consider it necessary to say, by way of introduction, a few words in regard to two preliminary matters, namely, (i) when Bengal first became a Presidency under the English, and (ii) what was the manner in which the affairs of the East India Company—or, to be more precise, of the United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies—were administered in England during this period.

(i) *Bengal: A Presidency:*³

Roughly speaking, before 1682 Bengal had been subordinate to Fort St. George (Madras). In 1682, however, it became, although for a brief period, independent of the latter. One Mr. William Hedges was appointed to be the first independent Agent and Governor of the (first East India) Company's "affairs and factories in the Bay of Bengal".⁴ His commission of appointment was dated 14 November, 1681. He landed at Hoogly on 24 July, 1682, and held office as Agent and Governor of the Company's "affairs in the Bay of Bengal", from that date till 30 August, 1684, when he was superseded⁵ by one Mr. William Gyfford (Gifford) who had previously

been appointed Agent and Governor of the Company's affairs in the Bay of Bengal, in addition to his duties as Agent and Governor of Fort St. George, Madras. Thus, Bengal once more became subordinate to Madras, and continued to be in this state of subordination from September, 1684 to December, 1699, when one Sir Charles Eyre was appointed Governor of Fort William at Calcutta and President of all the Company's "Settlements and Affairs in the Kingdoms of Bengal and Behar in the East Indies".⁶

Sir Charles Eyre actually assumed office as Governor of Bengal on 26 May, 1700.⁷ Thus Bengal again became independent of Madras, with Sir Charles Eyre as its Governor. This, in brief, is the history of the origin of the Presidency of Bengal.

(ii) *Home Administration of Indian Affairs:*⁸

Briefly speaking, the constitution, rights and privileges of the East India Company—or, to be very precise, of the United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies⁹—*practically* during the whole of the period with which we are now concerned,¹⁰ were in essence based upon, and derived from, the Charter which King William III had granted on 5 September, 1698, to the bulk of the subscribers to a loan of two millions sterling to the State, incorporating them as a New East India Company under the denomination of "The English Company Trading to the East Indies". The King had granted this Charter under the authority conferred upon him by an Act of Parliament.

Under this constitution, there were two bodies for the administration of the affairs of the Company in England: a General Court of Proprietors and a Court of Directors. The supreme authority for the administration of those affairs was, however, vested in the General Court of Proprietors. The Chairman of the Court of Directors of the Company was its "*ex-officio* Chairman", and consequently presided over the meetings of its General Court.

The Court of Directors consisted of twenty-four members who were annually elected by the General Court of Proprietors from among its own members by a majority of votes. The election was held "on some day or days, time or times, between the twenty-fifth day of March and the twenty-fifth day of April in each year". After the constitution of a new Court of Directors at the end of a year, it would, at its first meeting, elect by ballot, from among its own members, its Chairman and Deputy Chairman for the next succeeding year. Although the number of Directors was twenty-four,

any thirteen of them would be sufficient to constitute a Court. This number, therefore, was the quorum for all purposes of the Court, and any action taken by any thirteen Directors would be an action of the Court.

The Court of Directors was 'the executive body' of the Company. It was empowered "to act according to such Bye-Laws, Constitutions, Orders, Rules, or Directions, as shall from time to time be made and given unto them by the General Court (of Proprietors) of the Company". In the absence of any such bye-laws, etc., it would, subject to the constitution of the Company as based upon the Act of Parliament and the Royal Charter previously referred to, "direct and manage all the affairs and business of the Company"; choose and appoint its agents or servants from time to time; 'allow and pay reasonable salaries and allowances' to them, or 'remove or displace them, if necessary; and generally do such other business as it would judge necessary for the well ordering and managing of the Company and the affairs thereof'. Lastly, it would, subject to the same restriction as noted above, "do, enjoy, perform, and execute all the powers, authorities, privileges, acts, and things in relation to the Company as fully, to all intents and purposes, as if the same were done by the whole Company, or by a General Court (of Proprietors) of the same".

It may be noted here that only a holder of "five hundred pounds, or more, share or interest, in the stock" of the Company would have a vote in the General Court of Proprietors, but that no person could act as a Director till he had taken an oath that he possessed £ 2,000 of the Company's stock, or, if a Quaker, made a declaration to that effect. Nor could a person be "chosen a Director of the Company" who would not, "at the time of such choice, be a natural born subject of England or naturalised, and have in his name or in his own right, and for his use two thousand pounds, or more", of the Company's stock.

The Charter of King William III provided for the appointment of sub-committees by the Court of Directors from among its own members, for the execution of the business of the Company. Actually, however, the term used was "committee" and not "sub-Committee". There were several such committees which would be formed by the Court of Directors at its first meeting after its reconstitution at the end of a year, and amongst which its business would be divided: namely, the Committee of Accounts, the Committee of Buying, the Committee of Correspondence, the Committee of Law-

suits, the Committee of Shipping, the Committee of Treasury, the Committee of Warehouses, and the Committee of Private Trade. In April, 1771, a new Committee for the management and application of the Military Fund instituted by Lord Clive, was added. The Chairman and the Deputy Chairman of the Court of Directors were *ex-officio* members of all the Committees.¹¹

There was another Committee of the Court of Directors to which we find frequent reference in contemporary letters from the Court to the President and Council in Bengal. This Committee was styled the Secret Committee of the Court. Like its other Committees, it used to be formed by the Court from among its own members, after its own reconstitution by the General Court of Proprietors at the end of a year. It consisted of the Chairman of the Court of Directors, its Deputy Chairman, and some other members thereof, not less than two, or more than seven in number. Any three members of the Committee would constitute a quorum. Any "instructions, orders, and directions" which the Committee or any three members thereof might think fit to issue to any person or persons in the service of the Company in Bengal (or, for the matter of that, in the East Indies), had to be "duly observed and complied with" by them.¹²

English Administrative Institutions in Bengal: 1707 to 1774:

Broadly speaking, during the whole of this period the affairs of the Company in Bengal were ordinarily administered, subject to the control of its Court of Directors and, ultimately, of its Court of Proprietors in England, by a President and Council¹³ consisting of its superior servants. The President was also known as Governor. Moreover, there would often be appointed, during the later part of this period, a Select Committee to help the President and Council in the administration of the affairs of the Company in Bengal. The principal settlement of the Company in Bengal was at Fort William in Calcutta. Under this principal settlement, there were several minor settlements¹⁴ of the Company in this side of India. They were referred to either as 'subordinates' or as factories. This nomenclature, however, was not always strictly adhered to, and a 'subordinate' would often be referred to as a factory.¹⁵ A factory would ordinarily be under a 'subordinate'. Subject to the control and direction of the President and Council at Fort William, the affairs of a 'subordinate' were originally managed by a Chief and Council, and those of a factory by a Resident. Later on, the heads of 'subordinates' were also sometimes designated Residents. It may be

mentioned here that there were two other principal settlements of the Company in India during the period with which we are now concerned: one at Bombay, and another at Fort St. George, Madras. All these three settlements were also called Presidencies, probably because at the head of each of them there was a President. Broadly speaking, the affairs of the Company in the Presidencies of Bombay and Fort St. George were administered in the same way, and subject to similar control from England, as in the case of the Presidency of Fort William. It may also be noted here that, although the three Presidencies often acted, as a matter of fact, on the principle of mutual help and co-operation in relation to one another, they were, constitutionally speaking, absolutely independent of one another. The President (or Governor) and Council at each Presidency were responsible to the authorities of the Company in England for the proper execution of their duties in India.

The principal settlements of the Company at Bombay and Fort St. George at Madras also had minor settlements under them, as in the case of Fort William at Calcutta.

We shall now deal with the position and powers of the President, Council and the Select Committee at Fort William.

The Governor:

The Governor¹⁶ of Fort William in Bengal was appointed by the Court of Directors of the Company. This was also the case with the Governors of Fort St. George in Madras, of Bombay and of Fort Marlborough at Bencoolen, Sumatra. It was an invariable usage of the Company that the post of Governor and President in a Presidency should be filled by one of its civil servants. In the later part of the period now under consideration, the Governor was required to take an oath and to enter into a penalty bond that he might be "restricted in points of trade and private interest". Moreover, he was required to give a security of £ 10,000 for the faithful performance of his Covenant regarding the non-acceptance of any presents from any person.

Powers of the Governor:

In his *Memoirs of Warren Hastings*,¹⁷ Gleig has stated in connection with the office of President (i.e., the Governor) that he "may be regarded as bearing to his Council no other relation than that of *primus inter pares*". This statement is substantially correct, as the President and Governor did not possess in those days the power of overriding the majority of his Council or Select Committee and act-

ing on his own authority and responsibility in special cases.¹⁸ As a matter of fact, the power to override the majority of their Council and to act on their own responsibility "in cases of high importance" in the executive sphere was first conferred upon the Governor-General of Bengal, and also upon the Governors of Madras and Bombay, by a Parliamentary enactment of 1786.¹⁹ Technically, therefore, the President was the first among, usually, nine to sixteen 'equals'²⁰ and every question brought before a meeting of the President and Council was decided, if the whole Council had been duly summoned, by a majority of the Council.²¹ And a mere change in its personnel would not affect the system of the Company's Government at Fort William. This will be evident from the following extract from a letter of the President and Council of Fort William²² to the Nawāb of Murshidabad:²³

"That as the Nabob seems to conjecture there is a total suspension of our Government until Lord Clive's arrival. It becomes necessary to explain to him that the system of our Government is always the same and can never lose its force by the change of individuals—and that *whoever be President*²⁴ he does the duties of his office, until a succeeding President takes the Chair and jointly with the Council conducts all the Company's business with the same authority."

The President and Governor had, however, certain special powers and privileges which contributed much to the dignity, prestige and the influence of his office. For instance, he alone was empowered to carry on correspondence with 'the Country Powers' in India. Again, the Governor of Bengal was also, under the terms of his appointment, the Commander-in-Chief of all the Company's forces in the Presidency of Bengal. And we find in a General Letter from the Court of Directors to the President and Council at Fort William, dated 30 June, 1769:

"We are much surprised at the many questions which arose in the disputes²⁵ between our President Mr. Verelst and General Smith concerning their respective Military Authorities. As a full answer to the whole, in a few words, you are to understand that our Governor is to all intents and purposes the Commander in Chief of our Forces and *whatever orders he sends to any officer, must be obeyed*.²⁶ He is answerable to us for the use he makes of this power, and if he takes upon himself to give orders without the consent of the Council or Select Committee upon points belonging to their management he will suffer our severest resentment."

It is evident from all this that the President and Governor of Fort William occupied a very important position in the early governmental system of the Company in Bengal. Indeed, he was considered as 'the supreme Magistrate in Military as well as in Civil Affairs', and as 'the head of both civil and military establishments', because of his 'pre-eminence in all Departments'. His general position as the head of the Company's affairs in Bengal and the duty of the Council at Fort William towards him, had been explained by the Court of Directors in one of its earlier letters of 31 January, 1755 to the President and Council at Fort William, as follows:

"All the rules and directions we can lay down will be of no effect nor can we ever expect to see our affairs properly conducted unless the President for the time being agreeable to his situation and the real intention of his post is a *General Inspector and Supervisor of the whole machine*;²⁷ in that light we look upon the President and we expect Mr. Drake²⁸ will exert himself accordingly. We shall then find that the several important posts which have been hitherto conducted too independently will be properly checked and controlled and our servants in general will likewise be in all respects kept to their duty. Whenever therefore the President shall lay before you²⁹ any complaints or observations upon the conduct or management of our servants of any rank or degree or proposes any regulations for the better management of our affairs in general or any particular branches of them, you are seriously to attend to and consider them and apply such remedies as the nature of them requires."

The Court also directed in the same letter that, in consequence of the authority vested in the President, he was 'to call upon the several persons employed to see in what manner their business' was executed, so that it itself might have fewer occasions for complaints against the way in which they performed their duties.

We may also note in this connection what Lord Clive stated in the course of a parting message to Mr. Verelst who was to succeed him in the office of President and Governor of Bengal, and to the other members of the Select Committee at Fort William:³⁰

"The people of this country have little, or no idea of a divided power: they imagine all authority is vested in one man. The Governor of Bengal should always be looked upon by them, in this light, as far as is consistent with the honour of the Committee and Council. In every vacant season therefore, I think

it expedient that he take a tour up the country in the quality of *Supervisor General*.³¹ Frauds and oppressions of every sort, being by this means laid open to his view, will in great measure be prevented, and the natives preserve a just opinion of the importance and dignity of your President, upon whose character and conduct much of the prosperity of the Company's affairs in Bengal, must ever depend."

In the exercise of his powers, however, the President and Governor was subject to the control and direction of the Select Committee and the Council at Fort William, and to that of the Court of Directors in England, and he was accountable to them for the manner in which he executed the duties of his office.

Such, in brief, were the position, powers and responsibilities of the Governor of Bengal as these had been, before what is known as the Regulating Act of 1773 came into force. We may observe, however, that, apart from the specific powers vested in him, much depended upon personal factors. If the Governor happened to be a man of strong character and personality, and he himself was above temptations—and there were many in his way in those days—he would certainly be able to maintain the dignity of his office and exercise a considerable influence over men and affairs. But things would be otherwise if the Governor happened to be a weak man or if he was not himself above temptations.³²

The Council:

The constitution of the Council differed from time to time, the number of Councillors including the President and Governor, varying, ordinarily, from nine to sixteen.³³ The views of the Court of Directors on the question whether the Commanding Officer of the army in the Presidency of Bengal should have a constant seat on the Council, also varied from time to time. Members of the Council also varied from time to time. Members of the Council were, like the President and Governor, ordinarily appointed by the Court of Directors. But vacancies would often occur in the membership of the Council either as a result of the death, going away, dismissal or the suspension of its members, or otherwise. If any such vacancies occurred, the President and Council were empowered to fill them provisionally, pending the approval of the Court, by appointing some superior servants of the Company in Bengal. It should, however, be noted here that seniority alone was not to be a ground for such appointments. In its General Letter to Bengal, dated 24 December, 1765, the Court of Directors directed the President and

Council "to be extremely careful not to admit any one into Council" unless they were fully satisfied that his "abilities, integrity, circumstances and good character in general" rendered him fit for so important a station as the membership of the Council.

We have stated before that the President and Council were empowered provisionally to fill vacancies in the Council by appointing some superior servants of the Company from within Bengal. But sometimes such vacancies would be filled by the appointment of civil servants from other Presidencies. For instance, in 1765-66 four vacancies in the Council were filled by the appointment of four civil servants from the Presidency of Madras.

Public and Secret Departments:

The Council would sometimes form itself into two Departments, Public and Secret, for the transaction of its business. For example, it did so at a (Public) Consultation, held at Fort William on 3 November, 1763.

The Select Committee:

The Select Committee at Fort William generally consisted of five persons including the President and Governor there. Sometimes, however, it consisted of six persons and sometimes only of four (and even three) persons in certain circumstances. Although it was an almost invariable practice on the part of the Court of Directors to include a military officer—generally the Commanding Officer, for the time being, of the Company's army in Bengal—in the Select Committee, yet it would often lay it down as a general principle that the Commanding Officer should not be allowed to have a constant seat on the Committee.

Select Committees were ordinarily constituted from time to time by the Court of Directors, but casual vacancies therein were filled by their members themselves under the authority vested in them in this regard by the Court. Further, the President (at Fort William) would sometimes himself appoint senior servants of the Company available at Fort William, to be temporary members of the Select Committee. The usual quorum for the Select Committee was three, although "the Select Committee did not lay down any rules for themselves".

The Select Committee constituted by the order of the Court of Directors, dated 1 June, 1764, resolved at its first meeting held at

Fort William on 7 May, 1765, that the following oath should be taken by its members:—

“I, A.B., do swear that I will not reveal to any person whatever, any of the proceedings of this Committee, until the same be laid before the Council or until this Committee be dissolved.”

And we find from subsequent records of the Proceedings of the Select Committee that every person who became a member of the Committee later on, had to take this oath of secrecy before entering upon the duties of his office.

Powers of the Council and the Select Committee:

Briefly speaking, except during a short period in which the Select Committee was, as will be shortly noticed, endowed by the Court of Directors with extraordinary powers and was, therefore, to quote the words of Malcolm,³⁴ ‘the real engine of government’, and except during such an emergency as will be referred to hereinafter, the powers of the Council were really immense, since it was vested with ‘a general supervising power’ over the administration of the Company’s affairs in Bengal. Thus we find the Court of Directors laying down in a letter, dated 23 March, 1758, that the Council should have the power of “ordering, governing and managing all the Company’s affairs at Fort William in Bengal, and all its dependent places and settlements with as full power and authority as the Presidents and Councils in Bengal have been usually invested with”. And in a previous letter, dated 11 February, 1756, the Court had directed that the Council constituted thereby would have the power of presiding over and managing “all the Company’s affairs at Fort William in Bengal, and all the several dependencies thereunto belonging”. In another letter, dated 8 February, 1764, the Court stated: “We have appointed the following gentlemen to be the Council for managing and conducting the Company’s affairs at our Presidency of Fort William to whom all obedience is to be paid,” etc. Again, shortly afterwards, in reconstituting the Council at Fort William by its letter of 1 June, 1764, the Court described its power as “managing and conducting all our affairs at the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal to whom all obedience is to be paid”. Lastly, we may mention that in the Court’s commissions appointing a President and Council at Fort William, dated, for instance, 11 February, 1758, and 31 May, 1764, we find that the Council was vested with the power of “governing and managing all the Company’s affairs in Bengal and the places and provinces thereunto belonging”.

Although the Court of Directors vested such extensive powers in the Council as shown above, yet it directed³⁵ in 1758 that, if ever Fort William were attacked by an enemy, the powers of its Governor and Council were, so far as its defence was concerned, to be suspended, and that the sole authority therefor was to be exercised by a Military Government consisting of the "President, the Major, the Engineer, the Master Attendant for the time being and the next most capable military officer to be appointed by the said persons". This direction of the Court regarding the setting up of a Military Government at Fort William in the event of its being attacked by an enemy, was in essence repeated by it in its General Letters to Bengal, dated 13 March, 1761, 1 June, 1764, and 23 March, 1770, although the Military Government itself was ordered to be constituted differently on different occasions.

It may also be noted here that the President and Council were empowered by a Royal Charter, dated 8 January, 1758, to make bye-laws for the good government and regulation of the Mayor's Court and other Courts erected under the same Charter "for the town of Calcutta at Fort William" and places subordinate thereto, and of the inhabitants thereof. These bye-laws, however, were not to have 'any force or effect' until they were 'approved and confirmed' by the Court of Directors. The President and Council were also vested by the same Charter with certain powers relating to the administration of justice at Fort William and at places and factories subordinate to it.

It will be clear from all this that the President and Council of Fort William were vested at the same time with executive, legislative and judicial powers, and that the principle of separation of powers was not followed in framing the governmental system of the Company at Fort William.

Powers of the Select Committee:

The powers of the Select Committee varied from time to time; but except during emergencies when it would be invested by the Court of Directors with extraordinary powers, it was the Council, and not the Select Committee, which was vested with 'a general supervising power' over the administration of the affairs of the Company in Bengal. During an emergency, however, the Select Committee would be vested with special powers. Thus we find that in its General Letter to Bengal, dated 1 June, 1764, the Court stated that the intention of the General Court of Proprietors in desiring Lord

Clive to go to Bengal, in view of the critical situation of the Company's affairs in the Province was:

"That by His Lordship's character and influence, peace and tranquillity might be the easier restored and established in that Subaship.

"In order therefore to answer these purposes in a manner that we apprehend may prove most effectual, we have thought proper to appoint a Committee on this occasion consisting of his Lordship, Mr. Wm. Brightwell Sumner, Brigadier General Carnac, also Messrs. Harry Verelst and Francis Sykes to whom we do hereby give full powers to pursue whatever means they shall judge most proper to attain those desirable ends; but however in all cases where it be done conveniently, the Council at large is to be consulted by the said Committee, though the power of determination is to be in that Committee alone."

As a consequence of the conferment of these special powers upon Lord Clive and his Select Committee, the Council at Fort William became, for the time being, a factor of secondary importance in the administrative system of the Company. This state of things continued till the "general superintending power" which had been vested in the Select Committee by the Court of Directors by its General Letter to Bengal, of 1 June, 1764, and which had been confirmed by its General Letter to Bengal, of 17 May, 1766, was withdrawn from the Committee by the Court by its General Letter to Bengal, of 12 January, 1768.

Considerations of space do not permit here any detailed reference to the prolonged controversy which took place in 1770 between the Council and the Select Committee over the question of their respective jurisdictions.³⁶ The matter was referred, however, to the Court of Directors both by the Council and by the Select Committee, for its decision thereon. In reply, the Court upheld the contention of the Council as against that of the Select Committee.³⁷ With its powers thus defined by the Court, the Select Committee continued to function till October, 1774, i.e., practically till the introduction of the new system of Government constituted under what is popularly known as Lord North's Regulating Act of 1773.

Judiciary before 1774:

We shall now briefly³⁶ notice the system of judiciary which the Company set up in Bengal before 1774. In the first place, there were established in each district two "Courts of Judicature; one by the

name of *Mofussal Dewānnee Audawlut*, or provincial Court of *Dewānnee*, for the cogniz(ance) of Civil Causes; the other by the name (of) *Phoujdārree Audawlut*, a Court of *Phoujdārree*, for the trial of all crimes and misdemeanours". Over the first the Collector of the district presided 'on the part of the Company in their quality of King's *Dewān*'. He was 'attended by the provincial *Dewān* appointed by the President and Council' and some other officers. No cause could be 'heard or determined but in the open Court regularly assembled'. In the second the *Cauzee* and *Muftee* of the district and two *Maulavis* would 'sit to expound the law and determine how far the delinquents shall be guilty of a breach thereof'. The Collector of the district, however, was required to 'make it his business' to attend to the proceedings of this Court "so far as to see that all necessary evidences are summoned and examined, that due weight is allowed to their testimony, and that the decision passed is fair and impartial according to the proofs exhibited in the course of the trial". He was thus 'to exercise a sort of general superintendence' over the procedure of this Court. Here also no causes could be 'heard or determined but in the open Court regularly assembled.'

Secondly, two 'Superior Courts of Justice' were established at Calcutta: "one under the denomination of the *Dewānnee Sudder Audawlut* and the other the *Nizāmut Sudder Audawlut*". The President with two members of the Council at Fort William presided over the *Dewānnee Sudder Audawlut*, "attended by the *Dewān* of the *Khālśa*, the head *Canongoe* and other officers of the *Cutcherry*". In the absence of the President a third member of the Council might sit along with the other two members. That is to say, not less than three members of the Council were to 'decide on an Appeal'. But the whole Council might sit if it so thought fit.

A 'Chief Officer of Justice appointed on the part of the *Nāzim*' presided over 'the *Nizāmut Audawlut* by the title of *Daroga-Audawlut* (*Daroga-Audawlut*). He was assisted by the Chief *Cauzee*, the Chief *Muftee*, and three capable *Maulavis*. Their duty was "to revise all the proceedings of the *Phoujdārree Audawlut*, and in capital cases by signifying their approbation or disapprobation thereof with their reasons at large, to prepare the sentence for the Warrant of the *Nāzim*, which shall be returned into the *moffussil* and then carried into execution". With respect to the proceedings of this Court a power of control was vested in the President and Council at Fort William similar to what was vested in the Collectors in the Districts over the *Phoujdārree Audawluts*, so that "the Com-

pany's administration in the character of King's *Dewān*", might be satisfied that the "decrees of justice on which both the welfare and safety of the country so materially depend, are not injured or perverted by the effects of partiality or corruption".

Thirdly, with a view to preserving 'the dignity and importance of the Two Superior Courts' just referred to, there were established 'Two Courts of *Audawlut*' at Calcutta, 'exactly on the same plan as those of the Districts'. A member of the Council at Fort William presided over 'the *Dewānnee*' Court, and another member of the Council exercised the same kind of control over the *Phoujdārree* Court as was exercised by the Collector over the *Phoujdārree Audawlut* in a district. These duties were to be performed by the members of the Council in rotation. These two inferior courts of justice at Calcutta superseded in 1772 what had previously been known as the Zamindāri Courts in Calcutta. As Zamindār of Sutanati, Calcutta and Govindpur, the Company used to exercise criminal, civil and religious jurisdiction in these places through these Zamindāri Courts.³⁹

Lastly, mention may be made here of the Courts of law existing in Calcutta which owed their origin to a Charter of Justice granted to the Company by the King of England on 8 January, 1753—we mean the Courts known as the Mayor's Court, the Court of Appeals, the Court of Requests as well as certain other Courts, such as the Court of Quarter Sessions, for the administration of justice in criminal cases. The Mayor's Court consisted of a Mayor and nine Aldermen. An appeal could be made from the judgment of the Mayor's Court to the President and Council of Fort William. And in certain circumstances a further appeal might be made to the King in Council from a judgment given on appeal by the President and Council.

Such, in brief, was the system of judiciary which the Company had set up in Bengal before a Supreme Court of Judicature was established at Fort William under a Royal Charter, dated 26 March, 1774. We shall have an occasion to refer to this Court of Judicature later on.

English Administrative Institutions in Bengal: 1774-1818:

The Regulating Act of 1773:

Many things contributed to the awakening of the conscience of the people of England to what had been happening in India, and to the consequential enactment by Parliament⁴⁰ of the Regulating Act

of 1773 with a view to a better regulation and management of the affairs of the Company both in India and in England. Among these we may mention the heavy drain of the wealth of Bengal following the acquisition by the Company of the *Dewāni* of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa on 12 August, 1765; the impoverished and miserable condition of the people of Bengal 'since the accession of the Company to the *Dewānnēe*'; stories of various abuses and iniquities on the part of the Company's servants in this country and of 'colossal fortunes' acquired by many of them, often by unscrupulous means; unhealthy influence exercised by many of these people on English public life on their return to England; war in south of India with Haidar 'Ali and its financial implications; the terrible famine of 1770 in Bengal and its dreadful consequences; revelations made by the Select and the Secret Committee of the House of Commons, appointed in 1772, in regard to the affairs of the Company; payment of ever increasing dividends to the share-holders of the Company and also of a tribute to the British Exchequer of an annual sum of £ 400,000; and ultimately, financial embarrassments of the Company which practically brought it to the verge of bankruptcy and compelled it to apply to the British Government for a loan for enabling it to get out of its difficulties.

It appears from the Report of a Parliamentary Committee that the authors of the Regulating Act had "five fundamental objects" in view. They were, briefly speaking, as follows:⁴¹

- "1stly: The reformation of the Court of Proprietors of the East India Company.
- 2ndly: A new model of the Court of Directors, and an enforcement of their authority over the servants abroad.
- 3rdly: The establishment of a Court of Justice capable of protecting the natives from the oppressions of British subjects.
- 4thly: The establishment of a General Council to be seated in Bengal, whose authority should, in many particulars, extend over all the British Settlements in India.
- 5thly: To furnish the Ministers of the Crown with constant information concerning the whole of the Company's correspondence with India, in order that they might be enabled to inspect the conduct of the Directors and servants, and to watch over the execution of all parts of the Act; that they might be furnished with matter to lay before Parliament from time to time, according as the state of

things should render regulation or animadversion necessary".

It need hardly be pointed out here that we are concerned in this chapter mainly with the last three objects of the Regulating Act.

Salient features of the Regulating Act:

We shall now notice some of the salient features of the Regulating Act. In a preamble the Act stated that, whereas the powers granted to the Company by Charters had been 'found by experience not to have sufficient force and efficacy to prevent various abuses' which had prevailed in the government and administration of the affairs of the Company, 'as well at home as in India', it had therefore become highly expedient that certain further regulations, better adapted to its then circumstances and conditions, 'should be provided and established'. Accordingly, the Act laid down, in the first place, that, 'at the next ensuing general election', instead of twenty-four Directors being all elected for one year only, six should be elected 'expressly' for one year; six for two years; six for three years; the remaining six for four years; and that "at the expiration of every year, six new Directors, and no more, should be chosen", "in the place of such Directors whose term shall have expired and who are hereby declared incapable of being then re-chosen". In effect, this meant that the members of the Court of Directors, should, instead of being annually elected as before, ordinarily hold office for four years, one-fourth of their number⁴² being elected annually. The object of this provision was to strengthen 'the authority of the Court of Directors' and to prevent 'instability in the Councils and measures' of the Company.

Secondly, the Act declared that no person employed in any civil or military office or capacity in the East Indies should be eligible for appointment as a Director until such person should 'have returned to and been resident in England for the space of two years'.

Thirdly, the Act forbade, on pain of severe penalties, any collusive transfer of any stock of the Company for the purpose of voting at any election. Moreover, it raised, with effect from 1 October, 1774, the qualification for a vote at any General Court of Proprietors from £ 500 to £ 1,000 stock, and declared that no person would ordinarily be entitled to such a vote unless he (or she, etc.) had previously possessed the stock for 'twelve calendar months'. The Act also provided for a plurality of votes in certain circumstances upto a maximum of four votes for any proprietor.⁴³

Fourthly, the Act declared that, for the government of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal, there should be 'appointed a Governor-General, and four counsellors'; and that the whole civil and military government of this Presidency and also the management and government of all the territorial acquisitions and revenues in the kingdoms of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, should, during such time as the territorial acquisitions and revenues remained in the possession of the Company, be vested in the said Governor-General and Council of the Presidency of Fort William, 'in like manner as the same now are, or at any time heretofore might have been exercised by the President and Council, or Select Committee in the said kingdoms'. In case of any difference of opinion on any question proposed at any consultation, the Governor-General and Council were to be bound 'by the opinion and decision of the major part of those present'. And in case of an equality of votes on any question, as a result of the death or removal or the absence of any member of the Council, the Governor-General, or, in his absence, the eldest counsellor present at the consultation, was to 'have a casting voice', and his opinion was to be 'decisive and conclusive'.

Warren Hastings was to be the first Governor-General under the Act,⁴⁴ and Lieutenant-General John Clavering, the Honourable George Monson, Mr. Richard Barwell and Mr. Philip Francis were to be 'the four first counsellors'. They were, subject to what follows, to hold 'their respective offices' for five years 'from the time of their arrival at Fort William in Bengal, and taking upon them the Government' of the Presidency. They could not be removed from office in the meantime, except by the Crown on a representation made by the Court of Directors. If a vacancy occurred in the office of the Governor-General during these five years as a consequence of his death, removal, or resignation, it was to be filled, 'during the remainder of the term aforesaid', by the member of the Council who stood next in rank to the Governor-General. And if a vacancy occurred, during the same time, in the office of a member of the Council, as a result of his death, removal, resignation, or promotion, it was to be filled, for the unexpired portion of the said term of five years, by the Court of Directors with the consent of the Crown. The Governor-General and Council were empowered to act in spite of any vacancy in the Council. At the expiration of the said term of five years 'the power of nominating and removing the succeeding Governor-General and Council' was to be vested in the Court of Directors of the Company.

Fifthly, the Act took the first step towards the centralization of the governmental system of the Company in India. It laid down that the Governor-General and Council were to have 'power of superintending and controlling the government and management of the Presidencies of Madras, Bombay, and Bencoolen',⁴⁵ 'so far and in so much as' that it would not be lawful for any President and Council of Madras, Bombay, or Bencoolen, 'to make any orders for commencing hostilities, or declaring or making war, against any Indian princes or powers, or for negotiating or concluding any treaty of peace, or other treaty, with any such Indian princes or powers' without the previous consent of the Governor-General and Council, except in such cases of imminent necessity as would render it dangerous to postpone such hostilities or treaties till the arrival of such orders, and except in such cases where the said Presidents and Councils had received special orders from the Company. Any President and Council who would offend against these provisions of the Act would be liable to be suspended from office by the order of the Governor-General and Council. Moreover, every President and Council of Madras, Bombay and Bencoolen were required by the Act to pay due obedience to such orders as they might receive 'touching the premises' from the Governor-General and Council, and 'constantly and diligently to transmit' to the Governor-General and Council 'advice and intelligence of all transactions and matters whatsoever' that would come to their knowledge, relating to the government, revenues, or interest of the Company. The Governor-General and Council in their turn were required by the Act to pay due obedience to all such orders as they might receive from the Court of Directors, and 'constantly and diligently' to communicate to the Court 'an exact particular' of all matters that would come to their knowledge, 'relating to the government, commerce, revenues, or interest' of the Company. The Court of Directors, too, was required by the Act to transmit, within fourteen days of its receipt of any 'letters or advices' from the Governor-General and Council, (i) to the Treasury 'a true and exact copy of such parts of the said letters or advices' as would relate to the management of the revenues of the Company, and (ii) to a Principal Secretary of State 'a true and exact copy of all such parts' thereof as would relate to the civil or military affairs and government of the Company.

Thus a chain of connection was established by the Act between the administrative machinery set up by the Company in India and His Majesty's Government in England.

Sixthly, the Act declared that, as the Royal Charter, dated 8 January, 1753, which, amongst other things, constituted and established courts of justice at Fort William, did not sufficiently "provide for the due administration of justice in such manner as the state and condition of the Company's Presidency of Fort William in Bengal" required, it "shall and may be lawful" for the Crown to erect and establish by charter a Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William. This Supreme Court was to consist of a Chief Justice and three other judges who were to be barristers in England or Ireland, of not less than five years' standing, and were to be appointed by the Crown from time to time. It was to have full power and authority to exercise all civil, criminal, admiralty, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and to appoint such clerks and other ministerial officers, with such reasonable salaries, as would be approved of by the Governor-General and Council. Further, it was empowered to 'form and establish' such rules of practice, etc., and to do all such other things as might be found necessary for the administration of justice, and for the due execution of powers to be vested in it by the Charter. It was to "be, at all times, a court of record, and a court of Oyer and Terminer, and Gaol Delivery, in and for the said town of Calcutta, and factory of Fort William and the limits thereof, and the factories subordinate thereto". Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was to extend to "all British subjects" residing in the kingdoms or provinces of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, or any of them, under the protection of the Company. And it was to "have full power and authority to hear and determine all complaints against any of His Majesty's subjects for any crimes, misdemeanours, or oppressions, committed, or to be committed; and also to entertain, hear, and determine, any suits or actions whatsoever, against any of His Majesty's subjects in Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, and any suit, action or complaint against any person employed by, or directly or indirectly in the service" of the Company or of any of His Majesty's subjects.

The Supreme Court was not, however, to be competent to hear, try or determine any indictment or information against the Governor-General or any member of his Council, for any offence, not being treason or felony, which they might be charged with having committed in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa. Nor could the Governor-General, any member of his Council, or the Chief Justice or any puisne judge be arrested or imprisoned upon any action, suit or proceeding in the Supreme Court. An appeal would lie to His Majesty in Council from a judgment of the Supreme Court, subject to such

conditions as might be laid down in the royal charter establishing the Supreme Court.

Seventhly, the Act directed the Company to pay, during such time as its territorial acquisitions remained in its possession, the following annual salaries to the Governor-General and others as shown below:—

The Governor-General	£ 25,000
Each member of the Council at Fort William		£ 10,000
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court	£ 8,000
Each puisne judge	£ 6,000

In view of these salaries, the above-mentioned persons were forbidden by the Act to accept any other fee, perquisite, emolument or advantage whatsoever. They were also forbidden to accept, from any person on any account whatsoever, any present or reward, pecuniary or otherwise, or any engagement for any present or reward; or to be concerned in any traffic or commerce, except the trade and commerce of the Company itself. A similar restriction was imposed by the Act upon every person holding any civil or military office under the Crown or the Company in the East Indies. Further, the Act laid down that it would not be lawful for any Collector, Supervisor, or any other of His Majesty's subjects, employed in the administration of justice, or their agents or servants, to be concerned in any trade in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa, except on account of the Company. These provisions were inserted in the Act, obviously with a view to ensuring purity and efficiency in the administration of the Company.

Eighthly, the Act empowered the Governor-General and Council "to make and issue such rules, ordinances, and regulations for the good order and civil government" of the Company's settlement at Fort William and other factories and places subordinate thereto, as might be deemed just and reasonable and would not be repugnant to the laws of the realm, and "to set, impose, inflict, and levy, reasonable fines and forfeitures for the breach or non-observance" thereof. But these rules, ordinances, etc., were not to be valid until they were duly "registered and published" in the Supreme Court to be set up under the Act, with the consent and approbation of the Court. And it would be lawful for any person or persons in India "to appeal therefrom" to the King in Council, who was empowered by the Act to set aside any such rules, etc. Moreover, the Governor-General and Council were required by the Act to transmit copies of such rules, ordinances, and regulations to a Principal Secretary

of State; and it would be lawful for the King to signify to the Company his disapprobation and disallowance thereof.

Ninthly, the Governor-General and Council and the Chief Justice and other judges of the Supreme Court were empowered by the Act to act as Justices of the Peace for the Company's settlement at Fort William and for several settlements and factories subordinate thereto.

Finally, the Act adequately provided for the trial in England, by His Majesty's Court of King's Bench, of any Governor-General, or any other person employed in the service of the Company in any capacity, or of the Chief Justice or any Puisne Judge of the Supreme Court, or of any of His Majesty's subjects residing in India, who might commit any offence against any of its provisions, or might be guilty of any crime, misdemeanour, or offence, committed against any of His Majesty's subjects, or any inhabitant of India within their respective jurisdictions.

We have given above a summary of what appear to have been the principal provisions of the Regulating Act of 1773. The three new Councillors, namely, John Clavering, George Monson and Philip Francis arrived at Fort William from Europe on 19 October, 1774. The first meeting of the new Council under the Regulating Act was held at Fort William on 20 October, 1774, under the Presidentship of Warren Hastings, (now) Governor-General.⁴⁶ The other members who attended this meeting were the three new Councillors from Europe, namely, Clavering, Monson and Francis. Richard Barwell could not attend this meeting, as he came to Calcutta two days later. At this first meeting, the Regulating Act was read, together with the Instructions which the Court of Directors had sent to the Governor-General and Council on 29 March, 1774, in connection with the Act. Besides, it was resolved at this meeting that a Proclamation should be made at the Court House by the Sheriff (of Calcutta) at 7 on the next morning. Among other things, this Proclamation was to announce that the powers vested by the Act in the Governor-General and Council were to "commence and take place from the date of the Proclamation" obviously from 21 October, 1774. The new Council also executed some other business at its first meeting.

As authorized by the Regulating Act, a royal Charter was issued by the Crown on 26 March, 1774, providing for the establishment of a Supreme Court of Judicature at Fort William in Bengal. It was to consist of, as stated before, a Chief Justice and three Puisne

Judges. Sir Elijah Impey was appointed to be the first Chief Justice, and Messrs. Robert Chambers, Stephen Caesar LeMaistre, and John Hyde, the first three Puisne Judges. The Charter also ordered the abolition of the Mayor's Court at Calcutta, without prejudice, however, to the judgments already pronounced by the Court.

Some serious difficulties were experienced in the actual working of the Regulating Act. This was largely due to what were considered to have been defects in its provisions. The first difficulty occurred owing to the absence of any power in the Governor-General to override his Council. As we have seen before, under the Regulating Act, if there arose any difference of opinion on any question brought before a meeting of the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, they were to be bound "by the opinion and decision of the major part of those present at the meeting". Only in case of an equality of votes, the Governor-General, or, in his absence, "the eldest counsellor present" at the meeting, was to have a casting vote, and his opinion was to "be decisive and conclusive". As a consequence of this provision in the Act, Warren Hastings who had been appointed to be the first Governor-General of Bengal by the Act, was often powerless and helpless before his Council, as three of his four councillors, namely, Clavering, Monson, and Francis generally acted together in opposition to him. His difficulties disappeared, however, with the rather 'timely' death of Monson in September, 1776, as he could now have his own way by means of his casting vote; but the lesson taught by them was there. And it may be noted here that when Lord Cornwallis was appointed to the office of Governor-General of Bengal in 1786, he made it a condition of his acceptance of the office that he "should be given the constitutional power to overrule his Council", if necessary. Accordingly an Act⁴⁷ was passed by Parliament in 1786 which in effect empowered the Governor-General to overrule, "in cases of high importance, and especially affecting the public interest and welfare", the majority of his Council and to act on his own authority and responsibility.⁴⁸ Ever since 1786 this overruling power had been retained, in one shape or another, ever down to the last days of British rule, as a feature of the Indian Constitution.

A second difficulty experienced during the working of the Regulating Act arose from the inadequacy of the power of control and superintendence vested by it in the Governor-General and Council of Bengal over the subordinate Presidencies of Madras and Bombay. And we particularly notice this in the following observations of

Warren Hastings, made in the course of a letter to Lawrence Sullivan, dated at Fort William 22 March, 1776:⁴⁹

"You long ago knew my wish to see a control given to this government over the other Presidencies, but I never meant such a control as is now exercised; nor did the Parliament mean it. The Act gives us a mere negative power, and no more. It says the other Presidencies shall not make war nor treaties without the sanction of this government, but carefully guards against every expression which can imply a power to dictate what the other Presidencies shall do..... Instead of uniting all the powers of India, all the use we have hitherto made of this Act of Parliament has been to tease and embarrass."

The third great difficulty experienced during the actual operation of the Regulating Act, arose from the absence of a precise definition by it of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to be established thereunder, and also of the relationship to subsist between the Supreme Court and the Governor-General and Council. This difficulty took the form of serious conflicts between the Governor-General and Council on the one side and the Supreme Court on the other.⁵⁰ And it was perhaps inevitable. As James Mill has rightly observed by way of a comment on this aspect of the Regulating Act:

"They (i.e., the British Parliament) saw not, that they were establishing two independent and rival powers in India, that of the Supreme Council, and that of the Supreme Court; they drew no line to mark the boundary between them: and they foresaw not the consequences which followed, a series of encroachments and disputes which unnerved the powers of government and threatened their destruction."⁵¹

However, an amending Act was passed by Parliament in the year 1781, which removed some of the difficulties arising from the Regulating Act. Among other things, the Act of 1781 laid down, in the first place, that the Governor-General and Council of Bengal were not to be subject, jointly or severally, to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court "for or by reason of any Act or Order, or any other matter or thing whatsoever, counselled, ordered, (or) done by them in their public capacity only, and acting as Governor-General and Council."

Secondly, no action for wrong or injury was to lie in the Supreme Court against any person whatsoever exercising a judicial office in the country courts, for any judgment, decree, or order of the

said Court, or against any person for any act done by or in virtue of the order of the said Court.

Thirdly, the Supreme Court “was not to have or exercise any jurisdiction in matters concerning the revenue, or concerning any act done in the collection thereof, according to the usage and practice of the country”, or the regulations framed by the Governor-General and Council.⁵²

Fourthly, the Act of 1781 declared:

“And whereas the Governor-General and Council, or some Committee thereof or appointed thereby, do determine on appeals and references from the Country or Provincial Courts in Civil Causes; be it further enacted that the said Court shall and lawfully may hold all such pleas and appeals, in the manner and with such powers as it hitherto hath held the same, and shall be deemed in Law a Court of Record; and the judgments therein given shall be final and conclusive, except upon appeal to His Majesty, in civil suits only, the value of which shall be five thousand pounds and upwards.”

The said Court⁵³ was also declared to be “a Court to hear and determine on all offences, abuses, and extortions, committed in the collection of revenue, or on severities used beyond what shall appear to the said Court customary or necessary to the case, and to punish the same according to sound discretion, provided the said punishment does not extend to death, or maiming, or perpetual imprisonment”.

Judicial and discretionary powers vested in the Governor-General and Council by these provisions are worthy of note.

Fifthly, the Act of 1781 indemnified the Governor-General and Council and the Advocate-General at Fort William as well as all persons acting under their orders, from any action, suit or prosecution whatsoever, for or on account of any disobedience to, or resistance to the execution of, any process or order of the Supreme Court.

Finally, this Act empowered the Governor-General and Council to frame, from time to time, regulations “for the Provincial Courts and Councils”, and directed them to transmit, within six months after the making of these regulations, copies thereof to the Court of Directors and to a Secretary of State. These regulations might be disallowed or amended by His Majesty in Council, and would come into “force and authority”, if not disallowed within two years, subject to such amendments as might be made therein.

As Ilbert has observed, the decision of Parliament, as embodied in the Act of 1781, was substantially in favour of the Governor-General and Council and against the Supreme Court on all points.⁵⁴

Pitt's India Act:

We shall now pass on to what is popularly known as Pitt's India Act, 1784. This Act introduced some important changes into the system of Indian administration. Its object was to provide "for the better regulation and management of the affairs of the East India Company, and of the British possessions in India; and for establishing a Court of Judicature for the more speedy and effectual trial of persons accused of offences committed in the East Indies". Space does not permit us to deal here with the Parliamentary history of this measure.⁵⁵ It may, however, be noted here that its enactment had been preceded by elaborate inquiries by two Parliamentary Committees into the affairs of the Company in India, and that the reports submitted by these Committees were largely responsible for it.

We may now notice some of the principal provisions of the Act of 1784. In the first place, this Act empowered the Crown to appoint, for the better government and security of the British territorial possessions in the East Indies, a Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India, not exceeding six in number, as it might think fit, who were all to be members of the Privy Council, and of whom one of the Principal Secretaries of State and the Chancellor of the Exchequer for the time being, were to be two. Any three members of the Board would form a quorum "for executing the several powers" to be vested in the Commissioners. The Secretary of State, or, in his absence, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, or, in the absence of both of them, the senior of the other Commissioners, "according to his rank in seniority of appointment", was to "preside at, and be President" of the Board. In case of an equality of votes at any meeting of the Board, the President was to have a second or casting vote. The Commissioners were invested by the Act "with the superintendence and control over all the British territorial possessions in the East Indies, and over the affairs of the Company", as shown hereinafter.

This Board of Commissioners for the Affairs of India was generally known as the Board of Control, and will be so referred to by us hereinafter.

Secondly, the Act fully empowered the Board "to superintend, direct, and control, all acts, operations, and concerns, which in any

wise relate to the civil or military government or revenues of the British territorial possessions in the East Indies". And, in view of this, all the members of the Board were, at all convenient times, to "have access to all papers and muniments" of the Company, and to be furnished with such extracts or copies thereof as they might require from time to time. The Court of Directors of the Company were "required and directed" by the Act to deliver to the Board of Control, "within eight days after the holding of such respective courts", copies of all minutes, orders, resolutions, and other proceedings of all general and special Courts of Proprietors of the Company as well as of the Court of Directors itself, so far as they related to the civil or military government or revenues of the British territorial possessions in the East Indies. Further, the Court of Directors was required to deliver to the Board copies of all dispatches which it itself, or any of its Committees, might receive from any of its servants in the East Indies, immediately after the arrival thereof; and also copies of all letters, orders and instructions whatsoever which it itself, or any of its Committees, might think of dispatching to any of its servants in the East Indies. Moreover, the Court of Directors was required by the Act to pay due obedience to, and be "governed and bound" by, such orders and directions as it might, from time to time, receive from the Board of Control, touching the civil or military government and revenues of the British territorial possessions in the East Indies.

Within fourteen days after the receipt of such copies as mentioned above, the Board of Control was to return the same to the Court of Directors with its approbation thereof, or its reasons at large for disapproving the same, together with its instructions in respect thereto. And the Court of Directors, thereupon, was to dispatch the letters, orders, and instructions so approved or amended, to its servants in India without any further delay, unless, on any representation made by it, the Board directed any alterations to be made therein. But no letters, orders, or instructions were at any time to be sent by the Court of Directors to the East Indies, on any account or pretence whatsoever, until after such previous communication thereof to the Board of Control as shown above.

If, however, the Court of Directors ever neglected to transmit to the Board of Control its intended dispatches on any subject within fourteen days after requisition made, then it would be lawful for the Board to prepare and send to the Directors any orders or instructions concerning the civil or military Government of the British territories and possessions in the East Indies. And the Court

of Directors was required to transmit in effect the said orders and instructions to the Governments and Presidencies in India concerned, unless on any representation made by the Directors to the Board, the latter directed any alteration to be made therein. It would be permissible, however, for the Court of Directors to apply by petition, in certain circumstances, to His Majesty in Council, touching such orders and instructions. The decision of His Majesty in Council on the application would be final and conclusive.

Thirdly, the Court of Directors was required by the Act to appoint, from amongst its own members, a Secret Committee, consisting of not more than three persons. And if, in the opinion of the Board of Control, any matter required secrecy, then it would be lawful for it to send secret orders and instructions to the Secret Committee of the Court, which was thereupon required, without disclosing the same to any other Director, to transmit the said orders and instructions to the Governments and Presidencies in India. And these Governments and Presidencies were directed to pay a faithful obedience to such orders and instructions, and return their answers to the same, to the Secret Committee, which was to communicate forthwith such answers to the Board of Control.

Fourthly, the Board of Control was not to have any power of nominating or appointing any of the servants of the Company. The power of filling a vacancy in the office of Governor-General, Governor, any member of Council, or any Commander-in-Chief was vested by the Act in the Court of Directors. It would, however, be lawful for the Crown as well as for the Court of Directors to "remove or recall" from office any Governor-General, or Governor, or Member of Council, or any other person holding any office, civil or military, under the Company in India.

Fifthly, the Government of the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal, also referred to in the Act as the Supreme Government, was to "consist of a Governor-General and three Supreme Counsellors only", of whom the Commander-in-Chief of the Company's forces in India for the time being, was to be one and to have "voice and precedence in Council next after the Governor-General."⁵⁶ And the Government of each of the Presidencies of Fort St. George, and Bombay was to consist of a Governor or President and three Counsellors only, of whom the Commander-in-Chief of the Presidency was to be one, "having the like precedence in Council as in the Presidency of Fort William in Bengal", unless the Commander-in-Chief of the Company's forces in India happened to be present in

the Presidency; and in that case the latter was to be one of the Counsellors, instead of the local Commander-in-Chief who would, however, have during such time only a seat, but no voice in the local Council. No resignation of the office of Governor-General, Governor, Commander-in-Chief, or Member of Council in any Presidency was to be deemed "legal or valid" unless it was "made by an instrument in writing under the hand of the officer or person resigning the same".

Sixthly, the Governor-General and Council of Fort William were empowered "to superintend, control, and direct, the several presidencies and governments now or hereafter to be erected or established in the East Indies" by the Company, "in all such points as relate to any transactions with the country powers, or to war or peace, or to the application of the revenues or forces of such presidencies and settlements in time of war, or any such points as shall, from time to time, be specially referred by the Court of Directors of the said Company to their superintendence and control". And the said presidencies and settlements were bound to obey the "orders and directions" of the Governor-General in Council "in all cases whatever, except only where" they had received positive instructions from the Court of Directors, or from the Secret Committee of the Court, "repugnant to the orders and instructions" of the Governor-General and Council, and not known to the latter at the time of dispatching their orders and instructions. Thus the controlling authority of the Supreme Government at Fort William over the subordinate governments of Madras and Bombay was increased and the process of centralization of power commenced by the Regulating Act of 1773 was carried a step further by the Act of 1784.

Seventhly, if "any act, order, resolution, matter, or proceeding" of the Court of Directors had once received the approval of the Board of Control, it could not be revoked or rescinded by the General Court of Proprietors.

Eighthly, the Act of 1784 declared that, "whereas to pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures repugnant to the wish, the honour, and policy of this nation", it would not be lawful for the Governor-General and Council of Fort William, "without the express command and authority" of the Court of Directors or of its Secret Committee, "to declare war or commence hostilities, or enter into any treaty for making war, against any of the country princes or States in India, or any treaty for guaranteeing the possessions of any country princes or states",

except where hostilities had actually been commenced, or preparations actually made for the commencement of hostilities, against the British nation in India, or against some of the princes or States dependent thereon, or whose territories the Company had agreed to defend or guarantee in accordance with any existing treaty. Similarly, it would not be lawful for the Governor and Council of Madras or Bombay or of any other subordinate settlement to issue any order for commencing hostilities or levying war, or to negotiate any treaty with any Indian prince or State (except in cases of sudden emergency or imminent danger, when it might appear dangerous to postpone such hostilities or treaty), unless in pursuance of express orders from the Governor-General and Council, or from the Court of Directors, or from its Secret Committee. And every such treaty was, if possible, to "contain a clause for subjecting the same to the ratification or rejection of the Governor-General and Council". Further, every such Governor and Council were required to pay due obedience to all such orders as they might from time to time receive from the Governor-General and Council concerning the above. Any Governor and Council who would wilfully refuse to pay due obedience to such orders and instructions as they might receive from the Governor-General and Council were liable to be suspended from office by order of the latter. Moreover, Governors and Councils of subordinate presidencies were required constantly and diligently to transmit to the Governor-General and Council at Fort William exact copies of all their "orders, resolutions, and acts", and "also advice and intelligence of all transactions and matters" which would come to their knowledge, or which the Governor-General and Council might from time to time require.

Finally, the Act of 1784 made "elaborate provisions for the prevention and punishment of corruption, misgovernment or disobedience" on the part of the Company's servants in India. For instance, the demanding or receiving of any sum of money, or other valuable thing, as a gift or present by any British subject holding any office under His Majesty or the Company in the East Indies, was to be deemed to be extortion, and to be proceeded against and punished as such. The offender was also to forfeit to His Majesty the whole gift or present so received, or the full value thereof. It was provided, however, that the Court of Justice before which every such offence would be tried, would have full power and authority to direct the said present or gift, or the value thereof, to be restored to the party who had given the same, or "to order the whole, or any part thereof, or of any fine" which the Court might impose on the

offender, to be paid or given to the prosecutor or informer, as the Court might think fit.

The Act was to come into force in Great Britain immediately after it had received the royal assent, and in India with effect from 1 January, 1785.

We have given above a summary of what appear to us to have been the principal provisions of the Act of 1784. It will be evident from what we have stated that, except in respect of the power of appointment to offices in India and the management of the Company's trade, the Act virtually made the Board of Control the supreme authority in regard to the affairs of the Company in India and placed the Company, to quote the words of Ilbert, "in direct and permanent subordination to a body representing the British Government".⁵⁷ This Board of Control which was really to form a part of the Ministry in England, was to be the machinery which would "enable the Ministry to control the proceedings of the Company".⁵⁸ As a matter of fact, subject to the superintendence of the Board of Control, the Court of Directors "conducted the correspondence with the Company's officers in India".⁵⁹ The Court of Directors exercised, however, the rights of patronage in regard to appointments in India. The Board of Control was, as Pitt had intended it to be, strictly a Board of Control;⁶⁰ it had no power of appointment, nor any patronage. The functions of the Board were in practice exercised by its President,⁶¹ who "occupied in the Government (of the day) a position corresponding to some extent to that of a modern Secretary of State for India",⁶² and would thus always be a member of the British Cabinet.⁶³ So far as the home administration of Indian affairs was concerned, this state of things practically continued down to 1858.

Another noticeable feature of the Act of 1784 was its attempt to produce, to quote the words of Pitt, "a unity of system" in the Indian part of the Company's administration, "by investing the supreme government to be seated in Bengal, with an effectual control over every other presidency, and by investing the supreme government with executive power".⁶⁴ Particularly, the power of suspension vested in the Bengal Government in relation to other Presidencies gave it a considerable controlling authority over them. It is quite true that this controlling authority could not always be effectively exercised in actual practice, owing to the difficulties of "communication between different capital towns" in those days. Nevertheless, its very existence went a long way towards producing a unified and a centralized system of Government in this country.

We have already referred to an Act of 1786, and also to the particular provision thereof, which empowered the Governor-General of Fort William in certain circumstances to override his Council and act on his own responsibility.⁶⁵ This "discretionary power of acting without the concurrence" of his Council, or of forbearing from any action according to its opinion, "in cases of high importance, and specially affecting the public interest and welfare", was conferred upon the Governor-General, with a view to giving "energy, vigour and dispatch to the measures and proceedings of the Executive Government". But the practical result of this discretionary authority was, as Chesney has observed, "to render the power of the Governor-General supreme".⁶⁶ This Act of 1786 also enabled the offices of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief to be united in the same person if this was considered necessary.⁶⁷

Before we conclude this chapter we should like to refer to one or two more Acts of Parliament relating to India. None of these Acts, however, introduced any institutional change of a really constitutional importance into the administrative system of the Company in Bengal. Let us take, for instance, what is popularly known as the Charter Act of 1793. It was practically a consolidating measure. Among other things, it provided that the Board of Control to which we have referred before, was to consist of "such members of the Privy Council (of whom the two Principal Secretaries of State, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were always to be there) and such other two persons as the Crown might think fit to appoint." The first-named Commissioner in the letters patent appointing the Board, was to be its President. As before, three members of the Board were to form a quorum. And for the first time, provision was made for the payment of salaries to the members of the Board.

This Act also declared that when the office of Governor-General and the office of Commander-in-Chief of all the forces in India were not combined in the same person, such Commander-in-Chief might be a member of the Council at Fort William if he was "specially authorized for that purpose" by the Court of Directors, but not otherwise.

An Act of 1797 reduced the number of judges of the Supreme Court at Calcutta to three—a Chief Justice and two Puisne Judges.

What is known as the Charter Act of 1813, the enactment of which had as usual been preceded by elaborate Parliamentary inquiries into the affairs of the Company in India, provided, among other things, for the continuance of the Company, for a further

period of twenty years, the enjoyment of its territorial acquisitions and revenues, "without prejudice to the undoubted sovereignty of the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland in and over the same". Further, it retained to the Company its monopoly of trade with China and also its trade in tea, but threw open to all British subjects the rest of the trade with India, subject to some conditions.⁶⁸ Thirdly, this Act provided for the separation of the commercial accounts of the Company from its territorial accounts.⁶⁹ Fourthly, it laid down that the appointments to offices of Governor-General, Governors, and Commanders-in-Chief were to be made by the Company, subject to the approval of the Crown. Finally, the Act empowered the Governor-General in Council to direct "a sum of not less than one lac of rupees in each year" to be "set apart and applied to the revival and improvement of literature, and the encouragement of the learned natives of India, and for the introduction and promotion of a knowledge of the sciences among the inhabitants of the British territories in India".⁷⁰ This provision of the Act of 1813 is interesting as it represents the first attempt on the part of the British Government at imposing an obligation on the Company of fostering education in this country.

NOTES

1. The first meeting of the Governor-General and Council under the Regulating Act of 1773 (13 Geo. III, c. 63) was held at Fort William on 20 October, 1774. It may, therefore, be held that the Act came into force on this date. See the General Letter to the Court of Directors, dated at Fort William 21 November, 1774, Para, 2.
2. The East India Company Act, 1773 (13 Geo. III, c. 63).
3. For a detailed history of the origin of the Presidency of Bengal, see, D. N. Banerjee, *Early Administrative System of the East India Company in Bengal*, Vol. I, 1765-1774, Appendix 4. For further references in this connexion also see the same, p. 629n.
4. It may be noted here that, according to C. R. Wilson (*The Early Annals of the English in Bengal*, p. 83), the "Commission which made Hedges Governor, associated six others with him in the Council of the Bay, Job Charnock, John Beard, John Richards, Francis Ellis, Joseph Dodd, and William Johnson".
5. Mr. William Hedges appears to have been dismissed from the service of the Company.
6. For the relevant documentary evidence, see D. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 631-32.
7. With, according to C. R. Wilson (*op. cit.*, p. 157), the following four gentlemen as the members of his Council at Calcutta:
 "John Beard, second, and accountant; Nathaniel Halsey, third, and warehouse-keeper; Jonathan White, fourth and purser marine; (and) Ralph Sheldon, fifth, and receiver of revenues".
 Thus, altogether the Calcutta Council consisted of five members including the President and Governor.
8. For details in this connection, see D. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-116 and note.
9. The history of this name is as follows: There were two English East India Companies at the beginning of the eighteenth century: one, incorporated by Queen Elizabeth by a Charter, dated 31 December, 1600, was designated "The Governor and Company of Merchants of London Trading into the East Indies";

and the other, incorporated on 5 September, 1698, by a Charter of King William III, was styled "The English Company Trading to the East Indies". They were also referred to as the first and the second East India Company; the Old and the New Company; and as the London and the English East India Company, respectively. These two Companies had become serious rivals to each other in their East Indian trade, and this rivalry had naturally been proving disastrous to the interests of both. Their rivalry, however, was brought to an end in 1702 by an Indenture Tripartite, dated 22 July, 1702, "between Queen Anne of the first part; the Old Company of the second part; and the New Company of the third part". This indenture was the first substantial step towards the ultimate amalgamation in 1709 of the two Companies into a United Company. One of the terms of this indenture was that "in two months after the expiration of seven years from its date, the Old Company would surrender their Charters.... into the Queen's hand", and that the Queen would "accept of such surrender". Further, "from thenceforth the New Company" was "to be called *The United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies* whose affairs" were to be conducted by its "own sole" Directors, agreeably to the provisions of its Charter granted by King William III on 5 September, 1698. The indenture also provided for some transitional arrangements for the carrying on of their East Indian trade by the two Companies during the said seven years from its date. This is how the name of the *United Company of Merchants*, etc., originated.

We may add that by a deed, dated 22 March, 1709, the Old Company surrendered its "Charters, and Corporate Capacity" to Queen Anne, and the Queen accepted the surrender on 7 May, 1709, "by patent under her great seal of this date;" and that, previously to this, the Old Company had, by a deed, dated 22 July, 1702, conveyed to the New Company the island of St. Helena as well as all its forts, lands, factories and other territorial and other possessions in the East Indies (i.e., lying between the Cape of Good Hope and the Straits of Magellan), and the Earl of Godolphin, the Lord High Treasurer, had "in pursuance of an Act of the sixth year of Queen Anne" (6 Anne, Chap. XVII) given, on 29 September, 1708, an award on certain points of dispute still subsisting between the two Companies. Thus the union of the two rival Companies was actually effected in 1709 in accordance with the terms of the Indenture Tripartite previously referred to, and the provisions of the award of the Earl of Godolphin. For further details in this connection, see D. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 104-06 and note as well as the authorities referred to therein.

10. Technically speaking, between 1709 and 1774. As shown in the preceding footnote, the union of the Old and the New East India Companies was actually effected in 1709. During the short period between 1707 and 1709—or rather, between 1702 and 1709, there were some transitional arrangements for the carrying on of their East Indian trade by the two companies. For the purpose of this Chapter, we can ignore those arrangements between 1707 and 1709.
11. See Peter Auber, *Analysis of the Constitution of East India Company*, 1826, p. 182. For further details and references, see D. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 113-16 and note.
12. For further details, see D. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 114-16 and note.
13. It may be interesting to note here that during the period from 1 February, 1704, to 20 July, 1710—presumably, pending the arrival at Calcutta of the information of the actual union of the Old and the New East India Companies and consequential arrangements thereafter—there were "no less than three Councils" functioning at Calcutta. "In the first place", writes C. R. Wilson, "there was the Council for the management of the separate affairs of the Old London Company, at the head of which was John Beard. Then there was the Council for the separate affairs of the new English Company, which left Hoogly for Calcutta in May, and at the head of which was Sir Edward Littleton. And lastly, there was the Establishment Council for the management of all the United Company's affairs in Bengal". This last body consisted of eight persons, including Mr. Robert Hedges and Mr. Ralph Sheldon: "four members of the Old and four members of the New Company's Service". "It was presided over in alternate weeks by Hedges and Sheldon.... The 'rotation government', as it was called, came into power on 1 February, 1704. This state of affairs came to an end with the assumption, on 20 July, 1710, of the office of Governor and President of Fort William by the Hon'ble Antony Weltden,

with Mr. Robert Hedges and seven others as members of his Council. Obviously, the new Government had been ordered to be so formed by the United Company after the actual union of the Old and the New East India Companies in 1709. See C. R. Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 161-63, 186-87, 227-28 and 337-38.

It may also be interesting to note here that in 1757-58 another attempt was made by the Court of Directors of the United Company to establish a Rotation Government in Bengal. Actually, however, it was not established. See for details in this connection, D. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 136-39n.

14. Such as Cossimbazar, Dacca, Patna, Maldah, Luckeypore, etc.
15. It appears that a factory of considerable importance would be designated a 'subordinate'.
16. For a detailed treatment of the position, remuneration and the powers of the Governor, see D. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, Chapter II.
17. Vol. I, p. 23 (Ed. 1841).
18. Thus we find Henry Vansittart, President and Governor of Fort William, writing to the Court of Directors in 1763:

The powers of the President, the Select Committee and the Council require to be settled and better distinguished. I think they might be so regulated as to check and balance each other, and render the administration of your affairs more steady than it can be at present. In the last disputes I found myself, without the least authority beyond and other Members of the Council, nor could I prevent or put a negative upon the most unjust and improper Resolution of the majority. I was obliged to be myself the channel for conveying those Resolutions to the Nabob (Cossim 'Alī Khān), otherwise instead of threatening him with a rupture they would immediately have declared a rupture and ordered the Army to march against him so that upon the present footing it is in the power of any majority of the Council to engage the Company in new wars, whenever a Party shall be inclined to make new demands.... Most of the members of the Board (i.e., the Council) have been taught by those who were at the head of the party against the late government that everyone had a right to equal authority with the President in the management of all affairs with the Country Powers, consequently they have all formed plans of their own.... and if your Honors do not take effectual care to prevent it, you may very soon hear that the present system is voted injurious to the Company's interests or insufficient for the management of the Court.

From Henry Vansittart's letter to the Court of Directors, dated (presumably) 8 October, 1763. (For a discussion about the date of this letter, see D. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, p. 149n.)

We also find in a letter from Warren Hastings to the Court of Directors, dated at Fort William 11 November, 1773:

The powers of the Governor, although supposed to be great, are, in reality, little more than those of any individual in his Council. Their compliance, his own abilities, or a superior share of attention and the opinion that he possesses extraordinary powers, may give him the effect of them, and an ascendant over his Associates in the Administration; but a moment's consideration is sufficient to discover the nakedness of his authority, and to level him with the rest.

The Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy, appointed (by the House of Commons) to enquire into the causes of the war in the Carnatic, and of the condition of the British Possessions in those parts, printed in the year 1782, Appendix 5; also Gleig, *Memoirs of Warren Hastings*, Vol. I, p. 370.

- 19 26 George III, Chap. XVI, Sections VI & XI.

This special power was "not to be exercised by any Governor-General or Governor or President who would casually succeed to such office as a result of death or resignation of any Governor-General, Governor or President, unless he was provisionally appointed to succeed to the office by the Court of Directors or unless he was confirmed in the office by the said Court". *ibid.*, Section X.

20. In certain circumstances, even seventeen. See D. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 192 and note.
21. And apparently, not by the majority of those present at any meeting. See *ibid.*, p. 149, f.n. 1, and pp. 243-44 and note.
22. Presumably, dated at Fort William, 10 November, 1764, as the letter occurs in

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the Proceedings of the Consultation, Secret Department, held at Fort William on 10 November, 1764.

23. (At that time) Jaffer 'Alī Khān, i.e., Mir Jaffar.
24. The italics are ours.
25. For details in regard to these disputes, see D. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 154-69 and notes.
26. The italics are ours.
27. The italics are ours.
28. Mr. Roger Drake Junior, the then President of Fort William.
29. That is, the Council at Fort William.
30. See Lord Clive's letter, dated at Calcutta, 23 January, 1767, addressed to Harry Verelst Esqr., and Members of the Select Committee, entered in the Proceedings of the Select Committee, Fort William, of 11 February, 1767.
31. The italics are ours.
32. See in this connection D. N. Banerjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-91 and note.
33. For details in this connection see *Ibid.*, Chapters III & IV.
Under an order of the Court of Directors, dated 1 June, 1764, the maximum number might even be seventeen for certain purposes. See *ibid.*, pp. 192-93 and note.
34. Sir John Malcolm, *The Life of Robert, Lord Clive*, Vol. III, p. 152.
35. See the Company's General Letter to the President and Council of Fort William in Bengal, dated 12 May, 1758, para 20.
36. For details, see Banerjee, *op. cit.*, pp. 293-313.
37. See the Court's General Letter to Bengal, dated 10 April, 1771, and its additional General Letter to Bengal, dated 25 April, 1771.
38. For details, see Banerjee, *op. cit.*, Chaps. VII & VIII.
39. Known as the *Phoujdarree* Court 'for the trial of crimes'; the 'Court of Cutcherry for civil causes'; the 'Collector's Court for matters of revenue'; and according to some writers, a Caste cutcherry for taking 'cognizance of all matters relative to the several caste (*sic*) tribes of the Hindoo religion'.
40. The East India Company Act, 1773 (13 George, III, C. 63). See Keith, *Speeches and Documents on Indian Policy* (The World's Classics) Vol. I, pp. 45-60.
41. Ninth Report from the Select Committee, House of Commons, appointed to take into consideration the state of the Administration of Justice, etc., printed in the year 1783.
42. The total number of members of the Court of Directors was twenty-four.
43. Thus the possession of £ 3,000 stock would entitle a proprietor to two votes; that of £ 6,000 stock to three votes; and that of £ 10,000 stock or more to four votes.
44. He had previously been appointed Governor of Bengal with effect from 13 April, 1772.
45. That is, Fort Marlborough in Sumatra.
46. See the General Letter to the Court of Directors, dated at Fort William 21 November, 1774; also Appendix 44 to the Fifth Report from the Committee of Secrecy, appointed to enquire into the causes of the war in the Carnatic, etc., printed in the year 1782.
47. 26 George III, Chap. XVI.
48. This "discretionary power" of the Governor-General to overrule his Council was not however to be exercised in regard to judicial or legislative matters. It was only to operate in the executive sphere. See *ibid.*
49. See Gleig, *Memoirs of Warren Hastings*, Vol. II, (1841), pp. 41-42.
50. For details, see in this connection, among other works, James Mill, *History of British India*, Vol. IV, Wilson's Edition, Book V, Chap. VI; also Firminger, *Historical Introduction to the Fifth Report* (1812), Chap. XIII.
51. See James Mill, *op. cit.*, p. 309.
52. See Ilbert, *The Government of India*, 3rd Ed., p. 55; also Peter Auber, *Rise and Progress of the British Power in India* (1837), pp. 588-89; also the Act of 1781 itself.
53. That is, The Governor-General in Council.
54. Ilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 58.
55. See in this connection James Mill, *op. cit.*, Chap. IX; also Peter Auber, Vol. I, Chap. XII, and Vol. II, Chap. I.
56. It may be noted here that the Act of 1786 (26 George III, Chap. XVI), "enabled

the offices of Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief to be united in the same person." See Ilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

57. Ilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 62; also *Report of the Committee on the Home Administration of Indian Affairs*, London (1919), James Mill, *op. cit.*, pp. 559-60 says:
 "Of two bodies, when one has the right of unlimited command, and the other is constrained to unlimited obedience, the latter has no power whatsoever, but just as much, or as little, as the former is pleased to allow. This is the relative position of the Board of Control and the East India Company. The powers of the Board of Control convert the Company's Courts into agents of its will. The real, the sole governing power of India is the Board of Control, and it only makes use of the Court of Directors as an instrument, as a subordinate office, for the management of details, and the preparation of business for the cognizance of the superior power".
58. See Chesney, *Indian Polity*, pp. 41-42.
59. See *The Report of the Committee on the Home Administration of Indian Affairs*, 1919.
60. See Pitt's speech on the India Bill on July 6, 1784; Mukherji, *Indian Constitutional Documents, 1600-1918*, Vol. I, p. 53.
61. *The Report of the Committee on the Home Administration of Indian Affairs*, 1919.
62. See *ibid.*; also Ilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 66.
 "In point of fact", writes James Mill, "the whole business of the Board of Control rested with the senior member of the Board other than the Secretary of State and the Chancellor of the Exchequer; the other Commissioners being seldom called to deliberate, or even for form's sake to assemble. The senior is known by the name of the President of the Board of Control, and is essentially a new Secretary of State; a Secretary for the Indian department". James Mill, *op. cit.*, p. 558.
63. Chesney, *op. cit.*, p. 360.
64. Pitt's speech on the India Bill on July 6, 1784, P. Mukherji, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
65. A similar power was also conferred by the Act of 1786 (26 George III, Chap. XVI) upon the Governors of Fort St. George (Madras) and Bombay to override their respective Councils in certain circumstances.
66. See Chesney, *op. cit.*, p. 45.
67. Ilbert, *op. cit.*, p. 67; also Peter Auber, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 13.
68. Ilbert, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-77; also Auber, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 488-91.
69. Ilbert, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-79; also Auber, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 488-91.
70. Ramsay Muir, *The Making of British India*, pp. 296-97

CHAPTER XVIII

PART II

I. *The Madras Presidency down to 1818:*

(a) *The 17th Century:*

For long, the system of administration in the Company's Indian settlements was a haphazard growth.¹

The Company's factors were subject of course to the orders of their own immediate chiefs. The factors' relations with Indians, and their disputes with them were adjusted by the tribunals of the Indian powers. As among themselves, justice was administered in criminal cases by virtue of a King's Commission under the Great Seal which empowered the Commissioners to punish and execute offenders by martial law. In civil cases the President or the Chief of the Factory had absolute powers.

All the establishments on the Coromandel Coast, including Madras, also for some years, were subject to the factory at Bantam. Each Presidency came to be under a President and Council; and in course of time the control of the naval authorities was shaken off. The authority of the President became supreme; the Council came to possess definite functions, and by the close of the 17th century, there had grown up the nucleus of the body, that was known under British rule as the Indian Civil Service, with the gradations of Writers, Factors, Merchants, and Senior Merchants.²

In 1641, shortly after its foundation, the seat of the Agency was transferred from Masulipatam to Madras. Andrew Cogan, the first Agent, was succeeded by Francis Day, the real founder of the settlement; and both took a good share in the erection of the Fort and the colonization of the place.

The civil establishments slowly increased in importance; and the Agency began to exercise real control over the other coast factories and the small Bengal establishments then recently started. The first direct communication between Madras and the Company at home was despatched in 1642-43, "in which the Agent and the Council ac-

quainted the Court of Directors with the absolute necessity of giving a due equipment to the Fort". In 1658 all the factories on the Coromandel Coast and in Bengal were made subordinate to Fort St. George.

The Governor or Agent was the First Member of the Council, the Book-Keeper was the second, and the Ware-house Keeper and the Customer were the other two members. The duties of the Customer were to receive customs, rents and other taxes; he also exercised magisterial functions. "His office has been continued uninterruptedly to the present day, remaining now under the designation of the Collectorate of Madras and the Sea Customs." The Council, consisting of four members, passed orders on all matters concerning the factories and the servants of the Company. The Secretary kept a diary of the proceedings and consultations; and a copy of it was sent to the Company each year, "together with a general letter reviewing the proceedings; while in reply a general letter was received each year from the Court of Directors". The Collector of Customs, as Magistrate in the Black Town, sat alone. Europeans were tried by the Governor and Council in the Fort with a jury of 12 Europeans. In the White Town, the public peace was maintained by the Agent (Governor) as Commander of the garrison. In the Black Town it was kept by an Indian public officer known as *pedda Naik*.

In 1661 Sir Edward Winter, a member of the then triumphant Cavalier Party, was appointed Governor. He quarrelled with his Council and alienated the Indian powers. In 1665 he was superseded and made second in Council, while one Mr. George Foxcroft, a London merchant, was made Governor. Winter resolved on the bold expedient of usurping the Governorship. He alleged that the language of the new Governor was treasonable to the English Crown, and with the aid of the Commander of the garrison and other friends, he arrested and imprisoned Foxcroft, and himself assumed the Governorship. However, Foxcroft was soon restored to the governorship and Sir Edward Winter retired.

The Directors were long unaware of the revolution at Madras. They even sent Foxcroft in 1666 a fresh commission constituting him Governor (with the King's special authority) with power to try persons charged with capital offences.³ Foxcroft was the first Agent to be created Governor of Fort St. George, a title which was transmitted to a long line of distinguished successors.

Governor Streynsham Master (1678-81) framed regulations for the proper administration of justice. He reorganised the Choultry Court, which had been long held at the *Choultry*, or Town House, where justice was administered to the Indian inhabitants by persons, either Indian or European, appointed by the Governor, who were to try causes and register bills of sale of land and other property.

Master also established a Superior Court for the trial, by jury, of civil and criminal offences by virtue of the powers granted by the Charter of 1661. According to his scheme, the Governor and Council were to sit for the trial of causes according to English laws. This court was not intended to supersede the Justices of the *Choultry*, who were to continue to decide all small misdemeanours, breaches of peace and civil actions for debt not exceeding 50 pagodas. This court was superseded in 1684 by an Admiralty Court presided over by a Judge-Advocate from England.

By the Charter of 1683 the Company were given full power to declare and make war and peace with native powers, to raise and keep military forces and to exercise martial law in their jurisdiction. The same Charter established a court of judicature to hear and determine all maritime cases, including injuries and wrongs done on the high seas, "according to the rules of equity and good conscience, and according to the laws and customs of merchants."⁴ The Court of Admiralty was established in 1686, its judge and his two assistants being Members of Council and civil servants of the company. Later a Judge-Advocate was appointed from England, made Third in Council and was to preside at the Quarter Sessions. Courts-martial were also proclaimed under the authority of the charter. The Governor usually presided at the trial of pirates; but occasionally the Judge-Advocate sat for such trials.

James II delegated to the East India Company the power of establishing, by charter, a Municipality at Madras, and this charter was issued by the Company under their own seal, under the authority of the charters of 1661 and 1683 of Charles II and that of 1686 of James II. According to this charter, a Municipality and Mayor's Court were established at Madras.

The Municipality was to consist of a Mayor, 12 Aldermen and 60 or more Burgesses. The Mayor was to hold office for a year, the Aldermen for their lives or during their residence in Madras. The charter further nominated 29 free merchants as Burgesses. The new

Mayor was to be elected from the Aldermen annually; vacancies among the Aldermen were to be filled up by election from among the burgesses; and three of them were always to be covenanted servants. The Mayor and Aldermen were empowered to levy taxes for the building of a town-hall, a public gaol and a convenient school house, where native children might be taught to speak, read, and write the English tongue, as well as arithmetic and accounting. They were also empowered to build sewers and to regulate the paving of streets and lanes. After the establishment of the Corporation, directions were given to increase the quit-rents and to impose a duty on licenses of public houses.

The Mayor's Court was to have a Recorder, being an English-born covenanted servant of the Company. According to the charter, there was a right of appeal from the Mayor's Court to the Court of Admiralty. On account of quarrels with the Mayor's Court, the Government resolved to erect a new court of judicature. The *Choultry* Justices continued all this time; they were magistrates, and the senior among them was called the Chief Justice. The Aldermen of the Corporation sat as Justices at the *Choultry*. However, Government soon resolved to erect a new court of judicature consisting of a Judge-Advocate and four Judges. The Governor was to act as Judge-Advocate pending an appointment from England. The Judges were to include among others an Armenian merchant and the Company's Chief Merchant.

In 1692, the Supreme Court of Judicature was revived and the Company sent out a new Judge-Advocate from England. It inflicted sentences of death, whipping, pillory, etc. After some time the Judge-Advocate was removed from office and his place was ordered to be filled by the Members of Council in succession. In 1698 Governor Thomas Pitt was directed to frame a table of fees to prevent extortion by the law courts; and the Governor and his Council superseded the Court of Admiralty as a Court of Appeal. The sale and purchase of slaves for domestic purposes were recognised but had to be registered at the *Choultry* Court. The stealing of children was strongly condemned and the export of slaves was absolutely prohibited in 1683, though it was allowed later under certain conditions.

(b) *The 18th Century:*

In the time of Governor Macrae (1725-30) the Mayor's Court was reorganized by virtue of a royal charter, granted in 1726, for

establishing or reconstituting municipalities at Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta and setting up or remodelling Mayor's and other Courts in each of these Presidencies. The Mayor and the Aldermen were to constitute a Mayor's Court with civil jurisdiction, subject to an appeal to the Governor, or President in Council and a further appeal in more important cases to the King in Council. The Mayor's Court now also gave probate and exercised testamentary jurisdiction. The Governor, or President and the five senior members of the Council were to be Justices of the Peace and were to hold quarter-sessions four times in the year with jurisdiction over all offences except high treason. At the same time, the Company were authorised, as in previous charters, to 'appoint generals and other military officers with power to exercise the inhabitants in arms, to repel force by force and to exercise martial law in times of war.' The President and Council were also to be a Court of Appeal from the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court; while a Court by Requests or a Court of Conscience was instituted for the decision by summary procedure of pecuniary questions of inconsiderable amount.

In 1727, soon after the reorganisation of the Mayor's Court, the President and five Senior Councillors constituted themselves into a Court of Appeal and a Court of Oyer and Terminer and Gaol Delivery; while the five Justices of the Peace appointed by the royal charter were also appointed Justices of the *Choultry* to decide small debts not exceeding twenty pagodas. It was found inconvenient that the Justices of the *Choultry* who were also members of the Superior Court should appeal to the Mayor's Court; and so the Sheriff constituted a court (Consultation of November 27, 1727) to decide all petty cases without appeal as far as five pagodas and further up to a limit of twenty pagodas, allowing the parties the liberty of appealing to the Mayor's Court. The register of slaves was to be kept by the Sheriff in the place of the Justices of the *Choultry*, as well as the register of sales and mortgages of houses. The Justices of the Peace were to take cognizance of all petty breaches of the peace, larceny, etc; for lesser faults they were to inflict corporal punishments, and for the others they were to bind over the accused to the sessions or to the *Choultry*. The Register's fees at the Mayor's Court were also published.

Owing to the French capture and occupation of Madras (1746-49) the continuity of the Municipal Corporation and the Mayor's Court was destroyed and the charter of 1726 was surrendered. A fresh charter was issued in 1753 which exempted from the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court all suits and actions between 'Indian

Natives only' and directed that all these suits were to be determined among themselves only, unless both parties agreed to submit them to the Mayor's Court. This new charter (issued in January 1753) provided for the revival of the Mayor and the Aldermen; seven out of the nine Aldermen were to be natural born subjects of the King and only two could be foreign Protestants. The Aldermen were to continue in office for life; and from among them two were to be elected annually by the Corporation one of whom was to be chosen as the Mayor by the Governor-in-Council. The Mayor and Aldermen were to form a Court of Record for civil suits, not being between natives, and arising in Madras and its subordinate factories. Appeals up to 1,000 pagodas were to lie to the President and Council and in judgments for larger sums an appeal might be made to the King-in-Council. There was to be a Court of Requests for the decision of petty civil suits summarily by Commissioners appointed by Government. The President and Members of Council were to be the Justices of the Peace for Madras and the subordinate factories, to hold quarter-sessions and Oyer and Terminer and General Gaol Delivery and to be a court of record dealing with all offences excepting high treason. The mode of trial was to follow the English practice and the Sheriff was to summon persons to serve as grand and petty juries.

Thus the earliest Madras courts worked under the authority of the charters of Charles II and the earlier charters which might be construed as giving judicial powers. Up till 1678 the arrangements in Madras for the administration of justice can be gleaned from the rules and regulations framed by Governor Master and his Council in January 1678. The first Supreme Court was established in 1678 (March) in the person of the Governor and Council, sitting to hear causes, but not superseding the Justices of the *Choultry* who still decided on small misdemeanours and actions for debt. An Admiralty Court with a Judge-Advocate from England was established by virtue of the charter of 1683 and by the Directors' despatch of January 7, 1687. This is the forerunner of the present High Court. The first Mayor's Court was established in the same year with an appeal to the Court of Admiralty. A Recorder was also appointed to be an assistant to the Mayor. The Admiralty Court was soon afterwards superseded, on account of some reasons, by the Governor and Council functioning as a court of appeal from the Mayor's Court. The new Mayor's Court created by the charter of 1726 was a court of record from which an appeal lay to the Governor and Council who were constituted Justices of the Peace and a Court of

Oyer, Terminer, and Gaol Delivery. The Court of Directors sent out, with the charter of 1726, a book of instructions with respect to the method of proceeding in all actions and suits, civil and criminal, and also the forms of the oaths to be taken. It is noteworthy that this book of instructions laid down probably the rule that by the charter of 1726 all Common and Statute Law at that time extant in England was introduced into the Indian Presidencies and that all the Parliamentary enactments passed since that period were excluded unless their extension to India was specially declared. The charter of 1753 recreated the Mayor's Court, with some not very material alterations, but excluding suits between Indians, unless entertained with their consent. The jurisdiction of the Government courts in criminal matters was also limited to offences committed within the Presidency and the factories subordinate thereto. Later the arrangements made by Warren Hastings and known as the *Adālat* Scheme were applied to the Madras territories, viz., the *Jāgīr* District round Madras acquired in 1765, in the Northern Sarkars acquired in 1766 and in the Guntur Sarkar acquired in 1778. The Mayor's Court retained all its jurisdiction, till it was superseded by the Recorder's Court established in 1797, consisting of the Mayor, three Aldermen and a Recorder and having jurisdiction in civil, criminal, ecclesiastical and admiralty cases. Their jurisdiction was transferred to the Supreme Court established in 1801 by Letters Patent. Both the Recorder's Court and the Supreme Court could establish rules or practice and hold Oyer, Terminer and Gaol Deliveries; and their jurisdiction was subjected to the same restrictions as the Supreme Court of Bengal. An appeal lay from their decisions to the King-in-Council.⁵

Municipal functioning proper was given to Madras only by an Act of Parliament of 1792 which empowered the Justice of the Peace in the Presidency Towns, assembled in their quarter-sessions to arrange for the care of the streets and to assess the owners or occupiers of houses at 5 per cent of their gross annual value. The Act also provided for the collection of the assessment and the licensing of the sale of spirituous liquors. "This is the commencement of the Madras Municipality as such".

In the Government itself power was long vested in the majority of the Council. From the time of Foxcroft, the Council, which was nebulous till then, came to be definite in shape; and met with considerable regularity. The Governor had, as the commander of the garrison, certain ill-defined separate powers. The Council usually consisted of five or six members at first. The Governor was Trea-

surer; the second was Accountant and the other members managed the import and export warehouses, the customs and the mint. The youngest member of the Council was the Scavenger who collected rates and not dirt. The Council, till the establishment of the Recorder's Court in 1797, functioned as an appellate tribunal for both civil and criminal justice. French wars and political complications which increased from about 1775, led to the increase of the number of the Councillors to ten which was the limit in the second Governorship of Pigot. A Select Committee was created within the Council to deal with military and political matters and to ensure secrecy. The first Select Committee was formed in 1752. A second was appointed by the Directors in 1754, with greater powers; and it lasted till 1758. There was a third Select Committee to deal with the First Mysore War and the Nawāb's debts, which lasted till 1775. A fourth Committee was created in 1778 to deal with all military, political, naval, and secret affairs.

It was only in 1785 that the situation was really understood and Government was reduced to the President and three Members of Council. In 1786 boards were formed under Government, like the Board of Revenue, the Military Board, the Board of Trade, the Hospital Board and the Marine Board, which managed the various departments and were the channels of communication for the orders of Government; and the Members of Council ceased to be direct administrative officers.

From December 1750 matters of a secret nature, whether military or political, were separated from the rest, under the title of "Extraordinary Occurrences and Consultations". From September 1754 the transactions with the country powers were carried on by a Committee⁶ composed of the Governor and four Members of his Council. There were occasional consultations of the whole Council on matters of special importance.

In 1778 they appointed a fresh Select Committee consisting of the Governor, Commander-in-Chief and two members. This continued till 12 February 1785, when the new form of government prescribed by the Act of 1784 came into force.

In 1786 the Directors ordered a Military Board, a Board of Revenue, and a Board of Trade to be established, and in 1800 a Marine Board was started. As early as 1774 we find the revenue consultations being separated from the others, and there was a Committee of Assigned Revenue for the collection of all the Nawāb's revenues. This continued till 1790, when the Board of Revenue was directed also to act as the Board of Assigned Revenue.

II. *The Districts:*

In the eighteenth century complete anarchy prevailed in the land and the condition of the people was miserable, marked by insecurity of property, obstructions to trade, heavy taxation, uncertainty in the value of the currency and by distressing poverty among the agricultural classes. The wars of the Mughul captains in the earlier decades of the eighteenth century, the struggles that ensued consequent on the frequent inroads of the Marāthās, the disputed successions to the thrones of Hyderabad and Arcot, the bitter wars between the English and the French, and the subsequent English operations in Tamil Nadu and elsewhere, had so devastated the land and demoralised the people, that in the words of the *Fifth Report*, "the system of internal management had become completely disorganised, and not only the forms, but even the remembrance of civil authority, seem to have been wholly lost."⁷

The *jāgīr* or Chingleput district was twice ravaged by Haidar 'Alī, once in 1768 and again in 1780. The English had obtained it from the Nawāb by grants of the years 1750 and 1763 and rented to him largely on annual leases till about 1780 when the Presidency took over its management.

During the time that the district was rented by the Nawāb, a survey was made of it by Mr. Barnard in 1776 based on the statement of the *karnams* (village accountants) and the principal inhabitants. When it was assumed by the Company's Government, the district was placed under the Committee of Assigned Revenue, which let out the land in 1783 in fourteen large farms on leases of nine years at progressive rents. A Resident Officer was appointed in the next year to see to the several stipulations of the *kawls* being carried out. In 1788, shortly after the district was placed under the sole charge of a Superintendent, it was formed into two divisions, each under a Collector. In the next year, an Additional Collector was appointed; and the office of the Superintendent was abolished.

The settlements made in 1789 yielded a considerable increase in the revenue for the years 1791-92. In 1793 assistants were appointed to the Collectors; and in the succeeding year the country was put under the management of the famous Mr. Lionel Place.⁸

The cultivators were thrown a great deal into contact with the *dubashes* or Indian agents of the European officers and merchants who bought up the lands for almost nothing, leaving the former

owners as cultivators. They found means to introduce their own *amildars* into the management of the country and fomented quarrels between the cultivators and the Company's renters.

Mr. Place introduced a settlement on the basis of village rents and of the produce. The parties who entered into the engagements were the principal holders of land in the village jointly.⁹

The District of Nellore was acquired from the Nawāb of the Karnāṭak by the Treaty of July 1801. It did not seem to have suffered much in comparison with the rest of the region in the wars of the eighteenth century.

The great mass of the people were small cultivators, who were oppressively fleeced by the renters of the Nawāb; many of the head inhabitants of the villages were themselves sub-renters and additional extortioners. The chief outlet for trade was by the sea from which grain, tobacco and some cloth were exported while cattle were sent out in some quantity, chiefly to Hyderabad. The cloth trade was insignificant and declined perceptibly after 1800. The grain trade was principally with the southern districts, and was carried on by sea in small country craft. Land transport was mainly by means of pack-animals, chiefly bullocks. In addition to the heavy charges of transport, there were oppressive customs and tolls.

The incidence of land-rent in the early years of British rule pressed heavily on the cultivators and was positively oppressive in lean years. About one-half of the estimated produce was demanded by the state as its revenue under the new system.

The Northern Sarkars comprehended Ganjam, Vizagapatam, Godavari and Guntur (acquired from the Nizām in 1766, as *Chica-cole*, Rajahmundry, Ellore and Mustafanagar and Murtizanagar *Sarkars*); Krishna had been acquired in 1793 (as *Masulipatam Sarkar*); and Palnad from the Nawāb of the Karnāṭak in 1801.

At first the Nizām's officials who were in charge of these Sarkars were continued; but in 1769 they were placed under the charge of Provincial Chiefs and Councils into which the Company's commercial factories were then converted.

This system of administration continued until 1794. In 1775 a Committee of Circuit composed of five members of the Madras Council was appointed to inquire into the condition of the *Sarkars* and was revived after a first abolition. This Committee issued reports from time to time. Mr. James Grant, a Senior Merchant of

Bengal, while residing at Hyderabad, had access to valuable public records and issued his famous Survey¹⁰ which threw much light on the revenue economy of the land and was published as an appendix to the *Fifth Report*.

The English Government first imposed on the *zamindārs* the character of tributary chiefs, the fallacy of which soon became obvious. Their practice was at first to allow the *zamindārs* to appropriate the revenues of their charges for their own use on condition of their paying the stipulated *jumma*. They collected the revenue either in kind or money, and generally by farming it out to persons on annual or longer leases.

The village communities retained their old organization of the *patel*, the *karnām* who kept the registers and accounts of cultivation, the *boundary man* who preserved the limits of the village and gave evidence in cases of dispute, the *taliar* and the *totee* and the superintendent of tanks and water-courses. In many cases the *zamindārs* had usurped the judicial powers that were formerly exercised by the *amaldārs* and *faujdārs*. The duties of the police were generally performed by the revenue servants and the military peons of the *zamindārs* and the renters' peons and servants. The towns had a distinct establishment of *kotwals* and peons; but these were merely local and not connected with the general police of the country.

The Ceded Districts:

This region comprised all the territories acquired by the British Government in 1800 by treaty with the Nizām and situated south of the Krishnā and the Tungabhadra rivers. The districts are so called because they were ceded to the Company by the Nizām in 1800. Sir Thomas (then Major) Munro was their first and their most famous Principal Collector. He held immediate charge of the taluks which now constitute the Anantapur district and of the Rayadurg taluk of Bellary district and the rest of the territory was divided into the two Collectorates of Bellary and Cuddapah.

It was computed by Munro that, in 1800, there were scattered throughout the area, exclusively of the Nizām's troops, about 30,000 armed peons all of whom were under the command of about eighty *pālegars*, subsisting normally by rapine and committing everywhere great excesses.

The *pālegars* with whom the country abounded, had greatly intensified the effects of war, famine and bad management. The

indolence and corruption of the Nizām's officers had led them to abandon the collection of revenue to the *pālegars* and the village *patels*. Almost every village was a garrison, the inhabitants of which turned out and fought a pitched battle with their neighbours as well as with the peons of the *pālegars*.¹¹

The Bellary district gave less trouble than Cuddapah though it was disturbed during the Pindāri campaign of 1818. The district of Anantapur gave less trouble than the rest of the Ceded Districts.

Munro made for the year 1800-01 a settlement, *mozawar*, for each village as a whole and held the headmen severally responsible for the assessment of their own villages and jointly for the whole of the district. In the next year 1801-02 (*ḡasli* 1211) he introduced the *kulwāri* or *ryotwāri* settlement which was in theory regulated by the quality of the land and the value (according to the prices prevailing over a series of years) of the supposed net produce, of which last it purported to take 45 per cent.

Munro's survey and settlement of the whole of the Ceded Districts were finished in the years 1802-05. In 1804 a desire was expressed by Government to revert from the *ryotwāri* to a permanent settlement, in which each village was to be rented out as a whole for three years for a fixed sum to *zamindārs* and proprietors or, failing them, to the headmen; and the renter was alone to be responsible for the payment of fixed rent. Munro condemned the proposal, and declared that a direct settlement with the cultivators was more suited to them, more likely to reclaim the people from their wandering habits and fix them to their fields and would also afford greater security to the revenue and raise more produce than the system of great estates would do. In 1807, he reiterated his conviction in favour of the *ryotwāri* settlement; and he fully set out his views as to the modifications in his own system that he deemed necessary.¹²

Malabar:

In Malabar which was acquired by treaty in 1792, even under Haidar the quarrels between the different *rājās* and the turbulent spirit of the Nair chiefs, greatly obstructed for long the introduction of order and settled government.

The district was formally ceded to the British by the Treaty of Seringapatam and was first administered by a Commission on behalf of the Bombay Government. In 1800 the Commission was abolished, and the territory was transferred to the Madras Presidency. The situation in 1792 was very depressing. South Malabar was in

a condition bordering on anarchy. The Joint Commissioners worked with untiring industry, proclaimed freedom of trade in all articles of merchandise except pepper, established courts of inquiry and justice presided over by themselves in rotation and declared a general amnesty. But their mistaken revenue policy, adopted under the orders of the Governments of India and Bombay, retarded for years the pacification of the district and culminated ultimately in the fierce blaze of the Pychy rebellion.

The two Pychy rebellions (of 1797 and of 1800-05) were rendered worse by the attempt of Major Macleod to disarm the district in 1802 and to enhance the land assessments.

Early English authorities like Mr. Farmer, one of the first Commissioners, and Dr. F. Buchanan, stressed upon the *jenamkars* (freeholders) who held their lands either by purchase or by hereditary descent and the *kanamkars* or mortgagees, "to whom the land had been pledged in security for the interest of money advanced to the *jenamkar*, which advance is the *kanam* that is ever incumbent on land until it be redeemed."

The peculiarity of the *kanam* of Malabar mortgage is that it is never foreclosed; the quantum of money lent characterised the different gradations of the *kanam* tenure. Dr. F. Buchanan mentions another tenure, the *Virpattam*, in which the tenant deducted from the gross produce the quantity of seed sown and an equal quantity which was the whole granted them for their stock and trouble.

Tanjore and the Karnāṭak:

Tanjore was annexed in 1799 and the Karnāṭak was absorbed in 1801. In many parts of these regions the *ryotwāri* system was found applicable, while in Tanjore the village organisation was similar in many respects to that prevailing in Chingleput. The village system allowed and even encouraged oppression of the people by the superior landholders. The Board of Revenue, therefore, preferred the *ryotwāri* system and prepared surveys for most of these districts. Collectors, many of whom were trained in the school of A. Read and Munro, who were the real parents of the *ryotwāri* system, were clever in adapting the system to the requirements of their several districts. Annual settlements had everywhere to be resorted to. Abuses were generally guarded against, because the collectors were in touch with the villages and their reports to the Board of Revenue were useful reservoirs of experience, precedents and varied data.

In the Baramahal acquired in 1792 the ties binding the villagers were thin and joint action was not developed. Here Captain A. Read, the father of the *ryotwāri* system, dispensed with all middlemen and renters, and dealt directly with the individual cultivators; and he made a detailed fieldwise survey and promised the individual cultivators a fixed, unchanging assessment; but the level of his assessment proved too high for effective improvement and impossible of collection in bad seasons. His assessment, moreover, did not give the cultivator freedom to relinquish the land he did not want. The defects of the system were perceived by Munro, then one of Read's assistants, who made his mark as a revenue administrator under Read, and came to be convinced, during his Collectorship of Kanara (1799-1800), that the *ryotwāri* system was indigenous to South India and best suited to the needs of the people. Munro applied the principles of *ryotwāri* more thoroughly in the Ceded Districts, to the charge of which he was transferred in 1800, soon after their acquisition. The seven years of his stay in those districts for whose improvement and security he laboured very hard, made him completely a champion of *ryotwāri*. He came to think that not only yearly settlements were the best but the ryots must be further free to choose for themselves and must not be bound to hold for a second year what they did not want and found it better not to keep.

But by Regulation XXV of 1802 the Madras Government declared for a *zamindāri* settlement and attempted to create a class of *zamindārs* in Salem, for whom a permanent *peshkush* was to be fixed.

But the result was not commensurate with the expectation, as by 1821 the revenue fell to less than half of what it was in 1806. Many of the estates were attached by Government for arrears. The failure of this *mitta* (estate) system was due to the high original assessment of Read, of which Munro had all along been complaining, to the unwillingness of the new landlords to invest capital in the improvement of their estates, to the difficulty of dealing with the ryot, to the power of dividing the estates possessed by their holders which acted both ways—'accelerating the return of some of the country to the *ryotwāri* system and elsewhere establishing more firmly the new landlords'—and to the harsh rules of collection which were introduced by Regulation XXVIII of 1802 and which placed all the machinery of the courts at the disposal of the *zamindār*. In Kanara, as noted above, of which Munro was Collector for some time, the indigenous land revenue system was even more *ryotwāri* and under his reforms it gave good results.

Under the pressure of the Bengal Government a special Commission was appointed in 1802 which in the course of the years 1802-04, effected or tried to effect a permanent settlement in the Northern Sarkars, in the *Jāgīr* District, in Baramahal and in Dindigul.¹³

The Pālayams:

A list of the Pālayams in the Karnāṭak with the amounts of their tribute or *peshkush* is given as they stood in the Fifth Article of the treaty of 12 July, 1792 concluded by the British with the Nawāb. Colonel Fullarton has given an account of the *pālegars* of Tinnevely in Letter 2 of his book *A View of the English Interests in India*, which is a *compte rendue*, to the Select Committee of Fort St. George and contains an accurate, though harrowing, picture of the land. The *pālegar* chiefs could, at that time, bring 30,000 men into the field.

After the Company took up the management of the Karnāṭak, the Directors elaborated, in a Despatch of 1795, the rights acquired by the Madras Government to reform the administration of the *pālegar* territories. This was further supplemented by a Report of the Board of Revenue made in 1797 and by a Minute of Lord Hobart—(Governor 1794-98). Again, the Directors in their Despatch of 5 June, 1799, insisted on “the absolute suppression of the military power of the *pālegars* and on the substitution of a pecuniary tribute, more in proportion than the ordinary *peshkush* to the revenues of their *pālayams*, and more adequate to the public demands for defraying the expenses of general protection and government.”

The so-called Pālegar War of 1799-1801 was marked by a recrudescence of anarchy and followed by their final suppression. Government, by a proclamation of 1 December, 1801, suppressed the use of all weapons of defence and promised a general amnesty and a permanent assessment on the principles of *zamīndāri* tenure. This proclamation followed soon after the assumption of the Karnāṭak by the British and insisted on the surrender by all the inhabitants of the districts of Dindigul, Tinnevely, Ramnad, Sivaganga and Madura of all arms into the hands of the British military officers, and it also gave amnesty to all except a few most guilty persons. It was like the emergence of light after the darkest hour of pre-dawn.

In all the *ryotwāri* areas, the functions of criminal and civil justice were performed by the Collector and his assistants. But in all those regions under the sway of the *pālegars*, especially in the

Madura and Tinnevely regions, the peons of these chiefs exercised police duties, not only in their own villages but also presumed to protect the property of the inhabitants and travellers in the neighbouring *Sarkar* villages and roads. The village fees known as *stalam* or *kudi kāval* were of a much older creation than the *pālegars* themselves, and being coeval with the villages themselves. The *Desha-kāval* (or *Disaikāval*) or district watching fees originated either from a grant of the ruler or from the voluntary action of the villagers who were unable to protect themselves and submitted to such contributions. It was through claiming *kāval* fees that the *pālegars* rapidly extended their power and jurisdiction. Mr. Lushington reported that he found in the districts of Tinnevely in 1799, the *kāval* of 1,635 villages out of 2,113 villages were in the hands of the *pālegars* and their men. When the latter found that they could not appoint their own followers to the *kāval* of a village, they enforced an annual contribution on the villagers as the price of their forbearing to plunder them. These fees were violently and arbitrarily increased, particularly in the years 1740-46 and by 1799 they had risen to ten-fold their original level.¹⁴

It has been conceded that the *zamindārs* and *pālegars* easily acquiesced in the loss of their military power and were benefited by the permanent *zamindāri* settlement. But the scheme for creating new estates (*mittas*) as in Salem, failed miserably. Meanwhile opinion veered round from the *zamindāri* to an appreciation of the indigenous *ryotwāri* system. The Directors and Lord William Bentinck, Governor of Madras (1803-07) supported the new doctrine. But while further progress with the *zamindāri* settlement was stayed, the Board of Revenue sought permission from Sir George Barlow, Bentinck's successor in the governorship, to experiment with the village settlement. J. Hodgson, who now dominated the Board of Revenue and had come to appreciate the corporate life of the Tanjore villages held that the village system might be applied throughout the whole presidency and that the revenue due to Government might be leased to the principal inhabitants of the villages, on the basis of the average collection of the previous years and might be substituted later for a term and in perpetuity.¹⁵

In 1808-09 the District Collectors were required to lease out the villages on the new basis. But this attempt also failed; in many places the villagers refused to bind themselves with the leases; in others there was deceit and oppression, and in still others the revenue could not be collected at all from the cultivators, mainly because, as in the case of the early settlements of Read and Munro,

the assessments had been fixed too high. In spite of unfavourable reports from the Collectors, Government decided in 1813 to try new village leases for a period of ten years and even proposed that they should be made perpetual. But now the authors of the *Fifth Report*, wherein they reviewed the affairs of the Madras Presidency, did not believe in the wisdom of creating artificial *zamindāris*, nor in the advantages claimed in the villages lease system and held, believing in Munro's experienced views, that *ryotwāri* was the most suited to the people and that if the judicial machinery then in force did not suit it, it was the judicial system that had to be modified.

So in 1812, the Madras Government received orders to revert to the *ryotwāri* system. In 1814, the Directors recommended certain administrative changes to meet Munro's views as to the necessity of lowering the assessment and giving the ryot more freedom to change the area of his cultivation from year to year. Munro was sent out as Special Commissioner in 1814 for drawing up the new judicial regulations; and in 1816 the Madras Government passed a series of Regulations giving effect to the changes.

By the Regulations of 1793 all powers had been withdrawn from the hands of Indians. The village bodies and the jurisdictions of the *zamindārs* had been abolished. One or two European functionaries were in entire charge of a district. The Collector was confined merely to the collection of revenue, while the Judge was in entire charge of hearing and determining all causes, taking cognisance of all offences and regulating all matters of police. He was assisted by a single European Registrar and a specified number of Indian assistants, while all the police affairs were managed by a score or so of Indian *darogahs*; but in reality, his powers were very much limited. He had no summary mode of proceeding, except in cases of small breaches of the peace. In other cases the offenders were to be kept in jail till the arrival of the judges of the Circuit Court, before whom they were arraigned after the manner of English General Gaol Deliveries. The Collector was not even competent to decide any dispute between his servants and the ryots, while the Judge was not allowed very much of discretionary power.¹⁶

Court fees were made costly, the processes became more complicated and the collection of revenue more oppressive, while the *zamindār* could not collect the rents from the tenants, by a tedious process of legal action. After Munro was appointed to the new Commission for Judicial Regulations, the Directors elicited the opinions of eminent retired servants of the Company on the operation of the

judicial system. Their despatches were so worded as to presage an entire renovation of the judicial system. Munro had to assure the people that only a reform, and not a repeal, of the existing regulations was intended. He took charge of the office of Head Commissioner towards the end of 1814; and as a result of his labours, the Madras Government passed a series of Regulations in 1816 by which the office of District Magistrate and the control of police were transferred from the Judge to the Collector, the *Darogahs* and the *Thana-dars* were abolished, and the police work was to be done by village watchmen and the collector's revenue servants. Indian District *Munsifs* were appointed in some number to try all petty civil causes of value up to Rs. 200; and village headmen were empowered to try petty civil suits; they could also summon village *panchayats*, which were competent to determine all suits without limit of any value if the parties should agree to their arbitration.¹⁷

The Board of Control and the Court of Directors, had by now openly condemned the creation of artificial *zamindāris* and the latter body now issued instructions to all the Collectors for the re-introduction of the *ryotwāri* system, revised with some changes on the basis of the ideas adumbrated by Read and Munro. Munro advised that these *ryotwāri* instructions should be so issued that Government should control the Collector's discretion and limit opportunities for the interference of the court.

Thus the subjugation of the *pālegars*, the establishment of a proper judiciary, and the improvement of the revenue system absorbed all the energies of the Madras Government till 1818, and through all these decades no attention was devoted to the protection of industry and the welfare of the people. No action was taken either about the promotion of education or about the abolition of slavery, the existence of which both on the Coromandel and West Coast had compelled Government to gather information. Famines were dealt with by *ad hoc* measures as and when they occurred; there was evolved no settled policy. Munro was the only one among the Europeans who felt the error of excluding Indians from all higher services under the Government; he wrote:¹⁸ "Among all the disorders of the native states, the field is open for every man to raise himself; and hence among them there is a spirit of emulation, of restless enterprise and independence, far preferable to the servility of our Indian subjects." Except in a few places irrigation works were not cared for, and even existing works were not properly repaired.

"Their exclusion from offices of trust and emolument has become a part of our system of government, and has been productive of no good. Whenever from this cause, the public business falls into arrears, it is said to be owing to the want of a sufficient number of Europeans; and more European agency is too expensive; and, even if it was not, it ought to be abridged rather than enlarged, because it is, in many cases, much less efficient than that of the natives." (Gleig: *Life of Sir Thomas Munro*, Vol. I, p. 518).

III. *The Bombay Presidency to the end of the 18th Century:*

The Factory at Surat was the earliest and the most typical of the British Factories in India. It attained, through the efforts of Best and Downton, Aldworth and Sir Thomas Roe, a high degree of reputation. "Caravans came and went to all the inland capitals of India, Golconda, Agra, Delhi, Lahore; and the products of Asia from the Straits of Malacca to the Persian Gulf were piled up on the wharves of the Tapti. Merchants flocked in such numbers to Surat that during the busy winter months lodgings could scarcely be had." The Surat Factory was controlled by its Council of Factors; but often the general or commander of the fleet had a controlling authority. The Factors complained that he regulated even their promotion and precedence, that consultations were often held on board the ships, in the roads and that the Chief of the Factory often signed his name after that of the chief naval officer and that captains of the ships sat often in their Councils and interfered in their affairs (e.g., the complaint of Joseph Salbank, one of the senior Surat Factors made to the Directors in 1617 against Captain Keeling, who subordinated him to raw and junior men).

In disputes between the English merchants and Indians, the decision rested with the tribunals of the country powers. Captain Best's treaty with the Mughul viceroy of Gujarāt declared that "in all questions, wrongs and injuries that shall be offered to us and to our nation we do receive from the judges and those that be in authority, speedy justice according to the quality of our complaints and wrongs done us and that by delays we be not put off or wearied by time change." In civil cases the Chief of the Factory had absolute powers. Justice among the English residents was administered in criminal cases by virtue of a King's Commission under the Great Seal which empowered the Commissioners to punish and execute offenders by martial law, as illustrated in a Surat record of 1616

describing the criminal proceedings which condemned a murderer to death.¹⁹

The internal economy of the Surat Factory set the norm for other factories and Presidencies. In 1657, it was constituted the sole Presidency of the English in India, though subsequently Madras was restored to the Presidency rank. When Bombay was acquired by Charles II, it came to be ruled by Governors under the Crown, first by Sir Abraham Shipman, who perished in a few months, vainly trying to get possession of the Island from the Portuguese, and then by Humphrey Cooke, who only too readily accepted the mere cession of the port and harbour of Bombay, when offered by the Portuguese. Sir Gervase Lucas, a staunch Royalist, succeeded Cooke, but died within a few months after his landing, and his lieutenant and successor, Captain Henry Garey, was equally unsuccessful. When Bombay was ceded by Charles II to the Company, the latter's Governor of Surat, Sir George Oxinden took possession of the place (September 1668). He saw, with considerable precision, how Bombay was destined from its geographical position to become the key to India. His regulations for the civil and military administration of the settlement were adopted as the model for all the military establishments of the Company. Gerald Aungier, his successor, was President of Surat and Governor of Bombay from 1669 to 1677. He was the true founder of Bombay's greatness; and besides fortifying the city and constructing a dock, he laid out a town and established a court of justice for all litigants; created a police force and a militia and started a mint. He revived the old *Panchāyat* system for the different castes to whom justice was thereby brought to their very door in minor causes.²⁰

It was he that suggested, as early as 1671, that the seat of the Presidency should be removed to Bombay, whose population rose under him to 60,000 and its revenue increased three-fold. Aungier had schemes for organising the Indian merchants into guilds and for draining the tidal swamps that rendered Bombay so unhealthy. He was the first English Governor to realise the importance of a policy of religious toleration. Under Rolte, the settlement suffered a setback. Under Sir John Child, President of Surat and Governor of Bombay (1682-90), there occurred three serious difficulties which contributed to the utter failure of his administration. The first was the rebellion of Captain Keigwin, the Commandant of the Bombay garrison, who broke out in revolt, managed to get himself proclaimed as the Governor of the Island, annulled the authority of Child and of the Company and declared Bombay to be under the immediate

control of the King (December 1683). He issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of Bombay in the name of King Charles, dwelling on 'the intolerable extortions, oppressions and unjust impositions' of the Company; and he also wrote letters both to King Charles and his brother the Duke of York (afterwards King James II), explaining that the selfish and unscrupulous schemes of Sir Josia Child in England and of Sir John Child in India were at the bottom of the whole trouble, and that he would keep Bombay in faithful allegiance to the Crown.

Keigwin governed Bombay with remarkable success till November 1684 in the name of the King and submitted only on the appearance of a naval force sent with the sanction of Charles himself.

Sir John Child was the namesake and the willing agent and tool of the very masterful Sir Josia Child, who was the Governor of the Company in 1681 and continued to be the all-dominant force in its affairs until his death in 1690. Sir Josia was a great admirer of Dutch colonial policy and wanted to build up a similar power for the English in India. According to him Bombay was to be strongly fortified and protected and the charges incurred were to be met from increased rents, customs duties and municipal taxes. President Sir John Child was appointed Captain-General of the Company's forces on the Bombay coast, as well as Director-General of all mercantile affairs; and he was also authorised to regulate the affairs of the factories in Bengal and on the Coromandel Coast. Ordinarily he was to reside in Bombay, and was given the imposing title of Captain-General, usually shortened as the General. Bombay in consequence superseded Surat as the seat of the Western Presidency. It was thus given extended powers and made supreme over all the Company's establishments in India.

To check the interlopers who were giving increased trouble, a Court of Admiralty was set up in Bombay in 1684 under Letters Patent obtained from the King in 1683. In the disastrous war with the Mughuls that ensued as the result of Child's policy, to fight out and establish their privileges by arms, Bombay was besieged by Mughul forces and was to submit to a humiliating peace, one of the conditions of which was the dismissal of Child, who, fortunately for himself did not long survive this disgrace. General Sir John Child was thus the first Governor-General of India.²¹

The internal administration of Bombay in the first half of the eighteenth century was marked by the establishment of a bank in 1720 and by the formation of a large dockyard some time later under

a Parsi ship-builder of Surat. A Mayor's Court similar to that which was functioning at Madras under the Charter of 1726 was established in 1728.²² By 1744 the population had risen to 70,000 and the revenues amounted to 160,000. According to the evidence of J. H. Grose who visited the island in 1750, the chief characteristic of the administration of Bombay was "the mildness of the government and its toleration of all religions", which contributed to his popularity.²³

It is a matter of common historical knowledge that when the Regulating Act was passed, there arose a quarrel between the Bombay Council and the Supreme Council of Calcutta over the negotiations with Raghunāth Rāo. The Council were uncertain in view of the provisions of the Act, whether they had powers to make a treaty independently without sanction from Bengal. But they decided to act as they had not been notified of the arrival of Bengal Councillors. Their conclusion of the treaty of Surat (March 1775) was declared by the Supreme Government as being not merely impolitic but directly contrary to the provisions of the Regulating Act. Warren Hastings who was not in favour of the majority decision in the matter, but was out-voted, expressed his opinion that the distance between Bombay and Calcutta might render fatal the insistence that the Government of Bombay should await confirmatory orders from Calcutta.²⁴

NOTES

- 1 John Kaye remarks: "We traded, we conquered, we governed. It was long before this matter of government came palpably before us. At first all that we had to do was to govern ourselves, and this we did in a very loose manner—rather according to laws of power and impulses of passion than to principles of justice and reason."
2. The names of the Company's servants had to be enrolled in a regular seniority list; they could be transferred from one Presidency to another; and on occasions of emergency or when there was strife in any agency (as the subordinate factory was called) the Directors sent out one of their own number to improve the affairs. It was also their custom to cut down the pay of their servants when trade was slack. The Directors kept a paternal eye on their servants in India and sent out to them chaplains and books on theology. The chaplains often proved as keen traders as the factors themselves. Usually the factors got lodgings and free board at the common table. The diet and sumptuary allowances to the President often far exceeded his salary; the three Senior Merchants next to the Governor who constituted the Council, might live outside the factory, and got house and table allowances of their own. The servants of the Company followed, from the beginning, the Portuguese practice of private trade. The Company allowed its servants to supplement their wages by granting them an interest in the trade, and, in certain cases, a share in the profits; and it always protested "not against private trading, but against excessive private trading."
3. The Charters obtained from Queen Elizabeth and King James in 1600 and 1609, 1611 and 1622, conferred no privileges except the exclusive trade to the East Indies, which was an exceptional privilege in the light of the political economy of the times. The next important charter after the famous one (of 1657) of Cromwell was granted by Charles II in April 1661; and according to this, the

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Company were given power and command over their fortresses and were authorised to appoint Governors and others for their government. The Company were also empowered to send ships of war for their factories, to choose officers by commission under their common seal, to erect fortifications and to seize unlicensed persons and punish persons in their employment, to govern their factories by martial law and to make peace or war with any non-Christian power.

Prior to the issue of this Charter, the Agent and Council very probably possessed no judicial authority over the inhabitants "but such as was derived from the native suzerain." Justice towards natives and towards European subjects of foreign powers was administered in that way. Offences by British subjects were dealt with by the Agent in Council.

- 4 It was provided that the President should be Judge-Advocate till one should arrive from England (July, 1684).
- 5 The Admiralty Court, by fusion with the Recorder's Court created in 1797 became in 1801 the first Supreme Court appointed by the Crown and the latter, by fusion with the East India Company's *Sadr* Courts became in 1862 the present High Court.
- 6 This committee continued until 1758 under the altered title of "Select Committee for transacting Country Affairs." During Lally's siege of Madras (December 1758-February 1759) the Government was committed to Governor Pigot and Major Stringer Lawrence. As soon as normal government was restored, secret matters began to be dealt with by the whole Board in their Secret Department. In 1761 the Directors ordered the reappointment of a Select Committee for affairs requiring special secrecy, but presumably the Council reverted at once to the practice of dealing with all secret matters in the Military and Secret Department. In 1769 the Directors ordered the formation of a Select Committee to deal with political questions and military operations.
- 7 Governor Sir Archibald Campbell (1786-90) in whose time the administration came to be divided into departments, each under a board of officers, formed a Committee of Police for the regulation of wages and prices, which was ultimately superseded by a Board of Police in 1797.
- 8 Mr. Place's vigorous administration, which continued till 1798, busied itself with investigation of the land revenues, the discovery of abuses in connection with their collection and management, and the acquisition of information respecting the situation, the rights and the privileges of the *ryots*. He abolished altogether the office of *kānungo* which had been already discontinued by the Nawāb and instituted a department of record and accounts consisting of a *sheristadar* and *gumastās* to assist him in the various divisions of his charge; he strove to restore the office of *karnam* to its original efficiency. He did away with the office of *deshmukh*, but he revived the *natwāurs* who were the headmen of larger subdivisions each including a circle of villages.
- 9 Dr. Francis Buchanan who toured in the district in 1800 found that the condition of the people was better than that of the people of Bengal; while the town of Kanjivaram was regularly built with wide and clean streets.
- 10 From the Survey we learn that the *sarkārs* were properly regarded as the 'granary of the Carnātic during the north-east monsoon, in like manner as Tanjore is reckoned on for the other season of periodical winds from the opposite point of the compass.'
- 11 The *pālegars* never paid their *peshkush* with any regularity. Munro, therefore, assessed the *pālegars* at the highest *peshkush* which they had paid either to the Nizām or to Haidar, and in case of their refusal or neglect they were coerced by his military peons. The Directors of the Company wanted that the *pālegars* should be reconciled to British rule by more gentle measures and characterized Munro's actions as disingenuous; and the latter retorted by showing that "neither on the ground of their ancient rights, nor of their later conduct, were the *pālegars* entitled to 'gentle measures', and their 'feudal habits and principles' consisted of crimes, oppressions and contumacies, which, if permitted to continue would have rendered good government impossible."
- 12 He held that to give land any saleable value at all, the assessment should not exceed one-third of the gross produce; and as his own rates took about 45 per cent. He recommended that all his rates should be reduced by about 25 per cent. And an additional 8 per cent, (or 33 per cent in all) should be knocked off the rates on all land under wells and small tanks, on condition

that the ryots agreed to keep these in workable repair. He also proposed that the ryots should be given complete ownership of the land for which they paid assessment and that they should be at liberty at the end of every year to throw up their holdings or to occupy more land provided there was a proper proportion of good or bad land taken up or relinquished and that unoccupied land should remain in the hands of Government. It was only long afterwards that his views were given very partial effect to.

13. The *zamindārs* were forbidden to keep a military establishment, and were deprived of their police authority and their control over the miscellaneous sources of revenue. They were declared to be proprietors of their estates, with the cultivators for their tenants. They were given the power of distraint and were authorised to collect rent at the rates which prevailed in the year preceding the Permanent Settlement. In return they were required to pay yearly a *peshkush* fixed in perpetuity; if the *peshkush* fell into arrears their estate could be attached and sold. The *peshkush* was usually calculated to be the equivalent of one-third of the gross produce, or two-thirds of the gross rental, of the estate; but deviations from the standard were allowed in special cases.
14. Besides, the *pālegars* also levied in all possible cases taxes on ploughs, looms, shops and labourers. They confused by their encroachments the distinction between *pālayam* lands and *sarkār lands*. They had usurped, in a large number of the *sarkār* villages, the power of appointing and controlling the *sthala-kavalkars* and receiving from them *russums* or fees. They also levied hunting batta, contributions to marriage parties and a number of other payments, either fixed in a lump on the whole village, or levied on ploughs, looms, shops and labourers. They also received allotments of lands in the *sarkār* villages on which they received the government share or assessment and claimed the right of *madisum* (*madhyastham*) on behalf of the *sarkār* ryots as against the latter's revenue collectors; and thus discontented *sarkār* ryots would be settled in *pālayam* villages. Their right of arbitration was recognised, the *sarkār* renters' power was diminished and the *deshakaval* of the *pālegars* fortified.
15. Hodgson was influenced by the belief that it would keep alive and stimulate the habit of village self-government, a habit which the *ryotwāri* system tended to destroy. He also realised that it was not only principal inhabitants who could be oppressive. All collectors were not Munros. Some were corrupt and many were lazy. The Indian agency at their command was by tradition high-handed, extortionate, and venal. Under a corrupt or slack collector the *ryotwāri* system gave these men ample opportunities and thus Government would share the discredit of their misdeeds. The Board also hoped for some saving in expenditure under the village lease system, since the task of assessing and collecting the dues of each cultivator would be left to the villagers.
16. A variety of forms were invented, without paying strict attention to which no business could be done; a legal language was introduced entirely unknown to the mass of the people; depositions were required in all cases, to be taken down in writing; oaths were fabricated, repulsive to the religious prejudices of the community; nay, a distinct class of vakeels or advocates was created, without the intervention of one or more of whom, no suit could be tried, nor any cause determined. As a matter of course, the business of every court fell, under such circumstances, rapidly into arrears, till at last the evil became so glaring as to demand the application of some immediate remedy. (*Life of General Sir Thomas Munro*, Vol. II, p. 410).
17. Munro, as the head of the judicial commission did not agree cordially with the Governor, the Right Hon'ble Mr. Hugh Elliot. Munro complained that the Governor and Council, the Board of Revenue and the Sadr Adalāt were all hostile to his favourite scheme of *ryotwāri* assessment. As a result of the Regulations of 1816 the police came to perform many of the duties for which sepoys were formerly employed.

Another reform effected was the substitution of the rupee for the star pagoda as the standard coin for the Presidency, the rupee being calculated at the rate of 3½ for one pagoda.

There was also started in 1812 the college of Fort St. George, in imitation of Lord Wellesley's college of Fort William which trained civil servants in the vernaculars of the province, supervised the instruction of *munshis* and of persons who were to be appointed as law-officers and pleaders in the provincial courts. This college had a very useful career.

18. "With what grace can one talk of paternal government if we exclude the native from every important office, and say, as we did till very lately, that in a country containing fifteen millions of inhabitants, no man but a European shall be entrusted with as much authority as to order the punishment of a single stroke of a rattan. Let Britain be subjugated by a foreign power to-morrow, let the people be excluded from all share in the government, from public honours, from every office of high trust and emolument, and let them in every situation be considered as unworthy of trust, and all their knowledge, and all their literature, sacred and profane, would not save them from becoming, in another generation or two, a low-minded, deceitful and dishonest race." (Munro)
19. Pietro Della Valle visited Surat in 1623, and gave a good picture of life in the factory; while Mandelslo, coming fifteen years later, described in praiseful terms the life of the factory community "the strict order observed, the deference to the President, the collegiate life of the Factory, the common table with the Chaplain to say grace, above all, the divine service held daily and on Sundays three times."
20. Even foreigners of other nations residing in English Factories were subject to English law. Indians were nominally independent of English authority and outside the limits of the English factories they could claim the protection of their own ports even where a European was concerned in the disputes. For transactions outside his factory the Englishman himself would be subject to the judiciary of the country. The Charter of Charles II of 1661 empowered the Governors and Councils of the several factories in India to "judge ail persons belonging to the Governor and Company of the East Indies or that should live under them, in all causes whether civil or criminal, according to the laws of the kingdom, and to execute judgement accordingly. English Statute Law was here expressly recognized; and the expression, 'those that should live under them' was held to include all classes. Only for Bombay which was more than a trading station and was ceded by a formal treaty, did the Company obtain, by a special grant, power to pass laws and constitutions for the good Government of the settlement and to inflict the necessary punishments. But the question of jurisdiction, apart from that legislation and judicial action, remained rather anomalous as under the terms of James I's charter of 1624.
21. The subsequent history of the title is interesting. After the death of Sir John Child, Sir John Goldsborough was sent out (1691) as commissary and supervisor; and two years later he was made Captain-General and Commander-in-Chief, with Madras as his headquarters, while Sir John Gayer was to act as the Lieutenant-General and Governor of Bombay. On the death of Goldsborough, Gayer succeeded to the post of 'General' (1694), remaining at Bombay; while Hingginson, the Madras President, became Lieutenant-General. Ten years later (Gayer being kept in prison at Surat by the Mughul authorities) Sir Nicholas Waite, the new Governor of Bombay, assumed the title of "General" and upon his dismissal in 1708, his successor, Aislabie, laid claim to the same designation. The title was abolished in 1715 when the new post of President and Governor of Bombay was created, with Boone as its first occupant. The title of Lieutenant-General had lapsed in 1698, when Thomas Pitt was appointed Governor of Madras.
22. In the instructions for the procedure of the Mayor's Court in all actions and suits both civil and criminal, in the proving of wills and the granting of letters of administration of the estates of intestates, together with the forms of the oaths, directed by the Charter to be taken, was embodied as there is reason to believe that the originals were lost, though duplicates were sent out on 24 January 1753. The doctrine was first laid down that by the Charter of 1726 all the common and Statute Laws at that time extant in England were introduced into the Indian Presidencies and all Parliamentary enactments passed since then excluded, unless expressly extended to India by special provision. This doctrine had been long established beyond dispute, but in the celebrated trial of Nand Kumar in 1775 all the Judges of the Supreme Court at Calcutta appear to have considered it clear that the dividing line was drawn by the Charter of 1753. The latter charter expressly exempted from the jurisdiction of the Mayor's Court all suits and actions between the natives only which should be determined among themselves unless both parties submitted to the determination of that court. But the registers show that Indians continued to

resort to the English courts as much as before. There was the usual machinery of Sheriffs and Courts of Quarter Sessions presided over by the Governor and Councillors.

23. Some details as to the condition of Bombay are available in the series of letters, ascribed to Commodore John Burnell; the first letter is dated May 1710. (Orme MSS; VIII.17), (India Office Record).
24. One of the members of the Bombay Council, by name William Taylor, who made a report on the negotiations, contended that the Regulating Act supported the position of his government inasmuch as it exempted them from referring to Calcutta matters on which orders had been received direct from the Directors. He also pleaded that such a control from Calcutta would degrade the Bombay Government in the eyes of the Indians.

The Governor had a Council of two civil members and of the Commander-in-Chief; but often the Governor himself was the Commander-in-Chief. Under the Council, there were three boards, viz., the Board of Trade, the Board of Revenue and the Military Board which carried on the details of the administration and were normally presided over by the members of the Council. In Bombay the administration of mofussil districts came only with the wars of 1817-18 resulting in the annexation of the *Peshwā's* territories and, therefore, district administration came only later. There was in Bombay the same judicial administration as had been established in Madras.

CHAPTER XIX

LANGUAGE AND LITERATURE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

I. BENGALI

In a sense, Bengali literature of the eighteenth century was a continuation of that of the seventeenth. The Vaishṇava songs and biographies continued to be written, though they were much inferior to their predecessors. But the *Maṅgala-kāvya*, the origin and nature of which have been described in the preceding volume (pp. 558-60), formed the best poetical literature of the period. The earliest work of this type during the period under review was the *Shiva-saṁkīrtana* or *Shivāyana* of Rameshvar Bhaṭṭāchārya, composed about 1712 A.D. The theme is that of the *Chāṇḍī-maṅgala* of Mukuṇḍarām, but the distinctive characteristic is its refined taste as contrasted with the amorous contents of the books of this class. Rameshvar may justly claim to be one of the best poets of the century. Another poet, Ghanarām Chakravarti was a contemporary of Rameshvar and wrote a *Dharma-maṅgala Kāvya*. Another *Kāvya* of this class was written by Mānikram Ganguli about half a century later (1752-53 A.D.).¹

The greatest poet of the period was Bhāratchandra Ray Guṇākar, born some time about 1710 A.D.² in a Brahmin family of Bhursut area in the southern part of West Bengal (Rāḍha). He learnt Sanskrit and Persian and made his debut in 1737 with two very short poems on the popular deity Satyanārāyaṇa. After passing through many vicissitudes in his life, which are reflected in his poems, he found a good patron in Mahārājā Krishnachandra of Nadia. Here he wrote his *magnum opus* "*Annadā-maṅgala*". It was completed in 1752-53 A.D. and enjoyed reputation as a masterpiece for more than a century. Bhāratchandra was regarded as the best Bengali poet until the middle of the 19th century A.D. when revolutionary changes took place in Bengali literature.

The *Annadā-maṅgala* really comprises three independent parts. The first part is the *Maṅgala-kāvya* proper, dealing with the episodes of Shiva, Pārvatī (Annadā) and other minor deities. It, however, contains some new episodes such as Pārvatī's offering cooked food to Shiva, her description of her own life in verses of double *entendre*

conveying two diametrically opposite ideas. Besides, the gods and goddesses and Nārada are endowed with human sentiments and the author shows great skill in describing them as such.

The second, the best of the three parts, is the romantic story of the secret love of Vidyā and Suṇḍara, carried on through Hirā Mālīnī (florist of princess Vidyā). Suṇḍara visited Vidyā every night through an underground passage from Hirā's house to the bed-chamber of Vidyā. The love intrigue was discovered and the royal father of Vidyā ordered Suṇḍara to be put to death. Of course, Suṇḍara's prayer to the Goddess Kālī saved him from imminent death; he married Vidyā and everything ended happily. The secret amours of Vidyā and Suṇḍara are described in beautiful verses, very skilful and highly charming, but artificial and occasionally obscene. The character of the florist Hirā is superbly drawn and almost unparalleled in Bengali literature.

The third part of *Annadā-maṅgala* deals with a historical theme centering round the victory of the Mughul General Mān Singh over Pratāpāditya, the ruler of a petty principality in South Bengal. The heroic stand of Pratāpāditya, as described by the poet, is without any historical foundation, but has enchanted the Bengali readers for more than a century, and is still regarded as historical truth by many. Apart from the principal characters, the author has shown great skill in drawing some minor characters like Dāsu, Bāsu, etc. The description of the battle is also very lively.

Although the main episode is unhistorical (except, of course, the defeat and capture of Pratāpāditya), the *Annadā-maṅgala* has got some passages of great historical importance. It gives a vivid picture of the great dissatisfaction, amounting to hatred, towards the Muslim ruler in Bengal, 'Alī Vardī Khān, a contemporary of Bhārat-chandra. It is said in the introductory part that when 'Alī Vardī destroyed the Hindu temples in Bhubaneswar (Orissa), Nandī got furious and took up his javelin to destroy the *Yavanās*, but Shiva prevented him, saying, "My devotee, the ruler of the *Bargis* (i.e., the Marāthās) will subdue the *Yavanās*". So he appeared before the Marāthā ruler in a dream and he sent Bhāskar Paṇḍit to Bengal to whom reference will be made later.

In the third part also reference is made to the oppressions of the Muslims, such as destruction of temples and the insult of Brahmins (p. 196). Far more interesting is, however, a speech put in the mouth of the Mughul emperor Jahāngīr, which is a violent denunciation of Hindu religion and society, ending with Jahāngīr's ex-

clamation: "The very sight of a Brahmin is loathsome to me (lit. burns my body) and the desire often seizes me to convert all the Hindus to Islam." All this should be a corrective to those who fondly believe that the Hindu-Muslim differences were artificially created by the British.

Bhāratchandra wrote an erotico-rhetorical work, *Rasamanjari*, based on a Sanskrit work by Bhānudatta of Mithilā, describing the signs and feelings of lovers. It was composed before 1749. Bhāratchandra could also write good Sanskrit verses as shown by the *Nāgāshtaka*, a poem in eight stanzas, written in double *entendre*, which in one sense describes the Purānic story of the suppression of the Nāg (serpent) Kāliyā by Kṛṣṇa, and in another sense refers to the oppressions of Rāmdev Nāg, an agent of his landlord, Rājā of Burdwan, and an appeal for remedy to Krishnachandra, the patron of Bhāratchandra.

Bhāratchandra's *Vidyāsundara* contains a number of beautiful songs "which resemble Vaishnava lyrics in spirit and content but differ from them in structure and fineness".

Rāmprasād Sen:

Another great figure in the Bengali literature during the period under review was Rāmprasād Sen, a junior contemporary of Bhāratchandra. He was born in Halishahar-Kumārhaṭṭa on the Ganga, about 25 miles from Calcutta. He is far better known as a great devotee of the Goddess Kālī and a sādhak (saint). His devotional songs, quite large in number, are still highly popular in Bengal and are sung as a regular feature on the Calcutta Radio. He, too, wrote a poem depicting the amours of Vidyā and Sundara which bears clear signs of the influence of Bhāratchandra. He also wrote two other poems in the form of *Pāñchālīs*, namely *Kālī-kīrtan* and *Kṛṣṇa-kīrtan*. Rāmprasād was born in 1720-21 A.D. and died sometime between 1759 and 1795 A.D.³

Secular poems:

The stream of religious poetry which had been flowing throughout the medieval age continued till the middle of the eighteenth century when its force was considerably weakened. This is exemplified by the growth of new types of literature such as "short poems on romantic love or on historical and topical subjects and short secular love-songs." A sort of compromise between the old and the new ideals gave rise to the Kabi poetry and *Pāñchālī* which flourished

about the middle of the eighteenth century and continued almost throughout the period under review.

The earliest writers associated with the *Kabi* poetry were Lālchandra and Nandalāl, but by far the best was Rāmnidhi Gupta, better known as Nidhū Bābū (1742-1839 A.D.). He is one of the leading sponsors of the style of music known as *Ākhaḍai* and introduced the now famous *Ṭappā* style. Among other composers of songs may be mentioned Rām Basū.

As regards *Pāñchālī*, a Muslim writer Shaikh Faizullah was the author of *Satyapīrer Pāñchālī*, a popular semi-religious legend on which various *Pāñchālī* poems were written. Faizullah flourished early in the 18th century A.D. and composed two other poems, *Goraksha-vijaya* and *Ghāzī-vijaya*.

Special reference should be made to a collection of songs and ballads, known as *Mymensingha-Gītikā*, so called from the fact that these were current mostly in the Mymensingh district, now in Bangladesh. These were collected together early in this century and published by the Calcutta University. Two special features of these are: first, they anticipate romantic sentiments expressed in the Western literature which was a dominant feature in Bengali fiction, poetry and drama since the middle of the nineteenth century, and secondly, they are altogether free from reference to gods and goddesses and show no religious sentiments. The stories of these ballads are based on love and sentiments of ordinary men and women, narrated in simple but charming verses which make a profound appeal to human heart. These poems attained great popularity within restricted areas in East Bengal, but were practically unknown outside East Bengal. The date of composition of these verses is a matter of dispute. According to some, they belong to the medieval age, while others regard them as belonging to a period not earlier than the late eighteenth century. There seems, however, to be little doubt that in their present form they cannot be much earlier than the 19th century, and if they were composed earlier, their language must have subsequently undergone considerable modification. There is, however, general agreement on one point, namely that they show no influence of Western literature and reflect the feelings and sentiments of the unsophisticated rural folk.

Historical Literature:

Reference has been made in the preceding volume (p. 562) to the *Rājamālā*—‘Chronicle of kings’ (of Tripura or Tippera). It was

begun in the 15th century and dealt with the history of Tripura from the very beginning up to the rule of Dharma-māṇikya in the 15th century. In each of the next three centuries addition was made to bring the Chronicle up-to-date. The fourth and last part was written during the reign of Krishna-māṇikya (1760-83 A.D.). Though dates, events and even genealogies of kings in the *Rājamālā* have in many cases proved to be wrong, it undoubtedly possesses great importance, being the only general history of a region or kingdom, written in Bengali before the middle of the 19th century. Mention may be made of two other historical works of Tripura, namely *Champakavijaya* and *Krishnamālā* dealing respectively with some specific events during the reign of Ratna-māṇikya II (1685-1710 A.D.) and the life of Krishna-māṇikya, two kings of Tripura. The latter was written during the reign of Rājadhara-māṇikya (1783-1802 A.D.) nephew of Krishna-māṇikya. To this class belongs another Bengali book, also written in verse, known as *Mahārāshṭra Purāṇa*.⁴ It was written by one Gaṅgārām of whom nothing is known. The date given in the only available manuscript, namely 14th Paush, Sāla 1158, Shaka 1672, shows that it was written in 1751-52 A.D. and this is probably also the date of composition, which, in any case cannot be much earlier. The manuscript, containing 716 lines, ends with the words: "Thus ends the first part of the *Mahārāshṭra Purāṇa* (called) *Bhāskara-parābhava*". This indicates that either there were other parts, now lost, or the author intended to, but could not, write the other parts. The book gives an account of the Marāthā raids in Bengal during the reign of 'Alī Vardī Khān, from 1742 to the treacherous murder of Bhāskar Pandit, the Marāthā General, by 'Alī Vardī Khān in 1744.

The Chronicle is of great historical importance as it contains a contemporary account of the military raids of the *Bargis* (the nickname given to the Marāthā soldiers by the Bengalis) the memory of whose oppressions and cruelties has been still preserved in the lullaby songs in Bengal. The author gives a vivid picture of the atrocities perpetrated by the Marāthās and the miseries and sufferings of the people caused thereby, such as is not available from any other source. It is not unlikely that the author himself was a witness of, if not a sufferer from, these raids. The importance of the poem from this point of view will be evident from some passages quoted below.

The following passage describes the state of things which followed the defeat and flight of Nawab 'Alī Vardī Khān:

"Then the *Bargis* began to plunder the villages, and all the people fled in terror. Brahmin Pandits fled, taking with them loads of manuscripts. (Similar statements follow in respect of goldsmiths, coppersmiths, blacksmiths, potters, fishermen, conch-merchants and petty traders). The people fled in all directions; who could count their numbers? Kāestās, Baidyas—all who lived in villages fled, when they heard the name of the *Bargis*. Ladies of good family, who had never before set foot on the road fled from the *Bargis* with baskets on their heads. (Similar descriptions follow of other well-to-do classes). And pregnant women, all but unable to walk, began their labour on the road and were delivered there. And all the Sikdars and village officials fled for their lives when they heard the name '*Bargi*'. . . . From every village, big or small, people fled in fear of the *Bargis*.'"5

But even such hasty wholesale flight was of no avail. When they had plundered all they could in the fields, "Marāthā horsemen entered the villages and set fire to large houses. They stole all their gold and silver and did many foul things to the women. *Bangalas* (Bungalows), *Chāuāris* (thatch-roofed houses), *Vishnu-mandapas* (temples)—they burned them all, large and small. They destroyed whole villages and swept, looting, into all the four directions. They bound some people, their hands behind their backs, others they threw to the ground and while they were on their backs on the ground, kicked them with shoes. They shouted over and over again "Give us money", and when they got no money they filled peoples' nostrils with water, and some they seized and drowned in tanks, and many died of suffocation. In this way they did all manner of foul and evil deeds. When they demanded money and it was not given to them, they would put the man to death. Those who had money gave it. Those who had none were killed."6

This passage is followed by a long list of places burnt, destroyed and houses razed to the ground. No such vivid account of the brutal oppression of the Marāthās is to be found anywhere else and this is the justification of the long quotation. It is also of great historical importance. The view of the Marāthās entertained by the Bengalis, and probably also in other parts of India invaded by the Marāthās, is certainly not calculated to favour the idea of a political hegemony of Hindu India under the Marāthā rule, and we may understand why the dream of Shivājī of founding a Hindu empire was never realized.

Another type of Bengali literature which also broke an altogether new ground was the Book of Travel. It is represented by the

Tīrtha-maṅgala. Kṛiṣṇa Chandra Ghoshāl, a rich man of Kidderpore near Calcutta, made a journey by boat as far as Benaras and Allahābād. Bijayarām, a member of the party accompanying him, wrote an account of the journey and of the places visited, shortly after their return to Calcutta in 1770. The book written in simple verses contains much interesting information.

Prose Literature:

The vast Bengali literature described above and in the preceding two volumes was all written in verse and there was no prose Bengali literature, properly so called, during the period under review. There are short sentences in the Vaiṣṇava esoteric and catechismal treatises and long or short letters written in prose, but hardly any composition that could be really called literature, except a few books belonging to the two following categories:

1. Tracts written by Christian Missionaries, mostly Portuguese.
2. Translation of Legal Codes by the order of the East India Company towards the end of the 18th century.

This needs no detailed discussion.

As regards the first, two small tracts are said to have been written in prose by the Portuguese missionaries towards the end of the 16th century and a Bengali Grammar and Dictionary in the seventeenth century; but these are no longer available.

The oldest Bengali book written in prose, so far known, is the *Kripār Shāstrer Arthabhed* (written as *Xrepar Xaxtrer Orth Bhed*). It was composed by Manoel da Assumpcam in Dacca in 1734 and printed in Roman type in Lisbon in 1743 together with the Portuguese original. He also published in the same year a Bengali Grammar in Portuguese with a Bengali-Portuguese Dictionary. The next in point of time was the *Brāhmaṇ Roman Catholic Sambād*—a dialogue between a Brahmin and a Roman Catholic in which the latter seeks to establish the superiority of Christianity to Hinduism. It was composed in 1743 by a Hindu of East Bengal converted to Christianity. He was born in an aristocratic family but was stolen in his boyhood by the Arakanese pirates (1683). A Portuguese Missionary purchased him and converted him to Christianity under the name of Dom Antonio.

These two books clearly show the beginning of the Bengali prose. The only other prose writing is found in two long letters

written by Mahārājā Nāndkumār in 1771 and 1772 and in a large number of short letters.

It was in the first two decades of the 19th century that we find the beginning of the literary prose style, properly so called. But though it falls during the period covered by this volume, it is dealt with in the next volume for the sake of showing a continuous development.

Bengal owes a debt of gratitude to the Portuguese not only for their pioneering efforts for the development of Bengali prose style but also for the first printed books in Bengali; the Portuguese had established a printing press in Goa—the first in India—in 1556 A.D. Bengali language borrowed many Portuguese as well as Arabic and Persian words. We often forget that familiar words like *almirah* (*almārī*), *botām*, *chhabī*, *sāban*, *Darajā*, *janālā*, etc., are really derived from the Portuguese words with only very slight alterations.

II. HINDI

Hindi literature during the period under review continued the style and tradition of the preceding period and was not marked by any originality, though several writers give evidence of high talent and technical perfection. The poets mostly wrote in *Braj bhāshā* and their composition was highly artificial, full of 'pretty sentiments and rhetorical flourishes'. Particular reference should be made to Bhūshana (1613-1712) who wrote several short works panegyricizing the great Marāthā hero Shivājī in most musical *Braj bhāshā* marked by ardent patriotism of a Hindu, clothed in beautiful poetic image.

The Hindi prose, both in *Kharī Bolī* and *Braj bhāshā*, whose beginnings go back to the 16th century A.D., was highly developed. Very good progress of *Kharī Bolī*, i.e., Delhi Hindi is evidenced by the prose rendering of *Yogavāsishtha Rāmāyaṇa* completed by Rāmprasād Niranjani in 1741 and the Jain *Padmapurāṇa* of Pandit Daulatram (1761). Another writer of repute is Sadāsukhlāl Niyāz of Delhi who composed some episodes from the *Vishṇu Purāṇa* in Sanskrit Hindi. Mention may also be made of Insha Allah, one of the earliest writers to turn Hindi prose from religious to secular subjects.

The development of modern Hindi from the beginning of the 19th century is dealt with in the next volume.

III. ORIYA

Reference has been made in the preceding volume (p. 564) to the rise of an artificial style in Oriya. Its great exponent, Upendra Bhanja (1670-1720), introduced a new era in Oriya literature which continued throughout the period under review. His works, not less than 42 in number, demonstrate the treatment of all the literary genre of Orissa. The following view of an eminent literary critic gives a fair idea of his style and literary output:

“The tour-de-force of the Sanskrit Chitra-kavyas, poems with verbal plays, acrostics, combinations of different sounds etc., find their unheard of fulfilment in Upendra Bhanja’s works. Love-romances, poems based on the Sanskrit epics and the Purāṇas, lyrics, compositions in various metres, works on rhetoric, lexicons—all of these feature in Upendra Bhanja’s literary output. About 10 great romances are the most esteemed among his larger compositions. In the *Vaidehisha-vilāsa*, based on the story of the *Rāmāyaṇa*, every word beginning a line and a half-line has *ba* (or *va*) as its first consonant; in the *Subhadrāpariṇaya*, similarly *sa* has been employed, and in the *Kalā-kautuka* every line begins and ends in the syllable *ka*. In the *Avanī-rasa-taraṅga*, words with simple vowels only have been used. A section in the *Koṭi-brahmāṇḍa-sundarī* can be made to give descriptions of three seasons, the rains, winter and summer, according as it is read in its entirety, or with one or two syllables of each line omitted.”

Upendra Bhanja’s works exercised a profound influence upon Oriya literature and a large number of writers imitated him. The story of Krishna is almost a common theme of these writers, who, however, also wrote on Purāṇic themes and love romances, but without any novelty. There are, no doubt, some exceptions. Mention may be made, for example, of Brajanāth Baḍajenā’s *Samara-taraṅga*, a spirited ballad describing the fight between the Marāthās, who invaded Orissa, and the Oriya force led by the Rājā of Dhenkāṇal. Reference may also be made to Māguṇi Dāsa’s *Kāñchī-Kāverī*, a historico-romantic poem based on the love between king Purushottama-Deva and princess Padmāvatī.

Reference should also be made to some family chronicles written in prose and a vast folk literature dealing with fasts, feasts and festivities.

IV. ASSAMESE

The most noticeable change in Assamese literature during the period under review is the greater emphasis laid upon secular,

rather than religious, subjects as before. Apart from stories and romances, books were written on astrology, mathematics, veterinary science, rituals, dancing and music. So far as veterinary science is concerned there are three treatises, namely, *Hasti-Vidyārṇava*, an illustrated and scientific book on elephant-lore based on the Sanskrit work *Maṭaṅga-līlā* and another book on the same subject with the same title, composed in 1734 by Sukumar Barkath; while a third book, *Ashwanidān*, dealing with the diseases of horses, their prevention and treatment, was compiled in 1806 by Sūryakharī Daivajña. As to the other scientific treatises, mention may be made of the *Bhāsvatī*, an astronomical work by Kavirāja Chakravarti, and *Kitābat Mañjari*, a treatise on Arithmetic composed by Bakul Kāyastha about 1734 A.D. Reference may also be made to the *Hasta Mukṭāvalī*, a book on dancing by Śubhaṅkara Kavi and the romantic poem *Mṛgawatī Charit* by Rām Dvija.

Reference has been made in the preceding volume (p. 563) to the origin and nature of the *Burañjis*. These prose chronicles continued to be written during this period. Among the *Burañjis* written during this period or shortly before it, the following is a list of important ones with approximate dates within brackets:

Pādshā Burañji (c. 1650-1780), *Asam Burañji* (c. 1681), *Kām-rūpa Burañji* (c. 1700), *Kācharī Burañji* (c. 1706), *Jayantia Burañji* (c. 1742), and *Tungkhungia Burañji* (c. 1804).⁸

There are also *Burañjis* written in verse, two of which are well-known. Being commissioned by the last Ahom Prince Kāmeshwar Sinha in 1806, Dutirām Hazarika wrote the *Kalī Bhārat*—a history of the Ahom kings. Similarly at the command of the feudatory Prince Puraṇdar Sinha (1832-38), Bishveshvar Vaidyādhipa wrote the *Belimarar Burañji* (History of Sunset), a chronicle of the last Ahom rulers.

To this class of literature belongs the *Duraṅgarāja-Vaṁshavalī* (Chronicle of the Darang Kings) compiled by Sūryakharī Daivajña in 1798 and the *Koch-Rāja-Vaṁshavalī* (Chronicle of the Koch Kings) by Rahikānta Dvija in 1802.⁹

V. GÚJARĀTĪ

Gujarāṭī literature of the eighteenth century is quite rich in contents and in the varieties of literary forms, in spite of deteriorating social, economic and political conditions prevailing in Gujarāt at that time. Recent research has revealed that hundreds of

manuscripts of the works of Jain poets and authors of this period have been preserved in the Jain Bhaṇḍārs at different places. It shows that quite a good number of poets and authors have made a very large contribution towards the development of the Gujarāṭi literature of the eighteenth century. Most of the works of the poets and authors are still unpublished. The history of medieval Gujarāṭi literature will have to be written again when most of the medieval manuscripts are published and the works of the poets and authors are made available to scholars.

In the medieval Gujarāṭi literature, since the time of Hemchaṇḍrāchārya, particularly till the sixteenth century, the contribution is mainly from the Jain poets and authors. After the sixteenth century the medieval Gujarāṭi literature flows into two different currents, Jain and non-Jain. This demarcation between Jain and non-Jain literature is necessary in medieval Gujarāṭi literature, because most of the poets and authors were inspired to write by the religion they followed and the subjects of their works were mostly religious.

The major contribution of this period is in the field of *Rāsa* literature, in which the poets have narrated the biography or history of important Jain Tīrthaṅkaras, Āchāryas, Śhreṣṭhis, Tīrthas, etc. Along with *Rāsa*, contribution in the literary forms of *Phāgu*, *Prabandha*, *Akhyāna*, *Padyavārta*, *Bāramasi*, *Stavana*, *Sajjhaya*, *Kafi*, *Chābakha*, *Aratī*, *Pūjā*, *Bhajana*, *Bālāvabodha*, etc., were made by several poets and authors. This literature throws much light on the social, political, economic, cultural and religious life and conditions prevailing in Gujarāt and Rājasthān during that period.

Jinaharsha:

Poet Jinaharṣha (d. 1723) was born and brought up in Rājasthān. As a sādhu, he belonged to the *Khartar Gachcha*, and he was a disciple of Śhāntiharṣha. He spent his later life in Gujarāt, mostly in Patan.¹⁰

Jinaharṣha is one of the major poets of this period. His contribution to literature is spread over a period of more than fifty years. He has written, both in Gujarati and Rājasthāni, about seventy works of the types of *Rāsa*, *Chaupai*, etc., and has written more than four hundred poems of the type of *Stavana*, *Sajjhaya*, *Hundi*, etc. Some of his important works are *Chandan-Malayagiri Chaupai*, *Vidyāvilās Chaupai*, *Shukarāja Rāsa*, *Shreepāla Rājano Rāsa*, *Ratnasimha Rājarshi Rāsa*, *Kumārpāl Rāsa*, *Harishchandra*

Rāsa, Haribala Lachbhino Rāsa, Abhaykumāra Rāsa, Sheelavati Rāsa, Jambuswāmi Rāsa, Ārāmshobhā Rāsa. Most of his works are still unpublished.

The longest work of Jinaharsha is *Shatruñjaya Mahātmya Rāsa* which is available in his own handwriting. The *Rāsa* runs into more than 8,568 lines. The historical and religious importance of the chief Jain Tirtha, Shatruñja, is described at length in this *Rāsa*. Jinaharsha had a great command over languages. He was also well-versed in Rāg-Rāginī and therefore we find in abundance varieties of musical tunes in his poetry. Among the *stavanas*, his famous *stavana* named 'Antarjāmi' for Lord Pārshvanātha is still being sung everyday by devotees in Jain temples.

Udayaratna:

Poet Udayaratna was a popular and prominent poet of this period. He was a disciple of Shivaratnasūri. From his works we learn that he spent most of his time, as a *sādhu*, in Gujarāt, in places like Patan, Ahmadabad, Cambay, Kheda, etc. He has written more than twenty-five *Rāsas* and many poems of the type of *Stavanas* and *Sajjhayas*. Very few of his works are published. Among his *Rāsas* the prominent are *Jambuswāmi Rāsa, Ashta-Prakāri Pujā Rāsa, Sthulibhadra Rāsa, Rājasimha Rāsa, Malayasuṇḍarī Rāsa, Yashodhara Bhuvanbhānu Kevali Rāsa, Līlāvatī Rāsa, Harivamsha Rāsa*.¹¹ In *Jambuswāmi Rāsa*, written in Kheda-Hariala town, the poet has narrated the life of Jambukumāra. The *Rāsa* runs into more than 5,000 lines divided into dhals. Jambukumāra, son of a merchant, was inspired by the preaching of Sudhārāmaswāmi and decided to adopt the path of renunciation, but his parents insisted that he should first marry the daughters of the merchants in order to respect their commitments and then he would be free to adopt *dīkshā*. The parents knew that it was very difficult for a young man to think of *dīkshā* once he entered married life. But to the surprise of his parents and of all, Jambukumāra on the very first night of his marriage, successfully persuaded all his eight wives to adopt the path of *dīkshā* along with him. His parents and others also joined him. The story of Jambukumāra itself is very interesting and the poet has shown distinct poetic qualities in narrating it.

Udayaratna has written many *stavanas* and *sajjhayas*. His *stavanas* of Shamkleshvara Pārshvanātha and his *sajjhayas* on anger, pride, infatuation and greed are very popular till today and are being regularly sung by the Jains.

Devachandraji:

Devachandraji is one of the most remarkable poets of this century. A *Rāsa* on the life of Devachandraji was written in 1769 and is available. This *Rāsa* throws much light on the life and works of Devachandraji.¹² Devachandraji was born in Rājāsthān in 1760. At the age of ten he became *Dikshit* and then the disciple of Muni Rājasāgara, who had forecasted, before the birth of Devachandraji, to his parents, that their son will be a great *sādhū*. Devachandraji was very bright and in his young days studied several *shāstras* and works of his predecessors. He spent several years in Gujarāt and Saurashtra, did many religious performances, helped people and princes in times of natural calamities, made pilgrimages to Shatruñjaya and participated in religious discussions with leaders of other religions. He was one of the great scholars and philosophers of the period and was a very pious *sādhū*. He has written *Stavana-Chovishi*, *sajjhayas*, etc., which are full of deep meaning. His *stavanas* are very popular even now and are being regularly sung by the Jains in temples and Upāshrayas. His language has the characteristics of both Gujarāt and Rājasthān.

Mohanavijaya:

Nothing is known about the birth-place and birth-date of this poet, but from his works we learn that he belonged to Tapagachcha and he was a disciple of Rupavijaya. He has written several *Rāsas*, some of which are *Narmadā Sundarīno Rāsa*, *Puṇyapāl Guṇasundarī Rāsa*, *Chand Rājāno Rāsa*, etc. In all his *Rāsas*, he has mentioned the year in which they were written. Thus most of his works were written in the beginning of the eighteenth century in the towns of Gujarāt such as Mehsana, Patan, Saminagar, Rajnagar, etc. In addition to *Rāsas*, Mohanavijaya has also written *Stavana-Chovishi* in which his *stavana* for Bhagavān Rishabdev, beginning with 'Olambhade Mat Khijo' is very popular among the Jains.

Jñānavimal:

Jñānavimal was born in Bhinnamala, in the year 1638. He became a disciple of Dhiravimalgani. He spent much of his time in Surat, Cambay, Ahmadabad, Patan, Radhanpur, Palitana, Junagadh, etc., and passed away in Cambay at the age of eighty-nine. He has written several works both in prose and in poetry such as *Sādhuvaidanā*, *Jambu Rāsa*, *Tīrthamāla*, *Chand-Kevali Rāsa*, *Ashokchandra Rohini Rāsa*, etc., and has also written many *stavanas*, *sajjhayas*, *bhashyas*, etc.

Nemavijaya:

Nemavijaya was a disciple of Tilakavijaya of Tapagachcha. He has written several *Rāsas* and *Bar-masas*. Among his *Rāsas*, *Shilavati Rāsa*, *Vachchrāja Charitra Rāsa*, *Mantri Nrip Rāsa* and *Tejasara Rājarshi Rāsa* are available, though they are not yet published. The manuscript of *Tejasara Rājarshi Rāsa* is available in his own handwriting.

Prose Literature:

During this century, as in the previous one, the Jain authors contributed very largely to the development of medieval Gujarāti prose. In fact, there is hardly any literature in prose by the non-Jain authors and, therefore, the contribution of the Jain authors in this field is remarkable. Old manuscripts of more than three hundred different works in prose, of the type of *Bālāvabodha*, *Stabak*, *Tikā*, *Vārtik*, *Sāroddhār*, etc., are available.

Among the non-Jain poets of this period we have Shāmal, Pritamdās, Dhiro, Bhojo, Dayārām and other poets who have contributed largely towards the development of the medieval Gujarāti literature.

Shāmal:

Though born in the later part of the seventeenth century, poet Shāmal's literary works were written during this period. Shāmal, a Brahmin from Venganpur, knew Sanskrit, Braj and Persian languages. Shāmal, in the beginning, wrote religious didactic poems, but subsequently decided to write narrative poems. He has written *puranic* works in Gujarāti such as *Shiva-Purāṇa*, *Angadvishti*, *Rāvana-Mandodarī Samvād*, etc., but his major contribution is in the field of fiction in poetry. His outstanding works are *Simhāsana-Batrishi*, *Suda-Bahoteri*, *Vetāl-Pachisi*, *Pancha-danda*, *Madanmohana Padmāvatī*, *Vidyāvilasini*, etc. His fictions in poetry run into several thousand lines. Shāmal's poetry was very popular, particularly among the common people because his works are full of imagination and practical wisdom. Shāmal is known for depicting very bright female characters and is also known for his *chhappas* describing problems of practical wisdom. Poet Shāmal is one of the most outstanding story-tellers of the medieval Gujarāti literature.

Pritamdās:

Pritamdās (1720-1798), blind since birth, was born at Bavla, but he settled down in Sandesar in Kheda district. At the age of

fifteen he came in contact with some of the *sādhus* of the Rāmānaṇda sect and imbibed from them the knowledge of *bhakti*, *vedānta* and *yoga*. Pritamdās has written works like *Saras-gītā*, *Prem-Pra-kāsh*, *Jñāna-gītā*, etc., and has also written many *padas*, some of which are also in Hindi. Pritamdās is much known for his sweet *padas*. His *pada*, *Harino Mārag* is very popular in Gujarāṭi literature.

Nirānta:

The *padas* of poet Nirānta (1747-1852), born at Dethan near Miyagam, are still recited regularly by his followers during their daily prayers. Nirānta has written in simple and lucid language poems of different types such as *Sakhi*, *Kundalia*, *Jhulana*, *Dhol*, *Chhappa*, *Kafi*, *Var*, *Tithi* and *Mahina*. He has written some poems in Hindi also, and he has even addressed letters in verses to some of his contemporaries who were known for *bhakti*, *jñana* and *vairagya*. Subjects of Nirānta's poems are mainly self-realisation through knowledge, *premlakshaṇa*, *bhakti*, *nirguṇopasanā*, etc.

Ratno:

Ratno was a cloth-dyer of Kheda. He is known for his poem *Mahina* (1739) which is one of the best of its type in medieval Gujarāṭi literature. In this poem he describes vividly the delicate feelings of love and separation of Gopis from Krishna, in the context of the natural surroundings which keep on changing according to the months of different seasons.

Narbherām:

Narbherām (1768-1852), a resident of Pij, was a disciple of Guru Chhoṭālāl, who diverted him towards *bhakti* of Krishna. Narbherām, since then, used to visit regularly the places of pilgrimage—Dwaraka and Dakor. He has written several poems of *bhakti* of Raṇchhodrāi. In one of these poems he has described the bravery of Bhakta Bodana, who had daringly shifted the idol Raṇchhodrāi from Dwaraka to Dakor.

Dhiro:

Poet Dhiro, born at Gothada, started writing his *padas* at the age of seventeen. His married life was not happy as his wife was hot-tempered. This also seems to have made Dhiro interested in philosophy. He studied *Sāṃkhya*, *Vedānta* and *Yoga*. Dhiro has written *Ranayajna*, *Swarupani Kafi*, *Aval-Vani*, *Yoga Mārga*, *Jñāna*

Kakko, etc. He is more known for his poems of the type of *Kafi*, which are written in five stanzas. The subject of his poems lays much stress on *Ātma-Jñāna* (knowledge of the Self).

Bhojo Bhagat:

Bhojo Bhagat, a poet from Amreli, was illiterate as he never knew how to read or write. He was very popular among his followers who used to write down the poems for him. Bhojo has composed *Selaiya Akhyan*, *Bhakta-Mal*, *Brahma-Bodh* and a number of *padas*. Among his *padas* the type of *Chābakhā* (lashes) are more popular. In *Chābakhās* Bhojo attacked with bitterness, sometimes in the language of warfare, the hypocrites of different sections of the society including pseudo-*sādhus*. His language is simple and sincere and, therefore, it appealed to the masses.

Bāpu Gāikwād:

Bāpu Gāikwād (1777-1843), a Marāthā of Baroda, having come into contact with two of his senior contemporaries, Dhiro and Nirānta, became detached towards worldly pleasures and subsequently resigned from service in the State and spent his time in religious activities and in writing *padas*. He has written poems of the type of *Kafi*, *Rajia*, *Garabi*, etc., in which he has attacked the meaningless conventions of his time. Though a Marāthā, he has written poems in chaste Gujarāti.

Poets of Swāminārāyaṇa Sect:

During the eighteenth century, the people, particularly of the lower strata, in Cutch, Saurashtra and Gujarāt experienced a tremendous wave of *bhakti* under the influence of Sahajānānda (1781-1830) and his disciples, Muktānānda, Nishkulānānda, Brahmānānda, Prem-Sakhi, Premānānda, Devānānda, and others. His disciples have written hundreds of *garabis* and *padas* of *bhakti* and *vairāgya* in addition to longer poems such as *Mukundbāvani*, *Uddhava-gītā*, *Brahmavilāsa*, *Upadeshchintāmaṇī* (by Brahmānānda). Among the poets of this sect Brahmānānda and Prem-Sakhi are superior to others in their imagination, diction of language and style.

Dayarām:

Dayarām, who has been compared with Hafiz, or Byron, or Surdās of Gujarāti literature, has written more than forty works in addition to his miscellaneous *padas*. Some of his important works

are *Rasik-Vallabh*, *Bhakti Poshan*, *Ajāmil Akhyān*, *Rasik Rañjan*, *Satyabhāmāno-vivāha*, *Rukmiṇī-vivāha*, *Rāsa-Leelā*, *Patra-Leelā*, *Prem Parīkshā*, *Hanumān-Garuda Samvād*. Dayarām has also written several poems in Braj, Maithili, Sindhi, Punjābi, Urdu, Marāthī and Sanskrit languages. Dayarām's major contribution to the Gujarāti literature is his poetry of the type of *Garabi*—lyrical poems on some single thought, feeling or situation. Gopis' or Rādhā's love for Krishna is a subject for his *Garabis*. Dayarām is a master of *Garabis*, as he achieves poetical heights in them.

Poetesses:

During this period some poetesses have also made contribution towards the development of Gujarāti literature, though the authenticity of some of the works, said to have been written by them, is still doubtful. Among these poetesses we may mention Gauri Bāi, Divali Bāi, Krishna Bāi, Rādhā Bāi, Puri Bāi, Varanāsi Bāi, Jāni Bāi, Nāni Bāi, Ratnā Bāi and Sādhvi Hemashree.

Thus the medieval Gujarāti literature of the eighteenth century is rich both in contents and in varieties of literary forms. On account of the break-up of the Mughul empire and the incursions of the Marāthās, there was confusion everywhere. The popular frustration found expression in religious literature.

VI. PUNJABI

There is a tradition, which is part of the history of the Sikhs, that in order to inspire his own followers and the people in general, Gurū Govind Singh (1666-1708) kept in his employ fifty-two poets who composed in the prevalent mode of neo-classical Hindi poetry works whose themes were heroic, didactic and philosophical. All the writings of these poets whose names are known to history, though all of them may not have been in attendance upon the Gurū at the same time, were written down in the Gurumukhi script. They are reported to have recited their compositions in special assemblies convened by the Gurū. Their felicities of expression such as the pun, simile, metaphor and classical allusion are reported to have elicited great praise and ovation, and rich rewards are mentioned to have been conferred upon these poets from the Gurū's bounty.

A dominant theme of these poets was to give poetic form to the teaching of Gurū Govind Singh, who enunciated the gospel comprehending the supremacy of meditation and *bhakti*, the vision of a

society free from caste distinctions and sectarian rancour and the urge for heroic action to defend *Right*, in which the Indian mind would be able to see the resuscitation of the ancient heroic ideals of India. All this great body of literature, which is said to have comprised a great mass, is called collectively *Vidyā-sāgara* (ocean of learning).

Unfortunately the bulk of the literature produced under Gurū Govind Singh's patronage was lost, and only a part has survived in scattered copies in different places. Bhāi Mani Singh, priest of the holy Hari Mandir at Amritsar, now famous as the Golden Temple, at some time during the fourth decade of the eighteenth century got together whatever had remained of the compositions of the Gurū Govind Singh era and compiled it to form a large volume, later known as the *Granth* of the Tenth Master (*Dasham Granth*). There are divergent opinions as to the authorship of the compositions contained in this large volume of more than 1,400 pages in print. The consensus appears to be to ascribe the prayers and some of the philosophical portions to Gurū Govind Singh himself, an accomplished poet, and the rest to other poets, whose contribution cannot now in all cases be accurately identified.

One fragment highly valuable from the historical point of view is *Bachittar-Natak*, which contains a narrative of Gurū Govind Singh's life up till about the year 1690.

Dasham Granth comprises three versions of the epic of the goddess Chāṇḍī, based on the story of her fight with Mahiṣāsura, the Buffalo-Demon. Two of these are in Hindi, and the third in Punjābi. This last is believed to be Gurū Govind Singh's own composition, while the other two are very likely by the hands of some bards. Gurū Govind Singh got composed a great deal of literature of a martial nature, based on the tales of heroism from the mythology of India, whereby he sought to invoke the spirit of the heroic past and to arouse his contemporaries to crusade for the higher values to which he gave the name *Dharma*. Oriented to a similar objective are some Purāṇic tales—stories of the *avatārs* or incarnations of Viṣṇu. In these, too, the dominant spirit in the episodes is heroism. Some portions of the *Dasham Granth* are devotional and philosophical. These rephrase the monistic-monotheistic teachings of the Founders of Sikhism, in a classical idiom, taking their phraseology from the Indian spiritual sources, incorporating at the same time some vocabulary drawn from Islam. This last was intended to inculcate the spirit of tolerance, and to raise the seeker to the higher

levels of spiritual experience where the creeds melt into the universal mystical vision. A number of hymns form part of the corpus of this *Granth*, set to the classical Indian *rāgas*. A considerable portion is taken up with short tales portraying the wiles of woman (*Charitropakhyan*) in the medieval Indian tradition of social thought. These are likely to be by some of the poets attendant upon the Gurū.

A number of similar stories in Persian called *Hikayat* (tale) are also given. One celebrated part of the contents is *Zafar-Namah* (Epistle of Victory) believed to be addressed by Gurū Govind Singh to Aurangzib in the Deccan, castigating the emperor's deputies for their treachery and tyranny, and breathing the spirit of freedom. *Dasham Granth*, thus, is a treasure house of history, devotional literature and treatment of mythological themes. A detailed critical study of this remarkable volume is still to be made, though the process has already been initiated by Hindi scholars.

A remarkable work in the volume of the Sikh literature of this period is a prose narrative *Prem Sumārg*. It is difficult to fix its precise date. Even the name of its writer is not known. From internal evidence, however, this appears to be a kind of early sketch of Sikh polity of a period when the Sikhs had established their principalities or commonwealth over the Punjāb, and free from Muslim persecution or fear of domination, could think of the principles on which their rule might be established. The principles articulated are humane, in the spirit of the Sikh religious teaching. The ruler is enjoined the duty to cherish his subjects' welfare, to provide employment to all, and to maintain justice. There are traces of conservatism, such as would belong to a society which emerged out of the Hindu masses. For its historical significance this work, though comprising less than 200 pages, is remarkable. Its language is a mixture of Hindi and Punjābi, the former predominating.

Bhāi Mani Singh, the compiler of *Dasham Granth*, is credited with two prose works on Sikh religious themes. One is *Bhagat Ratnāvali*, containing brief biographical episodes about the devoted Sikhs who were contemporary with the first six Gurūs of the Sikh faith. The other, *Gian Ratnāvali*, is a commentary on *Japaji*. This last one gives very valuable insights into the meaning of this difficult sacred text.

Among the Sikh and Hindu poets and writers may be mentioned the names of Kirpaldās, Senāpati, Sarupdās Bhallā, Kesar

Singh Chhibbar and Gulāb Singh. A great poet, Nandlāl, who had mastery over the Persian language, has left voluminous works of a devotional-philosophical character, which is a part of the Sikh religious canon. Nandlāl is reported to have been an especial favourite of Gurū Govind Singh and attended his court.

A number of *Hukam-Namahs* or Encyclicals of Gurū Govind Singh, Mātā Sundari, his widow and the hero Bandā Bahādur were circulated to the Sikhs in the early part of the eighteenth century. These are brief, but contain valuable historical material. Their language is Punjābi with an admixture of Hindi. Recently these have been published and are a part of the background history of the Punjāb.

Some short epics, called *Vars* in Punjābi, appeared during the period under discussion. Besides *Chandi-di-Var*, already mentioned in connection with *Dasham Granth*, are *Nadir-Shah-di-Var* by Najabat, a Muslim, and *Var Haqiqat Rai* by Agra. *Nadir-Shah-di-Var* narrates the story of the devastation and loot of northern India by Nādir Shāh. Its narrative is forceful and dramatic and its language is bardic Punjābi. Agra's *Var* on Haqiqat Rai is the story of a Sikh youth of tender years martyred in 1734. It is deeply touching in tone and atmosphere. Haqiqat Rai is one of the heroes of the Punjābi people. A number of other *Vars* were composed on episodes from the life of Gurū Govind Singh and from the Indian religious lore.

Gūrdās Singh, a devoted follower of Gurū Govind Singh, composed his *Var* on the Gurū's eulogy, which is generally appended to the pre-existing *Forty Vars* of Bhāi Gūrdās who flourished earlier in the seventeenth century. This is a powerful paen of the glory of Gurū Govind Singh and the *Khalsa* and the famous refrain runs through it—*Wāh Wāh Govind Singh ape Guru-Chela* (Hail, Hail, Govind Singh! Master and Disciple). From internal evidence this too, like *Prem Sumārg* points to its period of composition being sometime in the second half of the eighteenth century, when the Sikhs had begun vigorously the process of overthrowing the Mughul power in the Punjāb. In a couplet in the body of the *Var* itself the year of its composition is stated to be 1757 (Vikram Era) which would work out to 1700 of the Christian Era. But that is not likely.

Muslim Literature:

Allied to the *Var* is *Qissa* (tale, romance), a form based on the Persian *masnavi*, and touching generally themes from Muslim reli-

gious lore or romantic tales current among the Muslim people. Later, the themes of the *Qissa* came to embrace a wider field. In the eighteenth century the favourite theme of *Qissa* was the romance of Yusuf and Suleikha, based on the story of Joseph in the *Qurān*, though highly embellished and romanticized by the Muslim poets. Two ill-starred Muslim lovers of Sind, Sassi and Punni, came in for treatment, and their story has been the theme of Punjābi poets now for more than two centuries. Another famous romantic tale is that of Hīr, the Jat belle whose love for the cowherd Rānjhā is the national romance of the Punjābi people. While a number of versions of the story of Hīr in various styles are extant, the earliest going back to Akbar's time, the doyen of the Hīr romancers is Wāris Shāh (c. 1730-90), to whom reference has been made in Vol. VII (p. 575).

A form of narrative and romantic poetry current in the age was *Si-Harfi*, a kind of acrostic built on the letters of the Arabic alphabet, each stanza beginning with one of these letters in succession, and thus over the whole narrative. To carry this kind of narrative through was regarded as a matter of great poetic skill.

A great deal of romantic and *Sufi* poetry was composed by the Muslim poets during this period. The *Sufis* wished to express the spiritual experience in universal terms, inclining however, to employ the Muslim vocabulary. Bullah is the greatest *Sufi* poet of the period, and like Wāris Shāh, has acquired the status of the spokesman of the Punjābi mind. Other *Sufi* poets are Muqbil, Fard Fakir, Hamid and Sayyid Ghulām Qādir. Muqbil also made his version of Hīr, which popularly ranks second only to that of Wāris Shāh. Muslim poets as a whole may be distinguished by their use of the vocabulary drawn from the Perso-Arabic sources, though in their general orientation they are overwhelmingly Punjābi. The Punjābi language for them was till then their favoured medium of expression. Urdu, which became later the dominant language of education and administration, came only with the establishment of British rule over the Punjāb. The Muslims have excelled in the romantic and lyrical fields of poetry besides the *Qissa* or tale. During this period their general sensibility was national and free from religious rancour and they expressed the general woes of the people in the period of the decline of the central authority at Delhi and the repeated invasions from Kabul and Iran, the loot and the anarchy. While the literature of this period is not generally great, it is historically valuable and contains a few masterpieces.

VII. MARĀTHĪ

Marāthī literature during the period under review was varied in form and artistic in style. The age of spiritual poetry of the saints had already given place to that of the poetry of the *Pandits*. The authors of this period continued the earlier tradition, but they wrote with a greater sense of art. It was the age of Marāthā supremacy in the political field which inspired many poets to compose patriotic poetry. The literature of this period may be classified under four sub-heads: (i) Scholastic poetry (traditional *Pandit* poetry), (ii) Ballad poetry (the *Powādās* and *Lāvṇīs*), (iii) The *Bakhars* and historical letters in prose, and (iv) Miscellaneous.

Pandit or Scholastic poetry:

The traditional narrative poetry based on the Epics and *Purāṇas*, which began earlier, got a fresh impetus in this period. The scholar poets of this period tried to enrich the literature externally and intrinsically in various forms. Along with the old traditional narrative poetry, a new class of biographers and composers of verses known as *padas* to be sung at the time of *kīrtanas* came into existence.

Kacheshwar Brahme (1731) belonging to the traditional narrative school wrote *Gajeṇdra-moksha* (95 *ślokas*) and *Sudāmacharitra* (103 *ślokas*) in various metres. He also wrote *Adi Bāvāchi* (121 *Ovi* and *Abhaṅgas*), an autobiography, and some *padas*. Shāhū Chhatrapatī of Satara and Bālājī Vishwanāth, the *Peshwā*, were his disciples.

Bajājī alias Niraṅjan Mādhav (1703-1790) was a near contemporary of Sāmraj, Nāgesh and Viṭhal. Being an ambassador of the *Peshwās* in distant territories such as Karnāṭaka, he was noted for his political activities. Simultaneously he was engaged in writing *stotras* (hymns), biographies, works on travel and Vedāntic compositions continuously for thirty-seven years. *Krishnānāṇḍa Sindhu* (1735) is known to be his first composition. It took twelve years to complete. He wrote *Chittabodha-Rāmāyaṇa*, a commentary on the seven *Kaṇḍās* of *Adhyātma-Rāmāyaṇa*. Out of it, only the *Bālakaṇḍa* is available. He also wrote *Jñāneshwaravijaya* (1765) in 1038 *Ovi* verses, a biography of Jñāneshwar based on the work of Nāmdev. His other work is *Vṛittamuktāvalī* (1761), a treatise on prosody. His *Subhadrāchāmpū* is the only *chāmpū* in Marāthī literature. His other works on prosody are *Vṛitta-Vaṇamāla* and *Vṛittavataṇsa*, which were written at the age of seventy. His twenty-one

stotras written on various occasions are compiled in his *Stotrakalpa*. Of these, *Rāmakarṇāmṛita* of 111 *ślokas* is the longest one. His *Niroṣṭha Rāghavachariṭra* is a typical example of word jugglery.

Niranjan Mādhav's travel literature consists of his religious visits to various places in India such as Uttaramānas, Dakshinamānas, Sri Prayāg and Kāshi. He describes graphically in it how the so-called priests and government officials harass pilgrims for their selfish purposes. He refers to the *jizya* or poll-tax of the period. He also describes the other side of the picture, viz., the lovely banks of the Gaṅgā and gaily dressed ladies trying to please the youths. He is also known to have written *Bodhapradīpikā* and *Advaitāmṛita*, prose commentaries on Shankarāchārya's treatises. Though he appears to have borrowed many ideas from Sanskrit, he has maintained his individuality and appreciative sense, full of devotion.

A new class of writers composing *padas* appeared on the scene in this period. The *Nāradiya Kīrtan* tradition, though age-old, had taken a popular turn at this time on account of the *padas* sung in sweet tunes. They wrote short devotional poems to be sung with sweet melodies in *Kīrtana*. The average man welcomed them as they appealed to his ear and mind.

Tryambak alias Madhvamuni (1731), belonging to the Madhva school of philosophy, occupies a prominent place in this respect. He is more known for his *padas* describing practical life than for his narrative poetry. His *padas* like *Chimanāsa Rāma* and *Uddhavā Shāntavana Karajā* are as sweet as honey. After Tukārām, he came forward to popularise the Bhakti school by his appealing words. Amritrāi alias Rāiji (1698-1753), the disciple of Madhvamuni, surpassed his gurū by his melodious *padas*. His poetry in *Kaḍaka* metre known as *Kaṭāv* attracted the people by its harmonious and lucid words. His *Santapadāchī jod de re Harī* is very popular. He possesses an extraordinary skill in drawing pen-pictures. His poetry is enriched by an artistic mixture of Hindi and Sanskrit words. His alliterations are so powerful that the audience is carried away by the delightful magical sound in his poetry. It was Amritrāi who was mainly responsible in making the *Kīrtana* tradition popular by his *padas*. Even the *Kīrtanakārs* of today use freely his *padas* to create interest in their *Kīrtanas*. The rich vocabulary and the skill in the arrangement of words coupled with his wonderful memory are some of his special features.

The new tradition of the *padas* included *Abhangās*, *Aratīs*, *Stotrās*, *Ashṭakās*, *Bhūpālis*, *Prabhātagītās* (songs of dawn), *Dhavalās*

(invocations) and *Pañās* (lullabies). They had some relation to the earlier tradition of *Bhajanī Kīrtana* in this respect.

Though writing of biographies began in the initial stages of Marāthī literature, this century saw the rise of the biographers who established a regular biographical tradition in Marāthī. Nābhañi of Gwālior (1700) wrote *Bhaktamālā*, a book containing the biographies of saints in the local dialect. It is not a biographical work in the true sense of the term, as it mentions only the names of saints. His disciple Priyadās wrote *Bhaktirasabodhini*, a commentary on *Bhaktamālā*, and Mārtand Bāwā wrote a Marāthī commentary on *Bhaktirasabodhini* which is also known as *Bhaktamālā*. These commentators added their own material to the original and their commentaries naturally developed into the biographical form.

Dāso Digambar's *Santavijaya* (34 chapters) belongs to this school. It may be noted that these biographers never critically analysed their material consisting of anecdotes which they received traditionally.

Mahipati Tahrabadkar (1715-90) stands out as the foremost writer who devoted all his life in writing the biographies of saints.

The biography of Tukārām in his *Bhaktavijaya* (1762) is his masterpiece. Although his work is marked by a historical sense, he does not seem to have made use of his material for discovering the 'truth, naked, unblushing truth, the first virtue of more serious history', which as Gibbon points out, should be the sole recommendation of any good biography. Mahipati wrote other biographies, viz., *Santalilāmrita*. Apart from these, he composed *Kathāsārāmrita*, *Tulsīmahātmya*, *Gaṇesapurāṇa*, *Dattātreyacharitra*, *Rishipanchamā*, *Anantachaturdashī*, texts of religious or ritualistic nature. *Aparā-dhanivedana Stotra* and *Pāṇḍuranga Stotra* are some of his other works in addition. Mahipati did a lot of pioneering work and furnished profuse data for the use of future biographers of saints. Thus by his writings he has added a new dimension to the art of biography in Marāthī, though we may not agree with his viewpoint.

After Mahipati, Bhīmaswāmi of Rāmdāsi Maṭh, Tanjore, and Rājārāmprasādi, the noted biographer of Rāmdāsi School, carried on this tradition further. Rājārāmprasādi, the author of *Shribhaktamanjarimāla*, narrated the lives of nearly a hundred saints, not included in Mahipati's work. These biographers wrote like other narrative poets whose works were characterised by devotion.

Moropant (1729-94) was the most luminous star in the galaxy of narrative poets of this century. In the words of V. L. Bhawe, "he was well versed in all the *shastras*. A man of keen intellect and high erudition, he was a versatile national *purāṇik* (an exponent of *purāṇas*)."¹³ He was the last poet of the narrative tradition before the advent of the British paramountcy and Indian renaissance.

Moropant's period of writing may be conveniently divided into four parts as follows: First period (1752-61); Pant, as he is popularly called, started his composition of poems at the age of about twenty-two. *Kushalavākhyāna* is his first work. Besides, he wrote *Brahmottarkhaṇḍa*, *Shri Krishna Vijaya* (first part 1-49 *adhyāyas*), *Pralhādavijaya*, *Madālasācharitra*, *Harischandrākhyāna*, *Devīmahātmya*, *Saptashatī*, *Vinayakamahātmya* and *Sāra-Rāmāyaṇa*.

Second period (1761-72): He wrote *Sītāgītā*, *Sāvitrigītā* and *Rukmiṇīgītā*—all female songs in the beginning of this period. Later he wrote *Shri Krishna Vijaya* (50-79 *adhyāyas*), *Sudāma-charita*, *Bhāsmāsūrākhyāna*, *Bhrigucharitra* and many *ślokas* (hymns) in praise of holy rivers like the Krishna and also of deities, *Shri Krishna Vijaya* (latter part: 80-90 *adhyāyas*), *Mantra Rāmāyaṇa*, *Āryamuktamāla*, *Samshayaratnāvalī*, *Ārya Kekāvalī*, *Nāmāryā*, all in *Āryā* metres, and also some poetical chapters like *Bhīshmabhakti-bhāgya*, *Avatāramālā*, etc.

Third period (1772-82) was the glorious period of the composition of *Mahābhārata*. During this period he wrote *Amritamanthana*, *Vāmanacharitra* and *Mantra Bhāgavata* (10th chapter of *Bhāgavat Purāṇa*).

Fourth period: In this last period, *Mantra Bhāgavata*, *Hari-vamsha*, *Saṅkīrṇa Rāmāyaṇa* (about 108 chapters, but actually 90 available) were his voluminous works. *Shloka-Kekāvalī* is the famous devotional poem of this period. As compared with his earlier writings, his later works are of a higher order from the literary point of view. His *Mahābhārata*, the story of Pāṇḍavās, as he calls it, is rich in presentation and surpasses the works of other writers on this subject. Its place is unique in the history of Marāṭhī literature.

Moropant followed meticulously the method of expanding and abridging portions of the original *Mahābhārata*, *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* into Marāṭhī. He paid more attention to the story element in these works and skipped philosophical discussions and descriptions. These are not mere translations, as some scholars assert,

because he has maintained his individuality of conceiving absolutely original ideas which are often absent in such types of works.

Jyotipant Dādā Mahābhāgawat, the exponent of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, and Sohiroba Ambiye, author of *Siddhāntasamhitā*, *Mahadbhuvaneshwarī*, and also of *padas*, *abhangas*, were contemporaries of Moropant, who continued the tradition of philosophical poetry. Krishnadayārṇava, author of *Harivarada*, Mādhavaswāmi of the south, the exponent of *Bhagavad Gītā*, *Aṇu Gītā* and *Yogavāsishṭa* and Shivarām, the exponent of *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* of this century belong to this school, while Gopāla, Shubhānanda and Anantatanaya, all composers of *Mahābhārata*, were the exponents of the school of longer narrative poetry of this period.

Bardic Poetry:

Side by side with *Bhakti* movement of the traditional narrative poets dedicated to 'spiritual democracy', the *Shāhirs* or the composers of historical ballads (*Powādās*) and lyrics of love (*Lāvṇīs*) inspired the people with national spirit, as well as romantic love, the natural instinct in human life. The ballads are historical poems which sing of the valiant deeds of the Marāthā heroes. This poetry taught people how to live and enjoy vigorously a practical life. The *Powādās* or ballads are much older than the *Lāvṇīs*. They have their origin in the reign of Shivājī and his times. Out of the three hundred ballads available, seven belong to this period. About hundred and fifty *Powādās* were composed during the *Peshwā* period, particularly the latter part of it, and the remaining in the beginning of the British period. The *Shāhirs*, belonging to all castes, recited mostly the historical incidents of their times and entertained the people in the popular language. They sung to the accompaniment of the drum, the lyre and cymbals. "Apart from their (ballads) value as national poetry," says H. A. Acworth, "their phraseology is well worthy of study as an example of the flexibility, the force, the richness, and capacity of the vernacular language of the Marāthā ryot".¹⁴ Prof. S. R. Sharma writes, "This is a mode of poetic composition which is peculiar to Maharāshtrā, and its vogue has not died out even now...."

If the *Powādā* is masculine in its robust vigour, the *Lāvṇī* is feminine in its tone and tenor.¹⁵ The great stalwarts of this *Lāvṇī* form were Anant Phandi (1744-1819), Parashurām, (1754-1844), Rām Joshi (1758-1813), Prabhākar (1769-1843), Saganbhāu (1778-1840) and Honājī Bālā (1790). Anant Phandi is known for didactic

Kaṭāvs and Parashurām for his pictures of social life and varied subjects. Scholarship forms part of the poetry of Rām Joshi, while the 'outer' or descriptive element is very strong in Prabhākar. Saganbhāu has a special love of saints and gods of Maharāshtrā. Honājī started a new experiment in this field by his lucidity and musical tunes. These *Shāhīrs* not only sang the heroic deeds of the Marāthās, but also lamented the deaths of the heroes and the decline and fall of the *Peshwās*. These poets sang spontaneously on public platforms the songs which were mostly unwritten. Although some of the *Lāvṇīs* are pornographic, a great majority of them are undoubtedly poetic. Honājī's *Ghanashyām Sundarā Shridharā* (an invocation to Lord Krishna at dawn) is a case in point. A few of these *Lāvṇīs* are typically philosophical. The *Shāhīrs* continued their tradition even after the downfall of the Marāthā State in 1818. This literature marked the decadence of Marāthā power and society.

The Bakhars and Historical Letters:

While the *Powādās* (ballads) are in verse, the *Bakhars*—the chronicles of Marāthā history—of this period are in prose. The term *Bakhar* is the metathetical form of the Arabic word *Khabar* which means news or report. In Marāthī this term is used in a limited sense, namely, political history or the history of the times. The writers of *Bakhars* wrote imitating the *Tawarikhs* of the Muslim potentates.¹⁶ The *Bakhars* were written to order by court-writers for their masters. Like the *Powādās*, the *Bakhars* had their tradition in Shivājī's times, though they had their origin even earlier. In the *Peshwā* period this form of literature developed as the Marāthā kingdom expanded. Rajwade estimates the total number of the *Bakhars* at more than two-hundred.¹⁷ Actually only half of them are extant and of these about seventy have so far been published. They can be classified as biographies, autobiographies, family histories, accounts of great events, news and reports and translations.

The oldest *Bakhar*, according to Rajwade, is *Shālivahanāchi Bakhar*.¹⁸ There are about twelve *Bakhars* dealing with the life and achievements of Shivājī. A few *Bakhars* are contemporary, while a great many are of later period. Most of the *Bakhars* have been composed on the events of the *Peshwā* period. The battle of Pānipat forms the theme of many of them. *Bhāūsāhebañchī Bakhar*, a contemporary one, dealing with this theme is unique among all the *Bakhars* from the point of view of literary style, narrative skill and impassioned prose. *Bhāūsāhebañchī Kaiḥiyat* and Raghunāth Yādav's *Pānipatchī Bakhar* are also contemporary ones on the same subject.

The *Kaifiyat* is believed to be the original, while *Bhāusāhebānchl Bakhar* is an enlargement of it.¹⁹ The other contemporary *Bakhars* on the same subject, viz., the autobiography of Nānā Phadnis and *Holkarānchi Thaili*, throw new light on the history of the times. *Peshwānchl Bakhar* by Krishnāji Vināyak Sohoni narrates the full history of the *Peshwās* beginning with Bālāji Vishwanāth up to Bājī Rāo II, the last of the *Peshwās*. Written in the last days of the *Peshwās* it is reliable only for events of the last *Peshwā's* regime. The *Bakhars* composed during this century are both rich in expression and subject. Like the bardic poetry, *Bakhar*-writing continued even after the downfall of the Marāthās in 1818. Malhār Rāmrao Chitnis has left to us the lives of the Satara Kings in the *Bakhar* form.

The beginnings of historical letters written by prominent personalities can be traced to the rise of the Marāthās under Shivāji. This form of writing was however, fully developed during the 18th century. Some of the letters merit our attention for their literary value. To mention a few of them: Letters written by Brahmeṇdra Swāmi Dhavadshikar, the *Gurū* of Chhatrapati Shāhū Mahārāj of Satara and Bājī Rāo, Chimpājī Appā, Bālāji Bājī Rāo and others. Even ladies like Tārā Bāi, the wife of Rājārām, Ānandī Bāi and Ahalyā Bāi Holkar wrote letters which are not only informative but interesting too. The *Peshwā Daftar* in forty-five volumes edited by Sardesai practically covers the whole *Peshwā* period and deals with the important events of the times. Some of them e.g., No. 4, Reports about Ānandī Bāi and No. 19, *Peshwā* Mādhav Rao's opposition to Raghunāth Rāo, reveal the personalities of their writers.

Ajnapatra, a treatise on polity was written in 1715 under the orders of Shambhūji of Kolhapur. It is ascribed to Ramchandra Pant Amatya, the statesman who saved the Marāthā kingdom under Tara Bai's leadership. Divided in nine chapters, the document depicts Marāthā administration in Shivāji's times. It discusses the duties of a ruler who desires to see his kingdom prosper. The *Ajnapatra* is an important document written in a powerful and masterly style. It is valuable both from the literary as well as the historical point of view.

The *Bakhars* and historical letters contain many Persian words which were current in court circles. Though foreign, they enriched the Marāthī language with force and meaning. They fill in the lacunae of prose-writing during this period. Like bardic poetry, they clearly reflect the true picture of Maharāshtrā of those times.

Miscellaneous:

During the last phase of the *Peshwā* period, Shāhmuni (Shāh Husain), a Muslim follower of *Mahānubhāva* Sect, wrote *Siddhānta-bodha* (1795) in *ovi* verse (50 *adhyāyas*). He himself refers in his work that his personal name was Shāh and Muni was his preceptor. He propounds the *Advaita* philosophy. He attempted to harmonize the philosophy of *Mahānubhāva* with the *Advaita* philosophy. He refers to the various commentaries on the *Gītā*, such as *Digam-barī*, *Shrī Hari*, *Madhusūdani*, *Bhāskari* and *Bhingāri* and also Jñāneshwar's *Bhavartha Dīpikā*, Vāman's *Sama Śloki* and *Yathārtha-dīpikā* and *Sapta Shlokis* of Nivritti, Sopāna and *Mukteswarī* of Mukta Bai. It is noteworthy that there are practically no Arabic and Persian words in his work. He maintains that Allah, Jesus and Vishṇu are one and the same. Krishna Muni Panjābi alias Khyali Bahādur, another *Mahānubhāva* writer composed his poems in various languages, particularly in Hindi. Mukundrāj Karanjekar, a *Mahānubhāva* poet, also belongs to this period. His *stotras* are well-known. Besides *Līlāmritasindhu* including *Rukmiṇī Swayamvara* of Pandit Damodar Dharashivkar of Vasmat, *Padasaṅgraha* of Vaku Bidkar, *Bharatārṇava* of Mahant Relkar are some other works of the *Mahānubhāvas* of this period. In the opinion of Y. K. Deshpande, *Kaivalya Saijīvanī*, a prose commentary on the *Gītā* by Govind Muni Jamadkar may perhaps belong to this period.²⁰

Some Jain poets also contributed to Marāthī literature at the end of the eighteenth century. Among them was Jina Sāgara.²¹ He is known as scholar poet. He wrote *Jivandhārāpurāṇa* (1744) in 1530 *ovis*. The subject of this work is the story of Jivandhārā, a contemporary of Mahāvīr. He also composed *Vratākathā* (stories of religious rites) and short religious stories and *stotras* in verse. His translation of Manatūṅgāchārya's famous *Bhaktāmarastotra* is very delightful. *Satīmahātmya*, a short poem by an anonymous author, belongs to the period of Raghūjī Bhosle II of Nagpur (1772-1816). Mention must also be made of Mahati Sagar's *Ravivār Kathā* (1801) and *Adināth Pañchakalyāṇī* (1810), Vishālkīrti's *Dharmaparikhā* (1807), and Ratnakīrti's Marāthī translation (1812) of *Shaṭkarmopadeśa*, a Sanskrit work by Sakalabhushana of sixteenth century.

The Vīrasaivas also played a great part in contributing to Marāthī literature in this century. Among them was Brahmadās who wrote *Jñānābdhitarāṅga* (1708) in 3857 *ovi* verses. This is the biography of Allamaprabhu, a great figure among the Vīrasaivas. Its style is lucid and narration attractive.

The *Ganeshopāsakas* (the devotees of Lord Ganesh), too contributed greatly to Marāthī literature by their works. For example, Niranjandās Ballāl of Bid wrote *Gaṇeshagītāṭikā* (6323 ovi verses) in 1729. Before that he composed *Gaṇesha Purāṇa* (1726), a Marāthī treatise based on the original one in Sanskrit. Yadumanik wrote *Sanjīvinī* (1725), a commentary on certain portions of *Gaṇesha Purāṇa* and *Gaṇesha Gītā*. Gaṇesh Yogindra (1703-1808), another noted writer of this School, composed *Gaṇesha Vijaya* (4522 ovi verses), *Yogeshwarī*, a commentary on *Gaṇesha Gītā*, *Gaṇeshguhya Stotra* (201 ovi verses), *Mayureshacharita* and *Ślokas*, *Abhangas* and *Aratis* in praise of Lord Ganesh. Peshwā Nana Saheb, a devotee of Lord Ganesh, wrote *Shri Gaṇeshakutukamrita* which is rather incomplete.

Ajnasiddha of Nagesh sect composed *Saṅkaṭhāranī* (a *Stotra* work of 137 ovi verses), *Varadaṇagesha*, a philosophical treatise, *stotras*, *Aratis*, etc. in the first decade of the eighteenth century.

D. K. Kelkar, a perceptive critic has aptly remarked: "The literature of the 18th century reflects the values of a static or stagnant society. The one refrain is to stoically accept one's position in society and find salvation in it. There is no call in it for revolt against social or political injustice. Women are condemned as the source of all evil. The low castes are persuaded to accept their degraded status as arising out of the deeds of their past life. One firm impression which this literature leaves on the minds of readers is one of acquiescence in their wretched condition. There is no trumpet call in it to break centuries-old shackles and march forward to a new life."²²

[See Appendix at the end of this chapter].²³

VIII. TAMIL

The century following the death of emperor Aurangzīb was a period of stagnation and wretchedness in India. The shifting political situation, the endless internal conflicts, the Anglo-French rivalries and their repercussions, all contributed to the general demoralisation. Even in the Tamil country, removed though it was from the scene of many of the conflicts, the epidemic of demoralisation was seen raging violently. The old vitality was gone, the age-long zest for life was no more, and the Tamils were but inexpertly fumbling with the arts of war and the arts of peace. Literature too was in a bad way. In the *mathas*, reaction and obscurantism sat enthroned; and in the courts, the poetasters lisped the language of banality and futility, turning out verses with clock-work precision and life-

lessness. It was a waste land in appearance, lacking pith, lacking colour, lacking life.

But this bleakness and seeming barrenness were (as events proved later) but the seed-time of a renaissance. It was during this century that the Christian missionaries sowed—though in their own ways and for their own purposes—some of the seeds of rebirth. They set up printing presses in India, learned the indigenous languages, issued vernacular editions of the *Bible* and generally drew the first uneasy outlines of a scientific study of the Indian languages and literatures. The Danish missionary, Zeigenbalg, wrote a Tamil grammar and put the *Bible* into Tamil in the first quarter of the eighteenth century. The Italian Jesuit, Constantine Beschi, was a more dynamic figure and with his forceful personality and adventurousness he made many converts and won a place in the affections of the Tamil people. He began learning Tamil during his stay in the Tinnevely district and mastered the language sufficiently to compose in the fullness of time a full-fledged epic in Tamil by name *Tembavani*. It is remarkable as a *tour de force* rather than as a supreme classic. But in its peculiar historical context, *Tembavani* acquires an importance that must not be belittled. *Tembavani* is a Christian *purāṇa* in thirty cantos, retailing Biblical episodes and charged with a Christian atmosphere. Fr. Beschi's *Aviveka Purāṇa Gurū Kathai* is a children's classic. The Gurū and his followers are variations of the Wise Men of Gotham, suitably clothed in the Tamil garb. Fr. Beschi's literary labours included the composition also of grammars and catechisms. Known popularly as *Virama Munivar*, Fr. Beschi lived a colourful and adventurous life and died in 1746 in the Tinnevely district.

There were, besides, Muhammedan poets, who let into the world of Tamil a significant Islamic stream in thought and mysticism. Sakkarai Pulavar, one of the earliest of them, composed a Tamil poem on Medina and another, Muhammad Ibrāhim, wrote a *Muhai-deen Purāṇam*. A third Muhammedan poet, Masthān Saheb, was a consummate lyricist and devotional poet. In this manner, Christian and Islamic cross-fertilization of Tamil letters gave the much needed pith to the soil, promising a rich harvest in the tomorrows to come.

The one outstanding Tamil poet of the eighteenth century was the great Saiva mystic and *bhakta*, Thayumanavar. He was born of Vellala parents, and for a time he was in the service of the ruler of Trichinopoly. After living the life of a householder for a short time, he became an ascetic on the death of his wife and wandered

from place to place singing soul-stirring songs that were a unique blend of rapture, mysticism and philosophy. It has been rightly said that Thayumanavar taught the *shāstras* in terms of music. The fervour of his devotion may be seen in strains like the following:

*Jewel! Precious Gold! saying so I danced,
Flood of Bliss! saying so I danced,
Cried seeking and desiring You,
Whimpered and screamed;
My whole being thrilled as I saluted,
Tears in torrents streamed down my cheeks,
And I was reduced to exhaustion.
Have I ever stood apart from You,
Haven't I ever been your slave,
However unworthy I should be,
Wouldst Thou abandon me?*

Thayumanavar's was a welling love that embraced all mankind and he accordingly declared:

*Beyond desiring a happy life for all,
I know no other thought, O Lord!
To see in another's mine own pain and pity it—
May Your grace teach me this wisdom, O Lord!*

Thayumanavar's apprehension of the indwelling God can be inferred from a moving asseveration like this:

*I cannot worship Thee, O Lord,
in any material form;
I find Thee in the flowers,
and how then may I pluck the dew-filled gems?
Neither can I raise my hands
before Thee in worship—
I feel ashamed because Thou art
Within me all along.*

The songs of Thayumanavar are grouped under *Paraparakkanni*, *Painkilikkanni* and *Ennatkanni*.

Two or three more eighteenth century writers deserve mention here. Arunāchala Kavirāyar was well versed in Tamil and Sanskrit and tried his hand at various literary forms. He is today remembered mainly on account of *Rāmanāṭakam*, a dramatised version of the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Rājappā Kavirāyar composed two Saiva works,

Kuttala Sthalapurānam and *Kuttala Kuravanchi*. Vedamalayappan Pillai wrote the *Maccha Purāṇam*, largely based on the Sanskrit original. Gurupāda Dāsar composed the *Kumāresha Shatakam* consisting of a century of homely stanzas evoking vivid pictures and reiterating moral or worldly-wise maxims. It is very good verse, but only very rarely poetry.

In conclusion, reference may be made to what may be called a unique type of Indian literature. This is the diary in Tamil prose written by Ānanda Ranga Pillai, a commercial agent to the French—a *Dubhāshi* (one who knows two languages) and adviser to Dupleix, the French Governor of Pondicherry. Ānanda Ranga Pillai kept a diary of events during the period 1736 to 1760. It contains not only a faithful record of events but gives evidence of the writer's "profound capacity for political judgment." It is justly regarded as the most valuable source of history for the period and has earned for the author the title "Pepys of Tamilnad". The manuscript of the diary, written by the author mostly in his own hand, is fortunately well preserved, and only a few pages have been recently published. But there is an English translation of the whole diary by H. Dodwell. None before Pillai, and only a few after him, have left a literary work of this kind in any Indian language. Ānanda Ranga Pillai died on 12 January, 1761, only four days before the English captured Pondicherry.

Reference may also be made to another type of literary work in Tamil, semi-historical in character. A good illustration is furnished by the ballad in memory and honour of Tej Singh who was appointed Governor of Jinjee (c. 1700) by Zu'l-fiqār Khān and died thirteen years later while defending the fort besieged by the Nawāb of Arcot. Tej Singh's wife committed suicide by becoming a *Sati*. A modern writer has observed: "The Tej Singh-Rājan ballad is as famous in Tamilnad as that of Prīthvirāj Chauhan is in Rajāsthān. The ballads made the theme popular by dwelling on the romantic and heroic elements which have a historic basis but really partake of the character of folk songs. The poet's talents are best displayed, for example, not in recording the actual events but in describing the occasion of the hero bidding farewell to his wife on the eve of his departure to battle."

IX. TELUGU

Changing political and cultural environment of the 18th century had its impact on the growth of Telugu literature as elsewhere.

The rise of petty principalities and foreign pockets brought about a radical change in the character and quality of the literary works of the period. Hitherto, poetry used to be mostly the monopoly of the *niyogi* brahmins. Now, with the change, *vaidika* brahmins and many non-brahmins began to compose *shatakas*, *yakshagānas*, prose works, ballads, *dandakas* (a type of encomium), treatises on grammar, prosody and other laws of poetic composition, lexicons and commentaries on classics, besides imitations of the great *prabandhas* of the past—all of which show that the creative genius of the authors was at a low ebb. The dialects and slangs of various parts of the country and the foreign vocabulary found place in the compositions of the times. The religious unrest of the day and the society was reflected in literature more than before. As early as in 1712 the Christian missionaries introduced the printing press, and other foreigners, many things including the stuff and habits of coffee and tobacco. It was a period of transition in our society and literature where adherence to and pursuance of the tradition was being overpowered by an urge for a change, and a new order was already in the womb. A brief mention of some literary works would illustrate the truth of these remarks.

Ananda Rangaratchandam of Kasturi Rangakavi was the result of a fruitful research on prosody and occupies an important position among the works on the subject. His *Sambanighantuvu* is a lexicon of pure native Telugu.

Rādhāmādhava Samvādan of Velīdināla Venkatapati is a work of poetic genius with vivacious characters and dialogues and made an indelible mark amongst a host of *śrīṅgāra kāvyas* in Telugu.

Rigvedī Venkatāchalam made a free style translation of Bhojā's *Champū Rāmāyaṇa* into lucid Telugu keeping the emotional pulse of the theme as high as possible.

The Kuchimanchi family in the East Godavari District has long been celebrated for its scholars and poets. Timmakavi of this family who assumed the title of *Kavisārvabhāuma* was a prolific author who was patronised by the Pithapuram court. He was a past-master in pure Telugu compositions—*Rāmāyaṇamu* and *Neelasundarīpariṇayamu*. His *Rasikajanamanobhirāmamu* is an erotic poem and a foster child of *Vāsucharitra* in its craft played with word and phrase. Glimpses of his contemporary society are discernible in his work called the *Bharga Shataka* and the *Kukkuteshwara Shataka*. The plight of a common peasant is interestingly portrayed in his own slang in the *Bharga Shataka*. In the latter *shataka* the poet

denounces the character of misers, criticises the base and the vile, sympathises with the ill-fated agriculturists, preaches morals and principles of good conduct and devotes exclusively a few verses for the depiction of the evening of his own life. The personality of the poet can be seen in these verses and moving through them the reader is automatically affected by a touching experience. The *Kukkuteshwara Shataka* has inspired several other poets to compose similar verses of social significance. Timmakavi's *Sakala Lakshana-sāra Saṅgrahamu* is a scholarly treatise on the validity of poetic usage and its grammatical justification.

Kuchimanchi Jaggakavi is as much famous as notorious for his poem called *Chāndralekhā Vilāpamu*. He first wrote *Chandralekhā Vilāsamu*, an amorous poem. When he did not get reward from his patron he changed it to *Chandralekha Vilāpamu* (i.e., the hue and cry of *Chāndralekhā*) which debased the fine face of the erotic sentiment of the poem, yet reserved a secure place for it in the pornographic literature of the country. He was no doubt an able poet endowed with imagination and scholarship. His *Bhaktamandāra Shataka* stands as a full compliment to his poetic pride.

Enugu Lakshmana Kavi's translation of the three *shatakas* of Bhartrihari, on account of his skilful rendering, besides being quite faithful to the original, has an original flavour of its own and became very popular.

Adidam Surakavi, son of Bāla Bhāskar, was a famous poet of those times and was much feared by his antagonists for his biting tongue. Royal patronage was extended to him by Padavijayarāma Rājū (1741-57) but afterwards during the despotic rule of Seetārāma Rājū he left the Vijayanagaram court offering castigating criticism of the misrule in his *Rāmalingesha Shataka*. His *Kavijanarājanamu* competes with *Vāsucharitra* in its pedantic setting. *Kavi Samshaya Viccheda* is a treatise on some special aspects of Telugu Grammar; *Chandraloka* is a translation of Appayya Dikshit's *Kuvalayānanda Kārikas* which are otherwise labelled as Jayadeva's *Chandraloka*; *Andhranāmaseshamu* is a small dictionary of the pure Telugu vocabulary in verse form.

Gogulapati Kurmanāth Kavī was undoubtedly a great poet of the century. His *Mrityunjaya Vilāsamu* is in a class by itself in *Yakshagāna* literature. His *Simhādri Narasimha Shataka* is historical in its appeal. It gives us a vivid picture of the unhappy results of the Muslim inroads into our country and the destruction of tem-

ples; the poet questions God in various ways about his partiality, silence and existence even.

The *Shuka Saptati* of Palavekari Kadiripati, assigned by literary historians to this century, is an interesting poem of erotic tales told in a lucid style, pleasing manner and sweet idiomatic Telugu. Mangalagiri Ananda Kavī was a Brahmin poet of the 18th century, who has given an effective portrait of Jesus Christ in his *Vedānta rasāyanamu*. His chief source was the Bible. He has another poem to his credit—*Vijayānandana-vilāsamu*, the story of Shashirekhā's marriage with Abhimanyu drawn from the Hindu mythology. His style and descriptions are captivating.

Gudipati Kodandapati was the author of a commentary on the *Amuktamālyada*, the *magnum opus* of Sri Krishna Deva Raya, the ruler of Vijayanagar (1509-1530 A.D.). He also rendered Bhanudatta's *Rasamañjarī* into Telugu; his verses are memorable for constructional delight.

Telangana consists of nine districts in the present Andhra Pradesh, which was formerly in the Nizam's dominion. There was a marked flourish in literature in that area during the 18th century—a number of small royal principalities like Surapuram, Gadwal, Palvan-cha, Domakonda, Jataprole, Vanaparti, etc. contributed to the growth of literature. Independent of any patronage, Lingamurty of Parashurām Panthulu family, originally belonging to a Marāthā stock, composed a great work called *Sītārāmañjaneya Saṁvādamu* wherein good poetry is coupled with lucid exposition of the *advaita* philosophy in all its aspects. It became since its appearance a hand-book of every teacher and preacher of philosophy in the Telugu country.

The Maringati family of Nalgonda district is reputed for its generations of scholars. Venkaṭa Narasimhāchārya (1730 A.D.) was a great scholar poet and composed 13 poems in Telugu, out of which only *Chiluvapadaga Rereni Katha* (in pure Telugu) and *Godavadhuti-parinayamu* have been published. The scholarly family of the Tirumala Bukkapattanamu was associated with and held in esteem by the rulers of Surapuram. Kiriti Venkaṭāchārya, a distinguished scholar poet of this family composed 13 works. His *Achalatmaja Parinayamu* is in double *entendre*, wherein the marriage stories of Sītā and Pārvatī are woven into one—a feat of scholarship and a kind of intellectual gymnastics.

The Telugu literary muse had its heyday in Tamil Nadu and also in Karnāṭaka even from earlier times.

Shāhji Bhosle (1684-1712), the eldest son of Ekoji I, the founder of Marāthā rule in Tanjore and the step-brother of Shivāji the Great, composed twenty plays in Telugu which display a blend of the form and spirit of the *Yakshagāna* and the *Veethi Nāṭaka* or the popular street-play. All his court poets, Darbha Girirāju and others composed such plays in numbers. Curiously enough, the erotic adventures of Shāhji happened to be the theme of many of those plays. Tukoji (1728-36), brother and successor of Shāhji, wrote two plays in Telugu *Shivakāma Sundaripariṇayamu* and *Rājarānjana Vidyā Vilāsamu*. The latter is a spiritual descendant of Krishna Misra's *Prabodha Chandrodaya* and has adopted the technique of Sanskrit drama to some extent. He conferred the title of 'Andhra Kālidās' to Alūrū Kuppanā, the author of the *Pārthasārathi Vijaya* or the *Bhāgavata Yakshagāna* and the *Āchārya Vijayamu*. Ekoji II composed the *Rāmāyaṇa* in *dvipada* metre. Pratāpa Simha extended his patronage to Muddupalani who composed the *Rādhikā Sāntvanamu*, a poem which is replete with all the charm of the erotics and a sweet expression but lacks in decency and decorum.

Shri Nārāyana Tirtha, the author of the famous *Sri Krishna Leelātaranginī* in Sanskrit composed *Pārijātāpoharanam Yakshagana* in Telugu. The great celebrity in the world of music, Tyagaraja, was just coming into limelight through his unique skill in the art of music and his compositions.

The Madurai court witnessed its golden age during the reign of Vijayaranga Chokkanāth (1706-38). Its speciality lies in its crop of prose literature and erotic poetry. Vijayaranga has to his credit two beautiful pieces in prose—*Shrirāṅga* and *Māgh Mahātmyam*. His courtier Sanmukham Venkata Krishnappa rendered Pinaveerana's *Jaimini Bhārata* of the late 15th century and Chemakura's *Sarvangadhara Charitra* of the early 17th century c., into prose in a grandiloquent style. Another court-poet called Kundurti Venkatachalapati rendered all the three great classics—*Bhārata*, *Bhāgavata* and *Rāmāyaṇa* into Telugu prose.

The *Shashāṅkavijayam* of Sesham Venkatapati and the *Ahalyā Saṅkranḍanam* of Sanmukham are the two popular poetic adulations of adultery that the court of Vijayaranga offered to the lovers of *sringara*.

Telugu literature received some attention and patronage in Karnāṭaka even before the 18th century at the hands of some Kempa Gowda princes and Chikadevarāya Wodeyar. His son and successor on the Mysore throne was Kanthirava Narasa Rāju (1704-

14) who was the author of eight works—more or less of the *Yakshagāna* type, and scores of *sringara padas*.

Gunuguturi Venkata Krishnayya of Kolar composed his *Nala-Rāghava Yādava Pāṇḍaveeyamu*, every verse of which has a four-fold meaning to suit the four stories running concurrently.

Koti Raya Raghunath Tondaiman's poem called *Pārvatīparināyam* is the product of a creative genius of a high order, rich in scholarship, descriptions and *chamatkars* and crafty in poetic diction. Nudurupati Vengana, his court poet, compiled a masterly lexicon on indigenous Telugu in verse form called *Āndhra Bhāshārṇavam*.

To conclude, there was indeed a rich crop of literary works but not of the highest quality. Some of them are translations from Sanskrit and some are imitations of Telugu classics. *Kavitrājamano-rāñjanam*, *Rasikajanamanobhirāmaṁ* and *Kavijanarañjanam* are some of the heirs and adopted children of *Vāsucharitra*. Most of the translations of the period are, of course, quite faithful to their Sanskrit originals, but they are neither sound in their method of translation, nor do they exhibit the natural potentialities of the poet as in the case of the translations of the previous generations, for instance of the Kavitraya or Sreenatha or Potana. Enugu Lakshmana Kavi's translations from Bhartrihari and the like are only a few exceptions. Likewise there are a few poems beaming with an original touch of their own, which are products of a rich imagination and results of a real craftsmanship, e.g., *Rādhāmādhava Saṁvādamu*, *Shashāṅka Vijayam*, *Ahalyā Sankraṇḍanam*. The literature of the period was mostly influenced by the *padas* of Kshetrayya of the previous century in structure and spirit. A few *Yakshagānas* of the period like *Tyagavimoda Chitra Prabandha*, *Rājamohana Koravanji*, *Rājarañjana Vidyavilasamu*, *Mrityunjaya Vilasamu* and a few *shatakas* like the *Kukkūṭeshwara*, the *Simhādri Narasimha* and the *Rāmalingeshwara shatakas* show an individuality of their own. The prose literature is no doubt a pride of this period to the extent that the ages bygone did not see so much of output as this, but it lacks novelty in theme or language or style.

A variety of themes is also seen in the literature of the time. Classical themes from the *Rāmāyaṇa*, the *Bhārata* and the *Bhāgavata* were very much respected, but contemporaneous and foreign themes were also accepted. The erotic muse played her part with no little éclat, but the philosophical, didactic and devotional elements also had their sway. The *Sitārāmāñjaneya Saṁvādamu* can be counted as one of the few best literary productions of the period.

The general trend of the literature of the period shows slackness in the traditional texture, decency and soundness and a considerable craze for experiment which pursues its prospect in modernity.

X. KANNADA

Karnāṭaka in this period passed through political revolutions which broke up even the nominal unity given to it by the Vijayanagar empire. The northern parts were divided between the Marāṭhās and the Nizām while in the south Mysore and Keḷadi chiefs disputed the sovereignty. The chiefs of Keḷadi-Ikkeri were followers of Vīra-saivism while the Wodeyars of Mysore, though occasionally patronising the authors of other faiths, mainly encouraged Brahminical authors. Hence we find that Brahmin authors who had until then left the field of vernacular literature mostly to the Jains and Vīra-saivas turned out works in greater numbers than the Jains and Vīra-saivas put together. The local chieftains or Poligars were mostly interested in local histories and legends. With the disappearance of the Keḷadi chieftainship at the hands of Haidar, Vīra-saiva as well as Brahmin authors were deprived of patronage. Haidar and Tipū usurped the throne of Mysore, and Kannada literature in the south showed a decline down to the beginnings of the nineteenth century.

The Jain authors of the period were mostly concerned with the vindication and glorification of their faith. The story of Padmāvatī was told in *yakshagāna* and *sāngatya* by Rāma and Surāla. Pāyaṇṇa (1748) wrote *Ahimsā Charite* and the Jain *Rāmāyaṇa* story was dealt with in the *Jina Rāmāyaṇa* of Chandrasāgara Varṇi (1810) and Padmanābha. Ananta wrote a history of *Gommaṭa*. Brāhmaṇāṅka wrote the *Jina Bhārata* and Chandrasāgara, *Paraśurāma Bhārata*. Padmarāja and his younger brother Devachandra (1770-1841) were the only two Jain authors of some eminence. Padmarāja wrote a story of Pūjyapāda in the *sāngatya* metre. Devachandra was associated with Colonel Mackenzie and collected many local legends in his *Rājāvalī Kathe* which professes to give a history of many local dynasties and castes. His *Rāmā-kathāvatāra* deals with the *Rāmāyaṇa* story. He appears to have been a precocious and prolific author of *shatakas*, *yakshagānas*, commentaries and philosophical works. Chandrasāgara Varṇi wrote some small semi-historical works like *Kadamba Purāṇa* and *Bijjala Rāya Purāṇa*. His *Mulla-shastra* professes to derive Islam from the teachings of an apostle from Jainism.

Among the Vīrasaiva authors Kāḍa Siddha, Yogānāṇḍa, Niraṇjanārya, Nijalingarādhya and Shivayogīshvar have written *shatakas*. Vīrasaiva ritual is described in the works of Nirvāṇa Maṇtri, Virakta Shadakshara and Mahūmūrti. Nīschintātma and Virupaṇayya have dealt with the story of Vīrabhadra. Among the *Purāṇas* the *Kaṇchi Purāṇa* of Niraṇjanamūrti and *Halasya Purāṇa* of Murige Swāmi may be mentioned. The *Yakshagāna* form has been employed in Nāṇḍināth's *Valli-Kaṇṭhābharaṇa*, *Kapotavākya* of Nanjayya, the *Stories of Karibaṇṭa* and *Sāraṅgadhara* by Sām-bayya, *Girijākalyāṇa* of Ganga, *Saundarakāvya* of Nūronḍa.

The Brāhmiṇ authors who dealt with the *Bhārata* story are Lakshmakavi (1723) and Paramadeva of *Turaṅga Bhārata* (1777). Lakshmakavi wrote in the *vārdhika-ṣaṭpadī* metre and mainly concentrated on the relationship between Krishna and Arjuna. He is also the author of *Rukmāṅgada Charitre*. The *Rāmāyaṇa* versions are found in the *Ānāṇḍa Rāmāyaṇa* of Timmamātya, *Hanumadrāmāyaṇa* of Subramaṇya, *Mūla Bālarāmāyaṇa* of Haridās, *Rāmāyaṇa* of Varada Vithal and Venkamātya (a minister of Haidar Ali). Among the *Purāṇas* Depa's *Devāṅga Purāṇa* and *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇa* of Beḷe Rāya are of note. *Sthala Purāṇas* or *Mahātmyas* were written by Vaidyeshvarabhakta (*Setu*), Venkaṭeṣha (*Hālāsyā*), Rangayya (*Kaveri*), Singarāchārya (*Shrī-rāṅga*), Kaḷale Nāṇjarāja and others. Bobbūr Ranga in his *Āmbikā Vijaya* and *Parashurāma Rāmāyaṇa* shows a little originality. Paṭṭābhirāma, a Brahmin author, wrote for the sake of a Jain friend *Ratnashekhara Charite* in strict accordance with the tenets of Jain religion. The *Sāṅgatya*, *Yakshagāna* and *Chaupadī* forms have been employed by several authors for the stories of *Padmini* (Chennayya), *Chāndrahāsa* and *Sītā Kalyāṇa* (Giriyamma), *Mallikārjuna* (Kashi Rām), *Śibi* (Chenna) and *Nāḷa* (Kempayya). Depa has narrated the story of the *Battisa Putthali*.

The women authors of note were Helavanakaṭṭe Giriyamma and Cheluvāmba. Cheluvāmba was the queen of Doḍḍa Krishna Rāja (1717-1731). Her *Varanāṇḍi Kalyāṇa* deals with the legend of Bibi Nāchiyār. She has also composed songs and commentaries. Helavanakaṭṭe Giriyamma was a lady of great sanctity, and spiritual attainment. She has composed many songs instinct with devotion and narrated the stories of *Chāndrahāsa* and *Uddālīka* in the *sāṅgatya* metre.

The Haridās movement is represented by Vijaya Dās (1725) and his disciples. Vijaya Dās's songs have the *aṅkita Vijaya*

Viṭhala. His four pupils Gopāl Dās, Venugopāl Dās, Mohan Dās and Hayavadana Dās were men of great devotion. Varāha Tīmmappa and Viṭhal Dās (c. 1759) have also composed numerous songs. Gopāl Dās's disciple Jagannāth Dās, besides songs dedicated to Jagannāth Viṭhal, has written *Harikathāmṛta sāra*. Gūrū Gopāl Dās and Varada Gopāl Dās were also pupils of Gopāl Dās. Vyas Viṭhal Dās was a disciple of Venugopāl Dās. Venkaṭa Dās and Māna Madure Dās lived at the end of the eighteenth century. Shrīda Viṭhal Dās and Shrīpati Dās were also pupils of Jagannāth Dās. The songs composed by these are very numerous and there are also compositions of many unknown authors with many *aṅkīṭas*.

The history of Mysore was written by Nagarada Puṭṭayya and Shānubhoga Veṅkataramaṇayya, whereas the *Keḷadi Nripa Vijaya* of Liṅgaṇṇa gives the history of the chiefs of Keḷadi. *Maḍakeri Rājendra Daṇḍaka* is the eulogy of a chief of Chitradurga. The *Vaidya Kanda* of Brahma and *Vaidya Saṁhitāsārārṇava* of Kaḷale Vīra Rāja are works on medicine.

Kaḷale Vīra Rāja's sons, Deva Rāj and Nañjarāj were the all-powerful *Daḷavāis* and king-makers in the middle of the eighteenth century. Nañjarāj was a great scholar as well as a general and a patron of Sanskrit, Telugu and Kannada authors. The *Nañjarāja-yashobhūṣana* (containing a drama *Chandrakalā pariṇaya*) by Nṛsimha is written in praise of him. Karāchuri Nañjarāj, as he is also styled, discovered the genius of Haidar at the siege of Devanahalli and was responsible for the rise of Haidar who ultimately proved as ungrateful to his master and patron as to the nominal Mahārāja. The political and martial exploits of Karāchuri Nañjarāj, who was the *de facto* ruler of Mysore, extended to the whole of the south as described by Peixoto. Nañjarāj wrote in Sanskrit *Sanḡita Gangā-dhara* and other works. In Kannada about twenty works have been attributed to him. Of these, seven describe the sanctity of holy places like Sivaganga, Bhadrāgiri, Setu, Halāsyā Kshetra, Nañjangūd, and Kāshī. From the *Skanda*, *Padma*, *Bhaviṣhyottara Purāṇas* he has selected and translated *Shiva Gītā*, *Shiva Dharmot-tara* and other portions describing the greatness of the Saiva faith. He has also rendered the *Bhārata*, *Harivaṁsa* and *Mārkaṇḍeya Purāṇas* into Kannada prose. Under his patronage Nūronḍa wrote *Saundara Kāvya* and *Venkaṭeṣha Halāsyā Mahātmya*. Katti Gopālārāj related to Immaḍi Krishnarāja of Mysore (1734-66), also wrote a *Sthāḷa Purāṇa*. Shālayada Krishnarāja (1748-74), who resided at Mysore, was also a prolific author. He wrote several *Śhatakas* and philosophical works like *Vivekābharaṇa* and *Anubhava Rasāyana*.

His *Ṣaṭpratya* deals with metres. Other compositions are in the form of songs and *Yakshagānas*.

Haidar's minister Venkamātya (c. 1770) wrote in Sanskrit *Alamkāramaṇidarpaṇa*, *Sudhālaharī*, *Kāmaṇilāsa Bhāṇa*, *Mahendraka Dima*, *Kharadarpaghātana*—a *vyāyoga*, a *kāvya*—*Hanumajjaya*, a *prahasana*—*Kukshīmbarī Bhaikshava* and in Kannada a *Rāmāyaṇa* in *vardhikashatpadī*, a *chāmpū Rāmābhyudaya*, and *Hanumadvilāsa*. Jakkamātya (1750) wrote a commentary on the *Saundarya Laharī*. Chidānanda is the author of *Jñāna Sindhū*, *Devī Mahātmya*, *Tattva Chintāmaṇi* and *Pañchīkaraṇa*. In the same *advaita* tradition Shivaram composed *Śiva Bhaktisāra* in the *Bhāminīṣatpadī* metre.

XI. MALAYALAM

By the dawn of the 18th century Malayalam literature was in its full bloom, thanks to the rich contribution of Ezhuthachan, who is looked upon as the father of modern Malayalam. His translation of *Adhyātma Rāmāyaṇam* and *Bhārataṁ* brought a revolution in Malayalam language in so far as it underwent a thorough change in its vocabulary and style, freeing itself from the bondage of the archaic forms almost akin to Tamil, and establishing itself as an independent language, with a bias for Sanskrit. It was the works of Ezhuthachan that standardised the language of Kerala. Modern Malayalam has not changed in its style and idiom from those of Ezhuthachan's.

The major literary output of the century was in the form of an indigenous play composed for the art of *kathakalī*, the dance drama of Kerala. The *kathakalī* plays are known as *āṭṭakkatha*, literally the story for dance drama. It seems the *Gītagovinda* of Jayadeva gave a model to this type of literary composition. The verses or ślokas in Sanskrit metre narrate the story and the dialogue is composed in imitation of songs in *Gītagovinda*, set to music in appropriate *ragas* of classical Karnāṭak style.

The Rājā of Koṭṭarakkara, a principality in south Kerala, was the first exponent of *āṭṭakkatha* literature. He composed eight plays based on the story of *Rāmāyaṇa* and they were known as *Rāma-nāṭṭam* plays. Literary status to this type of plays was given by another royal poet, the Rājā of Koṭṭayam, belonging to north Kerala. His works are based on the stories in *Mahābhārata*. Uṇṇāyi Vāryar, who composed the story of Nala (*Nalacharitaṁ*) in four parts, is considered to be the greatest among the *Kathakalī* poets. Critics of the day maintain that *Nalacharitaṁ āṭṭakkatha* is an original work

of great dramatic excellence. No other poet in Malayalam could rise to his level in retelling a *purāṇic* story with as much originality as any poet could claim, not only in the presentation of the theme dramatically but also in the portrayal of the different characters in the play so realistically. Even the minor characters in the play leave an indelible impression on the minds of the readers. The songs or *padas* from *Nalacharitam* are so popular among the women of Kerala that they are adapted to a folk dance of women known as *kaikoṭṭikkali*.

Uṇṇāyi Vāryar had many followers in the field. Nearly hundred plays were composed during the century by poets belonging to all categories and standards. Irayimman Tampi, Maharājā Kārttika Tiruṇal, Ashvati Tirunal Rājā and Kīlimānūr Koil Tampuran are but a few among them whose plays gained popularity through the medium of the dance drama, *Kathakali*.

Devotional literature in Malayalam found its heyday during the early phase of this period. Ezhuthachan was indeed the pioneer in this field and many works in imitation of his *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* were composed, giving emphasis to the *Bhakti* cult, by the ardent followers of its first exponent. *Jñānappāna* by Pūntānam Nambūdiri, a contemporary of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭatiri, the author of *Nārāyaṇīyam*, is a unique work in the branch of philosophic poetry. Written in simple and unostentatious language *Jñānappāna*, the song of real knowledge, is a sincere approach to the *advaita* philosophy by the author who uses no unintelligible technical expressions to drive home in an inimitable simple style his vision of life to the readers, both literate and illiterate.

It was during this period that the evangelists and missionaries from the West made their contributions to Malayalam by compiling dictionaries in the language, translating the Bible into simple prose and writing original works in prose and verse on Biblical themes. The modern prose owes much to the innovations of these Western missionaries. They were more conversant with the speech of the illiterate mass of the country and thus picked up genuine popular usage from their mouth to be employed in literary writing. It may be said that thanks to these foreigners, more or less, a revolution in prose writing was effected, freeing it completely from the bondage of pedantic Sanskrit style. In short, Malayalam prose found its own genius in their writings only, which remain even today a model to the modern prose writers.

Books on astronomy, astrology, mathematics and medicine were written during this period by scholars in Sanskrit. They are either in the form of commentaries on the original Sanskrit works or in imitation of them in the local language. These writings, for obvious reasons, have a bias for Sanskrit style and these two different strata of prose writings, one in popular style and the other in scholastic and pedantic language, came into vogue. It took nearly two centuries to evolve a happy blending of these two styles and to bring Malayalam prose to its present form, rich in vocabulary with Sanskrit language but at the same time flexible, pliable and effective with popular parlance.

Kunjan Nambiār, the people's poet of Kerala, lived in this century. He brought about a revolution in the cultural and religious outlook of the people by bringing art and literature from its high and pedantic sphere down to the popular standard. The art and literature, especially the histrionic arts, and religious, philosophic and *Purānic* writings, were the monopoly of the caste Hindus, actively connected with temples and other religious institutions. The Nambūdiri Brahmins, princes and the intermediary communities alone were directly connected with the temple arts like *kūttu*, *kūtiyāṭṭam* and *kathakali* which were strictly and exclusively presented in the temple precincts. These temple arts served as effective media for the propagation of Sanskrit literature and Hindu religion through *Purānic* stories. Among caste Hindus the non-Brahmin communities, viz., the Nāyars, who formed the majority of the population and who were subdivided into many clans, were not directly involved in the above-mentioned cultural and religious activities. They had the privilege of witnessing the above from a respectable distance. Only the nobility among them were influenced beneficially; the rest whose main vocation was either military service or hunting, remained somewhat aloof in so far as the cultural enlightenment was concerned. The lower Hindus and the others like Christians and Muslims were completely cut off from this higher strata of society. Casteism, untouchability, slavery and many other social evils were rampant throughout.

Kunjan Nambiār who belonged to the intermediary community of temple servants expounded a new solo dance art known as *tullal* for which he himself wrote more than fifty works, all in simple, but elegant verse. Kunjan, in fact, is the first people's poet. Of course, he chose *Purānic* themes for his dance recitals, but he retold the stories in a different manner. He narrated the stories in the social background of his times, converting all *Purānic* characters

into ordinary human beings, the exact type of which he picked up from among the people around him. Thus Arjuna, Duryodhana, Kāṁsa and Rāvaṇa were the prototypes of the kings who ruled different principalities during his times. They talked and behaved like ordinary men. At the same time the poet was keen about preserving the spirit of the *Purāṇic* stories he handled. The people, especially the illiterate mass who heard him, felt that they were listening to their own stories. The *Purāṇic* themes, thus retold, attained the status of being a realistic representation of the lives of the people. This, indeed, was a new innovation in those days as the people were made to feel by the poet that art and literature have predominantly a social function to perform.

The dominant note of his works was humour and satire. Kunjan Nambīār's poetical works thus attracted the masses more than the writings of any of his predecessors. They enlightened and educated the people. They created a social awareness among them. And no wonder, even today Kunjan Nambīār is looked upon as the greatest of the popular poets, the best humorist and satirist, and more than that, a poet of progressive outlook.

Rāmapurattu Vāryar, a contemporary of Kunjan Nambīār who wrote only one original poetic work, namely, *Kuchelavṛittam*, the story of Kuchela (Sudāma), is considered to be the morning star of the modern Malayalam lyrics.

The importance of *Kuchelavṛittam* cannot be exaggerated as it is the first work in Malayalam which embodies the personal emotions and feelings of the writer. The longer poems of lyrical nature written two centuries later by the modern poets, especially Uḷḷūr Parameshvara Ayyar, Vaḷḷathol Nārāyana Menon and Kumaran Āsān, the great trio of the century, found their model in *Kuchelavṛittam*.

Many missionary workers from abroad settled down in Kerala, and their contribution to the language and literature is praiseworthy. Several works on grammar were written by them, and indeed they are the pioneer works in the field, although treatises on grammar were there in the language in the traditional style. A travelogue, the first of its kind in the language, was written by a native missionary, Governor Pārammekkāvil Tomā Kattanār, who accompanied his Bishop Kariyāṭṭil Joseph to Rome towards the end of the century.

The period under review is characterised by a few distinctive features. The best of the classical poets Uṇṇāyi Vāryar, Kunjan Nambīār and Rāmapurattu Vāryar flourished in the first half of the

century. The literary output of the period maintained a high quality. The prose writing made its appearance during this period, inaugurating a new branch in literature. The close of the century witnessed a decline in the quality of literary productions.

XII. URDU

The Urdu poets of Delhi, writing under the influence of Wali (1667-1707) were partial to *Iham*, which was, at that time, practised not only in Persian but in Hindi also, especially in *Dohas*. Yet their poetry was not without genuine emotions and charm. The language, however, continued to be in a fluid state. The rules of grammar and spelling were not cared for; Urdu poets also did not bother about *Radif* and *Qafiyas* as the Arabic and Persian poets did. They, in fact, paid more attention to the sounds of words than to their relative spellings. Abd-us-Salam Nadvi condemns these 'defects' of their poetry, but Muhammad Husain-Azad had rightly defended them on an earlier occasion for these poets had written in the language and idiom of the day. However, a few of them may be noted here.

Najmud-din Shāh Mubarak Abru (1692-1747) is one of the earliest poets who wrote under the influence of Wali, whom he pays due homage by calling him as his teacher.

Sharf-ud-din Mazmun (1689-1745) was a soldier-turned-dervish and a poet. His style is very much artificial.

Sayyid Muhammad Shakir Naji (d. 1754) died young. He, a promising poet, is accredited with a *Mukhammas*, wherein he had criticised the king and his courtiers for their cowardice and effeminacy shown at the time of Nadir Shāh's invasion and destruction of Delhi in 1739.

* Ashraf 'Ali Fughan (d. 1772) kept himself away from *Iham*. His style is smooth and direct. His poetry has an element of pathos in it. Shāh Hatim (1699-1787), a leading poet of the time of Muhammad Shāh, wrote under the influence of Wali and was closely connected with the *Ihami* poetry. But he, nevertheless, joined the reformers of his time and made a selection of his poetry and called it "*Diwān Zadeh*" (1757). Along with others, Hatim brought about many learned and academic changes in the Urdu language and poetry. They believed in and insisted on using the loan-words from Arabic and Persian in the original sense and with the original spellings. This meant subservience to Arabic and Persian and; yet, it

became the fashion and practice of the then and future writers and poets of Urdu to follow their dictates. But it had its own reaction which got manifest in the prose-works *Rani Ketki ki Kahani* and *Darya-e-Latafat* of Insha.

Mirza Muhammad Rafi Sauda (1713-1780) decided on the advice of Khan-e-Arzu, to go over from Persian to Urdu. This decision had a far-reaching effect on his own poetic career and the development of Urdu poetry. In fact, Sauda did more than any other single writer of the day in raising Urdu to the status of a literary language for, unlike his predecessors, who were mostly *ghazal*-writers, he wrote, besides *ghazals*, *qasida*, satire, *masnavi*, *wasokht* and other lesser forms in Persian. Sauda seems to be well conversant with all the moods and human feelings at all levels of life, and he has, at his command, an ample vocabulary to express them with ease and vigour without showing any sign of exhaustion, strain or repetition at any time. He is the pioneer of *Tamsilia Shairi* in Urdu. He is rightly considered as the greatest *qasida* and satire writer of Urdu. In his social satires, he castigates the political, social and moral vices and defects of his age. Some of his personal satires are unpardonably vulgar.

Mir Muhammad Taqi Mir (1722-1810) is called *Khuda-e-Sukhan* (the Lord of Speech). It is a homage that people pay him for his great service rendered in the cause and uplift of Urdu poetry. He was a man of great merit and talents, which were duly reflected in the art and realism of his poetry. He wrote what he actually felt in his heart and mind pertaining to his personal life or the environment he lived in. As such his poetry, especially his *ghazals*, is a graphic document of his own moods, sentiments and feelings and the happenings of his age. His non-Ishqia *masnavis* are a fine example of objective poetry. They give the impression of being exact and truthful. His emotional experiences are that of a sad, gloomy and pathetic nature. He is ever quiet and subdued. We rarely come across a happy and joyful expression in his poetry; yet, it is moving and powerful and has a direct appeal to his readers. He has hundreds and not just seventy-two couplets of lasting beauty, nevertheless, his readers agree with Shefta that "his (Mir's) high is very high and his low is very low". His style is simple and direct. His best media of expression are his *ghazals*, especially those written in shorter metres.

Khwaja Mir Dard (1719-1785) is known for his learning and scholarship on the one hand and for his piety and high values of life on the other. He had mysticism in his blood. His religious studies

were very deep. He lived a life of contentment and had a sterling character. He was well-versed in music and was duly acknowledged as a *Gurū*. He is accredited with a number of *Khayāls*, *Thumrīs* and *Dhrupads*. His services to the Urdu language and poetry are great. The *mushairas* held at his place were well-known for their literary contribution. Delhi poets like Sauda, Mir and Soz participated therein and, later, they discussed the ways and means of improving the Urdu language and enriching the Urdu poetry.

Dard's poetry embodies authentic ideas of Sufism. In his non-sufistic poetry, he is keen and sincere and expresses his ideas in a simple and direct style. Like Mir, he too excels in *ghazals* written in shorter metres.

Dard's younger brother, Mir Asar, will ever be remembered for his beautiful *masnavi* called *Khwab-o-khayāl* which depicts the earthly as well as the spiritual love of the poet with utmost intensity of his feelings. It is a lyrical and subjective *masnavi* without a story.

Mir Ghulam Hasan (1727-1786) is known as a great *masnavi* writer on the strength of his *Sihrl-ul-Bayan*. It is the best metrical romance in Urdu. Mir Hasan's skill and excellence lie in his direct and simple style, vivid description, appropriateness of expression apt to the compositions of the occasions. But his characterisation of aristocratic ladies is uncharitable. *Sihrl-ul-Bayan* reveals his knowledge of humanity, nature and life, especially in their externals. Astonishingly enough, he maintains the same good level in his *masnavi* throughout. He, as yet, is unsurpassed in the domain of *masnavi*-writing.

Now, we come to a very notable poet called Wali Muhammad Nazeer (1740-1830). He was a school-master and wandered from place to place seeing and tasting life at all levels. He never cared for the dictates of etiquettes or the accepted norms of poetry with regard to thought, subject, form, diction and expression. He wrote of what he saw and felt in life and that too in a way which satisfied his own sense of language and poetry. He wrote of the masses and for the masses, who liked his poetry, for it touched their heart and mind. He is ever fresh in singing of the life and culture of the land and its people, no matter to what caste, creed and religion they belong to. His language and expression is bold and original. In matters of descriptive poetry, he equals Mir Anis of Lucknow.

The prominent poets of the period who gave a distinguishing shape to the language and poetry of Lucknow are described here.

Shaikh Ghulām Hamdāni Mushafi (1750-1824) migrated from Delhi to Lucknow and enjoyed the patronage of Mirza Sulaimān Shukoh. He was influenced by the trends of life and poetry of Lucknow, but, truly speaking, they did not go well with his temperament. Nevertheless, he serves as a bridge between the old and the new. He has something of Mīr, Sauda, Insha and Jur'at, but he lacks the respective distinguishing features of these poets. He, as such, does not have any characteristic of his own.

Sayyid Insha Allah Khan Insha (1756/58-1817) had a knack of learning languages. He knew Persian, Arabic, Turkish and many native languages. He was well conversant with the scientific principles connected with the nature of a language. At the same time he had mastered the art of poetry and was a noteworthy poet too. He was conscious of his attainments in the various fields. Now, with his wit and brilliance added to it, Insha became sarcastic and pugnacious in his remarks. Over and above this, he always tried to assert himself. This led to many quarrels at Delhi and Lucknow.

Insha may not, in future, be remembered much for his poetry, but he would ever be honoured in the domain of Urdu prose on account of his *Rani Ketki ki Kahani* and *Darya-e-Latafat*. In *Rani Ketki ki Kahani* Insha has not used Arabic and Persian words, yet, it does not sound artificial. His style is direct and forthright. It seems to have been written as a revolt against the dominance of Arabic and Persian languages. It gives an air of independence to the 'local' language. The same trend is evident in his *Darya-e-Latafat*, a work on linguistics setting principles which are valid even today. These books amply prove that Urdu has a genius of its own and that it should not be tied down to Arabic or Persian, etc.

Shaikh Qalandar Bakhsh Jur'at, a close friend of Insha, got attached to Mirza Sulaimān Shukoh. His poetry is a true picture of life at Lucknow where he was brought up. His poetry, however, written before his early blindness, is distinguishable from the one written after it. The earlier poetry is gay, witty and joyful, whereas the latter one, has an under-current of seriousness and pathos. His blindness deprived him of what life had given him or could have given him. Religion or intellectual pursuits could not help him in his misfortunes. It was his devotion to music which sustained him in his hard, difficult and unfortunate life.

Imam Bakhsh Nasikh (d. 1838) had acquired a taste and refinement of language which is amply borne out by his poetry. But his poetry like his ethics has no depth. Although he believed in the

greatness of Mir's poetry, he ardently followed Sauda, and, yet he has not given us an admixture of both. It is rarely that we come across a personal note in his poetry. Hence, not so as a poet, Nasikh would certainly be ever remembered for his stupendous service rendered to the Urdu language. He not only carried forward the work of early scholars of improving and developing the Urdu language with greater vigour and vehemence, but he also became almost the first person to codify and formulate definite rules regarding the usage, diction and grammar of Urdu. He also fixed the genders and formulated idioms to be used in Lucknow. Along with him and his disciples, others too followed his dictates. This made the language of Lucknow independent of the one at Delhi.

Khwaja Haidar 'Ali Atish (1778-1846) merits a greater notice as a poet. He was independent and care-free by nature and lived a life of contentment being satisfied with what he got from Nawab Muhammad Taqi, his patron. This has given vigour and power to his expression and language. His poetry was very popular on account of his craftsmanship, smoothness in versification and refinement of his language.

Something need be said about *Rekhti* with regard to Urdu poetry produced in Lucknow. *Rekhti* is the feminine form of *Rekhta*, Urdu poetry in general, for it is written in the language of the women-folk which is different from that of the men. Hashimi of Bijapur is said to be the first poet to write *Rekhti*, but it had no complete form as such. Hence, because of the completeness and the varied feelings of a woman in love with a man that it depicts, the credit of its intention is given to Sa'adat yar Khan Rangin (1756-1834), who is said to have got the idea from Insha. Rangin was mostly in the company of courtesans and dancing girls and his poetry reflects his amours with them.

In *Rekhti*, woman narrates the love on her side. It was new and unique compared to the general love poetry in Urdu, and as such, it was a return to the Hindi tradition wherein a woman describes her feelings of love for her man. But *Rekhti* seldom rises to this level. The language of *Rekhti* is not treated as a literary one, yet it has its own importance, for, it distinctly tells us of the language used by women at large. *Rekhti* became popular as it satisfied the taste of the degenerated nobility of the time.

The period under review is mostly important for its poetry. But it attains significance with regard to prose because of Insha's two monumental works, *Rani Ketki ki Kahani* and *Darya-e-Latafat*,

mentioned earlier. They were preceded by *Deh Majlis* (1714) of Fazli and *Naw Tarz-e-Murassa* of Ata Husain Tahseem (1798). Both are highly Persianised and written in a rhythmic and affected style. A little different from them is *Gulshan-e-Hind* of Mirza 'Ali Lutf. In comparison with the language used in Urdu poetry the language of these prose-books sounds most unrefined and under-developed. Perhaps writing prose was not in vogue at that time. Persian was used practically for all prose expressions. Moreover poetry was very popular and it was used while writing letters also. Prose, therefore, had no chance to improve and develop.

Hence the credit for direct, simple and, yet interesting Urdu prose goes, in general, to the writers connected with the Fort William College of Calcutta, which was founded to teach the native languages to the British employees of the East India Company. In this regard, Mir Amman deserves a special mention for his *Bagh-o-Bahar*, which is written in almost the spoken language of the day. Other writers of significance are Sher 'Ali Afsos, Haidar Bakhsh Haidari, Nihal Chand Lahauri, Bahādur 'Ali Husaini, Kazim 'Ali Jawan, Hafizuddin and Lallu Lālji.

XIII. SINDHI

Sind is known among the Sindhis as providing a fertile soil for the growth of poetry. There is a large number of poets—both classical and modern—who have moulded the life and thought of the Sindhis. Of these, there were three stalwarts—the Triumvirate of Sindhi poetry—Shāh (the Prince), Sachal (The Truthful) and Sāmi (the Master). Their poetry throws a flood of light on what the Sindhis are—on their customs, manners, religion, ways of life and ways of thought.

Shāh is the foremost among these three poets. He puts the kettle to the boil; Sachal takes the lid off it; while Sāmi passes the beverage on to the rank and file of the people so that they may be brought to an intense awareness of God even in the day-to-day affairs of life. There is not a scholar, past and present, but has paid tributes to these three who are still the primary sources of literary inspiration.

Shāh is a great narrative artist, who puts across to the reader his philosophy of life, love and God through characters that are alive and are yet symbolic and almost legendary as well. But in all his works, it is he who is the hero or the heroine, he who celebrates in

himself the upsurge in the hearts of men, he who is every man: he is the Seeker, he is the *Talib* or *Jagyasu*.

This great poet was born in 1689 and died in 1752. But though he is dead, he survives in his work and in the hearts of those who love him.

Whatever Shāh said in symbols, Sachal said in plain language. He is direct and forthright in his utterances, clear and lucid as are the great Greek poets.

When asked about his religion, he says:

"I am not a Muslim, nor a Hindu;
I am bigger than either."

When told that by birth he was a Muslim, he looks up and says:

"It is not the *Kalma* that makes me a Muslim
Nor did the Prophet bring faith from Arabastan".

"Oh! Sachal, you are the King of Kings
Though you may be only a man in the eyes of Man!"

This is Sachal, the revolutionary poet who followed in the footsteps of Shāh and carried the message of his Master in the rough-hewn language of the common man, touched with the wonder and beauty of a mind in harmony with the pulse of the Infinite. It is a wonder that though Bilwal and Shāh Ināyat, the great Sufis, were tortured and killed for their seemingly blasphemous utterances, Sachal escaped the gallows. This is because even the Mīrs and Talpurs, who were the rulers of Sind, were his followers, and therefore, no one dared lift his hand against the Master.

Sachal was a revolutionary. He had a restless, seeking mind, for it is only through spiritual unrest, through a desire to know, that one can reach out to the ultimate Reality. He wanted others to be equally restless, so that they might be his comrades in his search of the Great Ideal. Sachal was born in 1739 and died in 1829.

Sāmi, the Master, was born in 1743 and died in 1850. He teaches us the eternal verities of life, teaches us that the world is a shadow and that the only reality lies within the deep-feeling heart of man. And this wisdom of his is evolved out of life rather than from a study of books, and comes straight from the heart to speak to that which lies deeply buried in the heart of man.

Sāmi speaks directly from the heart to the heart in a language which surprises by its directness and freshness. This is one of the chief charms of his poetry, for it finds an answering echo in the minds of the high and the low alike. He himself used to say that he had merely vernacularised Vedantic lore.

Here are some ślokas of Sāmi which illustrate his philosophy:

“God is manifest, O S’āmi! like the sun,
The blind see HIM not, unclosing their eyes;
Why dost thou at every door run,
And chatter like lunatics, O unwise?”

* * *

“The fool perishes in ego’s vortex,
Entangled like an ape’s hand filled in greed;
He awakens not to draw the veil of darkness;
When the Master wills, S’āmi is from misery freed!”

* * *

“He who hath the chaos of ignorance destroyed,
Achieves the mighty pinnacle of *Atman*.”

XIV. ARABIC

Like the previous centuries of Muslim rule in India, the period under review also saw the Arabic language being learnt and studied by the Muslims as an indispensable medium for acquiring theological education, which assumed a special importance following the downfall of Mughul supremacy. As the religio-ethical and socio-economic health of the Muslim community came to be adversely affected by the weakening of the imperial authority, the intelligentsia among them, particularly the doctors of divinity, went for the revitalization of the Muslim morale by means of religious reforms. And Arabic became the natural medium for fulfilling the requirements of religious rethinking among the Muslims in the early part of the eighteenth century. Behind the production of Arabic religious literature worked the powerful reformist movement of Shāh Walī-ullāh Dehlavī, son of the eminent theologian of Aurangzīb’s time, Shāh ‘Abdur Rahīm Dehlavī.²⁴

Born in 1703, four years before Aurangzīb’s death, Shāh Walī-ullāh²⁵ represents the transition of the Indo-Islamic Culture from the medieval to the modern period. On his return from the Hejaz, where he received his formative education under the acknowledged masters of theology, Shāh Walīullāh wrote his chief works in

Arabic. His *magnum opus*, the *Hujjat Allāh al-Bālighah*, which earned him the title of Imām Ghazālī of India, constitutes his most important contribution to theological dialects. In this outstanding work, the author attempts a rationalist approach to religious problems and takes an evolutionist view of human history. His other notable works include *Ta'wīl Ahādīth*, on the interpretation of the sayings of the Prophet; *al-Musawwa*, a copious commentary on the well-known work, *al-Muwatta*, of Imām Mālik; *al-Tafhīm al-Ilāhīyya*, dealing with Sufistic doctrines; and *'Iqd al-Jīd fī Ahkām al-Ijtihād wa'l Taqlīd*, on the problem of *ijtihād* (use of individual reasoning) and *taqlīd* (conformity), used as an oft-quoted book of reference by the ulema of later generations. Shāh Waliullāh also wrote Arabic poetry, which mainly comprises eulogistic poems on the Prophet. Shāh Waliullāh's mission generated tremendous reformist shock-waves which reverberated through the posterity of Muslim intellectuals in India. After him, the mission was carried on most effectively by his illustrious son Shāh 'Abdul Azīz Dehlavī (d. 1823)²⁶ who employed, unlike his father, Persian rather than Arabic for his numerous compilations. Of his Arabic writings, the *Sirr al-Shahādatain*, which deals with the rationale of the martyrdom of Syednā Imām Hussain at Karbala, has proved to be the most popular and revolutionary book ever written on the subject by an author of Shāh 'Abdul Azīz's calibre.

It is generally remarked that the decline of Muslim political power brought about a simultaneous decay in the progress of Muslim learning. The opinion does not appear to be supported by facts. Though the disintegration of the Mughul administration gradually removed the economic stimulus which involved religious schools to produce trained *qazis* for the purpose of judicial appointments, the reduced calls thus made by the state employment on the Muslim man-power left more men free to devote themselves to academic and literary work. A number of educational institutions and foundations, such as those established by Ghāzi-ud-dīn Khan Firūzjang, Sharaf al-Daulah and Raushan al-Daulah sprang up in Delhi. The standardization of the curriculum of Arabic education was accomplished in the period under review of Mullā Nizām-ud-dīn (d. 1748) of the celebrated school of Farangi Mahall (in Lucknow).²⁷ The *Dars-i-Nizāmiyyah*, as the curriculum was named after its founder, enjoyed country-wide acceptance (still retained by madrassahs throughout the sub-continent) and provided instruction in grammar, rhetoric, philosophy, logic, scholasticism, Qurānic sciences, Islamic jurisprudence and Apostolic Traditions.

Mullā Nizām-ud-dīn's son, Maulana Abdul Ali 'Bahr al-'Ulūm' ('Ocean of Learning')²⁸ is the most well-known alumnus of the Farangi Mahall School. A prodigious teacher, he taught in many leading religious institutions of the country before settling down in Madras, where he died in 1819. A prolific author, he wrote a number of treatises and dissertations, commentaries and annotations on religious texts of classical masters. Among his numerous disciples, Maulvī Muhammad Ghauth Sharaf al-Mulk (1822),²⁹ following his master's example, compiled various works, of which the most notable is *Nathr al-Marjān fī Rasm-i-Nazmi'l*, Qurān in seven volumes.

Bilgram, near Lucknow, is a place with which are associated names of great litterateurs and scholars, the foremost among them being Sayyid Ghulām 'Alī Azād (d. 1786),³⁰ who wrote in 1764 a very curious work, entitled *Subhat al-Marjān*, which deals with topics such as references to India in Qurānic commentaries and *hadīth*, biographies of Indian scholars, rhetorical figures of Sanskrit and types of lovers depicted by the poets. Azād happens to be the most important Arabic poet of India. He has left seven *diwans*, selections from which have been published under the title, *Sab'ah Sayyārah*. For his collection of *na't* (panegyrics in praise of the Prophet), *Tasliyat al-Fu'ād*, Azād has rightly won the title of *Hassān al-Hind*, like his Persian counterpart Khāqānī who is known as *Hassan al-'Ajam*. Azād had a critic in his younger contemporary, Muhammad Baqir 'Agah' (d. 1805) of Madras who deserves mention as a prolific writer and a good poet in his own right. Another noted literary figure of Bilgram is Murtadā 'Alī Zabīdī (d. 1790),³¹ who compiled a comprehensive lexicographic commentary entitled, *Taj al-Urūs* on the well-known *Qamus* of Maj al-Dīn Fīrūzābādī. His *Ithāf al-Sadāt*, an illuminative commentary of Imām Ghazālī's *Ihyā* bears ample testimony to the author's knowledge and wonderful learning. Rahmān 'Alī has listed a total of sixty-six works by Zabīdī. Another conspicuous lexicographer of the 18th century is Muhammad 'Alī al-Fārūq of Thānabawan, who compiled a dictionary of Arabic technical terms, called *Kāshshāf Istilāhāt al-Funūn*. Among other poets of Bilgram deserving mention are Syed Tufail Muhammad (d. 1738) and Sayyid Muhammad Yūsuf (d. 1758).

A learned family of Khairābād, near Sitapur (in U.P.) produced scholars and theologians of eminence, such as Sifat Allāh ibn Madīnat Allāh (d. 1744) and Shaikh Ahmadullah (d. 1735). 'Allāma Fadl-i-Imām Khairābādī (d. 1827)³² attained great fame for his very popular text-books on logic, entitled *Mirqat*.

Sayyid Dildār 'Alī Lakhnawī (d. 1812),³³ the first Shia *mujtahid* of India, flourished during the period. His contemporary, Tafaddul Husain Khān Kashmīrī (d. 1800), who knew Arabic, Persian, English and Latin, was the author of several treatises on mathematics, in which he had excelled in his time. Mirzā Mazhar Jān-i-Jānān (d. 1780), the revered Sufi saint, had a large number of learned disciples, of whom Qādī Thanā 'ullāh Pānīpatī (d. 1810) won wide acclaim as 'Muhaddith' and has been described by Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz as the "Baihaqi of India".

XV. PERSIAN

In the post-Aurangzīb period of the history of Mughul India, the status of the Persian language faced a challenge as a result of the collapse of the central authority of the Muslim rulers and the emergence of Urdu as the potential *lingua franca* of the country, though it was not until 1837 that Persian ceased to be the official language of India. Excepting the art of historiography and memoir-writing, which found favour with both the Muslims and the Hindus, there occurred a virtual decline in the output of poetical compositions during the period. The time-honoured emigration of writers and versifiers from Persian-speaking lands of Central Asia to India, which reached its zenith in the heyday of the Mughul ascendancy under Shāh Jahān touched a low ebb in the second half of the seventeenth century. But the Persian and Afghān invasions of the sub-continent, though devastating both in nature and extent, brought in its wake numerous men of culture who perfected their creative art on the Indian soil. The native *Rekhta* writers invariably had something to write in Persian too.

Shāh Waliullāh Dehlavī,³⁴ the doyen of Islamic learning in India, though writing mostly in Arabic, took a revolutionary step by translating the Qurān into simple Persian. Persian translations of the Muslim scripture were attempted earlier, but none of them had gained such currency. The reason of the translation's popularity was that it formed a part of the broad-based movement initiated by the savant to bring the knowledge of the Qurān within the reach of the average literate Indian Muslim who generally spoke Persian. Equally popular was the *tafsir*, named *Fath al-'Azīz*, written by his illustrious son, Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīz Dehlavī,³⁵ who also had several other religious works to his credit, namely *Bustān al-Muhaddithīn*, *'Ujāla-i-Nāfi'ah* and *Tuhfa-i-Ithnā 'Ashariyya*. About the same time, 'Allāma Fadl-i-Imām Khairābādī prepared the famous *Amadnāma*, which proved to be a must for anybody who desired to learn Persian.

As theology was the subject-matter of scholars of Arabic, writing of history and biography became almost an obsession with those who tried their hand in Persian. The mass of historical writings clearly outweighs the quantity of *belles lettres* created during the period.

Mubārak Allāh Wādih (d. 1716), who received the title of Irādat Khān in the 40th year of Aurangzīb's reign, wrote in 1714 his history entitled, *Tārīkh-i-Irādat Khān* or *Maqṭal al-Salātīn*, containing chronicles of the seven years following Aurangzīb's death down to the year 1714 when Farrukh-siyar entered Delhi. He has also left a *diwān* and a *mathnawī*, known as *Āina-i-Rāz*. Muhammad Shafi Warīd, who served for some time under Prince 'Azam but soon retired and devoted himself to writing, compiled two historical works, named *Mir'at-i-Wāridāt* and *Tārīkh-i-Chaghtāi* and four *mathnawīs*, viz., *Gulistān-i-Nayrang*, *Mir'at-i-Farrukhī*, *Chaman-i-Dīdār* and *Sāqī Nāma*, apart from a *diwān* of lyrical odes. A precious narrative of the life and reign of Muhammad Shāh was written by Mīrza Muhammad Bakhsh 'Ashūb (d. 1785), who was also a poet of no mean order. *Mir'at-i-Ahmadī* of Ali Muhammad Khan, who was appointed Diwān of Gujarāt in 1746, is a very reliable source of accurate information of diverse kinds about the Mughul empire, particularly Gujarāt. It happens to be the only work of its kind after Abū'l Fazl's *Āin-i-Akbarī*.

The Persian tradition of Hindu historiography, which had its beginning during Shāh Jahān's reign with works like the *Chahār Chaman* of Chandra Bhān Brāhman³⁶ and the *Shāhjahān nama* of Bhagwan Das, was maintained throughout the eighteenth century with undiminished brilliance. Lal Ram's *Tuhfat al-Hind*, a general history of India from the earliest times to the reign of Farrukh-siyar and written in 1735, provides a rare instance of a Hindu author's complete self-identification with the Muslim view-point and style.³⁷ Imitating the same pattern is the *Tārīkh-i-Muhammadshāhī* of the noted Kayastha historian, Khushāl Chand. The *Shāhnāma-i-Munawwar al-Kalām* of Shiv Das Lakhnawi is a valuable document depicting the life and time of Farrukh-siyar. It is not a connected history, but a compilation of court news and detached narratives, official letters and *far-mans*. Ray Rayan Ānand Rām Mukhlis (d. 1751), an eye-witness of much that occurred during Nādir Shāh's Indian sojourn, was a versatile Hindu scholar of Persian. Besides a *diwān* and some epistles, he wrote a very authentic account of Muhammad Shāh's war with Nādir Shāh. The *Majma 'al-Akhhār* of Harsukh Rai, written in 1805, is a general history divided into eight books, the seventh

of which deals with rulers of different provinces of India, while at the end of the sixth is given the history of Mughul rulers up to the time of Shāh 'Alam. Lakshmi Narayan Shafiq of Aurangābād, author of the famous biographical dictionary, *Gul-i-Ra'nā*, wrote several important historical and topographical works, such as *Haqīqatha-i-Hindusthān*, *Ma'āthir-i-'Asafī* and *Ahwāl-i-Hardarābād*. His *tazh-kira* of poets, named *Chamanistān-i-Shua'arā*, occupies a coveted place in the history of Persian biographical literature.

The Awadh rulers patronized several Hindu chroniclers, of whom Harcharan Das and Harnam Singh deserve mention. The former wrote *Chahār Gulzār-i-Shujā'ī*, dedicated to Nawāb Shujā-ud-Daulah, which is a discursive but significant book of history, while the latter compiled *Tārīkh-i-Sa'adat-i-Jāwīd*, dedicated to Sa'adat 'Alī Khān, Nawāb Vazīr of Awadh, which is a general history of India, useful for the biographical details it gives of the nobles and dignitaries from the time of Muhammad Shāh to that of the author's own.

The eastern part of the tottering Mughul empire, particularly the Bengal Sūbah, made a commendable contribution to the Persian historical literature of the 18th century. The celebrated *Siyar al-Muta'akhkherīn* of Ghulām Husain Tabātabā'ī is a general history of India from Aurangzib's death to Nādir Shāh's departure in 1739, with a special section on the history of Bengal from the death of Nawāb Shujā-ud-Daulah to the year 1781. Rightly considered as the last great historian of Muslim India, the author has some penetrating observations to make regarding the East India Company which was rapidly acquiring political hegemony in the country. The *Siyar* is written in the style of a private memoir, the most useful and engaging shape which history can assume. There are also poetical pieces composed by the historian.³⁸

Among the independent *subāhdars* of Bengal, Nawāb Alī Vardī Khān is the most conspicuous for his patronage of chroniclers, scholars and poets. Yūsuf Ali Khān (d. 1781) wrote the *Tārīkh-i-Bangāla-i-Mahābhatjangī*,³⁹ which is a unique store-house of valuable historical details, gathered by the author from personal observation and experience. The author of the *Siyar* is heavily indebted to this book for his own account of Alī Vardī, of the Marāthā invasions of Bengal and of the Afghān rebellion. Yūsuf Ali's other notable works include *Hadiqata-i-Safa*, a comprehensive history, remarkable for its extremely accurate chronology and its notices of the learned persons of single epochs. There is also a memoir of poets and a rare compendium compiled by him. Yūsuf Ali's son-in-law, Nawāb Alī Ibrāhīm Khān, who held the office of Chief Magistrate of Benaras, was the author

of several voluminous *tazhkiras*, including *Khulāsat al-Kalām. Tārīkh-i-Ālī Ibrāhīm Khān*, composed during the administration of Lord Cornwallis, is a clear and succinct account of the Marāthā wars.

Tārīkh-i-Bangāla of Munshī Salīmullāh⁴⁰ and the *Riyād al-Salātīn* of Ghulām Husain Salīm⁴¹ were written at the instance of English patrons. The former work, which is of special value for the career and administration of Murshid Qulī Khān, was written by the order of Governor Henry Vansittart (1760-64), while the latter, which is the fullest account in Persian of the Muslim history of Bengal from the earliest times to 1786, was composed in Malda at the behest of George Udny, the author's patron and commercial Resident of the East India Company's factory at Malda.

Two interesting works, relating to the history of the Nizāmat in Bengal, which bear the stamp of rhetorical skill are the *Waqāi-Fath-i-Bangāla*, written in 1748, by Muhammad Wafā and the *Ibrat-i-Arabāb-i-Basar* written in 1757, by Rai Balmukund, where narratives are throughout written in chronogrammatic sentences. Another title worth mentioning is Maharājā Kalyan Singh's *Khulāsat al-Tawārīkh* written in 1783,⁴² which comprises a portion which is sometimes differently called *Wāridāti-Qāsismī*. The work is a good statistical account of Bengal and other provinces of the Mughul empire.

To the court of Sayyid Muhammad Riza Muzaffarjang (d. 1791) *Nāib Nazim* of Bengal, were attached two chroniclers, Muhammad 'Alī Khān Ansārī and Karam 'Alī, whose works *Tārīkh-i-Muzaffari* and the *Muzaffarnāma* respectively are indispensable source materials for the reconstruction of the history of the period in which the two authors lived. Closely associated with Nawāb Muzaffarjang was one Hājī Muhammad Beg Khān, whose son Mīrzā Abū Tālib Khān⁴³ became one of the most interesting intellectual luminaries of the 18th century. A man of keen intellect and wide learning, he wrote on a variety of topics and composed poetry, criticism and travelogue. In 1791, he brought out at Calcutta a scholarly edition of the *Diwān-i-Hāfiz* which was followed in 1792 by *Khulāsat al-Afkār*, a magnificent survey of the biographies of about 500 ancient and modern poets of Persian. He also compiled two works of history, namely, a history of the kings of India and *Lubb al-Tawārīkh*, a compendious account of the kingdoms of Europe and other western countries. *Tafdhil al-Ghāfilīn* is a first-hand account of the events connected with the administration of Nawāb Āsaf-ud-Daulah of Awadh. He also wrote a *diwān* which was edited by A. Swinton with English translation under the title *Poems of Mīrzā Abū Tālib Khān* and was published at

London in 1807. But what fetched *Mirzā Abū Tālib Khān* a lasting fame is his account of his travels in Asia, Africa and Europe, entitled *Masīr-i-Tālibī fī bilād-i-Afranjī*. The travelogue became so popular that it was translated into English, French, German and Urdu, sometimes with more than one edition.

The Nawābs of Bengal, being men of learning and culture, extended liberal patronage to men of letters and scholars. During the rule of Nawāb *Alī Vardī Khān*, Murshidabad shone as a focal point for poets and writers, most distinguished of whom, according to the author of the *Siyar*, was *Mīr Muhammad 'Alī Fādil*,⁴⁴ held in high esteem for his vast learning and scholarship. Murshid *Qulī II*, son-in-law of Nawāb *Shujā-ud-Daulah* of Bengal and deputy governor of *Jahāngirnagar*, was a gifted poet and wrote good poetry under the pen-name *makhfī*.

The poetical literature of the period under review is quantitatively negligible as compared with that of the preceding. In this connection, it is remarkable to note that almost every poet of name had some biographical writings to his credit too. Among such versifiers the pride of place belongs to *Shaikh Muhammad 'Alī Hazīn*.⁴⁵ One of the most accomplished writers of the age, *Hazīn*, after extensive wanderings in Iran and Arabia, emigrated to India in 1733, mainly to avoid *Nādir Shāh's* persecutions in his native country. At last, he settled down in Benaras where he died in 1766. His *Kulliyāt*, which contains *qasidas*, *ghazals*, *ruba'is* and *mathnawis*, reflects an excellent blend of classical and modern styles in Persian verse. His autobiography, *Tazhkirat al-Ahwāl*, compiled in 1741, is a veritable repository of information about the events and leading personalities of his age. The *Tazhkirat al-Muasirin*, comprises short biographical notices on about a hundred contemporary divines and poets. *Hazīn's* friend, *Alī Qulī Khān Wālih* (d. 1756) of *Dāghistān*,⁴⁶ is a very colourful literary personality of the time. An aristocrat by birth, *Wālih* came to India in 1735 and received in course of time honours from *Muhammad Shāh*. Though he completed a *diwān* in 1748, *Wālih's* fame chiefly rests on his monumental memoirs of poets, entitled *Riyād al-Shua'arā*, which contains quotations of verses of undoubted merit, observations on prosody and poetical figures, historical information and critical judgments on poetical qualities of poets discussed. According to *Sprenger*, "in India this *Tazhkira* is more esteemed than any other."⁴⁷

Sirāj ud-Dīn Alī Khān Ārzū (d. 1756)⁴⁸ was an excellent poet, a reputed scholar and an officer of rank in the time of emperor *Farukh-siyar*. Patronized by *Rājā Anand Rām Mukhlis*, *Sālārjang* and

Shujā-ud-Daulah, Ārzū wrote a number of works on a variety of subjects. He wrote commentaries on *Sikandarnāma* of Nizāmī *qasidas* of Urfī and *Gulistan* of Sadi. His lexicographical works are: *Chirāgh-i-Hidayat*, a dictionary of poetical expressions used by the poets of his time, and the *Gharāib al-Lughāt*, a vocabulary of Hindi words in Persian. But his masterpiece is *Majma al-Nafāis*, a biography of 1419 classical and modern poets of Persian. Ghulām Alī Azād Bilgrāmī,⁴⁹ mentioned above in connection with his contribution to Arabic studies, is the author of several remarkable Persian books, of which the most notable are: *Ma'āthir al-kiram*, lives of saints and mystics of Bilgram; *Yad-i-Baidā*, alphabetically arranged biographies of 532 classical and modern poets; *Sarw Azād*; *Khazāna-in-Amirah*; and a *diwān* of ghazals.⁵⁰ "The fame of the poet's learning", remarks T. W. Haig, "is such that parents take their children to his shrine in order that they may, by picking up with their lips a piece of sugar from the tomb, obtain both a taste for knowledge and the ability to acquire it."⁵¹

The Mughul royalty, though shorn of their political influence, displayed glimpses of their hereditary cultural lustre. Emperor Shāh 'Alam who reigned between 1759 and 1806 was the foremost among them to have a fine literary taste. He adopted 'Āftāb' as his pen-name and compiled a collection of Persian verses, entitled *Diwān-i-Āftāb*.

With the close of the 18th century, and the beginning of the 19th, the great political game of the British trading company for the establishment of the British paramountcy in India started. As a part of the concerted policy of the new rulers to put down as effectively as possible the last vestiges of the Mughul power and dominance in India, Persian was sought to be abolished as court language in British India, apparently on alleged economic grounds but really on a political one. Persian formally ceased to be the court language with effect from 20 November, 1837, by a legislative order.

XVII. SANSKRIT

A brief survey of Sanskrit literature during the days of Marāthā supremacy and the early British rule reveals that Sanskrit continued to flourish along with the other regional languages. The patronage of the rulers, munificent donations of the *agrahāras* to distinguished poets, and the literary activities at the popular pilgrim places and temple centres like Benaras encouraged Sanskrit writers in different fields. Royal personalities like Sarphojī (1711-28) and

Tukoji (1729-35) in Tanjore, Martāṇḍa Varmā in Travancore, Kalale Nañjarāja in Mysore, Kollūri Rājashekhara in Andhra, the *Peshwās* in Maharāshtrā, Sawāi Jay Singh in Jaipur, and Maharājā Krishna-chandra of Nadia (1728-82) in Bengal, invigorated, as it were, the Sanskrit literature that was at a low ebb, at least in North India, during the Muslim rule. With the advent of the British rule, Sanskrit study gained gradually a prestigious status.

Another noteworthy feature of this period is the foundation of a few Sanskrit institutions. The *Peshwās* of Maharāshtrā had set aside funds for the *dakṣhiṇā*, which was responsible later for the present Deccan College. The rich collection of the Saraswati Mahāl Library at Tanjore has for its nucleus the Sanskrit manuscripts, zealously preserved by Rājā Sarphoji. In 1791 was founded the Vārāṇasī Rājakiya Sanskrit Mahāvidyālaya, known at present as the Vārāṇasī Sanskrit Vishvavidyālaya.

The Kāvya Literature:

Mahākāvya:

Anantanārāyaṇa (also known as Pañcharatna), under the patronage of king Sarphoji, wrote *Rāghavacharita* (also known as *San-graharāmāyaṇa*) describing the story of Rāma in 12 cantos. The story of Rāmāyaṇa forms the theme of another poem entitled *Rāma-charitam* (12 cantos) by Rāmavarmā, the Yuvarāja of Cranganore. But a more noteworthy work based on Rāma's life is the poem *Rāgha-vīyam* (20 cantos) composed by the famous poet of Sanskrit and Prākriṭ, Rāmapāṇivāda of Malabar. He also wrote *Vishnuvilāsa* (8 cantos) eulogizing the deeds of Vishnu in his different incarnations. Another Maithilian poet Krishnadatta, the son of Sadārām, composed *Rādhārahasya* (22 cantos) depicting the amours of Rādhā and Krishna. Ghanashyām (also known as Āryaka), the minister of the king Tukoji of Tanjore (1728-1735 A.D.), in his poem *Veṅkaṭeshacharita* narrates the story of Lord Veṅkaṭeshwara of Tirupati. The Kerala poet Rāmapāṇivāda wrote *Mukundastavaḥ* at the instance of king Rāmavarmā. Shiva's defeating Kālī by his cosmic dance at Chidambaram is the theme of *Nateshaviṇayam* (7 cantos) of Veṅkaṭakrishna, patronised by Gopāl, a governor of Shivāji's provinces near Chidambaram. Duḥkhabhañjana of Benaras composed *Chandrashekharcharita*. Another great poet Rāmabhadra Dikshit, the son of the grammarian Yajñarām Dikshit, composed *Patañjalī-charita* (8 cantos) describing the life of Patañjalī, the well-known author of *Vyākaraṇa Mahābhāṣya*. His patron, the king Sarphoji of

Tanjore, bestowed upon him the agrahāra of Shāh-jirājapurā (now known as Tiruvalnular). An important work for the history of Tanjore is *Shāhendravilāsa* (8 cantos) of Shrīdhara Venkaṭesh, describing the exploits of the patron king Shāh-jī.

Slesha Kāvya:

Poems with words having two or more meanings were also attempted. The story of Rāma and Nala was simultaneously narrated in the two cantos of the *Rāghavanaishadhīya* of Haradatta, the son of Jayashaṅkar of the Gārgya gotra. The *Kośalabhosalīyam* (6 cantos) of Seshāchalakavi deals with the story of Rāma and Shāh-jī. Ghanashyām's *Ābodhākaram*, narrates the story of Nala, Krishna and Harischandra, at once. He also wrote the poem *Kalidūshaṇa*, which can be read both in Sanskrit and Prākṛit.

Chāmpū Kāvya:

The Chāmpū literature continued to grow with themes, religious and biographical. Based on the *Bhāgavata*, we have the *Bhāgavatachāmpū* of Somashekhara (also known as Rājashekhara) and the *Mādhavachāmpū* of Chirañjīva. Sarphojī, the second son of Vyāṅkoji Rājā wrote the *Kumārasāmbhavachāmpū*. The other Chāmpūs with religious themes are the *Uttarachāmpūrāmāyaṇa* of Venkaṭakrishṇa, the *Gaurīmayūrachāmpū* of Appā Dikshit and the *Gaṅgāvataraṇachāmpū* of Shankar Dikshit. The latter writer described the life of the Benaras king Chet Singh in his *Shaṅkara-chetovilāsachāmpū*. The other noteworthy biographical chāmpūs are *Vikramasenachāmpū* of Nārāyaṇa, the *Dharmavijayachāmpū* (dealing with the life of Shāh-jī) of Bhūminātha, the *Bhosalavamshāvalī* of Venkaṭesh and others. Rāghavāchārya's *Vaikunṭhavijayachāmpū* describes many temples and places of pilgrimage and Bāṇeshvara's *Chitrachāmpū* contains useful historical and geographical details. The political affairs of contemporary Deccan and Karnāṭaka as well as the Anglo-French conflicts form the theme of the *Ānandaraṅga-chāmpū* of Shrīnivāsa.

Shāstraniṣṭha-kāvya:

A few poets illustrated the *alaṅkāra* through their poems glorifying the royal deeds. Devashaṅkara Purohit's *Alaṅkāramañjūshā* praises the achievements of Peshwā Mādhav Rao I and his uncle Raghunāth Rāo. The merits of the Tanjore king Shāh-jī are sung in the *Shāharājīyam* of Kāshi Lakshmaṇa. Sadāshivamakhī, the son of

Kokkanātha, composed a rhetorical work *Rāmavarmāyashobhūshaṇa*. The *Guṇaratnākara* of Nrisimha sings of king Sarphojī. Rāmadeva's *Vrittaratnāvalī* is a panegyric of Yashavantasimha, illustrating different metres.

Other Kāvya:

Shrīdhara Venkaṭesh, a protégé of the king Shāhājī, composed *Dayāshatakam*, *Mātrbhūshatakam*, *Tārāvalīshatakam*, *Ārtihara-stotra*, etc. Vañcheshvara's *Mahiṣashataka* is a satirical poem on the minister of the king Tukoji of Tanjore. Jagannāth described the life of Sarphojī in his *Sharabharājavilāsam*. Dhunḍhirāja, the commentator of *Mudrārākshasa*, wrote the musical poem *Shāhvilāsam* following the pattern of *Gīta Govinda* and *Abhinavakādambarī*. Bāneshvar wrote a century of verses on Benaras. The *Āngrejacandrikā* of Vināyaka Bhaṭṭa and the *Itihāsatamomaṇi* of Rāmaswāmi Rāju deal with the British rule.

On the life of Shaṅkarāchārya, we have *Shaṅkaradigvijayasāra* by Sadānanda Yati who also wrote a commentary on the *Bhagavad Gītā* and an independent work entitled *Pratyaktattvachintāmaṇi*, the *Guruvamshakāvya* by Kāshi Lakshmaṇa Sūri and the *Brihacchāṅkaravijaya* by Brahmānanda Sarasvatī. Moropant, a Maharāshtrian poet, composed in all about 4,918 verses in praise of Rāma and other gods. His best known work is *Mantra-Rāmāyaṇa* comprising 3,992 verses. Among the *Samdesha Kāvya*s, patterned on *Meghadūta*, *Chandradūta* of Krishnachandra, *Tarkālaṅkāra*, *Tulasīdūta* of Trilochana, *Kokiladūta* of Haridās, *Kākadūta* of Rāmagopāl, etc., were composed.

Among the musical compositions, reference may be made to *Shivagītimālikā* of Shrī Chandrashekhara Sarasvatī, and *Krishṇalīlā-taraṅgiṇī* of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha. Nañjarāja, the Sarvādhikāri of Krishnarāja II of Mysore, composed the Saivite poem *Samgīta-gaṅgādhara*, imitating *Gīta Govinda*. In the same strain are written *Gīta Sundara* by Sadāshiva Dikshit, and the *Gīta Gaṇapatī* by Krishṇadatta.

Parāṅkusha Rāmānuja composed *Shrīprapattiḥ*, *Narasimhaman-galashamsanam*, *Khsīranadīstavaḥ*, *Vihageshvarastavaḥ*, *Devarājastavaḥ* and other *stotras*. Vrajanātha's *Padyōtaraṅgiṇī* and *Subhāṣita-suradruma* by Basava Nayaka of Ikkeri are the anthologies compiled during this period.

Nāṭaka, Nāṭikā:

The life of their patrons was dramatised by many a playwright. Venkaṭa Subramaṇya, a descendant of Appayya Dīkshit, wrote *Vasulakshmīkalyāṇam*, dealing with the marriage of his patron king Rāmavarmā of Travancore (1758-1798) with Vasulakshmī, a Sindhu princess for securing a political alliance. The *Bālamārtaṇḍavijayaṁ* (5 Acts) of Devarāja, the son of Sheṣādri, describes the heroic exploits and liberality of his patron king Mārtaṇḍavarmā (1729-1758) of Travancore. It also refers to the renovation of the shrine of Shri Padmanābha at Trivandrum by the king. The separation and the reunion of Kalāvati and the prince Nandaka form the theme of the play *Kalānandakam*, written at the behest of the king Tulajī of Tanjore (1765-1787) by Rāmachandrashekhara, who had performed a Pāuṇḍarikayāga.

Vishvanāth, the son of Trimaladeva of Andhra, who migrated to Benaras, composed *Mṛgāṅkalekhā*, a *nāṭikā* in four Acts, describing the marriage of Mṛgāṅkalekhā, the daughter of the king of Kāmarūpa with the Kalinga king Karpūratilaka. This play was staged at the Kāshi Vishveshvara festival. Another *nāṭikā* entitled the *Shṛṅgāra-vāṭikā*, depicting the love of the Avanti king Chandrakeli with Chāmpavati and Kāntimatī, was written by Vishvanāth, the pupil of Dhunḍhirāja. The Maithilian poet-dramatist Krishnadatta penned *Kuvalayāshvīyaṁ* (7 Acts) depicting the love of Kuvalayāshva and Maḍālasā, *Purañjanavijayaṁ* (also known as *Purañjanacharita*) based on the *Purañjana-upākhyāna* of the *Bhāgavata*, and an entertaining farce, the *Sāndrākutūhalam*. On the occasion of the coronation of Sabhāsundara, the grandson of the Chatrasāl of Bundelkhand, was written the play *Pradyumnnavijayaṁ* by Shaṅkara Dīkshit. Liberal like the patron Vikramāditya, Rāmavarmavañci Yuvarājā (also known as Ashvinī Mahārājā) (1757-1789), the son of Mārtaṇḍavarmā, wrote *Rukmiṇīpariṇayam* besides Malayalam dramatic pieces called *Kathakalis*. Jagannātha, the son of Bālkrishṇa who was the minister of the king Sarphojī of Tanjore, wrote *Ratīmanmatham* and *Vasumatīpariṇayam*. The famous poet and the devotee of Rāma, Rāmapāṇivāda wrote two dramas, the *Lalitārāghavīyaṁ* and the *Pādukāpaṭṭābhishekam*. The literary genius of Almoda, Vishveswara, the son of Lakshmīdhar of Pande family, wrote a *nāṭikā* called *Navamālikā* describing the amours of Vjiayasena and Navamālikā of Avanti. His other works are *Rukmiṇīpariṇayam*, a *nāṭaka* and *Shṛṅgāramañjarī*, a *Saṭṭaka* in Prakrit. The life of Shri Rāmānujāchārya was dramatised in the *Yatirājavijayaṁ* (also known as *Vedānta-vilāsaṁ*) by Varadāchārya of Kanchi.

Allegorical Plays:

Ghanashyām, the minister of the king Tukoji of Tanjore wrote the *Prachandārāhūdaya*, to refute the views put forth in the play *Saṁkalpasūryodaya* of Veṅkaṭanātha Vedāntadeshika. Jaṭādeva, who became a recluse after performing a *somayāga*, composed the play *Pūrṇapurusaṛthachandrodayam* wherein the king *Dashāshva* (i.e., the ātmā, the lord of ten horses in the form of ten *indriyas*) is united with *Anandapakvavallī* (the highest bliss) with the help of *Sushraddhā* and *Subhakti*. The union of *Vidyā* and *jīvātmā* is presented in the *Vidyāpariṇayam* of Vedakavi. In his *Shivaliṅgasūryodaya* (5 Acts), Mallārī Ārādhyā establishes the superiority of Vīra-Saivism. Nrisimha's *Anumitipariṇaya* explains the Nyāya doctrine of inference through the marriage of Anumiti (daughter of Parāmarsha); and Nyāyarasika Rāmadev, (also known as Vāmadev), the grand-son of Kāshināth, the famous palmist of Bengal, wrote a humorous quasi-dramatic work entitled *Vidvanmodatarāṅgiṇī* wherein he brings home the truth of different religious and philosophical doctrines. Among the less important works, reference may be made to the *Chittavrittikalayāṇam* and the *Jīvanmuktikalayāṇam* of Bhūmināth (also known as Nallā Dikshit) and to the *Amritodaya* of Gokulnath of Mithila.

Other types:

Varadāchārya (known as Ammālāchārya) wrote *Vasantatilakabhāṇa* (also known as Ammāl Bhāṇa) to vie with the *Shringāratilaka* (also known as Ayyā Bhāṇa) of Rāmabhadra. Ghanashyām's *Madanasamjīvana*, Ashvinī Maharājā's *Shringārasudhākarabhāṇa* and Jagannātha's *Anaṅgavijaya* are the other three noteworthy *Bhāṇas* of this period. Kāshīpati Kavirāja wrote the *Mukundānanda*, a *mishrabhāṇa* wherein the erotic adventures of the Viṭa alludes obliquely to the sports of Krishṇa.

Among the *Prahasanas*, a reference must be made to Ghanashyām's *Ḍamarūka* which is like a collection of select scenes. Rāmapāṇivāda wrote *Madanaketucharitam*, a *prahasana* and *Chandrikā*, a *vithī*, said to have been enacted during the reign of the king Vanchimārtaṇḍa at Trivandrum.

Miscellaneous Works:

The tradition of writing *ṭīkāś* was vigorously followed by the prolific writer Ghanashyām, who wrote commentaries on many works like the *Shakuntalā*, *Mahāvīracharita*, *Veṇīsaṁhāra*, *Bhojachampū* and

Dashakumāracharita. In a single night of a Rāmanavamī, he is said to have written a commentary on the *Uttararāmacharita*. He also completed the drama *Mahāvīracharita* by adding the last two Acts. He is said to have written 64 works in Sanskrit, 20 in Prakrit and 25 in other dialects. His wives Sundarī and Kamalā wrote a commentary on *Viddhasālabbhañjikā*. Dhuṇḍhirāja's commentary on the *Mudrārākshasa* is well-known. Rāmapāṇivāda wrote also commentaries on the *Krishṇavilāsa*, *Govindābhiṣeka* and *Dhātukāvya* and Achutarāya Modak on the *Bhāminīvilāsa*.

Vishveshvar wrote a *kathā* called the *Mandāramañjarī*.

As an example of geographical works, Rāmakavī's *Pāṇḍavadigvijaya*, a work bigger than the *Mahābhārata*, may be mentioned. It describes, through the conquest of India by the Pāṇḍavas, customs, manners and social conditions of different parts of India, before and after the Muslim conquest. It also includes the stories of Vikramāditya, Shālivāhana, Shaṅkarāchārya, etc., and of the kings like Pratāparudra of Orissa and Jayachandra of Kambhoja.

Basava Nāyak of Ikkeri compiled *Shivatattvaratnākara*, an encyclopaedic work giving the essence of different arts and sciences treated in the Vedas and the *Āgamas*. Another encyclopaedic work covering contemporary history and other subjects is *Bhuvanapradīpikā* of Rāmakrishna Shāstri. Raghava Appa Khandekar wrote the lexiconic work *Koshāvatāmsa*.

It is interesting to note that the Missionaries at Serampore published in three volumes the Sanskrit translation of "*The New Testament of Our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ*" entitled *Īshvarasya Sarvavākyaṃ*. Sir William Jones and his wife published a list of Sanskrit works at the Royal Asiatic Society.

Technical and Scientific Literature:

Alaṃkāra:

In his short-lived life of thirty-four years Vishveshvara Paṇḍit, son of Laxmidhara, wrote many works like the *Alaṃkāarakulapradīpa*, *Alaṃkāraakaustubha*, *Alaṃkāramuktāvali*, *Kavīndrakarṇābharaṇa*, *Kāvyaatilaka*, *Rasachandrikā* and a commentary on *Rasamañjarī* called the *Vyaṅgārthakaumudī*. Another well-known writer Baladeva Vidyābhūṣhaṇa of Bengal wrote a commentary entitled *Sāhityakau-mudī* on the *kārikās* of the *Kāvyaaprakāsha*, calling them the *Bharata-Sūtras*. He gives his own illustrations in praise of Krishna and adds a chapter covering topics not referred to in the *Bharata-Sūtras*. The *Kāvyaavilāsa* in two parts of Rāmadeva (also known as Vāmadeva and Chirañjīva) deals with *Rasa* and *Alaṃkāra*. Kalyāṇasubramaṇya,

patronised by the king Rāmavarma of Travancore, wrote the *Alaṁkāraustubha* dealing with the Arthālaṁkāras only. Nāgesha composed a number of commentaries such as *Marmaprakāsha* on the *Rasagaṅgādhara*, the *Udyota* on *Pradīpa*, a commentary by Bhaṭṭa Govinda on the *Kāvyaaprakāsha*, *Udāharaṇadīpikā* on the *Kāvyaaprakāsha*, *Prakāsha* on the *Rasamañjarī*, and the *Viṣamapada-Vyākhyānaṣaṭpadānanda* on the *Kuvalayānanda*. Mammāṭa's *Kāvyaaprakāsha* was also commented upon by Bhimasen Dikshit of Kanyakubja, Gopālabhaṭṭa, Gokulanāth Upādhyāya and Gokulanāth, the son of Pitāmbara who wrote the *Sudhāsāgara*, *Sāhityachūḍāmaṇī*, *Vivaraṇa* and the *Rasārṇava* respectively. Hariprasāda, the son of Gaṅgeshvara wrote the *Kāvyaloka* in seven Prakāshas and Achyutaraya Modak wrote the *Sāhityasāra* in twelve Prakaraṇas. A reference may also be made to works like *Alaṁkāramakaranda* of Kolluri Rājashekhara, *Alaṁkāramaṇidarpaṇa* of Pradhān Venkappayya, *Alaṁkārasamudgaka*, *Rasaratnahāra* and *Viṣamapadī* (a commentary on the *Kāvyaaprakāsha*) of Shivarāma Tripāṭhi, the son of Krishṇarām; *Kavikaustubha* of Raghunāth, *Kāvyaakaumudī* or *Ratnabhūṣaṇa*, the *Kāvyaasārasaṁgraha* (comprising three parts: *Kāvyalakṣhaṇa*, *Varṇasaṁgraha* and *Subhāṣitasāṁgraha*) of Shrīnivās Dīkshit, the *Rasamīmāṁsā* and the *Naṭkā* (a commentary on the *Rasatarāṅgiṇī* of Bhānudatta) by Gaṅgārāmajaḍī, the *Ramā* (a commentary on the *Chandrāloka* of Jayadevapiyūṣavarṣa) by Vaidyanātha Pāyaguṇḍa, the *Rasikarañjana* (a commentary on Bhānudatta's *Rasamañjarī*) by Vrajarāja Dīkshit and the *Alaṁkāramañjarī* of Sukhalāla.

Grammar:

The distinguished writer in Grammar, Nāgeshabhaṭṭa (well known as Nāgojibhaṭṭa), the student of Haripant, the son of Bhaṭṭojī Dīkshit, wrote *Paribhāṣendushekhara*, *Laghumañjūshā*, *Sphotavāda*, *Laghushabdendushekhara* and the *Brihatshabdendushekhara*, the commentaries on the *Siddhāntakaumudī*, the *Mahābhāṣyapradīpod-yota*, a commentary on Kaiyaṭa's *Pradīpa*, a commentary on the *Mahābhāṣya* and the *Mahābhāṣyapratyākhyānasāṁgraha*. Besides works on grammar he is accredited with a number of works on Dharmaśāstra, Jyotisha, Ṣaḍdarshanas and Alaṁkāraśāstra. He ascribes his commentary *Śabdaratna* on the *Praudhāmanoramā* to his teacher Hari Dīkshit. His disciple Vaidyanāth has written many commentaries viz., *Gadā* on the *Paribhāṣendushekhara*, *Chāyā* on the *Mahābhāṣyapradīpod-yota*, *Kalā* on the *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntamañjūṣā*, *Prabhā* on the *Śabdakaustubha* etc.

Jñānendrasarasvatī's *Tattvabodhinī* is a commentary on *Siddhāntakaumudī*.

Music and Dance:

Tulajīrāo, the king of Tanjore (1729-35) wrote the *Śaṅgītasārām-rita*, an extensive work on the southern system of music. His *Nāṭya-vedāgama* deals with dancing. Ahobila Paṇḍit (1750-77) composed the *Śaṅgītapārijāta*, which was translated into Persian by Dinānāth. He, for the first time, described the twelve *śvaras* in terms of the length of the string of the *Vīṇā*. Based on this work, Paṇḍita Shrinivāsa wrote *Rāgatattvavibodha* wherein he fixes the positions of his *śuddha* and *vikṛita śvaras* with the help of the sounding string of the *Vīṇā*. He also gives interesting details about the *śrutisvaras* and the *Mūrchanās*. With the help of musicians, Pratāpasimha Deva, the Mahārājā of Jaipur (1779-1804) compiled the *Śaṅgītasāgara*, an encyclopaedia of music. Tyāgarāja, the great musician and the devotee of Śrī Rāma, composed some of his songs in Sanskrit, like the other two great musicians, Muttuswāmi Dīkṣita and Shyāmasāstri. One of the distinguished writers of this period was the Mahārājā Bāla Rāma Varmā (1724-1798) of Travancore, who was also a poet of distinction. Based on the contemporary theatrical tradition of Kerala, he wrote the *Bālarāmabharata*, which, besides expounding the details of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*, refers to the details of Abhinaya as in vogue in Kerala. The King Nārāyaṇadeva's treatise *Śaṅgītanārāyaṇa* (4 chapters) deals with music, dancing, musical instruments and musical compositions. Vāsudevapātra's *Kavichintāmaṇī* (24 Kiraṇas) deals with music in the last three Kiraṇas.

Astronomy, Astrology:

In the field of Astronomy, Rāghava (also known as Appājīpant Khāṇḍekar) wrote *Khetakṛiti*. Rāmarudra of Bengal wrote *Jyotiḥśasārasaṁgraha*, *Paddhatichandrikā* and *Pañchāṅgārka*.

Dinakar of Poona wrote a number of works on the Jyotiḥśāstra such as *Grahavijñānasāriṇī*, *Māsapraveshasāriṇī*, *Yantrachintāmaṇī-ṭīkā*, etc. Mathurānāth wrote the *Yantrarājahatānā* and *Jyotiḥśasiddhāntasāraḥ*. Chintāmaṇī Dikshit's *Sūryasiddhāntasāriṇī* and *Golānanda* and Raghudev's *Dinasaṁgraha* dealing with the auspicious days for religious observances, are the other noteworthy works.

Medicine etc.:

Under Mahādji Sindia, Jogarāja composed *Ashvaphalaparakāsha*, a work on the veterinary science. Another medical work *Pratāpakal-*

padruma was written by Ananta under the patronage of Pratāpasimh of Jaipur. The *Vichārasudhākara* of Ranga Jyotirvid of Junnar (district Poona) deals with piles.

At the request of Rājāvrajalāla of Benaras, Bhāskara Nṛsimha wrote a commentary on the *Kāmasūtra*.

Dharmashāstra:

The field of Dharmashāstra was enriched by many works. Kāshināth Upādhyāya wrote the *Dharmasindhu* (also known as the *Dharmasāra*), *Prāyashcittendushekhara* etc. Pandits like Colebrooke, Kuberopādhyāya and Chitrapati wrote *Dattakachandrikā* and the *Vyavahārasiddhāntapiyūṣa* respectively. Under the orders of the Prince Cheta Sinh of Benaras (1770-1781), Devarāja compiled the *Prāyashcittasamgraha*. Mayarāmamiśra Gauda composed the *Vyavahāranirṇaya*, *Vyavahārasāra*, *Mitākṣarasāra* etc. Bāpubhaṭṭa Kelakar wrote the *Utsarjanopākarmaprayoga*, *Prāyashchittamañjarī* and *Shrāddhamañjarī*. At the instance of Saṁgrāmasimha, the *Sadāchārarahasya* was compiled by Anantabhaṭṭa. Nagesh, the son of Venkaṭesha of Haldipur wrote the *Āgamagrantha*, *Tāntrikamuktāvalī* and *Smṛtyarthamuktāvalī*. Other important works were the *Bālaṁbhaṭṭi* of Bālaṁbhaṭṭa Pāyaguṇḍa, *Dāyakramasaṁgraha* of Śrī Kṛṣṇa Tarkālaṁkāra, *Dharmatattvaparakāśa* of Shiva, *Vratarāja* of Vishvanātha, *Dattachandrikā* of Raghumaṇi, *Smṛtichandra* of Bhavadeva Nyāyālaṁkāra, *Nirṇayasāra* of Nandarāma Miśra, *Navyadharmapradīpa* of Kṛpārāma, *Sahānumaraṇaviveka* of Anantarāma, *Nirṇaya-kaustubha* of Vishveshvara, *Vivādārṇavasetu* compiled by the Paṇḍits Bāneshvara and others at the instance of Warren Hastings, etc.

Philosophy:

In the realm of the Advaita philosophy, Sadāshiva Brahmendra Sarasvatī, wrote *Brahmatattvaparakāśikā*, a commentary on the *Brahmasūtras*, *Siddhāntakalpavallī*, a poetic version of the *Siddhānta-leshasaṁgraha* of Appayya Dikshit, *Ātmānātmavivekasaṁgraha*, *Sarvavedāntasārasaṁgraha* etc. Besides his commentaries on all the 108 Upaniṣads, Śrī Upaniṣad Brahmendra Sarasvatī wrote other works like the *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, *Paramādvaitasiddhāntaparibhāṣa*, and *Tattvasiddhāntavṛitti*—in all comprising 45,000 *granthas*. Ayappa Dikshit discussed the interpretation of the *Brahmasūtras* by different teachers in his *Vyāsātātparyanirṇaya* and pointed out the tenability of the *Śāṅkarabhāṣya*. Among other works, we may mention Tryambak Shāstri's *Bhaṣyabhānuprabhā*, *Shrūtimatodaya* and *Advaitasiddhāntavaijayantī*.

The Shuddhādvaita school was enriched by Dasha-digantavijayī Purushottam (1668-1781), the seventh descendant of Śrī Vallabhāchārya. He wrote the *Prasthānaratnākara*, *Avatāravādāvalī* besides, commentaries on the Vallabhāchārya's *Aṇubhāṣya*, *Tattvadīpanibandha* etc., and on Viṭṭhalesha's *Vidvanmaṇḍana*. He is said to have written more than 67 works comprising nine lacs of ślokas. Gopeshvarajī, honoured as Sarvajña, wrote the commentary *Rashmī* on the commentary *Prakāsha* of Purushottama on the *Aṇubhāṣya*, and the *Bhaktimārtanda* which analyses the doctrine of Bhakti under four heads viz. *pramāṇa*, *prameya*, *sādhana* and *phala*.

The Dvaita doctrine was further expounded by Raghunāth Tīrtha (alias Śeṣachandrikāchārya) whose commentary *Śeṣachandrikā* was written to complete the *Tātparyachandrikā* of Vyāsarāya. His other works include a commentary on *Tantrasāra*, on the *Īśāvāsyopaniṣadbhāṣyaṭīkā* (in 1,720 granthas) and on *Karmanirṇaya*. Sumatindra Tīrtha of the Rāghavendra Mutt was a prolific writer—a doctrinaire, a poet and an Ālamkārika. His works include glosses on the *Prameyadīpikā* of Jayatīrtha, the *Rgbhāṣya*, the *Tantrasāra* etc. Satyapriya Tīrtha also wrote glosses on the *Tattvaparakāshikā*, *Muṇḍakopaniṣad*, *Māṇḍukyopaniṣad* etc. The magnum opus, the *Bhāṣyadīpikā* (19,150 granthas) of Jagannātha Tīrtha explains every word of the *Madhvabhāṣya*. He also wrote the *Sūtradīpikā* (1,630 granthas) giving the Madhva interpretation of the *Brahmasūtras*. Vādīndra Tīrtha commented on the *Tattvaparakāshikā* and composed the *Guruguṇastava*, a poem in thirty-six *sragdharā* verses, in praise of Rāghavendra. The last of the pontifical writers was Satyadharma Tīrtha, the contemporary of the Peshwā Bājī Rāo II (1795-1818). He wrote glosses on the *Tattvasamkhyāna* and on the *Bhāgavata*, and commentaries on the *Viṣṇutatṭvanirṇaya* and on a part of Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa*, besides the *Nityasamsārilingabhāṇḍa*, a theological work. A compendium of Madhva philosophy called the *Madhvasiddhāntasāra* was prepared by Vedagarbha Padmanābhāchārya.

Bhāskarakaṇṭha of Kashmīr wrote the *Bhāskarī*, a commentary on Abhinavagupta's *Pratyabhījñāvimarṣiṇī*. His *Lallāvāk* is a Sanskrit translation of the Kashmīrī work of Lallā. Shivopādhyāya expounded the *Vijñānabhairavatantra* by writing a commentary on it. The Saivaite tenets were defended by Appayya Dikshit of Edayattumangalam in his *Vimatabhañjana* and by Tyagaraja Makhin (popularly known as Rājū Shāstrī) in his *Nyāyendushekhara*.

Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa's *Govindabhāṣya* on the *Brahma Sūtras*, *Siddhāntaratna* and *Prameyaratnāvalī* deal with the Chaitanya Vaiṣ-

navism like Vishvanāth's *Kriṣṇabhāvanāmṛta*, *Gaurāṅgalīlāmṛta* and *Kriṣṇāhnikakaumudī*. Among the Jaina works, a reference may be made to the *Prameyaratnālaṅkāra* of Abhinavachārūkīrti Paṇḍit-āchārya.

In the field of Nyāya, Kriṣṇakānta Vidyāvāgiṣha wrote the *Nyāyaratnāvalī*, the *Upamānachintāmaṇiṭikā* and the *Śabdashakti-prakāśhikāṭikā*. Rudrarāma's *Vādapariccheda*, *Vyākhyāvyūha*, *Chittarūpam* and *Vaiśeṣikashāstrīyapadārthanirūpaṇam* as well as Gaurikānta Sārvabhauma's *Bhāvārthadīpikā* (a commentary on the *Tarkabhāṣa*) and *Saduktimuktāvalī* deserve to be noted along with the *Gadādhārīkarṇikā* of Krishnabhaṭṭa Arde and the *Vyāptirahasyaṭikā* of Mahādeva Uttamakara. In the Prābhākara school, Rāmānujāchārya wrote the *Tantrarāhasya*.

APPENDIX

The Historical Value of the Marāthī Bakhars

(By the Editor)

The writer of this chapter has given an account of the *Bakhars* (pp. 666-667) but has not discussed the value of these well-known chronicles as source-material for history. As this is expected in a historical work, the following statement may be quoted as a reasonable one:

"The *Bakhars* are neither acceptable as real literature nor as history. They can only be classed, as Hervadkar says, in a separate category, embodying both features. From the historical point of view they are very valuable as revelations of the spirit of Maharāshtrā—its characteristics, traditions, dress, ornaments, culture, social life, religious movements—in other words, the image and personality of Maharāshtrā, are brought to life. As a source of Marāthā culture they are invaluable. But as a source of authentic history they are dangerous—projecting a distorted, one-sided, prejudicial view of history—and cannot be accepted as source-material by any serious historian. Grave error has been perpetrated and harm done to Marāthā history by the use of *Bakhars* in writing so-called histories."

NOTES

1. Mukhopadhyaya, Sukhamay, *Madhyayuger Bangla Sahityer Tathya O Kalakrama* (In Bengali, p. 304).
2. *Ibid*, p. 314.
3. *Ibid*, pp. 321-22.
4. The account that follows is based upon the text of the *Maharashtra-Purana*, Ed. by Edward C. Dimock and Pratul Chandra Gupta, (1961).
5. *Ibid*, pp. 26, 28, 30.
6. *Ibid*, pp. 30, 32.
7. Chatterji, S. K.: *Languages and Literatures of Modern India*, p. 208.
8. B. K. Barua, *Assamese Literature* (P.E.N. Books), p. 87.
9. *History in Modern Indian Literature*, Ed. by Dr. S. P. Sen, p. 45. The date of the *Duranga-raja-Vamshavali* is given by B. K. Barua as 1806 (*op. cit.*).
10. *Jinaharsha Granthavali*, Ed. by Shri Agarchand Nahta. (Published by Shadul Rajasthani Research Institute, 1962).
11. *Jaina Gurjar Kavio*, Pt. II, p. 386.
12. *Ibid*, Pt. II, p. 473.
13. Bhawe, V. L., *Maharashtra-Saraswat*, 1963, p. 493.
14. *Powadas or Historical Ballads of the Marathas*, Ed. H. A. Acworth, 1891 (Introduction).
15. S. R. Sharma, *The Founding of Maratha Freedom* (Orient Longmans), 1964, pp. 442-443.
16. Rajwade, V. K., *Aitihāsik Prastavana*, 1928, p. 2.
17. *Ibid*, p. 349.
18. *Ibid*, p. 348.
19. G. S. Sardesai, *Marathi Riyasat*, Vol. 6, *Peshwa Balajirao Nanasaheb*, 1953, p. 437.
20. Y. K. Deshpande, *Mahanubhaviya Marathi Vangmaya*, (Shaka 1847), p. 94.
21. R. C. Dhere, *Prachin Marathichya Navadhara*, 1972, p. 23.
22. D. K. Kelkar, *Marathi Sahityache Sinhalokan*, (1963), pp. 506-509.
23. *History in Modern Indian Literature*, Ed. by Dr. S. P. Sen, p. 146.
24. Rahman Ali, *Tadhkira-i-Ulama-i-Hind*, Karachi, 1961, p. 296.
25. *Ibid*, p. 542; S. M. Ikram, *Ab-i-Kauthar*, Lahore, 1940, pp. 191-224; *Viswabhārati Annals*, Vol. IV, Santiniketan, 1951, pp. 1-51; Zubaid Ahmad, *The Contribution of India to Arabic Literature*, Allahabad, 1946, *passim*; Ghulam Husain Jalbani, *Shah Waliullah ki Ta'lim*, (in Urdu), Hyderabad-Sind, (Pakistan), 1963, *passim*; Aziz Ahmad, *Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment*, Oxford, 1964, pp. 220-222; Yusuf Husain, *Glimpses of Medieval Indian Culture*, Bombay, 1959, pp. 62-63.
26. *Encyclopaedia of Islam* (New Edition), p. 59; Muhammad Ishaq, *India's Contribution to Hadith Literature*, *passim*; Rahman Ali, *op. cit.*, p. 302; Aziz Ahmad, *An intellectual history of Islam in India*, Edinburgh, 1969, pp. 68-70; *Malfuzat-i-Shah Abdul Aziz*, 1960, pp. 8-35.
27. Rahman Ali, *op. cit.*, pp. 525-526.
28. Cf. Dr. Iqbal Ansari's article on 'Bahr al-Ulum' in *Burhan Monthly*, Delhi, Vol. 74, May, June and July, 1975; Rahman Ali, *op. cit.*, pp. 304-306.
29. Muhammad Yusuf Kokan, *Khanwada-i-Qadi Badr al-Dawlah*, Madras, 1963, Vol I, p. 148.
30. Rahman Ali *op. cit.*, pp. 362-363, Brockelmann, GAL, SII, Leiden, 1938, p. 624; C. A. Storey, *Persian Literature*, pp. 855-862.
31. Rahman Ali, *op. cit.*, pp. 491-494.
32. Cf. *Burhan Monthly*, Delhi, Vol. 75, September 1975, pp. 155-171.
33. S. M. Ikram, *op. cit.*, pp. 183-184.
34. Rahman Ali, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-143.
35. Vide *supra*, foot-note No. 2.
36. Vide *supra*, foot-note No. 3.
37. See F. M. Asiri's article, *Chandra Bhan Brahman and his Chahar chaman*, in *Viswabhārati Annals*, Vol. IV, pp. 51-62; Iqbal Husain, *Chandra Bhan Brahman, Islamic Culture*, Hyderabad, xviii, 1945, p. 115.
38. Aziz Ahmad, *op. cit.*, p. 237.
39. S. M. Ikram, *The Cultural Heritage of Pakistan*, O.U.P., 1953, p. 108.
40. Cf. the writer's critical edition of the text, published by the Asiatic Society, Cal., B.I. Series, 1969.

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41. Storey, *op. cit.*, p. 716.
42. Storey, *op. cit.*, p. 718.
43. Cf. S. H. Askari's article on 'Kalyan Singh's Khulasat al-Tawarikh,' in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XVII, No. 3, 1941, pp. 340-358.
44. Russell lecture delivered by Prof. Humayun Kabir at Patna College on 'Mirza Abu Talib Khan', as published in *Indo-Iranica*, XVII, No. 4, pp. 1-23.
45. *Siyar*, (Tr.), Vol. II, pp. 164-185.
46. Storey, *op. cit.*, pp. 840-849.
47. *Ibid*, pp. 830-833.
48. A. Sprenger, *Oudh Catalogue*, Calcutta, 1854, p. 132.
49. Storey, *op. cit.*, 834-840; Sprenger, *op. cit.*, p. 133.
50. Storey, *op. cit.*, pp. 862-866.
51. *Historical Landmarks of the Deccan*, Allahabad, 1907, p. 58.

CHAPTER XX

RELIGION

Hindu Religion:

A foreigner visiting India in the 18th century was much impressed by the religiosity of its people. From the early hours of the morning till late at night there were manifestations of the overpowering fervour of religion. In the morning, the river banks, lakes and ponds, were thronged with men and women taking a dip in the cold water, chanting religious hymns, and then making their way to the nearby temples to offer flowers and fruits and incense to their favourite deities. Then small processions with music playing, were seen winding their way to temples. In the afternoon the *Puranik* read out to his audience portions of religious works like *Jnāneshwari* or *Pāṇḍav Pratāp* or *Bhāgavata Purāna*. In the evening *Hari Kīrtans* were common.

In the house of the Hindu there was a small niche where he worshipped his family deities, and ancestors. When he sat down to lunch or dinner, he would make offerings to his deities. There were special days like *Rāma Navami*, *Ganesh Chaturthi* to mark the worship of some God or other. Religious performances filled the days of the Hindu. There were temples dedicated to Rāma, Shiva, Ganesh or Hanumān, in towns, among shady groves or on crests of hills which pilgrims were always visiting, greeting each other with the name of their deity from time to time. When the end came, the name of Rāma was always on the lips of the dying man.

As Forbes found out, "divested of extraneous matter, there was a great deal of purity and sublimity in the genuine principles of the Hindu religion. In its simplicity, it taught that there was one supreme ruler of the universe who was styled Brahmā, the Great one; this supreme intelligence consisted of a triad or triple divinity expressed by the mystic word OM, and distinguished by the name of Brahmā, Vishnū and Mahesh, or the creative, preserving and destructive powers of the Almighty. Images of these attributes were placed in temples and worshipped daily."¹

This abstruse and sublime religion had, in course of time, been supplanted by a system of polytheism and idolatry. The higher ranks of the Hindus had always the Vedānta philosophy at the back

of their mind. Not wishing to disturb the popular mind, or actuated by their respect for immemorial custom, they permitted the worship of the established gods to continue representing them as so many forms or symbols of real Divinity. Thus "ancient polytheism kept its ground and was further corrupted by the introduction of deified heroes who superseded the deities from whom they derived their divinity."²

Decay of learning was responsible for this state of affairs and led to gross superstition, a childlike faith in religious rites, idolatry, necromancy and belief in astrology from which the Indian mind is not yet totally free.

Symptoms of decadence were discernible in some of the religious sects amongst the Hindus, but saints like Prānanāth in Bundelkhand, Shāntidās and Swāmī Nārāyan in Gujarāt, Rāmprasād Sen in Bengal and Baladev Vidyābhūṣaṇa in Orissa made heroic efforts to raise the spiritual life of the people to a new height. Bitter quarrels prevailed amongst the *Tenkalai* and *Vaḍakalai* sections of the followers of Ramanuja in the south, culminating in the institution of a law suit by the latter in the court of the Collector of Trichinopoly in 1833.³ The hostile attitude of Mahārāja Krishṇachandra of Krishṇagar and his courtiers compelled the Vaishṇavas of Navadwip to hide the image of Chaitanya in a jungle. As many as eighteen thousand Vaishṇava *Bairāgis* are said to have been killed by the Nāgās in a free fight between the two sects in 1729-30 A.D.⁴ But the *Peshwās* followed a tolerant policy towards all religious sects. M. G. Ranade recounts that 8 Muslim *Dargās*, 10 places dedicated to the Devī, 52 to Māruti or Hanumān, 18 to Rāma, 9 to Viṣṇu, 34 to Viṭhobā, 12 to Bālājī, 40 to Mahādeva, 36 to Gaṇapati and 32 to the aboriginal gods received financial help from the Marāthā State.⁵ The preponderance of the temples dedicated to Hanumān and Rāma must have been due to the influence of the preachings of Rāmadās and his followers.

A remarkable feature of the religious life of the eighteenth century was the production of a series of biographies of saints in some of the most important modern Indian languages. The earliest of these was written in 1712 by Priyādāsji in Hindi in the form of a commentary on Nābhajī's *Bhaktamāla*. It is really a supplement to the original work which contained only a string of names with a few broad hints on the lives of saints. Narahari Chakravarti wrote his *Bhaktiratnākara* and *Narottamavilāsa* in the early part of the eighteenth century in Bengali. The most prolific writer on the lives

of saints was Mahīpati (b. 1715), the grandson of the famous Marāthā poet Bhānudās. He wrote the *Bhaktavijaya* in 1762 and the *Bhaktalīlāmṛta* in 1774. All these books became immensely popular, and helped to sustain the strength and vigour of the masses in the midst of political catastrophe and economic spoliation. These works throw important light on the social life of the period. Great saints had appeared in Mahārāshtra from the thirteenth to the eighteenth century preaching divine presence everywhere.

The *Shakti* cult in Gujarāt received a great impetus from the writings of Vallabha Bhaṭ (c. 1680-1751?), Nāth Bhawān (c. 1681-1761?) and Miṭnu Bhagat (1738-1796). All these poet-saints were Brāhmīns. Vallabha Bhaṭ's *Garbās* are sung in Gujarāt even today during the *Navarātri* festival. They are full of tender sentiments, humility and the spirit of self-surrender which usually characterise the lyrics written by the Vaishṇava devotees. Three new sects with distinctly reformist tendencies attracted a number of converts in Gujarāt. The first of these was the Rāmasanehi sect founded by Sādhu Shāntidās according to some, and by Rāmacharaṇ according to others.⁶ Being born at Jaipur in 1719, he became an ascetic at the age of thirty-one, founded the sect in 1769 and died in 1798. He asked his followers to abjure image worship and to concentrate their thoughts on Rāma. He prescribed the offering of prayers in the morning, noon and in the evening and prohibited the taking of any food at night. He was pained to find moral laxity in the Vallabhāchāri sect. He enjoined strict moral discipline and did not allow men and women to sit together at the time of prayers. His followers are to be found at Ahmadabad, Surat, Bombay, Poona, Hyderabad and in Rājasthān. They do not observe the Hindu festivals like *Diwāli*, *Holi* and *Dasserah*, but celebrate the *Fuldol* in the first month of spring, by feeding a large number of Sādhus with sweets. On this occasion eight of these Sādhus constitute a court to try cases of moral turpitude. Those who are found guilty are excommunicated.⁷ The second sect was founded by Mādhavgar, a *Kanbi* farmer of Nadiad in Gujarāt in the early years of the nineteenth century. He raised his voice not only against the worship of images, but also against the practice of rendering homage to *Gurūs*. He condemned the caste distinctions and did away with the practice of untouchability. But as he had no church organisation to back up his efforts, he failed to make many disciples.⁸

The greatest of the reforming sects in Gujarāt was founded by Sahajānanda Swāmī, who became famous as Swāmī Nārāyan (1781-1830). He was born at Chappaiya, about ten miles from Ayodhya,

on the Rāma Navamī day. Like Nityānanda he became a Sannyāsin at the age of twelve in 1793. His Gurū was one Rāmānanda, who after visiting many holy places, settled in Kathiawar. Sahājanaṇḍa was accepted as an incarnation of God as early as 1804, when his disciple Lāljee described him as such in his book, called *Yama Daṇḍa*.⁹ About that time he settled down at Ahmadabad, but the orthodox Brahmins made his stay there so uncomfortable that he had to retire to Wartal. He erected there a temple of Lakshmi-Nārāyaṇ. At present there are two other main shrines there, one containing the image of Kṛishṇa in the middle, Rādhā on the right, and Swāmī Nārāyaṇ on the left, and the other having images of Kṛishṇa, *Dharma* and *Bhakti*. He directed his efforts to the abolition of bloody sacrifices, *Satī*, infanticide and especially the eradication of immoral practices prevalent in the Vallabhāchāri sect. A large number of people joined the *Satsaṅg*, set up by him and gave up meat and wine. Many people belonging to the so-called criminal tribes gave up opium and tobacco and took to honest occupations. Prof. Monier Williams visited Wartal in 1875 on the occasion of the *Kārtikī Pūrṇimā*. He saw a concourse of at least 10,000 members of the sect and estimated the strength of the sect at more than 2,00,000 persons. He procured a copy of the *Shikshāpatrī* of Swāmī Nārāyaṇ, covering 212 precepts and published its translation. In these Swāmī Nārāyaṇ prohibited adultery, killing of any living creature—not even a louse, flea or the most minute insect—and the use of intoxicating liquor. He showed some sympathy for the untouchables and allowed them to sit in a corner at the ceremonial annual congregation. But his general attitude to the caste system was conservative in nature. He wrote:

“Nowhere except in Jagannath Puri let a man accept water or food which has been cooked by one from whom food is not to be taken, even though that food may have formed the *prasāda* of Kṛishṇa.

“Let no one abandon the duties of the class and order to which he belongs, nor practise the religious duties of others.”¹⁰

He prescribed different sectarian marks for the twice-born classes and the Shudrās. He was not in favour of remarriage of widows. He wanted them to live always under the control of the male members of their family and prohibited them from receiving instruction in any science from any man excepting their nearest relations. He asked his male disciples never to listen to religious discourses delivered by women. He held the tenth book of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa* as the supreme authority.

Prāṇanāth, a Kshatriya by caste, became prominent as a religious teacher at Panna in Bundelkhand at the beginning of the eighteenth century. He acquired great influence on Rājā Chhatrasāl by helping him to discover a diamond mine. He was equally proficient in Arabic, Persian and Sanskrit. He wrote as many as fourteen treatises, trying to prove that there is no essential difference between the teachings of the *Vedas* and the Holy *Quran*. The construction of his writings is purely in Hindi, but the vocabulary is mainly supplied from Persian and Arabic sources. He recruited his followers both from the Hindus and the Muslims and allowed them to retain the rituals and practices of their forefathers. But at the time of initiation they had to take the meal in the company of members of both the communities. The concluding portion of his book on the *Day of Judgment* exhorts:

Put off sloth, be vigilant; discard all pride of learning. He who hears with perfect faith will be the first to believe. Afterwards when the Lord has been revealed, all will believe.... Lay your soul at your master's feet; this is what Chhatrasal tells you.¹¹

The followers of the sect are called *Dhāmīs* because they consider God as their *Dhāma* or home. Prāṇanāth laid great emphasis on service, love and compassion for humanity.

Another promoter of Hindu-Muslim unity was Jagjīvan Dās, a Kshatriya belonging to Awadh. He was the disciple of a neo-Sufi named Bullā, the disciple of Yāri Sāheb (1668-1725). His Hindi book *Jñāna Prakāsh* was written in 1761. He founded the Satnāmi sect, though there were people called Satnāmis even before his time. The Satnāmis believe in monotheism, but adore the incarnations of Rāma and Krishna. The lay followers of this sect are to be found in Vārāṇāsi, Kānpur, Mathurā, Delhi, Ayodhyā, Hyderabad and Gujarāt.

Shiva Nārāyaṇ, a Rājput of the Uttar Pradesh, founded a sect in the first half of the eighteenth century with the object of bringing the Hindus and Muslims closer. Disciples were admitted to the sect not only from these two communities but also from the Christian. Shiva Nārāyaṇ wrote as many as twelve works in Hindi and one of these is dated 1735 A.D. He was a pure monist and he did not admit the validity of image worship. The followers of this sect are forbidden to use any animal food or intoxicant. They are exhorted to follow the path of devotion and self-restraint and cultivate the spirit of loving all mankind.

Garībdās (1717-1778), born in a Jāt family in Rohtak district, founded a small sect, the followers of which worship God in the name of Rāma, Hari and Allāh. Garībdās advised his followers to eschew empty rituals and to adhere to the path of love and devotion. The attempts to build up a synthesis between the Hindu and the Muslim faiths, however, failed to achieve any lasting success.

The reformers who confined their activities to the Hindu fold only, attracted larger number of followers. One of them was Charaṇadās, born in Alwār in 1703 A.D. He denounced the prevailing tendency to moral laxity and laid great emphasis on the purity of character. According to him:

This universe is permeated by *Brahman*; symbols like the *Tuḷsi* plant and *Shāligrāma shilā* are, therefore, useless. A good and pure life is the first word in religious life; love and devotion are its soul. But these are futile unless they are expressed through service, for the emotions of the heart are substantiated by action.¹²

But, later on, the followers of the sect founded by him adopted *Tuḷsi* plant and the *Shāligrāma Shilā* with a view to disarming the hostility of other Vaishṇava sects towards them. They worship Rādhā and Krishna. The secular followers of the sect belong mostly to the mercantile class. Their chief centres are in Delhi and in the upper part of the Doāb. Charaṇadās himself wrote several books in Hindi and translated the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. His sister, Sahajī Bāi, who succeeded him in spiritual authority, was also a learned lady. Her Hindi works, the *Samāja Prakāśh* and the *Solaḥ Nirṇaya* as well as the poems composed by her, are studied and recited even now. The Sādhus or clerical followers of the sect wear yellow garments and a small pointed cap round the lower part of which they wrap a yellow turban.

Towards the close of the eighteenth or the beginning of the nineteenth century a new religious sect was founded by Paṭudās. His spiritual preceptor was Govind Sāheb, born in the district of Vārānasī. The centre of the sect is at Ayodhya. The Paṭudāsīs do not worship any image. The adherents of this sect are to be found in Awadh and Nepal.¹³

The Rāma cult received a new orientation in the poetic compositions of Rāmasakhejī, whose *Nritya-Rāghava Milana* was written in Hindi according to his own statement in 1747 A.D. He was born in a Brahmin family at Jaipur and was initiated by Vasishṭha

Tirtha at Udipi. His works are considered as authoritative texts by the *Rasika* sub-sect of the Rāma cult. The term *Rasika* is defined by him 'as one who does not look at anything except the beauty of Rāma and does not forget him even for a moment. When he hears the sound of a cuckoo or sees the dance of a peacock he becomes eager to meet Rāma.' He abjures the rituals prescribed in the scriptures and also does not care to refrain from the prohibitions ordained in them.¹⁴ Rāmasakhejī depicts Rāma as performing the *Rāsa-līlā* in a moonlit night on the banks of the river Sarayu. Like Krishna of the *Bhāgavata Purāṇa*, Rāma too disappears suddenly from the dance and his lady friends make frantic efforts to search him out in every bower. Following the examples of Rūpa and Raghunāth Gosvāmi of the sixteenth century, Rāmasakhejī surrounds Rāma and Sitā with young devotees called *Mañjarīs*, whose highest ambition is to serve the holy couple without any expectation of reward. Besides these Rāma is described as being surrounded by a hundred million male and female friends. In his *Jānakī-nau-ratna-māṇikyā* he describes the *Dānalīlā* of Rāma who, in the guise of a collector of tolls, exacts his dues in curds and pleasures from Sitā and her female companions and later on takes them in a boat across the river Sarayu. The *Naūkā-vilāsa* of Krishna is hinted at in the *Prākṛit Paṅgala*, a work of the fourteenth century and the *Dānalīlā* is described by Narsi Mehta of Gujarāt. These sports have been attributed to Rāma in the middle of the eighteenth century by Rāmasakhejī. This is a departure from Vālmīki, Kamban, Kumār Vālmīki, Krittivāsa and other writers of the *Rāmāyaṇa* in modern Indian languages who describe Rāma as devoted exclusively to his single wife Sitā.

The followers of the *Rasika* sub-sect depict Rāma as performing *Rāsa-līlā* with Gopakanyās, Devakanyās, Nāgakanyās, Gandharvakanyās and Rājakanyās in his adolescence before his marriage with Sitā.¹⁵ Even after his marriage he is described to have performed *Rāsa-līlā* with the maids of Devās, Gandharvās, Kinnarās, Vidyadharās and Yakshas as well as human princesses.¹⁶ In imitation of the *Krishnāhnika Kaumudī* of Kavi Karṇapura and the *Govindalīlāmṛita* of Krishnadās Kavirāja, Rāmacharan Dās wrote the *Ashtayāma-pujā-vidhi* in the first quarter of the last century. The devotees of this sub-sect are instructed to consider themselves as *sakhīs* or female friends of Sitā and attend on her and Rāmachandra, even when they are engaged in the most intimate relations.

Some of the adherents of the Bengal school of Vaishnavism carried the identification of Chaitanya with Krishna to such an ex-

tent that they attributed to the former the love sports of the latter and described Gaurāṅga as a Nāgara or lover of women. Chaitanya is depicted in his standard biographies as a man of exceptionally pure character. He banished a favourite follower simply because he begged some fine rice from an old lady. But Narahari Chakravarti composed numerous songs describing how Gaurāṅga responded to the love manifested towards him by married ladies of Navadvīp.¹⁷

Vrindāvan and its surrounding areas became centres of propagation of the Bengal school of Vaishnavism amongst the people whose mother-tongue was Brājabhāṣhā. Priyadāsī, the commentator of the *Bhaktamāla*, became a follower of the Chaitanyaite sect. His grandson, Rasajānī Vaishṇavadās completed the *Bhāgavata* in Brājabhāṣhā in 1750 A.D. and he commenced this work with adoration to Chaitanya. Many of the standard works of the Gosvāmīs were also translated in the Brājabhāṣhā in the eighteenth century.

A new sub-sect of the Vaishnavas, known as the *Kartabhajās*, arose in the district of Nadia. According to the tradition current in this sect it was founded by a recluse named Āulchānd about the year 1721 A.D. He recruited a band of twenty-two principal disciples, the most important of whom was Rāmasharaṇ Pāl, who is reputed to have organised the sect. He probably died in 1783. The headship of the sect devolved successively on his wife, then his son Dulāl and then the latter's wife. In 1848 Akshoy Kumar Datta found millions of people adhering to this sect. *Mahantas* were set up at different rural centres to recruit new followers, to impart instructions to them and to collect the customary gifts and remit them to the headquarters at Ghoshpāda.¹⁸ This sect introduced the recital of mantras in Bengali and acknowledged the authority of *Gurūs* from the non-Brahmin community. Pious Mussalmans were also selected as the heads of certain centres and the devout Hindu followers did not hesitate to take the remains of their food in secret.¹⁹ The *Kartabhajās* were far in advance of the orthodox community in matters relating to social reform. They encouraged the remarriage of widows and discouraged the observance of rigidity of caste system in dining. Though the majority of recruits to this sect belonged to the Shūdra order, yet some high class Brahmins also accepted this faith. Thus Jay Narāyaṇ Ghoshal, the Rājā of Bhu-Kailash, refers to Rāmasharaṇ Pāl along with Jesus Christ and Nānak as prophets of the age in his *Karuṇā-nidhāna-vilāsa*, published in 1813 A.D. He also states in the preface to this work that *Kartā* is one, *Gurū* is one, but devotees are many. At another place he regrets that he is too infirm to sing the qualities of the *Kartā*.²⁰ In 1819 Ward estimated

the number of *Kartabhajās* under the leadership of Dulāl Pāl at 20,000.²¹ A number of followers of the *Kartabhajā* sect disowned the authority of the Pāls and set up an eclectic sect called *Rāmavallabhī* at Bānsabāti. They regarded Rāmavallabha as an incarnation of Shiva and held a great fair and festival on the Shiva Chaturdashi day in his honour and paid equal honour to and sang the names of Kālī, Krishṇa, God and Khuda with equal gusto.²² Another branch of the *Kartabhajā* sect became known as *Sāhebdhanī*. It was founded by Dukhī Rām Pāl, who preached against the servility to the *Gurū* and denounced image worship. They used to hold congregational worship every Thursday and freely partook of the food prepared by the devotees belonging to different castes and communities.²³ A sect known as the *Spastadāyaka* came into some prominence in Calcutta at the beginning of the last century. They did not recognise the divinity nor the absolute power of the *Gurū*. Men and women lived in monasteries like brothers and sisters. The women shaved their heads but kept a small tuft of hair.²⁴

A vigorous protest against the authority of the *Gurū* was also made by the Kishorī-bhajā sect, organised by Kālāchānd Vidyālaṅkāra of Vikrampur. According to this sect there are two universes, one external with the planets and the other internal in the body of human beings. Man and woman should consider each other as the *Gurū*. Males regarded themselves as Krishna and the females as Radha. They used to meet at night and sing and dance together.²⁵ Some of the songs recited by them were published by a band of reformers who wanted to have the sect suppressed.²⁶

Immoral practices indulged by a few persons here and there brought disgrace to the whole of the Vaishnava community both in western and eastern India. Rāmaprasād Sen complained in the middle of the eighteenth century that the Vaishnavas corrupted the damsels and daughters-in-law in many households.²⁷

The moral standard which prevailed amongst the Shāktas was not much higher. Rāmaprasād himself describes, how the hero of his *Vidyāsuṇḍara* prayed to Kālī for success in his efforts to seduce an unmarried princess and received her benedictions. Bhārat-chandra goes a step further. As the goddess was pleased with the hymn composed by Suṇḍara, she supplied him not only with the weapon with which the passage to the room of the princess was to be opened, but also took the trouble of writing an incantation on a copper-plate to help him in his design. In the earlier centuries deities like Chaṇḍī and Manasā are depicted as offering wealth,

power and progeny to their worshippers. But on the eve of the battle of Plassey they are represented as helping them in satisfying their carnal appetite. Signs of moral degeneracy can be detected also in the Shaivite literature. Rāmeshvara (c. 1677-1744) in his *Shivāyana* describes how Shiva went out for alms to a village inhabited by the Koch tribe; and the young Koch women on hearing the sound of his bugle came out in large numbers and were seduced.²⁸ Rājā Prithvichandra of Pakur also gives an account of the dalliance of Shiva with the Koch women in his *Gaurī-maṅgala*, written in 1806 A.D.²⁹ This is a sad transformation of the great deity who burnt down Eros by his angry look.

The lower strata of the Hindu society in Bengal and Bihar worshipped strange creatures like Kāloo Rāi, the patron saint of tigers, Rāma Thākur, a ghost, and Mālik Bāyo, a deified Muslim conqueror. A poet named Nityānanda wrote *Kāloo-rāi-maṅgala* under the patronage of Rājā Rājanārāyaṇ of Kasijora (1756-1770). The book relates how the ferrymen adopted the worship of Kāloo Rāi, the lord of tigers.³⁰ The cult of Bāro Bhaiyā, twelve Demons, the son of Vana Durgā, a tree-goddess, came into vogue probably in the eighteenth century. This village cult was affiliated to Tāntricism and Sanskrit *mantras* came to be used in its worship.³¹

In some parts of Bihar the masses came to worship Rāma Thākur, a ghost, whose cult was introduced, according to Francis Buchanan, by the grandfather of Rājā Mitrajit of Tekari, who flourished in the middle of the eighteenth century. Buchanan also states that Mālik Bāyo, a Muslim conqueror, came to be worshipped as a village deity in the interior of the Gaya district. The Dusāds worshipped a patron deity named Guriyā.³²

It is no wonder that the Depressed classes should have a separate goddess for themselves. The Brahmins of Southern India considered it a defilement to tread upon the shadow of an outcaste *Pañchama*. The upper castes of northern India did not consider it obligatory to bathe with their clothes in case of such a defilement, but they treated the Chāṇḍālas as worse than cats and dogs. There arose a number of saintly reformers amongst the Depressed classes. Following in the wake of Ravidās, the Doms or sweepers organised a sect called the *Hariśchandris*. Wilson only heard the name of the sect but could not ascertain what their tenets were.³³ Akshoy Kumar Datta found by means of personal investigations the existence of at least two sects among the Depressed classes in Bengal and one in Orissa. Of these Balarāma Hāḍi, the founder of the Bala-

rāmī sect, was born at Meherpur in the old Nadia district in 1785 A.D. His followers considered him as an incarnation of Rāma and he himself explained that he was called a Hāḍi because he created the *Hāḍa* or bone. The Balarāmīs condemned caste system and image worship.³⁴ A cobbler of Shantipur (Nadia district) named Dapā Muchi founded a sect called after the Sanskritised form of his name *Darpa-nārāyaṇī*. He preached the identity of man with God.³⁵ A sect known as the Chāmār Vaishṇavas flourished in Orissa. They gave initiation to the cobbler caste.³⁶

Some of the hill tribes in Eastern India came within the fold of Hinduism during this period. A temple was dedicated to Krishṇa at Manipur during the reign of Charai Rongba (1698-1709). Gharīb Niwāz Panhavā, who was brought up by a Nāgā chief, ascended the throne of Manipur in 1714 A.D. He was converted to Vaishṇavism of the Bengal school by Shāntidās Adhikāri and advised his subjects to accept his religion as their own. The introduction of the new faith was opposed by Khongnangthābā, the champion of the tribal religion. But the King is said to have ordered the destruction of all the scriptures of the old religion.³⁷ According to some traditions current in Manipur, he became a follower of the Rāmānandī sect later on.³⁸ The *Chaitanyaite Vaishṇavism* was firmly established in Manipur during the reign of Jay Singh (1759 and 1763-1798) popularly known as Rājarshi Bhāgya Chandra. He installed the image of Govinda in 1780 and introduced the artistic Rāsa dance.³⁹ In 1790 the Kāchhāri Rājā of Khaspur and his brother became recognised as Kshatriyas after entering the body of the copper effigy of a cow and emerging out of it.⁴⁰

In the border area of Orissa and Bengal arose two persons, Rāmachandra Yati and Rāmānanda Ghosh, claiming to be the incarnations of Chaitanya and Buddha, respectively. Rāmānanda Ghosh composed the *Rāma-tattva* in 1762 and the *Chandī-maṅgala* in 1766. This illustrates the catholicity of his views. He has been eulogised as the founder of a new sect by his disciples Krishṇakānta and by Rāmshāṅkara Deva, the author of *Abhaya-mangala*.⁴¹ Rāmachandra Yati states in his *Rāmāyaṇa* that Kālī sent him to this world with a view to exterminate the *Mlechchas*. But towards the end of his book he admits that he has failed in his mission. A manuscript of his work is dated in 1779-80 A.D.⁴²

A philosopher and leader of the Vaishṇava community in Orissa, named Baladeva Vidyābhūṣaṇa wrote an original commentary on the *Brahmasūtra* some time before the battle of Plassey. He under-

took the task because the followers of Rāmānuja, Nimbārka and Vallabhāchārya tauntingly said that while each of the older Vaishṇava sects had their special *Bhāshyas* on *Vedānta*, the followers of Chaitanya had none. In explaining the aphorism II.3.47 he states that the individual is different from God. The sixteenth century philosopher, Jīva Gosvāmin held that the relation between God and the individual is like that of *Shakti* with *Shaktimat* or the relation of the sun to its scattered rays. Baladeva thus made a significant departure from the philosophical tenets preached by the earlier teachers of the sect. His Gurū was a disciple of Nayānānanda, the grandson of Rasikānanda, a great religious preacher of the early seventeenth century. Baladeva's commentary on the *Utkalikāvallari* of Rūpa Gosvāmin was written in 1764 A.D.

The fervently emotional mystic songs composed by Rāmaprasād Sen made the Shakti cult a great spiritual force in Bengal. He received a stipend in 1749 and a grant of land in 1759 from Mahārājā Krishnachandra of Krishnagar and got one-third of an acre of residential land at Halisahar near Kalyani from Subhadrā Devī in 1758. He condemned ostentatious ritualism and wrote: "Mind, why are thou so anxious? Utter Kālī's name, and sit in meditation. From all this pomp of worship the mind grows proud. Worship in secret, that none may know." Again, he sang: "What have I to do with Kāsī? The lotus-feet of Kālī are places of pilgrimage enough for me. Deep in my heart's lily meditating on them, I float in an ocean of bliss." He ridiculed the idea of fearing death and wrote: "You, a serpent, fearing frogs! How amazing! What terror of death is this in you, the child of the Mother-Heart of all?"⁴³

Hindu power having been reestablished in Maharāshtrā at the end of the 17th century, Hindu religion received a stimulus unknown before. Old temples were repaired, morning and evening worship and religious celebrations were revived. Repetitions of religious texts and of holy books like *Gītā*, *Jñāneshwarī*, *Kirtans* became the order of the day. The *Peshwās* and their Sardārs spent lavishly on building new temples and renovating old famous ones. Among other temples the *Peshwās* built were Vateshwar by the side of the river Karha, Bañeshwar near Sivaganga river, Devadeveshwar on the Parvati hill near Poona, Shakunteshwar in the sands of the Krishna river. The Tryambak temple was completed in 1786. The *Peshwās* also built ghāts or steps leading to fords at Vārānasi, Nasik and other holy places. His *jāgirdārs* emulated his example in raising temples, *Dharmashalas*, etc. The charities of Ahalyā Bāi Holkar, who built temples at Maheswar, ghats at Vārānasi, are well-known. Nānā-

Phadnis spent much money on temples at Menawali, Wai and other places up to Ellora.⁴⁴

The poet saints from Jñāneshwar to Rāmdās popularised the central doctrine of the Marāthā religion. It was that the great Divine Being pervaded the universe, that the soul of every human being was part of the universal spirit and it was man's duty to seek perfection and reunion with *Brahman* by devotion, deeds of charity and undergoing a process of purification. The highest bliss, *Moksha*, was the ultimate reward of the good, while the wicked were punished by being reborn in forms distant from the union. The doctrine of all-pervading Divinity was accepted all round, but in actual life God was worshipped in various forms as Shiva, Vishnu, Rām, Ganapati, Devi Bhavāni, Khaṇḍoba, etc. Temples dedicated to these deities occupied prominent places in towns, and studded the country-side.

Equally important with the public or communal worship was the worship of the family deities. Every household would have a corner assigned to worship and here would be a small collection of the *Arādhyā Devatā*, the *Kulaswāmī* or the tutelary deity which in many cases would be Devi Bhavāni or Khaṇḍoba. There would be small brass or silver idols representing Bālakrishna, Pārvati and Ganapati, Shāligrām representing Shiva and a few *taks* which represented the family ancestors. A Marāthā after ablution in the morning would spend some time in the *Pūjā* before starting the work of the day. The higher castes spent more time and money over the daily rituals. Special days and occasions were marked for the public worship of particular deities by offering them incense, flowers and fruits and other gifts through Brahmin priests. The *Ekādashī* (11th day) of *Aṣāḍha* and *Kārtika* became occasions for pilgrimage to Paṇḍharpur. *Mahā Shivarātri* was dedicated to Shiva and there were special days for public worship of Rām, Gaṇapati and Dattātreya.

The family priest or Upādhyāya advised the family about religious and social observances. But its keeper of conscience was a saintly person of repute. In Hindu religion *Sadhus* and *Sannyasis* have always been held in great reverence on account of their selfless life and renunciation of worldly affairs. Some of these *Sannyasis* would get such celebrity that people would flock round them for advice and instruction. Such a person was styled *Gurū* or *Mahapurush*. Shivājī, the founder of the Marāthā State, venerated Rāmdās. He likewise respected Mauni Bāwā of Paṭgaon and found time

to visit him amidst his busy round of duties. Brahmendra Swāmi was the spiritual guide of the *Peshwā* family and much respected at Rājā Shāhū's court. Marāthā chiefs sought his intercession in their affairs. Mahādji Sindia used to seek advice of a Muslim saint Shāh Mansur and used to prostrate himself at his feet. He spent much money in renovating temples at Mathura, Gokul, Vrindavan and Pushkar.⁴⁵

Despite the general prevalence of Hindu beliefs the worship of pre-Aryan tribal gods continued to thrive. The general mass of the people were ridden by superstition, and the Brahmin priests did little to discourage queer ceremonies and strange rites. In villages, temples to Bhairoba and Jotiba were common. Bhairav was kept happy by application of oil and *Sindoor* and cured snake-bites. He also forecasted the success or failure of undertakings. Mhasobā, Vetāl, Vāghobā, Saṭwāi, Tukāi were other godlings whom the villagers feared and worshipped. These aboriginal godlings had been transformed into manifestations of Shiva and his consort, and were supposed to look after the health and welfare of the villagers. The nearby fields and orchards and hills had their spirits to be appeased with buffaloes, goats and fowls, depending on the degree of their malevolence. There was not a river, ford or tank which was not haunted by spirits and ghosts. Even the gates and walls of forts were not free from their influence.⁴⁶

The Bhakti movement of the middle ages was a protest against the ritual of Brahmanism and the superstition of the masses. The supremacy of one God was the first creed with everyone of the saints. The various forms in which God was worshipped were believed to merge finally into one Supreme Being. The rude concepts which prevailed among the people, the aboriginal and village gods, their frightful rites and sacrifices were denounced in forceful language. In the annual concourses at Paṇḍharpur and Jejūri men forgot their caste distinctions and hailed each other as brothers united in a common endeavour. The movement had a general liberalizing influence on society and created a healthy social atmosphere rare elsewhere in India.⁴⁷

Islām:

The eighteenth century may be regarded as the period of transition from the Medieval to Modern Islām in India, and Shāh Walīul-lāh of Delhi (1703-62) has been aptly described as forming the bridge between the two. He was born on a cultured Muslim family

and his father Shāh 'Abd-al-Rahīm rendered great help in the compilation of the Encyclopaedic collection of religious edicts commissioned by Aurangzīb. Walīullāh proceeded to Arabia to study Islāmic doctrines and sat at the feet of eminent teachers like Shaikh Abū Tāhir Muhammad ibn Ibrāhīm al Kurdī of Medina who taught him *Hadīth*, and Shaikh Sulaymān Maghrībī who taught him Māli-kite Jurisprudence. He also studied under other Arab scholars. It is a strange coincidence that he was not only a contemporary of the great religious reformer, renowned all over the Islamic world, 'Abd-al-Wahhāb of Nezd (1703-87), but both sat at the feet, more or less, of the same eminent Arab teachers. An eminent scholar, who lays stress on this point, has observed: "The two systems these two divines of the eighteenth century world of Islam worked out had the same source of inspiration, going back through the tradition of the study of *hadīth* in unmystical Hijāz to the orthodox discipline of ibn Taimiya, and though it is difficult to establish any theory of mutual influence of either on the other, their two systems did come closer, if not actually merge, in the Indian Islam of the eighteenth century."⁴⁸

This view, however, is not shared by all. For example, Murray T. Titus, the eminent author of the well-known book *Islām in India and Pakistan*, does not even mention the name of Shāh Walīullāh in connection with the Wahhābi Movement in India and observes: "The Puritanical sect, founded in Arabia during the eighteenth century by Muhammad 'Abd-ul-Wahhāb, was destined to have far-reaching influences throughout the Muslim world, and nowhere outside the land of its birth has that influence been more pronounced than in India. Although the sect as such has never been formally organised in India under the name 'Wahhābi', yet the doctrine preached by certain of the Indian reformers have been of that school, and the popular tendency has been to describe their activities as the 'Wahhābi' Movement."⁴⁹

There is, however, no denying the fact that the ideas and doctrines of Shāh Walīullāh more or less conform to the Wahhābi doctrine summed up as follows by Titus himself:

"In general, the movement has been marked by renewed emphasis of *tawhīd* (the unity of God); adherence to the principle of *ijtihād*, or the right of the individual to interpret the Qur'ān and the *hadīth* (traditions), and rejection of the four orthodox schools of canon law; opposition to the worship of saints, which they hold to be a form of polytheism (*shirk*); and earnest endeavour to re-

move all traces of the practices of early faiths from the worship of Hindu converts to Islām.”⁵⁰

These ideas were also preached by Waliullāh as has been briefly referred to in Vol. IX (p. 884) of this series.

According to Titus, the first appearance of the Wahhābi ideas in India was about 1804 A.D. when the Farāzi sect was founded in Eastern Bengal by Hāzī Shariātullāh.⁵¹ This has been described in Vol. IX (p. 884 ff.), but, as pointed out there, the movement in India was really started by Sayyid Ahmad of Rae Bareilly (1786-1831) who came under the influence of ‘Abdul Aziz, son of Shāh Waliullāh, and was inspired by the views of Shāh Waliullāh. As a matter of fact, there was hardly any difference between Waliullāh and ‘Abdul Wahhāb as regards the ends in view—Pure Islām must be re-enacted and regenerated and the Muslim society in India which had been reduced to the lowest level, particularly in the political field, must again be mighty. But as compared with the views of ‘Abdul Wahhāb, Waliullāh’s Islām was more comprehensive, richer and more flexible and retained a marked Sūfi colouring. In his Islām there was room not only for the Sunnis but also for the Shiahs who, quite contrary to the practice of the Wahhābis, follow various Imāms.

Shāh Waliullāh, like ‘Abdul Wahhāb, fully realised the danger of religio-ethical disintegration of Islām and his main efforts were directed towards rehabilitating the theory and practice of orthodox Sunni belief. “To this end he relied much more on the *Mālikite* than the *Hanafi* approach to the *Sunnah*, regarding it as the most distinguished among theological sciences and their sources, a historically stable factor which could undergo no change.”⁵²

The collapse of the Muslim power in India in a way helped Waliullāh’s ideas of restoring the vitality of Islām in India. During the heyday of Muslim rule the *Qāzīs* played a dominant role in the administrative system, and apart from the power and position their offices were also lucrative from the economic point of view. So a great stress was laid on the study of *fiqh* for the proper training of the *Qāzīs*. But this economic stimulus declined with the decay of the Muslim rule. So Waliullāh could successfully commend the subordination of Muslim jurisprudence to the discipline of *hadīth* on the one hand and a total absorption of the remnants of various Sūfi disciplines into the orthodox Islām on the other. He thus completed the work of Sayyid Ahmad Sirhindī of the 17th century by channelling the streams of Sūfi spiritual heritage into traditional Islām.^{52a}

It is not possible in a general work of history to deal with the views of Waliullāh in greater detail. But enough has been said to indicate that he was perhaps the most forceful personality during the eighteenth century who gave a new trend to Islām in India which bore fruit in the nineteenth century. This is amply testified by the activities of the movements generally referred to as Wāhhābi Movements in India and dealt with in Volume IX of this series.

The Wāhhābi Movement in India developed a militant political aspect, inspired by the dream of re-establishing Muslim rule in India by driving away the British. This has been dealt with in Volume IX, pp. 880 ff.

Fusion of the Muslim Communities:

The eighteenth century also witnessed the gradual fusion of the different groups or communities of Indian Muslims, known by the names of their original homes in Western and Central Asia (Irānis, Turānis, Afghāns or Pathāns) and the Hindu converts to Islām. They regarded themselves, and were regarded by others, as so many distinct classes or communities within the fold of Islām in India. The difference was akin to, but less rigid than, the different castes of the Hindu society. A brief reference may be made to the first three, but the fourth, who vastly outnumbered them, requires a somewhat prolonged discussion.

(i) The Irānis or Persians occupied a special position on account of their ancient culture. It has been said that the old cultural link between India and Irān was renewed by the advent of Islām. Their superior cultural heritage received due recognition and it has been well said that during the pre-Mughul period "the Turks and the Afghāns were the muscles whereas the Persians supplied the brain of the Muslim aristocracy of India."⁵³

(ii) The Turānis were Turko-Mongol by race, "more to be commended for their valour than beauty; a square, stout, strong people, having flatter faces and flat noses. . . ." ⁵⁴ They were far more numerous than any other foreign Muslim people who settled in India. They are described as follows by Aurangzīb in his last will and testament:

"The Turāni people have ever been soldiers. They are very expert in making charges, raids, night-attacks and arrests. They feel no suspicion, despair or shame when commanded to make a retreat in the very midst of a fight, . . . and they are a hundred stages remote from the crass stupidity of the Hindustānis, who part with their

heads but not leave their positions (in battle). In every way, you should confer favours on this race, because on many occasions these men can do the necessary service, when no other race can."⁵⁵

(iii) The Afghāns or Pathāns never forgot that their ancestors were once the rulers of India and entertained the hope of again becoming the masters of the country. They had a 'deep-seated hatred for the Mughuls and, generally speaking, the relations between the two were never friendly.' This spirit is reflected in some proverbs and games well known, at the beginning of this century, in Bengal where they found their last refuge.⁵⁶

(iv) The Hindu converts to Islām were by far the largest in number, but at the same time the lowest in social position among the Indian Muslims. From the very beginning, i.e., the conquest of Sind in 712 A.D., up to the eighteenth century, the conversion of the Hindus to Islām went on, not in hundreds but in thousands, specially in the Punjāb and Bengal. The main instruments of this conversion on a massive scale were:

- (i) Sheer force or violence,
- (ii) Temptation of money and power,
- (iii) Missionary efforts.

Each of these requires some elucidation. The first includes not merely actual violence and threats to violence but also the prospect of life that a Hindu had to face for refusal to accept Islām. This was clearly elucidated by a Qāzī of the Great Sultan Alāuddin Khiljī in the following words as recorded by a great Muslim historian:

"They are called payers of tribute, and when the revenue officer demands silver from them, they should without question, and with all humility and respect, tender gold. If the officer throws dirt in their mouths, they must without reluctance open their mouths wide to receive it. . . . To keep the Hindus in abasement is specially a religious duty." This is the best treatment that a Hindu could expect if he refused to accept Islām. For only the great doctor Hanīfah allows the Hindus to live the life of a *Zimmi* as described above. The great historian clearly says that "doctors of other schools allow no other alternative but 'Death or Islām.'"⁵⁷

That such treatment was actually accorded to people and various temptations were held out by offers of money and other privileges has been discussed in detail in Vol. III (p. 458), Vol. V (pp. 497-502), Vol. VI (pp. 24-25, 615-636) and Vol. VII (pp. 233-

236) of this series. As a matter of fact, beginning from the conquest of Sind (A.D. 712) up to the death of Aurangzīb (A.D. 1707)—and in a few cases even beyond that—we hear too often of the massacre on a large scale of the Hindus and also forcible conversion on a mass scale caused by the fear of such a catastrophe. Titus remarks: "The slaughtering of 'infidels' seemed to be one thing that gave Mahmūd (of Ghazni) particular pleasure".⁵⁸ But this was true of many other Muslim invaders. Mahmūd had good precedents. Muhammad ibn Qāsim, the first successful Muslim invader of India, after conquering Debal, "forcibly circumcised the local Brahmins and when they objected to this treatment he put all the males over seventeen to death and the others, including women and children, were led into slavery." No wonder, therefore, that "as he advanced and took their cities some people embraced Islām rather than die, and we may be sure that all who were made slaves were compelled to embrace the religion of the masters to whom they were allotted."⁵⁹ When Qutb-ud-din approached Koil, Hasan Nizami tells us, "those of the garrison who were wise and acute were converted to Islām, but others were slain with the sword."⁶⁰ At Kalinjar fifty thousand were taken as slaves. Such sickening stories⁶¹ may be added in any number. We may therefore conclude with one of the latest incidents that happened in the middle of the eighteenth century. Muhammad Aslam tells us very candidly that "after the crushing defeat of Hindu arms near Delhi by Ahmad Shāh Abdalī about ninety thousand persons, male and female, were taken prisoners, and obtained eternal happiness by embracing the Muslim faith."⁶² We may be quite sure that these people were more anxious for their lives than "eternal happiness."

No one outside a lunatic asylum would seriously believe that in such mass scale conversions sincere faith in Islām or anything like it would count in the least. Yet this process must be regarded as the major cause for the enormous growth of the Muslim population in Bengal, and so far as the recorded evidence goes, this one factor seems to be responsible for at least three-fourths—if not more—of the conversion of the Hindus to Islām.

As regards the last means of converting the Hindus to Islām, we have no definite information as to the extent of their success beyond a very moderate scale. There is not the least doubt that one of the major causes of whatever success they achieved was the very degraded position of the lower classes in Hindu society. There is some truth in the following statement of W. W. Hunter: "To these poor people, fishermen, hunters, pirates and low-caste tillers of the

soil (to which others may be added), Islām came as a revelation from on high. It was the creed of the ruling race; its missionaries were men of zeal, who brought the Gospel of the unity of God and the equality of men in His sight to a despised and neglected population."⁶³ But when we contrast the result of the activities of the Christian missionaries in the 18th and 19th centuries in a situation not very dissimilar, we cannot help thinking that other factors, notably the active official support and other temptations, counted for much in the success of the Muslim missionaries.

According to some writers the missionary efforts must be given the chief credit for the large number of conversions of Hindus to Islām. But this is a mere conjecture unsupported by facts recorded in history, as we have in the case of the first two means of conversion, namely force and violence accompanied by temptation.

It is a well-known fact that the largest number of converted Hindus is to be found in East Bengal, now called Bangladesh. The following statement of Titus may be quoted in support of what has been stated above: "Generally speaking, Muslim missionaries have followed in the wake of conquering armies. This was the case in the north, and in Bengal especially. Muhammad Bakhtyar Khalji swept over Bengal and Bihar at the close of the twelfth century A.D., and founded a Muslim kingdom there with headquarters in Gaur. Under the protection of this Muslim sovereignty, missionaries of the faith found freedom for the exercise of their zeal; and, as a result of certain social and religious causes, they were eminently successful. In eastern Bengal, Islām is not confined to the cities and centres of Government, as is largely the case in Northern India. Here, even under the admittedly severe measures of many of the Muslim rulers to spread the religion of Islām, but few, comparatively, of the village people embraced the religion of their conquerors. But in eastern Bengal we find it mostly in the villages; and judging from the manners and customs of the followers of the Prophet, their physical appearance, and the caste distinctions which they still retain, it seems clear that these converts were recruited from the original inhabitants of the soil. In this part of India, Hinduism was not nearly so well organized and consolidated as in the northern, western, and southern parts of the country. The inhabitants were under the influence of a crude form of Buddhism; and, despised as they were by their proud Aryan rulers, who held them in disdain, they apparently welcomed the Muslim missionaries gladly."⁶⁴

There is some truth in the above statement, but we have no

reliable and positive evidence in support of the view that the missionary efforts, pure and simple, should be counted as a very important, far less dominant factor, not to speak of the major factor, in the conversion of Hindus to Islām in India, in general, and in Bengal in particular. It is difficult to believe that pure missionary efforts should be more successful in Bengal, the remotest region from the centre of Muslim culture and authority, than the neighbouring provinces, or provinces like Madras (Tamil Nadu) where the lowest classes of people—the Panchamas—were the most despised or ill-treated people in the whole of India.

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CHAPTER XXI

ECONOMIC & SOCIAL CONDITIONS IN INDIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

I. *Economic Condition:*

Changes in the social stratification:

The economic stratification in the Mughul period resembled a pyramid with a very small but extremely rich and extravagant upper class on the top and poor agriculturists and artisans at the wide bottom. The older Mughul aristocracy gradually decayed due to the escheat system, extravagance, profligacy and maintenance of large harems, as well as diminution of family size caused by the wars. Miscegenation was also a major factor in the degeneration of the Turkish and Afghān nobility settled in India. With the consolidation of the Mughul empire, the Brahmins retired from Muslim Courts, and pursued their traditional learning and taught the various systems of Hindu philosophy in their regular *tols* in big villages and towns far away from the capital cities. In each village the school teacher was usually the Brahmin or the priest, though of course, *Kayastha* or *Baniya* schoolmasters were sometimes met with. It was some sort of universal education that was attempted in the villages of India in the mediaeval period when teachers were often hereditary, enjoyed rent-free lands or received voluntary gifts from each household; again, in an annual festival held in their honour, collections were made for them.

If the Brahmins fled from Muslim Courts, the latter found in the *Kayasthas* of Northern India capable and pliable instruments for the conduct of administration. The *Kayasthas* acquired the knowledge of the Persian language and of accounts, and filled all offices from secretaries and clerkships in the administration and the army down to the lowest village stewards. As the Muslim conquest extended southward to the Deccan the *Kayasthas* accompanied their Muslim masters as revenue officers and accountants, the *Qanungos* of districts and *Patwaris* of villages, and today this caste represents at once the most ubiquitous and flexible of all Hindu castes in India, abjuring cultivation and menial labour and cherishing the vocation of writing and keeping accounts everywhere. During the Mughul period another Hindu caste, the class of Shroffs and Sahukars, traders and merchants also grew in wealth and importance, especially in the

coastal regions of Bengal, Gujarāt and the Coromandel.

The Economic Condition of the Agriculturists and Artisans:

Below this growing middle class, represented by the *Kayasthas* and the *Baniyas* who lived by service and trade respectively, were the mass of agriculturists. Even in Bengal which was a land of plenty they lived poorly. The *Khulasat-ut-Tawarikh*, written in 1695, mentions that the staple food of the people of Bengal was rice and fish.

“The people have not even the custom of eating bread. Having cooked brinjals, herbs and lemon together, they keep it in cold water and eat it the next day. It is very delicious when mixed with salt. They carry it to distant places and sell it at a high price.”

Manrique, writing during 1629-1643, also gives the same picture:

“Their daily meal consists of rice with which, if they have nothing else to add, they take salt and are satisfied. They also use a kind of herb which is usually called Xaga (i.e., shakha or greens); those better off use milk, ghee, and other lacteous preparations.”¹

The *Khulasat* mentions that in Gujarāt the principal food of the people comprised jawar and bajara. The *rabi* harvest was scanty. Both wheat and rice had to come from outside, wheat from Mālwa and Ajmer and rice from the Deccan. Ovington (1689), mentioning that *khichri* was a very common food among the people, observed that it was made of *dal*, i.e., a small round pea and rice boiled together. John Fryer (1633-1681), who travelled mostly on the Coromandel and Malabar coasts, mentions, “boiled rice, khichary, millet, and (in great scarcity) grass roots as the common food of the ordinary people; which with a pipe of tobacco contents them.”² The mention of tobacco consumption by the general population is significant.

The artisan class also did not live in prosperity even where the fabricated luxury goods were in constant demand in the provincial and imperial Courts. For these, state monopoly of some kind was established or the supply of products sought to be insured by the appointment of state overseers. Peter Mundy (1630-1632) records that the sale of skein silk in Patna seems to have been a monopoly of the Governor. All silk yarn had to be bought through the Kotwal of the city at rates 25 to 37 per cent higher than what the

latter paid to the dealers. Similarly a *Daroga* of the king's weavers was appointed for Bengal for the regular supply of muslin to the imperial Court. Sometimes the interference of the administration went to the extent of monopolising looms to secure special trading privileges for officials, or a ban was imposed on the use, purchase, and sale of certain luxuries.³ Or again, the Governors made monopolies of important articles of food and clothing. Therefore, prices of articles depended not only on the annual rainfall but also on monopolistic conditions and cost of carriage. Only costly articles like indigo, cotton and silk piece-goods, spices, pearls and rubies could bear the high cost of carriage. For foodgrains, there could be only local markets.

In the eighteenth century when the calicoes, muslins and silks from the innumerable weaving centres of India were pouring into the Asiatic, African and European markets, the Dutch and the English factors and merchants contacted the weavers through Indian contractors and brokers (*dalals*) who had to reduce the prices of cloth (and hence the weavers' earnings) at the behest of the European merchants as it was the latter who solely monopolised the entire overseas trade. Later on, the European merchants employed their own salaried servants—*gumastas*, *Mutchulcahs*, *jachandars*—who exploited the artisans even more. They obtained advances sometimes from different rival European Companies and distributed the capital among the groups of weavers, clandestinely trading on their own account, and keeping the weaving population under their strong grip.

Formerly, as Bolts mentions, "it was a common practice for reputable families of the *tanty* or weavers caste to employ their own capitals in manufacturing goods, which they sold freely on their own accounts. Thus an English merchant in the older days could secure 800 pieces of muslin one morning at Dacca without the interference of any dealers, *pykars*, or *gumastas*."⁴

But as the Company came to employ their own servants or *gumastas* to deal with weavers and artisans and armed them with its *dustuck*, they bought and sold duty-free, and the 'inland trade of Bengal', as Verelst observed, "soon grew into a vast monopoly in the hands of the servants of the Company and their *gumastas*. In every district, village and factory they brought and sold salt, betel-nut, ghee, rice, straw, bamboo, fish, ginger, tobacco, opium, and other commodities. They forcibly took away the goods of ryots and merchants for a fourth part of their value, and obliged the ryots to

give five rupees for articles which were not worth one.”⁵ Similarly the *gumastas* took advantage of the Company’s monopoly in the cloth trade in exploiting, overawing and oppressing the weavers. Fines, imprisonments, floggings, forcing bonds from the weavers etc., were described by Bolts as the common method adopted by the Company’s agents and *gumastas*, as the result of which the number of weavers greatly decreased and the manufacture became dear and debased.⁶

Dacca was one of the most important weaving centres in the 18th century. According to Abbe Raynal who wrote in 1785, even here the position of the weavers became precarious. He observed:⁷

“Till of late, Delhi and Murshidabad were furnished from thence with the cotton wanted for their own consumption. They each of them maintained an agent on the spot to superintend the manufacture, who had authority, independent of the magistrate, over all the workmen, whose business had any relation to the object of his commission. It was a misfortune to them to appear too dexterous, because they were then forced to work only for the Government which paid them ill, and kept them in a sort of captivity. When the caprices of tyranny were satisfied, Europeans, other strangers, and natives were allowed to begin their purchases, but still, they were obliged to employ brokers established by the ministry, and as corrupt as they were. These restraints and rigours put an end to industry, the child of necessity, but the companion of liberty.”

The Ruin of the Indigenous Shroffs and Mercantile Houses:

When the European factors and merchants first came, they borrowed capital freely from the Indian bankers or shroffs who had their *Kothis* interspersed throughout India from Dacca to Lahore and from Multan to Masulipatam. It is well known how in the middle of the 18th century the Jagat Seths grew into great political importance in Bengal. It was they who were the financiers of the court of Murshidabad remitting the tribute of the province to the Delhi exchequer. The English Company also had to deal with the Jagat Seths. It was through them that they paid Rs. 12 lakhs to the Nawāb of Bengal when he blockaded the Kasimbazar factory in 1749. Their wealth is thus described in *Siyar-ul-Mutakherin*. ‘Their riches were so great, that no such bankers were even seen in Hindostan or Deccan, nor was there any banker or merchant that could stand comparison with them all over India. It is even certain that all the bankers of their time in Bengal were either their

factors, or some of their family." Without the conspiracy of the Jagat Seths and another Hindu millionaire Umi Chand (who became the principal contractor of the English Company) with the English, Bengal could not have been conquered by them. A year after the battle of Plassey, when the Jagat Seths refused to provide a large loan to the English, Holwell wrote to Hastings, "A time may come when they may stand in need of the Company's protection in which case they may be assured they shall be left to Satan to be buffeted."

In Madras the English Company also sought and obtained the assistance of the *Chetties*, some of whom became the Company's merchants and bankers supplying them with cash or bills of exchange on other Indian towns and cities. Similarly, in Gujarāt the *Nathjis* became the shroffs of the Company assisting it in difficult financial times. It was the *Nathjis'* loan of 30 lakhs to the English in Bombay which supported Lord Lake's expedition in 1804. Similarly, the Nepal War was financed by them in 1814.⁸ As the English Company established their monopoly in the inland trade of salt, cloth, betel-nut, tobacco, and other business, the big mercantile houses of the past gradually lost their importance, not to speak of their political influence. The price of salt doubled about 1765, and Awadh, Allahābād and Mālwa, instead of importing salt from Bengal, began to consume rock salt that was produced in the dominions of the Rohillās. Similarly the trade in betel-nut and tobacco, two other necessities of life, was monopolised in 1768 by the Company. All the merchants, including its own, were forbidden to carry these beyond the limits of Bengal.⁹ When the European merchants first arrived, the Indian traders served as their brokers and cashiers lending or procuring them money upon bottomry or at interest. This interest which was usually 9% at least, was higher when the English Company was under the necessity of borrowing from the Seths. But the rich Armenian, Greek, Bengali, 'Moorish' and up-country merchants were gradually ruined due to the monopoly established by the English Company in the ordinary trade of the country. Bolts writes that the English Company ventured to assert that they had a right to trade in India and directed certain merchants, inhabitants of Calcutta, not to trade.¹⁰ Many persons belonging to the merchant class now gave up trade, and thanks to the land reform introduced by Lord Cornwallis, acquired large and small estates.

The Kasimbazar estate was founded at the time of Warren Hastings by a gift to a silk merchant, Kantu Nandi, who once help-

ed Hastings to escape from his enemies at Vārānasī. Similarly, Hastings' *Munshi*, Nabakishen, became the founder of the Sovabazar estate and the chief *zamindār* of Calcutta. The Chait Singh spoliation episode at Vārānasī also created another *zamindārī*, that of the banker, Kashmiri Mal. In this manner, the accumulated capital which could no longer be adequately employed due to the ruin of trade and industry, began to be invested in land.

The Disruption of Village Communities and Peasant Rights:

Village communities began to disintegrate in the eighteenth century as the result of the increasing vogue of farming of government revenues. The farmer or contractor exercised some powers of sovereignty within the allotted district and owed allegiance to a superior chief or ruler according to his relative military strength or hold upon the rural population. The disorganisation of village communities was speeded up by Marāthā invasions and by the creation of the new landlords by the British, side by side with the old farmers or assignees, *chaudhuris*, *talukdars*, *jagīrdars* and other rentiers and superintendents. The Marāthā overlords farmed out their *pargānas* to bankers and Sahukars. All these intermediaries now dealt individually with the peasants or with the older headmen (now transformed into superior dealers), hardly invested capital in the land, and made the most of their temporary and insecure possession of the estates. When the East India Company assumed the *Diwāni*, about one-sixth part of Bengal according to Dow, was found by them in possession of the favourites and adherents of the princes, *jagīrdars*, *zamīndars*, farmers of revenue, etc. Many of these estates came into the Company's possession due to the failure of heirs and non-transferability. At this stage Lord Cornwallis created another fresh class of *zamīndars*.

This caused an obliteration of many cherished customary rights and privileges of the peasantry. The cultivators gradually lost several important rights. For instance, in Bengal the *ryot* held his land by a kind of lease or *pattā* that was irrevocable, and could not be dispossessed until after a failure in rent payments for a year. Such a right was extinguished. The cultivator also received considerable *tagavi* advances from Government for the purchase of cattle and for constructing necessary reservoirs and canals for irrigation.¹¹ Buchanan mentions (1808-1815) that in most parts of Dinajpur district leases were granted in perpetuity to the *ryots* and in some places they "pretend to a right of perpetual possession at the usual rate of rent, if they have occupied a farm for 10 years."

This fixity of rents (that was later on to be restored through the creation of occupancy tenancy in Bengal) was done away with as a result of the Permanent Settlement. The "natural rent" at the beginning of the 19th century did not exceed one-fourth of the produce of the holding in Bengal.

Further, as new classes intervened between the actual tillers of the soil and the State, the profits of agriculture could not go back to the land, but were intercepted by the increasing group of intermediaries. A class, not altogether new to India, the landless proletariat comprised of serfs and farm-hands, also multiplied and was soon to come into great prominence in the economic life of the country.

The Vogue of Slavery:

It appears that slavery became wide-spread in India in the 18th century. Manrique stated that the governors of the provinces seized the wives and children of those cultivators who could not pay the revenue, made them into slaves and sold them by auction. Hamilton also mentioned that he was himself empowered to sell up the families of his debtors in Tatta without going to court.¹² Famine, epidemic, and eviction from the land were responsible for a considerable amount of slavery that was in existence throughout the country.

The Portuguese carried on throughout the 16th and 17th centuries a profitable trade in slaves, captured especially from Bengal, including "men, women, children and even babies at the breast who were carried off and sold at the slave market at Hughli." With the expulsion of the Portuguese from Hughli, Akra and Budge-Budge, lower down the Bhagirathi, were infested by slave ships even as late as 1760. In 1717 the *Maghs* carried off from the southern part of Bengal 1,800 men, women and children, and sold them off at Rs. 20 to Rs. 70 each for work inland in Arakan. It was estimated that three-fourths of the inhabitants of Arakan were natives of Bengal or their descendants.

Slaves were also used to be exported abroad normally from Bengal in the 17th century and were also included among the exports of the Dutch and English traders at Surat, Madras and Masulipatam.¹³ In a Bengali document (1729), we read that a person sold himself for Rs. 11/- only with his wife, children and descendants for generations to come. In 1752 we find slaves being regularly purchased and registered in the *kacheri* or court-house of Calcutta,

each slave paying a duty of Rs. 4/- to the East India Company for such registration. Coffrees or Abyssinians were frequently employed as domestic slaves by the Europeans in Madras, Calcutta and Surat. Some of the rich Indian merchants of Surat had also Abyssinian slaves, but in their households they were brought up as children of the family, trained in business and even allowed to dispose of their income in favour of their descendants.¹⁴ As late as 1785 Sir William Jones eloquently exposed before the Grand Jury at Calcutta the evils of slavery:

“Hardly a man or a woman exists in a corner of this populous town who hath not at least one slave child either purchased at a trifling price or saved perhaps from a death that might have been fortunate for a life that seldom fails of being miserable. Many of you, I presume, have seen large boats filled with children, coming down the river for open sale at Calcutta. Now can you be ignorant that most of them were stolen from their parents, or bought perhaps for a measure of rice in a time of scarcity?”

By a proclamation in 1789, the traffic in slaves was abolished in India.

But rural slavery still continued to flourish in large parts of India. Buchanan's elaborate social and economic survey of North Bihar and North Bengal undertaken in the first decade of the 19th century showed that domestic slavery was prevalent, especially in the households of landlords, or wherever the nobility was represented by the Muslims, and the Mohammedan law prevailed.

Slaves were more commonly employed as farm hands. These serfs cultivated for their masters, who had small estates or rented lands, and received an allowance of grain and coarse cloth for subsistence. The allowance usually given was a piece of coarse cloth and about 15 maunds of grain. The slaves generally belonged to the depressed castes like the *Dhanuks*, *Chamars*, and *Rawaries* who sold their children. The prices of slaves mentioned by Buchanan were:

An adult slave	Rs. 15 to Rs. 20
A lad of 16 years	Rs. 12 to Rs. 20
A girl of 8 to 10 years	Rs. 5 to Rs. 15

Or, again, for each year of his age until he reached 20, the slave fetched a rupee more. In Purnea, Gaya, Shahabad, Bhagalpur and some other districts slaves were freely bought and sold. “The Assamese”, observes Buchanan, “sell a good many slaves and the people

of Bihar are willing to carry on the same trade." In 1812, it was estimated that one-sixth of the population of Sylhet consisted of slaves, mostly descendants of insolvent debtors; in Kamrup 12,000 slaves were released after its cession to the British.¹⁵

During his tour of social and economic investigation which began earlier (1800) in South India, Buchanan found slavery widespread also there. Land was largely owned by the Brahmins who almost entirely filled the different offices for the collection of revenue and administration of justice; they were also exclusively employed as messengers and inn-keepers. But the cultivation was, for the most part, left to the slaves of the inferior or depressed castes—the *parriar*, the *haluan*, the *shekliar*, the *tati*, the *vullam*, the *kana-kum*, and the *eirlay*. Even the few Muslim cultivators employed slaves. The slaves were the absolute property of their lords. They were not attached to the soil but could be hired, or sold or mortgaged. Only the husbands and wives could not be sold separately. A young man with his wife could be sold for 250 to 300 *phanams*; two or three children would add 100 *phanams*. The annual hire for a slave was 8 *phanams* for a man, and half as much for a woman. A good slave would sell for about 4 guineas but an ordinary slave sold from 20 to 60 *phanams* (9 S. 6½d. to 28s.8d.) The average price of a slave was much lower than in Bihar and Bengal. The master was considered bound to give the slave a certain subsistence allowance and also requisite clothing. But when there was no work in the fields, the slaves were asked to eke out their subsistence in whatever manner they could. Buchanan naively compares slavery in Malabar and in the West Indies as follows:

"There can be no comparison between their condition and that of the slaves in the West Indies Islands, except that in Malabar there are a sufficient number of females, who are allowed to marry any person of the same caste with themselves, and whose labour is always exacted by their husband's master, the master of the girl having no authority over her so long as she lives with another man's slave. This is a custom that ought to be recommended to our West Indies Planters, and if adopted would induce the Negro women to breed."¹⁶

In Central India Malcolm also found in the beginning of the 19th century numerous slaves in the households of the Rājput chiefs and Brahmins. Many of them became slaves during a famine or scarcity when men sold their children for bread, and others were stolen from their parents by *banjaras*, or grain-carriers. Female

slaves were sold from Rs. 40 and Rs. 50 according to appearance and were not permitted to marry, a shameless traffic being carried in Mālwa, Rājputānā and Gujarāt with the Deccan. Some times they were cruelly treated, but not generally. A great number of the slaves of Central India were from Marwar and Gujarāt where marāthā raids and distress compelled many to part with their children. Malcolm mentions that in the famine of 1813-1814 Amir Khān formed in Marwar a battalion of slave children and youths 1200 strong. Female slaves were still maintained here and there in the families of Rājput chiefs and *zamāndars* in Central India, but male slaves were not common and were generally treated more like adopted children than menials.¹⁷

Agrestic serfdom continued in India until the middle of the 19th century especially in the Punjāb, Eastern U.P., North Bihar, North Bengal, Assam, Orissa, Central India, Central Provinces and the South-Eastern coast of India.

The Trend of Real Wages:

We shall now consider the trends of wages and prices in India with reference to the standard of living of the common man in the 18th century. At the beginning of the 18th century wages for ordinary workmen in Calcutta ranged from 8 as. to 12 as. per mensem. By the 70s, wages of the coolies rose from Rs. 3 to Rs. 3-8-0 per mensem.

The 18th century saw a complete revolution in the price structure of India. One of the causes of the downfall of the Mughul empire was the intolerable increase of the burden of revenue of the agriculturists due to the depreciation of the value of silver in terms of copper, from 40 to 30 *dams*, for the revenue demand was assessed in *dam* (copper) but was actually paid mainly in silver. By the 17th century, the copper mines of Rājputānā and Central India were exhausted and India had to depend upon the Dutch for the fluctuating and precarious import of that metal from Japan. This led to the appreciation of copper *dam* which was equivalent to a general fall of the prices of agricultural produce, and diminution of agricultural income measured in terms of *dam*. As the revenue demand reckoned in *dam* remained fixed, the peasantry had to part with a larger share of their produce not only to meet the State demand but also for payment of interest to their creditors. So the grinding poverty of the bulk of the population was rendered more severe. The Mughul practice of assigning *jagīrs* to a host of civil and military officials, instead of giving them fixed salaries in rupees, also resulted in greater exploitation of

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the peasantry due to the fall in the value of silver, while the official class would not permit any reduction of their official expenses and their standard of living and status as well as the cost of the troops and horses which they were bound to maintain. Sayyid Ghulam Husain Khān (1783) observes that the *dam* was really equal to a 40th to 48th part of a rupee, but in the Chamber of Accounts 40 *dams* always made a rupee.¹⁸ The weight of the *dam* was by this time reduced by one-third.

The lighter copper coin, the 'little' pice, as contrasted with the greater (double) pice introduced by Aurangzīb, continued to be current in India later on in the times of Bahādur Shāh and Farrukhsiyar. Such currency debasement led to steady diminution of the real wages in the 18th century. The trend of prices in Bengal in the mid-18th century is briefly shown below:

Rate per rupee

Commodities	1729		1738		1751		1754		1760		1776	
	Mds.	Srs.	Mds.	Srs.	Mds.	Srs.	Mds.	Srs.	Mds.	Srs.	Mds.	Srs.
Coarse Rice	3	80	3	0	1	18	0	40	0	25	1	10
Wheat	...	3	30	—	—	1	18	—	—	—	0	35
Barley	...	8	00	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	13

The decline of real wages in the 18th century would be apparent from the following table:

1600 Base Year

1600	100.00
1650	184.51
1729	62.04
1807	69.82

1807 was the year in which Buchanan undertook statistical investigation in North Bihar and Bengal and recorded that the wages of the agricultural workers ranged from 3 pies to one anna per diem, while a rupee could buy three maunds of rice and 70 seers of wheat or barley.

The Marāthā Bargir was paid Rs. 5 to Rs. 10 per month and ordinary labour Rs. 2 to Rs. 4 per month.

Currency Debasement by the East India Company:

The East India Company also took advantage of the currency confusion to debase the coinage leading to a great loss for the popu-

lation. Thus we gather from the account of Abbe Raynal that the Company struck gold rupees to the amount of about 15 millions nominal value but which represented in fact only 9 millions, so that four-tenths or something more was alloy. In the treasury at Calcutta, the creditors received for each gold rupee not ten rupees and a half of silver which it was worth but the equivalent of six rupees of silver. Raynal adds that an oppression so general and contrary to the principles of trade and public faith must necessarily be attended with violence; and consequently it has been necessary several times to have recourse to force of arms to carry into execution the orders of the Council at Calcutta.¹⁹

Bolts also refers to the over-rating of the gold 'mohurs' issued by the Company to the extent of about 38 per cent above the current market rate. Similarly the silver *vaziry* rupee issued at the mints of Vārānasi and Allahābād was also a debased coin "almost 10 per cent less than *Arcots*".

Throughout Northern India gold almost vanished in the 18th century and the currency consisted of silver, copper, and *cowries*. *Cowries* were specially used in Bengal, Bihar and Orissa until the second decade of the 19th century; 3 *cowries* made one *dam*, while 25 *dams* made a pice. Later on 300 *cowries* made an anna or four pice.²⁰ In 1781 the East India Company first issued copper coins. The experiment was not successful as copper pice came back to the treasury due to the over-valuation of the copper. The Company thus after the conquest of Bengal systematically tried to debase the value of both silver and copper and this contributed not a little towards the reduction of real wages in the country since the wage rates could not readily be adjusted to currency and to economic conditions generally.

Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad writing at the end of the 17th century mentions no less than 26 sorts of *Hons* current in south India. "On Shāhū's return to Satara he set up a mint at Satara from which gold, silver and copper coins were issued. The Kolhapur Rājā established a mint at Panhala. Peshwa Bālājī Rāo granted licenses to private persons to coin money in consideration of a small fee to the State."²¹

Comparisons of the Standards of Living:

As compared with the period of Akbar, real wages in India, measured in terms of the principal foodgrains, were only three-fifths after the British conquest of Bengal. The trend of decline of real

wages in India that was marked since the 17th century has continued till modern times. The deterioration of the standard of living of the people is especially marked in the diminution of consumption of ghee, oil, salt and sugar that were cheap formerly relatively to both money and cereals.

Sugar was available for the masses of the population in the pre-British period under 5 pice per lb. In respect of salt, the monopoly of the servants of the East India Company and, later on, the governmental monopoly pushed up salt prices. At the close of the 18th century, a maund of Bengal salt was sold at Patna for Rs. 3/- while the worst quality of rice was sold at 72½ seers per rupee. In terms of rice, salt had more than twelve times its present price. For South India, a comparison of Buchanan's price schedules at the beginning of the 19th century and of present relative prices of commodities indicates that cloth, salt and sugar have now become many times cheaper in terms of rice.^{21a} The exchange ratio of salt was 10 times in terms of rice, of cloth 9 times, and of sugar 5 times, as compared to the present parity. At least sugar and salt were much cheaper relatively to both money and foodgrains in Mughul India than in the beginning of the 19th century,—sugar selling at only 2d. per lb. or under about 5 pice according to Terry and salt at 67 seers per rupee according to Abu'l Fazl.

Buchanan estimates (1808-1815) that in North Bihar a family could be supported on a minimum of Rs. 5/- per mensem and that the wages of agricultural labourers ranged from Rs. 2 to Rs. 3 monthly when food and land were not given. The poorer people wore coarse linen made of jute and used blankets and woollen goods in the rains and winter, now no longer available for them. Cotton spinning was the leisure-time occupation of all the women of the higher rank and of the greater part of the agriculturists' wives who thus added to the family income. Women also worked on the looms or did embroidery or *chikan* work. One ox and Rs. 5 of capital would enable a grain-dealer to start his trade that could yield a profit of Rs. 50 per mensem.

Famines:

The major famines in the 17th and 18th centuries are listed below:

Year	Area affected	
1595—1598	...	Whole of India.
1614—1615	...	Punjab as far east as Delhi.
1618—1619	...	Coromandel Coast and Vijayanagar.
1680—1682	...	Vijayanagar, Deccan, Gujarat and Sind.
1683—1684	...	Deccan and Gujarat.
1685	...	Surat and Golconda.
1642—1643	...	Orissa and Bengal.
1645—1646	...	Coromandel Coast, Southern Section.
1647	...	Rajputana.
1648	...	Coromandel Coast.
1650	...	Awadh, Gujarat and almost the whole of India.
1659	...	Sind and Gujarat.
1661	...	All parts of India.
1670—1671	...	Bihar.
1705—1708	...	Deccan.
1709—1711	...	Madras and Bengal.
1717—1718	...	Coast and Bay districts, Ahmadabad and Surat.
1722	...	Bombay.
1728	...	Madras and Bombay.
1731—1734	...	Madras.
1737	...	Madras.
1747	...	Bombay, Surat, Ahmadabad and Aurangabad.
1751	...	Bengal.
1769—1770	...	Bengal and Bihar.
1782	...	Bombay, Mysore and Madras.
1783—1784	...	Northern India from Multan to Murshidabad.
1788	...	Bengal.
1790—1792	...	Hyderabad, Deccan, Gujarat and Northern Madras.
1799—1801	...	Northern India to Hyderabad.

Each famine in the past resulted in appalling mortality from starvation, slavery and cannibalism. It is interesting to record the evidence of the French writer, Abbe Raynal, that in the Bengal famine of 1770-1771, the chief agents of the East India Company and the Council of Calcutta "kept locked up in their magazine a part of the harvest, and carried on the most odious and the most criminal of all monopolies." There were of course a complete failure of harvest in 1769 and a partial failure in 1770, but the Council of Calcutta, in order to gain a few millions of rupees, "devoted to destruction several millions in Bengal due to their cruel monopoly." Thus the famine of 1770-1771 which still haunts the people of Bengal like a nightmare was as much man-made as the most recent famine of 1943 in this province.

II. Social Condition:

From different points of view the eighteenth century is an inglorious period in the history of India. Gradual disintegration and ultimate collapse of Mughul imperial authority and debased character of the nobility marred in that period all progressive forces and subjected the country to dreadful political turmoils, social dis-

order and confusion and a grievous economic decline.

Religion:

But even in this debased atmosphere some of the traditionally good features continued in the spheres of religion, culture and society. Hinduism was still characterised by an attitude of toleration towards other faiths and adaptation to new environments and conditions. Grose observed in the mid-eighteenth century: "As to that spirit of toleration in religion, for which the Gentoos (Hindus) are so singularly distinguished, it is doubtless owing to their fundamental tenet of it, of which the purpose is that the diversity of modes of worship is apparently agreeable to the God of the Universe; that all prayers put to Him from man, are all equally acceptable and sanctified to him."²² The Dutch traveller Stavorinus, who visited India between 1768 and 1771, wrote: "These three distinct nations, the Moors (Muslims), the Gentoos (Hindus) and the Parsees, whose religions are wholly different from each other, exercise the greatest toleration and indulgence in this respect, towards one another; no one is molested on account of his religion."²³ William Henry Tone, employed in a regiment of infantry under the *Pesh-wās*, remarked about Poona in 1799: "In Poonah, which is the metropolis of the (Marāthā) Empire, and the seat of Brahminised authority, there are many mosques and one Christian Church, where the votaries of both religions may offer their devotions without any hindrance or molestations."²⁴

The general body of the Hindu population were followers of the old forms and practices of religious worship. There were many worshippers of Shakti, "the power or energy of the divine Mother in action". Worship of the mother-goddess, Durgā, Kālī, Tārā, Manasā was widely prevalent in Bengal and in the eastern districts of Bihār.²⁵ Tāntrism was practised in Mithilā, Bengal and Assam and some works on Tāntra were written in Mithilā and Bengal during this period. There were many followers of the cults of Shiva and Vishṇu and of their sub-cults which had appeared in course of time and spread in different parts of the country. There were a large number of followers of Śrī Chaitanya in Bengal, Orissā and some in Bihār. Adherents of sects like the Rāmānujis, the Rāmānandis, the Kabirpanthīs, the Nānakpanthīs, the Rādhāballavis, etc. were scattered in different areas. Many in Bengal and Bihār worshipped the Sun God and they were known as *Saurapatyas*, or *Sauras*. There were worshippers of Ganesha called *Gānapatyas*.

Besides the old religious sects some new ones appeared during

the eighteenth century. A few of the latter were either of an eclectic or monotheistic nature, and the rest were Vaishṇava sects. The founders of these sects were mostly of the non-Brahminical castes, and Gurū worship was a common feature of all of them.

All these new sects raised voices of protest against certain prevailing abuses which had crept into the religious system in course of centuries. There had been growth of popular belief in magic and witchcraft, emphasis on rituals and ceremonies and undue influence of priesthood which were responsible for some undesirable practices even in places of worship, particularly at centres of pilgrimage.

But it is not possible to agree with the prejudiced views of some contemporary English writers like Grant²⁶ or Martyn²⁷ and biased opinions of some Christian missionaries about Indian religion and morals. One of them made the monstrous observation: "All your Gods are nothing but demons. You will go to hell to expatiate in eternal flames the crime of your idolatry."²⁸ Ward observed wrongly: "Here everything that assumes the appearance of religion ends (if you could forget its impurity) in an unmeaning ceremony and leaves the heart as cold as death to every moral principle."²⁹

Some contemporary European writers were justly impressed by the good features of Indian religion. Abbe de Guyon remarks that by virtue the Indians understood "a certain greatness of soul which despises dangers and death, and has glory for its object; which tramples under foot ease and the pleasures of life; which seeks after the esteem of mankind".³⁰ "Their rules of morality", observes Craufurd, "are most benevolent; and hospitality and charity are not only strongly inculcated but I believe nowhere more universally practised than amongst Hindus."³¹ Orme refers to "humane and gentle manners" of the Hindus who were "charitable even to relieving the necessities of strangers."³² Forbes mentions the influence of religion "in elevating people to display human instances of self-denial, of laborious and painful exertion, which almost exceed belief."³³

Education:

The educational system of a country has considerable influence in moulding its society. In the sphere of education the old universities or centres of learning of international reputation, had disappeared in course of time under the influence of some adverse forces. But in other ways the traditional features prevailed. "The English

found in India", wrote Thomas in the closing years of the nineteenth century, "a widespread system of elementary education and higher education, of which the former was mainly practical, the latter mainly literary, philosophical and religious."³⁴ There was no system of education organized by the State. Education was patronised by some local rulers and members of the aristocracy and supported by contributions of some persons of benevolent disposition belonging to other sections of the population.

The celebrated lady-ruler Rānī Bhavānī of Nāṭore and Rājā Kṛishṇachandra of Nadiā were great patrons of learning in their respective jurisdictions and the Rājā of Darbhanga was a patron of it in Mithilā. The *Peshwās* greatly encouraged traditional education. They paid donations and rewards to Brāhmins, "whose proficiency in science and mythology, entitled them to distinction", and "rewards were conferred in proportion to the acquirements, moral conduct and sanctity".³⁵ In 1823 in the Madras Presidency 12,498 schools were "supported partly by the endowment of native Princes, but chiefly by the voluntary contributions of the people".³⁶

The institutions for higher Sanskrit learning, known as *Chatus-pāṭhis* or *Tols* in Bengal and Bihār, existed also in other parts of the country, such as Drāvida (South India), Kāśī (Benāras), Tirhut (Mithilā) and Utkala (Orissā). A writer described Nadiā in 1782 as "the Oxford of the province".³⁷ He further observed that Nadiā was "the focus of intellectual development, the land of the *Naiyāyikās*, who reasoned and argued on every conceivable topic, the abode of astronomers whose *panjikās* and almanacs still regulate the festivals and pujās and the daily domestic concerns of the Hindus". In 1787, Sir William Jones expressed feelings of joy for "spending three months every year near an ancient University of Brahmins (Nadiā) with whom he began to converse fluently".³⁸ He considered Sanskrit language to be "of wonderful structure, more perfect than Greek, more copious than the Latin and more exquisitely refined than either".³⁹

Benāras, described by Bernier in the 17th century as "the Athens of India", continued to hold a premier position as a centre of Sanskrit learning in India. Some Europeans who came to India in the eighteenth century were highly impressed with the high standard of Sanskrit education at Benāras and also with the astronomical observatory built there by Rājā Jay Singh II of Jaipur.⁴⁰ Regarding the institutions for higher Sanskrit learning in India, Forbes remarked: "We contemplate the Hindoo colleges and Brahminical seminaries, at Benāras and different parts of Hindustān, with plea-

sure; they are useful institutions; and however limited in their benefits to particular castes and descriptions of people, they are the nurses of literature, medicine and science as far as deemed necessary among the Hindoos".⁴¹

With the patronage of Muslim rulers and nobles, Persian education was then in a flourishing condition. For the Muslim population Persian was the most important medium of higher education, and many Hindus learnt it as a matter of practical necessity in view of its importance as official language for many years. The famous mid-eighteenth century Bengali poet Bhāratchandra, had a good knowledge of Persian, and Rājā Navakṛishṇa of Sobhābāzār (in Calcutta) was Persian tutor to Warren Hastings in 1750.⁴² Many Persian schools had Hindu students. Āzimābād (Patṇa) was a premier centre of Persian education in Bengal and Bihār. Ghulām Husain, author of the important contemporary work *Siyār-ul-Mutakherin*, writes that there "were in those times at Āzimābād a number of persons who loved science and learning and employed themselves in teaching and in being taught; and I remember to have seen in that city and its environs nine or ten Professors of repute and three or four hundred students and disciples from whence may be conjectured the number of those that must have been in the great towns or the neighbouring districts." In the mid-eighteenth century some scholars, well-versed in Persian, came to India from Irān and settled particularly in Patna and Bihār province. Madrasāhs were maintained at different places for higher education in Arabic and Persian.

There were some famous poets in Orissā during the eighteenth century. They were Upendra Bhañja, Rāmadas, Krishna Sinha, Sadānanda Kavisuryabrahma, Abhimanyu Sāmanta Sinha and Brajanāth Barajena. Some of them knew other provincial vernaculars besides Oriyā. Upendra Bhañja had some knowledge of Sanskrit. Abhimanyu Sāmanta Sinha "was a man of good education and knew Sanskrit, Marāthi, Hindi and Bengali".⁴³ His "famous work, *Vidagdha Chintamani* was modelled after the Sanskrit work *Vidagdha Mādhava*, of the Neo-Vaishnavite School".⁴⁴

Elementary education was widespread. There were institutions for it in urban as well as rural areas, and it was encouraged in almost every stratum of society. Edward Ives, who came to Bengal in the mid-eighteenth century,⁴⁵ observed regarding this province that "there were many schools for the education of children". Craufurd⁴⁶ observed a few years later that "there were schools in all the towns and principal villages". About Central India, Mal-

colm⁴⁷ wrote in the early years of the nineteenth century: "Though there is not one public place of instruction endowed or supported by any State in this country, yet private schools, both in the towns and villages, are very numerous". As he estimated, every village having above one hundred houses had a school-master, who taught "the children of the *Banias* or shop-keepers, and those of such cultivators as choose". Elphinstone⁴⁸ gives the following account about schools in the territories conquered by the British from the *Peshwā*: "There are already schools in all towns and in many villages, but reading is confined to Brāhmīns, Banyās, and such of the agricultural classes as have to do with accounts". As noted by Forbes,⁴⁹ there were "in all towns numerous schools for the education of other boys; they are generally in the open air, on the shady side of the house. The scholars sit on mats, or cowdung floors, and are taught as much of religion as their caste admits of, as well as reading, writing and arithmetic".

There was a *maktab* or Persian school attached to every mosque and such schools functioned at other places too. "Elegant penmanship" was "considered a great accomplishment".

Generally in the institutions for primary education, teachers were appointed and students were admitted irrespective of caste or creed. In Bengal some of the so-called depressed classes worked as teachers in such schools and at some places there were Muslim teachers for Hindu boys.

The general features of elementary education were similar in different parts of India, with some differences in details. In the village schools which were accommodated in simple thatched houses or in parts of buildings meant for other purposes, the students were taught to write in four successive stages of instruction, on the ground, palm leaf, plantain leaf and paper. They learnt the rules of arithmetic and accounts (agricultural and commercial) and some of the rudiments of physical and natural sciences. Thus they became acquainted with such matters as were needed for a common civic life, not so complex as that of today, and higher virtues of life were also inculcated into their minds.

General Social Life:

For study of general social life in the eighteenth century our main sources are contemporary historical works, accounts of foreign writers and of the Christian missionaries and contemporary vernacular literature. In spite of anarchy and confusion of the eighteenth

century which were affecting the general conditions of life in the country, society in India retained most of the traditional features with some changes under new environments. But it would not be fair to condemn the entire social life and to agree with the prejudiced and uncritical views of some of the foreign writers or the Christian missionaries. Some of the European writers of the eighteenth century or early nineteenth century, who were connected with Indian administration of the English East India Company, have recorded comparatively favourable opinions about the Indian society of the time. Thus Malcolm observed in his *Notes of Instructions to Officers and Assistants* working under him: "I do not know the example of any great population, in such circumstances, preserving, through such a period of changes and tyrannical rule, so much of virtue and so many good qualities as are to be found in a great proportion of the inhabitants of this country. This is to be accounted for, in some degree, by the institutions of the Hindus, particularly, that of caste, which appears to have raised them to their present rank in human society, at a very remote period; but it has certainly tended to keep them stationary at that point of civil order to which they were thus early advanced. With a just admiration of the effects of many of their institutions, particularly those parts of them which cause in vast cases not merely an absence of the common vices of theft, drunkenness and violence, but preserve all the virtuous ties of family and kindred relations, we must all deplore some of their usages and weak superstitions; but what individuals or races of men are without great manifold errors and imperfections, and what mind that is not fortified with ignorance or pride can, on such grounds, come to a severe judgment against a people like that of India".⁵⁰ "Having lived twenty-three years in India, and passed much of that time in intimate intercourse with various nations", R. Rickards wrote, "I have constantly seen, in their acts and conduct, the practice of the most amiable virtues. I have experienced, from many, the most grateful attachment. I believe them capable of all the qualities that can adorn the human mind; and although I allow many of their imputed faults (where is the individual or the nation without them?) I must still ascribe those faults more to the rigour of the despotisms under which they have so long groaned, and which unhappily we have but slenderly alleviated, than to natural depravity of disposition, or to any institutions peculiar to themselves".

The most striking feature of Hindu society was the institution of caste; and caste rules were strictly observed in matters of marriage, diet, inter-dining, etc. The caste rules had various defects.

But these helped specialisation in vocational professions. "In general, it is remarked", notes Edward Ives, "that whatever be the trade of the father the same is that of the son; so that the families of boatmen, fishermen, etc. are boatmen and fishermen to all generations".⁵¹ But on account of the economic and administrative changes in India since the middle of the eighteenth century, there was some laxity in professional specialisations on caste basis. Referring to this Buchanan⁵² observes: "All proper Hindus regret that in these days no caste adheres to its proper duties, but many persons, in order to procure a subsistence, betake themselves to professions for which they were not ordinarily intended". He notes that of the entire Brahmin population of Mithilā only 10 per cent devoted themselves to literary works instead of accepting service; about 68 per cent were proprietors of land; about 10 per cent were employed in various *zamindārīs* or carried on business; and the rest engaged themselves in the profession of priests or copied manuscripts of religious books for sale.

There was something like caste polity to look after proper observance of caste rules. Caste matters were decided by caste councils or caste chiefs. Excepting capital punishment various punishments like fines, penances, excommunications, etc. could be inflicted by them on defaulters of caste rules.

Family system was mainly patriarchal in character, except in Malabar and among some primitive communities in comparatively backward areas. So the senior most member of a family was its head and the women were normally "subject to the will of their master". In a joint family the mistress of the house had a dignified position and she had the authority in regulating its affairs.

Piety, charity, modesty and affection were considered to be essential qualities of a Hindu wife. Some contemporary European writers like Forbes,⁵³ Orme and Abbe Dubois, have highly praised these qualities of Hindu women. "Segregated from the company of other sex", writes Orme, "and strangers to the ideas of attracting attention, they are the only handsomer for this ignorance; as we see in them beauty in the noble simplicity of nature".⁵⁴ "What we call love-making", notes the Christian Missionary Abbe Dubois, "is utterly unknown among the Hindus". He further writes: "Whatever may be said to the contrary, Hindu women are naturally chaste. To cite a few examples of unseemly conduct, a few lapses attributable to human frailty is no proof of their want of chastity as a body; I would even go so far as to say that Hindu women are more virtuous than any of many other civilized countries."⁵⁵

Society in general had feelings of reverence for its womenfolk. "Women are so sacred in India", remarks Alexander Dow⁵⁶ significantly, "that even the soldiery leave them unmolested in the midst of slaughter and devastation. The harem is a sanctuary against all the licentiousness of victory; and ruffians covered with the blood of a husband, shrink back with confusion from the secret apartments of his wife". "A Hindu woman can go anywhere alone", writes Dubois, "even in the most crowded places, and she need never fear the impertinent looks or jokes of idle loungers. A house inhabited solely by women is a sanctuary which the most shameless libertine would not dream of violating."^{56a} This noble feature has been referred to by some other contemporary European writers like Forster⁵⁷ and Buchanan.⁵⁸

Purdah or seclusion of women in houses was observed in Hindu and Muslim families. It was in practice among the Moplahs of Malabar.⁵⁹ Women of poor families who had to go out to work for their livelihood, could not observe it. Regarding South India, Dubois noted that it was not practised there.

Marriage was a universal social practice except on the part of those who observed celibacy on religious grounds. To arrange for marriages of sons and daughters was considered to be a duty of the parents. In Hindu society, marriage was an indissoluble and sacred bond for a happy conjugal life and not a contractual relation for material comforts. It was celebrated with solemnity by offering prayers and invocations to gods. A duly married wife could not be discarded except on the charge of adultery. Marriages of both boys and girls were celebrated at an early age, although consummation did not take place till they attained maturity.

Good women served as "ministering angels" at home. But if necessary some of them could stand by the side of men "in the world's broad field" and "in the bivouac of life". With much experience of the affairs of Maharāshṭrā in the eighteenth century Malcolm remarked about the women there: "The females both of Brahmin and Sudra Mahrāttās have, generally speaking, when their husbands are princes or chiefs, great influence, and mix, not only by their power over individuals but sometimes . . . personally in the affairs of the State. If married to men of rank, they have usually a distinct provision and estate of their own; enjoy as much liberty as they can desire; seldom, if ever, wear a veil and give feasts and entertainments to their friends on births and marriages and on particular anniversaries". Two highly significant illustrations of

such a role on the part of women in the eighteenth century are those of Rāñī Bhavāñī of Nāṭore and Śhrī Devī Ahalyā Bāi, who ruled over Indore from 1766 to 1795. Rāñī Bhavāñī was guided by deep religious convictions with considerable capacity for administration and wide-spread charity for pious objects, which have immortalised her memory. Beveridge has described her as a "heroine among the Bengalees". Ahalyā Bāi was inspired by higher virtues of noble idealism and piety. Her charity was extensive and her skill and capacity in matters of administration were highly commendable. Her manifold qualities have been highly praised by Malcolm.⁶⁰ "In the most sober view that can be taken of her character, she certainly appears, within her limited sphere, to have been one of the purest and most exemplary rulers that ever existed; and she affords a striking example of the practical benefits a mind receives from performing worldly duties under a deep sense of responsibility to its creator."

Some of the Muslim ladies also participated in political affairs. Thus, Dardānāh Begum, wife of Murshid Qulī, Governor of Orissā, exhorted her husband to fight against 'Alī Vardī when the latter proceeded to subjugate Orissā. Zebunnisā, Begum of Nawāb Shujā-ud-din, assisted her husband in matters of administration. 'Alī Vardī's Begum also extended co-operation to her husband in administrative affairs and encouraged him in fighting against the Marāṭhā invaders of Bengal. Holwell thus writes about her: "A woman whose wisdom, magnanimity, benevolence and every amiable quality, reflected high honour on her sex and status; she much influenced the usurper's ('Alī Vardī's) councils and was consulted by him in every material movement in the State except when sanguinary and treacherous measures were judged necessary, which he knew she would oppose as she ever condemned them when perpetrated, however successful, predicting always that such policies would end in the ruin of his family."⁶¹

There was ordinarily no polygamy. Ward observes: "All the Hindus acknowledge that it is a great mistake for a man to have two wives; especially if both live in one house".⁶² Dubois notes significantly: "Polygamy is tolerated amongst persons of high rank such as Rājāhs, Princes, statesmen and others. None the less plurality of wives amongst the great is looked upon as an infraction of law and custom, in fact, as an abuse ... I know only of one case in which a man can legally marry a second wife, his first wife being still alive; and that is when, after he has lived for a long time with his wife, she is certified to be barren, or if she has borne only female children. ... But even in this case, before a man con-

tracts a second marriage it is necessary that he should obtain the consent of the first; and she is always regarded as the chief wife and retains all her prerogatives".⁶³

But polygamy had become a regular and notorious practice among those who were regarded as *Kulīns* in Bengal and among some of the Brahmins of Mithilā. Highly shocking abuses which *Kulīnism* produced have been graphically described by some contemporary European travellers, and in contemporary literature. Among the *Kulīns* family pedigree was like a marketable commodity. Claiming high lineage they sold it and amassed wealth by marriages with a large number of women quite regardless of age or marital adjustment. Sometimes out of financial considerations a girl of full-blown youth was married to a boy of 12 or 13 and a young girl was married to an old man. The *Kulīns* seldom lived with their wives who spent their days in acute mental agony in their father's or brother's houses, which were occasionally visited by their husbands for exacting money. "A Parhi Kulin Brahmin", remarks Buchanan, "may marry as many wives as he pleases, and some have 60; but in general they cannot procure above 8 or 10. They visit them alternately and give themselves no sort of trouble about the maintenance of either the mothers or children."⁶⁴ Referring to Mithilā, he writes: "A man of high rank is often hired when toothless or even moribund, to marry a low child who is afterwards left a widow, incapable of marriage, for the sake of raising her father's family and rendering her brothers more easily marriageable". In the year 1805, the Rājā of Darbhanga, who was acknowledged as the undisputed head of the Mithilā Brahmins, "prohibited any man on his estate from taking more than five wives; formerly it was usual for men to take a good many."⁶⁵

Dowry system was not compulsory or prevalent among those who were not *Kulīns*. Rājā Rām Mohan Roy, the first fearless champion of women's rights in modern India, made a strong protest against "horrible polygamy" and wrote against *Kulīnism* and polygamy.

Polyandry was exceptionally practised in Indian society. Buchanan writes that polyandry prevailed among the Tiyahs in Malabar.⁶⁶ Though the Nair women had the "privilege of changing their husbands they did not entertain more than one husband at a time".⁶⁷

Remarriage of widows in high Hindu families was not permissible. But in 1756 Rājā Rājballabh of Dacca tried to remarry his widowed daughter and referred the matter to the learned Pandits of Drāvida, Telānga, Benāras, Mithilā and of some other places. They

expressed an unanimous opinion: "Women are at liberty to marry again if their husbands be not heard of, die, retire from the world, prove to be eunuchs or become outcastes". Rājā Rājballabh's efforts did not succeed owing to the opposition of Rājā Kṛishnachandra of Nadiā and the *Paṇḍits* of that place.

But remarriage of widows was permitted at some places outside Bengal. The *Peshwās* collected a tax called *patdam* on the remarriage of widows. The famous Marāthā General Parashurām Bhāu, moved by the widowhood of his daughter at a very tender age, thought of her remarriage. The *Paṇḍits* of Benāras gave an opinion in favour of it, but it was not possible to have this remarriage as Parashurām Bhāu's wife was not of the same view.⁶⁸ Widow remarriage was widely prevalent among the non-Brahmins of Maharāshtrā. There were two forms of remarriage—*Pat* and *Muhurta*. The *Pat* seems to have been more informal. The Mon Bhunyās of Mālwa and the Māroo or the Jaudhpurī Brahmins "introduced this happy change in their social system".⁶⁹ Rājā Jay Singh II of Jaipur, Rājā Zālim Singh of Kota and some others "rendered their names famous in the cause of humanity by their laudable exertions in the furtherance of that object."⁷⁰

One shocking practice rampant in certain parts of India was *Sati*, that is, women burning themselves on the funeral pyres of their husbands. The efforts of some of the Mughul rulers to abolish it proved to be fruitless. During the eighteenth century it was more widely prevalent in some parts of northern India on the banks of the Ganga and in Rājasthān⁷¹ than in the south. Dubois writes: "In the southern parts of the Peninsula of India *Suttees* are seldom seen. I am convinced that in the Madras Presidency which numbers about thirty millions of inhabitants, not thirty widows allow themselves to be thus burnt alive during a year."⁷² Regarding Central India, Malcolm notes: "The practice of *Suttee* or self-immolation of widows was found very common in Central India. . . . This usage prevailed most when the Rājpoos had power and influence . . . the Mahrāttās, since they acquired paramount power in this country, have, by wise neglect and indifference, which neither encouraged by approval nor provoked by prohibition, rendered this practice very rare. In the whole of Central India there have not been, as far as can be learnt, above three or four *Suttees* annually for the last twenty years".⁷³ In the south-west of India the practice was not probably so much prevalent as in Bengal.⁷⁴

Even regarding Bengal, Scrafton observed about the mid-eighteenth century that the practice was "far from common and was not

complied with by those of illustrious families",⁷⁵ and Stavorinus wrote just after a few years that it was in practice among "some castes".⁷⁶ *Sati* was not universally prevalent among all castes. But its number increased considerably during the closing years of the eighteenth century and the early years of the nineteenth century. In the year 1799 twenty-two wives of a *Kulīn* Brahmin burnt themselves with his dead body at Nadiā. About the same time many wives of a *Kulīn* Brahmin offered themselves as *Sati* on the funeral pyre of their husbands at Sukchara, three miles east of Serāmpore. About three hundred women burnt themselves with their husbands within forty miles round Calcutta in the year 1804.

Compulsion may have been used in some cases by priests and relations to force women to offer themselves as *Satis*. But it often was the result of conjugal fidelity. Bolts writes in this connection: "Even those very women, who live sequestered from the world, and of course are inexperienced in such difficulties and misfortunes as will render life irksome and impel to desperation, often manifest much fortitude as amazes Europeans but to hear of, in the deaths which they voluntarily brave of burning alive with the dead bodies of their husbands in funeral pyres".⁷⁷ Another contemporary writer Scrafton observes: "Another circumstance that contributes to form their general character, is their marrying when infants, and yet no women are more remarkable for the custom of burning with their husbands. Many authors ascribe this to have been instituted to prevent their wives poisoning themselves; but I am persuaded that they submit to it by a nice sense of honour and conjugal affection."⁷⁸ "Such is the influence of customs and sense of shame", writes Craufurd, "that women of highest birth will undergo this awful sacrifice with as much fortitude and compassion as ever were exhibited by any philosopher of antiquity."⁷⁹ The Dutch traveller Stavorinus, who witnessed a *Sati* case at Chinsurā on 25 November, 1770, mentions that the woman "underwent everything with the greatest intrepidity and her countenance seemed at times to be animated with pleasure, even at the moment when she was ascending the funeral pile".⁸⁰

New forces which appeared in the first three decades of the nineteenth century as a result of the spread of western education, the growth of an enlightened public opinion under the leadership of Rājā Rām Mohan Roy and consciousness on the part of some officers of the Company's Government, some influence of Christian missionaries, helped the Government of Lord William Bentinck to pass

the Regulation XVII, dated 4 December, 1829, abolishing the Sati practice.

Slavery was another common social evil. From the medieval period "slaves formed a familiar feature of every respectable Muslim home".⁸¹ Slavery was widely prevalent in India during the eighteenth century. There were two types of slavery in India,—domestic slavery and feudal servitude. In the latter the serfs attached to lands were considered to be property of their masters, and when lands were transferred from one master to another they had also to change masters. This practice prevailed both in the north and south of India. Referring to the Pariahs of Malabār, Dubois writes: "All the Pariahs born in the country are serfs for life, from father to son, and are part and parcel of the land on which they are born. The landowner can sell them along with the soil and can dispose of them when and how he pleases."⁸² But the landowners sold their slaves only "in cases of great emergency" and not ordinarily. During his survey of South India from 1800-1806,⁸³ Buchanan saw many slaves there.

Circumstances which forced persons to sell themselves as slaves are mentioned in some slavery documents of the 18th century and the early nineteenth century.⁸⁴ It is mentioned in these how a poor and needy man sold himself under perpetual bondage to a rich man of his locality and also how one sold his children (males or females) as slaves or servants in lieu of money. Persons sold themselves or their children as slaves on account of distress caused by natural calamities like famines,⁸⁵ floods, etc. Mr. Day, Collector of Dacca, wrote to the Committee of Revenue in Calcutta on 2 March, 1785: "The long continued distress this district has laboured under from general scarcity of grain, and the failure of crops in consequence of the last deluge, has reduced its inhabitants to the lowest pitch of misery and distress; the poor and the lowest class of people, to secure themselves a subsistence are reduced to a sale of their children and many hundred have been purchased." Referring to the districts of Patṇa and Bihār, Buchanan writes: "Kurmis and Dhānuks born free occasionally give themselves up as slaves when they fall into distress."⁸⁶ About Central India, Malcolm notes: "Numbers date their condition from a famine or scarcity, when men sold their children to those who were able to support them, with a natural view of preserving the lives of their offspring, at the same time that they obtained means of protecting their own."⁸⁷ As it has been pointed out by Malcolm, "Slavery in Mālwa, and adjoining provinces, is chiefly limited to Sondees; but there is, perhaps, no part of India where there are so

many slaves of this sex. The dancing-girls are all purchased when young, by the Naikins, or heads of the different sets or companies, who often lay out large sums in these speculations. Female children and grown-up young women are bought up by all ranks. Among the Rajpoot chiefs these slaves are very numerous, as also in the houses of the principal Brahmins. The usage, however, descends to the lowest classes, and few merchants or cultivators are without mistresses or servants of this description: male slaves are rare, and never seen but with men of some rank and property, with whom they are usually the confidential servants."⁸⁸ Malcolm refers to the "mixed progeny of these unfortunate women" (female slaves). Buchanan holds that in northern India, the Rājputs, Khatris and Kayasthas openly kept "women slaves of any pure tribe, and the off-springs of such connections were classed in one group for marriage."⁸⁹ Rich Muslim families in Bihār maintained large number of male slaves called *Nafars* and female slaves called *Laundis*.⁹⁰ They also kept a distinct class of slaves known as *Molāzādās*.⁹¹

In Indian families slaves were not ordinarily subject to harsh treatment. The Committee of Circuit rightly observed in June, 1972: "The ideas of slavery borrowed from our American colonies, will make every modification of it appear in the eyes of our countrymen in England a horrible evil. But it is far from otherwise in this country; here slaves are treated as the children of the families to which they belong and often appear in a much happier state by their slavery than they could have hoped by the enjoyment of liberty."⁹² In the opinion of Malcolm slaves were "generally treated more like adopted children than menials."⁹³ Tod notes that the slaves of Mewar received good treatment. We get the following account of slavery prevalent in Peninsular India in a Report by William Chaplin, printed under the authority of the Commissioner in the Deccan: "It is however a very mild and mitigated servitude rather than absolute slavery. . . . Slaves are treated by the Hindoos with great indulgence, and if they conduct themselves well are considered rather as hereditary servants of the family than as menials. They become domesticated in the houses of the upper classes, who treat them with affection and allow them to intermarry with the female slaves, and offsprings of their connection, though deemed base born, if males, are often considered free; but if females, they remain slaves. Marriage however is equivalent almost to emancipation, because when married, slaves become rather an encumbrance to their owners."^{93a}

Compared to this the condition of the slaves in European, Eurasian and Portuguese families, particularly in Calcutta, was hard.

They were subject to various indignities and even corporal punishments for trivial offences. Sir William Jones observed in his charge to the Grand Jury in Calcutta in 1783: "I am assured from evidence which, though not all judicially taken, has the strongest hold on my belief that the condition of slaves within our jurisdiction is, beyond imagination, deplorable, and that cruelties are daily practised on them, chiefly on those of the tender age and the weaker sex."⁹⁴

The French and the English Companies, the Portuguese and the Maghs of Arakan carried on traffic in slaves, and there was a slave market in Calcutta in the eighteenth century. Slaves were carried from one part of India to another and were also imported into Bombay and Calcutta from Africa and some areas round the Persian Gulf, America and Mauritius. *Coffree* (African) boys and girls were sold as slaves in Calcutta. The Portuguese and traders of some other European countries transported Indian slaves to St. Helena, the French islands in the Indian Ocean, and to Ceylon. Against the unlawful selling of Indian slaves in St. Helena the Governor-General-in-Council of Fort William (Bengal) issued a proclamation on 5 August 1794, that "criminal prosecutions for the public offence and civil actions for the private injury arising from the unlawful sale or giving away of any person as a slave at St. Helena or elsewhere... will be instituted here against such persons as are amenable to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Judicature, and against whom sufficient evidence can be obtained to support the same; and moreover, that in future all persons in whose service natives shall embark from Bengal to England, will be required to give good and sufficient security against such natives being sold or given away as slaves at St. Helena or any other place or settlement during the voyage to Europe."

Under the influence of humanitarian forces during the first half of the nineteenth century, slavery was abolished and the India Act of 1843 removed legal recognition of slavery.

NOTES

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CHAPTER XXII

TRADE AND INDUSTRY

India lived in her villages and agriculture was the very backbone of her economic life. The Indian village was a self-sufficient unit. In times of normal rainfall it produced sufficient foodgrains for its subsistence. Other needs of the people living in it were few and they were met by the village artisans. The agricultural surplus went to the King in the form of land revenue, and the peasant, after paying the government, had little surplus left with him for purchasing the goods of urban industry. What remained went to meet his needs of salt, spices and clothing. In the circumstances, there could be little exchange of goods between the village and town.

Besides meagreness of demand, another factor restricting exchange of goods between the rural communes and towns was lack of good roadways. Before the nineteenth century, no *pukka* roads, with bridges spanning waterways, existed and merchandise had to be transported by pack-animals. *Banjaras* driving thousands of loaded bullocks were no uncommon sight. But the bullocks themselves consumed a lot. This raised the cost of hauling goods, restricting trade to commodities of luxury, display and high value, which only rulers and their retinue—the feudal nobility and court officials, could afford to purchase.

The second restricting factor to the enlargement of trade in the middle ages down to the end of the 18th century was the customs duties (*zakat*) and tolls levied on goods in transportation from the place of production to its final destination. The injunctions of the *Nitis* that merchants were ornaments of the kingdom remained in the book. The reality was otherwise. Endless levies on goods brought to the market or in transit by state officials and *zamindārs* were a source of perpetual harassment to the producers and carriers of goods. The *Peshwā Diaries*, Chapekar and Chaplin, list over fifty *Pattis* or levies on goods bought or sold or in transit.¹

Khafi Khan's comments on the subject are worth reproducing:

"The *rahdari* in particular is condemned by righteous and just men as a most vexatious impost and oppressive to travellers,

but a large sum is raised by it. In most parts of the Imperial territories the *faujdārs* and *jagirdārs* by force and tyranny, now exact more than ever from the traders and poor and necessitous travellers. The *zamindārs* also, seeing that no inquiries are made, extort more on roads under royal officers. By degrees matters have come to such a pass that between the time of leaving the factory or port and reaching their destination, goods and merchandise pay double their cost price in tolls. Through the villainy and oppression of the toll-collectors and *zamindārs*, the property, the honour, and the lives of thousands of travellers and peaceful wayfarers are frittered away.’²

This is not to say that trade and industry did not exist in the country. The imperial court, its nobility and its retinue, its feudatories and provincial officials with their establishments, though small in number compared to the general mass of people, formed a considerable class; they liked to eat, dress and live well and created a great demand for articles of luxury and display. The poor man contented himself with the rough cloth woven in the village, but the rich decked themselves with fine Bengal muslins, Benaras silk, Dacca *calicoes* and *Kinkhabs* of Ahmadabad (silk cloth) shot with gold thread; their wives were loaded with jewellery in gold and diamonds, rubies and pearls; their drawing rooms were covered with fine carpets and contained beautiful furniture and objects of art. It was these things that attracted the foreign traders. Between the rich class and the foreign companies they created a demand not only for spices, but for cotton and silk piece-goods, *Kinkhabs*, indigo, saltpetre, etc.

The organisation of industry for supplying the needs of the rural community was primitive. The artisans formed part of the village community, worked for the villagers part-time and were allotted a share in the produce of the farms fixed by custom and rarely by the market forces of demand and supply. They often worked on small farms of their own.

The producers of high quality luxury goods worked either in their homes or the State *Kārkhanās* (workshops) in the towns. Such village artisans who acquired special skills in their crafts, also made their contribution to the supply of these luxury goods. Normally the elder craftsmen trained their children in their hereditary occupation. As most of the craftsmen were poor, they worked for merchants who advanced them money for raw materials and their wages. Till the stipulated quantity of goods was produced for the merchant, the craftsmen were bound to work for them. The finish-

ed products were placed on the market by the merchant himself or the foreign company's agents.

Quite often the rulers and nobles had direct dealings with the artisans. They organised *Kārkhānās* at their capitals. Bernier describes large halls occupied by different craftsmen under the direction of *daroghās* who controlled them. The rulers sometimes showed interest in their work and encouraged promising craftsmen by special rewards.³

There was no home market for luxury goods. The foreign companies could offer in return woollens, lead and tin for which there was a small market. So most of what the foreign companies purchased had to be paid for in specie. India thus became a sink of precious metals throughout the 16th and 17th centuries.

India in these centuries was the magnet of the world's precious metals, her commercial activity far surpassing European commerce. The European merchants of Venice, Genoa and Lisbon acted as intermediaries of traffic in the precious goods that found their way to Europe through the Levantine and Egyptian ports or by the newly opened sea-route via the Cape of Good Hope. In 1600, neither Portugal nor Holland nor England produced much that could be exported to India and the East Indies in exchange for spices and pepper of the southern Islands and cotton and silk goods, pepper, indigo and saltpetre of India that were in world-wide demand. Only broad cloth, gold and silver embroidery and a few other luxuries for the nobility, coral, tin, and lead were imported in India from Europe, that therefore had to pay chiefly in bullion or specie for the increasing value of Indian exports. It was India that was the hub of this world commerce prior to the period of the Industrial Revolution.

By the end of the 18th century, however, trade, both internal and foreign, suffered a decline. There were many causes that brought about the decline; but the chief one was lack of peace in the land. The Mughul empire was in decline and it could no longer keep peace in the country. In the first place, the Mughul armies were exhausted by Aurangzib's long-drawn Deccan war; the wars of succession between his sons and grandsons drained the empire of financial and human resources and weakened the imperial fabric; foreign adventurers began swooping down the land from the north-west plundering imperial treasure; governors of provinces affected independence and were challenged by other officers of the empire; there were risings of local populations like those of the Rājputs, the Sikhs, the Jāts, the Bundelas and the Marāthās. All this affected

the tranquillity of the land which, in India, was the first requisite of a prosperous agriculture, a thriving trade and a flourishing maritime commerce.

The rise of Marāthā power and its expansion in the 18th century was another factor which ultimately affected adversely the general production of wealth and its distribution through trade and commerce. In the earlier half of the century, the Marāthās appeared to carry everything before them and evolve a new order to replace the old. But their imperial design was frustrated by a combination of local Muslim chiefs and the Abdālī Shāh of Afghānistan in 1761 at the battle of Panipat. After this, the Indian empire of the Mughuls dissolved into a number of competing *Subahdāris* and *Zamindāris* and warring Hindu kingdoms, and the country suffered the worst anarchy it had ever witnessed.

The Marāthā system of exercising their supremacy over conquered provinces by demand of tribute (*chauth*), without organising proper administration, was wasteful and expensive. Their armies overran territories, destroying everything which they could not take away and impoverishing the rulers and the subjects who were supposed to provide extra funds for meeting Marāthā demands. In their hurry to grasp the much-needed cash, their demands of tribute were often sold to bankers at a discount and districts were placed at the mercy of rapacious money-lenders. Many old cities like Lahore, Delhi, Agra, Ahmadabad, Cambay which were great trading centres, lay in ruins. Nana Phadnis who tried to obtain art objects from Hindustān, was informed by his agent that skilled artisans were no longer to be found in Delhi or Agra, because there was no demand for the products of their crafts.⁴ James Forbes travelling in India in 1785 lamented: "The country through which we travelled for several days past has presented a melancholy picture occasioned by a dreadful famine which had sadly diminished population and left the survivors in a state of misery. At Gwālior whole suburbs were strewn with skeletons; from thence to Agra the villages were generally uninhabited and the land become a wilderness from want of cultivation. In Agra on all sides there were objects of fallen grandeur; mosques, palaces, gardens, caravanserais and mausoleums mingled in one general ruin. The country between Muttra and Delhi had been completely depopulated by famine. Ruins of sarais, mosques, mausoleums and other magnificent structures surround the city of Delhi."⁵

Besides, Indian shipping was ruined first by the Portuguese, then by Dutch and English rivalry in the Asiatic seas, and Indian

trade by differential trade monopoly and extraordinary privileges at home in favour of the European factors and merchants who obtained special privileges from the Indian rulers and misused them. While the Indian cotton industry was also hard hit by the loss of the English market due to the prohibition since the beginning of the 18th century of the import of Indian calicoes and silk, by the discouragement by the East India Company of the manufacture of cloth goods of high counts and silk fabrics in India, it also suffered by the loss of her old markets in the Indian Archipelago, Persia and Africa, with the dwindling of the Indian mercantile marine.

Another factor in the declining trade was, as pointed out by Dr. Satish Chandra, the deepening crisis of the *jagirdāri* system which reduced the available social surplus. The number of government officials increased while the price of silver declined, which led to a rise in the cost of administration. The Mughul emperors lived in great style, luxury and pomp and were imitated by their nobles and *subāhdars*. This, no doubt, gave employment to artists and artisans, but did not solve the problem of agricultural production. Agricultural production, then as now, formed the mainstay of the Indian economy and a growth in the national income could proceed only from a rise in the volume and value of agricultural produce. A rise in the requirements of the ruling class without a corresponding rise in agricultural production resulted directly or indirectly in the growth of economic pressure on the producing classes. During the early part of the Mughul period (1530-1627) there is evidence of a continuous expansion of the cultivated area. But the limit was reached and Shāh Jahān had to scale down the salaries of his noblemen. The financial crisis could not be solved by reduction in salaries. Aurangzīb launched the Deccan War which exhausted the imperial resources. What was required was the rapid expansion of trade and industry and increased agricultural production. But the barriers of the existing social order and the general disturbed political situation encompassed trade and industry.⁶ Hence any improvement in the situation was not possible. The Indian economy was a shrinking economy.

Indian Inland Trade and Transport:

A large inland trade was maintained efficiently by organised caravan and river-borne traffic, a network of banking and wholesale mercantile establishments in all the trade and industrial centres of India with branches abroad and the system of payment by *hundis*. Caravans and *Cafilas* travelled long distances, as for instance from Chittagong, Hughli and Kasimbazar to Āgra via Patna, Benāras and

Allahābād; from Āgra to Multan and Lahore and thence to Kabul and Kandahār; and from Āgra to Surat via Burhanpur or via Ajmer; and from Āgra to Sakkar and Lahari Bandar, on the Indus river.

Travel from Surat to Āgra occupied about 35 to 40 days and cost about Rs. 40 to Rs. 45 on a bullock cart with two oxen. The journey from Āgra to Lahore took 15 to 21 days. From Āgra to Benaras, Patna, Hughli, Dacca and Chittagong in Bengal the river boats called 'patellas' plied regularly on the Jamuna and the Ganga or the Padma bringing salt, opium, *hing* (asafoetida), lead and carpets from Northern India. From the industrial centres of Kasimbazar, Dacca Malda, Patna, Baikunthpur and Benaras the far-famed silks and muslins went via Āgra to Lahore and thence to Persia, Turkey and Khorasan. Plain calicoes from Bengal went to Masulipatam in order to be dyed or printed there and silks to Patna, Āgra, Ahmadabad and Surat to be fabricated into superior fabrics. Saltpetre and sugar similarly moved out to the ports. From far-off Bengal, sugar came regularly to Surat for supply to Golkonda and Karnāṭak and export to Arabia, Mesopotamia and Persia. From Surat about 7,000 to 8,000 bales of raw cotton were carried down the Ganga to Bengal and bartered there for Kasimbazar silks, brought thence to Surat. The surplus cotton of Gujarāt was also disposed of to China, Persia and Arabia. Bengal indigo came to Masulipatam. Indigo from Bayana and Ahmadabad went to the West through the port of Surat. The inferior indigo from other places went to Kabul and Kashgar. Gradually the trade shifted to Bengal which became the chief source of supply at the beginning of the 19th century. The far-famed red cloth of Masulipatam went to Persia both by the land route via Golkonda and Surat or by the sea-route. Awadh calicoes, especially the *Derriabads*, went to Europe through Surat after being dyed and finished at Āgra and Ahmadabad. Hence these were sometimes called Āgra clothing. 'Āgra clothing', which had an exceedingly profitable market in Persia, the Red Sea coast and the Indian Archipelago, included North Indian cloth made in Awadh or the Punjāb, but bleached and transformed in Surat, Broach, Ahmadabad and neighbouring English factories. Some of these calicoes, after bleaching, found also a suitable market in England. Similarly, large quantities of silk came, as Tavernier tells us, from Bengal to Ahmadabad and Surat, where they were woven into fabrics.⁷

Saltpetre from the Patna region used to come all the way from Bihar to Surat. It was estimated by Abbe Raynal that the Europeans exported about ten million pounds for the use of their settlements in Asia or for their home consumption in their respective

countries where it was sold for about four times the price on the spot. The inland trade in salt produced in the Punjāb, Sambhar Lake and elsewhere, was also very important.

The Decline of Trade:

The inland trade in foodgrains was in the hands of the *Banjaras* who moved from one part of the country to another in bullock convoys and also catered to the requirements of armies on the march. European armies in the 18th century also depended upon them for their supplies. With the breakdown of the Mughul authority the system of policing the roads and customs disintegrated. In large parts of Central India, subject to Marāthā invasions and Pindāri raids, inland traffic was much impeded and subjected to vexatious imposts of Rājput princes and petty chiefs.

The period of anarchy developed, however, its characteristic trade and insurance organisation. This is vividly described by John Malcolm:

“Every trader had his party of armed men, formed connections with ministers and commanders of armies, contracted engagements with plundering chieftains and robbers and had his goods, whether exported or imported, guarded like the baggage of an army. The insurance companies at Ujjain, Indore and Mandasor, kept a small corps, which were supported by the high premiums charged on all articles that were exported or imported between Mālwa, Gujarāt, the Deccan and Hindustān. These companies were compelled to bribe the most powerful plunderers of the day, who in their demands upon them and the merchants, had no other standard than their own temporary interests.”⁸

Yet in spite of sporadic disturbances the smooth movement of trade from one part of the sub-continent to another continued, maintained by a considerable traffic in *Hundis*. At the beginning of the 19th century Malcolm notes:

“The provinces of Central India send rich produce to Deccan and Gujarāt; but export few articles to Hindustān; and to Mirzapore and Benares, from whence a great proportion of their imports are received, hardly any goods whatever are sent; add to this, that the bankers and agents of Ujjain and Indore are often the medium of the Gujarāt payments for the merchandise from the Bengal provinces, and we shall account for a great proportion of the remittances that are made.”⁹

In 1817 Malcolm notes that the exchange was five per cent premium for bills on Farrukhabad, Benaras, Delhi, etc., which was about the same rate as formerly when the country was in prosperity.

In Bengal the inland trade and prosperity of artisans and merchants suffered a serious set-back due to the innumerable ways of violence and transgression of the East India Company's agents, *gomastas* "erecting themselves", in the words of Warren Hastings, "into the lords and oppressors of the country instead of confining themselves in honest and fair trade". The Nawāb Mīr Qāsim complained without avail to the English Governor in 1762:

"From the factory of Calcutta to Kasimbazar, Patna and Dacca, all the English chiefs with their *Gomastas*, officers and Agents, in every district of the Government, act as collectors, renters, zamindars, and Talookdars, and setting up the Company's colours, allow no power to my officers. And besides this, the *gomastas* and other servants in every district, in every *gunge*, *perganah* and village, carry on a trade in oil, fish, straw, bamboos, rice, paddy, betel-nuts and other things; and every man with a Company's *Dustuck* in his hand regards himself as not less than the Company."

This, the Nawāb averred, went on with impunity "in every parganā, in every village and in every factory".¹⁰

And this resulted in the abandonment of several prosperous towns, markets and *aurangs*. The Collector of Dacca reported to the English Governor: "Many *hauts*, *gauts* and *parganas* have been ruined". Similarly, in South India the oppressions of the East India Company were responsible for the decline of the trade and industry in Madras. Thus R. & J. Dodsley observe:

"The trade of Madras was some time ago thought to be upon the decline through the oppression of the servants of the Company which has caused many merchants to withdraw. The Moors, Hindus and Armenians have got possession of the trade they were wont to carry on to Pegu, the English being now chiefly employed in ship-building."

Nor was the weaving population inconsiderable in numbers. It is estimated that in South India the East India Company engaged approximately 50,000 workers on 40,000 looms and that the total number of weavers of South India was probably about half a million. Bengal, it may be estimated, had in the middle of the 18th century about a million weavers. But the famine of 1770 killed off probably

half of the weaving population, dealing a severe blow to the declining industry. This famine swept away one-third to one-half of the whole population of Bengal, and, coming as it did on the top of the miseries and oppressions of that strange masterful foreigner—the Company Sahib Bahadur, which squeezed the land, still exercises a profound influence on the imagination of the Bengalis. A profound sense of disappointment and tragedy dominated the minds of the people.

The contemporary historian, Syed Ghulam Husain, wrote in 1780:

“Life is become disgustful to most. Comparing the present with the past, one is apt to think that the earth is overwhelmed with an everlasting darkness.”¹¹

In the religious lyrics of the contemporary poet Ramprasad Sen (c. 1720-81) who lived through the *manvantara* (famine) catastrophe, we encounter a sombre, tragic attitude towards life and poignant recognition of the contrasts between the rich, who lived in palaces and owned elephants, horses and chariots, and the have-nots who did field work, ate rice and salt and bore on their shoulders the palanquins of the former. “Are the Haves, Divine Mother,” he asked in agony, “your grandfathers and we only your discarded children?”¹²

Stages in India's Economic Decline:

The economic decline of India may be said to have begun from the middle of the 17th century when the English (1652) and the Dutch (1665) obtained from Shāh Jahān exemption from all tolls from Surat to all inland centres and from Hughli or Pipli to Agra and Delhi and reduction of customs duties, along with other privileges that the Indians did not enjoy (whose inland trade thus gradually passed into their hands), and at the same time enforced, like the Portuguese, a system of *cartasses* or passes for Indian ships en route. The year 1716 saw an extraordinary reduction of customs duties for the English at Surat and in Bengal by a *farman* from Farukh-siyar, such preferential treatment greatly aiding the transfer of foreign and inland trade from both Indian and Dutch to English hands. The year 1700, exactly a century after the establishment of the English and Dutch companies, saw the prohibition of the use of Asiatic silks and printed and dyed calicoes, though these could yet be imported for re-exportation. This was followed up in 1720 by the prohibition, with certain exceptions, of the wear and use of calicoes dyed or printed in England.

Protective duties for the English weaving industry against Indian products were gradually raised to about 80 per cent in the subsequent decades. The next significant event was the grant of the *Diwāni* of Bengal to the English. The assumption of the *Diwāni* by the East India Company in 1765 gave it not only the whole revenues of the eastern provinces but also tremendous political and economic power that was at once utilised for the discouragement of handicrafts and the ousting of Indian, Dutch, French and Danish factories and merchants from trading in salt, betel-nut, tobacco and foodgrains. A group of *zamīndārs* mustered courage to submit to the Members of the Council in 1765 a complaint against the monopolies and oppression of the Company's servants, among whom there was a general rush towards the interior trade of the three Provinces due to their meagre salaries:

“The factories of English gentlemen are many and their *Gomastas* are in all places and in every village almost throughout the province of Bengal; tobacco, turmeric, oil, rice, hemp, gunnies, in short in all kinds of grains, linen and whatever other commodities are produced in the country; that in order to purchase these articles, they force their money on the ryots, and having by these oppressive means bought their goods at a low rate, they oblige the inhabitants and shopkeepers to take them at a high price, exceeding what is paid in the markets; that they do not pay the customs due to the Sircar, but are guilty of all manner of seditious and injurious acts. There is now scarce any thing of worth left in the country.”

Only four years after the *Diwāni* (1769) an arbitrary order was passed by the East India Company for the prohibition of home work of the silk weavers and their forced labour in the English Company's factories. In that very year the French Company which found their trade reduced to insignificant proportions was abolished. Chevalier complained from Chandernagore that the English Company imposed customs duties from which the French had always been exempted, abolished old privileges, invalidated their passports, and even insulted their colours. The French historian, Abbe Raynal, also points out that the English Company monopolised the sale of salt, betel and tobacco, augmented the customs and at last caused an edict to be published which forbade every European except the English from trading in the interior parts of Bengal. Besides, weavers were forbidden to work for others until the English Company's orders were completed. The weavers consequently were forced to deliver their goods at any price that the Company's agents

fixed for them. On the proposal of the Dutch Company "for a participation with the weavers" the President of the Council at Calcutta wrote to the Directors in 1767 remonstrating that this would be tantamount "to throw off the mask and counteract the endeavours we use of seeming to act from the Nabob's authority only."

Thus the English thenceforward had no European rivals in trade and industry. The Dutch finding their trade in Bengal seriously in jeopardy and the oppression of both the English Company's agents and the Nawāb's officials intolerable, challenged the English by a naval expedition up the Hughli, but suffered a decisive defeat (1759).

The Dutch trade, formerly very profitable, now ceased to be so. Within a few years the province of Bengal was held in complete economic grip by the English Company and its servants and agents through a system of monopoly, coercion and exaction that sucked the people dry. The system was described by a contemporary English merchant, Bolts, as follows:

"It may with truth be now said that the whole inland trade of the country, as at present conducted, and that of the Company's investment for Europe in a more peculiar degree, has been one continued scene of oppression, the baneful effects of which are severely felt by every weaver and manufacturer in the country, every article produced being made a monopoly in which the English with their *Banyans* and black *Gomastas* arbitrarily decide what quantities of goods each manufacturer shall deliver, and the prices he shall receive for them."¹³

Such a system of monopoly and coercion in which "the most sacred laws of society were atrociously violated" virtually continued till 1784, when Pitt's India Bill placed the administration of the Company under the Crown and compelled some reforms. In a minute of 1789 it was stated that one-third of the Company's territory in Hindustān was a jungle inhabited only by wild beasts. Lord Cornwallis who came to India to effect a change in the administration by his system of land reform, created the *zamindārs* of Hindustān on the analogy of the landlords of Great Britain out of a class that was deemed by the contemporary Indian chronicler, Ghulam Husain Khān, as "refractory, untrustworthy, incorrigible and accustomed to infest the highways, torment the subjects, ruin the revenue and distress the Government." This new landed aristocracy was built up as allies of the Company's *Raj* by obscuring and obliterating the customary rights of ryots in the cultivated land, in the pasture land and

uncultivated waste and in irrigation, thus depressing the economic status of the majority of the agrarian population. Since 1793 the economic condition of the agriculturists of Bengal greatly deteriorated, while land became the chief source of investment and social prestige in the country where a phenomenal decline in handicrafts and trade was taking place and causing serious overcrowding in agriculture and chronic unemployment. During this period Indian calicoes and silks could sell in Great Britain at a price 50 to 60 per cent lower than the price of the British fabrics; and the annual import of Indian piece goods was valued on an average at £ 2.8 millions, representing about 33 per cent of the value of the aggregate imports from India. Riots and tumults among the British weavers in London and elsewhere, however, led to drastic protection of the woollen and silk manufacturers by Acts of Parliament. 1813 was the year in which the Parliament, in order to protect the British manufacturers, raised the duties against the Indian piece-goods at their highest—78 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent *ad valorem* duty on calicoes and 31 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent on muslins.

Before this year Indian silk manufactures and piece-goods made of cotton and silk intermixed were altogether excluded from the British market. At the same time the advantages of the use of machinery in large-scale factory production were showing their effects not merely in the displacement of the Indian by the British goods in the home market, aided by protection, but also in the British goods ousting the Indian goods from the Asiatic, including the Indian markets. In 1813 Great Britain sent out to ports east of the Cape of Good Hope, mainly to India, cotton goods worth £ 108,824. On the one hand, the manufacture and export of cloth goods quickly dwindled, and on the other hand, the import of British cloth goods into India began quickly to rise from about 1813.

In the same year the Charter Act of 1813 was passed terminating the monopoly of the East India Company and permitting private traders or free merchants to trade under special license. Three years later (1816) Abbe Dubois, who spent many years as a missionary in South India, wrote:

“This revolution (the invention of industrial development in England) threatens to ruin India completely. Just before returning to Europe I travelled through some of the manufacturing districts and nothing could equal the state of desolation prevailing in them. All the work-rooms were closed and hundreds of thousands of the inhabitants composing the weaver caste, were dying of hunger; for through the prejudices of the coun-

try they could not adopt another profession without dishonouring themselves.”¹⁴

In North Bihar and Bengal, however, Buchanan's contemporary survey (1808-1815) showed that the destruction of the handloom industry was not so sudden and immediate as in South India as it appears from the account of Dubois. “Buchanan counted 6,114 looms in Gorakhpur, 7,950 in Shāhabād, 13,500 looms in Purnea and 4,800 looms in Mālda with lakhs of women finding employment in cotton spinning.”

The Charter Act of 1813 was followed up later on by the Charter Act of 1833 which abolished altogether the mercantile character of the East India Company, that had closed most of their factories by this time, and also considerably reduced its trade operations. The way was now prepared for private British capital and enterprise to exploit unhindered, without the license system, the resources of India that was already “reduced from the state of manufacturing to that of an agricultural country.”

British interest in India was now focussed towards the improvement any export of Indian raw materials, such as cotton, silk, hides, oil seeds, dye stuffs and jute which were essential for the progress of British manufactures.

The year 1813 saw the final conversion of India from the industrial workshop of the world to its richest raw material country. This year saw also the imposition of various discriminatory import duties against non-British Indian ships visiting the ports of England that was most injurious to Indian shipping and ship-building. Next year, in 1814, the British Parliament enacted that no ship, even though British, can enter London that has not on board 3/5 of crew of British mariners. In the beginning of the 19th century, Calcutta, Daman, Surat, Bombay and Pegu were the major ship-building centres. Between 1781 and 1813, 181 vessels were built on the Hughli alone and their tonnage amounted to 83,246.¹⁵ But the industry declined as a result of discriminating legislation.

Economic Factors in the British Conquest of India:

Three important changes in the economic relations between England and India, which had far-reaching consequences, took place at the beginning of the eighteenth century. First, it was in the early years of the eighteenth century that English interest in trade was transferred definitely from the Archipelago of the East Indies to India.

Secondly, it was in the first decades of the eighteenth century that the English, anticipating the approaching disintegration of the Mughul empire, definitely changed the strategy of their trade. The year 1702 saw the union of two companies in England with one Charter. The United East India Company now emerged as a powerful and adventurous corporation, backed by the Government, to whom they made liberal advances, and invested with the authority to make war and peace in India. In the past they had followed a cautious policy of "quiet trading" believing that the "keeping of soldiers beggars a nation". But now following the policy of the "wise Dutch" the English began to run their factories in a manner that these could pay their own expenses and defend themselves against aggression, with fortifications and acquisition of adjacent hinterland. Thus the Company started on the road to become, in the words of Caraccioli, "the most formidable commercial republic known in the world since the demolition of Carthage".¹⁶ The French also had this pre-vision, for Francois Martin wrote home in 1700, "prosperous settlements and a few well fortified places will give (the Company) a great position among these people," and fortified Pondicherry. But the English did not draw the line between defence, aggression and piracy in India. Fifteen years earlier (1685), the English Company obtained permission of James II to fit out and send one fleet to cruise off Surat and take, plunder and destroy all Indian ships and vessels; and another fleet with troops to Bengal to act vigorously in that quarter.

Thus piracy was openly practised by the English on both coasts of the Indian Peninsula. Bolts describes the result:

"The fleet on the Malabār Coast made immense booty at sea from indiscriminately plundering all Indian merchant ships; whilst the troops in Bengal, under the command of Mr. Job Charnock, the Company chief factor at Hooghly, experienced many changes of fortune."¹⁷

Sir John Child, the Company's Governor at Bombay, who is described by Hamilton as being "guilty of every species of tyranny, oppression, injustice and plunder alike toward the natives and his own fellow subjects", prolonged this 'war' until 1690. It is true that both the earlier piracy and Sir John Child's imprudent aggression in Surat that was supported at home by his masterful Chairman kinsman Sir Josiah, came to grief. Aurangzīb's seizure of the English factory at Surat led to the complete forfeiture of all trade privileges and loss of prestige of the English in India. From Bengal they were also expelled by Aurangzīb's viceroy in 1688. Thus the

theory of the mailed fist had to be abandoned for the time being by the English. But terms were soon settled between the two sides both in Western India and Bengal. Child's removal of the seat of government (1687) in the course of the Mughul war, from Surat to Bombay, that was directed to be made "as strong as money and art could make it," was a part of the English total plan of defence and offence.

Thus was founded the English gateway to the East.

Three years later (1690) in Bengal Job Charnock acquired by negotiation Sutanatī, Govindpūr and Kalikatta on a strategic site on the eastern bank of the Hughli most helpful to the English to ward off the Marāthās and at the same time to fight their European rivals as well as the Nawāb of Bengal. Here was built later on, the second city of the British empire, as the English after a decade (1700) resorted more 'to the use of the military' than bribery and presents for successfully rejecting the demands of the native officials and even the Nawāb. On the Western Coast Mughul arms and prestige were dealt a severe blow by Shivājī whom the English looked upon with fear and respect. But the feebleness of Shivājī's successors and the disorder following the death of Aurangzīb were incentives to the English to resort to force. Surat greatly declined in trade and prosperity at this time, and the English were induced by the people of the city, fed up with local dissensions, to take over the possession of the castle, the government and the fleet from the Siddi in 1759. Though the Marāthās did not interfere, the English in their turn recognised the strategic importance of this possession. "Surat which has ever been considered as the emporium of this side of India, admirably well suited for a general mart connecting the produce and wants of Hindustān, Deccan, Arabia, Persia, Europe and China, is besides the only check to the absolute dominion of the Mahrāttās in these parts."

Thirdly, the opening of the eighteenth century also saw the acquisition by the English of extraordinary trade privileges that enabled them to oust native traders and merchants from both inland and overseas trade. In 1692 the East India Company got their customs duties, transit duties and other charges commuted into an annual lump sum of Rs. 3,000 only. Port duties, town customs, presents and other charges were, however, continued to be levied from the general body of native merchants. The Dutch merchants were at that time paying no transit tolls, but a 4 per cent duty at Hughli, and 5 per cent at Pipli and Balasore. At Surat they were paying 2 1/2 per cent duty in lieu of which the English paid a sum of

Rs. 10,000 only per annum according to the terms of a *farman* they secured from Farrukh-siyar. That the native traders in particular were unfairly treated was recognised even by the foreigners themselves. Thus the English Company wrote in 1698:

“The Company have by grants, firmans and mutual stipulations obtained very great privileges and immunities in most parts of India, not only beyond any other nations trading thither, but even beyond the natives themselves.”¹⁸

European Piracy in the Indian waters:

The unequal struggle between the European and Indian merchants due to the exemption of inland dues and duties was rendered all the more difficult because of the danger to Indian shipping in the Asiatic seas from the European pirates against whom no protection was forthcoming from the native administration. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, Indian vessels manned by Indian navigators and lascars moved in the Asiatic waters from Jeddah and Mocha on the Red sea to Malacca and Bantam in the East. Indian ships have been described by many European navigators and merchants as much bigger than the contemporary European vessels. It appears that the Indian vessels, intended largely for peaceful trade, were strongly and capaciously built, but lacked manoeuvrability and fell an easy prey to the European pirates. In certain ports of India there assembled as many as 500 Indian vessels. The Gujarātis, Canarians and the Bengalis of the eastern Bengal won reputation as *lascars* and captains. Raynal records in 1752:

“With regards to their (Indian) sailors commonly called lascars, the Europeans have found them serviceable in their voyages from one part of India to the other. They have been employed successfully in bringing home into our stormy latitudes such ships as had lost their crews.”¹⁹

Various kinds of ships mostly of 1,000 to 1,200 tons were built in numerous ship-building centres of India, the most important of which, in the 18th century, were Bassein, Goa, Surat, Masulipatam, Hughli, Dacca and Chittagong. Indian vessels used to proceed to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf in the month of January, returning in September or October, while the voyages to the Indian Archipelago were undertaken in September, the ships returning in April. Evidently the stormy monsoon months were avoided by the Indian navigators and merchants in the Asiatic seas. It took nearly three

or four months to reach the African coast and the Red Sea ports; while the voyage to Canton on the Chinese coast via Malacca, Patani and Siam also took about four months. In the Archipelago Indian and Chinese junks moved about in large numbers. European piracy began in the Indian waters with the Portuguese who were especially notorious on the coasts of Gujarāt and Malabar and also in Bengal where, according to Finch, they 'lived in no forms of subjection to God or Man'. Both the Dutch and the English Companies followed their example, not to speak of the high-handed adventures of the private merchants and interlopers. That piracy was a ruthless weapon employed by both the Dutch and the English for ousting Indian vessels from trade with the Archipelago is clearly indicated in two English letters from Surat. In 1647 a letter was addressed from here to the East India Company recording the publication of "resolutions" by the Dutch at Surat, "at the coast and other places, to intercept all such shipping as they shall encounter bound thither (Achin. 5)." In 1658 a letter addressed from Surat to Madras contains the following:

"In a postscript dealing with a Madras letter just received it was laid down that for the future none but the Company's ships were to be allowed to trade to Achin, Bantam, or elsewhere. You suffering no private man's ships of our nation whatsoever to voyage to and fro, neither to the ports the Honorable Company trade not unto, as well as where they do; nay, not suffer Banias or Moors (vessels) (except the king's) to trade at the ports the Company does, to their prejudice. The Dutch do not any, why we? It is our practice here, and it will be the better for our Master's profit that you do it there also."²⁰

Such piracy and seizure of Indian vessels at sea continued unabated. The abuse became so intolerable in Bengal that in 1748 Nawāb Alī Vardī Khān admonished the East India Company's Governor Barwell in a *parwanāh* as follows:

"The Syads (Arabs), Moghuls, Armenians etc., merchants of Hooghly have complained that lacs of goods have been seized and plundered, and I am informed from foreign parts that ships bound to Hooghly you seize under pretence of their belonging to the French. The ships belonging to Antony (an Armenian) with lacs on board from Mocha and several curiosities sent me by the Sheriff of the place, you have also seized and plundered. . . . As you were not permitted to commit piracies I write to

you that on receipt of this you deliver up all the merchants' goods and effects to them.'²¹

This warning went unheeded compelling the Nawāb to take resort to various repressive measures against the English traders in their different factories. But a weak ruler could not but submit to foreign high-handedness, backed by sea power that gradually drove the mercantile marine of the Indians as well as of the Armenians and the Turks out of the Asiatic seas. As the traffic in Indian merchandise was gradually transferred to the European mercantile marine due to European naval supremacy, the Indian merchants had to pay heavy freight charges while the Europeans paid nominal or no charges in the vessels of their own Companies. Gradually the English Company ousted not only the Indian but also the Dutch and French merchants from the carrying and maritime trades.

Indian Export of Cotton Goods:

We would now review briefly the trend of India's foreign trade in the eighteenth century. India's articles of export were calicoes, raw silk and raw cotton, indigo, pepper and various drugs and salt-petre. The most important item was, of course, calicoes—the products of Gujarāt, Sind, Agra, Awadh, Bihar, Bengal and the Coromandel Coast that were sold in England and other countries in Europe, the Guinea Coast and East Africa, Burma, Pegu, Siām, the Indian Archipelago and Japan, Persia and Western Asia. The total annual export of Indian handloom products by sea in the 17th century has been estimated by Moreland at about 50 million sq. yards; 15,000 bales of cotton goods were exported by the English merchants, and 10,000 bales by the Dutch to Europe, making a total of 25,000 bales or 32 millions of sq. yards for Europe excluding the trade of the French, the Portuguese and Danes. Markets in the Far East, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf supplied by the Europeans as well as by Indian, Javanese, and Siamese merchants, absorbed, it is roughly computed, another 18 million sq. yards of cloth. One and a half to three million sq. yards more represented the cloth export to Persia and Central Asia up to the borders of the Caspian sea by the land route.²² Thus the total annual export of cotton goods by sea was between 50 and 60 million sq. yards, to which should be added 3 million sq. yards representing the export trade by the north-western land routes. Tavernier estimates that the Dutch took from Bengal 6,000 to 7,000 bales of silk annually, and the merchants of Tartary took another 6,000 to 7,000 bales.

Reckoning a bale to consist of about 1400 sq. yards, the Bengal silk trade alone may be taken as somewhere about 19.6 millions of sq. yards at this period. Stavorinus also estimated that 3,00,000, to 4,00,000 lbs. of unwrought silk from Kasimbazar were consumed in the European manufactories. This excludes the silk fabrics exported to Europe from that centre.

Up till the beginning of the nineteenth century vast quantities of cotton piece-goods from Bengal, the Coromandel Coast, Gujarāt and other parts of India were exported by the English and French merchants to Europe in spite of various restrictions imposed on this trade. Thus, while the value of export of Indian cloth goods represented £ 200,000 to £ 300,000 per annum between 1677-80 and to £ 1 million between 1697-1702, it was about £ 1.4 millions per annum between the years 1786-1790. And the export of Indian cotton and silk goods to England at the opening of the nineteenth century amounted to £ 2.5 millions. France was also importing annually at this time (the figure is that of 1791) £ 1.2 millions worth of Indian cotton piece-goods; while a considerable quantity of these was also exported in American vessels (valued at Rs. 5,600,000 in 1816-1817).

Export Specialities and Centres of Handloom Production:

A very large number of handloom weaving centres existed in India throughout the 17th and 18th centuries.

Calicoes (from Calicut) was the general name adopted by the East India Company for Indian cloth goods exported to England, but there were two hundred distinct trade names of Indian cloth goods recorded in the correspondence of the English, Dutch, and French factors and directors. Such names are derived both from the centres of production in India and from the foreign consuming markets. A few names of such handloom products selling in European, Asiatic and African markets are adduced below: *Semianoes* (cloths made at Samana in Patiāla), *Derriabāds*, *Kerriabāds* and *Eckbarrys* (from Daryabād, Kairabād, Akabarpore or Akabarpur respectively in Awādh); *Gelalpores* (from Jalalpur in Fyzabād); *Mercooleces* (from Nygome or Nayagon in the district of Harodi); *Ambertees* (from Patna, Benaras, Lechore or Lakhawār, 30 miles south of Patna); *Fotas*, *Ginghams*, *Hummums*, *Sanoes*, *Sologesses*, *Elaches*, *Mulmuls* and *Cassas* (from Bengal); *Serribaffs* (from the Deccan); *Buritungeers* (from Sind); *Salempores*, *Moorees* and *Percales* (from Gujarāt) were the goods commonly met with in foreign trade.

In the middle of the eighteenth century the Indian cloth goods sought mostly in different countries in Europe were *Garas*, *Rumals*, *Ginghams*, *Cassas* and *Mulmuls* from Bengal, napkins, *Salempores* and *Betilles* from the Coromandel Coast, *Derriabads* from Awādh and *Baftās* from Gujarāt. White and blue *Guineas* were also still being exported by the European merchants for the Guinea coast in Africa where these were worn by slaves. Coarse *dutties* from Gujarāt went to Persia, Arabia, Abyssinia and the east coast of Africa; the *Chintz* of Cambay were used in Arabia and Turkey as mantles; the *Baftās* and *Gauzes* were used for summer wear in Turkey and Persia; the famous printed calicoes of Ahmadabad went to Europe and to Persia, Turkey and the Indian Archipelago; and the shawls made in Kashmīr and Surat were used for the winter covering in India, Persia and Turkey.²³ A large variety of cotton and silk goods, especially from Maldā, Kasimbazar and Dacca, went from Bengal not only to Europe, Persia, Turkey and Egypt, but also to Ceylon, Pegu, Siam, the Indian Archipelago and Japan.

This is a list of the export specialities included in the merchandise brought by seven French ships to Europe in 1742.²⁴ As many as 51,710 pieces of white *Gara* from Bengal, 58,325 pieces of *Guinea* from the Coromandel Coast and 71,096 pieces of napkins (*Rumals*) from Bengal, Masulipatam, Pondicherry, Tranquebar and Pulicat went in these French ships. This volume of the French trade in Indian calicoes is significant since French political influence was destroyed in another two decades.

India's eastern customers of cotton goods included Japan with whom the Dutch merchants built up an appreciable business after about 1625 and Siam, Indo-China, the Moluccas, Ceram, Banda, Amboyna, Macassar, Borneo, Sumatra and Javā. Across the Indian ocean in the west, South and East Africa, and Abyssinia furnished limited markets. But West Africa, Egypt, and the adjacent parts of North Africa, and the West of Arabia were important consuming regions. Persia, Central Asia, Russia and Turkey were supplied through the overland route via Lahore and Kandahār by caravans carrying there the specialised cotton fabrics of Dacca and Bengal. Turkey, Muscovy, and Poland preferred, according to Tavernier, the printed cloth goods from the Deccan, but Western Europe imported silk fabrics and cheap calicoes from various textile centres, specially Gujarāt, the Coromandel Coast and Bengal. The export trade of Indian cotton goods in the 17th and 18th centuries bore ample testimony to the adaptation of fabrics by Indian weavers of quality and prices to the various requirements, fashions and tastes of peoples

representing different cultures and stages of development from savages and slaves to kings, noblemen and common people in different lands.

Throughout the 17th century Indian calico was used as household linen in Europe and America. All classes of people in England "from the greatest gallants to the meanest cook maids" used both plain calico and *chintz*, (or printed cloth goods). The English flannel and broadcloth were given up in favour of light and elegant apparel.

Gradually the prints and the fine muslins captured the entire European market replacing the British and French stuffs. England developed, however, her own calico printing industry at the beginning of the 18th century in Surrey, Kent and other southern countries, imitating Indian methods of production and printing calicoes. The Dutch, however, were the first to introduce the Indian process of cloth printing into Europe which was later on learnt by the French and the English. Even the Indian designs and motifs were reproduced in the European printed calicoes in order to satisfy the customers. England now imported plain calicoes from India in larger quantities, sending out the finished products to the colonies and elsewhere, as well as meeting the needs of home consumers, in spite of the agitation carried on against this new industry on capitalistic lines by the domestic woollen and silk weaving industries. The English calico printing industry thus thrived on the import of Indian plain calicoes throughout the 18th century; it was only in 1799 that the prohibitive import duty of £ 67-10-0 per cent was imposed on 'plain white calicoes'.

Raw silk and wrought silk fabrics also greatly increased in value among the items of Indian exports to England since the end of the 17th and the beginning of the 18th century, to the great detriment of silk and woollen manufactures in England and the loss and chagrin of the English merchants trading with Turkey. Silk goods thus came under the schedule of prohibitory import duties in the first decades of the 19th century. It was the English who "first set the Indians on that vast increase of silk works" in Kasimbazar, where the production increased from 4,000 bales to 22,000 bales of silk per year due to the high prices offered by the competing Dutch, English and French factors and exporters.

The major centres of silk production in India in the 17th and 18th centuries were Kasimbazar, Murshidabād, Saidabād, Maldā, Satgaon and Sherpur—all in Bengal, and Patna and Baikunthpūr in

Bihar and Balasore in Orissa. It appears that the Bengal silk came into great favour not only in Europe but also in Japan and became a successful competitor of Persian and Chinese silk in overseas markets. Large quantities of silk also used to come from Bengal to Ahmadabad and Surat, where they were woven into silk fabrics for export to Europe. Silk *rumals* or handkerchiefs and *taffaties* used to sell most in the European markets. From the first decade of the 19th century all manufactures of silk and *taffaties* were prohibited for import to England—for silk and mixed cotton replaced many kinds of Norwich and London stuffs made of English silk and wool. This aroused English opposition and was responsible for the enactment of the various prohibitory and sumptuary laws in England between 1700-1730. Milburn observes in this connection:

“The use of printed Indian calicoes, both in apparel and household furniture, became at this time so universal as to be a great detriment and obstruction to the woollen and silk manufactures of the kingdom. This had occasioned several riots and tumults of the weavers in London, etc. It was, therefore, found necessary to redress the grievance, wherein so many were interested. An Act of Parliament was in consequence passed, to preserve and encourage the woollen and silk manufactures, etc., which absolutely prohibited the wear thereof under the penalties of £ 5 for each offence on the wearer and of £ 20 on the seller.²⁵

As a result of the total prohibition of import of Indian silks and printed calicoes to England in 1720, these were re-exported by the East India Company to some countries in Europe, whence again these were gradually excluded as they, in their turn, developed their own industries.

The following schedule of tariffs obtained in England at the beginning of the 19th century (1812). Muslins paid on importation to England 10 per cent and £ 27-6-8 per cent for home consumption. Calicoes paid £ 3-6-8 per cent on importation and £ 68-6-8 per cent for home consumption.

Prohibited coloured cotton goods paid a duty of £ 3-6-8 per cent on importation and were not allowed to be used in England. All silk manufactures and piece-goods made of silk and cotton (*taffaties*) were prohibited.

The consequences were described by Tucker in 1823, i.e., a decade after a Parliamentary enquiry in regard to the protective tariff was instituted:

“The silk manufactures and piece-goods made of silk and cotton intermixed have long since been excluded altogether from our markets; and of late, partly in consequence of the operation of a duty of 67 per cent, but chiefly from the effect of superior machinery, the cotton fabrics, which hitherto constituted the staples of India, have not only been displaced in this country, but we actually export our cotton manufactures to supply a part of the consumption of our Asiatic possessions.”

India was thus reduced from the state of a manufacturing to that of a raw-material-producing country. In order to safeguard first of all her calico-printing industry in the South and then the power-loom textile industry in the North, England not only prohibited the wear of printed calico and gradually increased the duties on imported Indian cloth goods rising up to 80 per cent *ad valorem*, but she also forbade the export of tools and machinery and even migration beyond the seas of artificers and workmen employed in printing calicoes, cottons, muslins, and linens. Thus the only country from which India could obtain her apprenticeship in large-scale manufacturing production, denied her this opportunity.

Meanwhile the Industrial Revolution progressed in England introducing undreamt of economies in the methods of production of cotton goods. The Industrial Revolution and the progress of mechanisation which first completely transformed the textile industry in England were almost contemporaneous with the assumption of the *Diwāni* in Bengal by the British in 1765. Hargreaves invented the spinning jenny two years later and Arkwright his water-frame about the same time, although the third of the great trio of the spinning inventions had to wait till 1779. Four years after the *Diwāni* (1769) the following order of the Directors of the East India Company was communicated:

“Manufacture of raw silk should be encouraged in Bengal and that of manufactured silk fabrics should be discouraged and silk winders should be forced to work in the Company’s factories and prohibited from working in their houses under severe penalties by the authority of the Government.”

This may be contrasted with the beneficent efforts of the East India Company in the 17th century who “first set the Indians on that vast increase of silk-worms” in Kasimbazar where the production increased from 4,000 bales to 22,000 bales of silk per year due to the high prices offered by the competing Dutch, English and French exporters. The English East India Company’s training of Indian

workers by sending out from England dyers and throwsters also contributed towards the development of the Bengal silk industry and expansion of the silk export trade. Thus the way was surely and steadily prepared for the supplanting of the Eastern textile workshop of the world by the Westerners.

Effects of the East India Company's Monopoly and Coercion on the Cotton Industry:

From the inside there were also forces of disintegration of organisation of handicrafts at play introduced by foreign trade, monopoly and coercion. At the time of the opening of the foreign markets for the Indian handloom industry in the 17th century the weavers worked in their own cottages or under master artisans and entrepreneurs in *kārkhānās*. European and Indian merchants as well as agents of governments would often give the artisans advances in order to obtain their products. For over a century the European merchants preferred to employ contractors, called '*dadani*' merchants, who made contracts with handloom weavers and gave them advances of money for obtaining the finished cloths. Such contractors could be distrained by the English East India Company, if necessary. These Indian contractors were entirely under the thumb of the European merchants, because without the intervention of the latter the wholesale market would be closed for them. "Were the present substantial merchants to be laid aside, it would be their ruin."²⁶ Thus the Indian merchants had to reduce their profits while contracting in order to secure the custom of the European companies and this meant reduction of the prices of cloth and the earnings of the weavers. Gradually the Indian merchants found it to their interest to become *gumastas*, the salaried servants of the Companies, instead of independent traders participating in the risks of business with the weaving population. The *gumastas*, however, in the new industrial organisation, became more oppressive than the merchants, and, having distributed the funds of the Companies among the weavers, often speculated on their own account, and sold off cloths to other traders.²⁷

By the middle of the 18th century, the English East India Company gave up the contract system and appointed a large number of *gumastas* who advanced money to the weavers, obtaining from them signed *chits* and exercising a monopolistic control over them so that the weavers were not permitted to work for others. Thus the weavers could not obtain a just price for their cloths. Bolts

mentions that the English East India Company's *jachandārs*, in league with *gumastas*, fixed prices in all places at least 15 per cent, and in some even 40 per cent, lower than the cloths would sell in the public *bazār* or market on a free sale. On the other hand, the weaver in order to obtain a fair price would attempt to sell his cloths secretly to others, particularly to the *gumastas* of the competing French and Dutch companies who were always ready to receive them. This led to great invigilation on the part of the peons and *gumastas* and to corporal chastisement and oppression of all kinds.

Bolts mentions that in the time of Mughul government and Nawāb Alī Vardī Khān, the weavers manufactured their goods freely, and without oppression; and though there was no such thing at present, it was then a common practice for reputable families of the *tanti* or weaver craft, to employ their own capital in manufacturing goods, which they sold freely on their own account. With the introduction of monopoly, the entire weaving population as well as the merchants and intermediaries connected with the cloth trade were subjected to oppression and even "the most sacred laws of society were atrociously violated". "Merchants from the upper parts of Hindustān were in fact expelled and those concerned with exports by sea discouraged", thus wrote Lord Cornwallis in 1788. But the effect of coercion on the weaving community was even more far-reaching.

Bolts (1772) describes the pernicious effects of the monopoly thus:

"With every species of monopoly, every kind of oppression to manufacturers of all denominations throughout the whole country has daily increased, in so much that weavers, for daring to sell their goods, and *dalals* and *pykārs*, for having contributed to or connived at such sales, have, by the Company's agents been frequently seized and imprisoned, confined in irons, fined considerable sums of money, flogged, and deprived, in the most ignominious manner, of what they esteem most valuable, their crafts. Weavers also, upon their inability to perform such agreements as have been forced from them by the name of *mutchulcahs*, to make good the deficiency and the winders of raw silk called *nagads* have been treated also with such injustice, so that instances have been known of their cutting off their thumbs, to prevent their being forced to wind silk. This last kind of workmen were pursued with such vigour dur-

ing Lord Clive's late Government in Bengal, from a zeal for increasing the Company's investment of raw silk, that the most sacred laws of society were atrociously violated, for it was a common thing for the Company's sepoys to be sent by force of arms to break open the houses of the Armenian merchants established at Sayedābād (who have from times immemorial been largely concerned in the silk trade) and forcibly take the '*nagads*' from their work, and carry them away to the English Factories.'²⁸

Whether the details of this oppression were true or not, the economic results were the wholesale abandonment of the occupation by the weavers, and the decline of the weaving industry in Bengal. Such was the direct consequence of the growth of the industrial monopoly by the English Company, and oppression exercised by the Company's peons, sepoys and *gumastas* against weavers and intermediaries in the cloth trade, which came within their grip as the Company extended their factories in the interior of the Provinces.

Verelst referred in 1767 to the unusual scarcity of weavers, a great many of whom had deserted their profession to seek subsistence from a less precarious calling. The *Aurangs* were not so well peopled as they were twenty years before, he observes, and yet the demand for cloth goods in Europe was then much greater than what the country could supply.

There was yet another method by which the weaving industry was hit by the English East India Company in the 18th century. They established some kind of monopoly of Bombay and Surat raw cotton, and thus the prices of cotton in Bengal rose from Rs. 16-18 per maund (about 80 lbs. weight) to Rs. 28 and Rs. 30. To counteract this, upcountry cotton began to be brought down the rivers Jamuna and Ganga, but the Company forced Muhammad Rezā Khān to levy a new and extraordinary duty of about 30 per cent on the cotton, so as to prevent its entry into the Bengal Province. Abbe Raynal points out that the English Company obliged the Nawāb of Bengal to establish in their favour a monopoly for the sale of cotton brought from any other province in order to raise it to an exorbitant price.²⁹ The gradual rise of the raw cotton prices towards the end of the 18th century deprived India of the advantage which she had formerly enjoyed in having cheap cotton. Since the 17th century the price of raw cotton in India increased by almost one and half times, whereas in England by the first quarter of the 19th century the price of cotton was reduced by one-third as compared with the price which prevailed down to 1780.

This increase of cotton price was true not merely of Bengal but also of Gujarāt and the Coromandel Coast. In the latter region, the increase was from 4d. per lb. in the 17th century to 6d. in the early years of the 19th century. In England, on the other hand, the price of cotton was reduced from 1s. 8d. in the 18th century to 7d. per lb. by 1828 when the American and West Indies cotton began to be imported. This factor also placed the Indian handloom industry at a disadvantage as compared with the British power-loom industry. Yet, India used to export raw cotton, especially from Gujarāt, Madras and Bengal. As late as 1827 India exported 68 million lbs. of cotton to England as compared with her American cotton import of 294 million lbs.

Other Items of Indian Export Trade:

Among other items of export of India in the 18th century besides cloth and raw cotton were raw silk, indigo and saltpetre. Raw silk was the basic material of the English silk-weaving industry which gradually developed fabrics ousting the imported Chinese fabrics. Saltpetre was also an important Indian export to Europe. As an important ingredient for the making of gunpowder its demand in Europe fluctuated, being determined by wars and expectation of wars.

In peace time saltpetre could hardly be sold. The great export trade to Europe of saltpetre was largely concentrated in the 18th century in Bihar and Bengal, where European Companies established factories for its production. In the year before the battle of Waterloo (1815) the East India Company exported 146,000 cwt. of saltpetre to England. After the Napoleonic wars the trade in saltpetre became unprofitable.

Indigo had been an important Indian export in the 17th and 18th centuries. Its centres of production were Gujarāt, Āgra, Sarkhej, Bayana, Bihar and Bengal. But the trade of indigo along with that of sugar was very unfavourably affected by the rise of the plantation system in the West Indies and the U.S.A., at the end of the 17th century. The West Indies, however, after a few decades, changed from indigo to crops enabling the Indian export trade in indigo to re-establish itself. After the destruction of the indigo factories in St. Domingo, which supplied the bulk of the world with indigo, the indigo factories in Bihar and Bengal suddenly leaped into prosperity in the second decade of the 19th century. There were as many as 400 indigo factories under about a thousand Europeans

in Bengal and Bihar, chiefly in Jessore, Nadiā, Murshidābād and Tirhut, and indigo worth £ 3.6 million was exported to England. But indigo plantation led to a great oppression of the cultivating class leading to widespread agrarian discontent in Bengal that was immortalised in Dinabandhu Mitra's poignant drama, *Nilā Darpān*. The causes of this discontent, discussed by Buchanan, for the district of Dinajpur in Bengal were that the English indigo planter deterred cultivators from the work of ordinary cultivation, cheated them both in the measure of their land and the crop and treated them as his slaves, beat and confined them whenever he was dissatisfied. He, in fact, suggested that new licenses for indigo plantation should be refused, and also that the Europeans not responsible to the East India Company for their conduct, be restricted to a residence in the principal towns and sea-ports.

Throughout the 17th and the 18th centuries India maintained a favourable balance of trade. Her important commodities of import were gold, silver, lead, tin, woollen goods, horses, spices, tobacco and glassware. The creditor position of India was maintained until even the first half of the 18th century.

But the political subordination of India not only led to the strangulation of India's European trade, but at home she was left completely at the mercy of England who forced upon her English cotton piece-goods without payment of any duty. The loss of Indian shipping and its displacement by British shipping also led to the loss of her nearer markets in Africa, Arabia, Persia, Indian Archipelago and further East that had for centuries depended upon her handloom products.

The Industrial Revolution in Great Britain hit Indian industry very hard. The handloom and other handicrafts, however cheap the labour, could not compete with the flood of goods pouring from factories using labour-saving machinery.

The Indian practice of burying gold and silver in the ground had pernicious effects on trade and industry. In the 18th century India, a considerable body of the industrial and trading population was represented by the Hindus. The Hindu trader concealed much of his wealth for fear of being despoiled. The Muslim's accumulated capital was escheated to the State on his death. The middle class consisting of traders, merchants and petty officials was not strong and enterprising enough for initiating industrial or commercial changes by investment of capital in new directions. The feudal

aristocracy which controlled much wealth was extravagant and hardly used it for trade and productive purposes.

The wide gulf between the intellectual and working classes not merely prevented any mechanical improvement in the arts and handicrafts of the country, but left the bulk of artisans and workers in the cold shade of social neglect and low status. Thus the intellectual, social, economic and political circumstances of India in the 18th century all conspired towards the loss of her industrial and commercial hegemony in the Orient.

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ERRATA

Page	line	for	read
21	19 from above	make of his wits	make use of his wits
45	1 -do-	remain	regain
87	20 -do-	or	on
92	2 -do-	assailed	assail
93	4 from bottom	Persians	Persian
199	note 1	7 Sept. 1741	12 May, 1741 according to Khare
234	22 from above	Jiya Bai	Jija Bai
264	12 -do-	but	omit 'but'
305	25 -do-	stronghold	strongholds
308	Note 21	Gooti	Govt.
337	Note 17	Spoys	Sepoys
340	12 from above	plates	plate
364	18	may	might
373	last line		omit 'and Vansittart'
375	5 from above	Mills	Mill
393	11 -do-	complaint	compliant
394	23 -do-	Hindustan	Hindustani
409	7 -do-	showed	shows
440	8 from bottom	1972	1792
456	10 -do-	store	stores
481	2 -do-	detachments	battalions
496	12 -do-	eighty-three year old	eighty-three years old
519	Note 130	p. 254	1957 ed. p. 568
519	Note 132	Prinsep III	Prinsep II
727	last line	on	in

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CHRONOLOGY

1658	English factories on the Coromandel Coast and in Bengal made subordinate to Fort St. George (p. 615).
1681, November 14	William Hedges appointed first independent Agent and Governor of East India Company's factories in Bengal (p. 578).
1683	By the Charter of 1683, the East India Co., is given full powers to declare and make war and peace with native powers (p. 616).
1693, March 16	Birth of Malhar Rāo Holkar (p. 267).
1699	Marāthās invade Mālwa for the first time (p. 79).
1702-8	Union of the rival East India Companies.
1703	Nemāji Sindia bursts into Mālwa near Handia and reaches Sironj (p. 79).
1704	Ajit Singh of Mewār and Durgadas of Mārwar make peace treaty with Aurangzib (p. 5).
1707, March 3 (New style)	Death of Aurangzib.
1707, March 14	Āzam, second son of Aurangzib, proclaims himself Mughul emperor (p. 10).
1707, May 8	Rājā Shāhu leaves Mughul camp for home (p. 45).
1707, June 18	Prince M'uazzam defeats and kills Prince A'zam at the battle of Jajau near Samugarh (pp. 11, 78).
1707, October 12	Battle of Khed between the armies of Rājā Shāhu and Tara Bai (p. 47).
1707	Ajit Singh of Jodhpur, Jay Singh of Amber and Amar Singh of Udaipur form a confederacy (p. 13).
1708, January	Rājā Shāhu ascends the Marāthā throne at Satara (p. 48).
1708, August	Death of Dhanājī Jādhav, Rājā Shāhu's <i>Senapati</i> (p. 49).
1708, October 6	Bahādur Shāh (Mu'azzam) restores Jay Singh of Amber and Ajit Singh of Jodhpur to their ranks in the services (p. 141).
1708, November 17	Murder of Guru Govind Singh at Nanded (pp. 14, 126. Also see <i>ibid</i> , pp. 237, 322 & 323 of Vol. VII).
1709, January 13	Bahādur Shāh disposes of Kam Baksh (p. 11).
1709	Death of Parsoji Bhosle (pp. 50, 240).

THE MARATHA SUPREMACY

1710, December	Emperor Bahādur Shāh expels Banda Bahādur from Lohgarh fort (p. 162).
1712, February 27	Death of Bahādur Shāh, Mughul emperor (pp. 15, 126).
1713, January	Farrukh-siyar ascends the Mughul throne on the death of Bahādur Shāh (p. 152).
1713, September	Farrukh-siyar confers <i>diwani</i> of Bengal <i>subāh</i> on Murshid Qulī (titled as Jafar Khān) (p. 104).
1713, November 17	Bālājī Vishwanāth appointed <i>Peshwā</i> of Shāhu's kingdom (p. 53).
1713	Chin Qilich Khān appointed by Farrukh-siyar as the governor of the six <i>subāhs</i> of the Deccan with the title of Nizām-ul-Mulk Bahādur Fath Jang (p. 119).
1714, May 6	Murshid Qulī Khān (titled Jafar Khān) made Deputy Governor of Bengal, and <i>Subāhdar</i> of Orissa (p. 104).
1715, December 7	Banda Bahādur captured by the Mughuls with his followers at Gurdas Nangal (p. 162).
1715	Nizām-ul-Mulk, Governor of Deccan, recalled and in his place Sayyid Husain Ali appointed (p. 119).
1716, June 19	Banda Bahādur, the Sikh leader, tortured to death (p. 127).
1716, November	Sawai Jay Singh of Amber, on instructions of the Mughul emperor, raids Thun, but is compelled to raise the siege as the Jat leader Churāman makes peace with Sayyid Abdulla, <i>Vazīr</i> (p. 153).
1717, September	Murshid Qulī Khān, Deputy Governor of Bengal, made <i>subāhdar</i> of Bengal (p. 104).
1717	Farrukh-siyar issues a <i>farman</i> granting the English East India Co. permission to trade in Bengal, free of all duties, on a payment of Rs. 3,000 per annum (p. 105).
1718	The <i>Peshwā</i> and Sayyid Husain Alī Khān, Deccan <i>Subāhdar</i> , enter into a treaty and the <i>Peshwā</i> gets the grants of <i>Swaraj</i> , <i>Chauth</i> and <i>Sardeshmukhi</i> of the six <i>subāhs</i> of the Deccan (pp. 44, 64, 80).
1719, February	Sayyid Brothers seize emperor Farrukh-siyar and put him in prison (p. 59).
1719, March	The Sayyids who had seized power from Farrukh-siyar grant sanads to Rājā Shāhu agreeing to his demands of <i>Chauth</i> , <i>Sardeshmukhi</i> and <i>Swaraj</i> of the six <i>subāhs</i> of the Deccan (p. 59).

CHRONOLOGY

- 1719, March The new Mughul emperor, Rafi-ud-Darjāt, ratifies the grants of *Swaraj*, *Chauth* and *Sardeshmukhi* of the six *subāhs* of the Deccan to the *Peshwā*, agreed to in 1718 (pp. 64, 79, 80).
- 1719, April Farrukh-siyar done to death (p. 20).
- 1719, May Bālāji Vishwanāth, *Peshwā*, returns to Deccan with the deeds granting *Chauth*, *Sardeshmukhi* and *Swaraj*, along with Rājā Shāhu's mother (p. 59).
- 1719, June 6 Rafi-ud-Daulah is raised to Delhi throne by the Sayyid brothers (p. 20).
- 1720, April 2 Death of Bālāji Vishwanāth, *Peshwā*, at Saswad (p. 61).
- 1720, April 17 Bājī Rāo succeeds to the *peshwāship* on the death of his father Bālāji Vishwanāth (p. 63).
- 1720, September 19 The English navy attack Gheria (Vijayadurg), the stronghold of Kanhoji Angria unsuccessfully (p. 296).
- 1720, June 19 The battle of Khāndwā fought between Sayyid Dilawar Alī Khān and Nizām-ul-Mulk. Dilawar Alī Khān is killed (p. 120).
- 1720, July 31 'Alam 'Alī Khān, deputy of Husain 'Ali, is defeated by the Nizām at Balapur (p. 67).
- 1720, October 8 Sayyid Husain Alī, one of the Sayyid brothers, assassinated by Haidar Beg near Toda-Bhim. (pp. 23, 65, 67 & 120).
- 1720, November 13 Battle of Hasanpur. Sayyid Abdulla captured and imprisoned (p. 23, 120).
- 1720, December 25 Muhammad Khān Bangāsh appointed Governor of Allahabad (pp. 83 & 138).
- 1720 The first Bank established in Bombay (p. 634).
- 1720 The Bundelas rise in revolt against Mughul Governor of Allahābād (p. 138).
- 1720-21 *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo invades Khāndesh (p. 67)
- 1721, January 4 *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo meets Nizām-ul-Mulk for the first time near Chikalthan (p. 67).
- 1721, May 25 Chhatrasal Bundela defeats Dilir Khān (a general of Muhammad Khān, Governor of Allahābād). Dilir Khān is killed (pp. 138 & 139).
- 1721, August 20 The English and the Portuguese enter into an alliance to end the menace of Kanhoji Angria (p. 297).
- 1722, February Nizām-ul-Mulk is appointed *Vazīr* (p. 130).

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1722, September	Mir Muhammad Amīn alias Saadat Khan is appointed Mughul Governor of Awadh (p. 26).
1722, November	Jay Singh, Governor of Āgra, conquers Thun (p. 153).
1722	Murder of Abdullah, one of the Sayyid brothers (p. 65).
1723, February	The <i>Peshwā</i> invades Mālwa and meets Nizām-ul-Mulk at Badaksha near Jhabua (p. 80).
1723	Pilaji Gaikwār defeats Momin Khān, governor, and levies <i>chauth</i> in Surat <i>Athāvisi</i> (p. 280).
1723	Rājā Ajit Singh of Jodhpur and the Mughul emperor enter into a treaty (p. 139).
1723	The Marāthā army commences probing attacks on Portuguese territories on the West coast (p. 95).
1724, May 18	Nizām-ul-Mulk meets the <i>Peshwā</i> at Nalcha, enters into an agreement with the <i>Peshwā</i> Bāji Rāo and wins him over to his cause (p. 67).
1724, October 1	Nizām-ul-Mulk defeats Mubariz Khān, <i>Subāhdar</i> of Hyderabad, at Sakharkharda (p. 67).
1725, February	Hamid Khān, the Deputy of Nizām with the aid of Kanthaji Kadam Bande and Pilaji Gaikwār defeats Shujā'at Khān, a deputy of Governor Sarbuland Khān, and kills him (p. 72).
1725, June	Girdhar Bahādur is appointed as Mughul <i>subāhdar</i> of Malwā (p. 81).
1725	Nizām-ul-Mulk recovers Hyderabad. From this period dates the independence and the founding of the Hyderabad State (p. 120).
1725-26	Marāthā forces, under the leadership of the <i>Pratinidhi</i> and the <i>Peshwā</i> , invade parts of Karnataka but are met with opposition by the armies of the Nizām (p. 68).
1726, January	Sarbuland Khān, Mughul Governor of Gujarāt, defeats Pilaji Gaikwār and Kanthaji Kadam Bande in a battle near Sojitra (p. 72).
1726, April	Sarbuland Khān agrees to grant <i>chauth</i> of Gujarāt to the <i>Peshwā</i> (p. 73).
1726	The Court of Directors send along with the Charter of 1726, a book of instructions with respect to the method of proceeding in all actions and suits—civil and criminal (p. 620).
1726-27	Marāthā forces under the leadership of the <i>Pratinidhi</i> and the <i>Peshwā</i> again invade parts of Karnataka but are met with opposition by the armies of the Nizām (p. 68).

CHRONOLOGY

- 1727, February 8 Sidi Sā'at, commandant of Anjanwel fort, razes to the ground the temples and dharmasala raised by Brahmendra Śwami at Parshuram (p. 76).
- 1727, February 20 Sarbuland Khān, Mughul Governor of Gujarāt, continues the agreement made in April 1726 to grant *chauth* and Sardeshmukhi of Gujarāt to the Peshwā (p. 73).
- 1727, June 30 Death of Murshid Qulī Khān (p. 106).
- 1727, July 30 Rājā Shāhu orders that 'the Mokasa' of prant Gujarāt previously granted to Chimnāji Ballāl be given to Khanderao Dabhade towards the maintenance of his troops (p. 73).
- 1727 The Mayor's court is re-organised (p. 618).
- 1727, August 1 The Marāthā army under the generalship of Peshwā Bāji Rāo invades Nizām's territories of Khāndesh and Gujarāt (p. 69).
- 1728, February 25 The Nizām defeated at Palkhed. Treaty of Mungi-Paithan (pp. 69, 81, 97, 98, 121).
- 1728, November 29 Chimnāji Appā attacks Subādhar Girdhar-Bahādur at Amjhera and completely annihilates the Mughul army (pp. 81, 91, 143, 144, 145, 267).
- 1728, December Jaitpur, a Bundela stronghold, surrenders to Mughul governor Muhammad Khān Bangāsh (p. 83).
- 1729, March 22 Peshwā Bāji Rāo, on a request from Chhatrasal Bundela for help, defeats Muhammad Khān Bangash and obtains a *Jagīr* in Bundelkhand (pp. 83, 139, 40).
- 1729, June 20 Death of Kanhoji Angria (p. 299).
- 1729, July Ranoji Sindia is granted *Saranjam* previously enjoyed by Pilaji Jadhav (p. 251).
- 1729, August 5 Sekhoji Angria succeeds to the Admiralty of the Marāthā navy on the death of his father Kanhoji Angria (p. 299).
- 1729, September Death of Khanderao Dabhade Senapati.
- 1729, December Chimnāji Appā, brother of the Peshwā, raids Gujarāt, and occupies Pawagarh held by Kanthaji Kadam Bande (p. 74).
- 1729 (end) Sawai Jay Singh appointed Governor of Mālwa. Suggests a policy of appeasement (p. 81).
- 1730, March 23 Sarbuland Khān, Mughul Governor of Gujarāt, further extends the treaty concluded in April 1726 and continued on 20 February 1727 granting *chauth* of Gujarāt to the Peshwā (p. 73).

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- 1730, March The fort of Mandu (Mālwa), captured by the Marāthās (Holkar and Pawar) restored to the *subāhdar* as a result of the understanding arrived at between Rājā Shāhu and the Mughul emperor (p. 82).
- 1730, September Muhammad Khān Bangash is appointed Mughul *subāhdar* of Mālwa in place of Sawai Jay Singh (p. 82).
- 1730, October Malhār Rāo Holkar is granted the entire assignment of the *subāh* of Mālwa (p. 84).
- 1731, April 1 Armies led by Trimbak Rao Dabhade *Senapati* and the *Peshwā* clash against each other at Dabhoi and the army led by the *Senapati* is defeated and he is slain (pp. 75, 121, 279, 281).
- 1731, April 13 A treaty (offensive and defensive) concluded between Rājā Shāhu and Rājā Shambhūjī of Kolhapur (pp. 71, 231-32).
- 1731, December 14 Death of Chhatrasal Bundela at Panna at the age of 82 (p. 140).
- 1732, December Meeting between *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo and the Nizām at Rohe Rameshwar. An agreement concluded by which the Nizām was to have a free hand for expansion in the south and the *Peshwā* in the north (pp. 75, 121).
- 1732 *Peshwā's* chief sardars—Holkar, Sindia and Pawar—start sharing collections from Mālwa (p. 84).
- 1732 The Marāthās launch an offensive against Mālwa (p. 84).
- 1733, February Death of Sidi Rasul Khan, the Sidi chief (p. 76).
- 1733, February The Marāthās surround Sawai Jay Singh near Mandasor and extract from him Rs. six lakhs in addition to the revenue of 28 *parganās* already collected (p. 84).
- 1733, May-December *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo's campaign against Janjira (pp. 76-78).
- 1733, June 8 Shripat Rao Pratinidhi occupies Raigarh fort (p. 77).
- 1733, July 16 The English occupy Underi with the consent of Sidi of Janjira (p. 300).
- 1733, August 28 Death of Sekhoji Angria (pp. 77, 300).
- 1733, December 1 Truce is declared between the Marāthās and the Sidis and Abdur Rahman, grandson of Sidi Rasul Khan, is seated on the Janjira *masnad* (p. 78).
- 1734, April 22 Malhār Rāo Holkar and Ranoji Sindia capture Bundi, oust Dalel Singh (nominee of Jay Singh of Amber) and reinstate Budh Singh to the throne of Bundi (pp. 25, 84, 143).

CHRONOLOGY

- 1734, October Jay Singh of Amber convenes a conference of all the Rājput chiefs at Hurda to explore ways and means of holding the Marāthās beyond the Narmada, in which all agree and sign an agreement. The agreement remained a dead letter (p. 25).
- 1735, February 28 The armies of Sindia and Holkar plunder Sambhar (p. 85).
- 1735, February *Vazīr* Qamar-ud-din Khān attacks Marāthā army under the leadership of Pilaji Jadhav in vain near Narwar (p. 84).
- 1735, March 24 The Marāthā chieftains agree to accept Rs. 22 lakhs as *chauth* for Mālwa and thus the Mughul efforts to hold at bay the Marāthās prove a failure (p. 85).
- 1735, October *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo I starts from Poona on his north-Indian campaign (p. 86).
- 1735 On the death of Chānd Sultān, Rājā of Deogarh, his illegitimate son Vali Shah usurps the throne (pp. 240-41).
- 1736, January 15 *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo I on his north Indian campaign reaches Mewar frontier and compels Rana Jagat Singh of Mewar to sign a treaty (p. 143).
- 1736, February 4 *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo visits Jalmandir in Pichola lake (p. 86).
- 1736, February *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo I and the Rana of Udaipur meet in formal Darbar (p. 86).
- 1736, March 4 *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo I meets Sawai Jay Singh at Bhambholao near Kishangarh to discuss the *jagīr* and *chauth* to be conferred on the *Peshwā* on behalf of the Mughul emperor. The *Peshwā* demands control over Mālwa, Bundelkhand, Bengal and the Deccan (pp. 24, 87).
- 1736, April Chimnāji Appā, the Marāthā General, defeats and destroys the force of Sidi Saat at the battle of Charhai Kamarle (p. 301).
- 1736, September 25 A treaty concluded between the Sidi chief and Chimnāji Appā, by which a dual government is established in the eleven *mahals*, formerly owned by the Sidi. The Sidi becomes a tributary of the Marāthā State (p. 78).
- 1737, March 26/27 An advance detachment of the Marāthās enters Salsette island in a surprise attack. Thana fort under possession of the Portuguese surrenders (p. 95).
- 1737, March *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo I marches to Delhi (p. 89).
- 1737, March 30 *Peshwā's* commander, Satvoji Jadhav, routs the Mughul army near Delhi (p. 89).

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- 1737, July Muhammad Shāh, Mughul emperor, summons Nizām-ul-Mulk to the court. Nizām-ul-Mulk is appointed Governor of Agra vice Jay Singh (p. 27).
- 1737 Gujarāt is finally lost to the Mughul empire (p. 24).
- 1738, January 7 *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo defeats Nizām-ul-Mulk at the battle of Bhopal and compels him to sign a convention at Duraha Sarai by which the *Peshwā* gets *subāhdari* of Mālwa, tributes from the Rājās between the Narmada and the Chambal and Rs. 50 lakhs from the Nizām to meet war expenses (pp. 24, 91, 122, 144).
- 1738, November 26 Nādir Shāh on his way to India, with an intention of invading, occupies Khyber Pass (p. 92).
- 1738, November The Portuguese make a vain bid to recapture Thana, occupied by the Marāthās in March 1737 (p. 96).
- 1739, January 25 Lahore surrenders to Nādir Shāh (p. 92).
- 1739, February 16 Nādir Shāh arrives at Sirhind on his invasion of India (p. 30).
- 1739, February 24 Emperor Muhammad Shāh is made a captive by Nādir Shāh (p. 92).
- 1739, March 12 Nādir Shāh, the Persian invader, enters the Shalimar Gardens near Delhi with his captive Muhammad Shāh, emperor, *Vazīr* Qamar-ud-din and the royal harem (p. 33).
- 1739, March 20 Nādir Shāh, the Persian invader, enters Delhi with his army (pp. 33, 93).
- 1739, March 20 Sā'adat Khan (originally known as Mir Muhammad Amin), a Mughul noble and the founder of the kingdom of Awadh, commits suicide (p. 113).
- 1739, March 21 Nādir Shāh proclaimed sovereign of Delhi. Due to a rumour, a tumult breaks out and Nādir Shāh orders a general massacre of Delhi population in which 4 lakh lives are butchered (pp. 33 & 93).
- 1739, March 30 Death of Shuja-ud-din, Governor of Bengal (p. 108).
- 1739, April Harde Sah, son of Chhatrasal Bundela and Rājā of Panna, passes away (p. 140).
- 1739, May 5 The Marāthās succeed in wresting Bassein fort from the Portuguese. Portuguese power wanes (p. 96).
- 1739, May 12 Nādir Shāh as Sovereign of India, holds a *Darbar* at Delhi (p. 36).

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- 1739, May 16 Nādir Shāh, the Persian invader, leaves Delhi on his homeward journey (pp. 36, 94).
- 1740, January Chimnāji Appā foils attempt of Sambhājī Angria to wrest Kolaba from Manaji Angria. The English send succour to Manaji (p. 303).
- 1740, April 10 Alī Vardī Khān, Governor of Bihar, rebels against Nawāb Sarfarāz Khān, his master, kills him and usurps the *subāhdari* of Bengal (pp. 109, 241).
- 1740, April 28 Death of Peshwā Bājī Rāo I at Raverkhedi, 36 miles from Khargon (p. 97).
- 1740, May 19 The allied Marāthā army under Fateh Singh Bhosle and Raghuji Bhosle, defeats Dost Ali, Nawāb of Arcot, in a battle near Damalcherry (p. 180).
- 1740, June 25 Bālājī Rāo Peshwā, alias Nana Saheb, succeeds Bājī Rāo to the Peshwāship (p. 170).
- 1740, September Treaty concluded between the Marāthās and the Portuguese (p. 96).
- 1740-41 Expedition of Bālājī Rāo Peshwā against Rājputānā (p. 175).
- 1741, March 26 Raghuji Bhosle wrests Trichinopoly and captures Chandā Sāhib (p. 180).
- 1741 Nasir Jang, son of Nizam-ul-Mulk who rises against his father for grabbing *subāhdarship* of the Deccan, is defeated with the aid of the Marāthās (p. 122, 180).
- 1741, July Jay Singh of Amber as Mughul Viceroy cedes Mālwa to the Marāthās and appoints Peshwā Bālājī Rāo as the Deputy Governor of Mālwa (pp. 24, 145, 173).
- 1741, September 7 Bālājī Rāo Peshwā gets *chauth* and *sardeshmukhi* of Mālwa by a *farman* from Sawai. Jay Singh, Mughul Governor of Mālwa (p. 176).
- 1741-43 Expedition of Bālājī Rao Peshwā against Bengal and Bihar (p. 176).
- 1742, January 12 Death of Sambhājī Angria (p. 303).
- 1742, April Marāthās invade Bengal (p. 113).
- 1742, May 6 Mīr Habīb plunders Murshidabad (p. 242).
- 1742, September 27 Alī Vardī Khān raids the Marāthā camp under the command of Bhāskar Rām and Marāthā army flees (p. 242).
- 1743, January Nizām-ul-Mulk marches into Karnataka and brings it under his control and the Marāthās are ousted (p. 180).
- 1743 Nizām-ul-Mulk appoints his second son Nasir Jang as the *subāhdar* of Adoni (p. 122).

THE MARATHA SUPREMACY

- 1743, April Alī Vardī Khān, Nawāb of Bengal, with the help of Peshwā's army, drives out of Bengal Raghuji Bhosle's army (p. 242).
- 1743, August Rājā Shāhu settles the dispute between the *Peshwā* and Raghuji Bhosle and marks out spheres of the two. This was done as a sequel to interference of the *Peshwā* in Bengal which was Raghuji Bhosle's sphere (p. 243).
- 1743 Tulaji Angria is appointed *Sarkhel* by the Rājā of Satara setting aside the claim of Manaji Angria (pp. 184, 303).
- 1743, September Death of Jay Singh of Amber (p. 26).
- 1744, March 30 Bhaskar Ram Kolhatkar, invited by Alī Vardī Khān, Nawāb, is treacherously murdered by him (p. 243).
- 1744-45 Expedition of Bālaji Rāo *Peshwā* against Rājasthān and Bundelkhand (p. 177).
- 1745, January 25 Tulaji Angria captures Anjanwel and Govalkot (p. 303).
- 1745, February 15 Nizām-ul-Mulk defeats the Marāthā army led by Babuji Naik and Fateh Singh Bhosle in Karnataka (p. 180).
- 1745, March 11 Ranoji Sindia wrests Bhilsa from the Nawāb of Bhopal (p. 177).
- 1745, May 23 A peace treaty concluded between Muhammad Shāh, emperor and Alī Muhammad Rohillā (p. 135).
- 1745, July Death of Ranoji Sindia, founder of the House of Sindia at Shujalpur (p. 252).
- 1745, December 21 Raghuji Bhosle raids Murshidabad, but the attack is repulsed by Nawāb's forces (p. 243).
- 1745 Death of Zakariyah Khān, Mughul governor of the Punjāb. A civil war among his sons breaks out and one of his sons invites Ahmad Shāh Abdālī for his help (pp. 37-38).
- 1745 The Afghān generals and Afghān soldiers of Alī Vardī Khān rise in rebellion against Alī Vardī (p. 110).
- 1746, September 21 The French capture Madras Fort (p. 318).
- 1746 Orissa passes into the possession of Raghuji Bhosle (p. 37).
- c. 1746 The ruler of Jammu stops paying tribute to the Mughuls (p. 162).
- 1747, March Jagat Singh, Rana of Udaipur who supported the claims of Madho Singh, is defeated at Rajmahal by the combined armies of Jaipur, Marwar and Bundi (pp. 144, 178).

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1747, June	Nādir Shāh assassinated (p. 123).
1747	Bālājī Rāo <i>Peshwā</i> goes on his North-Indian campaign (p. 177).
1748, January-March	Ahmad Shāh Abdalī, the ruler of Afghānistan, raids India for the first time, but his attack is repulsed (pp. 123-24, 129, 177, 186).
1748, February	Alī Muhammad Rohillā, who was appointed <i>faujdar</i> of Sirhind, returns to Rohilkhand with his followers and re-establishes himself in March/April 1748, overthrowing Mughul rule (pp. 37, 136).
1748, March 11	Death of <i>Vazīr</i> Qamar-ud-din (p. 129).
1748, April 25	Death of Mughul emperor Muhammad Shāh (pp. 38, 184).
1748, May 21	Nizām-ul-Mulk passes away (pp. 122, 184).
1748, June 20	Safdar Jang is appointed <i>Vazīr</i> (p. 129).
1748, August	Holkar marches against Ishwari Singh and compels him to share his kingdom of Jaipur with Madho Singh (p. 179).
1748, September 15	Death of Ali Muhammad Rohillā (p. 136).
1748	Mustafa Khan, Shamsheer Khan and Sardar Khan, the Afghān generals and Afghān soldiers of Alī Vardī Khan rise in rebellion. Alī Vardī defeats them in a battle at Rani Chak (Ranisarai) (p. 110).
1748	Siraj-ud-daulah is appointed nominal Deputy Governor of Bihar (p. 110).
1748	Revolt in Gond State and Diwan Raghunath Singh tries to throw off Marāthā yoke. Raghuji Bhosle takes over the administration of the State (p. 241).
1748-67	Ahmad Shah Abdalī raids India seven times (pp. 123 and f.note 36, p. 166).
1749	The French promise their help to Chandā Sāhib against Anwar-ud-din (p. 320).
1749, August	Death of Anwar-ud-din, <i>subāhdar</i> of Karnatak at the battle of Ambur (p. 321).
1749, August	Madras is restored to the English by the French (p. 321).
1749, December 15	Death of Rājā Shāhu, the Marāthā ruler (pp. 181, 184).
1749, December	Ahmad Shah Abdalī raids India for the second time and conquers the Punjāb after defeating the Mughul Governor (pp. 124, 130, 186).

THE MARATHA SUPREMACY

- 1750, January 1 Suraj Mal Jat defeats the Mughul army led by Salabat Khan and compels him to accept his terms (p. 155).
- 1750, September 13 Safdar Jang is defeated by the Afghāns at Ram Chatauni (pp. 113, 137).
- 1750, October Bālājī Rāo *Peshwā* arrives at an agreement with Rām Rājā, making his own authority supreme in the State. This is known as Sangola agreement (pp. 63, 182).
- 1750, November 24 Tara Bai puts Rām Rājā, the Marāthā ruler, in confinement (p. 182).
- 1750, December Nasir Jang is shot dead in an encounter with the forces of Nawāb of Karnatak (p. 322).
- 1750, December Ishwari Singh of Amber commits suicide (p. 144).
- 1751, January 10 The Rājputs massacre the Marāthās in Jaipur (p. 179).
- 1751, January Muzaffar Jang, Nawāb of Karnatak, is cut to pieces in a melee in the Cuddappah district (p. 323).
- 1751, February 18 The battle of Bahadurpura is fought between the army of *Peshwā* Bājī Rāo and Damājī Gaikwar, but Damājī forces his way towards Satara (p. 282).
- 1751, March/April Safdar Jang's alliance with the Marāthās. The combined armies of Mughuls and the Marāthās inflict severe defeats on the Rohillās (p. 253).
- 1751, May Treaty concluded between Nawāb Alī Vardī Khān and Raghuji Bhosle, ceding Orissa to the Marāthās and agreeing to pay Rs. 12 lakhs as *chauth* to Raghuji from Bengal revenue (pp. 37, 110 & 243).
- 1751, November Ramdas, the Diwan of Salabat Jang, invades Marāthā territory on the advice of the French and concludes treaty at Shingwa (p. 182).
- 1751, December Ahmad Shah Abdalī raids India for the third time, defeats Governor Mir Mannu and conquers Kashmir (p. 124, 186).
- 1752, March 5 Muin-ul-Mulk, the Mughul Governor of the Punjāb, surrenders to the Abdalī and thus the *subāhs* of Lahore and Multan go to the Durrānis and the emperor confirms these in a treaty entered into with Abdalī on April 13, 1752 (p. 186).
- 1752, March Gujarat partitioned between the *Peshwā* and Damājī Gaikwar (p. 283).

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1752, April	Safdar Jang, <i>Vazīr</i> , under orders of the Mughul emperor makès peace with the Rohillās and the Bangashes (p. 113, 139).
1752, May	The Mughul emperor enters into a defensive subsidiary treaty with the Marāthās and entrusts the Marāthās the task of defending the empire from internal and external aggressions (pp. 186-87, 387).
1752, June	Chandā Sāhib is killed at the instigation (?) of Muhammad Ali (p. 325).
1752, August 27	Khwaja Javid Khan, a favourite and confidant of Mughul emperor, is murdered (p. 187).
1752, October 16	Ghazi-ud-din, eldest son of Nizām-ul-Mulk, who gets a <i>farman</i> from the Emperor as <i>subāhdar</i> of the Deccan, dies of poisoning (p. 182).
1752, November	Treaty of Bhalki concluded between the Nizām and the <i>Peshwā</i> (pp. 182, 253, 326).
1752	The Marāthās wrest from the Nizām Junnar, Ahmadnagar and Khandesh districts (p. 253).
1753, January 8	By a royal charter Courts of Justice are established at Fort William (p. 596).
1753, March 20	Jawan Mard Khan Babi, the Mughul commander, surrenders Ahmadabad to the Marāthas (p. 284).
1753, November	Death of Mir Mannu (Muin-ul-Mulk) (p. 124).
1753, March-November	A civil war ensues between emperor Ahmad Shāh and his <i>Vazīr</i> Safdar Jang (p. 114, 155).
1753-60	<i>Peshwā</i> Bālājī Rāo conducts a number of campaigns in Karnatak to collect tribute and establish Marāthā supremacy (p. 183).
1753	Sukhjiwan Mal submits to Ahmad Shah Abdali as a feudatory (p. 164).
1754, June 2	Imad-ul-Mulk, with the help of the Marāthās, deposes Mughul emperor Ahmad Shāh (p. 187).
1754, June 23	Jayappa Sindia raids Marwar and collects some contributions (p. 190).
1754, September 15	Jayappa Sindia defeats Bijay Singh of Marwar near Merta (p. 190).
1754, October	Death of Safdar Jang. His son Shuja-ud-Daulah becomes <i>subāhdar</i> of Awadh (p. 114).
1754	Treaty of Pondicherry between the English and the French (pp. 329, 337).
1755, February	Death of Raghuji Bhosle (p. 244).

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- 1755, March 19 Bālājī Bājī Rāo and the English conclude a treaty to wipe out the power of Tulaji Angria on the West Coast (pp. 184, 305).
- 1755, April 7 Suvarnadurg fort held by Tulaji Angria falls to the joint attack of the English and the *Peshwā* (p. 305).
- 1755, July 25 Jayappa Sindia assassinated (p. 254).
- 1756, February 12 Tulaji Angria surrenders to the Marāthā commander when attacked by the joint forces of the Marāthās and the English and the navy (p. 306).
- 1756, February 13 The English occupy Vijayadurg against the wishes of the *Peshwā* Bālājī Rāo (p. 184).
- 1756, February Jaipur and Jodhpur make peace treaty with the Marāthās (pp. 190-91).
- 1756, April 21 Death of Alī Vardī Khān, *Subāhdar* of Bengal. Siraj-ud-Daulah succeeds him (p. 111).
- 1756, June 4 Siraj-ud-Daulah's soldiers storm the English factory at Kasimbazar (p. 112).
- 1756, June 20 Siraj-ud-Daulah captures Calcutta (p. 112).
- 1756, October 12 The *Peshwā* and the English come to an understanding and Vijayadurg is restored to the *Peshwā* and Bankot and ten surrounding villages go to the English (p. 306).
- 1756, October 16 Siraj-ud-Daulah defeats and kills Shaukat Jang in a battle at Manihari (p. 112).
- 1756, November Ahmad Shah Abdalī invades India for the fourth time and reaches up to Delhi on January 23, 1757 (pp. 124, 131, 187, 191).
- 1756 The Nawāb of Cambay seizes Ahmadabad but Damāji Gaikwar recovers it (p. 284).
- 1757, January 23 Ahmad Shāh Abdalī in his fourth invasion of India reaches Delhi and plunders the city and the people are subjected to pillage (pp. 124, 187).
- 1757, January-April Mughul emperor formally cedes to Ahmad Shāh Abdalī the Punjāb, Kashmir and Thatta and the Sirhind districts (p. 124).
- 1757, February 9 Siraj-ud-Daulah and the English conclude a treaty known as Treaty of Alinagar by which (1) trade rights and factories are restored to the English (2) the *subāhdar* agrees to pay compensation, and (3) the English are granted permission to fortify Calcutta and coin *sicca* rupees (p. 112).
- 1757, March Ahmad Shāh Abdalī during his invasion of India raids the fort of Ballabgharh held by the Jats and puts to death all the inhabitants (p. 155).

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1757, April 2	Ahmad Shāh Abdalī leaves Delhi for his home country (p. 187).
1757, June 23	Battle of Plassey (p. 339).
1757, June	The Marāthās enter into a new treaty with Imad-ul-Mulk and get one-half of all the revenues that they could gather from the Mughul dominions (pp. 187-88).
1757, August 11	Raghunath Rāo, the Marāthā general, attacks Delhi and captures it (p. 188).
1757, August to 1758, January 2	Sindkhed campaign of Bālājī Rāo <i>Peshwā</i> against the Nizām for realising the promised <i>Jagīr</i> of 25 lakhs (p. 182).
1757, September 9	Najib Khan Rohillā makes peace with the Marāthās (p. 188).
1757, December 12-17	Battle of Sindkhed (p. 254).
1757-1760	Clive's first Governorship.
1758, February- April	The first Marāthā invasion of the Punjāb under the leadership of Raghunath Rāo assisted by Malhar Rāo Holkar (pp. 132 & 188).
1758, April	Count de Lally reaches Pondicherry (p. 333).
1758, April	A Marāthā army under Raghunath Rāo defeats Abdali's Governor of the Punjab and expells the Afghān army, and Raghunath Rāo appoints Adina Beg Khan as the Marāthā Governor of the Punjab (p. 125).
1758, October	Adina Beg Khan, Governor of the Punjab, passes away (pp. 125, 189).
1758, October	The Marāthās under the leadership of Tukoji Holkar march beyond Attock and reach Peshawar (p. 189).
1758	Death of Manaji Angria (p. 306).
1758	Jagat Raj, son of Chhatrasal Bundela, and Rājā of Jaitpur passes away (p. 140).
1759, January 29	Dattaji Sindia meets the <i>Vazīr's</i> (Imad-ul-Mulk) forces near Delhi and after a few skirmishes compels the <i>Vazīr</i> to an agreement (p. 192).
1759, October	Ahmad Shah Abdalī, invades India and establishes his government at Lahore. This invasion was on an invitation from Najib-ud-daulah, who actively helped the invader (p. 190).
1759, October to February 1760	Sadāshiva Rāo Bhāu, on behalf of Bālājī Rāo <i>Peshwā</i> conducts the campaign of Udgir against the Nizām and defeats him completely (Feb. 3, 1760) (p. 183).

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- 1759 Ali Gauhar's (Shah Alam II) Bihar expedition fails (p. 114).
- 1759, December Clive humbles the Dutch forces in Bengal (p. 342).
- 1759 Peshwā Bālājī Rāo wrests Underi fort from the Sidis (p. 184).
- 1760, January 10 Dattaji Sindia is killed in the battle of Buradi Ghat against Ahmad Shah Abdalī (pp. 192, 254).
- 1760, February Clive leaves for England (p. 342).
- 1760, March 4 The Marāthā army under the command of Malhar Rāo Holkar is defeated by Ahmad Shah Abdalī's forces at Sikandrabad (pp. 192, 254).
- 1760, May 16 Hafiz Rahmat, on behalf of Ahmad Shāh Abdalī meets Malhar Rāo Holkar and Suraj Mal for peace, but the Marāthā terms being exorbitant, no agreement is reached (p. 193).
- 1760, August 2 Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu, the commandant of the Marāthās, captures Delhi (p. 193).
- 1760, September Mir Qasim is made *subāhdar* in place of Mir Jafar by the English (p. 344).
- 1760, October 17 The Bhau advances to Kunjpura (p. 194).
- 1760, October 29 The Marāthā army, under the leadership of Sadāshiv Rāo Bhāu, retraces its steps and reaches Panipat (p. 194).
- 1760, November 1 The invader, Ahmad Shāh Abdalī, reaches Panipat along with his allies for ousting the Marāthās from the North (p. 194).
- 1760, December 18 Death of Rājā Shambhūjī of Kolhapur (p. 234).
- 1761, January 14 Ahmad Shāh Abdalī, defeats the Marāthā army at the third battle of Panipat (pp. 44, 125, 132, 137, 146, 194-97).
- 1761, January 15 The English force, led by Major Carnac, defeats Shahzada (p. 344).
- 1761, January Lally surrenders to the English at Pondicherry (p. 335).
- 1761, March 20 Ahmad Shāh Abdalī starts on his homeward journey after winning the battle of Panipat (January 14, 1761) (p. 125, 196).
- 1761, April Ahmad Shāh Abdalī makes an unsuccessful attempt for peace with the Marāthās (p. 196).
- 1761, May/June Malhar Rāo Holkar captures Rampura and Gagrani (p. 215).
- 1761, June 23 Death of Bālājī Rāo Peshwā (p. 197).

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- 1761, September 14 Raghunath Rāo, the regent, concludes an agreement with the English making substantial concessions to the English but receiving nothing in return (p. 202).
- 1761, November 29/30 Malhar Rāo Holkar defeats the Jaipur army of Madho Singh in the battle of Mangrol (pp. 215, 269, 388).
- 1762, January The Nizām invades Marāthā territory but suffers a defeat (pp. 201, 204).
- 1762, February 15 Shuja-ud-daulah appointed *Vazīr* (p. 115).
- 1762, March/April Shuja-ud-daulah conducts an expedition against Hindupati, ruler of Bundelkhand (p. 115).
- 1763, February *Peshwā* Madhav Rāo I plunders suburbs of Hyderabad (p. 202).
- 1763, April 4 An English deputation consisting of Amyatt and Hay wait on Mir Qasim for settling levies on inland and foreign trade (p. 348).
- 1763, May Nizam Ali plunders Poona (p. 202).
- 1763, June 21 Ellis, chief of the English factory at Patna, seizes Patna city and begins war (p. 349).
- 1763, June Mir Qasim routed at Katwa and Murshidabad. Murders his commander-in-chief and the English prisoners (p. 349).
- 1763, July Nawāb Mir Qasim deposed by the English (p. 115).
- 1763, August 10 Nizām Alī's army under the command of Vithal Sundar defeated by the *Peshwā* Madhav Rao I at the battle of Rakshasbhuvan (pp. 202, 244).
- 1763, September 25 Peace concluded between Nizam Ali and *Peshwā* Madhav Rao I (p. 203).
- 1763, December 25 Death of Suraj Mal Jat in a contest with Najib-ud-daulah on the bank of the Hindaun (p. 156).
- 1763 Haidar Alī expands his dominions almost to the banks of the Krishna by subjugating *Peshwā's* territories (p. 205).
- 1764, February Exile Mir Qasim promised help by Shah Alam II in recovering Bihar and Bengal (p. 115).
- 1764, May 3 Haidar Alī defeated by the Marāthās at Ratehalli (pp. 205, 455).
- 1764, October 22 Battle of Buxar between the English army under Major Munro and Shuja-ud-daulah and Mir Qasim. The allies are defeated. The battle established the supremacy of the English (pp. 115, 349).

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| 1764, November | The Marāthās recapture Dharwar from Haidar Ali (p. 205). |
| 1764, December 1 | Battle of Jadi Anwatti between Haidar Ali and the Marāthā army led by <i>Peshwā</i> Madhav Rao I. Haidar Ali defeated (p. 206). |
| 1764 | Shuja-ud-daulah reappointed <i>Vazīr</i> under pressure from Clive (p. 116). |
| 1764 | The triumphant Sikhs establish their sovereignty in the Punjāb, assemble at Amritsar and strike coins of gold and silver with the inscription "Degh, Tegh, Fateh" (p. 133). |
| 1764 | Ahmad Shāh Abdali ratifies a formal peace with the Marāthās (p. 216). |
| 1765, February | Jawahir Singh Jat makes peace with Najib Khan Rohillā (p. 216). |
| 1765, February | Death of Mir Jafar (p. 350). |
| 1765, March | Agreement is concluded between Haidar Ali and <i>Peshwā</i> Madhav Rao I, and Haidar Ali surrenders several Marāthā districts including Bankapur and gives up claim over Savanur and Gooti and agrees to pay tribute of 32 lakhs (p. 206). |
| 1765, May 3 | The allies of exile Mir Qasim, Shuja-ud-daulah and Malhar Rāo Holkar are finally defeated at Kora by the English army under Sir Robert Fletcher (pp. 115, 216). |
| 1765, May | Clive arrives in Calcutta for the second time to administer the English affairs (pp. 116, 351). |
| 1765, July | Mahadji Sindia settles the tribute of Kota at 15 lakhs and leaves Diwan Achyut Rao to collect the tribute from Udaipur, Shahpura, and Rupnagar (p. 216). |
| 1765, August 12 | <i>Farman</i> from Shāh Alam granting the <i>Diwani</i> of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa to the E. I. Company (pp. 352, 592). |
| 1765, August 16 | The treaty of Allahabad concluded between Nawab Shuja-ud-daulah and the English, terms being (1) restoration of all the territories held by the Nawāb with the exception of Allahābād and Kora districts given to the emperor, (2) Chunar to be retained by the English, (3) the <i>faujdari</i> of Banaras to be with the family of Balwant Singh under English protection although formally subordinate to the Nawāb of Awadh, (4) The Nawāb to pay to the English Rs. 50 lakhs as war indemnity, (5) The Nawāb of Awadh to defray the cost of maintenance of the troops for the defence of his territories under the defensive treaty clause (p. 116). |

CHRONOLOGY

- 1765, October *Peshwā* Madhav Rao I, marches against Janoji Bhosle and brings him to book—Treaty of Khalapur (p. 245).
- 1766, January Raghunath Rāo leads an expedition into Hindustān (p. 217).
- 1766, March 13/14 The combined Jat-Sikh army under the leadership of Jawahir Singh defeats the Marāthā army at the battle of Dholpur and occupy Dholpur (p. 217).
- 1766, April The Marāthā armies under Malhar Rāo Holkar and Mahadji Sindia join the forces under Raghunath Rāo near Bhandar (p. 217).
- 1766, May 20 Death of Malhar Rāo Holkar at Alampur (pp. 146, 217, 255, 269).
- 1766, July Robert Clive convenes a congress at Chapra which is attended by Shuja-ud-daulah and the envoys of the emperor, the Jat Raja and the Rohillā chiefs in which a treaty is concluded for 'mutual defence and security' against Marāthā invasion (p. 116).
- 1766, November 12 General Caillaud, on behalf of the English, concludes a treaty with Nizām Alī which indirectly provided for the employment of English auxiliary troops by Nizām against Haidar Alī (p. 207).
- 1766, December Nahar Singh Jat, a rival of Jawahir Singh Jat and a protege of the Marāthās, commits suicide (p. 217).
- 1766, December Jawahir Singh Jat concludes peace with Raghunath Rāo by surrendering Marāthā commanders captured in March, 1766 (p. 218).
- 1766, December The Rana of Gohad makes peace with Raghunath Rao through Mahadji Sindia and agrees to pay 15 lakhs (p. 218).
- 1766 Rana Ari Singh II of Udaipur agrees to pay to the Marāthās a sum of Rs. 26,30,221 in four years (p. 216).
- 1766 The English, the Marāthās and the Nizām form a triple alliance against Haidar Alī (p. 122).
- 1767, January *Peshwā* Madhav Rao I marches into Karnatak and captures several forts held by Haidar Alī (p. 207).
- 1767, February Robert Clive leaves India (p. 354).
- 1767, May Peace is concluded between Haidar Alī and *Peshwā* Madhav Rao I. *Peshwā* recovers lost territory in Karnatak. Haidar also agrees to pay 3 lakhs to the *Peshwā* in tribute (p. 208).

THE MARATHA SUPREMACY

- 1767, July Raghunath Rāo returns from Hindustān discomfited.
- 1767, August The first Anglo-Mysore war breaks out (p. 208).
- 1767, September The English troops under the command of General Smith defeat the forces of Haidar Ali and Nizām Ali at the pass of Changama and at Trinomali (p. 122).
- 1767, November Thomas Mostyn, an envoy of the English, sent to Poona to persuade the *Peshwā* to join the English against Haidar Ali (p. 208).
- 1767, December 14 Jawahir Singh wins a pyrrhic victory over Jaipur troops in the battle of Maonda (pp. 158, 218).
- 1767 The Bengal Government make advances to Janoji Bhosle for the transfer of Orissa on condition of payment of *chauth* of Bengal, which Janoji rejects (p. 247).
- 1767 Jawahir Singh Jat raids Marāthā possessions in northern Mālwa and conquers large areas (p. 158).
- 1767-73 The Sikhs extend their power from Saharanpur in the east to Attock in the west, from Multan in the south to Kangra and Jammu in the north and organize themselves into 12 *misl*s (confederacies) (p. 133).
- 1768, February 23 Nizām Ali confirms the old treaty of 1766 (p. 123).
- 1768, February The Bombay Government send an expedition against Haidar Ali's fleet on the west coast (p. 209).
- 1768, June 10 Battle between *Peshwā* Madhav Rao I and his uncle Raghunath Rāo at Dhodap in which Raghunath Rāo is defeated and taken a captive (pp. 203-04, 245).
- 1768, July Jawahir Singh Jat is assassinated (p. 219).
- 1768, August 18 Death of Damaji Gaikwār (p. 284).
- 1768, November 29 The English conclude a treaty with Shuja-ud-daulah which checked the strength and progress of his army. Hastings reversed it in 1772 and cancelled it fully on September 8, 1773 (p. 117).
- 1768, November The English effect a reconciliation between the Mughul emperor and Shuja-ud-daulah and Shuja-ud-daulah becomes the *de facto* *Vazir* (p. 117).

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- 1769, March 23** Peace is concluded between *Peshwā* Madhav Rao I and Janoji Bhosle at Kanakapur and Janoji surrenders territories worth 8 lakhs to the *Peshwā* and promises loyalty to the *Peshwā* (pp. 204, 210, 246).
- 1769, April 4** The English (Madras Government) sign a treaty with Haidar Alī which provides restitution of mutual conquests and is a defensive alliance (p. 458).
- 1769, April 8** Ratan Singh Jat, ruler of Bharatpur, is murdered by an alchemist (p. 159). Civil war ensues (p. 219).
- 1769, May** Mahādji Sindia and Tukojī Holkar appear near Udaipur to support the cause of Ratan Singh (falsely reported to be a son of Rana Raj Singh II). But no action takes place as differences develop between Sindia and Holkar and Ari Singh agrees to pay 64 lakhs as present to Sindia and alienate 1½ lakhs worth jagir in favour of Ratan Singh (p. 219).
- 1769, October** *Peshwā* Madhav Rao I starts on his expedition of Karnatak (p. 211).
- 1769** The English appoint European servants throughout the whole country to superintend native officers in their work of revenue collection and administration of justice (p. 355).
- 1769-70** A terrible famine visits Bengal (p. 357).
- 1770, April 6** The Marāthās defeat Nawal Singh, Jat ruler, near Sonkh (p. 220).
- 1770, October 31** Death of Najib-ud-daulah Rohillā (p. 255).
- 1770, December** Shāh Alam II, the emperor, who has been a pensioner of the English, negotiates with Mahādji Sindia (p. 221).
- 1771, January** Gopal Rāo Patwardhan, an able general of *Peshwā* Madhav Rāo, passes away (p. 212).
- 1771, February 10** Mahādji Sindia captures Delhi and requests Shāh Alam to return to his capital (pp. 221, 255, 367).
- 1771, March 5** Trimbak Rāo Pethe, the Marāthā general, defeats Haidar Alī in the battle of Moti Talav, and Haidar Alī escapes (pp. 213, 423, 456).
- 1771, February 12** Shāh Alam II ratifies a formal agreement with the Marāthās (p. 388).
- 1771** Fateh Singh Gaikwār, younger brother of Govind Rao Gaikwār, obtains recognition for Sayaji Rāo as chief from the *Peshwā* in preference to Govind Rao (p. 285).

THE MARĀTHĀ SUPREMACY

- 1772, January 6 Shāh Alam II, enters Delhi as emperor under protection of the Marāthās (p. 388).
- 1772, March Raghunath Rāo, who had rebelled against *Peshwā* Madhav Rao I and had been kept in confinement, is released (p. 204).
- 1772, April *Peshwā* Madhav Rao I and Haider Ali conclude peace. Haider pays 31 lakhs to the *Peshwā* and promises to pay 19 lakhs. The Marāthās retain Sira, Madgiri, Gurrumkonda, Dod Ballapur, Kolar and Hoskote while Nandigarh, Chik Ballapur and Devayanadurg go to Haider. 1772-85 Warren Hastings' Governorship.
- 1772 Quinquennial settlement (p. 363, 382).
- 1772, April Warren Hastings stops payment of pension to Shāh Alam (p. 117).
- 1772, May 16 Death of Janoji Bhosle of Nagpur (p. 246).
- 1772, June 17 Shuja-ud-daulah, Nawāb of Awadh, concludes a treaty with the Rohillās in the presence of Sir Robert Barker, English commander, under which the Rohillās agree to pay Rs. 40 lakhs to the Nawāb for expelling the Marāthās from Rohilkhand (pp. 118, 138, 221, 367).
- 1772, November 18 Death of *Peshwā* Madhav Rao I (p. 222).
- 1772, December The Marāthās (Holkar and Visaji Krishna) compel Shāh Alam II to confer the office of *Mir Bakshi* on Zabita Khan (son of Najib-ud-daulah) and grant Kora and Allahābād to the Marāthās (p. 221).
- 1773, August 30 *Peshwā* Narayan Rao is murdered (p. 388).
- 1773, September 7 The English and Shuja-ud-daulah conclude the treaty of Benaras under which the districts of Kora and Allahābād were given to the Nawāb for a sum of Rs. 50 lakhs and an annual subsidy for the maintenance of a garrison of the Company's troops for the protection of the Nawāb. The other matters protection of the Nawāb. (pp. 117-18, 368).
- 1773 (Spring) The combined forces of the English and Awadh repulse the Marāthā attack on Rohilkhand. (pp. 118, 367).
- 1773 The Regulating Act for the better management of the Company's affairs (pp. 370-72).
- 1774, March 26 A Royal Charter is issued by the English Crown providing for the establishment of a Supreme Court (p. 598).

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- 1774, April** The combined armies of the English and Shuja-ud-daulah march into Rohilkhand on the failure of Hafiz Rahmat Khān to pay Rs. 40 lakhs to drive out the Marāthās and occupy Rohilkhand. Hafiz Rahamat Khān is killed in the battle of Miranpur Katra (pp. 118, 370).
- 1774, October 20** The first meeting of the new Council under the Regulating Act is held under the presidency of Warren Hastings, Governor-General (p. 598).
- 1774-82** First Anglo-Marāthā war (pp. 44, 147).
- 1775, January 26** Death of Shuja-ud-daulah (p. 119).
- 1775, January 26** The battle of Panchgaon fought between Mudhoji Bhosle and Sabaji Bhosle in which Sabaji is killed (p. 246).
- 1775, February 17** Peshwā Raghunath Rāo, who flees Poona and joins Govind Rao Gaikwār at Baroda when pursued by Barbhais, is defeated at Anand Mogri (p. 286).
- 1775, March 6** Treaty of Surat. Raghunath Rāo obtains British help against the Poona Council (pp. 256, 286, 424, 635).
- 1775, March** Nandkumar brings against Warren Hastings a charge of accepting bribe from Munni Begam, guardian of Nawāb of Awadh (p. 373).
- 1775, May** Treaty of Fyzabad between the Nawāb of Awadh Asaf-ud-daulah and Bristow on behalf of the Bengal Council (pp. 372-73).
- 1775, May** Nandkumar executed on forgery charges.
- 1775, April-June** Konher Rāo Trimbak Patwardhan attacks Kolhapur and defeats the Kolhapur army in the civil war (p. 235).
- 1776, March 9** The Patwardhans once more attack Kolhapur and plunder it (p. 235).
- 1776, March** Haidar Alī captures Gooty and imprisons its ruler Murar Rao Ghorpade along with his two sons (p. 424).
- 1776, March** Treaty of Purandhar to secure a general peace between the E.I. Company and the Marāthās (p. 425).
- 1777, January 8** Haidar Alī defeats the Marāthā army led by Patwardhans at Saunshi (p. 425).
- 1777** Death of Mīr Qāsim (p. 349).
- 1777** Mudhoji Bhosle lays claim to Satara throne under English encouragement (p. 247).

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- 1778, February-April Mahādji Sindia invests Kolhapur and Kolhapur Rājā agrees to pay Rs. 15 lakhs to raise the siege (pp. 235-36).
- 1778, November The British renew war with the Marāthās.
- 1778 War breaks out between England and France (p. 426).
- 1779, January 16 Convention of Wadgaon (p. 256).
- 1779, March 19 Mahé, a French possession, falls to the English (p. 458).
- 1779 Nizām takes active interest in the formation of anti-British confederacy in collaboration with the *Peshwā*, Haidar Alī and Bhosle of Nagpur (p. 442).
- 1780, January 26 A treaty of offensive and defensive alliance is concluded between Fateh Singh Gaikwār and the English at Kandila (p. 286).
- 1780, February 15 The allied army of the English and Fateh Singh Gaikwār captures Ahmadabad (p. 286).
- 1780, February 20 Haidar Alī concludes a treaty with the Marāthās (p. 426).
- 1780 Nana Phadnis forms a quadruple alliance against the English with Mudhoji Bhosle, Nizām and Haidar Alī as his allies to oust the English (p. 247).
- 1780, April 11 The Governor-General and the Council pass a series of regulations for administration of justice (p. 379).
- 1780, August 3 The English force under Col. Popham surprise Gwālior (p. 256).
- 1781, January 22 The Marāthā war with Kolhapur ends (p. 236)
- 1781, July 1 Coote defeats Haidar Alī in the battle of Porto Novo (p. 459).
- 1781, July 1 Mahādji Sindia defeats an English contingent near Sipri (p. 257).
- 1781, September 27 Coote defeats Haidar Alī in the second battle of Pollilore (p. 459).
- 1781, October 27 Coote defeats Haidar Alī in the battle of Solingar (p. 459).
- 1781, October 13 Truce between Mahādji Sindia and Col. Muir of East India Co. effected on terms of no gain no loss to either party (p. 257).
- 1781 The British Parliament passes the Act of Amending the Constitution of the Supreme Court in India (p. 380).
- 1782, April 6 Death of Mirza Najaf Khān, emperor Shāh Alam's regent (p. 257).

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1782, May 17	The treaty of Salbai between the Marāthās and the English (pp. 257, 287).
1782, December 7	Death of Haidar Alī (pp. 426, 460).
1783, October	Mahādji Sindia concludes a new treaty with the English to enforce the treaty of Salbai on Tipū (p. 449).
1784, March 11	The treaty of Mangalore between the English and Tipū is signed (p. 427, 460).
1784, April	Prince Jahandar Shāh (Jawān Bakht) runs to the protection of the English at Lucknow (p. 389).
1784, June	The treaty of Yadgir between the Nizām and Marāthās is concluded (p. 442).
1784, November	Mahādji Sindia attains supreme power in Delhi (pp. 258, 390).
1785, February	Warren Hastings leaves India (pp. 385, 472).
1785, March	Ambāji Ingle, Mahādji Sindia's <i>subāhdar</i> concludes a treaty with the Sikh chiefs (pp. 472-73).
1785, May 10	Mahādji Sindia concludes a treaty of friendship with Sikh chiefs (p. 391).
1785, May/July	Tipū Sultan occupies Dodwad, Dharwar, Sampgaon and Jamboti belonging to the Marāthās (p. 427).
1786, September	Lord Cornwallis arrives in India as Governor-General (p. 472).
1786	Death of Tulaji Angria in Marāthā custody. (He had surrendered to the Marāthā commander on February 12, 1756) (p. 306).
1786, March-April	Mahādji Sindia demands arrears of tribute from Jaipur.
1787, March	The Poona Government and Tipū reach a settlement (p. 432).
1787, July	The battle of Lalsot (p. 148, 260).
1787	The Kolhapur army attacks the Sāwant of Wadi (a feudatory) who flouts the authority of the Rājā of Kolhapur. The Rājā of Sawantwadi is helped by the Portuguese in facing the Kolhapur army (p. 236).
1788, April	Sindia's army is defeated at the battle of Chaksana by the Rohillas (p. 261).
1788, June 17/18	Mahādji Sindia's forces defeat Ismāil Beg at Agra (pp. 261, 398).
1788, July 30	Ghulām Qādir and Ismāil Beg jointly take possession of Delhi (p. 398).

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- 1788, August 1 Ghulām Qādir deposes Shāh Alām II and installs Bidar Bakht on the Delhi throne (p. 398).
- 1788, August Ghulām Qādir's atrocities.
- 1788, October 2 Mahādji Sindia occupies Delhi (p. 399).
- 1788, October 16 Shāh Alam II is reinstated on the Delhi throne by the Marāthās (p. 399).
- 1788, December 31 Ghulām Qādir captured (p. 262).
- 1788 Peace established between England, France and Holland (p. 433).
- 1788 Mudhoji Bhosle of Nagpur passes away (p. 247).
- 1788 Nizām Alī surrenders Guntur Sarkar to the English (p. 474).
- 1789, March 3 Ghulām Qādir put to death (p. 399).
- 1789, December 29 Tipū attacks Travancore but fails in his design (pp. 433, 463).
- 1789, December Death of Fateh Singh Gaikwār of Baroda (p. 287).
- 1790, February Ismāil Beg defects to the Rājputs (p. 402).
- 1790, April Tipū Sultan attacks Travancore for the second time and Travancoreans have to retreat (p. 463).
- 1790, June 1 Treaty of Poona between the *Peshwā* and the English directed against Tipū Sultan (pp. 434, 463).
- 1790, June 20 Battle of Patan fought between Mahādji Sindia and the Rājput allies. The Rajputs defeated (pp. 262, 402).
- 1790, July 4 Kennaway, on behalf of the English, concludes a separate treaty with Nizām Alī, to secure his alliance against Tipū Sultan (pp. 434, 463).
- 1790, September 10 Battle of Merta: Jodhpur army defeated by Sindia's army led by De Boigne (p. 262).
- 1790, December 10 The English forces, led by Abercrombie, overrun Malabar (p. 435).
- 1791, January 6 The Jodhpur Rājā, Bijay Singh, enters into a treaty with Mahādji Sindia (p. 404).
- 1791, March 21 Cornwallis, the English commandant, carries Bangalore by assault (p. 436).
- 1791, April 4 Parashurām Bhāu Patwardhan reduces Dharwar fort (p. 435).
- 1791, December 4 Khande Rāo Hari, a commander of Mahādji Sindia, intercepts Ismāil Beg on his way to Kanud and defeats him (p. 405).

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- 1791 Varanasi Rajakiya Sanskrit Mahavidyalaya (the present Sanskrit Vishwa Vidyalyaya) is founded (p. 701).
- 1792, March Tipū Sultan defeated by the allies: treaty of Seringapatam (p. 440).
- 1792, April Ismāil Beg surrenders to Perron (p. 405).
- 1792 Municipal functioning proper is given to Madras by an Act of Parliament of 1792 (p. 620).
- 1792 The East India Co., sends a maritime expedition against Kolhapur State for piracies committed by the Kolhapur ships; obtain reparations for losses suffered and gets permission to open factories at Malwan and Kolhapur (p. 236).
- 1793, June 1 Holkar's troops are defeated by Sindia's army in the battle of Lakheri (p. 272).
- 1793 Death of Raghuji Angria (p. 306).
- 1793 Permanent Settlement at Bengal.
- 1794, February 12 Death of Mahādji Sindia at Vanawadi (near Poona) (pp. 263, 407).
- 1794, May 10 Daulat Rāo Sindia, son of Anand Rāo Sindia, is installed as successor to Mahādji Sindia (p. 490).
- 1794, July Nizām Ali and the Marāthās commence negotiations for a settlement (p. 444).
- 1794, November Lakhbā Dādā appointed Daulat Rāo Sindia's viceroy in northern India (p. 410).
- 1795, March 11 The battle of Kharda: the Nizām is defeated (pp. 446-48).
- 1795, April 10 The treaty of Kharda concluded between the Nizām and the Marāthās (pp. 447-48).
- 1795, August 13 Death of Ahalyā Bāi Holkar (p. 272).
- 1795, August Lakhbā Dādā, the Marāthā viceroy in north India, occupies Sabalgarh (p. 413).
- 1795, October 27 Accidental death of Peshwā Sawai Madhav Rao (p. 263).
- 1795, October Bhanga Singh of Thaneshwar and the Queen of Patiala assail Marāthā force and Nana Rāo beats back a hasty retreat to Delhi (p. 417).
- 1795, October Lakhbā Dādā, the Marāthā viceroy, occupies Narwar (p. 413).
- 1796, October 7 Nana Phadnis enters into a secret treaty with Nizām Ali (p. 449).
- 1796, December 5 Bājī Rāo Raghunath becomes Peshwā (p. 488).

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- 1797, August 15 Death of Tukoji Holkar (pp. 264, 490).
- 1797, September 14 Malhar Rāo Holkar II killed in a fight at Bhamburda by the forces of Daulat Rāo Sindia (p. 490).
- 1797, November 3 Zamān Shāh occupies Lahore (p. 414).
- 1797, December 31 Nana Phadnis is arrested by Michael Filose, an officer of Daulāt Rao Sindia, and made a prisoner (p. 489).
- 1798, March 10 Lakhbā Dādā arrested under orders of Daulat Rāo Sindia by Harji Sindia (p. 415).
- 1798, June 16 The combined armies of the Rājās of Satara and Kolhapur and Chhatra Singh defeat the *Peshwā's* army led by Madhav Rāo Raste (p. 488).
- 1798, July 15 Nana Phadnis released from confinement (p. 489).
- 1798, August 4 Parashurām Bhāu defeats the Satara Rājā and occupies the fort of Satara on 31 August, 1798 (p. 237).
- 1798, September 1 Wellesly binds the Nizām with a subsidiary alliance (pp. 123, 449).
- 1798, October Zaman Shāh invades India for the last time; reoccupies Lahore but retreats (p. 483).
- 1799, April 17 The allies (the English and Nizām) lay siege to Seringapatam (p. 466).
- 1799, May 4 Tipū Sultān falls fighting at Seringapatam against the combined armies (p. 441, 446).
- 1799, May 5 Lakhbā Dādā and Bālā Rāo Ingle make an armistice (p. 416).
- 1799, September 16 Parashurām Bhāu defeated and killed in the battle near Pattankudi by the Kolhapur forces (p. 238).
- 1799, September Daulat Rāo Sindia deprives Ambāji Ingle of authority over Mewar (p. 416).
- 1799, October 27 A peaceful settlement is entered into between Lakhbā Dādā and General Perron at Muaz-zamabad (pp. 416-17).
- 1799, December Shivāji III, Chhatrapati of Kolhapur, defeated by *Peshwā's* forces and compelled to seek shelter at Panhala (p. 488).
- 1799 Death of Ismāil Beg at Āgra fort while in imprisonment (p. 405).
- 1799-1801 The Polygar war (p. 628).
- 1800, March 13 Death of Nana Phadnis (p. 489).
- 1800 September Death of Govind Rāo Gaikwār (p. 289).

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1800-05	Pychy rebellion in Malabar (p. 626).
1800-18	Period known in Marāthā history as <i>Gardi Ka Wakt</i> (period of trouble) (p. 273).
1801, June 25	Yashwant Rāo Holkar, on his plundering spree of Sindia's possessions, defeats Sindia's officer MacIntyre at Newri (p. 491).
1801, July 4	Captain Brownrigg, an officer of Sindia, defeats Yashwant Rāo Holkar in a battle near Satwas (p. 491).
1801, July 15	Death of Umdat-ul-Umara, Nawāb of Arcot (p. 526).
1801, July 18	Yashwant Rāo Holkar captures Ujjain.
1801, October 14	Daulat Rāo Sindia attacks Indore and scatters the forces of Holkar (pp. 149, 265, 491).
1801, November	The Nawāb-Vazir of Awadh enters into a new subsidiary treaty with the English (p. 524).
1802, March	Convention of Cambay between the Gaikwār and the English. The English obtain a stronghold over Ānand Rāo Gaikwār (pp. 290, 487).
1802, June 6	Ānand Rāo, the Rājā of Baroda, enters into a subsidiary alliance with the English (p. 290).
1802, October 8	Fateh Singh Māne, an adventurer, who had joined Yashwant Rao Holkar, defeats the <i>Peshwā's</i> forces led by his commander Nana Purandare at Baramati (p. 492).
1802, October 25	Yashwant Rao Holkar defeats the combined armies of the <i>Peshwā</i> and Daulat Rāo Sindia at the battle of Hadapsar (p. 265, 273).
1802, October 25	<i>Peshwā</i> Bājī Rāo II, makes proposals to the English for subsidiary alliance (p. 492).
1802, December	Treaty of Bassein: <i>Peshwā</i> Bājī Rāo accepts subsidiary alliance losing his independence (p. 238).
1803, March 18	Governor-General ratifies the treaty of Bassein (p. 492).
1803, May 13	The <i>Peshwā</i> , who had fled Poona, returns to under British protection (p. 494).
1803, August 7	Arthur Wellesley declares war on Bhosle and Sindia (p. 494).
1803, August 29	The English capture Broach (p. 496).
1803, September 4	The English army led by Lake defeats Sindia's forces at Aligarh (pp. 266, 496).
1803, September 11	The English army defeats Sindian forces at the battle of Delhi (pp. 266, 496).
1803, September 16	Shāh Alam seeks British protection.

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1803, September 17	The English capture Champaner and Pava-garh (p. 496).
1803, September 23	Arthur Wellesley defeats the combined armies of Sindia and Bhosle at the battle of Assaye (pp. 265, 495).
1803, September	Ranjit Singh Jat enters into a defensive and offensive alliance with the English (p. 160).
1803, October 15	The English capture Burhanpur (p. 495).
1803, October 18	The English capture Agra (p. 496).
1803, October 21	The English capture Asirgarh (p. 495).
1803, October	The English become masters of the province of Cuttack (p. 496).
1803, November 1	The English forces defeat Sindia's army at the battle of Laswari (p. 266).
1803, November 28/29	The English defeat Bhosle's forces at the battle of Argaoon (pp. 265, 496).
1803, December 15	The English capture Gawligarh (p. 496).
1803, December 17	Treaty of Deogaon between Bhosle of Nagpur and the English (pp. 248, 496).
1803, December 30	Treaty of Sarje Anjangaon concluded between Daulat Rāo Sindia and the English (pp. 266, 497).
1804, February 5	Yashwant Rāo Holkar tries to persuade Daulat Rāo Sindia to withdraw from British alliance (p. 497).
1804, February 27	Daulat Rāo Sindia concludes a defensive alliance with the English (p. 497).
1804, April 16	War declared against Yashwant Rāo Holkar by the British (pp. 276, 498).
1804, July-August	Monson's disastrous retreat from Mukundra pass to Agra.
1804, November 13	Holkar's infantry defeated at Dig.
1804, November 17	Yashwant Rāo Holkar routed by Gen. Lake's army at the battle of Farrukhabad (p. 498).
1804, December 23	The English capture Dig (p. 498).
1804	With a new treaty made with the <i>Peshwā</i> , the treaty of Deogaon concluded in 1803 is confirmed (p. 248).
1805, January 7	The siege of Bharatpur by the English begins (p. 498).
1805, April	Ranjit Singh, the Rājā of Bharatpur, makes peace with the English (pp. 161, 277, 499).
1805, October 5	Death of Lord Cornwallis (p. 526).
1805, November 21	Daulat Rāo Sindia concludes a treaty with the English, known as treaty of Mustafapur (p. 499).

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- 1805, December 24 Yashwant Rāo Holkar enters into treaty with the English at Rajpooor Ghat (pp. 278, 499).
- 1807, July Treaty of Tilsit concluded between the Czar and Napoleon (p. 528)
- 1808 Appā Desāi of Nipāni defeats Kolhapur army near Savgaon (p. 238).
- 1811, October 20 Death of Yashwant Rāo Holkar at Bhanpura (p. 500).
- 1811 Appā Desāi of Nipani attacks Kolhapur army which suffers very badly. This defeat leads to British arbitration (p. 238).
- 1812, August Treaty of Pandharpur between the *Peshwa* and his feudatories through British mediation (p. 503).
- 1812, October 8 Settlement between the *Peshwā* and Kolhapur Rājā is reached through the British (p. 238).
- 1812 The College of Fort St. George, in imitation of Lord Wellesley's College of Fort William, is started to train civil servants (p. 637).
- 1814, November The Anglo-Nepalese war is launched (p. 530).
- 1816, March The treaty of Saugauli is signed between the English and the Rājā of Nepal (p. 533).
- 1816, March Death of Raghuji II Bhosle (pp. 248, 501).
- 1816, May 27 Appā Sāheb, cousin of Parsoji Bhosle, concludes a treaty of subsidiary alliance with the English (p. 501).
- 1817, February The Rājā of Sikkim signs a defensive treaty with the English (p. 532).
- 1817, June 13 *Peshwā* Baji Rao II is compelled to sign the Treaty of Poona (p. 503).
- 1817, October 16 Marquis of Hastings opens campaign against the Pindaris (p. 505).
- 1817, November 5 Bāpū Gokhale, *Peshwā's* commander, sets fire to the Residency buildings and attacks the English. Battle of Kirkee (pp. 505-06).
- 1817, November 5 Daulat Rāo Sindia signs the treaty of Gwālior with the English (pp. 150, 266, 501).
- 1817, November 15 The English army led by General Smith defeats Bāpū Gokhale at the battle of Yervada (p. 506).
- 1817, November 24 Appā Sāheb Bhosle of Nagpur receives from the *Peshwā* the robes of *Sena Saheb Subah* (p. 502).
- 1817, November 27 Battle of Sitabaldi fought between the English and forces of Appā Sāheb Bhosle in which Bhosle's forces are defeated (p. 506).

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- 1817, December 16 Appā Sāheb Bhosle, Rājā of Nagpur, surrenders to the English (p. 506).
- 1817, December 21 Battle of Mahidpur fought between Holkar and the English. Holkar is defeated (pp. 150, 506).
- 1818, January 6 Treaty of Mandasor concluded between Holkar and the English (pp. 150, 278, 506).
- 1818, February 20 The battle of Ashta fought between the English and Bāpū Gokhale, in which Gokhale is killed and his forces defeated (p. 507).
- 1818, May Appā Sāheb Bhosle escapes from British custody and seeks refuge with the Rājputs.
- 1818, June 3 Bājī Rāo II, *Peshwā*, surrenders to the English at Mhow (p. 507).
- 1818, June 16 Bājibā Gujar is raised to the throne of Nagpur as Raghuji III (p. 506).
- 1819, April 8 The English wrest Asirgarh from its commandant Yashwant Rāo Lad (p. 506).
- 1819 Ranjit Singh conquers Kashmir; and the Afghan rule which had commenced with the invasion by Ahmad Shāh Abdalī (1752) ends (pp. 164-65).
- 1827, March Death of Daulat Rāo Sindia (p. 266).
- 1837, November 20 By a legislative order, Persian ceases to be court language in British India (p. 700).
- 1839 The jagir of Manaji Angria lapses to British Government for want of a direct heir (p. 306).
- 1840 Appā Sāheb Bhosle, who had taken shelter with Man Singh, the Rājā of Jodhpur, passes away (p. 506).
- 1844 The British appoint a Diwan to administer the State of Kolhapur (p. 239).
- 1851, January Daeth of Bājī Rāo II, *Peshwā* at Bithur (p. 507).
- 1853 Nagpur State is annexed to the British empire for want of a legitimate heir (p. 248).

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